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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 65/79)

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DETAILS OF GEORGES SEGUY (CGT), EDMOND MAIRE (CFDT) ACCORD

Analysis of Political Consequences

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 6-12 Oct 79 pp 110-112

[Article by Albert du Roy and Michel Jacques: "Maire: A Traiter in Spite of Himself"]

[Text] In mentioning the name of Edmond Maire, was Giscard trying to discredit the trade union leader? The affair indeed throws light on the present political situation--that of the government and that of the opposition.

"There are situations when silence sometimes safeguards the future better than statements that will always be interpreted in polemic terms." That precaution, pronounced on Saturday, 29 September, by Michel Rocard before the directive committee of the PS [Socialist Party] was meant for the socialist leaders, who had become evervated as a result of the continuing communist attack and who are again revealing PC [Communist Party] alignment with Moscow.

The remonstrance could just as well have been meant for Valery Giscard d'Estaing who, the night before, had made a speech and manifested his interest in certain proposals made by Edmond Maire, secretary general of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. The mere mention by the chief of state of the name of the trade union leader could be interpreted, under the present circumstances, as political damage. One immediately saw this in the columns of L'HUMANITE, where Maire was accused of treachery. If Giscard intended, without any ulterior motive, to profit from his suggestions, did he really need to proclaim it?

One cannot find any better example of present political blockage. Whether one regrets it or whether one tries to turn it to account, the "Maire affair" throws light on the political situation--both with respect to the government and the opposition.

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Let us review the facts.

On Friday, 28 September, upon closing the Data Processing and Enterprise Week at the Congressional Palace in Paris, Giscard said: "The provision of data processing in enterprises can lead to profound changes. I ask the government to think about the proposals put forward by Edmond Maire." The CFDT leader, during talks in which some ministers and heads of enterprises took part, had proposed that the workers of each enterprise be brought together to consider the consequences of data processing progress on their working conditions.

The recommendation of the chief of state may be understood in two ways. First: Giscard was captivated by the analysis of a man who, even though an opponent, nevertheless gave proof of great lucidity. Why would he refrain from referring to this? This is the interpretation held by the CFDT Committee, which immediately pressed its advantage: "If the presidential statements have any significance, some legal provisions with regard to the enterprise and contractual committees concerning the right of expression on the part of workers must take place without delay." And the CFDT added: "Only actions count." As a matter of fact, everyone is aware of the gulf that has separated the reformist goodwill of the chief of state and the timidity of his majority since 1974.

Second: If Giscard mentioned Maire's name, it was in order to captivate him--and to initiate that precious "social agreement" of which he dreams--or, at worst, in order to compromise it--and to divide the left still more. An interpretation that was immediately reinforced by Jean Lecanuet, who, before the UDF [French Democratic Union] parliamentarians convened in Vittel, went after what he wanted: "In the ranks of the reformist left, there are some responsible men who support courageous diagnoses." And there was Giscard's opening, reduced to the mediocre operation of a politician's recovery.

On Saturday, 29 September, it of course was the second interpretation that the Communist Party bore in mind. L'HUMANITE did not bother with fine points. The "informative" article was entitled: "Giscard Calls on Maire for Help." And the editorial, awkwardly entitled "Duet," strung out the perfidies: "Maire obligingly falls in with the operation...The class cooperation which the CFDT leader chooses...The social agreement concerning which Giscard and Maire yesterday gave us an example...A parallel was evidently immediately established with the "turning to the right " of the PS.

On Monday, 1 October, Edmond Maire, first surprised by Giscard's speech, and then a traitor in spite of himself, gave an explanation in an interview with MATIN. "The winks of the majority are not innocent," he answered those who took him for a naive man. And since people of good faith cannot dispute his opposition to the policy of the present government--"There are men whose honesty in life is not at the mercy of a compliment," Francois Mitterand said with respect to him--Maire did not lose any time before striking hard

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at "the policy of economic enfeeblement and of social regression." But he gave a long, keen analysis of the communist attitude: "The argumentation of the PC is poor, its bad faith singular. Its only reproach in our regard is that one of our proposals was considered by Giscard--as if it were not our role to propose solutions and to further them. The trade union movement has nothing to gain from the worst kind of politics. It will be in a better position if it obtains results by its own action."

Not a word of criticism, on the other hand, regarding the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] which, it is true, did not add its voice to the virtuous communist indignations. The very day that L'HUMANITE struck hard at Maire, LA VIE OUVRIERE, CGT weekly publication, proclaimed: "Unity of action has won and will live on." It praised the accord concluded on 17 September between the two trade union confederations.

Is this unusual shift between the PC and the CGT just a matter of circumstance or does it express a difference in analysis?

The CGT was ready to take part in the talk on data processing. Only disagreement on the place to be reserved to it turned it away. Moreover, some of its leaders share Maire's ideas regarding the consequences of data processing. The CGT would therefore have no basis to reproach the CFDT, its participation in the talk, and its positions.

#### Stinging Criticisms

More remarkable is the conclusion of the accord on 17 September. Immediately after the end of the vacation period, Maire spoke clearly: "I fear," he said in Rouen, "that the CGT is doing on the trade union level what the Communist Party has decided to do on the political level." A clever way of forcing its partner to prove its independence. The speech did not please the PC. Three days before the meeting between the trade unions, in a report to the Central Committee that was published in L'HUMANITE, Georges Marchais was bitingly critical of Maire. It was difficult for the CGT to ignore that report: of the 16 members in the confederal bureau 8 are communist.

And yet, the accord was concluded--without the CFDT's having yielded. On the contrary, it was around those key words that the trade union meetings were articulated. Some within the CGT believe that they perceive in that surprising accord the result of an internal CGT debate. Between the traditional "aligned" members, foremost among them Henri Krasucki, and the "independents" who, basing their arguments on the disastrous non-trade unionization (see Patrick Arnoux's article in the Economy section), wanted to put the interests of the trade union before those of the party.

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The PC had two good reasons to agree, by way of exception, to this semblance of independence. A trade union reason: to the extent that the government translates its words into actions, the "realism" of the CFTD could be shown to be profitable in the eyes of wage earners. A political reason: the language is sufficiently hard at the top, between communists and socialists, not to permit adherence to the union to be expressed at the base. The CGT net could serve to quickly catch the fragments of the splintered Union of the Left--to the advantage of the PC.

The Maire affair makes two simple strategies clear. That of the PC is to appear as the only force that is totally in opposition. And it throws suspicion on all those who do not pursue the policy of all or nothing. That of Giscard, on the other hand, is to break up this simplistic alternative--by favoring that which can undermine bipolarization.

Edmond Maire has some trumps that doubtless will permit him to dodge both strategies. After all, on the trade union level, the one that is right is the one that obtains results. Pierre Vanlerenberghe, secretary general of the CFTD Union of Administrative Personnel, explains: "We are not just trying to draw attention, but are trying to effect social change." One will soon know if Giscard mentioned Maire's name in order to compromise it and to stir up leftist dissent, or if he wants to prove that it is possible to be an opponent and to be heard even so.

Can the experiment be valid at the political level? Everyone knows that Maire and Rocard are friends. Will the former pave the way for the latter? Rocard has been maintaining for a long time that the PS must define a completely independent position with regard to communist positions. This political independence resembles that which the CFTD pursues on the trade union level.

#### Irritation

But the official PS doctrine binds the party to the communist strategy of all or nothing. The present socialist leaders around Mitterand still think that the PS derives its strength from its indefectible adherence to the Union of the Left. Even when that union no longer exists.

On Saturday, 29 September, the day of the directive committee, the Louis Harris poll published by L'EXPRESS, which manifested Rocard's popularity with the public, was severely commented on. Mitterand dismissed it by simply saying: "Polls are always favorable to those who order them"--forgetting that his closest collaborators on 16 June had made use of another poll that was published by L'EXPRESS that was judged favorable to Mitterand. One should rather say that polls are always wrong in the eyes of those whom they displease.

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The irritation of the socialist leaders in reality is explained by refusal to take into account facts that argue in favor of a change in line. Provided the "Maire affair" proves the effectiveness of the independence of the noncommunist left with regard to the PC, it bears the ferment for an unsettlement of the convictions of the PS.

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Communist Viewpoint

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Oct 79 p 6

[Article: "The CGT-CFDT Accord"]

[Text] A result of the combativeness of the workers.

The VIE OUVRIERE published a round table of the CGT leaders.

Under the title, "How the Union For Action Won and Will Live," the CGT weekly, VIE OUVRIERE, this week reviewed the accord concluded on 17 September between the CGT and the CFDT, an accord that has already been extended to numerous enterprises and occupational branches.

As a matter of fact, this accord was accompanied by numerous commentaries that are hostile to the CGT and by tendentious or fanciful speculations.

"The Accord Is a Victory for the CFDT"; (the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR title of an interview with Edmond Maire: "How the CFDT Won" is characteristic of that approach). The second tendency tried to support the idea of differences within the CGT delegation: "On the one hand, the hard liners; on the other, the more pro-trade union line," for example wrote L'UNITE, which led the confederal bureau to address a letter to the PS organ and to request its publication. L'UNITE appeared this week...without that letter, which is the best admission of the lubrications that were advanced.

The Element That Has Caused Things to Move

Regarding those malicious commentaries Henri Krasucki said: "It is just simply that that accord troubles many people."

He recalled the CGT reply to the antisocial measures of the government, its action week, etc. "It must indeed be said that at that moment the CFDT's language was different from the CGT's. It criticized even our initiatives." While the accord does not settle everything," continued H. Krasucki, it does foster the development of the movement regarding demands. For us that is the main thing.

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Gerard Gaume thought that the action week organized by the CGT "was the decisive element that made things move."

"Much of the media predicted a rupture, with the obvious desire of causing us to bear the responsibility. One therefore understands the resentment of some who are now trying to distort the facts."

The CFDT Refused

Returning to the conditions under which the agreement was concluded, Jacqueline Lambert indicated that the CFDT delegation first had "registered its surprise at our desire for unity. Then its proposals and demands caused us all to wonder if they were not going to refuse." Jacqueline Lambert specified that the CFDT wanted to limit the platform demands to two objectives: the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] and reduction of work hours, "objectives that of course are important," but "which perforce limited the range of future actions." "The CFDT in the beginning manifestly was making a point of rupture of this matter. Now, our concern was to place those obviously essential demands in the broader context of the struggle of all workers..."

Rene Lomet recalled "since the facts are apparent," from the very first the CGT delegation had proposed that the two organizations declare themselves against the idea of agreement. "The CFDT refused."

Henri Krasucki explained that, compared with a period during which the two groups had "a resolute attitude of opposition to the antisocial policy of the government and employers," the situation is now different.

The CGT had a categorical position regarding the crisis, the policy of the government and of employers, and the measures that they take, whereas the CFDT, since what it has called its "reorientation," accepts a certain austerity and an industrial policy with certain withdrawals and the consequences that that has on employment.

"Obviously that attitude affects the vigor of action."

For the CGT leaders, the vital point is that it was possible to conclude an accord. Now it is a question of implementing it. "One does not start from nothing," said Rene Lomet. "There was action week, and after that many others joined in and are carrying on." "A unitary accord," stressed G. Gaume, "must not be made to the detriment of our own action."

"To implement the accord, everyone will do so with its own means," added H. Krasucki, "will express his own ideas, his position with regard to governmental and employer positions and also his own freedom of initiative."

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"If one comes to an agreement on objectives that have the consent of the workers, fine. If there are problems, difficulties, one goes back to the workers and tells them the truth. One asks them to help solve these matters, making proposals to them. And if, with a good agreement there are still points on which there is not full agreement, well, the CGT will continue to say and to do what it has to do; it's up to the CFDT to do the same regarding its concerns. Finally, I would say that it is already as obvious for many workers as it is for the CGT: consider the support that is needed to cause matters to progress. Well, it is now time to provide that support."

Socialist Assessment

Paris L'UNITE in French 21-27 Sep 79 p 5

[Article by Michele Kespi: "The CGT-CFDT: The Worst Has been Averted"]

[Text] The 17 September accord disengaged the jammed gear of dissension and rupture was avoided.

"A red letter day," said Edmond Maire, CFDT leader, late in the evening of 17 September. The accord signed that day at the confederal level between the CGT and the CFDT as a matter of fact is the first general accord since September 1977.

Some difficult meetings. A first meeting of 4 hours on Friday, the 14th, had made it possible to pave the way. Before giving its decision, the CGT asked for an adjournment in order to consult on Monday, the 17th, with its executive committee, whose 93 members had already met the whole day on Tuesday, the 12th. It is unusual for this group to meet at such short intervals. But the difficulties of the period, the differences within the CGT, doubtless explain that caution. A caution which, at the end of the interview on Friday, left the CDT leaders not at all optimistic. They entertained their impressions of the night before: one chance in two of arriving at an accord. That was the conclusion of the National Bureau on 12 and 13 September. And on Thursday, the 13th, Edmond Maire alluded to "the impetus to be given to the enormous problem of a unitary action"-- a problem that was all the more difficult since the CFDT refused "to let itself be pushed toward initiatives that are more spectacular than effective, to trade union actions which, under cover of demands, would first of all pursue a political objective."

A busy weekend in which a joint CGT-CFDT committee had sought possibilities of compromise without finding them. It is doubtless the CGT executive committee, convened during the morning of the second meeting, that gave the green light. As a matter of fact, there was a confrontation of two trends: those who wanted unity, those who did not. On one side, the "hard liners," grouped around Henri Krasucki and Michel Warcholach. On the other, the

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more pro-trade union line which, in accordance with Georges Seguy, Rene Buhl, and Jacqueline Lambert, urged an agreement. How, in fact, was one to explain to the workers that one was not granting priority to the matter of low salaries or to a reduction in work hours? All the more so since the CFDT had known how to present quite flexible proposals to its partner that were difficult to dismiss without further examination. The Seguy line won, and it was with the desire for an agreement that the CGT arrived on Monday, at 1600 hours, at Cadet Street.

To say that it was all smooth sailing after that would be untrue. The negotiation took a long time--about 5 hours--and it was laborious: the meeting adjourned no less than two times: the first, at the request of the CGT; the second, on the initiative of the CFDT. The importance of the two delegations, seven for each side (Georges Seguy, Rene Lomet, Rene Buhl, Gerard Gannie, Jacqueline Lambert, Jean-Claude Laroze, and Michel Warcholach for the CGT; Edmond Maire, Jacques Chereque, Michel Rolant, Jeannette Laot, Georges Begot, Hubert Lesire-Ogrel, and Albert Mercier for the CFDT), does not sufficiently explain the reason for the length of the discussions. "Of course there are still some differences; one has only to note the length of our discussions. But we have succeeded in disengaging the jammed gear of disagreement and in providing an impetus for unitary action." Georges Seguy manifested a similar satisfaction: "The workers expected something other than a doctrinal quarrel from this meeting. It is useless to deny our differences, but we are determined to talk about them in a calm manner. The text on which we have agreed is consonant with all of the objectives for which the workers have recently been fighting."

For the three objectives to be considered (raising the low salaries and SMIC, reduction in work hours to 35 hours, right of expression on the part of the workers), the CGT and CFDT are calling for some time off from work in the enterprises and the branches..." Action, if employer blockage continues, "will be developed at a later time by means of interoccupational demonstrations under the auspices of regional unions." Finally, the two confederations will address the point at the end of October and, "if the conditions for the mobilization of the majority of the workers are reconciled, they will envisage implementing a very broad interoccupational action."

Following is the private judgment of a leader of the Executive Committee of the CGT concerning the accord: "A text that is very close to the proposals of the CFDT." In fact, it includes the theory for actions, expressed on several occasions, that is favored by that confederation. This caused Georges Seguy to declare that "no one can say that he is satisfied with this text..." while the CFDT delegation wore a beatific smile.

Now, how will the accord be received by the militants? Will action be consonant with the accord? How will the two confederations together bring about

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eventual negotiations? Rupture has been avoided. Only the future will tell if the 17 September accord was more than a declaration of unity that was simply dependent on circumstances.

Analysis of Communist Strategy

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24 Sep 79 pp 54-55

[Article by Irene Allier and Georges Mamy: "When the Trade Unions Join the Relay"]

[Text] The event of the week was not Giscard's televised speech, of the PC-PS meeting, but the rapprochement of Georges Seguy and Edmond Maire.

Was Valery Giscard's televised show on 17 September an important event? Certainly not. And the meeting 3 days later between the delegations of the French Communist Party and of the Socialist Party? Not that, either. On the other hand, during the same week, the accord concluded on 18 September between the CGT and the CFDT produced this evidence: there, on the contrary, something important, something new, occurred, which went beyond the trade union sphere. "That social contract cannot help but have consequences for the political movement," said Edmond Maire, the pugnacious architect of those unexpected meetings, in the interview that one will read about further on. It is a wager. But the CFDT starts from a reality: the specific fate of the French in the midst of a crisis. It is skillfully and effectively utilizing that irresistible control lever to unlock the mechanisms of the government and those of the leftist parties, completely paralyzed by the political situation, and above all by the withdrawal of the PC. Success is not guaranteed. But perhaps something has begun to move. Finally...

It seems that Giscard even disappointed many of his own people. In fact, it was an odd speech--that speech that he made on his third broadcast, "An hour with the president." Having opened in the manner of a Mendes France who was determined to speak the truth--before Frenchmen who were quite correctly characterized as having three "attitudes": dissatisfaction, doubt, and anxiety--the proposal was to smoothly branch off to the expediencies of a Pinay, of a Queuille, or of a Laniel. They, too, invariably threatened--but in vain, to "reduce expenditures" when all other solutions to the economic or budgetary equation eluded them. The chief of state concluded his public interview--should the country be asked to "make every effort now" or spread it out over a longer period?--by confirming Raymond Barre to his post.

Find True Hegemony

But what ambiguous compliments for this prime minister, modestly decked out in his "honesty," his supposed lack of "personal ambition," and with consideration for his "colleagues"! And what was one to think of the presidential

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statement which specified that the accord had been granted in accordance with Barre's most recent measures "in full settlement," if not that Matignon's account as a tenant was running low? Some made a risky decision. Will the change in team occur in March, then; for example, between two parliamentary sessions and two budgets? And to whose advantage? Jacques Chaban-Delmas? Robert Boulin? Jean-Francois Deniau? Andre Giraud? Jean Francois-Poncet?... Incurable, the small political group in no time at all set out again in the direction of its preferred amusements. It's of no importance, really.

One development, however, was of particular interest in Giscard's interview: deploring the absence of a "social agreement," the president expressed the wish that there would be discussions concerning the matter of low salaries and the length of the work week. The approach doubtless was not politically innocent. But, from a practical point of view, it was like an outstretched hand to the CFDT. In doing this, the chief of state even broke down the reticence of his prime minister, who has always balked--against the advice of Robert Boulin--at the idea of a reduction in the work week.

A few days earlier, the PC and the CGT would not have missed the opportunity to point out that there was complicity there between the CFDT and the government. But, precisely on 18 September, the Communists did not resort to such expedients. And that indeed is where the remarkable effectiveness of the action carried out by Edmond Maire is apparent: at the same time, it compelled the chief of state to take a step toward the CFDT and he obliged the CGT to conclude a contract with it, that is, to dissociate itself from the isolationist behavior of the PC.

One would not be able to swear that this rapprochement--an unexpected one--between the CFDT and the CGT will unquestionably resume a procedure which, in time, would lead to a certain popular unity. At least, one has seen this CGT, which seemed frozen in an incomprehensible communist strategy, begin to move. It is true that it is on the trade union level that the PC "line" is most vulnerable, because of its contradictions. According to the new calculation of the Communist Party, it will one day directly take over, to its advantage, the "movement of the masses." It is moreover this ambition that explains its concept of the "union at the base," a union that it intends to realize exclusively for itself. In fact, it no longer wants to exclusively play, beside the CGT, the role of a simple electoral force. On this ground, it believes, it will "always be beaten by social-democracy." According to its new strategic plan, the PC should arrive at a "real hegemony with respect to the masses," without the CGT, to which would fall the rather imprecise "role of constant contestation of the political power."

A long-term plan, admittedly--"It's a matter of about 40 years..."--and which will clash with some tough realities in the near future--and doubtless with the resistance of some CGT followers, whether communist or not.

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In the most recent issue of the publication, DIALECTIQUES, which appeared before the meeting and the accord, Jean-Louis Moynot, confederal secretary of the CGT, wrote as follows: "Many of us are convinced that important progress in the unity of action, in particular with the CFDT, would be of such a nature as to cause the entire French trade union movement to advance. That moreover is in line with a very profound aspiration of the non-trade union workers, who readily report with respect to "trade union disputes," their view that politics is a sterile show of forces that baffles them."

Moynot is not looked upon as a representative of the majority trend of the CGT. But it sometimes happens that he expresses somewhat in advance the positions of Geroges Seguy, himself. Not all in the trade union confederation have mechanically, automatically, donned the new ideological uniform of the communist leadership. That manifestly served Mairé and the CFDT. But other aspects, and therefore other retreats, are possible in the future...

The Socialist Party--meeting with a communist delegation for the first time in 18 months--did not have to hope to be able to profit from similar contradictions or hesitations. At the PC no one hides it from you any longer: after all, all the bridges are down, cut off. "I tell you once and for all: stop trying to find in the socio-political picture a premonitory sign of an improvement in our relations with the PS. You would be losing your time." Since the Central Committee meeting on Wednesday, 12 September, the communist leadership no longer hesitates to explain in just as plain terms to the militants, the sections and cells, how and why the PC has deliberately changed its strategy. "The union of the left is over." "One must not count on a political agreement with the PS," "No question of joint actions with it," "We will no longer do anything together: we saw the price of that."

In other words, not only has the PC renounced the strategy of union of the left, for which it fought for almost 15 years, but it accepts, for an unforeseeable time, renunciation of accession to power. Why? First, because, as it has said a hundred times, it would risk coming to it in a state of weakness. It has repeatedly given to its own persistent accounts of the unitary period: since September 1974 in each partial legislative election, it lost six votes. So, a negative balance. "We will not be the supplementary strength of the PS": the communist refrain came from this established fact. But it does not have a simple arithmetical significance: it has a political meaning. It repeatedly says that the PC does not want anything to do with a socio-democratic or reformist experience in which, paralyzed by a leadership agreement with the PS, it would lose its justification. "What we refused in 1978 and what we will refuse in 1981 is an electoral victory that does not provide any chance for real change. We have no more liking for social-democrat Schmidt than for Giscard. We renounced the revolution of 1917. But we nonetheless will not repeat 1945. And as for the Popular Front, that also is over."

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### They Are Angry At Us

Well, then? To tell the truth, the Communist Party seems not to know. While looking for an alternative solution, it puts out to pasture those of its followers who still expect a political prospect, the vague idea of a "new union" established at the base (with whom?), of a self-styled "self-management strategy" (which, in the best of circumstances, would have the effect of democratizing the party a little, but not of proposing a political outcome for it) and of a confidence in the "movement of the masses"...In the meantime, it concentrates on only one objective: the change in the relative forces of the left, the strengthening of the party--and of the only party. It cherishes--one has said it, one confirms it--the hope of seeing the communist candidate outstrip the socialist candidate in the presidential election. Afterwards, we will see...

The Central Committee and, backing it, the "assets" of the party( 40,000 militants approximately) subscribed to that speech. As for the adherents, that is another matter. Demobilized because of disappointment (They are angry at us," confessed a leader) or incredulous in the face of that 180-degree turn, they stay home and they do not seem, at least temporarily, particularly receptive. In the 14th arrondissement [district] of Paris, for example, it is the section secretary, himself, who still of late had to sell L'HUMA-DIMANCHE. He no longer could find any volunteers.

But the Marchais leadership leaves no room for doubt. It perhaps does not know where it is going. But it is going there resolutely and no longer dissembles practically anything of this bewildering choice and its consequences.

If the PC had not thought to be able to refuse right off the offer of a meeting made by Francois Mitterand at Anglet this summer, Charles Fiterman and his comrades showed that it mattered little to them now to appear as they are. "We cannot accept proposals for action on objectives when, in other respects, we note that the Socialist Party is developing positions that are not ours, that are not consonant with the interests of the workers." With that pretext advanced by Fiterman, the PC then quietly rejected the majority of the proposals formulated by Pierre Beregovoy: a nonaggression pact; a joint appeal to all the rank and file organizations of both parties; a preliminary plan for specific actions (including Schlumberger, Lardet-Babcock, Ugine, etc.).

However, it agreed to "promote the convergencies that might be manifested with respect to the situation," and to convene the Union of the Left municipal councils in order to mobilize public opinion--in particular against the increase in taxes...

A step forward? A small step, perhaps. But who today can believe that the broken engagement would be patched up either in a short, or intermediate, period of time?

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Unless a powerful social movement materializes to modify the deal and to upset the sketchy calculations of the leaders: that is the hope that caused the CDT-style success this week."

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How the CFD Won

Paris LE NOUVEL OVSERVATEUR in French 24 Sep 79 pp 56-57

[Interview with Edmond Maire by Claude-Francois Jullien and Lucien Rioux, of LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "How the CFD Won"; date and place not given]

[Text] LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: The unity of action accord that you have just signed with the CGT is a victory for the CFDT.

Edmond Maire: It is above all a victory for the workers and for the entire trade union movement, up to then bogged down in disagreement and in relative ineffectiveness. That accord reverts to the conclusions that we had drawn from the critical analysis of our past action. We said: We must establish priority objectives, in limited number, specific ones, attainable on a short-term basis, and which we will be able to induce our interlocutors to negotiate. The CFDT-CGT accord has defined those objectives and we can achieve some results before the end of the year. Likewise, we wanted some coordinated actions from enterprises, then from branches and regions, in order, if possible, to come up with a national plan: the agreement provides for that.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Specific objectives, a specific calendar, the line of the CFDT is really what has been adopted...

EDMOND MAIRE: The important thing is for that line to be consonant with the present situation. Having said that, it is true that the priority demands adopted by the accord--raising the low salaries, reduction in work hours, right of expression in the enterprises--had been defined in our Brest congress. But we do not have a monopoly. They are above all the people's demands and well suited to the present situation.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Nevertheless, you did not seem to believe in that accord. After all, you wanted the CGT to accept your proposals. That is what it did. How do you explain this?

Edmond Maire: We had reason to be pessimistic. The CGT--Georges Seguy's speech at Place de la Republique [Republic Square] confirmed this--seemed to want to eliminate us from the unity of action, or at least to put us in a lesser position. But precisely because we were pessimistic, we worked up

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our proposals. For about 10 hours, our national bureau went over them with a fine toothcomb and finally they impressed the CGT delegation, which deemed it necessary to convene its executive committee before giving us an answer. On Saturday, 15 September, we expressed those proposals in a text that the executive committee of the CGT was able to discuss on Monday morning. To look at that document, it was clear that the criticisms that other trade unionists might have wanted to address to the CFDT would not have carried enough weight in a public debate. That must have counted for something.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Those about faces of the CGT were odd, were they not? It wanted to carry out an independent action alone, then it forbade the unity of action in all domains before coming round to a joint action with the CFDT. Why that evolution?

Edmond Maire: We would like to know the reasons. Georges Seguy told us that he did not want to discuss disagreements that were expressed publicly during the month of August because, according to him, that might cause harm. We would have preferred to speak of them and to know why, on 9 August, even before it had made us any proposals at all, the CGT had accused us of passivity, whereas we were already trying to define an effective action for realizable objectives. We did not want to undo or impair our discussions, but only to avoid a repetition of that type of unfavorable and unexpected change in the situation. We did not make refusal of the CGT a condition: we will speak of that later.

As for explaining the fluctuations of the CGT, that is very difficult. What we note, on the other hand, is that the positions of the Communist Party regarding the CFDT fluctuate quite a bit. The PC adopts a day by day policy with respect to us. If we allow ourselves to criticize some nationalist aspect in the position of the PC, the CFDT is called a passive organization, in favor of austerity, classified along with the PS as being in the social-democratic Gehenna...If we reject "the union for public safety," for a while we become allies in the struggle against the socialists. And since there are many communists on the leadership ladder of the CGT, such fluctuations of position cannot help but cause some interference.

Fortunately, those tensions did not prevent the conclusion of a good accord.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: According to some rumors spread by some trade union militants when the accord was about to be concluded, Henri Krasucki raised new problems and a noncommunist CGT adherent, Rene Buhl, cut him short and kept on talking until Seguy finally intervened, in favor of conciliation.

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Edmond Maire: It's a serial story. There are always some differences within a delegation--both within the CFDT and the CGT. To want to interpret them by saying: the former is in the good camp; the latter, in the bad, is to run right into an impasse. One must reason on an overall basis: there is no doubt that there are political interferences in the trade union positions. To express them in precise terms is a game that one often loses.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. Georges Seguy and you, yourself, set the limits of that accord. Seguy proved to be the most hesitant. No one, he said, can be entirely satisfied with it...

Edmond Maire: Seguy was speaking for himself at that moment.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: And you, yourself, specified: "It is not just a question of an agreement depending on present circumstances." How far can this regained unity of action go?

Edmond Maire: For 2 years, apart from partial agreements on Social Security, on voluntary work suspension because of pregnancy, on immigrants...it has been practically impossible to define a joint confederal policy. Of course, relations were not broken, the opposite of what occurred between the parties of the left.

If the accord is essential for unity, it now remains to be translated into fact. That will not be simple. We will see to it that our objectives are not drowned in a confused ensemble that would prevent their translation into fact. The priorities adopted by the confederations must prevail.

We have envisioned three stages: 1) Action at the base in the enterprises; 2) If the movement is carried out and is developed in the branches, we will organize some regional demonstrations; 3) If these actions have a real, profound impact on the majority of workers, we will envisage the third stage, that of a national interoccupational action, still with our three priority objectives. By attaining results, we will give the workers confidence.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: The agreement is sufficiently specific for the trade unions--the CGT in particular, which was not enthusiastic in the beginning--to feel bound by it. Is that not dangerous?

Edmond Maire: When we sign an accord, we rely on the complete loyalty of our partner. The application of that accord will require efforts from some of our CGT comrades, it is true. But the CGT, like us, knows from where we come. We have, they and we, experienced that long period of disagreement, of bitterness, following the failure of the left and of the difficulty to remobilize the workers...If the agreement was concluded, it is not in order to conceal our differences from the public; it is the fruit of a reciprocal engagement.

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LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Can that accord between the two great French workers confederations have a positive effect on the political left that is so terribly divided?

Edmond Maire: In the near future, I do not think so. But the dynamics are well engaged. If one grants priority to the social struggles in order to change society, that is, politics, the economy, culture, it is indispensable for the trade unions to begin to move and to give impetus to the fight with real prospects of success. That social combat cannot help but have consequences for the political movement.

In 1972, the "Joint Program" preceded the interconfederal accord that was signed in 1974. It was not the best step. Since then the social movement has been placed in a perspective that is too exclusively political, involving electoral change. We made our self-critique and Georges Marchais, in his most recent speech to the Central Committee, devoted partially to the CFDT, in turn did the same in terms that sometimes were close to those of our comrade Moreau in his January 1978 report to the national council of the CFDT, outlining our new political action. So much the better!

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: The PC and PS tear each other to pieces; the CFDT and CGT find each other again. Is this not the old policy of two irons in the fire; unitary with the CFDT and antiunitary with the PS?

Edmond Maire: Such calculations may exist. They will not hold up in the face of a strong, aware, social mobilization. We indeed hope that the dynamics that will result from the return of the unitary action between the CFDT and the CGT little by little will help to overcome the political difficulties and to recreate, on new bases, the conditions for a union of the people's forces.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: The CFDT meets the PS on Monday, 24 September. Even though many CDT adherents participated in the revival of the Socialist Party, relations between the political organization and the trade union movement are not good. This time, the interconfederal accord places you in a position of strength. So, what do you expect from that meeting?

Edmond Maire: A change of climate, better understanding. In spite of some joint actions on nuclear matters, or Social Security, we have had an impression for 18 months that the Socialist Party has not understood the desire of the CFDT to obtain some immediate results on the trade union or legislative level. It proved this, for example, by refusing the reform of the Conciliation Board in Labor Disputes which, in spite of its imperfections, provides supplementary guarantees to the majority of workers and can give a new impulse to trade unionism.

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The CFDT is convinced that the endlessly revived indictment of employers and the government is not enough and that it will not bring about new electoral and political successes. On the contrary, from the failure of the left we have concluded that it was necessary to give priority to social struggles, to mass action, and to immediate results. That action moreover will provide increased chances for a leftist alternative. It is on all of that that we are going to make our point and we hope to overcome lack of understanding.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Your relations are not better with the PC. On 18 September, L'HUMANITE again denounced Edmond Maire's "contradictions"... What purpose could an eventual meeting serve?

Edmond Maire: Since its congress, the Communist Party has again adopted some CDT proposals, but refuses to acknowledge it. If it attacks the CFDT, perhaps it is so that its militants and the workers will not become aware of it. When we say, for example, that there is some "reorientation," in the speech of the PC, the latter is not happy. It is not serious. It will pass.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: But you, yourself, denounced the contradictions of the PC...

Edmond Maire: In fact, two contradictions seem outstanding. As in the case of the CFDT, the PC now affirms priority for social struggles. It even does so with such emphasis that to listen to Marchais in the most recent Central Committee, one might wonder about the limited role vested in the political parties and in the accession of the left to the government. Fine...But we note that there is a contradiction between the party's speech and its application. Because, at the same time, the PC persists in its attitude of sheer denunciation, of denial of certain realities, or sets for itself objectives that are absolutely not in keeping with the struggles. And, if one looks at all of the objectives that it proposes as immediate ones, not only is that ensemble not attainable now, but the PC would do well not to propose it in that manner if it should, in the future, accede to power.

In short, the PC at the same time that it affirms priority for social struggles, continues to aim above all for its own increased sphere of influence, especially the electoral.

Another example? The PC explains: no more politician-type politics. It is not up to the leaders to define the policy to be followed; each worker must deal with it, himself. That is socialist self-management. Well, with respect to the definition, we say: we agree. But how can the Communist Party reconcile that with its concept of a working class vanguard party--

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and, under the circumstances, of a vanguard political bureau of the party? See how it goes in different directions. Always from the top. We will discuss all of that with the PC and we will explain our action policy. At the same time, of course, we will listen to what it has to say, about our own contradictions, too.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you think of the "social agreement" desired by the president of the republic?

Edmond Maire: Valery Giscard d'Estaing speaks of the social agreement while in Europe France is the country that holds the record for inequalities. In polarizing the political discussion around this theme, he is trying to cause one to forget realities, their harshness, and the merciless nature of our system with regard to those that are most poor. In fact, in the face of the crisis, never have the proposed solutions been so diametrically opposed between the dominant class and the French workers' movement.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

STEPS IN CONCEPTION, DESIGN OF NAVY'S SHIPS OUTLINED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 48-49

[Article by Capt Georges Helies: "From Operational Requirements to Military Program"]

[Text] The design and construction of naval and naval-air materiel, from weapons or the simplest equipment item to the most complex vessel, are placed far down the pipeline from the plans and programs that spell out the missions of the navy as well as the categories and levels of the major components to be envisaged. (Entering the Naval Academy in 1948, Capt Georges Helies served for many years as missile-artillery officer on sea duty, in schools, and on the naval general staff. After commanding the fast Escort "Le Vendéen," the experimentation vessel "Ile d'Oleron," and, in the past, the flotilla of light vessels in the Atlantic, he participated in several armament and modernization programs for vessels of all sizes. He is currently chief, "fleet under construction," bureau, Navy General Staff.)

After these points have been spelled out, we draw up the requirements which express what the navy general staff expects from equipment capable of accomplishing these missions through simple or combined action.

Not a Simple Problem of Terminology

The first concept phase thus starts with the expression of the operational requirement. But, depending upon the more general definition of the term, the latter is conceived only if the situation has been untangled or if there is some kind of insufficiency. It may also come from a necessity or from failure to adapt.

Controlled by the operations division of the navy general staff, it involves basic ideas which largely go beyond this framework. Indeed, while the analysis of the threat, the environment, and the execution of missions constituting the entire fabric, justify the adjective "operational," it is

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necessary, in formulating it correctly, to take into account the notions of performance, margin of characteristics, and other elements touching upon technology.

The approach to it, both pragmatic and rational, therefore must be the fruit of a dialogue between operations officers, materiel officers and even equipment engineers.

Its final shape must be sufficiently bold so as to not to risk rapid and highly realistic time limits and in order not to be involved in a "wild goose chase."

But it is certain that the drafting of the memorandum expressing it must spring from combat concepts which will cover more than just a decade.

This need for initial collaboration often leads to a blurred situation which extends all the way to the switch of the expression of the operational requirement in the document characterizing the next phase, that is, the general staff objective.

This is expressed in certain interservice publications by the fact that the "military requirement" and the "general staff objective" for the navy seem to respond to the same concern.

In fact, the "operational requirement" remains an in-house document for the navy general staff. It gives rise to a "general staff objective" which summarizes the foundations and defines the objectives to be attained by the new equipment.

This document is the requirement which in turn is addressed to the DGA [General Delegation for Armament] and the technical directorate concerned so that the "feasibility study" may be started.

These relative ambiguities in the initial terminology of programs clearly show that the trend of thought and the methods needed to get through the first development phase less simple than one might have thought. They also prove that the analysis of systems can be accomplished only through an iterative process if one wishes to create a military tool suitable for the environment from its inception onward, harmonious in terms of its operation and capable of surviving against developing threats and environments.

The problem becomes even more complicated in the navy due to the fact that we like to use the same methodology, with the same concept and development guidelines, in working on weapons and equipment, that is to say, "weapons systems" which will respond to one or more objectives and the vessels carrying them, which must perform those missions.

In most cases (except for small, single-purpose vessels or highly ambitious systems), the range of programs and especially their nature are not the same. The operations estimate does not always express this difference.

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The navy general staff expressed this differentiation of level and echelon over a period of time with two terms:

"The general staff objective" which we mentioned earlier;

"The military program" which defines the essential military data of a vessel to be built.

These two documents are drafted within the "Materiel Division of the Navy General Staff."

Measured and Realistic Ambition: General Staff Objective

It is interesting very briefly to analyze the data behind the general staff objective in order better to understand the origin of a military program for the construction of a vessel. A piece of equipment or a system must last at least fifteen years and a vessel must go on for at least twenty years.

Some people, from this stage onward, doubt that it is necessary to take into account the cost-effectiveness concept for a specific piece of equipment intended, in war time, to outclass the enemy's equipment.

But how can one conceive and introduce the idea of choice and complementarity between several systems if this criterion is not maintained?

The general staff objective thus would have to bring out the following:

The justification for the desired operational requirement,

The desired performance figures,

Restrictions liable to influence these performance figures (in particular, adaptation to the naval environment).

The desired employment times (by outlining, as the case may be, the evolution possibilities, by echelons, in order to increase the profitability),

The priority to be assigned to the need,

An initial inventory drawn up with the support of the technical directorate, showing the principles behind the solutions that seem worth exploring.

The establishment, from the very beginning, of a "mixed study group including the EMM [Navy General Staff] and the DTCN [Technical Directorate of Shipbuilding]" is a fundamental element in the smooth handling of the process and the dialogue between operational specialists and engineers. This dialogue will facilitate the distribution of responsibilities throughout the program. Its initial effort is designed to review the means liable to respond to the objective.

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From this examination spring the following:

The "military requirement statement card," drafted by the general staff, spelling out the solution selected;

The "technical and financial development program card," prepared by the DTCN.

It is also during that period of time that the "program manager" engineer will be designated, along with a "project officer" for the important programs who will have the advantage of being able permanently to keep track of the specific evolution of solutions and inevitable interface problems.

The organizational framework of the EMM must display much flexibility during the drafting of the "operational requirement" and the "general staff objective" in order to combine the influence of these various parameters which are involved in the program concerned.

All of the divisions must help take into account the various threats, alliances, strategy, financial plans, and budgets, personnel requirements, maintenance policy, on-site logistic support, as well as the materiel policy which in the end benefits from the research and development programs.

Before the requirement is ever spelled out, these studies and exploratory development efforts must be conducted from various angles and on several levels, such as the CPE (Permanent Testing Commission), the DRET (Technical Research and Study Directorate), the EMM, the STCAN (Shipbuilding and Naval Weapons Technical Service), the CEPMAN (Naval Equipment Practical Study Commission), and the GROF (Paris Operations Research Group). They must make it possible to prevent costly "adventures" and to limit the particularly heavy burden of technological and financial restrictions.

The estimate of the advantages and inconveniences finally must take into account certain government guidelines. The choices made can furthermore influence other programs.

Finally, the international exchange policy will become involved with industrial policy which may wish to balance some specifications or strengthen some other sector.

Temptations of Perfectionism: Military Program For a Vessel

The difficulties mentioned above only grow worse when it comes to spelling out the "military program" for a single vessel. The basic idea as a matter of fact is to build a homogeneous assembly which will be efficient on the basis of equipment that will be heterogeneous in terms of age, level of completion, and role.

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While the same thinking processes and the same rules can be applied to a program which is thus found down the pipeline from the general staff objective, we must admit certain truths and constant factors:

A vessel may have to meet only multiple threats but it must be able easily to fit into a task force;

It is a living unit in which equipment on different technological levels must be harmonized and some of those levels are in the process of gestation at the moment the program is drawn up. Their presence adds considerable value. The risk must be weighed.

There are many ways to express operational requirements. The military program must not express the temptations that are commonly encountered:

The exaggerated limitation of the tonnage which is not necessarily expressed by economies because it leads to expensive and penalizing structural constraints. The hull, with its various installations, on the average involves only one-third of the basic estimate.

The tremendous increase in units, in terms of number and quality. The basic estimate is full of them and space is always limited.

One must of course admit that one cannot cover all of the saturating threats because that simply cannot be done even in hulls considered sufficient at the beginning, without doing the following:

Getting over the barrier represented by fund allocations (weapons and equipment items take about half of the basic estimate),

Taking risks in terms of deadlines,

Compromising the series-production effect,

Blocking the indispensable reviews and revisions half way along the unit's life time.

Multipurpose capability thus could only be limited.

Vessels will have to achieve full effectiveness through complementarity.

However, the handling of action systems must permit each vessel to perform a certain spectrum of missions in keeping with its size. Experience proves as a matter of fact that missions change while vessels remain the same. These considerations caused a chief of naval operations of an Allied navy to say: "Give me a balanced navy and I will accomplish your missions."

Let us keep in mind then that the military program must be a part of the risk and the stakes. The vessel must be a tool whose vulnerability remains

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commensurate to the offensive and defensive systems it carries. The plan for this program comprises two subheadings:

The operational definition which recalls the employment concept, the tasks, characteristics, and the possibilities of maintenance, while spelling out the specific dealines;

The principle characteristics of the ship's installations, weapons, and equipment, keeping in mind of course the cost ceiling.

After the technical service has translated this program into "technical specifications," the builder will be able to build the vessel although the "basic document" will inform the authorities on the program's technical and financial implementation process. This implementation process will be controlled by a "program director," who will be supervised and guided by a "mixed committee."

The "Fleet A-building" bureau, assisted by other bureaus, acts as the project officer.

The result must be a balanced assembly which will go into action about seven years after it has been conceived.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH ACTIVITIES NOTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Oct 79 p 13

[Text] To complement the scientific and technical research budget for 1980, whose major outlines we described in issue 779 of AIR & COSMOS, we are now giving some indications on the research activities of the Ministry of Transportation, as described in an annex to the finance bill for 1980, drawn up by the secretariat of state to the prime minister in charge of the general delegation for scientific and technical research.

Aeronautic research activities of the Ministry of Transportation in 1978 and 1979 concentrated on three areas: aeronautic construction, air navigation, and safety-regulations.

Aeronautic Construction

Three major goals were set: the reduction of nuisances, reduction of fuel consumption, and improvement of competitiveness.

Reduction of nuisances. Research in this area is designed to reduce the noise of turbomachinery (study of compressors) and aircraft noise (especially light planes and helicopters), and also to reduce the pollutants emitted by turbomachinery.

Reduction of fuel consumption. This research concentrates on three points: reducing the structural masses of aircraft, decreasing aircraft drag (which encompasses practically all of aeronautics), and studying engines to reduce their specific consumption.

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Improvement of Competitivity

Here three lines for research have been established:

- a. Decreasing project costs, that is, the costs of development and certification; involved in this are computer methods, new test techniques, etc.;
- b. Decreasing production costs;
- c. Decreasing operating costs by improving reliability, by simplifying maintenance and by reducing consumption;
- d. Improving the quality and the attractiveness of the product in relation to the performances, flexibility and ease of use of planes, and crew and passenger comfort.

Air Navigation

In this area, the main effort has been concentrated on major technological developments in the field of the presentation of information to the pilot and the design of the instrument panel, moving toward more elaborate data processing systems and a sophisticated integration of data and control features.

In 1979 a program was to be begun that would lead to the development in 1982 of a complete MLS ground equipment model meeting international standards.

Security-Regulations

Inflammability and toxicity are very critical safety problems. Methods have been developed (research on criteria), teams formed, and effective coordination is being provided by the FAA. Explosions of jet engines are also critical safety problems; studies on the shielding of small jet engines and the definition of "fail safe" shapes for larger engines are being conducted.

Prospects for 1980

The EERM [Meteorological Research and Study Facility] during the 7th Plan began a general research and development program whose two main objectives are: the acquisition of an intellectual potential enabling it to handle the major scientific changes coming between 1980-1990 and the mastery of a certain number of techniques needed for practical applications.

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In the area of general forecasting, the EERM's activity's main target is the "Amethyste" program conducted jointly with the central forecasting service. Short-term forecasting now makes special use of earth-synchronous satellites, such as Meteosat. For 1980, budget allocations amounting to 20.53 million francs will enable continuing the Meteosat and Argos programs in the amount of 8.2 million francs.

In the field of civil aviation, budget allocations come to 94.28 million francs, including a credit of 11 million francs, which will be the subject of a program contract between the ministry of transportation and ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research]. With the rest of the funding allocated for aeronautics, special effort will be made on programs to save energy and reduce nuisances. Furthermore, in addition to this funding, agreement in principle has been reached on a program contract between the secretariat of state for research and the ministry of transportation, amounting to 5 million francs. This will be used to equip the regulation aircraft.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PLAN FOR CIVILIAN-MILITARY 'INTEGRATION' IN INTELLIGENCE

Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 80-84

[Article by Gerardo Cocchis: "Behind the Lines of the Complex Army Corps-- Towards an 'Integrated' Civilian-Military Operational Intelligence Service"]

[Text] Lt Col F. spe. [Infantry-Regular Army] Gerardo Cocchis has taken various specialization courses, including the 16th course for "I" [Intelligence] - SIOS [Intelligence and Special Operations Service] officers and the 2nd course for mechanized units - Armored Troops School. He is presently performing the duties of chief of "I" section and chief of off-line code section of the 5th Military Zone Command.

There would be no reason for proposing new criteria for organization of the operational intelligence service behind the lines of the Major Unified Units if the presentation, according to protocol, of an explicit declaration by an ambassador wearing ceremonial hat and sword still constituted the initial act of a war. There would in fact be all or part of the time needed for mobilizing the forces for territorial defense, moving the units, organizing the service itself and--what would count most in a world that still respected certain specific codes of behavior--for carrying out the first urgent measures to achieve a gradual transition from a state of peace to a state of war in an atmosphere of relative tranquillity. But ambassadors, rules of protocol, hostilities waged only by uniformed soldiers, along with so many other things, are now part of the past.

In the times in which we live, attack is made without forewarning, so as to hit the adversary while he is still unprepared, or at least, not sufficiently prepared. And this is the point of departure for examination of the problem that concerns us: any day "X" in a period of international tension not unlike so many other days, when suddenly, even if not entirely unexpectedly, hostilities begin.

The Threat

The threat that hovers behind the lines breaks down into three principal components: psychological warfare; guerrilla warfare; and outflanking from the sky and/or the sea, in direct or indirect support of offensive action developed against the units at the line of defense.

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Psychological warfare, which in the contemporary era is aimed at backing guerrilla warfare on the one hand, and on the other, at weakening the spirit of resistance of the armed forces and the population, and which is started in a more or less underhanded manner even before hostilities begin, can be expected to reach levels of maximum virulence from the very first hours of warfare. If it were not countered in a timely and effective manner, it would find fertile ground in evacuees, refugees, people in flight from very heavily damaged zones, who, if prey to panic, could make the traffic situation chaotic behind the lines--a zone in which units in movement and logistical support operations have to be able to count on freedom of movement, apart from the fact that great difficulties for defense activity would arise from sabotage and from guerrilla action.

Guerrilla warfare, in a future conflict, could take the shape of a "pantographic projection" of the political terrorism already being carried out. There is no need to go into the disparate hypotheses advanced from various sides regarding the international links in the armed subversion against constituted powers; one need only observe the problem to deduce that at the opportune moment, it will be supported with weapons, money, technical advice, etc., from those who have an interest in it.

In this regard it is sufficient to recall that all up-to-date armies have parachute troops trained in espionage, reconnaissance, sabotage, surprise attack, etc. From this follows the simple hypothesis that such parachute troops would find possibilities of protection and support behind the lines; but it is also realistic to suppose that especially well-qualified and specifically trained elements would receive assignments to organize, command and coordinate a "second front" sparked, in the initial phase of the conflict, precisely by the militants of the various terrorist organizations.

Vertical outflanking is routine procedure that is now conceptually incorporated into the doctrines of all the armies abreast with the times, and is put into practice in the strategic and/or tactical field in accordance with the quantitative and qualitative availability of airborne units, units trained for the purpose, and suitable airplane and helicopter fleets.

These three parameters have been referred to separately because of requirements of exposition. Actually, it is unrealistic to think that they will have their effect on the conduct of defense one at a time, staggered in time. On the contrary, it is more logical to suppose that in principle, they will be astutely put into action simultaneously with one another and in harmony with the main attack on the advance defense positions.

Thus it is necessary to foresee as permanently immanent a composite threat, articulated under three different aspects, any of which could temporarily take on a more dangerous character than the other two, depending on the geographical area and the phase of operations.

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The Intelligence Problem

Behind the lines of the Major Unified Units, until such time as the military authorities are vested with civilian powers as well, civilian authorities and military authorities operate with their own particular responsibilities.

The civilian authorities are responsible for the activities pertaining to evacuees, refugees, public order, countering guerrilla warfare, etc; and the military authorities are responsible for the security of the units and for the military objectives, tactical-logistical supply of the advance units, action against landings from the sky and/or from the sea, etc.

Since the various responsibilities are exercised at the same time and in the same operational ambience, the following question arises: how to clarify the situation and keep track of its continual evolution, avoiding possible interferences or breakdowns, with consequent failure to transmit intelligence from one authority to another, or divergent evaluations drawn from the same intelligence framework?

So long as compartmentalization of civilian and military responsibilities persists, the answer is to be sought in different organization of the behind-the-lines operational intelligence service.

The Restructuring of the Service

The entire matter of the organization of intelligence behind the lines of the complex army corps requires a reconsideration in order to pursue the hoped-for organizational and functional improvement, on the postulate that the existing intelligence chains remain unaltered.

As it happens, new means based on more advanced technology are not necessary, or at least are not indispensable; but what is absolutely indispensable is a different and more modern "mentality" that implies the abandonment of narrow sectorial views of the intelligence problem.

The organs of the state--civilian and military organs--cooperate with one another where necessary; and this concept of cooperation is still a valid one in those areas where it is necessary to harmonize diversified technical activities. On the other hand, there is no inherent diversification in the matter of intelligence, especially when it is directed towards the same objectives. Hence it is necessary to abandon the concept of cooperation, replacing it with the more up-to-date concept of "integration."

The best instrument for the purposes of effective control of the areas falling behind the lines of the complex army corps operating on national soil appears to be the "integrated civilian-military intelligence service."

It is not only desirable but also achievable, when one takes into account the fact that the territorial organization of the Carabinieri comes under double

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control: that of the civilian authorities, as a judicial police force; and that of the military authorities, as a branch of the Army.

The proposed solution of the problem, making of such an organization the solid and capillary framework of the proposed "integrated service," is based on the setting-up, since peacetime, of "mixed provincial intelligence centers" organized alongside the carabinieri group commands and located in all provincial capitals.

The new "I" organ should be composed of:

- a specialist "I" officer, as military technician;
- a carabinieri officer, as judicial-police technician;
- a functionary of the Prefecture, as technician in the civilian problems connected with aspects of intelligence (evacuees, refugees, sensitive points, etc);
- officers of other armed forces and army corps, only in the provinces concerned;
- possibly experts from other branches, when and where necessary.

The "mixed provincial intelligence center" would constitute the link between the Military Zone Command, the Behind-the-Lines Command and civilian provincial authorities upstream, and the "investigative organs" downstream (Chart A). If, then, a behind-the-lines area included several provinces, the contiguous "mixed intelligence centers" would be able, through the normal channels of communication of the Carabinieri Branch, to make intelligence flow to the "center" closest to the position of the Military Zone Command/Behind-the-Lines Command.

It is implicit that the "zone of intelligence responsibility" of each "center" has to coincide with the territory of the province and that the "zone of concern" has to extend to the territory of the contiguous provinces.

The military specialist personnel assigned to the "center" could be seconded to the Administration that functions as Military Garrison Command in the provincial capitals falling in the behind-the-lines zones of the Major Unified Units, and would technically come under the orders of the "I" section of the Military Zone Command predesignated as Behind-the-Lines Command, with subsequent transition, in hierarchical subordination, to the Behind-the-Lines Command itself, at the moment of mobilization.


Among the duties of the proposed "integrated organ," in addition to the normal duties of every "I" organ, among which counterintelligence activity and defense against sabotage and guerrilla action would take on particular importance, several additional ones will have to be planned for:

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Chart A--Integrated "I" Organization

GRAFICO A

ORGANIZZAZIONE «I» INTEGRATA



[Key on following page]

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Key:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Organs of evaluation                   | 20. Company                                 |
| 2. Military                               | 21. Lieutenant District                     |
| 3. Civilian                               | 22. Brigade                                 |
| 4. Military Zone Command                  | 23. Patrol                                  |
| 5. Behind-the-Lines Command               | 24. Station                                 |
| 6. Prefecture                             | 25. Police Headquarters                     |
| 7. Data-processing and distribution organ | 26. Police Group                            |
| 8. Mixed Provincial Intelligence Center   | 27. Highway Police                          |
| 9. Carabinieri Group                      | 28. Railway Police                          |
| 10. Investigative organs                  | 29. Police Station                          |
| 11. Armed Forces                          | 30. Mayor                                   |
| 12. Treasury Police                       | 31. Urban Police                            |
| 13. Carabinieri                           | 32. Forest Police                           |
| 14. Police                                | 33. Citizens                                |
| 15. Auxiliaries                           | 34. Legend                                  |
| 16. Territorial Defense Unit              | 35. Organs called upon                      |
| 17. Military Aviation Base                | 36. In peacetime                            |
| 18. Naval Base                            | 37. After transfer to campaign headquarters |
| 19. Group                                 | 38. After mobilization                      |

---

--elaboration of the civilian-military intelligence planning, guided by the directives received received from the Prefecture and from the Military Zone Command, respectively;

--distribution of the planning to the "investigative organs" already set up in peacetime;

--initial and periodic indoctrination of the personnel of the aforesaid "investigative organs";

--distribution of the planning to the territorial defense units, at the moment of their assumption of operational responsibility, and to the operational and logistical units at the moment of their transfer to campaign headquarters;

--initial orientation on the situation for minor units on temporary station, and if necessary, for those in transit.

After the setting-up of the "I" organ, the behind-the-lines civilian-military operational intelligence organization in each "provincial sector" would be articulated as shown in the table on the following page.

As regards communication transmissions, the solutions are not especially difficult inasmuch as only the "investigative organs" of the Armed Forces (the others are already connected with one another) and the Behind-the-Lines Command

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CIVILIAN-MILITARY OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

- peripheral "investigative organs": Territorial Defense forces; army field units stationed permanently or temporarily behind the lines; second-level and third-level logistical units; Treasury Police Brigades; peripheral organs of Police, Highway and Railway Police; units of other armed forces, where present;
  - intermediate "investigative organs": Group, Companies and Lieutenant Districts of the Treasury Police; Police Headquarters, Police Group, Highway Police Command, Railway Police Command, Police Stations;
  - "investigation and intelligence-gathering organs": the Carabinieri Stations, each for the territory for which it has competence by law;
  - "investigation, intelligence-gathering and intelligence-transmitting organs": Carabinieri Group, Companies and Lieutenant Districts;
  - "intelligence data-processing and distribution organ": the proposed "mixed provincial intelligence center";
  - "civilian evaluation and interpretation organ": the Prefecture;
  - "military evaluation and interpretation organ": the Major Unified Units Behind-the-Lines Command.
- 

must provide for linking themselves to, respectively, the carabinieri stations (or lieutenant districts/companies) and the carabinieri group closest to their positions, with distances normally within a few kilometers, permitting prompt communication by wire.


The proposed solution:

- is aimed at setting up an "integrated organization" capable of assuring the various responsible authorities of a flow of unequivocal intelligence (Chart B);
- does not involve abandonment of the intelligence network in force and therefore does not affect the normal hierarchical subordination of the various units;
- "hooks" the units in temporary positions, and possibly those in transit, onto a single capillary territorial network, avoiding possible "intelligence voids" dangerous to them;
- does not impair very much the activities of the carabinieri, who, in the "integrated" framework described, would carry out the same activities as are assigned them by the present regulations as their responsibility under the law and as military police;

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Chart B



- Key:
1. Civilian-Military "Integrated" Operational Intelligence Flow
  2. From the contiguous province
  3. Behind-the-Lines Command
  4. Mixed Provincial "I" Center
  5. Prefecture
  6. Legend
  7. Gathering flow
  8. Transit flow
  9. Flow should be understood as descending also, and where possible, lateral
  10. Processed flow
  11. Gathering organs (Carabinieri Stations)
  12. Gathering and transit organs (Carabinieri Lieutenant Districts [...], Companies[I], Groups[II])
  13. Investigative organs of Armed Forces
  14. Investigative organs of Treasury Police
  15. Investigative organs of Police (including Highway and Railway Police, etc)

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--implies the necessity of finding specialist "I" personnel for capable organic staffing of Units or Administrations functioning as Military Garrison Command of the provincial capitals concerned. This drawback--which, however, is a very limited one because the number of capitals is not high--would be compensated for both by the possibility of eliminating connection with the Prefectures carried out by official means, as is now provided for, and by the advantages derived from it by Commands, civilian organs, territorial defense units and various units.

The staffing, though, must be carried out beforehand, in peacetime, for the purpose of:

--making the "mixed provincial intelligence center" functional, on the basis of agreements with the other organs concerned, in accordance with a periodic calendar that provides for meetings for compilation and updating of civilian-military intelligence planning as well as appropriately programmed exercises;

--activating, in extremely short times, the entire "integrated" territorial intelligence network, both in case of serious international crisis and in case of natural calamities.

After mobilization, this same arrangement could be taken as a sole model for the entire national territory, with the duties of the "mixed center" assigned to the Provincial Military Commands (the setting-up of which is not provided for behind the lines of the Major Unified Units).

Conclusions

A few years ago, the proposal explained might have been considered precipitate. Today, though, the time seems to be ripe for adoption of organizational concepts more in line with the dynamics of modern tactical procedures and for overcoming the compartmentalization at the lower and intermediate levels, with connections consequently effected solely at the higher levels, which, in any case, are to be preserved unaltered.

War has never been a private matter of the military, but future war will be even less so.

Thus, military and civilians involved together in equal measure in dangers, privations and sufferings of various kinds will have to unite in a common front of resistance, cemented by the same force of will and determination. But moral qualities and qualities of character are not enough by themselves for coping with the serious perils of a war; it is also, and especially, necessary to organize with the means adapted in time to the requirements.

The scheme outlined should obviously be developed in depth and studied in all the aspects of its application, and it might not even pass the scrutiny of close criticism applied in the light of obstructive considerations which at the moment escape one.



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But the purpose of this lightly sketched study is to draw attention and to spark discussion among the civilian and military officials who, because of direct responsibility or from simple personal interest, "notice" the problem.

Other approaches might well be taken, provided that the two basic principles are preserved: a service that is functional and effective from peacetime on, and a unified civilian-military intelligence effort.

The areas behind the lines of the complex army corps are in zones where a great many activities simultaneously take place that are especially vulnerable to any offensive that is not countered in a very timely manner.

It is vital that the civilian administrations and the military Commands have a steadily clear and consistent view of the situation, so as to ensure order and security. It is vital because the forces behind the lines constitute the close support for the technical requirements and are the direct support of the moral and spiritual stability of the advance army corps.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

TIERNO'S PRESTIGE--Enrique Tierno Galvan, mayor of Madrid, has asked Alonso Puerta to have the Madrid Socialist Federation name him [Tierno] president of the federation. Enrique Tierno feels that it is not proper that he be a simple militant of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Nov 79 p 7]

GRAPO'S ALGERIAN CONNECTION--The guerrilla instruction manuals confiscated from GRAPO [First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups] by the Madrid police are clearly Algerian inspired. About 90 percent of its pages are devoted to the making of homemade arms and explosives. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Nov 79 p 7]

ETA IN BRUSSELS--Spanish security services have detected the presence of important ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] leaders in Brussels. For 2 months now, and since the measures adopted by the French Government regarding Basque political refugees went into effect, Brussels appears to have become one of the centers of ETA activities in Europe. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 79 p 7]

'DESCUBIERTA' CLASS CORVETTES--Spain will build three "Descubierta" class missile launching corvettes for the Thai navy. The corvettes will be built in Cartagena. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Oct 79 p 7]

LIBYA TO PURCHASE SUBS--Libya is once again interested in purchasing four "Daphne" class submarines. These submarines will be built in Cartagena under French license. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 11 Nov 79 p 7]

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END

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