

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030054-7

3

1979

|

|

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8835

31 December 1979

West Europe Report

(FOUO 7/1/79)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece,
Cyprus, Turkey).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8835

31 December 1979

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 71/79)

CONTENTS

PAGE

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Institute Study Claims NATO Superiority in Euromissiles (Wolf Perdelwitz; STERN, 15 Nov 79)	1
--	---

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

Technical Military Training for Foreigners Described (Claude-Louis Kern; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79)....	3
Technical Military Aid to Saudi Arabia Described (Yves Salkin; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79)	9
Technical Training for Foreign Air Forces Summarized (Charles Mainguy; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79)	16
Briefs	
Counter-Terrorist Training	22
Operations Bases Named	22
Trouble in PC	22
Militants Quitting Party	23
Marchais Strategy Viewed	23

SPAIN

Political Parties Vie for Control of Barcelona (CAMBIO 16, 25 Nov 79)	24
Commentary Scores Interior Minister for Lack of Action (Jose Oneto; CAMBIO 16, 25 Nov 79)	27

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Martin Villa's Political Star Believed To Be Rising (Jose Oneto; CAMBIO 16, 18 Nov 79)	29
'CAMBIO' Interviews Leaders of Police Union (CAMBIO 16, 25 Nov 79)	31

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

INSTITUTE STUDY CLAIMS NATO SUPERIORITY IN EUROMISSILES

Hamburg STERN in German 15 Nov 79 pp 229-234

[Article by Wolf Perdelwitz: "Dead Heat Between Hare and Tortoise"]

[Text] Where armament is concerned, they are in agreement like on hardly anything else: Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his challenger in the CDU/CSU Franz Josef Strauss want to satisfy the wishes of the Americans and of NATO by upgrading the West European NATO troops' armaments with nuclear-tipped medium-range Pershing 2 rockets and with cruise missiles. Led by the FRG, NATO will make its decision to build these weapons in mid-December.

But in the West too, there is disagreement on the NATO doctrine of Soviet nuclear superiority. The Hamburg Peace Research and Security Policy Institute, under the direction of former Bundeswehr general and father of orientation and indoctrination, Wolf Graf Baudissin, claimed Western superiority on the basis of official and semi-official data. Dieter Lutz, deputy institute director, provides the following conclusion to his analysis:

"Where 'Eurostrategic atomic weapons' are concerned, NATO rather than the Warsaw Pact is in the lead -- in some sectors with a four-fold superiority."

As to "upgrading" for the purpose of bringing the atomic seasaw back into equilibrium, the East has this justification rather than the West. Says Lutz: "Our comparison of forces indicates that there is no basis for finding a NATO military inferiority in the 'Euro-nuclear situation.' On the contrary, it can be assumed that the Warsaw Pact feels that it must take rearmament measures to counter the increasing quantitative and qualitative NATO level."

In the category of atomic ground combat weapons, Lutz calculated a 4.56 to 1 NATO superiority: where the West has an atomic firepower of 986 howitzers, 320 rockets and 300 land mines, the East has an atomic firepower capability of only 311 support rockets. Lutz determined parity in short-range rockets with 1,637 missiles east and 1,622 west of the Elbe. For the medium-range weapons category, Lutz calculated approximate parity also: 538 rockets with 778 atomic war heads for the Warsaw Pact; 194

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

rockets with 674 warheads for the West. If, as Lutz tries to do, the individual weapons are graded as to combat effectiveness, the pendulum swings far over to the NATO side in all aspects. Western superiority appears completely overwhelming upon listing total numbers of all nuclear warheads: 4,500 for the USSR; 12,000 for the United States; 500 for the UK and 200 for France.

But from the NATO point of view the Soviets have started a new round in the arms race. For a little more than 1 year they have been replacing their up to 20-year old medium range rockets (SS 4 and SS 5) with brand new SS 20 two-stage missiles.

The latter, with an effective radius of 4,500 km, can reach all of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Each carries up to 3 atomic warheads, which can independently reach their targets with an accuracy of 100 meters--more accurately than has been any Soviet rocket's capability to date. In addition, their launching ramps are transportable by being mounted on a tank; they are therefore difficult to detect and destroy.

Therefore, says NATO, the Warsaw Pact has extended to medium range rockets the advantage which it already had in tanks and personnel.

In the Hamburg peace researcher's experience, these NATO arguments are merely a pretext for its own arms increases. Supposedly, he says, the development of the U.S. Pershing 2 rocket is merely a response to the introduction of the Soviet SS 20. In reality, says Lutz, the first SS 20 was detected in 1975 by the U.S. "Big Bird" reconnaissance satellite. But the development of the Pershing 2 had already been started one year earlier. Says Lutz: "New weapon systems are developed and produced because research and production facilities are not kept busy or simply because appropriate scientific and technological levels have been reached. Their military functional applicability is determined afterwards. The 'gap argument' is used as a rule to provide justification to the public."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.

9273
CSO: 3103

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TECHNICAL MILITARY TRAINING FOR FOREIGNERS DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 50-51

[Article by Col Claude-Louis Kern*: "Technical Military Aid--An Up-to-Date Training Program"]

[Text] The admission of foreign military trainees to our military schools as a form of cooperation is not new. The first foreigner to be admitted to French military training was Japanese Infantry Lieutenant Harada who entered the Ground Forces Advanced War College on 1 November 1884.

The training of military personnel for foreign governments did not actually reach its current level until around the 1960's.

A total of 75 foreign countries have benefited to date from our military training, but only some 50 countries are currently sending trainees to our schools on a yearly recurring basis. These are principally the French-speaking countries. The African countries and Madagascar fill more than half the available openings for trainees every scholastic year, while one-third of the openings are reserved for the North African countries.

The growth in total number of trainees admitted has been typical: From a modest beginning in 1963-1964 (1,300 trainees), it rose rapidly to a total of 3,000-3,500 trainees per year between 1964 and 1969, the period during which various African states fielded armies.

Admissions have remained at this level after having gone through a sharp drop and recovery in the early 1970's.

* A graduate of Saint-Cyr, class of 1945, Col Claude-Louis Kern served in various organizations and officer schools in France, and in several overseas general staff and technical aid assignments, until 1970, when he assumed the duties of military attache to a French embassy in a French-speaking African country. Since 1973, he has been chief of the "Foreign Trainees in France" section of the Armed Forces General Staff's Foreign Relations Division.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thus, between 1964 and 1978 the Armed Forces received some 40,000 foreign military trainees in their schools.

Training At All Levels

It has been customary for some time to distinguish between two types of military cooperation: the traditional form of cooperation inherited from the past, which was geared especially to the French-speaking countries, and a form of technical assistance that was associated with the sale of arms. This distinction is more and more losing its validity. However, it will be used in this article for explanatory purposes.

Thus, foreign trainees are admitted to French military training either on the basis of traditional cooperation or on that of technical assistance associated with arms sales.

The first form of cooperation involves essentially personnel admitted on an individual basis for general military training under overall aid agreements spread out over an extended period. Admissions are granted for scholastic or calendar terms comprising "classic" courses of instruction listed in a catalog which is updated annually. The curriculum conforms to an annual program established in advance.

The second form of assistance involves personnel admitted generally in larger or smaller groups for pinpoint training on specific equipment sold to the interested country. Admissions are granted for terms of variable duration based on "a la carte" curricula outside the regular annual program.

Trainees are thus enrolled in:

--Advanced military training (advanced war colleges of the various Armed Forces components, the Advanced Interforces War College, the Advanced Interforces Course);

--Basic officer training and specialized service schools (Coetquidan Special Military School, Salon Air School, Brest Naval School); this group properly includes the university-level institutions of professional training that come under the DGA [General Delegation for Weaponry] (see chart);

--More than 650 very diverse study and practical training courses organized by the three Armed Forces components, the Gendarmerie, and the Public Health Service, with durations ranging from 14 to 665 days in the last couple of years.

After this quick outline of the current situation, I have thought it interesting to very briefly summarize the process involved in preparing for these admissions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Foreign Students Enrolled in University-Level Institutions under the DGA [General Delegation for Weaponry] in 1978/1979						
University-level institutions	Careers offered	Duration of studies	Total students and auditors (1)	Total foreign students and auditors	Principal countries of origin of foreign students	
Polytechnic University Paris	High level careers in sciences, technologies and economics	1 year military training, 2 years science studies	612	33	Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Morocco, Mauritania, Low Countries, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia	
National College of Advanced Technologies (ENSTA) Paris	High level technical careers in naval, mechanical, chemical, electronics, nuclear fields	2 or 3 years	245	30	Algeria, Cameroon, Spain, Lebanon, Mexico, Syria, Venezuela, Yugoslavia	
National College of Aeronautics and Space (ENSAE) Toulouse	High level technical careers in aeronautics, space, automation, data processing fields	2 or 3 years	512	111	Egypt (50 percent), Spain, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia	
National College of Aeronautical Construction Engineers (ENSICA) Toulouse	Design, construction, repair engineering careers in aeronautics, space and associated industries, technologies	3 years	154	11	Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia	
National College of Weapons Studies and Technologies Engineers (ENSIETA) Arcueil	Engineering careers in industries and technologies related to land vehicles and weapons or to naval construction and hydrography	3 years studies, 1 year specialized training in armed forces	165	4	Algeria, Argentina, Ivory Coast, Madagascar	
(1) Excluding enrolled students (Polytechnic and ENSIETA) in basic military and specialist training phases with the Armed Forces.						

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The process can be summarized as follows:

After the interested countries have presented their requests for training of their personnel:

--these requests are studied by the appropriate Foreign Affairs and Cooperation departments, which make the final decisions on the courses to be offered and reimburse the Defense Ministry's expenditures;

--the Defense Ministry organizes the courses, and is therefore merely a purveyor of services.

The processing schedule calls for the steps that must precede the above decisions to commence 1 year in advance.

This long timeframe is necessary to meet the pressing requirements of many of our partners, who need to know our decisions well enough in advance to provide for the teaching of French to their candidates and for the timely inclusion of the expenses associated with this training in their annual expense budgets.

Training Facilities and 'Special Courses'

An activity of this scope is hardly without its problems.

Disregarding a few minor difficulties such as an inadequate technical background occasionally encountered here or there among a very few trainees, the two principal difficulties encountered arise from:

--the imbalance between the number of admissions requested and the number available, and

--the exceedingly scant knowledge of our language possessed by many of the candidates.

As regards the imbalance between the volume of requests presented by the interested countries and our capacity for satisfying them, the ratio between the latter and the former in the last few school years has been not more than half in total, and not more than one-third in the cases of some schools and courses that are especially in demand.

This problem goes back several years. It was first felt by the advanced military training sector, then spread to the basic officer training schools, and 3 or 4 years ago reached the Ground Forces specialist schools, particularly those of the Infantry, the Armored Corps and Ordnance.

The available training facilities having proven insufficient, a solution was sought through the creation of "special courses" which, in certain cases, also have the advantage of being better suited to our partners' needs.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The first endeavor of this kind was that of the Navy, which, in 1971, created and added to its Naval Academy a "Naval Academy Special Course," open to 20 candidates. This endeavor proved successful and, in 1972, it was decided to enlarge the experiment.

The year 1973 saw the birth of an "Air Academy Special Course" and of a "Quartermaster Specialist Training Course."

In January 1974, the "Advanced Interforces War College" opened its doors to admit and train some 40 senior officers from the three armed forces components [i.e., army, navy and air force] (including the French ones) before admitting them to the Advanced Interforces Course with French and foreign students who were graduates of the traditional service academies.

After an inevitable period of hesitation and adaptation, the results being obtained are now considered satisfactory.

This solution, which helps to overcome, in part at least, the first major difficulty mentioned above, has gradually unfolded: 1980 will see the opening, at the Montpellier Infantry Specialist School, of a special "Overseas Combat" course especially designed for our African partners.

There are also, after a fashion, "special courses" for trainees whose mastery of our language is deemed inadequate. Prior to their military training courses, these trainees follow a civilian remedial French course organized by the Ministry of Education at Besancon. Admission to these courses, as well as financing of transportation and of the courses themselves, is exclusively the province of the Foreign Ministry, which centrally processes all requests. The duration of these courses is 10 weeks.

The Advanced Interforces War College completes this language training with a 6- to 7-week special course given on its premises prior to the opening of the regular curriculum.

The Navy, for its part, has instituted a 5-week remedial French course at the Saint-Raphael Air Petty Officers School.

The Air Force has contracted with a civilian company to provide "rudimentary drill" training for certain categories of trainees. These courses are given at Rochefort. This is a new and very effective approach that is to be picked up and considerably developed, on the same basis, by the DGA, whose constantly growing needs have now reached substantial proportions.

Complex, constrictive for the Armed Forces, burdensome on credits and staffing, and at times difficult to organize though it may be, this form of cooperation continues nevertheless to be highly important. It has made possible the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

fielding of national armies by the French-speaking countries of Africa. It has proven to be one of the essential components in the training of the advanced national cadres of which these young countries are so greatly in need.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

9399

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TECHNICAL MILITARY AID TO SAUDI ARABIA DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 52-53

[Article by Gen Yves Salkin*: "Cavalrymen of the Desert"]

[Text] Blue kepis fluttering among the AMX 30's over an expanse of desert, black kepis surrounding a GCT 155 positioned among shadowy thornbushes, mouse-colored kepis hovering over an engine in front of a workshop...mythical scenes in an Oriental tale? No. They are actual scenes in the field of Franco-Saudi military aid in full operation.

The practical solutions that had to be devised in this new area of problems handed to the French Army, and an assessment of the initial results of this worthy undertaking being carried out by volunteers in this Arabic peninsula --this land that is still so full of mystery and that is still so talked about throughout the world--are the topic of this article.

A Venture

The ultimate aim was clearly defined a few years ago by the Saudi government: field as rapidly as possible a combined-components force complete with the most modern French equipment and the most advanced weapons systems.

The tasks embodied in this overall objective were laid out:

--delivery of ordered equipment

--construction of installations (training, support, living accommodations)

* A graduate of Saint-Cyr, class of 1943, Gen Yves Salkin commanded the 30th Dragoon Regiment at Valdahon from 1969 to 1971, directed training at the EAABC [Armored Corps and Cavalry Training School] at Saumur from 1971 to 1974, served as army attache in Mexico from 1974 to 1977, then as head of the French Military Aid Mission in Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1979. Since 1 September 1979, he has been director of the ESORSEM [College of Reserve Officers in General Staff Service].

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

--training of battalion and unit commanders

--instruction of cadres and crews

--involvement in the overall logistical support operation

These tasks were in turn particularized with the utmost care and articulated within a network of contracts for equipment, technical assistance, and ground structures.

A most alluring problem on the whole...but at the same time full of uncertainties because of its vast scope and the widely diversified types of aid requested.

- An Innovative Effort

Stimulated by the Saudi originators of the "tank project," the French general staffs went to work on it. As a new problem, it called for innovative solutions.

First, there was a need to become thoroughly familiar with the environment in which these various operations were to be carried to fruition. A military mission was created, the chief of which installed his office, symbolically, in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, alongside that of the Saudi armored corps commander.

A team of high-level instructors under his direct authority was attached to the Saudi Armored Corps School to train battalion and unit commanders.

Also placed under his control were:



--a "post-sales supportive structure" staffed and maintained by the equipment supplier;

--an "aid structure" staffed and maintained by a specialized firm, whose first assignment was to build from scratch two training centers, one for training in the use of the equipment and the other in its maintenance.

Concurrently, volunteer personnel had to be recruited: active cadres "outside the budget" or "detached," young retirees, civilian specialists.

A form of practical instruction had to be worked out specifically to overcome the language barrier, despite the presence of qualified interpreters. The proven principles of our military schools were applied: "one learns more with his hands than with his head," "hands in the grease, not in your pockets"... These principles were enhanced by a number of training aids (sectionized motors, demonstration models, breadboards...).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Equipment being loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Lastly, with respect to the courses of instruction, it became evident that to avoid any "war of devolution" a determination would have to be made of respective future Saudi roles. The "progressive transfer of responsibilities" system adopted proved successful: French instructor with Saudi observer, Saudi instructor with French adviser, Saudi instructor alone or with French assistant. Development of instruction was enhanced by regular increments of French-speaking Saudi officers trained in our language institutions and in our training schools after the start of the project.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Caption: Saudi installations ready to receive the AMX 30's

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A Positive Balance Sheet

The road traveled to achieve the established goal was long...it was not without ruts.

Finding Saudi personnel in sufficient numbers, fitting the schedule of training to that of equipment deliveries, keeping the operation on schedule despite sudden changes in French staffing...these are a few examples of the kinds of difficulties encountered.

Although it is too early yet to draw up a final balance sheet of the entire operation, some of its results can, however, already be assessed.

We cannot presume, of course, to judge the results achieved from the Saudi viewpoint, but we need feel no constraints on calling attention to international press agency reports according to which the armored brigade cut a very fine figure during the June 1979 large-scale maneuvers.

From the French viewpoint, the benefits derived from the operation by our cadres have been highly positive.

From the technical standpoint, they have become experts on equipment some of which has not yet been issued to the French Army.

In the training domain, they have learned better than they could have within the metropole how to use the most effective training methods to get their message across.

From a tactical standpoint, they have become aware of factors the importance of which they had not suspected: the vastness of spaces for maneuver, the extensiveness of firing ranges, the cruel tolls of heat and thirst, the tyranny of logistics in desert regions...

And lastly, their experience as human beings has been an enriching one. They have worked side by side with men who did not live in the same manner as they and who reasoned differently from them, but with whom they nevertheless became comrades-in-arms.

Launched a few years ago by a handfull of enthusiasts, French Military Aid to Saudi Arabia has become a living reality. Centered initially around the AMX 30 tank, it is growing with time; new equipment is being unloaded there and workshops are mushrooming out of the sand.

Still in its adolescent stage, it has already won its letters patent of nobility; it is always part of the agenda of the talks held by the highest officials of the two friendly countries whenever they meet.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is still an unfinished symphony that should be carried forward concordantly to its concluding chord.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

9399

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR FOREIGN AIR FORCES SUMMARIZED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 56-57

[Article by Brig Gen Charles Mainguy*: "Under All Skies"]

[Text] Cooperation between France and foreign countries in the field of military aeronautics is almost as old as the militarization of the first airplanes.

Three and one-half years after awarding military pilot certificate number 1 to Lieutenant Tricornot-de-Rose, Australian Capt Walter Watt was awarded certificate number 508 on 3 August 1914, the first military pilot certificate ever awarded to a foreigner.

In the 3 years that followed, to 3 August 1917, 100 citizens of foreign countries were awarded certificates in France: 36 Russians, 24 Italians, 22 Serbs, 7 Portuguese, 4 Americans, 3 Japanese, 1 Romanian and 2 Indochinese, Caodac Minh and Phantat Mao who were serving in the French Foreign Legion. These two legionnaires were the first beneficiaries of a technical aid undertaking that subsequently assumed major proportions: the training of cadres and aviation specialists in the former French commonwealth.

Aeronautical cooperation took another forward stride immediately following World War I. Close ties were formed with various countries, especially in South America where the potential of aviation was understood very early. In the 1950's, it was not unusual to meet very highly placed officials in South American aviation who were holders of a French certificate earned between the two world wars.

* A graduate of the Air Academy, class of 1949, Gen Charles Mainguy, bomber pilot, took part in operations in the Far East and [former]AFN [French North Africa]. After passing the Air War College in 1967, he served as chief of the Office of Forecasts and Studies, commander of the Villacoublay Air Base, and chief of the Air Force General Staff's Technical Aid Office. Since 1 November, he has been deputy director of Weapons Research, Project Studies and Technologies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Technical aid missions were sent to many countries. In Colombia and Venezuela, they played an important role in setting up a national aviation.

After the Second World War, two factors brought about a substantial growth in technical aid:

--the fielding of national fleets by newly independent countries: 24 countries, most of them French-speaking, benefited from French technical aid in this initial phase and 14 of these still do.

--the growth of French military aircraft exports.

French Air Force orders represent only one-fourth of all the Mirages manufactured by AMD-BA.

The same ratio applies to helicopters in service in the Armed Forces as compared to the total number manufactured by AEROSPATIALE.

The Air Force currently provides technical aid of three types to more than 30 foreign nations:

--training of foreign personnel,

--assignment of technical advisers to foreign air forces,

--exchanges of information, specialist missions and various services on request by foreign air forces.

Necessary Adjustments

While the admission of French-speaking foreign trainees posed no new problems for the Air Force, since it was already training many Africans and citizens of the Indochinese peninsula in its schools, the rapidly growing number of requests from countries of non-French cultures did give rise to new requirements:

--the teaching of French,

--the organization of elementary science courses to bring certain candidates up to minimum required levels,

--use of foreign languages or of interpreters by French instructors for courses of short duration.

For the past 20 years the Air Force has admitted more than 1,000 trainees annually.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This represents a substantial effort, in that, while the training given qualifies the foreign trainees for the same diplomas awarded our own trainees, major adjustments are frequently necessary to prepare them for the instruction given in our schools.

The fact is that foreign instruction programs are not necessarily equivalent to those of our own national education system, that French manners and customs can differ substantially from the habits acquired by the trainees in their own environments, and that, in sum, too many of the candidates must moreover learn, in a country that is entirely strange to them, the basic rudiments of the military profession.

A combination of all these conditions makes a candidate's entry into our schools much more difficult.

Most foreign trainees spend at least 1 year in the Air Force, and some remain in it more than 3 years. In elementary pilots school, they have at times represented one-third of the total annual enrollment of trainees.

Each year, the Air Force places at the disposal of the Ministries of Cooperation and Foreign Affairs all the available openings for trainees. The number of openings is unfortunately always less than the number of requests received.

For the last several years, studies have been made and all possible steps taken in an effort to satisfy the growing requirements of countries that request French training.

An Air School Special Course [CSEA] has been created for foreign trainees whose prior form of education has not prepared them for the normal competitive examinations. These trainees receive the same military, general and professional training as do our own officer candidates recruited through competitive examinations. Only the theoretical science instruction given them undergoes certain adjustments. Each year, the Air Force makes available 30 CSEA openings in addition to access to the normal Air School competitive examinations.

A French language school created in 1972 at Rochefort together with the SATI [Industrial Technical Aid Company] to satisfy the Air Force's own internal needs has just been converted into the CIFL [Interforces Language Training Center].

Another step has consisted of providing openings for foreign military transport pilot-trainees at the Amaury de la Grange (Hazebrouck) and Cipra (Dinard) civilian pilot schools. After earning a professional pilot certificate and IFR [Instrument Flight Rules] qualification there, these trainees go through a brief complementary specialist training course with the Air Force before being awarded a military transport pilot certificate.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Other pilot improvement facilities exist in the form of national and inter-regional schools to which France may contribute needed assistance.

An example of this is the group of Moroccan Royal Air Force schools located in Marrakech, which each year admits more than 100 African trainees and obtains the assistance of some 60 French Air Force instructors.

This aid will be further developed with the setting of an Alpha Jet pilot training school at Meknes.

Technical Aid: A Temporary Solution

The above form of cooperation falls directly under the second type of technical assistance demanded of the Air Force: foreign assignment of technical advisers.

With 300 highly qualified officers and noncommissioned officers assigned as technical advisers abroad, the contribution being made by the Air Force from its own resources is substantial.

It is all the more felt as the advances in modern aviation year by year demand an ever higher level of technical knowledge and competence on the part of our personnel.

In this domain as well, the demand far exceeds the availability. The Air Force is trying to increase the number of locally qualified cadres, by way of new solutions to the problem of training them either in France or in their own countries, as a means of reducing to the minimum the extent of this form of "substitute" aid, which from the viewpoint of a country's own development can only be considered a very temporary solution.

A properly conducted technical aid has as its dedicated aim its own gradual disappearance over a specified period of time. Only the continuing procurement by many countries of new and more and more sophisticated equipment can justify maintaining the present number of aid personnel assigned abroad in 25 foreign air forces.

Services On Request

The third type of technical assistance comprises a number of different services requested of the Air Force under the heading of good relations with friendly countries that value the quality of our production, our organization and methods.

These requests have to do especially with:

- maintenance of our equipment,
- instruction programs and documentation,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- organizational studies,
- plans for air base ground structures or for special technical installations,
- airlifting of equipment,
- special orientation courses of short duration at our air bases and decision centers for personnel occupying positions of high responsibility.

This list is far from being exhaustive and the number of each type of request is high. Since the beginning of 1979, some 40 countries have requested Air Force specialized assistance under this heading.

The magnitude of the activities of all kinds in the field of technical cooperation with foreign air forces has necessitated certain organizational adjustments:

- a special office has been created within the EMAA [Air Force General Staff]: the Technical Aid Office;
- a new division has been set up within the General Headquarters for Air Force Schools;
- at Rochefort which is frequently called upon to handle over 300 foreign trainees on the base, a special division has been set up to handle all problems relating to these trainees.

Taken together, the Air Force personnel working full time in technical aid activities represent numerically the staffing of a medium-size air base.

The services thus provided are voluminous, but the essential point is the degree to which they fulfill the expectations of the countries that request our cooperation.

There is not the least doubt that the diplomas awarded by the Air Force are held in high esteem, that the rigorous training given by our schools is highly valued, and that the technical competence and devotedness of our technical advisers are beyond question.

Nor can there be any doubt that the present form of our training, requiring as it does a high level of general knowledge, places severe demands on certain rapidly developing countries whose elite are drained by the many demands of national interest, of which aviation represents but a small sector.

The requirements we place on others, in the same way that we place them on ourselves, are, however, commensurate with the complex technologies we seek to master.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Despite the urgency of the demands placed upon us, nay, despite certain foreign pressures, we find it necessary to avoid the temptation to produce a greater number of lesser qualified specialists. It is the price that must be paid for the confidence of those countries that do us the honor of entrusting their requirements to the French Air Force.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

9399

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

COUNTER-TERRORIST TRAINING--Officials of the National Gendarmerie are convinced that the risks of a terrorist attack on the high sea, particularly one involving the taking of hostages, are increasing. The likely scenario: the capture of the crew members of some French oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The GIGN [National Gendarmerie Intervention Group] will henceforth be trained for various operations at sea such as underwater attacks; the transfer, by helicopter, of a commando group to the bridge of a [hijacked] ship; and the immobilization of a ship by jamming its propellers or draining its tanks. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Dec 79 p 21]

OPERATIONS BASES NAMED--Three towns in South France--Frejus, Bonifacio and Perpignan--will serve as bases for possible French overseas action. They are (or will be) the encampments of the units making up the 31st intervention demibrigade. These locations are not far from the world's two "hot spots" where French interests may be directly threatened: Africa and the Mediterranean. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Dec 79 p 21]

TROUBLE IN PC--Because of Georges Marchais' attitude in the Boulin [suicide] affairs, hundreds of letters and protests continue to arrive at the [PC headquarters] Place du Colonel Fabien. Militants are quitting the party, especially in the Paris federations, the Paris region and in the Bouches-du-Rhone. [PC] parliamentarians have refused to back the attacks by "a certain press" [i.e., the PC press]. There is even said to have been some uproar at the offices of L'HUMANITE and HUMANITE DIMANCHE. To fight it, Marchais and Roland Leroy are said to have made up. In early December, a meeting of the Central Committee was to decide whether to keep Leroy on as head of the PC daily. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Dec 79 p 21]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITANTS QUITTING PARTY--The tension that has existed in the Paris federation of the PC during the past 2 years has resulted in the loss of a third of the party's militants. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 26 Nov 79 p 4]

MARCHAIS STRATEGY VIEWED--The recent communist meeting (of French, Spanish and Italian communists) in support of the Polisario is part of [Georges] Marchais' strategy. He wants to emphasize his Eurocommunist image and quickly overtake the PS on international affairs. He is getting ready to take a long trip in 1980 (through Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam and Japan). [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 26 Nov 79 p 4]

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

POLITICAL PARTIES VIE FOR CONTROL OF BARCELONA

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 p 37

[Text] The renewal of the Municipal Pact between the Catalanian socialists and the Convergence nationalists on Barcelona's City Council has made the communists so nervous that they have launched charges of electoralism at both parties and the socialists of playing into the hands of the Right.

After the April municipal elections the key towns and cities of Catalonia remained in the hands of the socialists and communists helped in many places by Jordi Pujol's nationalists and the Christian Democrats of the UCD [Democratic Center Union]. This agreement limited to 6 months by Convergence and Union and called the "Pact for Progress" expired a few days ago.

The CDC [leadership body of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia] drew up a hardly favorable announcement: "We consider the so-called "Pact for Progress" very negatively because we believe it did not respond to any real programmatic agreement serving the city but rather to a will to impose a political formula that now and in the future could establish a hegemony of the Marxist parties in Catalanian society."

The broadside was a strong one and Reventos, leader of the Catalanian socialists, was not slow to react: "Any abandonment (of the agreements) can only be a response to the opportunism of an electoral campaign for the Catalanian parliament or to the unjustifiable aspiration to expand the power areas of the town councils."

Nevertheless, despite the strong pressures of the CDC's most extreme right wing and the unilateral abandonment of the pact by the UCD at the very time when the council of the nationalists was meeting, the progressive sector of Roca Junyent exerted sufficient pressure so that a new pact might be negotiated "under conditions permitting a more effective city government."

A short time later, Roca was to reach the point of resigning as deputy secretary general of his party using as an excuse his dedication to his parliamentary tasks and responsibilities although various sources note that the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

resignation was the culmination of a series of frictions with the sector of Trias Fargas, author of the final draft of the council's note which so harshly attacked the expired "Pact for Progress."

PSUC: A Big Hoax

The negotiations lost by Convergence began on Tuesday, 6 November, at the highest level. Jordi Pujol, Josep Maria Cullerell and Antoni Comas, on behalf of the socialists. After 3 days of total silence and long days of negotiations, a pact emerged in which references were made to 11 different areas of the City Council and the desire to strengthen the role of the regular council was made patent, guaranteeing full cohesion between the municipal agreements and the parties' activities, institutionalizing the meetings of the various political groups' spokesmen and seeking the presence of a representative of each party at press conferences following regular council meetings.

The communists' reaction was immediate and very tough. The PSUC's [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], Antoni Gutierrez, said as a result of the agreement that the formula was wrong and that it was a matter of a maneuver to separate communists and socialists and to weaken the policy of progress in Catalonia.

Josep Miguel Abad, PSUC deputy mayor, was still tougher and went as far as to term the pact a great hoax and an electoral fraud for the city. He affirmed that the agreements made are already in operation or are in sight, including some, such as the purchase of 50 buses, that have been pending since the administration of the former "digito" mayor Socias Humbert and insinuated that socialists and convergentists had spend the 3 days discussing other issues, a clear reference to the coming elections to the Catalanian Parliament.

The statements by the deputy mayor immediately provoked a strong response among the socialist ranks. Reventos went to the extend of threatening to suspend the talks arranged with the PSUC to heighten the value of the municipal pacts if Abad were not disapproved by his party. It was not a major fight. The Barcelona Local Committee supported Abad's political assessment, adding the nuance that the form in which it was said was a personal matter.

CDC: "We Have Not Asked for a Larger Share of the Pie"

Josep Maria Cullerell, deputy mayor, a member of Convergence and a leader of the Council's Treasury Department, told Julian Castello of CAMBIO 16, what his party's intentions are: "The "Pact of Progress" has of course expired because it was only for 6 months. Now, everyone thought we wanted a larger share of the pie but we have not even brought that up. What we want is to have the city councils work and not spend time at the plenary meeting discussing issues such as divorce or public and private schooling, issues that belong to parliament."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Cullell does not really agree with the assessment of the "Pact of Progress" made by his party's council. "Six months ago a program was agreed upon," he stated, "and it has been fulfilled with interest." With respect to Communist nerves, Cullell considers them to be justified.

"Pujol said it earlier at his lecture in Esade, that Catalonia's future policy depends on the PSC [Socialist Party of Catalonia] and the CDC. We worked together in making this pact. The PSUC, being on the outside, has become nervous and also the UCD; consequently I am not surprised that they want to destroy and discredit it," Cullell concluded.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.

8094

CSO: 3110

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

COMMENTARY SCORES INTERIOR MINISTER FOR LACK OF ACTION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 p 21

[Article by Jose Oneto: "Ibanez Freire"]

[Text] A week after the abduction of the UCD's [Union of the Democratic Center] secretary for Internal Relations and deputy for Cuenca, Javier Ruperez, it is not yet known what kind of measures the minister of interior, Antonio Ibanez Freire, has taken to bring a little tranquillity to public opinion increasingly terrorized by the ease with which people here are killed, abducted, subjected to extortion and deals are made.

Two weeks after the reports by Deputy Juan Maria Bandres on the alleged torturing of Basque prisoners in a few areas of Euskadi, the minister of interior, Lieutenant General Ibanez Freire, continues to remain totally silent in a deliberate effort to get the government's spokesman, Josep Melia, pull his chestnuts out of the fire.

The reports of alleged torture made public 2 days following a personal interview between deputy Bandres and the minister of interior have up to now not been worth any commentary on the one whose main mission is watching over the honor of the state security corps and punishing any individual excess which might occur in any Civil Guard police station or prison. By responding with silence the minister of interior has deliberately allowed the colors which are everyone's to be snatched from him by the ETA organization which has included them among the petitions for the release of UCD deputy Javier Ruperez.

Ibanez Freire, who as a politician has succeeded in getting even the opposition to speak well of him and embrace him daily in the corridors of Parliament, is deliberately not fulfilling his duties as minister of interior among which is providing minimal security to some citizens who, perplexed, are contemplating the way in which the minister of interior for the sake of a personal political career systematically refuses to face up to things, a spectacle which is already becoming commonplace in Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez's government.

At this stage the minister of interior should have already appeared on television (as abused Rodolfo Martin Villa did on many occasions) to explain if

torture has been applied or not, what measures have been taken, what kind of investigation is going to be set in motion... And to explain whether or not there will be negotiations with the ETA, what measures have been adopted to resolve the Ruperez case, what the results are in the anti-ETA struggle...

Although people are getting irritated and there is the risk of an increased spiral of violence, the minister of interior has to make the honor of the members of state security very clear, he has to bring about some sort of calm in the country and has to be in contact with a citizenry which is left devoid of explanations and security. Even if he ruins himself.

The spectacle is much more shameful if one looks at the ranks of the opposition, an opposition which crushed Martin Villa and which is now delightedly contemplating the figure of Ibanez Freire, one of whom no explanations are asked as to his professional behavior which leaves much to be desired.

In the last ministerial crisis, after the March legislative elections, the prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, chose to place a military man at the head of the Ministry of Interior.

More than an effort to involve the army in the problems of public order, the choice implied a hidden wish to silence the opposition by installing in the Ministry of Interior a lieutenant general who would stop any kind of criticism.

By gambling on the idiocy of the socialists and communists in the face of the military estate, Suarez was resolving a problem that had brought him into serious conflicts with the uncompromising maintenance of order by his predecessor.

The move has produced so many good results that neither the minister of interior is attacking the Left when it should be attacked, nor does the Left attack the minister when there is good reason to attack him.

Furthermore, the Left is deceiving itself, is changing, is becoming transfigured when it sees Lieutenant General Antonio Ibanez Freire in the corridors of Parliament. And Ibanez Freire becomes transfigured too when he embraces Carrillo, when he greets Enrique Mugica or when he is interviewed--to speak of torture in private--with the deputy of the Euskadiko Ezquerria [Basque Left] Juan Maria Bandres.

Obviously something is off the track here. In the government and, of course, in the opposition.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.

8094

CSO: 3110

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

MARTIN VILLA'S POLITICAL STAR BELIEVED TO BE RISING

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 Nov 79 p 21

[Article by Jose Oneto: "Martin Villa"]

[Text] After 6 months of silence, Rodolfo Martin Villa, former minister of interior, has returned to the foreground in current political affairs to present what virtually amounts to a government program.

Attached from all sides while minister of interior, confronted by many military sectors charging him of being a traitor, hated by the "blues" of the extreme Right and criticized by the democrats, Rodolfo Martin Villa left the government 6 months ago because he could no longer continue to head the Ministry of Interior and because the alternatives which Prime Minister Suarez proposed to him at a time of his choosing were not acceptable.

He could have been a good minister in the cabinet of the present government or perhaps an effective political vice premier. Perhaps the latter, because of his loyalty to the prime minister and because of the time he had to spend in the Ministry of Interior against his will, would have been an appropriate reward. But at that time Suarez did not want to have two centers of power and he had a feeling that an economic vice premier like Fernando Abril and a political vice premier like Martin Villa could paralyze the Council of Ministers and cause a daily confrontation.

When it appeared that Martin Villa was already practically finished (and certainly no politician in recent years has worn himself out as much as he has in the government), he has showed up again to draw up an entire program which is also a veiled criticism of a policy made up wholly of concessions.

In a newspaper interview and at a public appearance on the tribune of the 21st Century Club, Martin Villa has shown himself to be what he has always been: One of the pillars on which the party is based.

Because in the UCD [Democratic Center Union] those who hold the real power are not the social democrats of Fernandez Ordonez, nor Joaquin Garrigues' liberals, nor Alvarez Miranda' or Jose Luis Alvarez's Christian Democrats,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

but rather the men who came from the old apparatus of the dictatorship who were in the trade unions, in the ministries and above all in the provincial and local organizations.

These men are very close to the chief who at this time is Adolfo Suarez and are completely identified with Martin Villa, a prototype of the politician of the former regime, skillful at finding openings and without whom the transition would have been impossible.

Despite all the criticism and all the defects, Martin Villa, one of the most important politicians this country now has, was an excellent minister of interior. Especially when compared with the present one, a lieutenant general who has committed errors similar to those of his predecessor but whom the opposition respects and fears (and at times foolishly praises him) because of the stars shining on his cuff.

On reappearing, Martin Villa criticized the UCD of which he requested internal democratization; he has criticized Parliament for which he asked greater authority and effectiveness, and has also criticized the government for its lack of political far rightedness. And above all he has sounded the alarm for something which at this stage is elementary: The government should achieve fulfillment of the law and the tribunals of justice should apply it.

Throughout his two public statements, Rodolfo Martin Villa has called attention to two issues (autonomy and the economic crisis) and has pointed out that the government's present policy of lagging behind problems cannot go on. On the one hand the proliferation of demands for autonomy can place, and in fact are already placing, the functioning of the state in jeopardy.

On the other, the economic crisis, and on this presidential adviser Fuentes Quintana has been far more categorical, can put an end to the democratic system itself if there is no real growing awareness by all of the political forces.

And most important: One cannot lag behind problems. One cannot continue governing by the day without any perspective, without any proposals for solutions on a medium-term basis. One cannot go on in a makeshift way.

Finally, the analysis which the former minister of interior is making as to the fundamental attitude of the Spanish people is also important. "Rights and freedoms have been accorded too much importance to the detriment of duties, solidarity and social respect. People are constantly resorting to demands and requirements forgetting performance and individual contributions. A major campaign must be carried out one restoring to our community a feeling of concepts of solidarity in work, a sense of duty, of respect for others."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas,S.A.

8094
CSO: 3110

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

'CAMBIO' INTERVIEWS LEADERS OF POLICE UNION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 pp 31,33

[Interview by CAMBIO 16 with USP [Police Union] members in Zaragoza circa mid-November 1979]

[Text] "If torture is going on, let it be revealed." Last June the USP embarrassed the administration. It took the Ministry of Interior to court and won its case. But they continue to be the "illegal" policemen who are opposed to torture and for the right to strike.

On 28 February 1979 more than one high police official received a shock. At the little window of the Ministry of Interior 102 policemen presented the statutes of a new association: the Police Union.

The union wanted to negotiate with the administration when civil servants were merely allowed to cooperate, and they did not want to give up the right to strike.

What concerned the upper levels of the police was however that the USP would emerge confronting the other union, the Professional Association of Policemen, which those first mentioned accuse of being "yellow."

A week ago, the USP held a gathering in Zaragoza to grant an interview to Cambio 16. On the following day, Modesto Garcia, Antonio Plaza, Mariano Briones and Mauricio Moya agreed to talk with this review.

[Question] Why do they persist in prohibiting the union?

[Modesto Garcia] Perhaps because at the Ministry of Interior they know that they are not going to be able to control us nor settle with us through sinecures as they can another association. For that reason too someone with the police corps is seeking to discredit us by calling us "reds."

[Question] And is the USP in fact "red?"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Garcia] The USP is an independent trade union in which there is room for all policemen who respect democracy and political pluralism. Policemen fit into it who politically may be either in the Communist Party or in the Popular Alliance.

[Question] Does torturing go on in the police?

[Garcia] We do not have proof that it goes on. In any event it would be a matter of sick individuals, unbalanced people, whom we, their own comrades, would be the first to request that they be expelled from the corps.

[Antonio Plaza] We are for having any individual who considers himself maltreated by the police inform the judicial branch of the facts. The USP will cooperate with judges and prosecutors on the data in which the existence of ill treatment appears. However, care will also be taken to demand responsibility when it is proven by the judicial action that there was no torture and that the honor of officials of the High Police Corps has been questioned.

[Question] Why did the police fail with respect to the ETA?

[Garcia] Basically because a sector of the people subscribes to the ETA's doctrines whereas they reject the police. So it is very difficult for the police to obtain the information we need to struggle against terrorism.

On the other hand, it must also be noted that we have always felt that the solution for the Basque country resided in the Statute of Autonomy which has just been passed and which should lead to a reconciliation between the Basques and the rest of the country.

[Question] What do you think of Basque terrorism?

[Mauricio Moya] We are opposed to a denial of the right to life. Consequently, we are against the death penalty whether it comes from the state or from other groups which may be able to defend interests that are negotiable in a peaceful way.

We therefore condemn killings by the ETA whether or not its victims are policemen. The policemen who die in the Basque country are workers defending their family's livelihood something the ETA should not forget.

We know there are good policemen and bad policemen, that there are hardly any Basque policemen, that there is a great gulf between the police and the citizens in those provinces. We believe that the police are the people and have to serve the people and we believe that we are in a period of reconciliation and ardently desire that there be peace.

[Question] Is it true that the policemen who go to the Basque country are the lowest of every [police training school] class?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Antonio Plaza] It is true. It is paradoxical, but it does happen that way in that the top graduates can ask for what they want and no one wishes to go to the Basque country.

With the police stations the same thing happens. On one occasion Martin Villa said that he was going to send those who performed the best in the course for inspectors. And indeed he did send them. They went there, but the majority of them returned a short time later to their former positions. Wirepulling and special contacts achieved the miracle.

[Question] What is the present situation of the police?

[Garcia] The situation is that of transition toward democracy. Within the police it has caused upheavals at all levels. The establishment of police stations in towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants, for example, has been a total failure.

[Question] So Martin Villa's reform was to no avail?

[Mariano Briones] Over all, the reforms initiated by Minister Martin Villa are not as negative as they appear. What is happening is that Rome was not built in a day and Rodolfo Martin Villa did not have time enough.

[Question] Was creating the BC [Central Information Brigade] also another Martin Villa success?

[Briones] Experience is proving that this brigade has achieved nothing up to now.

[Plaza] The system is not an operational one. With the central brigade system there is a tendency to centralize the police whereas centralizing any service does not improve its effectiveness.

On the other hand, the BCI's investigation is directed at a very specific extreme. Instead of devoting itself to obtaining information on all extremist political groups so that the state may take action, the Spanish extreme Left is the only one to be exclusively pursued.

[Question] And why is that?

[Plaza] Perhaps because at certain levels the extreme Right is too closely related to the past.

[Question] How does the administration look on the police?

[Garcia] For the administration as personified by its leaders, a policeman is in a servile position. A servile policeman is most favorably regarded by his bosses and, in contrast, the one who exercises his rights and who demands and fulfills his obligations is a "red" and is passed over.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Within their respective limits, the upper level police officials are real viceroys. They have more than enough resources for punishments. One of them is to refer constantly to the needs of the service as a means of pressure. In addition, to initiating disciplinary expedients for insignificant reasons including that of exercising rights recognized by the constitution.

[Question] You are not able to speak out?

[Briones] Speaking out is dangerous even if some general issues are raised, those that are mentioned in the newspapers and in the street every day.

We have a recent example in Inspector Alcobendas Jesus Merino de la Hoz who was disciplined for having expressed his opinion of an editorial in EL PAIS.

The high police officials continue to operate with the previous system's inertia and apply the same norms and concepts of a totalitarian system to one that has freedoms.

[Question] But the police are surely at least well paid?

[Plaza] A few policemen, of course. And I am referring to those services where the pay envelopes are still in effect.

On the other hand, the vast majority of the officers receive modest salaries without any account being taken of the incompatibility of the work the policeman is obliged to perform.

[Question] Aren't the policemen who combat ETA terrorism probably better paid?

[Moya] They are not paid much better considering the social rejection from which they suffer and the fact that they are risking their lives every day.

[Question] What training does a policeman get?

[Plaza] The only thing superior about the High Police Corps today is its name. One ought to have at least 4 years at a school and today one goes there for 9 months.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.

8094

CSO: 3110

END