

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020036-8

20 NOVEMBER 1979

NO. 2046

1 OF 2

JPRS 74604

20 November 1979

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2046



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

50272-101		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74604		3. Recipient's Accession No.																																																																																					
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		2.		5. Report Date 20 November 1979																																																																																					
4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2046				6.																																																																																					
7. Author(s)				8. Performing Organization Rept. No.																																																																																					
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201				10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.																																																																																					
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above				11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)																																																																																					
				13. Type of Report & Period Covered																																																																																					
15. Supplementary Notes				14.																																																																																					
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.																																																																																									
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors																																																																																									
<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Political Science</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Inter-Arab Affairs</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Libya</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Sultanate</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sociology</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>North African</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Mauritania</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>of Oman</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Economics</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Affairs</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Morocco</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Syria</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Culture (Social Sciences)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Afghanistan</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>People's Democratic Republic of Yemen</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Tunisia</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ethnology</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Bahrain</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Persian Gulf Area</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>United Arab Emirates</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Geography</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Egypt</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Qatar</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Western Sahara</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Techological</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Iran</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Saudi Arabia</td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Yemen Arab Republic</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Military Sciences</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Iraq</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Spanish North Africa</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Israel</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Sudan</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Jordan</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Kuwait</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Lebanon</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>						Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Inter-Arab Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	Libya	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Sultanate	Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/>	North African	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/>	of Oman	Economics	<input type="checkbox"/>	Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/>	Syria	Culture (Social Sciences)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/>	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Tunisia	Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/>	Persian Gulf Area	<input type="checkbox"/>	United Arab Emirates	Geography	<input type="checkbox"/>	Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/>	Qatar	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Western Sahara	Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iran	<input type="checkbox"/>	Saudi Arabia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yemen Arab Republic	Military Sciences	<input type="checkbox"/>	Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/>	Spanish North Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Israel	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sudan				<input type="checkbox"/>	Jordan						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Kuwait						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lebanon				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Inter-Arab Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	Libya	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Sultanate																																																																																			
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/>	North African	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/>	of Oman																																																																																			
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/>	Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/>	Syria																																																																																			
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input type="checkbox"/>	Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/>	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Tunisia																																																																																			
Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/>	Persian Gulf Area	<input type="checkbox"/>	United Arab Emirates																																																																																			
Geography	<input type="checkbox"/>	Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/>	Qatar	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Western Sahara																																																																																			
Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Iran	<input type="checkbox"/>	Saudi Arabia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yemen Arab Republic																																																																																			
Military Sciences	<input type="checkbox"/>	Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/>	Spanish North Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																																																				
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Israel	<input type="checkbox"/>	Sudan																																																																																					
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Jordan																																																																																							
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Kuwait																																																																																							
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Lebanon																																																																																							
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms																																																																																									
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15																																																																																									
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161			19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 100																																																																																				
			20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price																																																																																				

(See ANSI-Z39.18)

See Instructions on Reverse

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
(Formerly NTIS-35)
Department of Commerce

JPRS 74604

20 November 1979

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2046

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Arab Gulf States Bear Strain of Regional Conflicts (Salim al-Lawzi; AL-HAWADITH, 5 Oct 79)	1
OPEC Agrees To Increase LDC Aid (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 13 Oct 79)	6
Arab Gulf States Defy Shi'ite Rumbblings (Ali Hashim; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 7 Oct 79)	7
Briefs	
PLO-Iranian Differences	11
FRG, Mossad Plan Palestinian's Death	11
Arabs Fear Israeli Nuclear Test	12
BAHRAIN	
Opposition and Resentment Against Government Identified (Adil Munir; AL-HURRIYAH, 17 Sep 79)	13
PFLB Leader Claims Dozens Arrested by Government (AL-SAFIR, 20 Sep 79)	16
PFLB Discusses Possibilities of Escalated Political Struggle in Country (Abd-al-Rahman al-Nu'aymi Interview; AL-HURRIYAH, 1 Oct 79)	18
IRAN	
Millions of Dinars Contributed to Kordestan Disturbances (ETTELA'AT, 21 Aug 79)	25

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121]

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Yazdi Leaves for Havana Nonaligned Conference (ETTELA'AT, 26 Aug 79)	31
Front of the Oppressed, Nonaligned Conference Examined (KEYHAN, 11 Sep 79)	33
Postponement of Second Gas Pipeline Praised (KEYHAN, 11 Sep 79)	36
ISRAEL	
Retrospective on Yom Kippur War Presented (Eli Feingarsh; AL HAMISHMAR, 28 Sep 79)	39
KUWAIT	
'AL-ANBA' Comments on al-Asad's Moscow Talks (KUNA, 19 Oct 79)	46
Single Arab Policy Viewed as One-Dimensional, Shortsighted (Editorial, Henry Hamati; AL-QABAS, 22 Sep 79).....	47
Arab's Hurry for Palestinian Solution Criticized (Editorial, Henry Hamati; AL-QABAS, 23 Sep 79).....	50
Jordanian, Palestinian, Lebanese Agreement Lauded (Editorial; AL-QABAS, 26 Sep 79)	54
Census To Be Conducted in February 1980 (AL-QABAS, 27 Sep 79).....	56
Briefs	
Plan To Centralize Oil Industry	58
LEBANON	
Public Security Director Announces Personnel Transfers (AL-SAFIR, 3 Oct 79)	59
MOROCCO	
Central Committee Issues Communique Following 30 September Meeting (LIBERATION, 5-11 Oct 79)	65

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
USFP Sec Gen Bouabid Addresses Meeting of Central Committee (Abderrahim Bouabid; LIBERATION, 5-11 Oct 79) ...	71
 SAUDI ARABIA	
Amir Sultan Interviewed on Austria Visit (Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Sep 79)	79
Press Criticizes Attitude of Millionaires (AL-HAWADITH, 28 Sep 79)	82
Briefs Port Development	86
 SULTANATE OF OMAN	
Electrical Projects Spread in Administrative Regions ('UMAN, 1 Sep 79)	87
Thamarit-Salalah Road Project Begins ('UMAN, 2 Oct 79)	89
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Umm Shaif Boosts Offshore Production (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 13 Oct 79)	91
Dubai Police Stations Linked by Arabic Teleprinters (EMIRATES NEWS, 2 Oct 79)	93
Dubai's Imports Rise by 30 Percent (Maruf Khwaja; EMIRATE NEWS, 11 Oct 79)	94
 YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	
Soviet Arms Said Shipped to Country (AL-HAWADITH, 28 Sep 79)	95
Agreement With Chinese Construction Company Signed (AL-THAWRAH, 3 Sep 79)	97

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB GULF STATES BEAR STRAIN OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Oct 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Salim al-Lawzi: "No Change in the Regimes Foreseen for Next 2 Years, Except a Weakening of Their Decision-Making Powers"]

[Text] For the fourth time in 3 weeks, Egyptian policies have recently forced themselves on the attention of the Baghdad summit states, stirring up fears, doubts and confusion. The first time they did that was when President Anwar al-Sadat affirmed that King Husayn would soon join the peace process. Spurred by this statement, opponents of the Camp David accords hurriedly contacted the Jordanian monarch, but were reassured that the Egyptian president's statement was incorrect. Some of the Gulf states even rushed to fulfill their financial obligations to Jordan ahead of schedule. The second time was when President al-Sadat announced that Egypt stands by Morocco and is prepared to send military forces to support King Hassan against threats from Algeria and the Polisario. Suddenly, a host of Arab rulers descended on Rabat, severally and collectively--some had even cut short vacations they were spending in Europe--in an attempt to put out the fire in the western Sahara so as to prevent the possibility of any Egyptian intervention in the Algerian-Moroccan dispute. The third time was when a Lebanese source, one that is rather extensively knowledgeable about conditions in the Arab world, stated that there is no truth to reports that Lebanon will joint the Camp David accords. Suddenly, Arab states, which had tepidly received the call by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis to hold an Arab conference to discuss the Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon, wasted no time in announcing that the holding of an Arab summit was now more necessary than ever because the situation in the Lebanese south constitutes a threat to the entire Arab region. The fourth time was last Wednesday, 26 September, when Husni Mubarak, the Egyptian vice president, said that Iranian threats against Bahrain are an act of folly which threatens the security of the Gulf and should be firmly and strongly confronted, and that Egypt is willing to discuss Bahrain's needs to defend itself against such threats. In so doing, Egypt was upstaging Iraq which 24 hours earlier had declared that Iran's fingers will be chopped off if they were to touch any Arab part of the Gulf. Only hours after Mubarak's statements, all the Gulf states eagerly declared their support for Bahrain.

And so Arab politics returned to the methods and language of the 1950s in their attempt to tackle the problems of the 1980s. Cold war methods were revived to become the striking force of the new Egyptian diplomacy in its bid to re-classify the Arab states which reject the Camp David accords.

While this diplomacy has not overstepped the expected limits in the non-oil-producing countries, it is exacerbating the confusion, disarray and fragmentation besetting the Gulf region. James Schlesinger, the former American secretary of energy and defense secretary and a former member of the National Security Council, had cautioned about the inherent dangers in the turmoil engulfing the Gulf, only 3 days before an attempt was made to set off a sectarian strife in Kuwait and Bahrain. What he said was that "the danger posed to the oil wells does not stem from the possibility of a Soviet domination of the region, but from the likelihood of disintegration in the region and the spread of the Iranian brand of chaos in it."

Before Schlesinger, Richard Helms, former director of the American Central Intelligence Agency (who now manages a public relations firm in Washington), made remarks that almost coincide with remarks contained in an article published in the Soviet newspaper NEDELYA. Helms said: "Iran is rapidly heading for the laps of the left. Khomeyni's revolution has failed to develop into a modern force capable of dealing with the dynamic leftist organizations. It has succeeded in bringing down the Shah but has not succeeded in grasping power." The Soviet newspaper in turn said: "The theocratic government in Iran has failed to establish a state. Instead of dealing with anarchy and unemployment and improving the conditions of workers, it is instead slaughtering the Kurds."

Regardless of the different terms used to describe the danger threatening the Gulf, its security, its states and its oil--oil is the most important factor here--observers in the area believe that there are five major sources of danger. They are:

1. The disintegration of authority in Iran, and the actions of some "ayatollahs" who have opened their own [political] stores either to serve certain foreign agencies or promote petty opportunistic interests or out of an impulsive ignorance of the region's affairs. A call such as the one made by Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani to foster a revolutionary movement in Bahrain can only lead to the results predicted by Schlesinger, Helms and the Soviet newspaper NEDELYA--that is, the exportation of chaos and sedition to the Gulf states under the slogan of "exporting the Khomeynist revolution." Also, demands by spokesmen of Iman Khomeyni to bring to trial Hassan Nazih, president of the National Iranian Oil Company, are no more than an attempt to replace specialists with Iranian revolutionaries who want to gobble up the oil after they have devoured authority in the name of "the revolution." Such a breakdown in authority will lead to serious consequences which may be used to mount subversive actions in the oil fields.

2. The leftist trade unions' control of oil workers, especially in the Abadan area. A strike in the Iranian oil fields--a likely prospect--means a stoppage in the exportation of Iranian oil, in other words, a new economic

catastrophe far worse than the catastrophe faced by the Western nations before the last 4 months. The question which seems to force itself upon the discussions of Western and Japanese industrial circles is: "When will the Soviet Union play the card it holds in Abadan? "

3. The possibility of blowing up an oil tanker in the Hormuz Straits, thus disrupting the oil traffic in the straits. This possibility has been previously cited by Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil Minister, in a press statement which he made after the OPEC meeting in Geneva. It is this possibility which has made Lloyds, the British insurance company, declare the Gulf region a war zone, in other words refuse to insure oil tankers. The British firm cannot afford to sustain a stiff loss equivalent to the compensation payment on, say, a 500,000-ton tanker which may be blown up by radical elements in the Hormuz Straits thus blocking the flow of oil.

4. The military force trained and prepared in Aden under the supervision of Communist experts and estimated at about 35,000 men. It was believed that this force was readied for the purpose of stirring events in the region, either in the direction of northern Yemen to secure Saudi Arabia's recognition of the Soviets' right to maintain a presence in the region, even if a commercial one only, or in the direction of the Sultanate of Oman which has been building up its military forces following the security agreement it has concluded with the United States. But after the agreement between 'Ali Salih, the President of northern Yemen, and 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, the Adeni head of state, reached in Kuwait several months ago--an agreement which was later reflected in the Soviet Union's decision to resume supplying northern Yemen with the latest types of weapons and which made observers expect a settlement of the outstanding issues between the two Yemens under the supervision of the Soviets--the Adeni military force became fully targeted against the Sultanate of Oman, in other words, against the entrance to the Gulf. The decision by southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia to reject Oman's plan for the protection of the Hormuz Straits has had the effect of tightening the Arab siege of Oman, thereby increasing the likelihood of the expected blowup between Aden and Oman.

5. The statements made by some leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement, which have been classified by some studies within the category of "worst case possibilities" and which have been ascribed to the existing alliance between Khomeyni and Yasir 'Arafat. At the press conference he held during his visit to Spain a month ago, the PLO leader was asked whether he believed that oil is a political weapon. 'Arafat answered: "It is our right to use the economic weapon which we have in our hands. This is a legitimate right exercised by many nations. The United States used it against Cuba and China and, therefore, has no right to ask us why do we use it ourselves. The question of energy is linked to the Palestinian question and the two cannot be separated." Western circles related this statement to a story attributed to Yasir 'Arafat to the effect that the PLO alliance with the Khomeyni revolution has metaphorically become something akin to a falcon used to scare the bustards [a bird related to the crane]. The Palestinian

-Iranian alliance is now having reflections on the opposition movements not only in the Gulf states but within Iraq too.

If we were to add to those five sources of danger threatening the Gulf a number of other minor factors, such as the errors committed by authorities dealing with troubles, the tribal and sectarian complexes governing official behavior and the ambitions and fears which obsess the regimes, we find before us a mosaic of clashing colors and overlapping lines where it becomes difficult to distinguish between buffer zones and minefields.

It is in such an atmosphere that the question of the Gulf security is being revived. It is clear, however, that discussion of this subject lacks depth even in the specialized journals where we find that traditional and conventional thinking is the prevailing norm and the dominant mode of interpreting and analyzing the plans, ideas and solutions being bandied about in the area. The Sultanate of Oman which 10 days ago proposed the establishment of a Gulf defense pact that would embrace, in addition to the Arab Gulf states and Iran, the United States, Britain and West Germany (Oman later backed down from this proposal), understands the security of the Gulf as one of defense against Communist threats--as if the Soviets intend to attack the oil wells or send occupation forces or dispatch a commando force to block the Hormuz Straits. Indeed, NEWSWEEK has reported that Sultan Qabus has applied for Arab aid to buy minesweepers to clear the waters of the Hormuz Straits in the event of "Moscow agents" embedding them with mines. The magazine said that the sultan would have to seek help from American experts if the Arab states failed to respond to his request.

Iraq has wasted no time in seizing this opportunity to ride the wave begun by the Shah of Iran after the withdrawal of the British forces from the Gulf, the wave which is premised on the argument that the security vacuum in the Gulf should be filled by the states of the region, that these states are able on their own to defend the region. Iraq has also contended that Oman's plan amounts to a revival of foreign military pacts in the region. Iran, meanwhile, moved quickly. The Iranian fleet carried out military maneuvers and Tehran Radio announced that the Iranian revolution is singularly capable of protecting the Gulf in the interests of the peoples of the Gulf, not in the interests of foreign powers as the Shah used to do.

If we were to lay aside all this verbal war and ponder the real meaning of the Gulf security, we will find that there are two concepts in this connection which are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. They are:

1. Protection of the regimes from sabotage and infiltration. This concept is embodied in the security cooperation accord concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well as the security cooperation and coordination which already exist among Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain on the basis of exchanging information and advisers and setting up monitoring and surveillance procedures. This concept of security does not view the dangers posed to the Gulf from a military perspective but sees such dangers lurking in possible sabotage and infiltration in areas with open borders.

2. Advance control and supervision in the oil areas. In this context, some Gulf states are studying a plan to install electronic systems similar to the advance warning systems used in Sinai between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. The electronic eyes of such systems can detect the movement of even an insect and project it on monitoring screens. Those states believe that such electronic networks are the best means of lessening the dangers of "sabotage" and decreasing the chances of infiltration by saboteurs to oil fields in the area.

Beyond such effective arrangements to safeguard the security of the Gulf, the political disputes, sectarian strife, border problems and the struggle for leadership, control and influence will have limited results. The regimes will no change, nor will the systems be overturned. The rulers of the Arab world, from the Atlantic to the Gulf, know better than anyone else that the international powers stand in the way of presumed and ready-to-happen changes. They also know that their stay in power is not due to their own popularity or to internal forces and factors but to international calculations and Soviet-American fears of a possible nuclear confrontation in an area whose oil is seen as strategically necessary for the national security of the two superpowers. For the next year or 18 months--and may be even for the next 2 years, that is until after the American elections, the United States will want to freeze the situation in the Middle East. The Carter Administration is unwilling to take a grand stand, in fact it is incapable of doing so. On the other hand, the Soviet Union realizes that any attempt to change conditions or to exacerbate the situation in the Gulf will gladden the hearts of electoral experts in the United States and prompt a weak president like President Carter to adopt hardline positions which would make him look like a national hero compared even to the hawkish presidential candidates, as we have seen in the crisis of the Soviet military force in Cuba.

The freezing of the situation, however, does not mean an end to tensions nor would it prevent local conflicts from turning into brush fires. Nevertheless, all the contending forces and parties--including Iran, Iraq and the maneuverings of Egyptian diplomacy--are unable and unwilling to cause a major clash which would force the two superpowers into a nuclear confrontation--a confrontation which, were it to materialize, will, as all international observers agree, unleash a terrible deluge with incalculable consequences to the fate of mankind and the world.

What then can be the results of such conflicts and brush fires and the consequences of inciting and arousing the have-not and wronged classes in the Gulf region? Since the replacement of the regimes is out of the question under the present international conditions, the only result will be the weakening of the decision-making ability of those regimes. This is the very state of disintegration and chaos feared by both the Americans and the Soviets. They are united in warning of the consequences of such disintegration and chaos.

9254
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

OPEC AGREES TO INCREASE LDC AID

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 13 Oct 79 p 7

[Text] OPEC Finance Ministers meeting in Vienna last week agreed to step up their aid to developing countries. The OPEC ministers decided to contribute another \$100 million to the joint fund set up by the UNCTAD in 1976 meeting in Nairobi. The fund was set up to fix the price of raw materials and primary products to developing countries.

The OPEC countries had announced last November that it will financially support the joint fund which was to help 29 countries classified as the world's poorest countries.

The main aim of the joint fund is to provide a steady flow of exports of primary products to developing countries, namely to LDCs. It operates as an autonomous body which can intervene in the market to affect prices with its accumulated stocks of these products. This raised the need for substantial financial resources and called for contributions from rich countries.

OPEC Ministers had decided to increase their total aid to developing countries by \$800 million bringing the capital of the mutual fund to \$2.5 billion. In their meetings OPEC Finance Ministers exchanged views on the international monetary system and the coordination of monetary policies between the Arab countries. There were rumours that the ministers will also discuss the prospects for the sliding US dollar but some officials said the dollar will not feature on the list of issues being discussed.

The UAE Oil Minister, present President of OPEC was sharply critical in the meeting of the industrial countries' failure to cure high levels of inflation at home which contributed to the gradual erosion of the oil revenues of OPEC countries. Otaiba said the OPEC countries are currently contributing between 20 and 40 per cent of their real national income to the developing countries while the industrial countries' contributions to the developing world does not exceed 0.5 to 2 per cent of their national income.

It is noted that the rumours that preceded the meeting and talked of possible discussion of a shift away from the dollar had prompted a sharp drop in the value of the dollar against all major currencies and brought gold to a new record level.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB GULF STATES DEFY SHI'ITE RUMBLINGS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 7 Oct 79 p 9

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "Bahrain Tremor Has Sprayed Emirates But Kuwait Is Still Calm; Gulf Summit to Confront Ayatollahs' Preachers; Iranian Winds Moving in Direction of Gulf Have Turned in Recent Days into Storms Blowing on This or That Emirate"]

[Text] Kuwait--Kuwait and Bahrain, the two states in which the traces of the Islamic Iranian revolution have begun to emerge, have asserted that they will fight any attempt to incite sedition and disturbances and that they will stand firmly and resolutely in the face of any intervention in their domestic affairs, regardless of whether such intervention comes from Iran or from other sources.

After detaining Ahmad 'Abbas al-Mahri, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini's sister, the Kuwaiti authorities also stripped his father 'Abbas al-Mahri, who lives in Tehran at present, of his citizenship. The Kuwaiti authorities have also repealed the passports of Dr Muhammad Hasan Nusayr, 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad and lawyer Khalid Khalaf.

Dr Musayr is one of the high-ranking officials of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Oil. 'Abd-al-Samad is a Shi'ite master [member of class said to be descending from prophet's daughter] and an employee of the Ministry of Oil also. He is a relative of two high-ranking Kuwaiti officials, namely Ahmad 'Abd-al-Samad, the Ministry of Information's assistant undersecretary for financial and administrative affairs, and his brother Yusuf, head of the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Khalaf is a well-known lawyer and a former member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly who had ambitions to hold a ministerial portfolio one day. He has published several articles in the Kuwaiti papers dealing with reform, democracy and legislation.

Reply to Reply

Iran's initial reply to this step has been Ayatollah Khomeyni's appointment of 'Abbas al-Mahri as the Friday preacher in Kuwait.

An informed Kuwaiti has said that Kuwait will reject this appointment and consider it intervention in its affairs. He said that the authority concerned with such appointment is the Higher Shi'ite Authority, i.e., al-Muqallid and Hujjat al-Islam [the tradition follower and the reason of Islam] Abu-al-Qasim al-Jaw'i who lives in the venerable al-Najaf, and that this authority has not approved this appointment.

The charge addressed to al-Mahri, who is detained pending interrogation, and to those whose passports have been repealed is the charge of taking part in unlicensed political symposiums held in mosques and al-Husayniyat [Shi'ite clubs], of inciting sedition and of instigating against the regime. Repealing passports is a Kuwaiti means to which the government resorts against whoever violates the law in force to prevent the person concerned from leaving the country and to interrogate him at any time, if necessary.

Kuwait is relatively calm at present. The government measures have been received with regret by some circles and with satisfaction by others. But what is certain is that the uproar raised over all these issues has subsided and no longer evokes the interest of anybody because the Kuwaiti people are not inclined toward troubles and like stability, even though they like to whisper and to exchange rumors and "gossip" in the social get-togethers that are a nightly occurrence.

Good Relations

A Kuwaiti official has described the official Kuwaiti-Iranian relations as good, especially since the visit paid to Tehran by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister and in view of the major role played in the Iranian capital by Shaykh Nasir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti ambassador and the doyen of the diplomatic corps.

The official added that what has happened is no more than a summer cloud and that the official relations between the two countries will remain normal despite all circumstances and new developments.

A Gulf diplomat in Kuwait has said that the "Gulf states deal with Iran as a sovereign state and a big neighbor and not as a revolution, religion and creed."

With the calm situation in Kuwait, there is an uproar in the Gulf over the Iranian intervention in Bahrain's affairs--an intervention that creates fears of an attempt to touch off the situation in this quiet island state. The Iranian position has aroused the interest of all the Gulf states.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI has learned that if the Iranian intervention in the Gulf states' affairs persists, the amirs and heads of the Gulf states will be invited to an urgent summit to study the situation and to adopt a united position toward Iran.

The area's ministers of foreign affairs are expected to be invited to an urgent meeting to prepare for this summit and to draw up its working paper.

The Iranian actions in the area have evoked strong reactions. Instead of causing collapse and disintegration, these actions have made the area's peoples rally more strongly around their rulers and move closer toward each other. They have even created cohesion among the Gulf states that have discarded the sensitivities, as well as some regional conflicts over border demarcation or over some oasis and islands, existing between them earlier.

The official Iran has said nothing so far about what is happening in the area. Only Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, always disavows the actions of some clergymen and denies that they have any official capacity or that they have been entrusted with official missions.

Problem-Story

The story behind all that is happening is that some Iranian clergymen arrive in the area's states and appoint themselves spiritual leaders for the area's Shi'ites. These clergymen then start to interfere in the affairs of the country which they enter, delivering sermons, criticizing and giving instructions as if they are the people with the power and the authority.

This conduct has aroused the resentment of the area's Shi'ites before that of others. The area's Shi'ite leaders say that if the Shi'ites suffer from any injustices or have any complaints, then these leaders are the ones to eliminate them within the framework of the traditions followed in the Gulf, i.e., through the existing institutions or through the shaykhs.

UAE

The problem of Bahrain has touched with its spray the UAE, especially the emirates of Dubai and Sharjah.

Ayatollah Sayyid Hajj Madrasi came to Bahrain and began to deliver sermons, make speeches and attack [the government], so Bahrain's government deported him to Sharjah. In Sharjah, Madrasi resumed his ways, helped from Dubai by Shaykh 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Jawahiri. They were both detained for a week in the UAE and then deported.

In Tehran, Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani declared himself "leader of the Bahraini revolution," threatening to restore Bahrain to Iran and to lead in it a revolution that will overthrow Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah, the state's amir, his regime and his family. This attack and these challenges have aroused the anger of all of the Gulf area states. The Iraqi government has also moved, sending envoys to the area's states to declare Baghdad's support for their rulers. The Iraqi press has also launched its strongest attack against Iran since the revolution. The Kuwait press has taken part in this attack and the Kuwaiti government has moved to declare its support for the Bahraini regime.

The UAE has not escaped the spray of the Iranian clergymen, one of whom has threatened it with woes and terrible things for deporting two clergymen.

The Gulf summit has become urgent, as stressed by a prominent Gulf source. This summit may issue resolutions compatible with the size of the storm that has begun to blow on the Gulf states.

8494
CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PLO-IRANIAN DIFFERENCES--Beirut-informed sources in the Lebanese capital have disclosed to AL-SIYASAH that during his recent visit to Lebanon and Syria, Iranian Vice Prime Minister Sadeq Tabataba'i held talks with the Palestinian leadership and that the talks revealed that these sources described as differences of opinion on several issues--differences which necessitated Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) visiting Iran for talks at the highest level. These sources added that Hani al-Hasan's departure for Iran as PLO office director there came after these differences of opinion had at times reached a pitch that neither the Palestinian or Iranian side wished to delve into or reveal. There are two points worth noting in this respect: 1--The presence in Iran of 12,000 Palestinians who are helping the revolution stabilize the internal situation. 2--The Iranian revolution has given the Palestinian revolution 700 million rials as aid to bolster the Palestinian struggle. These informed sources concluded by saying that current evidence indicates that no matter how great the differences of opinion between the Iranian and Palestinian revolutions, the intensification of contacts at that level would maintain the strategic bond between them. [Text] [LD191353 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Oct 79 p 1 LD]

FRG, MOSSAD PLAN PALESTINIAN'S DEATH--Beirut, 21 October--The Lebanese paper AL-SAFIR today discloses a plan to assassinate Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, Fatah Central Committee member. The paper adds that the plan, which was drawn up by the Mossad and the FRG intelligence apparatus, was supposed to be carried out by a Fatah officer who was detained for some time in the FRG. The paper says that the Palestinian officer, 1st Lt 'Abd al-Wali 'Abid, was subjected to physical and psychological torture during his detention. Intelligence officers threatened to kill his family should he refuse to carry out the assassination. The paper says that 'Abid, who was detained in the FRG in February on charges of possessing explosives, shot himself and succumbed to his wounds last Thursday in a Beirut hospital. The paper quotes a Palestinian source as saying that 'Abid's colleagues and Fatah officials noticed that he was in poor psychological condition after his return from the FRG. The source added that 'Abid disclosed everything during his convalescence and that Abu Iyad visited him several times to encourage him to return to work. The paper also publishes a warning to the FRG from the Palestinian source, who said that such actions would

endanger its interests in the area. The source added: At a time when Western European countries are adopting positive stands toward the Palestinian people, the FRG adopts this surprising attitude and coordinates acts of tortures against our people and plans to assassinate our leaders. A statement issued by Fatah pledges to avenge 'Abid's murder. [Text] [JN211551 Doha QNA in Arabic 1020 GMT 21 Oct 79 JN]

ARABS FEAR ISRAELI NUCLEAR TEST--Washington--Diplomatic sources have stated that there is a strong suspicion that the mysterious nuclear explosion that took place off the shores of South Africa last September was a test of an Israeli tactical nuclear warhead. Egypt and a number of other countries concerned are studying reports being reiterated in diplomatic circles here that the nuclear explosion was the first test of an Israeli nuclear weapon carried out by South Africa on Israel's behalf. According to these sources, Egypt is very worried by these reports. One such source said that, if the reports are true, Cairo will view the matter as a "very serious development." Analysts believe that the Carter administration knew about the test in advance and secretly approved it in order to alleviate Israel's security fears and facilitate an overall Middle East peace. However, it is known that some U.S. officials are worried that Israel's growing nuclear capability could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The U.S. administration was therefore so eager to divert public attention from the possibility of Israel having a role in the nuclear explosion that it claimed that South Africa was responsible for the explosion. [Excerpts] [LD060925 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 3 Nov 79 p 1 LD]

CSO: 4802

BAHRAIN

OPPOSITION AND RESENTMENT AGAINST GOVERNMENT IDENTIFIED

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 17 Sep 79 p 35

[Article by 'Adil Munir: "What Is in Bahrain; Open Doors for Monopolies and Bases; Popular Opposition and Position of Organized National Forces"]

[Text] After the Iranian revolution's triumph, the U.S. intelligence started to study the influence of this revolution on the neighboring countries with anxious care because the area in which this big fire [revolution] has taken place contains more than 60 percent of the world oil reserves and supplies 30 percent of the total world oil production. This is in addition to the area's strategic position and to its being a vital market for western goods.

After double-checking their calculations, the U.S. agencies estimated that Bahrain will be foremost among the countries to be affected by the fire for several reasons:

Because Bahrain has a revolutionary reserve embodied in a national movement with organizational frameworks that are more than 30 years old and that include a working class with revolutionary and unionist traditions.

Despite the damage suffered by this movement after the August onslaught and despite the ceaseless suppression operations organized by (Henderson), the specialized adviser, this movement has continued to operate under the conditions of a secret (commune) and has been waiting for the opportunity for a new revival.

The presence of deep disputes within the ruling regime due to the dual tribal and bourgeoisie character of the ruling family because some leaders of the family have exploited the oil revenues and commissions to carve for themselves places outside the tribe and within the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.

There is popular opposition to the use of Bahrain as a U.S. base for aggression against the Arab peoples and the Iranian revolution. This opposition has escalated with the approaching date for renewing the contract [for the base] with the United States.

There is in Bahrain a religious movement opposed to the regime. Moreover, the presence of broad masses who are not represented in the government has caused this movement to be strongly influenced by the Iranian revolution.

Open Doors

With the policy of open doors, the government has tried to steal Lebanon's role as a middleman, at least in the Gulf area. The regime's leaders enjoy describing their country as the Gulf's "Hongkong." After the civil war in Lebanon, numerous companies and banks moved their headquarters to Bahrain and the number of banks in the country rose to 70 banks which recycle the Gulf surplus monies to New York and London. Many foreign investments [companies] have been operating in the country directly or through Bahraini representatives or partners. But most of their investments are employed in the construction, services and maintenance work sector. These companies have stood as a barrier in the face of the creation of a local industry. But the benefits of the policy of open doors have been confined to a small segment close to the ruling family whereas broad sectors, which include not only the workers and the toilers but also broad segments of small merchants, industrialists and contractors have been hurt by it. This policy has been coupled with economic chaos and stagnation because of the low oil prices [sic] and high prices of commodities in the capitalist market and because of the growing size of the administrative agencies, especially the suppression [intelligence and security] agency that absorbs a large part of the general spending.

After dissolving the parliament and the unions, the regime tried to compensate the masses with promises to solve the inflation, housing and unemployment problems. But these problems have intensified as a result of the onslaught of the foreign firms and expertise. This is why the policy of open doors has been coupled with the concentration of capital in the hands of small segments whereas the poor and middle classes have gotten poorer.

Form of Opposition

All these factors have energized the opposition movement after a relatively long period of lukewarm activity. This opposition has been embodied in appeals, memoranda, sit-ins and marches staged by workers and employees who happen to be relatives of detainees, and especially of the students banned from travel. But the more prominent form of this opposition is the religious form because the authority's oppression has been directed mainly against the organized opposition. Since the August onslaught, the authority has expanded implementation of the state security law, has dissolved the Constituent Assembly and the unions, has suspended many of the constitution's provisions, has promulgated a penal law providing for life imprisonment or the death sentence "for whoever exposes the state external or internal security to danger," has jailed many strugglers and has prevented more than 100 students from leaving the country to continue their studies. Recently,

the acts of oppression have expanded to include more than 120 clergymen and students. Despite this extensive onslaught, the government has been careful not to touch the religious opposition which has escaped the campaign. This has helped this opposition to rise with its full strength relatively [sic] and to lead the new opposition movement, relying on the big victory of the Iranian revolution.

Even though the religious movement has projected some democratic demands (such as release of the detainees, curtailing the foreign influence, dealing with some aspects of the ruling family's corruption), its slogans continue to fall very short of the slogans of the democratic movement. The religious movement does not present clear positions against the presence of the U.S. bases and of the foreign monopolies. Under Bahrain's backward position, this religious opposition has imbibed many of the negative aspects of the Iranian revolution, such as projecting sectarian slogans and getting preoccupied with sidebattles, such as banning alcohol and mingling [of the two sexes]. This is why the new opposition faces significant difficulties:

If the religious quality predominates the national opposition movement, there is a likelihood that this opposition will assume a religious form, especially since the Shi'ites constitute 50 percent of the population whereas the regime is Sunni. Moreover, some parties of the Iranian revolution encourage this form of opposition.

The conflict within the ruling regime is not likely to flare up currently because of its interlocking interests. Moreover, Saudi Arabia will constitute a safety valve that will not permit these conflicts to flare up.

Bahrain's position within the general Gulf position has not been decisive but rather a position like that of Lebanon which reflects the conflicts in the area. This is why Bahrain's position should not be taken in isolation from the area which is experiencing currently retreats in Iraq and in Iran under the threats of U.S. intervention. Moreover, Bahrain's position is also connected with the settlement in the area--a settlement in which oil constitutes one of the decisive factors.

The entire national direction, and not movement for the sake of movement or for the sake of underlining a position serving one of the movement's parties, must be taken into consideration.

These tasks require the organized national movement to play the leading role through a common action program seeking to mobilize the broad masses and their capabilities so as to abolish the military bases, release the public liberties, curtail the activities of the foreign monopolies, improve the living conditions of the toiling masses and adopt a liberated foreign policy.

8494
CSO: 4802

BAHRAIN

PFLB LEADER CLAIMS DOZENS ARRESTED BY GOVERNMENT

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 20 Sep 79 p 10

[Article: "Popular Front in Bahrain Says in Press Conference: Campaign of Arrests Included 120 People and Country Living Under Undeclared State of Emergency"]

[Text] A leader of the Popular Front in Bahrain [AL-HURRIYAH identifies front as the PFLB--Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] has warned of the plans of the imperialist and reactionary circles that seek to instigate and nurture sectarian sedition in Bahrain.

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Nu'aymi, member of the Executive Committee of the Popular Front in Bahrain, has stated at a press conference held at the Press Union premises in Beirut that the front has called for the creation of the Bahraini national coalition to foil these plans.

He said that the government is trying to distort our people's struggles and to prepare for a sectarian sedition. He pointed out that the authorities depict the recent movement as being confined to the Shi'ite sect alone and are trying to link this movement to statements made by elements inside Iran who have no connection with the Iranian revolution, such as Ayatollah Rohani. He also said that the prime minister is resorting to strengthening his relations with the Sunni notables who--not the Shi'ite leaders--have expressed their resentment over the policy that he has been following.

Al-Nu'aymi discussed the broad lines of the Bahraini national coalition and said that the front is currently holding contacts with all the forces and notables in Bahrain to reach minimum agreement among them.

He also dealt with the impact and role of the Iranian revolution, denying that "Iran has exported the revolution to Bahrain." But he did stress "the revolution's positive objective effects" and referred to the "need to strengthen the relationship between the Arab revolutionaries and their Iranian brothers."

He added that to underline the importance of this relationship, the front responded to an invitation from the Islamic Republican Party, visited Iran last June and met with most of the Iranian leaderships, led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

In this context, al-Nu'aymi stressed the Arabism of Bahrain and the fact that it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland. He said that the theories that view Bahrain as part of Iran respect nobody other than the revolution's enemies. Al-Nu'aymi attacked the policy of the Bahraini authorities and described it as a policy of "estrangement," considering this policy responsible for the deteriorating conditions reached by the country and leading to the creation of an "import system supported by the Americans, the British and Saudi Arabia and living under a constant and undeclared state of emergency and among people who reject it and who are wrathful at the regime."

Concluding his press conference, al-Mu'aymi announced the names of some of those arrested recently by the government authorities and numbering 120 people, including Shaykh Muhriz al-'Akarai, Shaykh 'Ali al-'Ufsur and 'Abd-al-Jalil al-'Aradi.

8494
CSO: 4802

BAHRAIN

PFLB DISCUSSES POSSIBILITIES OF ESCALATED POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN COUNTRY

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 1 Oct 79 pp 40-41

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Nu'aymi, Member of Executive Committee of Popular Front for Liberation of Bahrain, by Walid Nuwayhid"]

[Text] Bahrain is witnessing nowadays an extensive protest movement that forewarns of significant political changes if the Bahraini national movement can take advantage of the conflicts touched off by the policy of opening up to [foreign] capital adopted by the government at the beginning of 1975.

The protest movement is not confined to the popular sectors but also includes the various forces and activities in the relatively poor island in which no oil has been discovered. The island maintained its historical structure [for a long time] but this structure has begun to be exposed to foreign blows embodied in the transformation of Bahrain into a free commercial market and into an area in which foreign banks are concentrated.

This position has motivated Saudi Arabia to send 350 troops to Bahrain to contain the political and religious movements that have expanded and whose influence intensified since the call made by Ayatollah Khomeini on the 17th of last August on occasion of the Jerusalem Day.

What is happening in Bahrain at present? What are the forces moving on the arena? What are the spheres of the Bahraini national movement? What is the impact of the Iranian revolution on the area? What are the tactics, slogans and alliances of the Bahraini democratic national forces?

We took these questions to 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mu'aymi, member of the Executive Committee of the PFLB [Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] and we have tried as much as possible to provide some answers that shed light on some aspects of the issue that will cause an upheaval in the Gulf situation in the near future.

[Question] The Gulf area was subject previously to some kind of a balance imposed by the area's two leaders: Iran and Saudi Arabia. This balance

has been subject to political fluctuations depending on the winds prevailing in the neighboring countries. In the wake of the Iranian revolution, what are the current directions of the situation and what is the position of the forces present in the Gulf?

[Answer] There is a firm connection between Bahrain and the area. The transformations that take place over separate intervals and the effects that these transformations have on the Gulf area, especially Bahrain, should not be separated.

The Iranian revolution's victory has shaken the firm mainstays of the imperialist plans in the area as a result of the collapse of one of the basic mainstays of the U.S. plan in the Gulf and the neighboring area.

This collapse with all its weight has had an impact on Bahrain where the ruling class has been hit with a confusion that has made it embark on a series of moves to contain the initial positive results of the Iranian revolution. Talk has escalated about the need to impose security by force under the pretext of protecting the "Arabism of Bahrain" at one time and the pretext of fighting the "U.S. threats" of military invasion at others. There have also been rising calls to organize and unite the ranks in order to face the future eventualities.

Naturally, the aim of these government containment attempts has not been to create an internal bond that truly seeks to protect the Arabism of the Gulf and to confront the U.S. invasion but to find political pretexts to cover the truth of the movement which started on the eve of the shah's fall and Khomeini's triumph. The true goal governing all of the government's moves is summed up in the fact that they are moves to protect the authority itself against disintegration and collapse and to launch a counter offensive against the religious and political inclinations that have recently emerged in Bahrain in light of the victory realized in Iran.

Here, we can talk about the negative aspect of the authority's movement--a movement started immediately upon the shah's fall.

This movement is summed up in a number of contacts made by the government with some Sunni clergymen and merchants in an attempt to divide the national ranks and to create a political split between the two major religious sects in Bahrain. The authority started by launching a rabid political campaign against the Shi'ite sect, accusing it of wanting to overthrow the regime and to establish a Shi'ite state tied to Iran.

These suspect attempts fell on deaf ears insofar as the people and the clergymen are concerned, especially after the patriotic man in the street moved to project his fundamental demands that focus on the achievement of a number of national and pan-Arab slogans that aspire to realize real independence and to wrench some reformist and social concessions [from the government].

As for the political forces existing historically in Bahrain, they have been affected by the events by varying degrees. There is an opinion that says that the authority's opening up to the opposition forces is nothing but a phased tactic whose aim is to absorb the popular wrath and to expose the positions of the opposition forces prior to striking them in the future. There is another inclination that believes that what is happening in Bahrain at present reflects to a large degree the rupture occurring in the area, especially after the Iranian revolution, considering that the balances have been tipped in favor of a broad political and religious national revival that makes it possible to project certain demands that can be wrenched from the authority.

On the other hand, there is disagreement in assessing the religious movements that have taken place in the area and in Bahrain recently. Some parties view the religious movements as movements independent of the current transformations in the country and believe one should steer clear of them and should maintain the national positions developed in previous stages. Other parties view the religious movements as a political force which should be dealt with flexibly and believe that a minimum common points of agreement must be established with them so as to launch a battle that relies on numerous forces which agree on a broad program of political, social and economic demands.

So far, no unified visualization has yet developed from these views to help the various parties agree on a single line that could add to the national movement a popular and historical dimension that permits turning a new leaf in the history of the Gulf area's states. This, specifically, is what we are seeking to achieve and what we have been seeking to achieve recently.

We have demanded the creation of a broad front including all the forces opposing the regime and bound to a political line truly hostile to the Americans so as to block the path in the face of any reactionary attempt seeking to transform Bahrain into a center of intelligence and sabotage against the Iranian revolution.

In this regard, we have presented for discussion the issue of the "broad democratic national coalition" and have defined its demands in 10 general points that focus, for example, on the question of restoring the National Council (Parliament), beginning preparations for elections, releasing the detainees, restoring the democratic liberties, permitting political action and other demands that the various parties and forces can approve. So far, the contacts to form the democratic national coalition have not achieved considerable success.

[Question] Within the framework of the visualization that you have just projected, what are the spheres of the Bahraini national movement and what are the possibilities of making gains under the canopy of certain balances that are difficult to break?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the question of changing the regime in Bahrain is tied to the area's situation generally because it seems impossible to wager on fundamental transformation at a time when Bahrain is considered a U.S. military base, a link between the area's states and a commercial and financial center through whose channels the Arab monies pass to the outside world.

As I have already said, the Gulf emirates are mere appendages to the area's [major] states. Therefore, this or that inclination prevails in them, depending on which way the balances are tipped. Consequently, change does, definitely, not come from within them. They merely reflect the course of affairs and the total transformations in their environment. This is why the national political and religious forces must always take advantage of the area's events to continue the struggle, to improve their positions and to dictate their terms to the limits within which we can act.

This is why we on our part believe that there is a broad possibility at present to impose on the authority a specific reform program, if we can take advantage of the atmosphere of the Iranian revolution.

We have actually started a number of these political movements that have begun to grow and to produce some positive results. The latest battle we waged against the government was the battle to defeat the decision banning Bahraini students from going abroad to continue their studies. The government was compelled on the 12th of the current month of September to back down on the decision and returned 212 passports to the students after a series of demonstrations, statements and sit-ins had been staged against the decision.

On the other hand, we can see Saudi Arabia's moves in the area and its fear of the winds of the Iranian revolution. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a series of contacts to contain every rebellion and every movement to express progressive religious opposition. By the way, Saudi Arabia has sent 350 troops to Bahrain and it is building a modern bridge linking the island of Bahrain with the Saudi coast at a cost of one billion dollars which will be completely paid by Saudi Arabia.

[Question] Let us return a little to the opposition religious movements. What are their forces, inclinations, goals and spheres of growth?

[Answer] Traditionally, the religious movements in Bahrain, both the Sunni and the Shi'ite movements, have been supported [financially] by Saudi Arabia. In the past, there were two Islamic groups: The Islamic Enlightenment Society (Shi'ite) whose leaders were reactionary and had direct relations with Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Reform Club (Sunni) which had good relations with the regime and with Saudi Arabia at the same time.

With the early signs of the Iranian revolution, an opposition clergyman emerged and formed what is known presently as al-Husayni Fund. The fund leader, Shaykh Muhammad Hadi al-Madrasi, adopted a position supporting

Khomeyni whereas the Enlightenment Society opposed him. After the Iranian revolution's triumph, the Enlightenment Society reconsidered its position whereas the Reform Club persisted in its opposition [to Khomeyni]. Khomeyni accredited al-Madrasa as his official [representative] in Bahrain.

Thus, some clergymen moved in the direction of supporting Khomeyni and the signs of an independent religious opposition movement raising some democratic and political slogans appeared. This is why the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain adopted from the outset a position supporting Khomeyni and every political or religious line wishing to move against imperialism and reaction.

The call issued by the religious opposition men for a march on 23 February 1979 came in support of the Iranian revolution. The Popular Front did not hesitate to participate in the march side by side with the clergymen. We raised our slogans with the other slogans so as to block the path in the face of any attempts to exploit Khomeyni's movement. The government tried to insert its elements in the demonstration and to pretend that it supported this demonstration. But the plan failed and a clash took place with the reactionary elements.

Khomeyni issued his call for the Jerusalem March on the 17th of last August and the clergymen moved to organize a march on the occasion. We took part in the religious march, raising our national and political slogans.

Then came the incident of the arrest of Shaykh al-'Akari at the airport upon his return from Iran and his meeting with Khomeyni to touch off the political situation anew. Al-'Akari is a radical clergyman who is opposed to the government and who supports Khomeyni's movement and he has always mixed political issues with religious issues and attacked the regime and corruption in his sermons in mosques.

After the arrest, the clergymen called for a protest demonstration on the holiday. A big march was staged and we participated in it strongly, raising the slogans of releasing the religious detainees and restoring the democratic and unionist liberties. When the march reached the police headquarters, a clash took place with the security men, one man was killed and two were wounded. This was our first actual contact with the clergymen and with many popular groups that we had not penetrated before.

A short time ago, another problem erupted between the clergymen and the government when 40 clergymen submitted a plea demanding that the state carry out a number of reforms. The government rejected the plea and this has led to faster growth in the religious opposition. The statements made by Ayatollah Rohani in Iran in support of the demands made by the clergymen came as a stab to these clergymen who proceeded to issue a statement stressing the "Arabism of Bahrain and of the Gulf" to prevent the government from attempting to exploit Rohani's statements against them.

The government also recently arrested Shaykh al-Madrasi and deported him to the UAE on the pretext that he holds a UAE passport. This incident created reactions that led the government to arrest a number of clergymen.

At the same time, Khalifah ibn Salman, the prime minister, embarked on several counter moves, contacted the Sunni clergymen and tried to stir up the sectarian situation but he has received no favorable response, especially from the Sunni business circles.

It is our assessment that instigating sectarian hatred is a part of the U.S. plan to fragment the Bahraini national movement and to divide the area on a sectarian basis. It is our opinion that the successful means to confront sectarianism is to speed up building the independent democratic national coalition so that it may face the government with the fundamental demands.

[Question] What are the tactics of the Bahraini national movement in light of the country's social and economic structure?

[Answer] There are in Bahrain currently numerous crises (housing, living conditions, services). The country's area is small and it has a population density of 1,100 persons per square mile. The country is poor in natural resources and work opportunities are not available in it, compared to the neighboring countries.

The 1973 war came to raise oil prices fourfold. Thus, the government embarked on the operation of facilitating the flow of surplus monies and of helping their investment. But the authority confronted the obstacle of the National Council which it had established in 1972, after independence. So, the authority proceeded to dissolve the council on 24 August 1975 in order to eliminate legislative control over the decisions and to confine the decision-making to the amir [country's ruler], the prime minister and the crown prince.

In November 1975, the state issued the offshore law which permitted the transformation of Bahrain into a financial market controlled by 50 foreign banks whose task is to pump the surplus Arab monies to the United States, West Europe and Japan.

Offshore commercial companies were also founded in Bahrain, turning the country into some sort of a Hongkong or a "Gulf Lebanon" whose task is to act as a commercial middleman between the Gulf states and the international imperialist network. In return, Saudi monies flooded the country, aid was doubled and American experts were brought in. Thus, corruption has spread, graft increased, morals have disintegrated fearfully and the foreign presence has escalated in a manner that exceeds the country's needs and its absorption capability.

This policy has conflicted with all values and has left its imprints on the entire society. Certain social groups have collapsed and other peripheral

groups have risen in a period of no more than 5 years. All this has created a strong reaction among the clergymen and has enabled the political movements to grow anew as a result of society's disintegration and of its intensifying crises.

If we examine the country's present social and economic structure, we find that the peasants, farmers and fishermen do not exceed 6,000 persons whereas the working class constitutes more than 146,000 members of the total work-force, including 96,000 foreign workers. The number of students of all stages amounts to 60,000 students out of the total original population of Bahrain which amounts to (300,000) persons.

In view of this socio-economic structure of Bahrain, we can see that there are national and class forces that can dictate their conditions and wrench their demands if the struggle is escalated and the democratic national coalition formed.

We on our part find it most likely that the political, social and economic situation will deteriorate. There is also the possibility of changes in the authority and of the alteration of balances at the top. It is likely that 'Isa ibn Khalifah, the country's amir and ruler, will resign and that his son Hamad ibn 'Isa, the crown prince and the minister of defense who is supported by the Americans, will take his place.

If such changes happen, their purpose will be obvious--namely to contain the ongoing transformations in the country.

8494
CSO: 4802

IRAN

MILLIONS OF DINARS CONTRIBUTED TO KORDESTAN DISTURBANCES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 21 Aug 79 p 2

[Text] A group of government and military officials held a radio-television press conference yesterday afternoon concerning the problem of security in the country. Reporters from news organizations took part. Participating were: Hashem Sabaghian, Minister of Interior; Brigadier General Daneshvar, commander of the gendarmerie; General Riahi, Minister of National Defense; Major General Shaker, Chief of the Joint Staff of Army of the Islamic Republic; and Brigadier General Mostafa'i, Police Chief of Islamic Republic of Iran. First to begin the questioning was the government spokesman, Sadeq Tabataba'i, after which reporters' questions were answered.

In response to a question from the government spokesman that people think there is a problem because the government is not taking decisive steps to strike down opponents of the revolution, the interior minister answered that the government does not accept the idea that decisive steps are not being taken. Our armed forces have passed from the shadow of the oppressive regime into the embrace of the people. Bringing about order is necessary for reform in the military. This command was executed by General Riahi, former defense minister. Still necessary decisiveness is lacking. In this way we are trying to create a peoples army and you saw in the events at Paveh how a decision was made and at the Imam's order they went and punished the invaders of Paveh.

The Police

Dr Tabataba'i asked the chief of police whether there was any reason for the police not having the necessary morale. General Mostafa'i answered that fortunately the morale of the police was very good now. In answer to the question whether this morale was such that they could maintain the security of the city he said that, in general, yes.

General Daneshvar said in regard to the gendarmerie that 95 percent of personnel had good morale, but after the Imam's order this went up to 1,000 percent. The morale of the armed forces and the entire Iranian nation in a difficult period in the world has been without parallel and has been the

same throughout history. Now the personnel of the gendarmerie have no operational problems and only in regard to the living conditions of some personnel in remote regions do we have any concern. General Riahi said that after the order of the Imam the morale in the army rose extraordinarily and the officers, NCOs and soldiers volunteer more than we can accept.

Mobilizing Model Units

A question was asked about the situation in Paveh, where, it is said, before the Imam's order that the army did not want to go. General Shaker said that he could not agree because before the Imam's order several units had announced that they were on alert and after the order troops from all over mobilized into one model unit.

Dr Tabataba'i asked: What actions had the army taken prior to the Imam's order? General Shaker said that the day before the order they had set up commissions after a report arrived that a gendarmerie and police unit were besieged by more than 2,000 people. Steps were taken including reconnaissance flights which broke the sound barrier and then orders were given to open fire. After the Imam's order morale, discipline and the attitude of the people came alive and made the commanders' job easier.

Against the Revolt in Kordestan

A question was asked about the events in Kordestan and how much sprang from real political sources and how much from insurgency. The interior minister said: we have stated categorically that the forces that cause trouble there are separate from our Kurdish brothers and the problem of Shia and Sunni does not exist. As the Imam has said the rights of all the people are protected in the constitution. They try to use economic shortages and the welfare of the region against the revolution, but we know these problems do not come from the free will of the people. We have many development and economic plans for Kordestan and with the return of peace to the area we are beginning to implement them.

Dr Tabataba'i asked the commander of the gendarmerie what the situation in Paveh was. He said that it was peaceful now. A question was raised that therefore his opinion was not certain because he said "now." General Daneshvar said that perhaps there was some agitation. He then spoke of the incident at Paveh and said that the invading elements were followers of the Democratic Party and Mollah Bakhtiar, representative of Talabani, and they were completely equipped. After the dawn bombardment of 28 Mordad [19 Aug] these forces went into hiding and some were taken prisoner. Eighteen million dinars of help had been spread around by Talabani. We captured a man who had been hiding with him in a place where orders were given to blow up places.

The general added that he had said in a meeting with Abdolrahman Qasemlu that they were both Iranian Muslims and brothers and that these small

differences should not come between them. Where there is justice there can be no differences. Qasemlu said that he wanted all of Kordestan to be one Iranian province and asked my cooperation in this aim.

General Daneshvar said at another point that the announcement that the period of military service was 1 year had impaired the army, taken away its capabilities and made it so that for awhile it could not function. He added: we have had difficulties created by the Kurdish Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani, whose mouthpiece is 'Azaeldin Hosseyni. He promised that 80 percent of the people of Mahabad were in favor of intervention and have telephoned asking us to finish the job. I have tried for 4 months to eliminate gunfire in Kordestan.

A question was asked as to why of all the groups in Kordestan only the Democratic Party was declared illegal. The interior minister answered that the only group with a 40-year record was the Democratic Party, the tool of Jalal Talabani. It is not really a party but a rebel group from over the border. If it happens that other groups join in these activities we will ask the Revolutionary Council to declare them illegal also.

Source of Agitation

General Shaker said: those who attacked the army in Sanandaj were not the same as those in Paveh, but the source of the agitation was the same. Concerning Gonbad also, where there are signs of fire, we predict that this is also the result of agitation. The government is at work to stop this with aid programs.

A question was asked as to what measures the government was taking throughout the country to prevent such incidents as Kordestan. General Riahi answered: We believe in the army that there are many plotters, both inside and out, and that the Islamic Republic must consider itself in a state of partial war. This was the reason for the Imam's order for all units to be on alert. We want no intrigue among the people and we ordered all of it destroyed throughout the country. The interior minister said that according to the Imam's order those units with military training were to go to the guards camps and those units without training were to register at revolutionary bases so that training could be done.

General Daneshvar said in connection with universal military service that the period of service was a year and a half and that everyone high or low would serve, with the difference that after doing a period of training those that are surplus will be excused. The initial period is 4 months and after this, according to need, some soldiers, from privates to those having sergeants certificates, will be chosen to finish the training. Those having their licentiate and more will become officers. This law is without precedent. Those that formerly were students and excused, including all those with diplomas and born before 1337 [21 Mar 1958-20 Mar 1959] will still be excused. This law has been enacted.

Plan for the Press

The interior minister then talked about the press plan. He said that in troubled times the press plays a great role and must refrain from giving out false information. If we protest about this, they say that the news services are giving out this news. For example, to weaken morale they were spreading unkind rumors about my dear brother, Dr Chemran, that he had been shot, or as the Voice of America said, had become a martyr. The entire press knows which among them have real devotion. These devotees announce that there is a free press and then create false and inflammatory news. All of them have deceitful plans and tried hard to upset order after the revolution. A correct press law is overdue and will be announced as soon as possible and will stop these disorders. They used to protest to us that such and such a thing was said by such and such a paper and asked if we denied it. The government would have to deny a paper every day. General Shaker has given the answer to your question as to, in our opinion, what threats the nation faces. I do not see any danger. Agitations exist and will continue, but in my opinion these agitations will not interfere with attaining the aims of the revolution. In answer to the same question, General Riahi said that we will have these agitations because the Western governments are not happy with the Islamic revolution. Eastern governments have not said much but we have many words and deeds from the West.

Duty of the Press

The journalists then asked their own questions. One journalist asked that since you have stated that the Kurdish Democratic Party is connected with Talabani and planned the recent events, how can the government's election of Dr Qasemlu to the press assembly and the Imam's meeting with Talabani be explained?

The interior minister answered that the sole reason was that the Democratic Party had created strong armed forces in the area and could threaten voters. Of course, 110,000 votes is not much, but because each cast several votes they could elect their own representative. I do not have any information about the Imam's meeting with Talabani, but as we have said before, we are positive that the disturbances were caused by the Democratic Party and Talabani and we will confront them. For this reason the government and revolutionary council announced that the party was illegal and stopped its activities.

Hasehm Sabaghian said in answer to another question about a studied plan for the press and whether it would not be better to guide and limit the press instead of stopping it, that no one forgets the service of the press. The press was very valuable after the revolution and a healthy press can play a role in all parts of society. An analytic press could be very enlightening but the alternative is very different. Most of the press, perhaps not a majority, we have spoken about and have confidence in, the

other played a role in the disturbances. Instead of analysis it offered a threat. Because its information was not sufficient, particularly in places distant from them, the press played a large part in deviations and the people wanted them stopped. Because our revolution must build, not destroy, the news of the government and its spokesmen must be official. Our views are not those of all of the press. Part of the press does not support the Islamic revolution or its policies and many have destructive aims toward our revolution because they profit from disorder. Dr Tabataba'i said that he gave his word that the news in these papers was so completely fabricated and so grossly that he did not at first have a press conference.

Tabataba'i said at another point the object of the press law was not to limit the press but to prevent abuse of freedom, not keeping information from the people but seeing that they are fully informed. He said that the paper PEYGHAM-E-EMRUZ the day before yesterday made eight clear mistakes and deviations about the events in Paveh. It was closed because of this wrong information given to the people. The interior minister, speaking about the plan of the komitehs to reform themselves, said that it was not planned to abolish the komitehs. They would gradually absorb the revolutionary guards and police. The plan has been put into effect in Tehran and more so in the provinces. In regard to reforming the komitehs this task has already been undertaken by the central komiteh. Reductions will begin in Tehran and have already started. It is natural in reforms that there would be some unrest, but the central komiteh has faced up to this unrest. In the provinces where komitehs are not needed, an announcement of dissolution has been made.

The defense minister said in regard to the existence of an intelligence and counterintelligence service that the service known as SAVAK was dissolved and a new organization has been formed in the Ministry of Defense called the National Intelligence and Counterintelligence Organization. It has just started work but we hope that it will produce good results and safeguard the nations information.

A question was asked as to who was responsible for looking out for political and social organizations that have not been banned and which of those in the national movement should be banned. The interior minister said that at first this was in the office of the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas which was made up of many groups. After that this oversight was the responsibility of the revolutionary guards where it still is until a decision is taken by the government. In regard to the building of the Mujahidin organization, I have talked with representatives of that organization and told them that, if they agreed, the government was willing to assume the responsibility using the revolutionary guards to protect the building. Two or three days later they announced that they did not want the responsibility and that the interior ministry was willing to assume responsibility using the revolutionary guards.

A question was asked concerning Kordestan and economic plans for the area. Sadeq Tabataba'i said that all programs which were initiated were stopped and workers assigned to the projects were taken hostage.

Hashem Sabaghian said that Kordestan is not the only place that needs economic aid but also Sistan, Baluchistan, Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and other places.

We have divided Kordestan into three areas: white, yellow and red. The white area is that which has no security problem and development can take place, but still no work was going on in these areas. We promised the Mahabad City Council that if it is named a secure area we will commence development as quickly and broadly as possible.

9448
CSO: 4906

IRAN

YAZDI LEAVES FOR HAVANA NONALINED CONFERENCE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 26 Aug 79 p 12

[Text] Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, foreign minister, announced at his departure for Cuba that Iran's foreign policy is founded on neutrality and noncommitment to the superpowers and noninvolvement in the cold war. The conference of nonalined nations is a good opportunity for us to introduce the values of our revolution to the world.

Dr Yazdi brought up this topic during the discussion. He said that previously representatives of Iran had participated in the Rabat Islamic Conference but our attendance at the nonalined conference is proper for the welfare of an important world group. It is important both for us and for the countries which are members of this bloc.

Our foreign policy is always based on neutrality and no attachment to the superpowers or participants in the cold war. Therefore, it is possible for the first time for the Iranian revolution to make itself known to the world. It also gives us the opportunity to make known the great values of our revolution.

Threats Against the Revolution

As you know there are many threats against our national revolution and hence against the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At this conference, which will have about 100 participants and guests, the opportunity exists, in spite of these threats, to make known the values, benefits and reality of the Iranian Islamic revolution.

In the nonalined organization some countries are members whose activities are not for the good of the nonalined. The duty of countries interested in the welfare of the organization is to stop these countries that tend to the right or left and bring the influence of the superpowers into the organization.

The active participation of Iran in the conference will bring effective help to preserve the principles and unity of the nonalined organization in real terms and with correct philosophy.

Move to Cuba

The Iranian foreign minister, who left for Cuba today as the head of the delegation, said in regard to the quality of actions and programs of the conference that the presence of Iran is to strengthen the principles and basic philosophy of the nonaligned against the superpowers. Also, countries of the third world want information on the basic ideas of our revolution as a world ideology and our presence will further this.

In answer to the question, what will be the most important problem for Iran at the conference, Dr Yazdi said that this would be to make known the realities of the Iranian revolution to the nonaligned and the third world. It is important for us but also important for them. We have problems with Palestine, Lebanon, fighting Zionism and we will also set forth ways to organize the world's potential to fight imperialism. In answer to the question, will Iran make specific proposals at the conference, the foreign minister said that of course we have plans and proposals concerning relations with countries like Yugoslavia, Algeria and Syria which we hope will be accepted.

At the end of the discussion Dr Yazdi remarked that we recognize the non-aligned as a new front and strong movement in the struggle with the superpowers. The member countries of the organization in the third world have similar strengths and capabilities, which based on the similarities in our own foreign policy, can form a united front to fight superpower economic domination.

9448
CSO: 4906

IRAN

FRONT OF THE OPPRESSED, NONALINED CONFERENCE EXAMINED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Sep 79 p 10

[Text] The conference of the nonalined in Havana, capital of Cuba, was a demonstration of power and yet of a painful reality that where once there was fire in the ashes, these seem to have gone out. We say seem to because every developing country has touched upon its alinement or non-alinement but none wants to or can spread its own remedies among these special countries.

The painful reality is the loud cry of billions of deprived people throughout the world. Deprivation is caused by human actions and most of the deprived are the result of the exploitation of one human being by another. In this regard the holy Koran uses the word "deprived" to mean "deprived by someone." In the last two centuries, which saw the growth of Western imperialism, the downtrodden of mankind were day by day led into more weakness and misfortune so that other countries could become more affluent and powerful.

This cry that we made constantly was an unanswered cry in the wilderness before the Islamic revolution. With the revolution, another situation prevailed. For the first time in the history of man the greatest satanic power was sent to the historic graveyard. New formulas for standards to evaluate power came into existence. These show other nations that they can change history if they want. We see that the leader of the revolution has time and again invited the deprived of the world to unify. In his statement to the Islamic conference in Algeria, which he sent via Hojatollah Khosroshahi, he asked for the creation of a united front of the deprived, from both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. This invitation, which was made at the same time to the nonalined countries, is important and valuable from several aspects. History shows that from the formation of the first nonalined conference in Bandung in 1956 until today, the nonalined have not only failed to form a united front but in these 23 years greater differences have arisen between them.

Principal Bases of Imperialism

The nonalined countries have never agreed. The biggest example could be the case of Egypt and Indonesia. Gamal Abd-el-Nasser and the late Soekarno,

with Nehru and Tito, were founders of the nonaligned movement. After their deaths their countries took on the appearance of bases for American imperialism. Iran's message explains these facts. As long as the organization is not in the hands of the nations they are condemned to break up. Countries following policies of the day and their own welfare divert the organization from the correct path. It is true, as we said at the beginning, that this conference would be like past conferences and be a show of strength. The reason for this is also basic. In these 23 years what have the nonaligned accomplished? Published statistics from the United Nations show that the nonaligned could not form a united front to solve their own difficulties and work together.

Their problems are:

1. Hunger. Based on published statistics from the World Food and Agricultural Organization, in 1974 a half million people in the poor countries, also members of the nonaligned movement, died of starvation. The reason for this in the words of the organization is not only the lack of food but there was no system for investing in agriculture and technology to create more food. Another report published by the International Food Research Society says that every day 25,000 children in poor countries, some of them members of the nonaligned movement, die of starvation. The United Nations added in its announcement that 1.5 billion in Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Cape Verde, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Zambia, Sudan, Pakistan, Indonesia and tens of other countries suffer from hunger. In India alone, 5 million children die of starvation. Malnutrition affects 75 percent of the poor people of the world.

In the face of this great human problem, why do not some of the nonaligned countries make haste to save these countries with help at a time when the great powers are selling them billions of dollars a year in arms.

2. Armaments. The U.S. Arms Control Agency said in a report that in 1976 more than \$398.9 billion of arms were sold, of which \$308.3 were spent by developed countries, \$90.7 by developing countries.

The United States in 1977 sold \$13.4 billion in arms to under developed countries. Last year the figure did not pass \$11.4 billion. Saudi Arabia alone spent \$6.4 billion for arms.

3. Refugees. Millions of citizens of nonaligned countries have fled for their lives and have taken refuge in other countries. According to official UN statistics the number of homeless from various countries are:

Palestine: 2.5 million homeless, Lebanon 200,000, African continent, between 4 and 5 million, far eastern countries, 650,000.

In Cambodia 3 million out of 6 million lost their lives as a result of the civil war.

According to official statistics, there are now \$400 billion worth of arms in the world, but the financial office of the UN Refugee Committee, founded in 1951, has a budget of only about \$200 million a year and is responsible for administering aid to more than 20 million homeless.

In view of these figures we say that the nonaligned countries should think primarily of the condition of their own pitiful people if they really care about anything besides putting up a front.

A United Front of the Disadvantaged

Until today these conferences have been noted only for speeches and propaganda, after which each goes his own way. If these countries really want to help their own people they must:

1. Follow the words of Imam Khomeyni and form a front of the underprivileged in all developing countries. To achieve unity, the disadvantaged must form a front which can then oppose the well fed which so far the deprived of the world have done separately.
2. To take a non-East, non-West foreign policy. But nonattachment or no military agreements with East or West cannot be the sole criterion for membership, because countries like Indonesia and Egypt and Palestine are not members of a military pact but are still political and economic adherents of imperialism.
3. To diminish their stupendous military budgets and stop buying weapons to kill each other. Cooperate economically and politically.
4. To expand cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, education and economics it would be best to form a permanent organization like the United Nations.
5. Rich countries of the nonaligned should aid the poor countries and if they have large reserves of oil and gas they should sell them to these countries for less than the international price.

If the countries that are meeting today in Havana want to eliminate selfishness and expansionism and want to help other countries, they can bring into existence a genuine third force against both East and West using the greatest God-given natural resource, the great power of humanity, and bring a better life to their own pitiful and backward nations.

9448
CSO: 4906

IRAN

POSTPONEMENT OF SECOND GAS PIPELINE PRAISED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Sep 79 p 10

[Text] The Islamic Republic radio has announced that the Iranian government has decided to postpone the second gas pipeline all over the country. This pleases the friends and well wishers of the nation and makes them hopeful of the future. It also angers and threatens the world's oil and gas exploiters who are against the people of Iran. Friends are happy because they know that the abundant gas which lies in the ground, and which makes up a major part of the nation's riches, will be safe from plunderers.

The Kangan gas field, one of the three or four largest in the world, has nearly 2 trillion cubic meters of gas based on small information from only a few wells. In view of the depth and level of the deposit and the few existing wells, these reserves must be considered the minimum which we can estimate now. For a true estimate many more wells must be drilled. Drilling is difficult because of the thickness of the geologic crust, great variable pressures, mineral deposits and the great distance from sources of water and manpower. Up to now this could only be done with the help of profit-seeking foreigners.

Finally, the extraction of gas from the Kangan field is also technically difficult because the field has more than one layer of gas, thus requiring expensive methods to drill wells, the result of which produced the number of severe and expensive contracts with foreign companies.

Transporting gas to consumers: 1) using large, extensive pipelines, e.g. to the border of the Soviet Union or Turkey, requires a great investment and the construction of a widespread system of pumping stations; 2) liquifying the gas in plants near the field and hauling the liquified gas to consumers by sea also requires great expenditures to build the plants. If we want to ship the liquified gas ourselves we would also need to invest enormous sums in shipping lines.

Implementing This Master Plan

None of these difficult operations can be undertaken at this time without the participation of foreign, profit-seeking companies and modern technology.

Therefore, we would be obliged to use foreign workers to implement the plan and make weekly expenditures to buy modern technology. Thus, if the current, artificially low price of gas remains, it would not accord with expenditures and making huge investments from the pockets of the people could not be justified, especially if there are other places in the economy that could use them. The flood of foreign specialists would also stop as we Iranians do not have the means to implement a complicated industrial plan. Transferring the execution of this project to foreigners using their investment, with accompanying large profits and severe political consequences, which no one knows better than we Iranians, is out of the question except for the traitorous Shah's government. From what existed before, the income from our oil can now be used for projects of benefit to the country, praise God. There is no necessity for the extraction and sale of cheap gas, the strategic energy of the 20th and 21st centuries.

It is much better strategy to keep these enormous sources of gas in the ground, to stop depleting natural resources and not supply the reserves of the world's oil eaters. The nation will get along in any case. After rebuilding the ruined society left over from the corrupt, traitorous Pahlevi regime, we still have enough left over for industrial growth. By using gas for daily needs we can do these projects ourselves. We can either use it, put it up for sale, or increase production by using the injection process, depending on economics, the political situation or the needs of industry.

Revolutionary Decisions

Perhaps it can be asked, why do other countries sell their gas? First, it must be remembered that not many countries have our great blessing, great quantities of gas, because nature does not divide its treasures equally. Countries that at present have large amounts of gas are: the Soviet Union, Iran, the United States, Algeria, Holland, France, etc. France, the United States, Holland and the Soviet Union do not sell gas at present but the Soviet Union, Algeria etc. must export some gas to obtain foreign loans. After the great Iranian national revolution, some exporting countries also changed their views about exporting this strategic product and this has brought lower levels of production.

Why is the cartel of world oil users angry with Iran over this clear-sighted decision? We know that gas makes up nearly 20 percent of world energy use (oil is about 45 percent) and its price is nearly 20 percent cheaper than oil. Many industrial countries take advantage of the cheap price and abundance of gas by burning gas in industry, factories and even autos. Therefore, Germany, France, Italy and England, which lack gas or have only limited amounts, are trying to obtain gas supplies from abroad for its industry which needs more every day. For example, a 300-kilometer pipeline carries North Sea gas to the northeast coast of England and an Algerian pipeline supplies Italy, Austria and Germany. Therefore, industrial nations are always looking for new sources of cheap gas and to this end will stop at nothing. We know that from the first jet of gas from the

Kangan gas well a few years ago the oil companies and their powerful patrons, i.e., the industrial nations, turned to Iran with great appetite and through treason and the loyalty of the treasonous, thieving government of the former Shah imposed a second vast pipeline on the country which became an artery for the life blood of its own industry. They had dreams of gold from these valuable fields of the Iranian nation. They thought that quickly they could do with them what they had done to the oil of Khuzestan (From about 8 billion tons of oil in the Khuzestan fields, about half was extracted between 1286 [21 Mar 1907-20 Mar 1908] and 1333 [21 Mar 1954-20 Mar 1955] by British imperialism and later by the American, British, Dutch and French consortium, who stole it at low prices). Of course, this golden dream of stealing gas was ended by the victorious revolution. This is the reason for the anger and enmity of the oil thieves to the decision of the Iranian nation to preserve its oil underground for the future. Most news services of the exploiting countries have said that Iran and the other exporting countries are the principal cause of the economic crisis. They say that perhaps Iran has turned off its gas out of enmity to Europe. The truth that no values have been turned off and that gas is being preserved in the ground is concealed from their people in order to aggravate and anger them toward the Iranian revolution. This is also meant to convince the people that all their economic problems are not the fault of their systems and governments and hang the blame around the neck of Iran and the other exporting countries.

In contrast to these acts of the enemies of Iran, any honorable person who shows to the present government that he has the welfare of Iran in mind will be aided. We want happiness as the result of this decision and nothing else.

9448
CSO: 4906

ISRAEL

RETROSPECTIVE ON YOM KIPPUR WAR PRESENTED

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 28 Sep 79 Weekend Supplement pp 8-9

[Article by Eli Feingarsh: "The Secret of the Generals' War"]

[Text] As the years go by it is possible with more ease and objectivity to look back upon the Yom Kippur War, with its political viewpoints and the many military issues. The present anniversary day of the Yom Kippur War pushes further from us the horror of the wars of Israel, at a distance beyond the time measure of a single year. The first year of peace, "which passed peacefully" and brought in its wake political and security attainments beyond what had been planned for and anticipated, placed the Yom Kippur War in another and different light than in the past. In a conspicuous and clear manner the great tragedy of two nations which have signed a peace treaty between them now stands out and screams out after they had drawn the blood of their sons in a cruel and needless war.

Three Books

One of the means permitting an evaluation of the Yom Kippur War that is more comprehensive and objective is the three source books which were published during the past year. Yitzhaq Rabin's book "Service Record" for the first time reveals important and authentic details about the tripartite negotiations for an interim arrangement or partial agreement that focused on the opening of the Suez Canal. It becomes increasingly apparent that the failure of these negotiations is the chief polluting agent for the Yom Kippur War. It is superfluous to point out the significance of this version with respect to the factors which brought about the failure of the negotiations in the early years of the 1970's.

The book of Hanoch Bartov on "Daddo" deals mainly with the moves and the events during the war as determined and viewed on the political-military strategic level. The book revises recorded history, both public and privileged, of the Agranat Commission Report and its harsh projections upon the senior military echelon.

The book of "Beren" Avraham Aden, "On Both Banks of the Suez," details the principal tactical moves on the battlefield itself, analyzes and clarifies complex situations and draws cautious conclusions. The three books complement one another in several political episodes and in many military events, but for a full and consecutive view of this chapter of the war there is still a lack of source books which might complete and broaden the political and military backdrop, and of those able to bring other clarification, knowledge and intellectual grasp to the events and the battles which are already known publicly.

The Eighth of October

One of the topics on which a great deal of writing and consideration has been devoted is the Eighth of October, the day of the first counterattack of the IDF on the southern front. In general they are prone to dealing with the technical moves and description of the battles in the area while dealing less with the factors which moved the war machines and those who operated them. Such is, for example, the issue of the War of the Generals. Within the overall tragedy of the war an Israeli tragedy revealed itself, which laid bare the weakness of the social foundation and the system of relations among the senior IDF commanders. The very highly positive social image of IDF commanders in the Israeli public view and in world public opinion absorbed a severe blow. The struggle of the generals, first revealed in the events of 8 October on the Egyptian front and becoming damagingly sharper, continued and days and months thereafter, was boundless in its accusations, vilifications and sharp outbursts.

It must not be assumed at all that differences of opinion and tactical perceptions, as they became clear on that day, were the sole source of this mighty outburst of mutual accusations. The generals who grew up and were trained on the values of the Haganah and of the IDF, in which they served together for most of the best years of their lives, and whose formations they commanded in all of Israel's wars, certainly stored up within them over the course of years sensations of depression and envy as well as blind struggles on differing perceptions. All of these reached a boiling point under the battle stress of the Yom Kippur War.

Answers to questions as to whether this outburst of passions was by the force of reality, and why it occurred only on the southern front, and how other military organizations cope with so sensitive an issue, might dispel the mist of battle surrounding the struggle of the generals. Even among other nations there must surely be differences of opinion and fixing of blame on one commander or another, but the national social norms protect them within the area of civil and ethical expression. Considerations of overall national damage which might come about from unbridled verbal hostility moderates and reins the individual in his personal expressions. The senior officer knows also that in order to clarify conflicts for

absolving from blame or for clearing of his name there are at his disposal reliable governmental instruments and institutions, to which he is not only enabled and obligated to turn with his allegations, but that they are also what prevent him, by the law, from giving total freedom to the venting of wild passions.

Among a number of IDF generals of that period, such civil and ethical "individual confidence" was totally lacking. With no consideration whatever of the destructive influence that open and unbridled hostility was apt to cause to the military in particular, and to all of society, they made heard their words with no limitations of timing content or style. This was clear expression of extreme egotism which destroyed many vital sections in the area of fundamental values in the military, such as wartime comradeship.

However, when the start of the struggle of the generals was revealed publicly, the senior military and political echelon failed as well. The chief of staff no longer retained the authority to silence by a decree those generals who were going wild with their language, and the political echelon was incapable of channeling the outbursts of the commanders into appropriate and responsible instruments and systems. The arbitrary limitations which the Agranat Commission imposed upon itself and upon its many witnesses made it impossible for the generals to express their pleas as they desired.

Both of these senior echelons were in fact involved, in this measure or another, in the moves and the events which took place during the first days of the war and the projections of which found expression in the public portion of the Agranat Commission Report, but the lawful authority to control the situation was still at their disposal. And so there prevailed and continued without hindrance a massive anarchy on the national ethical level.

Between North and South

The absence of sufficient control of the senior echelons in the nation on the military commanders and the disdain on the part of the latter in accepting decisive governmental authority, which manifested itself also in the lack of operational discipline, were an outcome of the system of relations and the atmosphere which prevailed in the IDF even previously. The confrontation of the generals began in effect even before the Yom Kippur War, in the discussions and the expressions of opinion on leading military and security matters. Chiefs of the general staff and of commands showed disdain for the authority of the military establishment, they leaned upon a civilian system of public relations. Every self-respecting general acquired for himself a press entourage which very willingly absorbed his thoughts and opinions, in order to disseminate them in public.

The military establishment lost its power to influence permanence and preparedness in the strategic area and battle theory. Against this background there were circumventions of discipline in the high echelons and many see in this overall atmosphere which reigned at that time in the IDF the malignant source of the drop in the level of discipline in the military.

The senior commanders who fought on the Syrian front also lived and functioned under such background conditions, of course. The opening conditions of the war on the Syrian front were more difficult for the IDF than were those on the Egyptian front. In the north there was no strategic depth, the stopping of the Syrian forces was accomplished literally at the edge of the descent into the Huleh Valley, the ratios of forces during the first 2 days of the war were worse than in the south, improvisations for unification of forces and of tactical solutions greatly characterize the battle against the massive Syrian incursion. Despite these difficult conditions no confrontation whatever erupted among the commanders of the northern command.

What, then, were the "special" reasons of the southern front which germinated the severe struggle of the generals?

In a slightly more penetrating comparison between the battle conditions on the two fronts during the first 2 days of the war it appears that despite what has been written above, the sum of the conditions and the factors of which a military establishment in a broad battle sector is composed were inestimably more severe in the south than in the north. Among such factors the senior command is the principal component which determines the outcome of the campaign. The quarrel of the generals erupted against the background of the battle events of 8 October. The failure of the first Israeli counterattack broke all of the accepted wisdom with respect to the battle capabilities of the Egyptian enemy and the superiority of the IDF command. The breakdown of concepts and perceptions, feelings of disappointment and frustration--these were vented in the search for a culpable one in the military failure.

A Type of General

The central figure in the war of the generals was Major General S. Gonen, a general in the southern command. The Agranat Commission attributed to him the principal blunders which led to the failure of the attack, and recommended limiting his utilization by the IDF. In the description of the personality of Gonen, Beren writes, among other things: "I knew Gonen well. I was his commander during the many turns of his service (since 1956). I knew he had qualities. In Operation Kedesh he earned a decoration of the chief of the general staff. During the Six Day War, when he fought as Unit Commander 7, he gained a great deal of publicity. He was courageous and a professional armored corpsman. He fashioned for himself

an exhibitionist image and a reputation as a severe disciplinarian, and in that I was dissatisfied with him. He imposed discipline upon his commanders through intimidation, both from the standpoint of style and from the standpoint of substance. More than once I saw him fling objects, tear maps, and bellow at those surrounding him, and impulsively rushing to incarcerate soldiers. It was amazing that a type so impulsive toward those subordinate to him knew how to control his emotions and exercise extraordinary self-control when it involved ranks superior to him. Toward his commanders he was a moderate among moderates; he was what is called in military jargon an accomplished "cyclist," among those who press hard toward the bottom while their eyes are riveted toward the top. The most serious of all in his style of leadership appears to me to be the restricting of the movements of those subordinate to him. They were forbidden to take a step, no matter how small, without his knowledge. Fear reigned around him and more than once I saw adults losing their power of thinking while standing in his presence."

The capability of Gonen's staff work is described by Beren when he mentions a group exercise in which Gonen served as an officer in the operations branch at general headquarters:

"In the course of the exercise I observed close-up how unsuccessful Gonen was in carrying out his mission. That because he bellowed and imposed fear on his aides, thereby causing them to freeze with terror. A situation was created whereby people were incapable of assisting him. Naturally, under such conditions Gonen was unsuccessful in accomplishing his mission."

Qualifications for Failure

At the conclusion of that exercise Beren reported to Daddo, who was at that time the commander of the group being exercised, on Gonen's behavior and work capability. He stressed the hazard to the IDF from an officer such as Gonen who, in his opinion, has no place in the military. In the course of time Daddo promoted Gonen to general and subsequently to head of the southern command. In Beren's opinion, Gonen was not mature enough for his mission and possessed all of the qualities for failure: "Control over large bodies of troops requires help in staff work, and Gonen was incapable of consolidating staff work. Even his experience as commander of a group was limited and restricted, since he commanded a reserve group during a relatively short period only. He did not even have the opportunity to drill himself in command of a group with all of its troops and components."

The stories of the character and behavior of Gonen are many and fascinating. Whoever was not an eye-witness to these manifestations will not believe that thus indeed was the face of things in the formations which he commanded. His image was an anomaly in the IDF--it was quite easy to discern the feeling of inferiority and the aspiration toward superiority of the type of person so amply characterized by Beren's definition, "the cyclist."

With the outbreak of the war a perplexing situation was created. Gonen, the young inexperienced general, commanded the principal war front, while the veteran and experienced Generals Sharon and Adan were under his command. Gonen did not remain in this assignment to the end of the war and the question is whether his inevitable replacement should not have taken place immediately upon the outbreak of war.

The chief of the general staff, who according to Beren's interpretations felt friendship for Gonen since the time he had served in his group as an officer of the operations branch of general headquarters, but unlimited confidence in him and did not distinguish the obstacles which directed all of the activities of his student.

The Crossing Insanity

The feeling of inferiority and superiority, the arrogance and the disdain for the enemy, directed the considerations and decisions of Gonen even on 8 October. Without considering the tactical situation which had taken form in the area, he dreamed of only one thing--crossing of the Canal. All of his plans which had been altered numerous times on that day had this common denominator. His reports to the general staff were influenced by visions of an improved military situation, which makes possible and requires the crossing of the Canal. His zeal to demonstrate to the entire world that he, as the commander of noted and experienced generals, is to lead the troops of Israel over the Canal into the heart of Egypt disconnected him from any realistic vision and rational thinking which were required by the severe situation which prevailed on the front.

In this compulsion to cross the Canal at the earliest "impossible" opportunity, Gonen found great love and support in Arik Sharon. The second central image in the war of the generals also was revealed in all its personal and negative nudity. The egotistical urge of Sharon to accomplish at any price his original plan--to cross the Canal--cut him, too, off from an overall perspective of the severe battle picture.

Beren argues in his book that Sharon, who knew what the activity of the enemy in his sector was, did not clarify the situation to Gonen, and thus erred in that he did not hold his sector appropriately and abandoned it before the forces of Beren seized it. Beren criticizes Sharon severely for failure to carry out orders of the command--to transfer a battalion to his group--as well as for his refusal to support it toward evening in an attack upon the enemy from the south to the north.

The significance of the behavior of Sharon symbolizes mainly a lack of war comradeship and an extreme egotism. The two generals at the center of the war of the generals, therefore, were of identical lines of character and

similar norms of behavior and authenticity. During recent years we have seen that even in the civilian careers of both, these characteristics manifest themselves. "It's all a matter of character"--that is the only appropriate explanation for the confrontation among the generals, which visited such great damage upon the IDF and upon all of society.

8090
CSO: 4805

KUWAIT

'AL-ANBA'' COMMENTS ON AL-ASAD'S MOSCOW TALKS

LD190953 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0714 GMT 19 Oct 79 LD

[Text] Kuwait--AL-ANBA' said that the building of the Arab military force was the only way to make sure that we are not trapped into negotiations and are capable of war or peace. Moreover, this is the best alternative for those who want genuine victory.

The paper was commenting on the Moscow talks by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and the announcement about their total success on the political, armament and economic levels.

The paper referred to the statements by the Saudi crown prince and the chairman of the PLO expressing expectations in connection with the establishment of a just peace and the setting up of a Palestinian state.

AL-QABAS commented on the Soviet-Syrian statement issued at the end of President Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow. It said that the joint statements do not always reflect the real decisions reached at talks because they are often drafted with extreme precision to create specific suggestions which might be true but which might be merely a camouflage.

The paper referred to what it termed the vague expression in the statement with regard "to the continuation of support for the strengthening of Syria's capabilities." AL-QABAS expressed its hope that the strengthening of capabilities means the continuation of the support "with greater drive and larger volume in proportion to the increasing challenges which Syria and the Arabs in general are being subjected to in this part of the world."

The paper believed that the Soviets did not disappoint President al-Asad, although they did not meet all his demands. It said that the alliance between Damascus and Moscow had made long strides "and it is no longer in the interest of the Soviets to leave Syria exposed to Israel militarily." It added that the Camp David parties have chiefly concentrated their pressure on Syria to achieve a further aim, namely to exert pressure on the Soviets, to try to expose them in the Middle East and, if possible, expel them from the region.

46

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

SINGLE ARAB POLICY VIEWED AS ONE-DIMENSIONAL, SHORTSIGHTED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Sep 79 pp 1, 17

Editorial by Henry Hamati: "Re-examination Required for Single Arab Policy"

[Text] A single Arab policy prevails at present in the Arab world. These are the principles of this policy:

- A. Arab solidarity.
- B. Restoration of the territories occupied in June 1967 in return for peace with Israel and recognition of its existence.
- C. The creation of a Palestinian entity that reduces our rights in Palestine to a part of the West Bank of Jordan and Gaza Strip.
- D. Entrenchment of the political and social map of the Arab states and of their regimes.
- E. Peace in the Middle East and equal relations with all countries of the world under the western wing of the international detente.

A single Arab policy, we say?

Yes, a single policy!

Even Egypt, which is outwardly outside the concept of Arab solidarity, is practically within the Arab consensus of these principles which the steadfastness and confrontation states have turned into their slogans and goals. The truth that many dare not declare is that the urgent Egyptian move needed the steadfastness and confrontation demonstration and benefited from it by the degree of the practical progress that this move achieved for this single Arab policy in the area and within the international sphere. This is an actual fact and it is futile to deny it. The controversial relationship that binds the move and the demonstration is most like, if you wish, two conflicting roles in a drama: Each achieves its desired effect by the degree by which it distinguishes and strengthens itself.

However, the single Arab policy includes nothing other than these principles concerning Palestine and which have now come to be known, even in the popular "terminology," as "the issue of Middle East peace." This is the entire sphere of this policy. Within this framework, this policy has set for itself a final goal which it has expressed in the demand for "the just and lasting peace" with its two well-known conditions: Withdrawal of the Jews from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and their recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

So, what we mean by the single Arab policy is the Arab consensus on these two conditions and the joint external political coordination to realize them, after guaranteeing that abidance by the two conditions will constitute the ultimate boundaries of the political thought and political action in all parts of the Arab world. This consensus has not been impossible, despite the social and political differences and conflicts contained within the Arab societies and their political systems. This consensus has not been impossible for numerous reasons, the most important being the size of the mini-states confronting the conflict with its international caliber and the retreat of these states to the point of succumbing to the will of the U.S.-Soviet detente that has drawn the Middle East peace map in its own way.

Yes, it can be said that the unity of the current Arab policy is a reflection of the international detente. This statement of ours does not justify the retreat and the acceptance. It simply explains the historical fact concealed by the media--a fact which finds a fuller explanation in an analysis of this united Arab position toward the Palestinian issue. Stating this fact requires no eloquence and no metaphor. The fact is simply summed up in that the confrontation mini-states cannot launch war without western money and eastern weapons, without the less important capabilities possessed by the single Arab policy, without a convenient international climate permitting these states to reject peace and recognition and without intrinsic domestic conditions that free them of the pincers of social and political disunity and of economic and cultural backwardness and enable them to say no with their own strength and through another, and different, Arab policy.

However, there is between declaration of the principles of rejection and declaration of the principles of acceptance a possibility for a different kind of action--namely, harboring the principles of silent action. The Arab approach toward the Palestinian issue has excluded this kind of action from its calculations and has set no place for it on the stage of the political drama that it has agreed to perform.

It seems that silence is the true steadfastness in this phase. The single Arab policy lacks any principle that we can achieve silently in our real life, as if the sole purpose of this policy is to underline the sincerity of the Arabs, their moderate demands and their honest intentions. What we declare is all we harbor inside and there is nothing else there whereas politics consist of the apparent and of the hidden, of what we promise and what we intend!

The historical fact on which we are trying to shed light in this quick review of the single Arab policy is the absence of the principle of the possible, in its dynamic sense, from among the principles of this policy. This policy lacks, therefore, a futuristic dimension.

The fact that must be underlined in this review is that the minimum-limit policy of which the Arab states talked collectively in Baghdad is actually the maximum-limit policy followed by each of the Arab states separately within its own political entity and within its relations with the other states, especially in regard to the fundamental needs that the confrontation requires of these mini-states and of their economy, culture and ethnic structure. At the level of the bilateral relations between these mini-states and at the level of the social, psychological and political problems under which they are suffering, we can see nothing that goes beyond this minimum limit, either in the thought or in the approach of these states:

Their political relations with one another have continued to accumulate inadequacy.

Their internal relations--and Lebanon is a mirror that reflects all of them--have continued to be an explosive (compound).

We will not be exaggerating if we say that these mini-states have found in the minimum-limit policy a way out, a pretext and a support--and there is no need to explain the meaning of these words.

Moreover, what has compelled the Arabs to abide by the minimum-limit policy? Besides, what drags and drives them to hurry up a solution for the Palestinian problem in this manner, as if all the historical chances have escaped their hands and this is the last chance? There is no doubt (the fault lies in the interpretation of the facts and phenomena of sociology and of politics). Meanwhile, the centers of Arab strength on which the Arab strategy is built are in conflict with the actual Arab policy, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

This is unless the fault is more than a transient mental slip in the course of human life with its regular laws.

8494
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

ARAB'S HURRY FOR PALESTINIAN SOLUTION CRITICIZED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 23 Sep 79 pp 1, 21

[Editorial by Henry Hamati: "Centers of Strength and Weakness"]

[Text] Every strategy is established on points of strength, and so is the current Arab strategy. Our concern here is solely within the limits of comparison between the reality of the Arab strength and the dimensions of the Arab common strategy toward the Palestinian issue.

It is also our concern that these words not be used--like all words against the United States, Israel and Egypt--to serve this strategy, to persuade the west of the enormous concessions made by the Arabs or to employ rejection in order to highlight the virtues of acceptance.

To put it briefly, the Arab financial-political strength complex--under which we can include the various forms of the oil and marketing power, the geographic demographic and ideological strength and the economic, cultural and political conditions conducive to the western interests--is the primary base of the Arab political action at present.

The picture of this enormous base is revealed in the following observations:

Economic colonialism, or the so-called economic relations between the northern countries and the southern countries, is practically impossible except when two conditions are available: Industrial backwardness and money.

The position of the Arab market internationally lies in the fact that it possesses the most valuable cash resource in the world, with a backward industrial situation.

The dialogue between the north and the south is futile because the south is backward and possesses no money to purchase the advanced production of the north.

The significance of the oil does not lie in its being a source of cash revenues but in its being a source of energy. By being a source of energy,

the western society. Socially, it has been possible to eliminate the control of the owners of the "fundamental industries" through nationalization. Internationally, there is no solution to this problem--the problem of the predomination of oil as a source of energy that is ever-increasingly needed by every economic activity--except military colonization. This is why the United States, the west generally, and the east--through the exchange of benefits--have an interest in the continued presence of Rhodesia, Israel, Taiwan and similar places as hot areas or as readily available pretexts for military intervention, or at least the threat of military pressure.

Through the theories of liberal economists, or the remnants of such theories--theories such as having the state implement big public projects through which it puts into circulation sums of local currency necessary to enable the common people to purchase the goods produced locally--the European state has been frequently able to save its industry from collapse. (Before World War II, the rescue operation came through destroying the economic structures of the backward colonies, plundering their raw materials at trivial prices and forcing them to purchase consumer production). However, the application of these theories at the international level currently, in the form of aid to the developing countries and within the limits to which this aid has been offered, has not been enough to guarantee the fate and future of the western industries, especially the European industries. However, this aid has been enough to increase inflation by such an enormous degree which has made raw materials (except oil--the source of energy) of relatively small value. This means that the poor countries will become more and more incapable of purchasing the western products.

The Arab market which has no industry and which is full of money--along with the other oil countries: Iran, Venezuela and Mexico--is the real south with which the dialogue, the northern industrial countries are aware, is useful. The dialogue with this south is a must, is vital and is even fateful. As for the remaining poor countries of the south, the European countries have found themselves compelled to rotate their due debts, out of need and not out of generosity.

With this position, we are a thousand times better off than China. Yet, China has not accepted to be a corpse and Taiwan a living body! Taiwan constituted a gap in China's wall and the Chinese did not accept the continued presence of this gap or the west's entry through this gap. They refused to open their doors, despite their needs that were rising to the point of strangulation, before toppling Taiwan and they have toppled Taiwan. Despite their needs, they have toppled it!

With this position, we are a million times better off than the Organization of African Unity. Yet, the west's position toward Rhodesia is much firmer than its position toward Israel.

What has come to be constantly described as a political victory may not be in fact more than a catastrophe.

We are witnessing a sharp psychological obsession with scoring a political victory against Israel that reflects at the maximum--in the visualization of the current Arab strategy--Israel's recognition of the right of the Palestinians to a part of the bank of a river and to a severed strip in return for recognition by the Palestinians and by others of firm Jewish rights to Palestine.

Our sole concern is comparison!

In the face of the current Arab power, we find that the United States is dealing with us firmly at a time when it is under the energy crisis, under the pressure of the dollar crisis and under the burdens of its allies in Europe and the Far East.

We find the Europeans, the predatory nations, still dealing with us hesitantly at a time when they are under the threat of an industrial collapse that can result, within a matter of a few weeks, in a crushing political collapse of all the European democratic systems.

We find Israel acting like a lion and a tiger, in the words of Jewish author Ephraim (Sivila), at a time when it is engaging in "international beggary." It is now begging from the United States 3.5 billion dollars to cover its economic collapse!

Our sole concern is comparison!

After all this, we find ourselves--surprise of all surprises--compelled to entrench the Israeli presence with peace and recognition and forced to offer guarantees that make the peace lasting. These guarantees are demands that we are afraid to embark on. The biggest danger of the present Arab strategy is that it is in a hurry and that it does not keep any thoughts to itself. It contains nothing but itself at a time when it is based on an enormous Arab power that we have misevaluated and misused.

When we examine the subject of our hurry on its own and without the other subjects, we discover a fatal miscalculation. We find, for example, that it is in the interest of the United States itself and of the west generally for matters not to proceed with such speed, for the Middle East problem not to be completely settled at present and for the Arab acceptance not to be so comprehensive and profound to the degree whereby Israel stops being a problem for us and loses its position as a center of pressure through which they control the oil prices because the oil prices will then follow the law of supply and demand, like the western products.

If Israel is not going to disappear, why the hurry?

If Israel's survival will keep us, if we do not deal with its tomorrow in its capacity as a problem, under the nightmare of international pressure similar to the pressure under which we live at present, then why all this hurry?

If it is in the interest of the United States for Israel to continue to be a problem and for the labor preceding the birth of peace--a birth with which the United States claims to be helping Israel--to be prolonged (10 years have passed so far on the Rogers Plan and this is a period counted as part of the oil era), then isn't it in our interest to re-examine, with minimum consideration for our power, the element of strength in our Arab strategy? Perhaps we may discover that in addition to lacking any futuristic thinking, this strategy is also free of concerns that require time to be settled, except the concern of settling the Palestinian issue before it is too late.

We are confident that we do not need all the current Arab economic and political weight to destroy Israel in the manner in which Taiwan and Saigon have been destroyed. It is our opinion that we do not need all the current Arab economic and political weight to conclude peace with Israel and to recognize it when such peace and recognition become a useful goal!

We need a faithful and intelligent strategy that includes the other concerns that are totally disregarded by the current Arab strategy. We need a strategy that does not repeat the only word it knows for one or two decades of our life and that is not committed to time and not bored by it. We need a strategy that requires time to utilize its points of strength and to develop them so that it may achieve through them what it does not declare.

8494
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

JORDANIAN, PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE AGREEMENT LAUDED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Jordan, Lebanon and Resistance: Extracting Strength From Weakness"]

[Text] Weakening the Arab regimes will not strengthen the Palestinian resistance and strengthening the weak Arab regimes will not weaken the resistance, on the contrary it will strengthen it.

The PLO should have finally realized this, even though it acted in the past on the strength of the opposite concept.

It has been proven now that the confrontation with Jordan weakened both sides while adding strength to their common enemy. It is also being proven now that the fragmentation in the Lebanese structure is reflected on the Palestinian resistance by the same severe degree by which Lebanon is harmed.

What the PLO is currently trying to do is to extract strength from weakness, both in Jordan and in Lebanon. King Husayn's meeting with Chairman 'Arafat in Amman a few days ago was some kind of a legitimate meeting of two heads under one roof, a kind of agreement to share the piece of bread instead of fighting over it and an endeavor for solidarity in good times and bad times.

It seems that the same thing is being repeated in Lebanon through the meeting of President Sarkis and Chairman 'Arafat. The decision that may have been taken by the Palestinian resistance to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon does not weaken the resistance and it strengthens Lebanon. When the Jordanian-Palestinian-Lebanese robe is fully woven, the three parties will find themselves in a better position internally, internationally and at the Arab level.

Since the announcement of the Camp David accords, the PLO has displayed a larger degree of independence in its actions and conduct. This independence has allowed the Palestinian resistance to shine more brightly at the international level, to perform a bigger role at the level of the Arab movement and to have a greater presence in the international calculations.

This fact must eliminate the Arab illusion that has prevailed in the minds for long years, namely the illusion that custodianship over the resistance is better for it than independence. It has now become evident that the Arab custodianship over the resistance has weakened the Arabs and weakened the resistance also.

If the resistance pursues its thrust in this sound direction, it may succeed in penetrating all the Arab negative barriers to become a center of polarization for the Arab regimes and for rapprochement among them. Let us dream that the agreement of al-Husayn, 'Arafat and Sarkis for better or for worse will reflect its positive traces on the Syrian-Iraqi relations.

8494
CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

CENSUS TO BE CONDUCTED IN FEBRUARY 1980

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Sep 79 p 2

[Article: "Preparations for Population Census at Beginning of February; Population Increased Hundredfold in 200 Years"]

[Text] The Ministry of Planning, in participation with specialized experts, is currently preparing for the population census which will take place in Kuwait on 1 February 1980.

The previous population statistics and estimates that date back to 1765 stress that between 1765 and 1975, i.e., within nearly 200 years, Kuwait's population increased 99.5 times.

The statistics also show that in the 18 years between 1957 and 1975 the population increased fourfold.

The results of the latest population census conducted in Kuwait in 1975 showed that Kuwait's population amounted to 994,837 people whereas the population in 1765 was, according to an estimate by Danish explorer (Karston Peuter), 10,000 people.

Historical Glimpse

A pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Planning and containing a historical glimpse of the censuses in the State of Kuwait refers to some historical figures published on Kuwait's population in the past. From these figures, it is possible to recognize the degree of population increase. The pamphlet points out that Kuwait's population between 1900 and 1910 was estimated at 35,900 people whereas this population was estimated by the Supply Department at the beginning of World War II at 80,000 people. The ministry's pamphlet points out that these figures are mere estimates that do not rely on comprehensive surveys or official censuses.

First Census

The pamphlet says that Kuwait carried out the first census in 1957 and that the results of this census showed that the population amounted at the time to 206,473 people. The second census was carried out in 1961 and showed that the population was 321,621 people. The third census, conducted in 1965, showed that the population amounted to 467,339 people. The fourth census was conducted in 1970 and showed that the population rose to 738,662 people. The latest census, conducted in 1975, showed that the population rose to 994,837 people.

Preparation for Next Census

The pamphlet says that the current efforts are focused on getting ready the printed forms to gather the data, to train the workers and to follow up their production in every phase of the process of data collection which will begin as of 1 February 1980. At the same time, arrangements are being made to receive and supply more than 2,500 workers, to divide them into field-work cadres and to prepare the programs to train them theoretically and practically on the means of data collection and data review.

Building and Installation Count

Implementation of the first of these programs which are designed to train the controllers, supervisors and assistants, who exceed 150 trainees, will begin on 2 December 1979 and will continue for 24 days. This general population census will be accompanied by a count of the buildings, houses and installations to find out the degree of construction and housing development and the progress achieved by the construction sector in the past 5 years.

8494

CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

PLAN TO CENTRALIZE OIL INDUSTRY--Kuwait is planning to bring to an end the broad measure of autonomy enjoyed by several state-owned oil and oil-related companies by merging them into a single corporation headed by Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, it was reported last week. The reports said the Kuwait Oil Company, the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, the Kuwait Petrochemicals Industries Company and the Kuwait Oil Tankers Company would all be brought under the new company's control. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Oct 79 p 8]

CSO: 4820

LEBANON

PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTOR ANNOUNCES PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Oct 79 p 5

[Article: "Abi al-Lam' Issues Resolution on Assignments of Public Security Commissioners"]

[Text] Director General of Public Security Faruq Abi al-Lam issued a resolution bearing the number 175 on 1 October 1979. It determines the assignments of Public Security commissioners.

The text of the resolution is as follows:

The Director General of Public Security, in accordance with Decree No 105 of 14 April 1977, Article 79 of Legislative Decree No 139 of 12 June 1959, and Resolution No 98 of 27 July 1979, hereby resolves the following:

Article 1. The following commissioners shall be transferred to the posts indicated beside each of their names:

Commissioner General (distinguished) Mustafa Qa'qur--Chief, Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

Commissioner General (distinguished) Bahjat 'Isa al-Kuri--at the disposal of the Director General.

Lieutenant Colonel Na'im Farah--Chief, Office of Investigations.

Commissioner (distinguished) Yusuf Salim--Chief, Office of Foreigners.

Commissioner (distinguished) Husni al-Shaykhah--at the disposal of the Director General.

Commissioner (distinguished) George Haddad--Chief, Passport Office.

Commissioner General Zahi Bustani--Counsellor of the Director General.

Commissioner General As'ad al-Taqsh--Assistant to the Chief, Office of Investigations.

Commissioner General Hasan al-Saba'--Chief, Public Security Office, Beirut Airport.

Commissioner General Hafiz Shihadah--Chief, Junayh Port Station.

Commissioner General Muhammad Matar--Chief, Public Security Office, Southern Region.

Commissioner General Sayf al-Din Yusuf--Chief, Public Security Office, Northern Region.

Commissioner General Mikhail al-Ramuz--Assistant to the Chief, Inspection Organization.

Commissioner General Nabil Khayrallah--Chief, Residence Registry Office.

Commissioner General Michel al-Khuri Iliyas--Chief, Public Security Office, Port of Beirut.

Commissioner General Hayyam Abu Sa'd Bustani--Chief, Public Security Directorate, Affairs of Nationality, Passports and Foreigners.

Commissioner General Layla Fayyad Latif--Chief, Public Security Directorate, Affairs of Nationality, Passports and Foreigners.

Commissioner General Muhi al-Hamsa--Office of Foreigners, Chief of Temporary Residence Division.

Commissioner General Yasmin Isma'il--Office of Foreigners, Chief, Arab Residence Division

Commissioner General Rabi'ah al-Khaymi al-Ladiqi--Public Security Directorate, Chief, Affairs for Organization and Studies.

Commissioner General 'Ali al-Musawi--Public Security Directorate, Chief, Operations Affairs.

Commissioner General Naji Abu Khalil--Chief, Secretariat General.

Commissioner General Munir Ta'mah--Office of Investigations, Chief, Internal Politics Division.

Commissioner General Wahib Qayqanu--Chief, Printed Material and Recordings Censorship Office.

Commissioner General Ghassan Zahr al-Din--at the disposal of the Minister of Interior.

Commissioner General Ghattas Shuwayri--Chief, Public Security Office of al-Biqa'.

Commissioner General Joseph Abu Samra--at the disposal of the Director General.

Commissioner General Antoine Barud--Chief, Public Security Directorate, Administrative Affairs.

Commissioner General Sami Abu al-Hasan--Chief, Administrative Office.

Commissioner General Mustafa al-Haj--Chief, Office of Inquiry.

Commissioner General Antoine Jubayli--Senior Assistant to the Chief, Beirut and Mount Lebanon Public Security Office.

Commissioner General Nabil Haydar--Office of Investigations, Chief, Labor Unions Division.

Commissioner General Sulayman Sasin--Office of Investigations, Chief, Students Division.

Commissioner General Fadil Idhami--Assistant to the Chief, Public Security Office for the Northern Region.

Commissioner General Sim'aan Hubayqah--Assistant to the Chief, Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport.

Commissioner General Tallal al-Khadari--Deputy Assistant to the Chief, Public Security Office for Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

Commissioner General Rizqallah Frayfar--Chief, Public Security Cabinet.

Commissioner General Jan Mikhail--Administrative Office, Chief, Disciplinary Division.

Commissioner General Illi Dani--Administrative Office, Chief, Technical and Accessories Organization.

Commissioner General Muhammad Faqih--Assistant to the Chief, Office of Public Security for the Southern Region.

Commissioner General Mufid Abu Khazzam--Chief, Press Censorship Affairs.

Commissioner General Siham Harakah--Chief, Security Office, Beirut International Airport.

Commissioner General Fu'ad 'Uwaydat--Security Office for Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Bayt al-Din [Station].

Commissioner General Ru'uf 'Atallah--Public Security Office for Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Ba'bda Station.

Commissioner General Furiat al-Khunsa--Assistant to eh Chief, Secretariat General.

Commissioner General Sunniyah Shatah--Inspection Organization.

Commissioner General Kamal Midwar--Public Security Office for Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief of the al-Jadidah Station.

Commissioner General Aflayn al-Hashim--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

[Commissioner General] Maha Shabib--Assistant to the Chief, Residence Registry Office.

Commissioner General Nabil Taqi al-Din--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner General Dallal Rahbani--Office of Foreigners, Chief of Artists Division.

Commissioner General Samir Hamud--Office of Censorship of Printed Materials and Recordings, Chief of Television Censorship Division.

Commissioner, 1st Class Muhammad al-Saba' I'ayn--Administrative Office, Chief, Division of Personnel Matters.

Commissioner, 1st Class Rudwan Qahwaji--Assistant to the Chief, Public Security Office, Port of Beirut.

Commissioner, 1st Class 'Isam Nasir al-Din, Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, 'Alayh Station.

Commissioner, 1st Class Muhammad 'Asi--Office of Investigations, Chief, Counter-Espionage Division.

Commissioner, 1st Class Antoine Tarraf--at the disposal of the Director General.

Commissioner, 1st Class Hasan 'Abdallah--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Permanent Secretary.

Commissioner, 1st Class Shuqi Khalifah--Chief, Information Affairs.

Commissioner, 1st Class Michel al-Qadi--Information Affairs.

Commissioner, 1st Class 'Abd al-Rakman Bu'iyun--Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Second Beirut Station.

Commissioner, 1st Class Butrus 'Awn--Administrative Office, Chief, Licensing Division.

Commissioner, 1st Class Joseph Jarmanus--Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, First Beirut Station.

Commissioner Adib 'Aqiqi--Office of Investigations, Chief, the Economy and Banks Division.

Commissioner As'ad Lahud--Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Jubayl Station.

Commissioner Yusuf Hattit--Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Third Beirut Station.

Commissioner Fu'ad Qustun--Public Security Office, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Chief, Junayh Station.

Commissioner Ahmad Ramadan--Public Security Directorate, Information Affairs.

Commissioner Edwar Rihhal--Public Security Office, Port of Beirut, Chief, Operation Squad.

Commissioner Tawfiq Khuri--Public Security Office, Port of Beirut, Chief, Division of Passports and Residence.

Commissioner Jan Sham'un--Public Security Office, al-Biqa', Permanent Security.

Commissioner Farid Ja'ja'--Office of Investigations, Chief, Public Places Division.

Commissioner, Jan Shadiyaq--Public Security Office for the Northern Region, Chief, Bashar and al-Kurah Stations.

Commissioner Yusuf Mu'rawi--Public Security Office of al-Biqa', Chief, al-Masna' Station.

Commissioner Ramiz Hayyak--Administrative Office, Chief, Mazra'ah Yashu' Station.

Commissioner Fawzi Rumiyaq--Public Security Office for the Northern Region, Chief, Zgharta and al-Batrun Stations.

Commissioner Muhammad al-Sabbah--Public Security Directorate, Information Affairs.

Commissioner 'Ali Haydar--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner Samir Barjawa--Office of Foreigners, Chief, Division for Palestinians.

Commissioner Faris Kassab--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner Salim Dargham--Administrative Office, Chief of Accounting Division.

Commissioner Mudhath al-Haj--Inspection Organization.

Commissioner Kamal Ma'wid--Public Security Directorate, Administrative Affairs.

Commissioner Antoine Istifan--Public Security Directorate, Operations Affairs.

Commissioner Ziyad al-Hajjar--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner Ili Qassis--Inspection Organization.

Commissioner Munir Latif--Public Security Directorate, Affairs of Nationality, Passports and Foreigners.

Commissioner Baddi' Abu Sulayman--Secretariat General, Chief, Mail Division.

Commissioner Antoine Qazi--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner Habib Faqih--Security Office for the Southern Region, Chief of Bint Jbayl Station.

Commissioner 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shami--Public Security Office, Beirut International Airport, Chief of Service.

Commissioner Adib al-'Alam--Division of Foreigners, Chief, Secretariat Division.

Commissioner Georges Khalil--Public Security Office for the Southern Region, Chief, Jazzin Station.

Commissioner 'Atif Hariri--Public Security Directorate, Administrative Affairs.

Commissioner Ghazi Shulq--Security Office for the Northern Region, Chief, Secretariat Division.

Commissioner Sayid Ma'wid--Inspection Organization.

Commissioner Hannahti--Office of Inquiry.

Commissioner Ahmad 'Addadah--Inspection Organization

Article 2. This resolution shall be announced where necessary.

7811
CSO: 4802

MOROCCO

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ISSUES COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING 30 SEPTEMBER MEETING

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 5-11 Oct 79 pp 4-5

[Communique issued by Central Committee of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), following 30 September meeting in Rabat]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces met on 30 September in Rabat, in its second regular session for 1979.

After hearing the political report presented on behalf of the Political Bureau by First Secretary A. Bouabid;

After a thorough examination of the social, economic and political situation prevailing in the country in relation to its struggle for our territorial integrity and the developments in the Arab Maghreb; and

In the light of our fundamental options as confirmed by our Third Congress, which assigned a clear strategic horizon to our objectives:

The Central Committee notes with bitterness and concern the successive failures experienced by government action aimed at the defense of our territorial integrity and their consequences on the reputation and respectability of our country as a state and nation, failures that have no other counterpart than the successes of our enemies in the pursuit and intensification of their aggression, which inflicts on our country losses of human life and resources whose importance can no longer be underestimated and whose effect can no longer be ignored.

It is in fact necessary to recognize that the absence of an unswerving political will in the service of an overall strategy excluding all hesitation or ambiguity in our country's positions has made it possible for the war of attrition that has been imposed on us for 4 years to achieve several of the tactical and strategic objectives that our enemies assigned to it in the political, diplomatic and military spheres which encourages them to step up the speed of their plan of action in the field.

Our enemies have succeeded in imposing on the Moroccan Government a veritable diplomatic isolation, enabling them to achieve the adoption by

different international organizations of positions in keeping with their own, as was the case in Monrovia and Havana and as one has every reason to believe will be the case in the United Nations in its current session.

After obtaining the backing of several official or semi-official bodies, our enemies are preparing to extract from the United Nations a resolution that would give their increasing aggression against our country the international legitimacy they are seeking and thereby confer on them a new dimension helping to fulfill the slogan they have often used: the imposition of a military solution. This objective now seems feasible in the eyes of our enemies and credible in the eyes of those who support them because of the repeated successes enjoyed by the mercenaries in the attacks they have perpetrated with the help of heavy, sophisticated equipment. These attacks, inside our country and several hundred kilometers from the enemies' bases, cause doubt about our ability to control our borders and to enable our armed forces to play their proper role at the proper time.

Government officials and their administrative networks have demonstrated such hesitation, if not actual negligence, and such incompetency in exercising their duty to control our borders and achieve the required coordination with our armed forces in the field that we are now faced with the question of outlining responsibilities for the manner and style of conducting a sacred national affair. Without answering this question, we shall never understand what happened at Tan Tan, Assa, Fom El Hassn, El Bouirat and elsewhere.

Naturally, the acts of heroism that the officers and soldiers of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) demonstrate in battle are striking proof of their technical capabilities, their willingness to fight and the high level of their morale. But the heavy losses suffered by the different forces of order in the surprise attacks also show, with equal proof, that the level of command in charge of coordinating and defining plans of actions and making decisions -- that is, the level having the ability to determine and assume responsibilities -- suffers serious inadequacies.

The same causes produce the same effects in the different spheres: Diplomatic and military failures are the effects of the absence of an overall strategy and a firm political will, the absence of a governmental authority capable of determining responsibilities with precision and clarity, but also capable of assuming its own with competency and boldness.

Such an absence makes any control laughable and illusory and can only lead to a deepening of the process of degradation now experienced by our country.

This observation is also valid when one examines the economic and social situation and when one sets about analyzing problems of education in our country:

- 1) the patching of the budget -- twice resorted to by the government during the year -- by means of an increase in indirect taxes, which erode the

purchasing power of the masses of the people, and an increase in the prices of food staples, despite the government's pledges not to modify them;

- 2) the increase in unemployment, the dismissal of government employees and white- and blue-collar workers in a mass, arbitrary fashion;
- 3) the systematic use of repression and arrests, political trials and sentences based on texts dating from the Protectorate; and
- 4) the absurd campaign launched to hide the very serious problems affecting our education and reduce them to the normal ups and downs of the beginning of any school year.

All of this proves the total, final failure of the choices adopted since the 1960's. The class which derives its privileges from the place it enjoys in the main centers of economic and administrative decision making is no longer able to sooth itself by self-satisfied slogans or to preach the virtues of liberalism.

We are faced with a government that serves this class and that can now do nothing but shamefully admit its failures, which it prudishly terms "difficulties" so as to disguise its inability to solve the problems existing in all domains.

In the face of the results to which the process of the impoverishment of the masses has led it -- a process of which it is the source and beneficiary -- and confronted with its ineluctable need to reap what it has sowed, the privileged class tries to wash its hands of its responsibility for the current situation, invoking the burdens imposed by the recovery of our territorial integrity, while accelerating the drain of capital going to foreign countries and engaging in operations in which its class behavior can scarcely be distinguished from national betrayal.

As a result, our country is faced with very serious questions that demand adequate responses, both with respect to our territorial integrity and our economy and politics.

The USFP, which refuses to be limited to wait-and-see positions or to take an opportunistic path, avoiding what is required by a responsible commitment, owes it to itself not to be limited to an analysis of the situation and to propose its alternative, the very alternative that was defined scarcely 10 months ago by our Third Congress following an overall evaluation of the situation and on which the current conditions confer historical dimensions.

Therefore, based on this alternative, the Central Committee believes that it is its duty to reaffirm its demands:

- 1) with respect to the struggle for our territorial integrity:
 - a) the definition of an overall strategy that must be put into action and carried out by a political will acting within a framework in which all responsibilities at all levels are determined;
 - b) the lifting of repressive measures of which members and citizens in the southern region of the country are the victims and the opening up of new horizons for them, horizons in which, with the cooperation and the confidence of every one, they will be able to work in their political and trade union organizations for the mobilization of the people so necessary to the support of actions being waged by our armed forces in carrying out their duty to defend our nation and its children;
 - c) the effective and massive arming of citizens in areas whose strategic situation exposes inhabitants to surprise attacks;
 - d) the creation of mobile units able to face the mercenaries and attack them at their own bases;
 - e) the drafting of a coherent and intensive diplomatic plan of action based on an overall, progressive and open vision aimed at eliminating our country's isolation and correcting the grave errors that have been committed;
 - f) a systematic policy of sincere cooperation with Mauritania aimed at guaranteeing trusting co-existence at a time when our common struggle has permitted us to become neighbors; and
 - g) a refusal to overestimate the attempted mediation with Algeria, which can in no way lead to what only the action of a Morocco in a position of strength can bring about, to wit, the recognition of its territorial integrity and the region's need to work for the building of the Arab Maghreb. However, the Central Committee cannot let this opportunity go by without renewing our party's willingness to join with the Algerian FLN in a constructive and responsible dialog aimed at creating the objective and subjective conditions necessary for the creation of real prospects for the building of the Arab Maghreb. We remain convinced that such prospects alone are able to make it possible to go beyond the contradictions and conflicts that have grown deeper and that threaten to lead to an armed confrontation between the two brother nations in an absurd war that would be nothing but a historical crime.
- 2) with respect to the economic and social situation which is the source of the deterioration in our people's living conditions:

The Central Committee demands:

- a) that we follow the sole path capable of providing the effective, overall solutions to the economic and social problems affecting our country, the path of the recognition of the real origins of the current situation and

the application of a firm political will in order to eliminate them, which first of all requires a real, far-reaching and concrete political opening;

b) the choice of new methods in the decision-making process and administration and new social and political relationships; and

c) that we meet the problems of the future with a spirit open to the future and with a determination that will give rise to enthusiasm.

It is within this framework that the Central Committee of the USFP, meeting Rabat in its regular session on 30 September 1979, renews its trust in the alternative which our special Congress and our Third Congress defined and expressed in a minimum program capable of being applied immediately and constantly enriched by practice.

It believes that regardless of the acceptance gained by this alternative, it is its duty:

1) to require that the government reconsider its decision to increase the prices of sugar and oil, just as it reconsidered its decision to increase water and electricity rates. This is all the more feasible since receipts from such increases can easily be compensated for by taxing the privileged classes and the companies that exploit our country and by a coherent policy that will put an end to the waste which drains the country's projects of their promotional nature and harms their economic and social effects;

2) to denounce the systematic and "soft" repression begun in the spring of 1979 and whose results can be measured by over 1,500 exclusions and several dozen trials and prison sentences; and

3) to demand that the government nullify its arbitrary decisions that bring into question a recognized right, inasmuch as its obstinacy in this matter can only be interpreted as the expression of a political determination to repress citizens for their membership in a given trade union or political organization, which obviously leads those involved to derive from such a situation all the imperative political consequences.

In this connection, and no matter what decision the government might make on this question, the Central Committee can only renew the complete solidarity of all its members with the working class in the struggle headed by its powerful organization, the CDT [Democratic Labor Confederation]. It also expresses its satisfaction with the success enjoyed by the solidarity campaign organized to support the victims of repression and summons all trade unionists in our party to redouble their mobilization in order to deepen and intensify this action so as to make solidarity the rock against which the repressive measures and the arbitrary decisions will be broken.

The Central Committee hails the resumption of the legal life of the UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students] after the success of its 16th Congress,

which opened up new prospects for the organization of students on democratic foundations and for their struggle at home and abroad on the trade union and national level, thereby pursuing their historic mission in the movement of national liberation.

11,464
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

USFP SEC GEN BOUABID ADDRESSES MEETING OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 5-11 Oct 79 pp 2-3

[Excerpts from Speech of Abderrahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), at 30 September meeting of the Central Committee]

[Text] The Central Committee of the USFP held its regular meeting on Sunday, 30 September, in Rabat. A large portion of its work was devoted to an analysis of the economic, political and social situation prevailing in the country. The Political Bureau report opening the discussion touched upon three aspects: the political and economic situation, the question of the achievement of territorial unity and party activity. A thorough, wide-ranging discussion followed in the usual democratic atmosphere characterizing our party's operation.

Following this debate, the first secretary of the USFP took the floor to sum up the discussion and in order to provide clarifications which certain speakers requested.

"The alternative to the situation prevailing in the country is contained in the final political statement of the Third Congress of the USFP," he said. "It requires a questioning of the elective, administrative and governmental apparatuses." He noted that the final declaration of the Third Congress of the USFP is a minimum program constituting an alternative that can bring the country out of the worsening crisis, irresponsibility and improvisation.

"As for the democratic experiment, we have said from the very beginning that it is a false democracy," he said. "We have become involved in order to denounce this falsification and its direct repercussions on the economic, financial, social and cultural situation and on the overall crisis in our country." The democratic experiment has failed; this is a fact. "Did we expect that our presence in Parliament and in the municipal and communal councils would halt the repression and change the mentality of the administrative apparatus?" he wondered. "No one expected these institutions to be anything but another fighting front." The first secretary then added: [words omitted] does not consist in rehabilitating this democracy but in

furthering the fight for democracy and for the coming of a new society based on the choices that we defend."

We should not be surprised that repression continues to be used against the members of our party. "Our enemies will always try to erect obstacles in our path," he said, "but this can only strengthen our party's will and force and increase the trust demonstrated by the masses. We believe in democracy, we fight for its coming and every day, we offer up victims to defend it. We shall continue this struggle because it is a legitimate national struggle aimed at freeing citizens from oppression and exploitation and at building a free, democratic and socialist society."

Before concluding, Bouabid recalled that thanks to its constant struggle, our party has won a wide international following.

At the end of its meeting, the Central Committee approved a communique, the translation of which we are publishing in this edition.

Abderrahim Bouabid at the USFP Central Committee Meeting

The regular meeting of the Central Committee of the USFP was held on 30 September in Rabat. Abderrahim Bouabid, first secretary of our movement, delivered the main speech on the general situation in the country. A wide-ranging debate on the topics covered followed.

The following are lengthy excerpts from his speech.

Turning to social problems, Bouabid said:

"All Moroccans can now judge the gravity of the economic and social crisis in which the country finds itself. All of our party's predictions have unfortunately turned out to be correct. The increase in the cost of living, accompanied by a wage freeze for those lucky enough to have a job in our country, results in a deterioration of the purchasing power of the exploited classes. When one realizes that that purchasing power is reduced 40 percent every year, one is justified in asking certain questions: How has this happened? What are we to do about it?

"We must tirelessly recall that the source of the evil is found in the capitalist option and the system of outrageous exploitation imposed on our people in the management of the country's affairs. If those in power attribute this deterioration in the purchasing power to the international situation, they forget or pretend to forget the essential point: The main reason actually resides in the increasing dependency of our economy on the international capitalist system."

Speeches Are One Thing, Reality Another

Failure can be seen everywhere and the failure is admitted even by the advocates of liberalism, who are beginning to recognize their inability, not

only to rectify the situation, but simply to put an end to its deterioration. And yet, the government has made many promises. How many times has it been said that measures will be taken in order not to make the lower-income groups bear the burden of the increase in the price of staples such as sugar and tea? How many times have we been told that there will be wage increases for those on the bottom of the scale? All Moroccans can now see that speeches are one thing and reality another. Nor does this surprise us, considering the fact that those in power have a completely erroneous vision of the reality of things.

The first secretary then went on to say that the deterioration in the situation requires that we intensify our action in the direction of a greater mobilization of the social classes that are exploited, encouraging them to refuse, in their daily life, to suffer the consequences of the crisis, to rise up against our country's increasing tendency to come under the boot of the system of capitalist exploitation, to denounce the bourgeoisie which, seized with panic in the face of a situation deemed to be unstable, has no other concern than to protect its capital by putting it in foreign banks.

"Our struggle and that of our party has no other objective than to create a new society. And yet, that objective will not be achieved through any miracle. It depends on our ability to mobilize the Moroccan masses that suffer grievously in their lives and on our strength of persuasion in this mobilization."

Going on to speak about education, Comrade Bouabid noted: "The beginning of the academic year in our schools and universities clearly illustrates the failure of the government's policy in this domain, as in others. How far have we gotten with the national demand concerning universal education? We have not forgotten that this was considered by the government itself to be an objective to be achieved first of all in 1970 and then in 1975. Now they speak about 1995, 40 years after independence! One can therefore see that promises do not cost those in power much, but we know better than anyone what the true story is and the picture before us is eloquent: Only 50 percent of all children of school age are actually in school this year. The remaining 50 percent have no other prospect before them than the streets.

"In secondary education, the situation is the same. The so-called reforms adopted in this cycle raise other obstacles by means of competition preventing our children from having access to higher education. The result of this new policy will be to limit access to higher education to a small elite, which will certainly include the sons of those who, by virtue of their relations and their personal intervention, have a 'long arm,' despite the real results of the competition. It should be noted that the introduction of entrance examinations comes at a time when the different officials ceaselessly repeat that Morocco is lacking in technical personnel. We agree that restrictions may be imposed on access to the so-called literary disciplines, but why should we close the School of Medicine, the School of Science and the technical institutes to high school graduates wishing to pursue the study of medicine or scientific and technical studies? One of the most surprising aspects of this situation is that the country continues to appeal

to foreign doctors and technicians, with all that this implies for our finances. Forcing high school graduates to take another examination can have no other explanation than an incoherent, improvised policy in the field of education. It is therefore not surprising that those in power, deprived of an instrument responding to the needs of rational planning, cannot find any solutions to the problems that exist. They play everything by ear and improvise solutions as the need arises."

There are now thousands of high school and even university graduates who are forced to join the ranks of the unemployed every year. There are at least 3,000 law school graduates who are unemployed at a time when 40 percent of the upper-level personnel of the joint Moroccan-foreign companies working in our country are not Moroccans.

Unemployment, which spreads its tentacles year after year, now affects the young and people pretend to forget that this burden is borne by the social classes because those who have the good fortune to have a job must also pay for the increased cost of living along with the unemployed or laid-off relative or cousin who lives off of his meager daily pittance, even considering the noble habitudes of family solidarity that characterize our people. It is precisely this trait of the Moroccans that has warded off the imminent explosion so far.

Our Position: Set Forth by the Third Congress

Naturally, our officials miss no opportunity to attribute the current crisis to the imperatives dictated by the defense of our borders. No one would think to deny the need to throw into the fray the entire weight of our potential for the national cause. This is perfectly clear, but we have the right to ask certain question:

Is this potential being judiciously used in the field of defense?

Is there no waste?

The simple truth is that this burden is heavy only because there is faulty management and because there is no clear, overall view of the problem. This being the case, we cannot allow all the burden of national defense to be borne solely by the lower classes, while the Moroccan bourgeoisie does not even pay the taxes levied by an unfair tax system.

Regarding the means to be mobilized for the defense of our country, our party has its own ideas on the matter. They are contained in the political manifesto of its Third National Congress. But what is one to do and think in the face of a class which, overcome by worry, protects its capital by placing it in foreign banks?

"In substance, this is the situation that now prevails in the country. As one can see, there is no lack of problems, but the proper solutions can be found. They are essentially political in nature. They can be summed up

as placing national potential in the service of all Moroccans and not just a minority. That has always been our position, it is our credo, we have not changed and our line remains the one set forth by the will of our members at the Third Congress of the USFP."

Concerning the situation on our southern borders, the first secretary of our party noted:

"On this matter also, our idea of the defense of our borders is different from that of those in power. It is unfortunate to note that our adversaries found their policy on our territorial integrity on Morocco's weakness and on its inability to decide to pick up the challenge imposed on its borders. This weakness is not imaginary. It is real and can be explained by the total absence of an overall strategy and the nonparticipation of the broad masses in the defense of our borders. We are convinced that only the mobilization of our people can cause our adversary to lose hope of one day attaining its objective. Our country's suffering is real and painful and the sacrifices made by our armed forces on the front lines are heavy, but the war of attrition imposed on us calls for the use of other means and another strategy.

"On the diplomatic level, our isolation is so great that we have difficulty finding sincere support for our cause and no country dares to proclaim openly that the Sahara constitutes an integral part of our country because of the deterioration of Morocco's image abroad."

In the United Nations, our adversaries are working to see that the current session of the general assembly adopts a recommendation inviting Morocco to withdraw its forces from the recovered territories.

Coming after so many international encounters, such a position on the part of the United Nations would automatically be followed by an intensification of our adversaries' offensive in the field.

This scarcely enviable position was foreseeable and on countless occasions, our party has called attention to the deterioration of our international position.

There are those who naively claim that Morocco has nothing to fear from positions hostile to our country as long as such hostility is limited to the diplomatic level and as long as Morocco stands its ground. Such claims are simplistic because standing our ground is not enough to preserve our territory. When we have the capability of safeguarding our land, international opinion will reconsider its positions on the Moroccan nature of the Sahara. Most of the countries that vote against us do so either based on erroneous assumptions or because the question has not been presented in a convincing manner.

Avoid Confrontation

Still on the international level, another new element that some individuals try to minimize, despite its grave implications for our territorial unity,

is the meeting of the Spanish, Italian and French Communist parties in Madrid. That meeting is not a coincidence. We know that the French Communist Party does not undertake any action without long reflection and a thorough analysis of the possible consequences. Therefore, the meeting in Madrid cannot have been called for the sole purpose of satisfying the Algerian rulers. We are going to see the consequences that will result from such a meeting involving the participation of the Italian Communist Party, which had previously been relatively reserved on the question of the Sahara, and the Spanish Communist Party, which is separated from the other two West European Communist parties by more than one divergency. In the still recent past, these parties could not come together on the Vietnamese question despite their unified views. Georges Marchais has never been able to meet with Santiago Carrillo, even on the Spanish candidacy for the EFC, due to their disagreement on the matter. Now they are all together on the crucial question of the Sahara. This is an event that must be taken into consideration because of the effects it will have on Morocco's relations with the two blocs.

We are witnessing flagrant meddling in the region by parties that carry weight and have influence on national opinion and the working class in their respective countries, meddling that demands self-determination of the Sahara and the recognition of a so-called Saharan people and their sole representative, the pseudo POLISARIO Front.

Clearly, this self-determination is but a pre-established recognition aimed at covering an entity shaped by the Algerian Army and emanating from it.

It is an entity with weapons and funds which no liberation movement in Asia, Africa or Latin America has enjoyed in the past. It is an entity established only a few months ago.

Comrade Bouabid then wondered whether the Moroccan officials would continue to follow the path which has created the situation endangering the country and its future. Will the government always play deaf to the voices of the people and Morocco's human resources?

Morocco is truly facing a threat that is growing every day in a region where a confrontation between two brother peoples becomes increasingly likely.

The first secretary of the USFP stated that "that is what caused our brothers in the PLO and particularly Abou Ammar to undertake mediation between Morocco and Algeria so as to prevent these two countries from having a confrontation that will have the worst repercussions on the Palestinian question and the Arab question in general."

If the Irreparable Should Come To Pass...

"We can therefore understand the concern of our Palestinian brothers on this matter because they know better than anyone else the horror of what could happen if a fratricidal war should break out in this region of the Arab world.

"Are there any indications of a detente?" In answer to this question, Abderrahim Bouabid said that unfortunately, nothing seems to point to any desire for dialog on the part of the Algerian leaders. He also recalled that the USFP has always addressed itself to the leaders of the FLN for a franc and constructive dialog, proposing a solution within the framework of the Arab Maghreb, a Maghreb of peoples. Avoiding the irreparable is the top priority, for it is the irrevocable that our people and the majority of all Algerians reject."

Referring to the Algerian political leaders, whose number was recently expanded, Abderrahim Bouabid said that they are not of the same line as the governmental positions on the matter because "they are familiar with the phases of the liberation of our two countries at the time of the common struggle. If they succeed in creating a trend in Algerian opinion favorable to an understanding, this will help to avoid a war.

"As for certain rumors, whether new or dreamed, we must not attribute any importance to them. This does not mean that we are pessimistic because we are working for understanding and openness.

"Whatever the case, if the irrevocable happens, the result will be to plunge Morocco into one bloc and Algeria into another in a process that will damage our region, moving toward dangerous dependency.... In this connection, we issue a warm appeal to the Algerian people and the FLN, reassuring them that our duty and the legacy left by our martyrs will prevent us from creating a zone of tension which our two countries can well do without, tension that would give rise to the intervention of several countries. We owe it to ourselves to work to solve these problems within the framework of an overall vision of the interests of the Arab Maghreb.

"Moreover, this does not prevent us from reaffirming that the Moroccan people, who are on the defensive, will no longer tolerate attacks without replying as required by the situation."

Moving on an analysis of the pseudo democratic experiment in Morocco, Comrade Bouabid said:

"We have agreed to embark upon what has been called a democratic experiment. From the very beginning, we have said that it was impossible -- with the administrative apparatus being what it was -- to expect honest results recognizing the weight and strength of our party. The accomplishment was not the previously known result, but rather, a positive dialog and means of struggle on a national level in all regions.

"Our comrades in Parliament and on other fronts express the ambitions of the masses and their opinion on territorial unity, social problems, the question of wages and prices, the problems of the fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups, and so on.

"This is a mission entrusted to our comrades working within an unrepresentative parliament emerging from rigged elections. Despite their small number, they make the voices of the masses heard by everyone. The day when we feel that their action in Parliament is no longer of any interest, the party's leadership organs will decide whether it is fitting to keep them there.

"As for the municipal and rural councils, the prime concern of the administrative apparatus in most of the provinces is to prevent our comrades' action aimed at serving the population. On this subject, one government official even said, in speaking to our comrades: 'If I let you carry out these projects, it means that I am helping you now to prepare for the next election campaign.'

"In cases where defections occur on the part of our elected candidates, owing to their capitulation and their lack of firmness with regard to pressure from the government or certain temptations, the regional bodies of the party are vigilant and make sure that all action by elected officials is in the interests of the citizen who has placed his trust in the USFP.

"But the action of our comrades in most provinces is honorable. It responds to needs, particularly in the distant provinces. How is it possible to imprison the president of the municipal council of the city of Ifni, the gateway to the Sahara?

"Such measures destroy all mobilization, lead us to despair and encourage our adversaries to doubt the will of our country.

"If repression is the response of some officials, we shall restate our firmness, firmness that requires more organization, wisdom and responsibility, firmness that also requires, under these circumstances, that we avoid futile action."

11,464
CSO: 4400

SAUDI ARABIA

AMIR SULTAN INTERVIEWED ON AUSTRIA VISIT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 15

[Interview with Saudi Defense Minister Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: "Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Tells AL-MUSTAQBAL: We Have no Plans Now to Exchange Representation With Moscow"]

[Text] Vienna--Last Saturday, Amir Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, ended his official 4-day visit to Vienna, Austria. The visit was highlighted by a lengthy meeting between Amir Sultan and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky which lasted for more than 3 hours. Another high point of the visit was the 2-day military maneuvers held especially on the occasion of the Amir's visit (with live ammunition), during which were displayed all the types of weapons--locally produced or imported and developed--used by the Austrian armed forces. In Vienna, AL-MUSTAQBAL had a brief interview with Amir Sultan. The following are the main points of the interview:

[Question] Has your visit led to any positive results pertaining to the prospects of Austria selling arms to Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] My visit to Austria was not connected with any specific purpose inasmuch as it was concerned with fostering cooperation between our two countries and meeting with our friends in that great nation to get acquainted with what they have [sic] and to develop Saudi-Austrian friendship. This was the purpose of the visit.

[Question] In which direction is the [Middle East] region moving? Is it headed for war or peace?

[Answer] The Arabs seek peace, but what they want is peace based on justice and right. As to the other side, it is known what they want.

[Question] After your meeting with Chancellor Kreisky, have you detected any possibilities for an effective and real peace?

[Answer] It is known to all the Chancellor Kreisky has been serving the cause of world peace for a long time now, and it is natural for us to have conducted our talks within that context.

[Question] Have you agreed with Chancellor Kreisky on the outlines of a peaceful settlement?

[Answer] The issue here is one which belongs to our Palestinian brethren. No other Arab has the right to speak for them. Therefore, any discussion of this specific problem should be done with the Palestinians themselves.

[Question] According to information by the Center for Strategic Studies in London, the situation in the region has changed following the events in Iran.

[Answer] I do not think so. The speculations which are being bandied about nowadays are made by consciences [sic] that are unaware of the realities of the Middle East. They are particularly unfamiliar with the realities of the situation in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

[Question] Is the region facing any dangers?

[Answer] I do not think so.

[Question] Do you have any tendency now to establish relations with the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Our relationship with the Soviet Union as a great power derives from the United Nations charter. We cooperate with the Soviet Union if it follows the path of right and justice on any issue. We are not committed to any one state against another.

[Question] But are you considering exchanging diplomatic relations with Moscow?

[Answer] I do not believe that there is any particular plan at present. We believe that when the Soviet Union realizes that doctrines cannot be exported, we may then begin to consider the idea of establishing relations with the Soviet Union.

[Question] Does the kingdom have any intention of using oil as a tool of pressure, as it had done in 1973?

[Answer] The kingdom exercises the right of sovereignty, but we are now in the process of supporting the entire free world as well as supporting all peoples--be they in Europe, America or anywhere else. Therefore, we

hope that we would not be forced to take any measure which would affect the interests of other states.

[Question] Based on the extensive talks you held today with the Chancellor of Austria and based on the daring initiatives Chancellor Kreisky has taken so far, do you expect any particular new steps toward solving the Arab problem and restoring Arab rights?

[Answer] Chancellor Kreisky has exerted great efforts in favor of a just peace. We implore God to insure the success of this trend which would assure the Palestinian people and the region's states happiness and peace under the banner of securing the legitimate rights of all states.

[Question] Saudi Arabia has called for the unification of Arab ranks. How can this be done at the present time?

[Answer] This policy of ours has been consistent since the era of King 'Abd al-'Aziz. Its objective is to unify Arab ranks, and I believe that regardless of whatever events and problems that may occur or arise, the Arabs will stand as one when duty calls.

[Question] In the context of Saudi moves in all directions and on all levels, are there any prospective meetings in or visits to Europe or other parts of the world?

[Answer] Visits and meetings will continue between Saudi Arabia and friendly nations as well as between Saudi Arabia and other nations in the service of world peace and the economic well-being of mankind and the Arab nation.

9254

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

PRESS CRITICIZES ATTITUDE OF MILLIONAIRES

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 27

[Article: "Criticism and Counter-criticism in the Saudi Press"]

[Text] Some political and media currents can be likened to hurricanes. They develop in a given society and soon they rage out of control, smashing all obstacles and sweeping away barriers that had made some areas seem impregnable. Observers have been lately struck by certain phenomena which can be classified as self-criticism, specifically the campaign mounted by some Saudi newspapers against certain business and financial deals and commissions. The campaign has reached such proportions that the newspaper AL-RIYAD recently published an article by Muhammad 'Alwan which included the following remarks:

"I will not pose (to Khashuqji and Akram 'Ijjah) the question, 'how did you get your wealth?' because we know the answer in advance and because we do not want to delve into the details of how they made their wealth and to what extent were their actions and practices legitimate. The question itself is unacceptable in principle because if we are to bring such wealthy men to account we would need many commissions [of inquiry] costing millions [of rials] as well as a team of specialists and legal and judicial experts... It is our hope, however, that their conscience will awaken, even if for one time, because that one time would be enough to put an end to this blatant ravishment of the wealth of this homeland either in the name of making a commission or in the name of striking a business deal, to the rest of all those new euphemisms of ravishment."

Addressing himself to 'Adnan Khashuqji, Muhammad 'Alwan goes on to say: "You are probably bewildered by this uproar against you and against the wealth you have amassed, but I say, no, this is your money and you have used your own abilities, regardless of whether they were positive or negative, as well as various methods and expertise, regardless of whether they were legal or illegal, to make this wealth of yours. This is your own affair, But we have reached a simple conviction, namely, that it is not for us to bring you to account, although the perennial question 'how did you make your wealth?' will linger in our minds and will continue to hound you and

all those who have accumulated enormous and incredible wealth that cannot be measured by the standard gauges of normal human effort, intelligence and productive capacity... Nevertheless, many people join me in wondering about what have 'Adnan Khashuqji and Akram 'Ijjah offered their country."

'Alwan concluded his article by apologizing to Khashuqji for taking so much of his time "because you might need this time to strike a new business deal or get a new fat commission by which you would beef up your wealth and deprive a young man or a young woman in your country of a job opportunity. May our country rejoice in its wealthy men! God Almighty was right when He said: 'If We want to destroy a town, We will have its wealthy and affluent men sin and spread depravity in it, thereby making it deservant of Our destruction.'"

This article has been considered the most vehement criticism of its kind to a group of millionaires who have accumulated their wealth through business and financial commissions and deals as well as American and French arms deals. Prominent Saudi financiers, businessmen, engineers and contractors have been photocopying such articles and mailing them to their friends abroad, on the basis that self-criticism, a wave started a year ago by the Minister of Electricity al-Qusaybi in an article severely critical of Akram 'Ijjah, is spreading and building up and may in fact develop into a popular trend which might go as far as naming names, citing figures and disclosing secret accounts.

What has been puzzling and raising tens of question marks is that the self-criticism campaign being played out in the Saudi press against business commissions, deals and unjustified wealth coincided with a parallel press campaign in Egypt against 'Adnan Khashuqji and Akram 'Ijjah, but in a more biting and disparaging language aimed at those who stand behind Khashuqji and 'Ijjah--to such an extent that a well-known journalist, Kamal Abu al-Majd, has published an article in the weekly AL-MUSAWWAR in which he delved into Khashuqji's personal life to the point of even naming his Italian girlfriend, Laura, although Laura has converted into Islam and changed her name to Lamya and has in fact made a pilgrimage to Mecca and performed the ritual circumambulation of the Ka'bah. It has also been said--though this was disregarded by the Egyptian press--that Khashuqji has taken Lamya as his wife for more than a year now--that is, before the death of his father, Dr Muhammad, but that he has chosen to keep his marriage shielded from the limelights.

The question now is: Is it true that Ashraf Marwan stands behind the Egyptian press campaign against Khashuqji, as Khashuqji's friends say, and is the source of all those and other stories being published in the Egyptian press? Then there is another question: Is there a link between the self-criticism campaign in the Saudi press and the daring article written by Amir Nawwaf Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, former adviser to King Faysal, and published by the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT which is funded by a group of Saudi financiers and businessmen headed by Shaykh Kamal Adham, a former special adviser to King Faysal?

Amir Nawwaf's article in AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT was entitled "Who Will Answer Carter and Preserve Our Dignity?" The following is an excerpt:

"The American President Jimmy Carter has said that none of the Arab leaders he has met has particularly expressed a desire to see the establishment of a Palestinian state, despite the public statements made by those leaders in this connection. President Carter went on to say that the Arab leaders with whom he has met have never demanded the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This is what the president of the United States is saying. He is telling the peoples of those Arab leaders, 'Your leaders are lying to you.' In so doing, President Carter disregarded diplomatic norms and etiquette and has deliberately defamed Arab leaders... Why then are they tolerating his behavior, unless, of course, what he has said is true? Who will believe us after what President Carter has said?"

Amir Nawwaf concluded his article as follows: "If the president of the United States has chosen to ignore diplomatic norms for a specific purpose in his mind or for a certain political goal relating to his electoral situation, then it becomes incumbent upon Arab leaders, in keeping with their responsibilities toward their peoples, to sweep aside diplomatic norms and make public all the letters they have exchanged with President Carter on the question of the Palestinian state and disclose the minutes of their meetings with him relating to the issue of the Palestinian state. Only then will we have credibility in the world. Only such action will enable us to preserve our dignity. Only such action will remove the label of lying which president Carter has attached to our leaders."

This article has caused quiet ripples and reactions among the Arab and foreign political and diplomatic circles, and a lot of people have been trying to surmise whom Amir Nawwaf means when he says, "Who will answer Carter and preserve our dignity?"

Initially, some observers believed that there were differing views within the ruling Saudi family on the question of, "should we answer Carter or not?" It has also been said that the American ambassador, John West, a personal friend of President Carter who was chosen to act as a bridge between President Carter and Amir Fahd [the crown prince], sometimes spends a week or two waiting for a meeting with senior Saudi officials. Once he insisted on an urgent interview with Amir Fahd, only to be told: Put what you want to tell His Highness Amir Fahd in writing and you will receive an answer as soon as possible, because the Amir's schedule is so full that even an urgent meeting cannot be arranged before 2 weeks.

Sources connected with American circles say that treating the representative of a superpower--indeed, the only superpower with which Saudi Arabia dealt--in such a manner is a phenomenon which deserves examination, that it demonstrates that American-Saudi relations are not doing well.

As to Amir Nawwaf's article, "Who Will Answer Carter and Preserve Our Dignity?", King Khalid reportedly made remarks similar to those contained

- in the Amir's article at a private meeting held 2 weeks ago in Geneva
- where he spends part of his annual vacation. It was clear that King Khalid
- was very annoyed by the American President's disregard of diplomatic practice
- and the inaccurate statements he has made, not to mention that President
- Carter's action was an affront to the Arab leaders he had met. It seems
- that Amir Nawwaf, who is known for his sedateness among his brethren, the
- sons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz, decided that it was better not to keep quiet
- about President Carter's remarks. He must have figured that if the officials
- in power preferred not to enter into a battle of words with President Carter,
- then it was at least incumbent upon a member of the royal family who has
- no position of authority to express an opinion which represents the Saudi
- viewpoint on President Carter's behavior and remarks.

- However, a week after the appearance of the article in question, the newspaper
- AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT used a regular back-page column entitled "Good Morning"
- to carry a comment by one of its publishers, Hisham 'Ali Hafiz, in which
- he said that the issue raised by Amir Nawwaf with regard to President Carter's
- remarks does not merit the level of uproar and clamor which the Amir had
- tried to arouse, because President Carter did not lie, since the Arab
- leaders involved have not actually asked him to recognize the Palestinians'
- right to a national state of their own, but simply demanded that the
- Palestinians be granted the right to self-determination.

- A lot of people were puzzled by all this. Who after all knows more about
- whether President Carter's remarks were correct or not: the Arab kings,
- princes and leaders who had met with him or Amir Nawwaf or Hisham 'Ali Hafiz?

- The sense of bewilderment is not due to the Saudi publisher's affirmation
- that the Arab leaders in question have not raised the question of the
- Palestinian state with President Carter--everyone knows that Shaykh Kamal
- Adham, the head of the Saudi group which owns the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT,
- is a well-informed man and is considered, in fact, to be one of the most
- important sources of information in the Arab region. The puzzlement
- results from the fact that the task of correcting the information of Amir
- Nawwaf was assigned to Hisham 'Ali Hafiz rather than to Dr al-Yamani, the
- Saudi Information Minister, or to the Secretary General of the Arab League
- or at least Dr Clovis Maqsud who has a double function as a contributing
- editor of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT and an Arab League official.

- At any rate, the recent campaign of criticism and counter-criticism in
- the Saudi press, in or outside Saudi Arabia, has stirred up a great deal
- of whispers and rumors which quietly circulate in various private and
- formal circles and in the foreign embassies. At the same time, however,
- it has raised an inevitable question: Will the campaign stop at the
- expected limits or will it build up into a hurricane which will rip the
- wraps off the closed Saudi society and throw its doors and windows wide
- open to criticism and counter-criticism?

- Commenting on the press debates going on in his country, a Saudi official
- said: Criticism is in our nature, but what has happened is that such
- criticism have been transferred from private circles to the pages of news-
- papers.

- 9254
- CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

PORT DEVELOPMENT--The competent authorities in Saudi Arabia are undertaking a program to develop Saudi ports in order to cope with the expansion in imports and exports resulting from the continuous economic growth and the increasing needs of the various regions of Saudi Arabia. Most ports are being expanded under the government's long-term port development plan. As to ports on the Red Sea, 20 reserve piers are being added to the port of Jidda which has 27 piers, seven piers are being built in the port of Yanbu' and two in Jizan with the possible addition of seven more in the future. The development of the ports of Al-Wajh and Al-Qunfudhah is being studied. On the Arabian Gulf, 18 piers are being built in the port of Al-Dammam--four for the unloading of containers--in addition to the port's 24 piers. At the port of Al-Jubayl, 14 piers are being build. These will be later supplemented by 14 others which will exclusively service the industrial and petrolchemical complex there. Work is now going on to improve the port of Al-Khubar. The Saudi authorities had earlier solved the problem of pile-ups in the kingdom's major ports by mechanizing loading and unloading facilities. Total goods unloaded at the ports of Jidda, Al-Dammam, Yanbu' and Jizan amounted to 27.6 million tons in 1977, an increase of 67 percent over 1976. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7] 9254

CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

ELECTRICAL PROJECTS SPREAD IN ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 1 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "26 Power Stations To Operate in States by 1980; Government Is To Pay Residential Hook-Up Costs"]

[Excerpt] His Excellency al-Shaykh Hamud ibn 'Abdallah al-Harhi minister of electricity and water stated that his ministry has made major strides in completing the program it had prepared for 1979 with regard to providing water and electricity for the capital.

His excellency added in a special interview he granted to the Newspaper, 'UMAN, that the ministry will carry out implementation work in its special program for cities and villages and that this program will begin early next year.

He said that 1980 will be the year during which all the power plants in the administrative regions--there are 26 plants--will become operational. "When we say they will become operational, we do not mean the machinery will be operating, but we do mean that we will give the citizen an opportunity to benefit from electricity services.

His excellency the minister of power and water added that it will be the ministry and not the National Power Company that will carry out the operation of residential hook-ups and connections. He said that the company's function will be confined to operating the stations, maintaining the power lines and collecting consumption [payments] in accordance with citizens' wishes. The feasibility of this method has been proven in the administrative region of Nazwa and it will be universalized in all the administrative regions.

His excellency the minister denied that the ministry intended to raise consumer prices, and he said that his ministry was not thinking of such a matter.

His excellency the minister of electricity and water said that the ministry had made similar progress in providing drinking water and that a similar

drinking water program was progressing hand in hand with the electricity program that had been prepared by the ministry to serve different areas of the sultanate.

His excellency said that 1980 will witness the birth of water systems projects in Nazwa, Suhar, Sur and al-Buraymi.

With regard to immediate solutions to the water problem, his excellency Hamud al-Harhi said that the ministry was implementing and studying emergency means for supplying the areas that are suffering from a water problem, and especially the populated areas such as al-Batinah.

8592
CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

THAMARIT-SALALAH ROAD PROJECT BEGINS

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 2 Oct 79 p 1

[Article: "Work on Thamarit-Salalah Road Begins; Work on Road To End in 1983; Exhaustive Study for Construction of Port in Sur"]

[Text] Engineer Salim Hamid al-Ghasani, acting undersecretary of transportation for the affairs of roads and ports affirmed that work on the Nazwa-Thamarit Road had begun early last month. It is expected that work on this road will be completed in February 1983. Engineer al-Ghasani said that the ministry was currently carrying out the studies that were necessary for the completion of internal roads in some of the administrative regions. The lengths of these roads amount to approximately 90 kilometers. These roads include the Matrah-Suhar Road and the roads that branch from it to Barka', to al-Masna'ah, to al-Suwayq and to Saham. That is, the area of al-Batinah will be tied together with a system of modern, paved roads.

He added that the ministry has a plan to build other roads. In addition, to the Nazwa-Thamarit Road, work is underway on the second phase of the Matrah-Qurayat Road and on the Nazwa-'Ibri Road with their branch roads. Work is also underway on the al-Bustan-Sidab Road.

He added that the other roads are being studied and will be implemented soon. These are the al-Jabaliyah Road in the southern area, the roads in the Musandam area and the Khasab-Bukha Road.

The acting undersecretary of transportation said that work was underway at the present time to expand the runway at the al-Sib International Airport.

With regard to ports, Engineer al-Ghasani said that a contract had been signed with an international consulting firm to carry out a detailed and an expanded study for the purpose of establishing a port in Sur. In accordance with royal instructions and with the coordination of the Musandam Committee, a small port for ships will be built in Bakha in the area of Musandam. Another small port will also be built in Khasab. Both of these ports will be seven meters deep and will play a role in the commercial and economic life of this area.

Engineer Salim ibn Hamid al-Ghasani concluded his statement [by saying] that the ministry's plan also seeks to improve and develop the port of Raysut so it can receive 35,000 ton ships, as far as oil tankers are concerned. Completion of these improvements is expected in March of next year.

8592
CSO: 4802

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020036-8

20 NOVEMBER 1979

NO. 2046

2 OF 2

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UMM SHAIF BOOSTS OFFSHORE PRODUCTION

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 13 Oct 79 pp 4-5

[Text] Offshore production in Abu Dhabi now centers on the Umm Shaif field which last year produced an average of 249,600 barrels a day, and the Lower Zakum field which produced 245,929 b/d. Development of the Upper Zakum field was started in 1977 and the first production is expected in 1981. This should build up to a capacity of 500,000 b/d in 1983 for the first stage of the development. The field will push Abu Dhabi's total production to about 2 million b/d in the mid-1980s. Upper Zakum field is a more difficult reservoir to produce from than Umm Shaif or Lower Zakum, but is of impressive size. Ultimately it could produce at about 1 million b/d if a second stage of development is approved and it could hold this production for 60-70 years.

Upper Zakum will require water injection to maintain production pressures. It is one of the most ambitious offshore field developments ever undertaken in the Gulf. The investment figures compare with the capital expenditure needed for offshore developments in the far more hostile environment of the British North Sea.

About 170 wells will be drilled in the first stage. A total of 25 were completed last year. 35 should be finished in 1979, and drilling will probably continue in the 1980s. The production facilities will be concentrated on one major central platform, satellite structures while there will be about 70 small platforms around the field. At the same time an onshore reception and export loading terminal is being built around the field on Zirku island, as well as an airport and housing for a scheme expected eventually to employ 600-700 people.

At the refining end of Abu Dhabi's oil industry ADNOC is pressing ahead with the construction of a \$600 million refinery and export terminal at Ruwais. The plant will have an initial capacity of 130,000 b/d, but this could well double later. With domestic demand increasing rapidly Abu Dhabi is having to import about half its requirements of oil products.

Onshore production comes from four main fields: Bu Hasa, with an output last year of 445,000 b/d. Assab (316,000 b/d), Bab (51,000 b/d) and Sahil.

25,000 b/d. A fifth field, Shah is being developed and should be productive by the first half of 1981. The planning and technical design work has started and output should reach the level of about 50,000 b/d.

Another small discovery the Ardanah field should come on stream with the output building up to 50,000 b/d. One other small field, Al Bunduq is located on the median line between the Abu Dhabi-Qatar offshore concessions. Oil revenues from the field are shared equally between the two states.

Individually most of the major Abu Dhabi fields now in production could achieve significant higher levels of production but Dr. Hamra Krouha, General Manager of ADNOC, is determined to prevent repetition of past oil companies' practices of forcing maximum production from some reservoirs at the expense of jeopardising the ultimate level of recovery of oil and gas.

As an example of this policy, besides the Bab onshore field which has a production potential of 130-150 thousand barrels per day, but which is currently producing only some 50,000 b/d, "this field has badly developed at the beginning and is therefore showing bad signs of fatigue. In the world of today oil companies are interested in not wasting a single barrel. It is criminal to develop a field with a short term approach thus taking the risk of not getting the maximum recovery" Krouha said. He maintains that as much as 6 per cent of the oil in place has already been lost because water has been injected too near the center of the reservoir with the result that some oil has been forced behind the water.

The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company is considering a new development programme with its partners for the field. But if the consortium rejects the plan on the grounds that it is too expensive it is likely to press ahead independently along with any of the individual companies that wish to join it.

The pattern of independent development by ADNOC has emerged strongly in recent years as some of its international partners have shied away from committing the kind of major investment required for Abu Dhabi's more ambitious schemes. At the back of their minds all oil companies operating in the UAE are aware that at any time Abu Dhabi could choose to follow the example of several other OPEC members by opting for a 100 per cent takeover by the state.

There are no signs of this happening in Abu Dhabi but oil companies reluctance to take on new commitments must be strengthened by the fact that the major new development programmes now underway will take several years to show any return.

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DUBAI POLICE STATIONS LINKED BY ARABIC TELEPRINTERS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 2 Oct 79 p 3

[Text]

Dubai, Oct. 1: A fully computerised radio teleprinter network using the Arabic alphabet and linking all police stations in Dubai has been acquired by Dubai Police as part of a modernisation plan that will eventually embrace police force all over the UAE.

The new telecommunications system has been designed and delivered by AB Teleplan, Swedish consultants to Dubai Police who have also been providing training courses for operators and maintenance staff over the past year.

The system, the most modern used by any police force in the Arab world, will greatly improve police efficiency and simplify hitherto cumbersome and slower methods of telecommunication transmission as well as record keeping.

Explaining its salient features, a Teleplan press release said the computer controlled system operates by means of a UHF radio links, making it completely independent of the public telecommunications network. This feature fulfills a long standing need of Dubai police to have access to a self-sufficient and independent network on which would not be affected by the obvious limitations of the public network.

The system's most outstanding feature is the use of the Arabic alphabet in teleprinter transmissions. In this regard Dubai police have clearly pioneered the introduction in public service of the Arabic teleprinter which is still being experimented upon in other countries.

One other advantage of the new system is that it is designed for future connection to a computer for the maintenance of vehicle-files and drivers' licence records. Such a linkage, expected to come about in the not too distant future, will help clear the bottlenecks that are sometimes the cause of delay in processing vehicle and licensing documents.

Teleplan, who have been working for about two years on the development of a modern telecommunications network at both Dubai and the federal levels, have suggested a countrywide network interconnecting police headquarters of each emirate and also the Ministry of Interior in Abu Dhabi as well as the police headquarters in Al Ain. Based on radio communications, the independent network includes both teleprinter and telephone communications.

According to a study on the federal project estimated to cost 2.5 million dirhams, the teleprinter part of the system is intended for the

transmission of written messages between the headquarters, while the telephone part forms a kind of hot-line telephone system between the same locations.

Besides the telecommunications project in Dubai, Teleplan have also been providing Dubai police with the training expertise at its College of Technology where 21 students this morning completed the first year of their two year course in basic technical sciences and computer technology.

Acting Chief of Dubai Police, Col. Dahi Khalfan, awarding completion certificates to the students and also prizes to the top three, urged them to take full advantage of the first class technical facility to learn skills that would be of inestimable value to the police force.

The students, all potential Dubai police officers, will resume their studies for the second year in November.

The educational program devised by Teleplan comprises two phases, of which the present is the first. The second phase would require students to specialise in one of four disciplines - maintenance and service technology, computers and data processing, system design and education of future teachers. Part of the second phase will involve training in Europe.

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DUBAI'S IMPORTS RISE BY 30 PERCENT

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 11 Oct 79 p 1

[Article by Maruf Khwaja]

[Text]

Dubai, Oct. 10: Dubai's total import bill for the first six months of this year rose by almost two billion dirhams over the corresponding period last year and was more than half of 1978's total.

This indicates a 25 to 30 per cent increase in the value of imports which appears to have been also maintained in the third quarter of this year. Only a proportion of the increase is however attributable to higher costs, since figures released by the Dubai government's statistics office show that the volume of imports rose only a little less proportionately to the dirham value of the goods. Total imports from January to June 1979 came to 7.258 billion dirhams as compared to 5.374 billion in the corresponding period last year.

Higher bills for and greater imports of machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, miscellaneous items, and foodstuffs accounted for most of this increase. Dubai's food bill reached a record level of 832 million dirhams in the period

under review, an actual increase over January-June 1978 of more than 306 million, while the quantity bought rose from 183 million kilos to 388 million.

In the machinery and transport equipment sector, a decline in the import of passenger cars and pick-ups was compensated by increase in the quantity and value of capital equipment imports. The figures for the two periods are respectively 2.777 billion dirhams and 2.136 billion.

The value of beverages and tobacco imported during the half year ending in June almost doubled over the period last year from 88.6 million to 170.4 million dirhams.

While the value of manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials went up from 1.4 billion to 1.8 billion dirhams, the quantity imported fell from 1.08 billion kilos to only 604 million kilos, reflecting a rise in prices of these goods even before the last substantial rise in the price of oil.

It must in fact be borne in mind that the figures for the first six months of

this year do not represent the existing situation which was radically altered when the last oil price rise went into effect two months ago. Prices of imported goods rose far more steeply after July than at any other period recorded.

The countrywise figures of imports released by the Dubai government show Japan leading as usual with exports to Dubai worth 1.518 billion dirhams, an increase over the six month period last year of 458 million. The United Kingdom also improved its performance with additional exports to Dubai of 406 million dirhams, while the United States registered a gain of almost 200 million maintaining its number three position.

While Italy edged out India for fifth place with a performance that almost doubled its exports from 191 million to 309 million dirhams, Hong Kong rose most rapidly in the somersaulting to eighth position over the Netherlands.

CSO: 4820

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

SOVIET ARMS SAID SHIPPED TO COUNTRY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 12

[Article: "Soviet Arms Shipped to North Yemen and Mediation with the South"]

[Text] Western intelligence agency reports are saying that the Soviet Union is resupplying North Yemen with different kinds of arms and that [this activity] followed in the wake of a "secret" visit that was made by a San'a' government delegation to Moscow early last month. These reports state that the first shipment of Soviet arms did arrive at the port of al-Hudayidah on the 29th of August. This shipment included anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, quantities of Kalishnikov machine guns, bazooka guns and ammunition.

What is being said in western capitals at the present time indicates that President 'Abdallah 'Ali Salih had become impatient with the procrastination of the Americans who had promised to supply North Yemen with arms when disturbances with South Yemen occurred 8 months ago. When the intensity of the crisis was growing, Washington announced that it will send military supplies worth 500 million dollars to the government of San'a'. These supplies were to include F-5 airplanes, M-60 tanks and other air defense and field artillery weapons. But what did actually arrive to the Yemenis was much less than what the United States had promised. The airplanes and the heavy tanks in particular did not arrive. The San'a' government sent several messages to Washington inquiring about the arrival dates of the promised weapons, but it received no satisfactory answer. Last June the San'a' government sent emissaries to the U.S. government to make direct inquiries about the weapons, but they returned from Washington without any reply from U.S. officials.

It was then that the San'a' government decided to reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union. After preliminary negotiations with the members of the Soviet military delegation in San'a', a military Yemeni delegation--and it is being said that it included the minister of defense and the chief of staff--flew to Moscow on a Soviet Aeroflot airplane, and they were accompanied by some of the members of the Soviet delegation in San'a'. In Moscow the delegation met with Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and with the Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov. Western sources state that the meetings were also attended by some Soviet experts who are working in South Yemen.

As a result of these negotiations Soviet weapons began arriving in al-Hudayidah. It is being said that delivery began less than 4 weeks after the Yemeni delegation's trip to the Soviet capital. Western sources are also stating that the Soviets promised the Yemenis they would send them three squadrons of MIG-21 fighter airplanes, 50 heavy T-62 tanks and 100 T-55 tanks. An agreement was also reached that experts from East Germany would be sent to train Yemeni troops to use the new weapons.

Some diplomatic sources in London are saying that Moscow will not try to solve the dispute between the two parts of Yemen in its own fashion. In return it will gain the name of being "the catalyst for unity between Arab brothers whose purpose is to solve their disputes."

8592
CSO: 4802

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

AGREEMENT WITH CHINESE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY SIGNED

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 3 Sep 79 p 2

[Article: "Agreement Is Signed Between Republic and Chinese Construction Firm; Chinese Firm Is To Draw Up Special Designs for International Convention Center; Project Costs, 500 Million Riyals; Project Area, 24,000 Meters"]

[Text] An agreement was signed yesterday at the Ministry of Public Works between the Yemen Arab Republic and the Chinese Architectural Construction Company. The agreement stipulates that the company carry out the architectural design work for the construction of an international convention center in the area of 'Asar. It is to be located 145 meters from the San'a'-al-Hudayidah Road west of the capital and is to be built over an area of 24,000 surface meters.

The Saba' News Agency has learned that the center will seat 1,100 persons and that its annexes will be built over 2,000 surface meters. The annexes will include a hotel, large and small meeting rooms, a restaurant for guests and ten hospitality units in the form of bungalows over an area of 8,000 surface meters.

The building will also include a reception hall, exhibition halls for the sale of souvenirs, lounging areas, a movie theater and a theater. There will be special areas for printing, telex, first aid and mail services. There will be a security [office], a library and simultaneous translation services. There will also be parks, parking places for cars and an arena.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Yemeni side by our fellow Engineer 'Abdallah al-Khurshami, the minister of public works. The deputy director general of the Chinese Architectural Construction Company signed on behalf of the firm. Total costs for the project that will also be implemented by the company amount to approximately 500 million riyals. This project will be financed by the government.

The signing ceremony was attended on the Yemeni side by [our] fellow citizens, the director general of Technical Affairs at the ministry and the director of Rural Water Projects. On the Chinese side the ceremony was attended by the chargé d'affaires of the Chinese Embassy in San'a', by the economic adviser and by a number of the firm's senior experts.

8592
CSO: 4802

END
97