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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 664



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SAHARAN QUESTION MAY SPLIT OAU

Parsi JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Dec 79 p 31

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Is the OAU in Danger of Breaking Up?"]

[Text] Is the OAU in danger of breaking up in 1980? There are indications that it may. Many conflicts of opinion have combined to make this split possible, particularly those disagreements about the Western Sahara. The SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab Republic) has been recognized by 35 countries of the world. It is now close to being recognized by the 25th African country. Such recognition would enable the SDAR to apply for admission into the OAU as a full-fledged member. There is a precedent for such admission: Angola was admitted in 1976 with a simple majority, i.e. the votes of half the member states plus one.

Ever since its diplomatic successes at the summit conferences of the OAU (July 1979) and the nonaligned movement (September 1979), as well as in the United Nations, the POLISARIO has, as part of a well-prepared plan, established membership in the Organization of African Unity as its next goal. Resolutions of the 16th OAU summit--adopted by 33 countries--and the Committee of Three (Monrovia, 4-5 December 1979) recognized the right of self-determination of the Saharans and thereby spurred the POLISARIO to further intensify its efforts.

The OAU is thus liable to admit as one of its members a state which practically does not control 1 inch of its territory, or at least not one city nor even one large village within that territory. Admittedly the POLISARIO does frequently crisscross the former Spanish Sahara at will, creates many problems for the Moroccan armed forces, and even moves in impressive convoys, but it does not occupy any clearly-defined site in the Sahara.

It is probably with a view to achieving its next goal, namely OAU recognition, that the POLISARIO has been conducting some highly daring operations these past few months in hopes of "liberating" a few cities, such as Smara. These attempts have all been unsuccessful. At the same time, Morocco has also been conducting large-scale campaigns, such as operation "Ohoud," in

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an effort to prevent the POLISARIO from firmly establishing itself in any part of the Sahara. This intensive military activity has produced some bitter and bloody battles.

These clashes are being used to buttress the POLISARIO'S case before the next OAU summit where it hopes to make "Morocco suffer its greatest and ultimate defeat." Yet this scenario frightens some countries, including a few that have recognized either the SDAR, or the POLISARIO as a liberation movement. Countries who fear a direct confrontation within the OAU are currently maneuvering to "freeze" any new recognition so that the fateful number of "25" is not reached.

Morocco has in fact, clearly stated that it would withdraw from the OAU if the SDAR were ever admitted. Its example could be followed by four or five other countries determined not to get caught in the trap of what they call "the anti-Moroccan conspiracy" and "the destabilization of Africa for the benefit of hardliners, of progressives." Upsetting the balance which has thus far, thanks to African "prudence," saved Africa from fragmentation, is liable to be greatly detrimental to unity. Since the OAU's establishment in 1963, Africa has weathered many storms. Will it do so again in 1980?

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRANCE URGED TO GIVE UP INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 36-37

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "France and Its Small Diego Garcias"]

[Text] The nonaligned countries, the UN, and the OAU have called upon France to free its colonies in the southern Indian Ocean. France has not only turned a deaf ear to these summons, it is even building bases in the colonies in question.

On 7 December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution, approved by 112 countries, which "reaffirms Comorian sovereignty over the island of Mayotte and asks that Paris negotiate as soon as possible with the Moroni government so as to permit reunification of the archipelago." There were some 23 abstentions on this resolution, mainly by Western countries. Only one country voted against the resolution: France, of course. In replying to the charges leveled at France, the French delegate to the UN merely said that this debate "should never have taken place" because it constituted "unwarranted intervention in France's internal affairs."

In fact, at that very same moment, Gaullist and Giscardian members of the French National Assembly in Paris were passing a law extending for 5 more years Mayotte's astounding status under French law, namely "a special collectivity (community) within the Republic." The deputy from Mayotte, a certain Bamana, had the following sentence added to this law: "The island is part of the French Republic and cannot cease belonging thereto without the consent of its population." And for good measure, former prime minister Michel Debre, a deputy from Saint-Denis [Reunion] and the leading spokesman for the French Indian Ocean "lobby," uttered his standard war cry in defense of the Christian West, blaming the French Government for remaining on the defensive at a time when it is being regularly attacked in all of the international forums about Mayotte, Reunion, and scattered small islands in the vicinity of Madagascar.

The UN had, in fact, discussed the question of these small islands a few days earlier, and French representatives had employed the same old subterfuges. In their view, "these small islands form an integral part of the

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Republic and any claim relative to them is, therefore, unfounded and gratuitous." The General Assembly of the United Nations did, nevertheless, invite the French Government "to open, without further delay, negotiations with the Malagasy Government with a view to restoring to it the Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa, and Bassas da India islands arbitrarily separated from Madagascar." A total of 97 countries voted for the resolution and seven against (France, of course, Belgium, the United States, Italy, Great Britain, Germany, and, oddly enough, Senegal).

As in the case of Mayotte, these disputed islands had also been the subject of a multitude of statements made these past few years in the OAU, the nonaligned movement, not to mention the regional conferences on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. But this was the first time the UN General Assembly had ever considered the question. Upon thus seeing that its presence on these islands is so little "desired" by the international community and nearby countries, will France decide to soften its position somewhat in the coming months?

For the moment, such is not the case. As far as Mayotte is concerned, supporters of the "French presence" are firmly in the saddle. The May 1978 coup conducted against Ali Soilih by Bob Denard, a mercenary, with the complicity of certain French circles, permitted restoring to power in Moroni men who were most favorable to France during the colonial era. The mercenaries have remained on the island and gone into the export-import and hotel business while technical assistance personnel sent from Paris have replaced them in the armed forces, police, and various governmental departments and agencies. Such a regime cannot, therefore, refuse anything to France which helps pay the government's bills and provides its "elite" with relatively well-paying positions.

Furthermore, because of the archipelago's poverty and the inability of the men in power to manage the affairs of state, France has total control of communications and defense in the region. Its warships move freely throughout the archipelago, going from Mayotte to the other Comorian islands. All air service between the islands of the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros is provided by a French airline, Reunion-Air Service, Air Comoros having had to shut up shop. In this way, France may be said to be actually proceeding to indirectly reunify the archipelago. It is doing this, however, in line with its own interests and from Saint-Denis, Reunion!

Under these conditions, Moroni's claims on the disloyal island have lost some of their effectiveness. And Paris can justifiably view UN condemnations as "face-saving gestures" that are not likely to have any consequences. Unless, of course, President Abdallah is overthrown in the near future, a possibility that is mentioned periodically.

Hence Mayotte is expected to remain, for a long time to come, that "French" island which does not speak French, easy prey to a handful of Creole families of Reunion origin who dominate local business and the Mahori Movement

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(practically the sole political party), and a "cozy refuge" for officials of the hardline "colonial" administration. In fact, more than half of the island's Europeans are Foreign Legionnaires. The very ones whom Madagascar expelled from their Diego-Suarez base in 1973 but who now remain ensconced only a few hundred kilometers away, as a possible threat.

Missiles Some Day?

The case of the small islands in the Mozambique Channel and northeast of Madagascar is less complicated. They are supposedly "uninhabited." At least that is what Paris claims in explaining why no native population lays claim to the islands. They are actually occupied by small detachments of the 2d RPIMA (Overseas Infantry Paratroop Regiment), periodically resupplied by Transall transport aircraft from Air Base 181 at Gillot on the island of Reunion. These are also troops who were formerly stationed in Madagascar, at Ivato in the vicinity of Antananarivo. They continue to maintain surveillance of Madagascar, but from the outside because they can no longer occupy the country directly as they did in the days of President Tsiranana.

The old justification for France's ownership of the Bassas da India, Europa, Juan de Nova, Glorieuses, and Tromelin islands is no longer very convincing: these islands serve as weather stations and track cyclones in cooperation with the Reunion weather service. This reason is no longer convincing, first because weather satellites are increasingly replacing men and are performing much more efficiently, and secondly because the military presence on those islands has gradually stifled the civilian presence.

Runways have been extended on most of the islands. This operation on Tromelin in 1978 required the presence of 400 legionnaires and paratroopers. And the small 2d RPIMA detachments, when not performing guard duty--a somewhat ridiculous task on these small desolate islands covering an area of only a few square kilometers--are primarily employed in building barracks and installing modern telecommunications equipment. What nearby countries fear, especially Madagascar, is that some day the French Ministry of Defense may perhaps deploy missile systems on these islands, under the pretext of deterring the West's adversaries from attacking the large tankers that ply the "oil route" along a coastline which Paris considers too "red."

In any case, Antananarivo is making restitution of these islands a point of honor. In addressing the United Nations, Blaise Rabetafika argued: "There definitely existed an independent and sovereign Malagasy state to which these islands belonged. Consequently, they have always legally, historically, and geographically formed an integral part of Madagascar. For that reason, the Malagasy Government denounces France's unilateral and arbitrary action placing these islands under its jurisdiction as overseas territories effective 1 April 1960."

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Nostalgia Still Exists

As a matter of fact, the Malagasy Government had raised the issue of the future status of these islands during the 1960 negotiations on the first French Malagasy Cooperation agreements, after Madagascar had become fully independent of France. But like Moroni's Comorian government today, Malagasy officials back then in 1960 could refuse Paris nothing because Paris imposed its will on them. It took the major upheaval of May 1972 and Madagascar's gaining of what was called its "second independence" to revive publicly the issue of these islands. May 1972 was also the date when the 2d RPIMA stationed its troops on these small islands, with tortoises and terns for company: ridicule has never killed the French Army!

We would continue in this sarcastic vein if only the climate in which all this petty intrigue is taking place were not so tense. If only France were not maintaining 4,500 men in Djibouti--for the purpose of "defending" the southern Indian Ocean--plus a naval force manned by 2,150 sailors, plus some 3,000 army and air force personnel on Reunion. If only these French Army troops were not conducting an increasing number of field exercises, amphibious landings, parades, and paradrops to such an extent that, for example, the island of Reunion looks like a veritable base, a situation compelling Paul Verges, secretary general of the Reunion Communist Party and member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, to say: "The more military intervention forces there are here, the more it will focus the attention of African countries on the Reunion question." And only if questionable Frenchmen, even though some are employed by the French Ministry of Cooperation, were not interfering so much in the internal affairs of Mauritius, and especially of Seychelles. Such activity might possibly lead people to believe that the part of France which is nostalgic for its hegemony over the southwestern Indian Ocean still definitely has the upper hand over that part of France which has forgotten the old colonial days.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ZAIRIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS STRENGTHENED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3342

[Article: "Strengthening Relations With Zaire"]

[Text] At the close of the visit to Brazzaville of Nguza Karl I Bond, the Zairian Government commissar of foreign affairs (MMT [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS] of 23 November 1979, p 3279), the Congolese authorities made public the content of a joint communique marking the strengthening of relations between the two neighbors.

In this communique the partners reaffirmed their attachment to the principles of neighborliness in Central Africa, a region the situation in which was made the subject of an in-depth investigation, and to "peace, which the peoples of Africa need."

The communique also reaffirms the support of Zaire and the Congo for the peoples of South Africa, who are struggling against the "illegal Salisbury and racist Pretoria" regimes and recalls their commitment to spare no effort to hasten the total and effective decolonization of the African continent in compliance with the ideals and principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)."

The official talks between the two delegations particularly involved the strengthening of bilateral relations in all fields and African and international questions. Zaire and the Congo are engaged in conducting a "fruitful" dialog and "brotherly concert within the African framework as well as the international, bearing in mind the multiplication of tensions in the countries of the Third World."

In the economic field, the two governments, after having "verified the important possibilities opened up at the Grand Zaire-Congolese Joint Commission," decided to take "a certain number of measures intended to ensure the efficient realization of joint projects" and agreed to give a "new impetus" to the work of the Joint Commission to that end.

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It should be pointed out that economic relations between the two neighbors were strengthened recently. A mission of Zairian telecommunications experts met in Brazzaville last July in order to study the realization of telex-telephone communications via wireless beams between the Congolese capital and Kinshasa. The liaison is to be realized soon by the Telecommunications Joint-Stock Company (SAT), a French company.

In September it was a Congolese delegation that went to Zaire for the Joint Commission meeting. At the close of the latter, it was decided that Congolese officer trainees would be trained by the Zairian merchant marine. The project of the Pool Fluvial Company as well as the possibility of Zairian merchandise being transported by ATC (The Trans-Congolese Communications Agency) were also studied. A second meeting of the Joint Commission has been organized in Brazzaville in October.

In order to provide electricity, talks were held between the two countries' national electrical energy companies. They had to do with the strengthening of Zairian provision of electricity to Brazzaville and with the establishment of an Inga (Zaire)-Pointe-Noire liaison. The increase in the demand for electricity in this city is clear. The power planned for 1983 is 18 megawatts, and the Congolese Government is presently studying the possibility of realizing a La Bouenza-Pointe-Noire high-tension line.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EXCERPT OF REPORT ON ITALIAN TRADE WITH AFRICA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 pp 3666-67

Text Italy's trade with Africa, which has just been examined in a brief and general manner, is relatively modest representing less than 10 percent of Italy's commercial operations with the entire world. Moreover, this trade is of special interest, from both the import and export aspect, to about 10 countries out of the 57 on which statistics are available (but of which certain ones, it is true, are territorially, demographically and economically insignificant).

Five Major Suppliers

The right half of Table ITA-CE-1 shows Italy's principal African partners. The two half-"Camemberts" devoted to the "suppliers" and "customers" clearly indicate the exceptional position of five countries in the two categories: Libya, Algeria, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria, followed at some distance by serious-minded outsiders such as Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Morocco.

In 1978, two countries, Libya and South Africa, accounted for a little more than 50 percent of Italy's total imports from Africa (31.13 percent coming from Libya and 19.2 percent from South Africa); and six suppliers, Libya, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Ivory Coast and Tunisia, accounted for 80.6 percent of overall Italian purchases made by the dark continent, leaving only 19.4 percent to their 51 neighbors.

Table ITA-CE-C, right half [as published], gives the 24 principal African exporters to Italy in 1978. The 1978 list stops with Uganda with 10.3 billion lire. To give a total of 30 countries, we need to add: Mozambique (9.2), Togo (8.7), Senegal (8.65), Central African Republic (7.2), Burundi (3.5) and Swaziland (3.3). Beyond that point, suppliers account for very little, their sales, for the most part, amounting to only a few hundred million lire.

Between 1977 and 1978 the change in the value of purchases made from the 15 foremost suppliers (in 1978) was the following: Algeria: +128.2 percent; Egypt: +72.2; Nigeria: +43; Kenya: +32.8; South Africa: +22.2; Sudan: +9.6; Libya: +8.6; Cameroon: +8.4; Tunisia: +3.7; Morocco: -4.2;

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Liberia: -9.2; Ivory Coast: -13; Zaire: -19.8; Zambia: -21.1; and Congo: -35.5. Among the outsiders one can note a substantial upsurge in purchases from Guinea (+66.7 percent) and a decline in deliveries from Uganda (-41.1).

Table ITA-CE-C

Italy's Best African Suppliers and Customers in 1977 and 1978 (Figures Given Are in Billions of Lire)

Imports from Africa			Exports to Africa		
	1978	1977		1978	1977
Libya	1,455.4	1,340.2	Libya	1,106.9	1,081.0
South Africa	902.0	737.9	Algeria	804.2	579.2
Egypt	635.6	369.0	Nigeria	556.8	524.2
Algeria	394.4	172.8	Egypt	345.6	300.2
Ivory Coast	218.1	250.6	South Africa	265.2	233.2
Tunisia	172.6	166.5	Morocco	181.9	185.9
Nigeria	133.0	93.0	Tunisia	167.7	163.9
Zaire	113.2	141.2	Somalia	79.6	64.7
Morocco	82.3	95.9	Ivory Coast	73.8	49.9
Sudan	77.8	71.0	Kenya	68.1	48.3
Cameroon	64.6	59.6	Ethiopia	57.6	43.4
Zambia	60.6	76.8	Sudan	50.7	63.8
Liberia	59.6	65.6	Ghana	50.2	33.8
Kenya	38.9	29.3	Tanzania	48.1	28.0
Congo	34.5	53.5	Zaire	46.7	51.9
Guinea	34.0	20.4	Canary Islands	38.0	31.7
Gabon	30.5	24.0	Cameroon	35.6	34.4
Tanzania	25.1	28.1	Senegal	31.6	35.2
Mauritania	22.9	23.9	Liberia	26.4	40.4
Ghana	20.5	23.8	Zambia	25.8	24.8
Ethiopia	19.2	19.5	Angola	24.4	17.4
Somalia	12.6	16.6	Benin	20.3	7.4
Madagascar	11.1	9.4	Guinea	15.3	13.3
Uganda	10.3	17.6	Reunion	14.3	10.3

Six Principal Customers

With regard to Italian exports to Africa, six countries are prominent in 1978 (as shown in lower half of Chart ITA-CE-1); Libya (26.1 percent of Italian exports to the dark continent), Algeria (19.1 percent), Nigeria (13.2), Egypt (8.2), South Africa (6.4) and Morocco (4.2). These six countries therefore absorb 77.2 percent of Italian goods delivered to Africa. The 51 remaining states share in exports of 970 billion lire; but of this total the 18 customers listed between numbers 7 and 24 in Table ITA-CE-C

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account for 874 billion. In fact, only 96 billion lire remain for the 33 African countries not listed.

Between 1977 and 1978 there was a sharp increase in Italian sales to Africa (27.3 percent). Of Italy's 25 principal African customers only 6 reduced their purchases in 1978 compared with 1977. Appreciable increases can be seen in purchases made by the major purchasers. The following shows the change in the market from 1977 to 1978 for the 15 foremost customers: Tanzania: +71.8 percent; Ghana: +48.5; Ivory Coast: +47.9; Kenya: +41; Algeria: +38.8; Ethiopia: +32.7; Somalia: +23; Egypt: +15.1; South Africa: +13.7; Nigeria: +6.2; Libya: +2.3; Tunisia: +2.3; Morocco: -2.2; Zaire: -10.0; and Sudan: -20.5.

Among the countries listed between numbers 16 and 25, one can see the following substantial positive or negative spreads: Benin: +174.3 percent (from 7.4 to 20.3 million lire); Angola: +40.2 percent; Reunion: +38.8 percent; Liberia: -34.7 percent; and Uganda: -47.9 percent.

Distribution of Italian Purchases of African Products

In 1978, Italian purchases from Africa were confined principally to rough or semifinished products. Considering only imports close to a billion lire and equal to or greater than that value, we come up with a total of 4,585.7 billion, representing 97.8 percent of Italy's 1978 purchases from Africa. We may consider this total and percentage fully representative of the market. The following gives the distribution in billions of lire:

1. Nonmetal ores: 2,639.9, of which crude oil amounted to 2,465 (1,323.3 coming from Libya, 578.0 from Egypt, 355.6 from Algeria, 85.7 from Tunisia, 78.6 from Nigeria, 23.7 from Congo and 20.1 from Gabon); coal came to 34.4 (all from South Africa); and other ores amounted to 140.5 (84.1 from Libya, 28.0 from Morocco, 22.5 from South Africa and 5.9 from Togo).
2. Ordinary or precious-metal products: 840.0, of which precious metals (gold, silver and platinum) amounted to 665.7, all from South Africa; copper came to 103.4 (57.8 from Zambia, 34.0 from Zaire and 11.6 from South Africa); lead being 21.2 (10.6 from South Africa, 4.8 from Morocco, 4.0 from Tunisia and 1.8 from Zambia); iron and laminated steel totaled 14.5 (7.4 from Algeria and 7.1 from South Africa); nickel was 9.4 (all from South Africa); metals in ingot form came to 5.3 (all from Algeria); cinders and slag amounted to 2 billion (coming from South Africa); and aluminum came to 1.4 (all from Egypt).
3. Raw agricultural products: 442.6, broken down as follows: coffee: 229.2 (72.1 from Zaire, 53.7 from Ivory Coast, 39.8 from Cameroon, 18.3 from Tanzania, 15.7 from Kenya, 6.4 from Central African Republic, 2.4 from Burundi, 1.4 from Rwanda, 1.3 from Congo and 1.0 from Togo); cocoa: 89.7 (36.3 from Nigeria, 33.5 from Ivory Coast, 11.6 from Ghana, 3.1 from Cameroon,

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2.7 from Gabon, 1.8 from Togo and 0.7 from Benin); raw cotton (waste excluded): 6.5 (40.3 from Sudan, 15.3 from Egypt, 8.1 from South Africa and 1.3 from Chad); miscellaneous fruits (except citrus): 25.1 (11.5 from Ivory Coast, 10.2 from Somalia, 1.2 from Cameroon, 1.2 from Algeria and 1.0 from Egypt); oil seeds or fruits: 18.4 (12.5 from Sudan, 1.6 from Senegal, 1.5 from Egypt, 1.4 from Gambia and 1.4 from Nigeria); fresh or dried vegetables: 8.2 (6.9 from Morocco and 1.3 from South Africa); medicinal plants: 2.0 (1.2 from Egypt and 0.8 from Zaire); citrus fruits: 1.5 (all from South Africa); vegetable fibers other than cotton: 1.4 (all from Tanzania); wheat: 1.4 (from South Africa); corn: 1.1 (from South Africa); and tea and spices: 1.0 (all from Kenya).

4. Forest products: 127.5 distributed as follows: rough wood: 114.6 (90.1 from Ivory Coast, 7.7 from Congo, 6.8 from Ghana, 6.1 from Cameroon, 2.6 from Gabon and 1.3 from Liberia); raw latex: 11.6 (3.1 from Liberia, 2.9 from Ivory Coast, 2.6 from Zaire, 1.7 from Cameroon and 1.3 from Nigeria); and other gums and resins: 1.3 (all from Sudan).

5. Metallic ores and scrap iron: 119.2 broken down as follows: iron ore: 85.8 (50.3 from Liberia, 17.9 from Mauritania, 14.8 from South Africa and 2.8 from Algeria); other metallic ores: 30.0 (12.5 from Guinea, 8.3 from South Africa, 5.0 from Morocco and 4.2 from Gabon); scrap metal: 3.4 (2.4 from Algeria and 1.0 from Liberia).

6. Products for human consumption at least partially processed: 83.2 distributed as follows: olive oil: 35.1 (from Tunisia); other vegetable oils: 3.2 (20.8 from Sudan, 6.5 from Ivory Coast, 2.3 from Cameroon, 1.4 from Senegal and 1.0 from Mali); products derived from sugar (molasses): 6.8 (3.9 from Ivory Coast and 2.9 from Cameroon); preserves and fruit juices: 5.0 (3.7 from Ivory Coast and 1.3 from Kenya); and canned fish: 4.3 (all from Morocco).

7. Chemical products: 80.4 broken down as follows: chemicals: 53.1 (21.4 from Guinea (alumina), 17.6 from Tunisia (phosphates), 10.9 from Morocco (phosphates) and 3.2 from Libya); organic products derived from petroleum: 15.9 (9.6 from Algeria and 6.3 from Libya); prepared fertilizers: 5.9 (all from Tunisia); pickling or tanning products: 4.6 (from South Africa); and disinfecting and phytosanitary products: 0.9 (Kenya: pyrethrum).

8. Vegetable or animal products not intended for human consumption: 71.2 divided as follows: rough pelts: 69.5 (coming from 17 countries the main ones being: South Africa with 24.9, Ethiopia with 9.0, Nigeria with 8.7, Kenya with 5.0, Mozambique with 3.7, Botswana with 2.8, Cameroon with 2.3, Somalia with 1.9, Upper Volta with 1.6, Swaziland with 1.6 and Rwanda with 1.4); and oil cakes: 1.7 (Egypt).

9. Oil and coal derivatives: 70.4 distributed as follows: light oils: 42.7 (23.7 from Libya, 16.2 from Egypt and 2.8 from Tunisia); heating oils:

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14.7 (4.5 from Kenya, 3.9 from Algeria, 3.3 from Mozambique and 3.0 from Egypt); medium-weight oils: 11.6 (Libya); and liquefied gas: 1.4 (Egypt).

All other purchases are less than 22 billion lire as a unit and will not be listed.

ITA-CE-D Distribution of 1978 Italian Exports to Africa (Billions of lire)

Product categories	Value	Principal customers
1. Machines and equipment	953.4	Algeria 208.9, Libya 202.9, Nigeria 176.8, Egypt 84.6, South Africa 64.0, Morocco 44.4, Tunisia 42.5, Ivory Coast 17.8 and Sudan 13.3.
2. Transportation equipment	749.6	Libya 195.0, Nigeria 132.0, South Africa 95.4, Algeria 69.4, Egypt 49.5, Somalia 36.9, Ethiopia 29.9, Morocco 29.4, Tunisia 21.8, Kenya 21.4 and Ghana 21.2.
3. Mechanical products	385.2	Libya 153.0, Algeria 95.4, Nigeria 39.8, Egypt 21.7, Morocco 13.1, Tunisia 10.8, Ethiopia 6.8, South Africa 6.2 and Ivory Coast 6.0.
4. Oil and coal derivatives	362.8	Algeria 120.0, Libya 68.5, Egypt 33.5, Nigeria 30.3, Tunisia 16.6, Morocco 15.6, Benin 15.5, Liberia 12.3, Zaire 10.5, Ivory Coast 10.1 and Cameroon 7.8.
5. Metallurgical products	290.3	Libya 111.2, Algeria 71.9, Nigeria 32.1, Egypt 20.1, Morocco 18.4, Tunisia 14.2 and Kenya 7.5.
6. Chemical products	235.9	Egypt 53.8, Algeria 52.4, Nigeria 24.9, Libya 23.5, South Africa 23.1, Tunisia 14.7, Morocco 9.8, Kenya 8.2 and Sudan 6.4.
7. Industrial food products	156.8	Algeria 77.7, Libya 26.1, Nigeria 16.2, Egypt 10.8 and Ivory Coast 3.5.
8. Lime, cement, glass and the like	119.3	Libya 45.6, Nigeria 27.7, Algeria 16.2, Egypt 12.8, South Africa 4.8 and Morocco 4.6.
9. Miscellaneous industrial products	106.4	Libya 40.7, Nigeria 19.6, Egypt 12.3, Algeria 11.0, South Africa 6.0, Tunisia 5.5, Somalia 4.2 and Morocco 4.1.

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ITA-CE-D (continued)

Product categories	Value	Principal customers
10. Clothing	94.4	Libya 51.5, Nigeria 20.9, Egypt 4.2, Ivory Coast 4.1, Tunisia 3.7 and South Africa 3.1.
11. Wood industries	89.9	Libya 70.5, Nigeria 6.3, Tunisia 5.2, Egypt 3.6, Ivory Coast 2.5 and Senegal 1.8.
12. Textiles	89.0	Libya 27.4, Algeria 21.5, South Africa 12.5, Tunisia 10.0, Morocco 5.2, Egypt 5.1, Nigeria 2.2, Kenya 1.7 and Ivory Coast 1.6.
13. Precision clocks and watches	48.2	Algeria 13.1, South Africa 11.4, Libya 10.8, Nigeria 5.5, Egypt 3.1 and Tunisia 1.6.
14. Rubber products	46.8	Nigeria 14.2, Algeria 11.1, Libya 6.4, Ivory Coast 3.0, Morocco 2.3, Kenya 2.2, South Africa 2.0, Egypt 1.8 and Tunisia 1.5.
15. Nonfood vegetable products	28.4	Libya 28.4.
16. Paper boxes	27.8	Libya 13.5, Algeria 7.4, Egypt 5.3, South Africa 3.6 and Tunisia 3.3.
17. Polygraphic industry products	10.8	Libya 7.5, South Africa 2.0 and Nigeria 1.3.
18. Raw staple products	10.7	Libya 8.9 and Egypt 1.8.
19. Nonmetallic ore	6.0	Algeria 4.7 and Libya 1.3.
20. Leathers and furs	2.3	Nigeria 7.2 and South Africa 1.1.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CABRAL, TOURE VISITS TO BRAZIL--The presidents of the republic of Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, Messrs Luis Cabral and Sekou Toure, will make an official visit to Brazil next year, the speaker for Brazil's Chancellery, Mr Bernardo Pericas, announced on 18 December; the dates of these visits were not indicated. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3677] 9294

GABON-ANGOLA TENSION--The presence in Gabon of Roberto Holden, head of the puppet FNLA organization, has subjected the relations between Libreville and Luanda to intense tension. The head of Angolan diplomacy, Paulo Jorge, has just warned Gabonese authorities about the serious consequences that could derive from the presence of Holden in Libreville, after he was expelled from Dakar and Abidjan. Gabon, which recognized Angola, has an accredited ambassador in Luanda. However, the Angolan Government has no diplomatic representation in Libreville. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 204, 7 Jan 80 p 21]

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ANGOLA

PLANS DRAWN FOR BENGUELA RAILROAD RENOVATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3695

[Article: "BADEA to Take Part in Renovation of Largest Railroad in the Country"]

[Text] The board of directors of BADEA (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa), at its 15th meeting (1-2 December), has approved a 10 million dollars loan for the renovation of the country's largest railroad--the Lobito road--which extends over 1,348 km from east to west.

The economic importance of this railroad is all the greater as it is connected to the railway systems of Zaire and Zambia and that, until 1975 when it was shutdown following the Angolan liberation war, it was the regular transit route for ore exports from the Zairian Shaba province and from the Zambian copper belt.

The project will comprise two stages: first, the transportation capacity of the railroad will be increased from 42,000 to 70,000 tons per month; in the second stage, it will be increased to 96,000 tons per month. The total projected investment is 82 million dollars. Of these, 55.3 million will be used on the Angolan system proper (additional work on the Zairian and Zambian systems being financed separately). The cost of the first stage is estimated at 25.35 million dollars, of which 39.4 percent will be financed by BADEA, with co-financing from OPEC special fund (2.99 million), Belgium (.78 million), Sweden (1.30 million), the Netherlands (2.60 million), UNDP (.39 million) and the government of RAP [expansion unknown] (7.15 million).

The BADEA loan, reimbursable over 15 years, including a 5 years' extension, and bearing interest at an annual rate of 4 percent, will jointly finance the following:

--technical assistance for hiring, training and upgrading the skills of the personnel of the Angolan railroad company (Benguela Railways);

--purchase of rolling stock. i.e. 180 railroad cars during the first stage, and 450 during the second, to meet projected requirements;

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--modernization of the hauling stock, i.e. purchase of 18 diesel locomotives, which will lead to a progressive phasing-out of steam locomotives and to the general use of diesel locomotives (by the end of the second stage of the project, the Angolan railroad will be 75 percent dieselized);

--repairing of the rails on the eastern portion of the railroad, and renovation of several kilometers of railroad between Huambo and Cubal; for this purpose, repair and maintenance material and equipment will be purchased;

--purchase of telecommunication and signalling equipment to improve the operation of the system;

--improvement and reinforcement of bridges; replenishment of spare part stock, and modernization of maintenance and repair shops.

The realization of this project will remove the economic obstacle which has heavily handicapped the international trade of Zaire and Zambia, as well as that of Angola. By granting this loan, BADEA is therefore adopting for its own one of the cardinal objectives of the African Railroad Union: "To promote unification, development, coordination and improvement of the railroad systems of Union members, in order to ensure connection of their systems to one another and to other transportation systems which link Africa to the rest of the world."

In addition, the re-opening of the Angolan railroad will contribute to reducing the dependence of Zaire and Zambia on the southern route which, apart from its political implications, is longer and more expensive.

With the development of international trade, of regional transportation of persons and goods, and the expected rise in income, especially in foreign currencies, it is estimated that the project will create favorable conditions for a regional economic integration.

On a purely national level, this project is expected to promote, in Angola, the development of large, densely populated areas, the development of the transportation sector, the creation of jobs, the improvement of job training and the distribution of income. With respect to the latter point, activities resulting from overall transportation (railroad and shipping) are expected to create an annual income of close to 30 million dollars.

The project will be carried out under supervision from Companhia do Caminho de Ferro de Benguela. The first stage will be completed by the end of 1981, the second stage by the end of 1982.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

MPLA POLICIES OUTLINED--Angola does not have, at this time, a true plan for economic development. This lack should be remedied in 1980 or 1981. However, the MPLA-Labor Party has defined a certain number of general policies: increase of cultivated areas; cadre training; rational use of foreign technical assistance; increased prospecting for mineral resources; selection of the most important state, mixed, and even private enterprises in order to provide them with cadres and the means to conduct their activities; legislation on problems of work discipline and fight against absenteeism; rigid policy of austerity and financial controls; guarantees for timely payment of monies due the state; compulsory registry of accounting and statistical data; setting of prices according to rate of profit; improvement of foreign trade infrastructures. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jan 80 p 42]

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CAMEROON

REPERCUSSIONS OF CABINET SHUFFLE OF 8 NOVEMBER

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Nov 79 pp 21, 22

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]

[Text] True to himself, President Amadou Ahidjo surprised everyone on 8 November by totally unexpectedly reshuffling his government. The cabinet which had been established on 30 June 1975 stood a good chance of breaking the record for longest time in office. Of course, twice during the legislative session, two of its members had been removed. But that only involved immediate adjustments, of a very limited scope. At the level of the populace, however, a desire for change was being felt more and more. Yet everything seemed to anticipate that the "great washing" would occur only after the presidential elections set for May 1980. And none of the victims of the latest reshuffling would have thought he would have to start packing before next year.

The president's decision thus had the effect of an explosion on the Cameroonian political scene. Twelve ministers (out of 23) have had a change in post. Three departures stand out especially, turning this technical reshuffling--mainly concerning the economic sector--into a political mini-event. Thus, an influential member of the Political Bureau of the sole party, the UNC, Francois Sengat Kuoh, spokesman for the party's progressive wing, is leaving his position of charge to the president, which for many years made him one of the head of state's top advisors. With him, two members of the party's Central Committee also left the government: Henry Elangwe and Marcel Yondo.

Elangwe, from the former English-speaking Cameroon, was the director of the Department of Mines and Energy, i.e. petroleum. And it is known that, by the most accurate estimates, Cameroon is considered one of the great oil producers of the future. This prospect, however, is not without its dark side. The Yaounde authorities are afraid that the people living in the regions where the pools are located have some separatist notions. Indeed, haven't we recently noticed an abundance of statements by opponents abroad, calling for the pure and simple return to the federal system? It would obviously be risky to connect Henry Elangwe's departures with these matters. But President Ahidjo's intentions are so unfathomable that his decisions are subject to all kinds of interpretations.

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Marcel Yondo's departure from the government came as a big surprise. An elected member of the UNC Central Committee at the Congress of Douala in 1976, the former minister of finances seemed destined for a fine future. In any case, he was one of those overambitious young wolves who do not conceal their political designs very well. Was he a victim of that, or did he remain apart from it? The fact is that no one is accusing his competence. Although his replacement as head of the Ministry of Finances, Gilbert Ntang, former PDG [president-director-general] of the Cameroonian Railway Company, is also a technical person. But the latter, as high functionary, must be more concerned with technocracy than with politics. Perhaps the cabinet reshuffling of 8 November indicates a desire on the part of President Ahidjo to take matters into his own hands, reminding all that he is still master of the game.

A genuine malaise has pervaded the country for several months. Three months away from the UNC Congress, to be held in February in Bafoussam, principal city of the West Province, the Cameroonians appear to have discovered the delights of the game of politics, which the sole party system and the president's forceful personality had suppressed somewhat. Thus, certain events, without being obviously connected, have caused a disturbance to a political life which had for several months been immersed in monotony.

President Ahidjo's decision last June formally to govern his relief forces launched again the political debate. Several public officials thought that from then on the door to succession would be open. This error in judgment spawned numerous intrigues among those who had more or less declared their candidacies.

It was in this context that the Office of Security learned, in July, that a group of non-commissioned officers was organizing a plot to overthrow the regime. In fact, these four non-commissioned officers disclosed themselves to their superiors, to let them know of the discontent which was growing within the army. They will subsequently confess that they tried to remove President Ahidjo on the day of the ceremony at which the officer trainees of the EMIAC [Cameroonian Military Inter-Service School] receive their commissions.

The conspirators' arrest should have closed the case. But in a country where rumors are the authority, the most unlikely reports, based on an insinuation of some officer or another, have been circulating ever since.

No official statement will be released concerning this abortive attempt. It is still true that the matter raises certain questions. The ethnic backgrounds of the four non-commissioned officers is one of them. They are all from the south central part, the region of which former Prime Minister Paul Biya is also a native. Some people soon made the connection, and saw the arrest of the non-commissioned officers as a plan to harm the prime minister. Others maintain, without any proof supporting it, that the arrested non-commissioned officers wanted to beat another group of soldiers who were preparing a coup d'etat that would have been advantageous for Bamileke.

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A fanciful hypothesis? Of course. Nevertheless, like many others which are currently spreading in Cameroon, it indicates a certain state of mind. The official silence helps to encourage speculation. All the more since other incidents raise new questions.

Thus, everyone has interpreted in his own way the violent confrontations in Dolle, in the northern part of the country, which left about 30 dead, including 14 police, at the end of October. If it is true that an intense animosity exists among some tribes of the region, especially between the Choa and Kotobo Arabs, the fires were fanned by a holy man imposter who tried to exploit the situation. Spreading his opium among the peoples, he convinced them of their invulnerability and incited them to more hostility toward other groups of people. Members of the police force who were sent onto the scene were put to death, while trying to put an end to that situation, by the agitated populations. Whatever its real significance, the event shows how difficult it is, 20 years after independence, for the Cameroonian ethnic groups to live together.

In a central Africa overcome by upheavals, Cameroon had up to now remained an island of stability. Likewise, the present stirrings appear, in the final analysis, as the sign of a crisis of growth. "Our country," says a Douala militant, "is like a car. The motor, i.e. Ahidjo, is still in good condition. But the other parts must be changed to prevent a breakdown." Which translates: the cabinet reshuffling of 8 November would be followed next year by a more deeply rooted change both in men and in system of governing.

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CAMEROON

FIRST STAGE OF EXPANSION OF PORT OF DOUALA ALMOST COMPLETED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Nov 79 pp 103, 105-107

[Article by Samuel Bea]

[Text] In the first months of next year, work on the first segment of the port of Douala's expansion, begun 3 years ago, will be completed. Its purpose has been to provide Cameroon's economic capital with a harbor facility adapted to the country's ever-increasing needs. The operation had gotten underway after several delays. After that, it appeared to be having success: its creditors, who were hesitant at first, long since became reassured as to the economic and financial profitability of the operation; Cameroon's two neighbors, Chad and the Central African Republic, who have the misfortune of being landlocked, will be partially relieved. As for Cameroon, it goes without saying that it will profit greatly from the project. Within a short time, a slowing in export cost hikes will result, and perhaps even in some cases a reduction of those costs, allowing exports to become more competitive. Handling a larger amount of merchandise will contribute, at least it is hoped, to a notable increase in duty revenues. Finally, and most importantly, it is hoped that the new harbor installations, for which future developments are foreseen, will boost the economy of Douala and the region along the coastline. Set up at the end of the 15th century as a trading post for the Portuguese and the Wouri river peoples who bartered for trinkets with palm oil and ivory, the port of Douala-Bonaberi is 25 km from the sea, in the Wouri estuary. Poorly developed until 1914, it fell to the French right after the Treaty of Versailles, at the same time as all of eastern Cameroon. Between the two wars, and after World War II, the authorities of the protectorate attempted some remodelling. But that was of a limited nature: the port's location, in the middle of an estuary, and an access made difficult by a shallow channel, were some other factors discouraging much interest.

The securing of the country's independence in 1960, and its subsequent development of trade, radically altered the situation. Overall traffic at the port of Douala, representing 90 percent of total port traffic, increased rapidly, from 767,000 tons (imports and exports) in 1960 to 1,536,000 tons in 1968. After a downward trend, beginning in 1971 and intensifying in

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1975 (the year when the effects were being felt of the crises involving oil and wood, large Cameroonian exports), the growth resumed and continued uninterruptedly, in spite of slight fluctuations once in awhile. Especially regarding imports, whose volume increased from 411,000 to 2,026,000 tons between 1960 and 1978 (or five times), while exports for the same period rose from 356,000 to 811,000 tons (a little more than double). (See table on port traffic).

Vis-a-vis this increase in traffic, the harbor installations have, since 1969, been showing the first signs of collapse: dock occupancy has reached the saturation point--90 percent, with 75 percent considered normal. The result was that ships' waiting times have increased, and penalties have multiplied. Meanwhile, there was something even more serious: insufficient means of storage. That required all kinds of maneuvering. To top it all off, the canal of access was not deep enough, with a water level of five meters, preventing ships with heavy cargo from approaching. At best, during high tide, the port could accommodate vessels with a draught of 6.5 to 6.8 meters, and 6,000 to 7,000 tons of cargo. In other words, at a time of hugh vessels, when more specialized types of ships are being used (barge-carriers, container ships, roll-on/roll-off ships), it could be said that the port's future was seriously threatened. Unless the whole operation were reviewed. That was the decision that was made. It required a series of preliminary studies:

--technical: topographic and hydrographic surveys; study of tides, currents, swells, sedimentation;

--economic: traffic predictions; technological development of maritime transport; evolution of ship size; instances of container ships and paddle wheels; economic profitability studies;

--financial: determination of estimated implementation costs; definition of the indebtedness capacity of the organization managing the port, in terms of gross margin of self-financing; establishment of a tariff policy, etc.

--organization and managerial: definition of features and structure of the organization managing the port; definition of methods of operation.

These studies resulted in the two basic options: on one hand, the port of Douala had to be equipped and expanded, preserving, however, its function as a varied merchandise port; on the other hand, a deep water port for heavy traffic (petroleum and possibly ore) had to be built at Cape Limboh, west of Victoria.

The characteristics of the project under completion depend both on the desire to develop other installations later on, as well as on the geographic location itself of the port of Douala, which is limited upstream by the bridge over the Wouri and, in the middle, wedged between the water surface and the cliffs.

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Overall Traffic of the Port of Douala
(1960-1978)

	(in thousands of tons)										
	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Imports	411	658	1115	1163	1148	1167	1225	1331	1380	1714	2026
Exports	356	515	727	732	742	891	966	717	848	802	811
TOTAL	767	1173	1842	1895	1891	2058	2121	2048	2228	2516	2837
Traffic Evolution Prospects											
Year	1975		1980		1990		2000				
Tons unloaded	1,229,372	1,585,939	2,614,745	2,610,691	tons/yr						
Tons loaded	1,619,265	1,392,206	2,196,909	3,004,862							
Ship Movement	977	955	1210	1500	no/yr						
Ship Anchorage	3022	2350	3404	2925	da/yr						
Average Waiting Time	5.28	1.60	1.57	0.8	hrs						
Source: ONPC [expansion unknown]											

Two types of work have been initiated: that which can be called the "functional components," constituting the major part of the program, and that which is simply the "accessory components." The former include a roll-on/roll-off container ship terminal, a wooden park, a fishing port, and a section for light ship repair. The "accessory components" are the dredging of the canal; the construction of a railway and road service; the improvement of traffic, surfaces, and various existing networks; the insuring of the workability of durable storage areas; and the expansion of the internal harbor service.

The work assigned to the French Dredging and Public Works Contracting Company (SFEDTP) for engineering, and to the Dutch company Bos and Kalis for dredging, were made known to the contractors in October, and work was begun two months later. Some 600 people were to be permanently employed, and 150 different engines would be required. Since mid-1978, more than 50 percent of this work has already been completed, and some was finished ahead of plan. The wooden wet-dock (for anchoring grumiers [translation unknown]), and the floating wood park have been finished, as well as the line of approach for the fishing port. The construction of the superstructures (cold storages, fresh fish markets, ice works) was started in October 1978 and would be completed a year later. As of right now, in its first stages, the dredging of the canal raised the water level to 6.50 meters. It will continue until it reaches 7.50.

When the work's first phase is completed in 1980, the capacity of the port will be increased from two to more than 5 million tons per year. Moreover, as stated by John Monie Nkengong, Minister of Transport, when the work was inaugurated, "With the enormous possibilities for future expansion that the master plan adopted offers, this capacity can be increased to 7.5 million tons in 1985 and to more than 10 million tons in 1990, requiring limited investments." But estimates for 1990 are half as low (see table on prospects). Average waiting time will be reduced from 8 hours and 50 minutes to 45 minutes.

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From the financial standpoint, the first stage of the expansion under completion will have cost 25 billion francs CFA. If the financiers seemed to have some reservations about the project, those were soon dispelled. First of all, financial and economic studies revealed a solid rate of profit: 21 percent. This figure, according to the same analysis, will not fall below 11 percent, even if costs increase by 50 percent and if profits are 35 percent lower than what is anticipated. However, costs have not greatly exceeded the initial estimates and, if it has been necessary to make some adjustments, it was because a traffic increase predicted for the CAR and Chad was taken into account.

Moreover, the guarantee made by the state to the investors played a part.

The eight financiers of the project are:

- The Canadian Agency for International Development (ACDI), with a loan of 7.5 billion francs CFA.
- The group from the World Bank (BIRD + IDA): 6.25 billion francs CFA.
- The African Development Bank (ADB): 2.8 billion francs CFA.
- The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA): 2.5 billion francs CFA.
- The Reconstruction Credit Bank: 2 billion francs CFA.
- The European Development Fund (EDF): 1.1 billion francs CFA.
- The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (France): 750 million francs CFA.
- The Aid and Cooperation Fund (France): 750 million francs CFA.

to which must be added the State of Cameroon and the Cameroon National Port Office (see insert).

The effects of the port's expansion are manifold. Of course, the most direct one will be the certain advancement of the national economy: with the establishment of an industrial sector, whose nucleus will be the brick-crushing factory of the CIMENCAM [Cameroon Cement Plant] and the fertilizer factory of the SOCAME [expansion unknown]; the creation of jobs in the sea-board region which has suffered serious unemployment problems; and the development of activities surrounding the fishing port. On a larger scale, the improvement of the harbor installations can and must contribute to the reduction of merchandise costs, or at least to maintaining them. That goes for imports and exports alike. Finally, the newly remodelled port of Douala will doubtless be in a better position to compete with the other ports along the west African coastline. Which has not been the case up to now.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FPO LEADER SAYS FRANCE HOLDS REAL POWER IN BANGUI

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 27

[Article by San Fie: "Deadlock at Bangui"]

[Text] Dr Abel Goumba: "It is France who really holds power in this country."

Just 3 months after the overthrow of "emperor" Bokassa, under conditions we are only too familiar with, the "debokassization" of the Central African Republic is confined to just a few changes in the names of streets or establishments: Jean-Bedel-Bokassa avenue has now become Avenue of the Martyrs, the Jean-Bedel-Bokassa highschool has become the Highschool of the Martyrs, and President-Idi-Amin-Dada avenue has become the Avenue 18 January 1979 (the date of the first massacre of children). As for 1 January 1966 Avenue (the date of Bokassa's coup d'etat), it again becomes David-Dacko avenue while Empress Catherine avenue becomes the Avenue of France! In other words, the combination farce and tragedy goes on. To get the population--who still does not understand why "certain heads have not yet rolled"--to be patient, a "national investigating commission," charged with purging those persons who were compromised under the regime of the former emperor, has been set up. According to justice minister Francois Gueret--who heads that commission--it should lead to the arrest, "for crimes of blood," of 28 persons, including a certain number of military personnel implicated in the murder of children, as well as Catherine Cbagalama, Bokassa's sister. But all of this is nothing but an appetizer for the big feast and the profound change expected by the people of this country.

The fact is that, by denying the nation's active forces, the labor unionists, the college and high school students in particular, any right to participate in the country's political life and by breaking off conversations with other opposition groups, just after they had been started, David Dacko and his French advisers closed the door to any prospects for real change. Although the jerry-built throne has been smashed, Bokassa's shadow is still hovering over the country.

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Giscardian France bears the heaviest responsibility for this tragedy where a people is denied hope and speech. This was emphasized in a statement published in E. ZINGO, the information organ of the fighting Central Africans, by Dr Abel Goumba, president of the FPO (Ubangi Patriotic Front), the oldest opposition movement, without which nothing new can be done in Bangui.

"The die is cast in Central Africa," says Dr Goumba. "After having, for an instant, given the people of Central Africa and the world the illusion of a pretended restoration of democratic freedoms taken away by him even before Bokassa, with Bokassa, and after Bokassa, David Dacko has just dropped his mask: he has once again gagged the Central African people in order better than in the past to subjugate them to exploitation and misery--this time with the blessing of France whose paratroopers are currently holding the road to Bangui. To conceal his unannounced intentions--rapidly to put an end to the round-table conference which was agreed to in spite of him amid the euphoria of the initial success of the French coup d'etat--Dacko claimed the pretext of the, by the way isolated, case of Patasse in an attempt to reduce to silence the entire Central African opposition whose solid roots among the people bother his antinational undertakings. The fact is that the FPO did not entertain many illusions as to the chances of success of these negotiations which were imposed by the popular will.

"We now witness the same scenario: Bokassa's personal political adviser, like a Sisyphos, resumes the antipopular methods which had brought about his downfall to the benefit of that same Bokassa and once again moves against the nation's active forces. As during the time of the Bokassa-Dacko two-man team, France is already embarking upon the road of massacre of young Central Africans as witnessed by the events of 29 October 1979."

The Last Word

"It is France that restored Bokassa's personal political adviser to power against the will of the Central African people. It is France which, by supporting Dacko, hopes to give him time enough to create a political base which he does not have in the country; in doing so, it is in the process of introducing tribalism and division into Central Africa. It is France who really holds power at Bangui. It is France who, by protecting Dacko, gave him and still gives him the kind of audacity with which he takes all of the provocative and irresponsible measures he took in recent days, assured that he can count on the support of the French army as confirmed by his paradoxical conclusion to call for calm during the antigovernment demonstrations on 29 October 1979, organized by college and high school students: "If you want war, you shall have it." It is France which definitely and indirectly contributed to the accentuation of the misery of the Central African people by imposing leaders chosen by France.

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"But let no one be mistaken: in this kind of struggle, the peoples always have the last word. French bayonets and arbitrary imprisonment cannot accomplish anything. The FPO continues to work as always toward national unity in the interest of the Central African people whom it wishes to spare the bitter experience of endless suffering. The FPO will continue to fight, regardless of what happens, for the defense of the right of the Central Africans freely to choose their leaders, to make the instruments for their own development, themselves, amid dignity and respect for the rights of other peoples: that is the meaning behind our battle."

FPO Demands

The FPO essentially demands two things:

(1) The immediate withdrawal of French troops; the Central African armed forces are the only legal forces to assure the security of the Central African people and of foreigners settled in the Central African Republic;

(2) The formation of a provisional government of national union, charged with preparing and establishing democratic institutions; to attain this objective, the FPO demands the resumption of negotiations in order to find a political solution to the failure of the old regime in Central Africa.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3628

[Text] According to an announcement by the National Committee for the Balance of Payments of RCA [Central African Republic], the 1978 budget reveals that the trade volume increased slightly (up 10 percent) and that the overall deficit increased somewhat from 0.8 billion CFA [African Financial Community] in 1977 to 1.6 billion in 1978.

This development can be blamed on the stagnation in export revenues which in turn is tied to the stability or even decline of certain prices and products, whereas expenditures for imports and services increased slightly, thus creating a greater deficit in the balance of goods and services (down 15.8 billion CFA as against 13.1 billions in 1977). On the other hand, free services, made up almost essentially of foreign development aid, continued to show a considerable surplus, whereas capital transactions (investments and foreign loans) showed a positive balance," although a very modest one at that," the committee stated.

The deficit in the balance of payments was financed by an increase in the commitments of the public sector with respect to the IMF and by a decline in the assets of the Central African Republic in the operating account whose balance nevertheless largely showed a credit as of the end of 1978 (about 4 billion CFA).

For 1979, the committee noted that the prospects for the development of the balance of payments will reveal only minor structural changes compared to 1978; an improvement was nevertheless registered after the fourth quarter due to the increase in foreign financial aid following the return to the republican system of government and, overall, the balance of payments for the year should be close to equilibrium.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NEW PRESIDENTIAL TOUR IN PROVINCES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3628

[Text] President David Dacko made a trip to the eastern part of the Central African Republic in mid-December, going to the province of M'Bamou, whose prefecture is at Bangassou. This region is one of the country's poorest and has a serious shortage of lines of communication, poor agricultural resources, and a chronic population decline.

Discussing the potential of the region (uranium at Bakouma, agriculture), the president commented that it could become very rich but that big sacrifices would be necessary before that.

Since the 20 December coup d'etat, this is the third trip made to the provinces by the Central African president who intends to break with a tradition of extensively centralized government, to explain the reasons for the government's complete destitution, and give the peasants and the local communities back their confidence.

It is noted that, in the course of one of his trips, the chief of state announced his intention to replace the MESAN (Movement for Social Evolution in Black Africa), the party founded by Barthelemy Boganda in 1949 but which was also the only party of the imperial regime, with the UDC (Central African Democratic Union).

It seemed that Mr. Dacko was personally in favor of a multiparty system but that contacts with the rural population showed him that it was devoted to the single-party system.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

VICE PRESIDENT AFFECTED BY HYPERTENSION--Mr Henri Maidou, vice-president of the Central African Republic, left Bangui on 19 December for a private stay of about one month in Egypt and France. He told AFP [FRENCH PRESS AGENCY] shortly before his departure that reasons of health (especially hypertension) forced him to take a rest for 3 weeks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3683] 5058

FRENCH COMPANY WITHDRAWS--One of the three french companies stationed at Bangui (the 3rd Company, 8th RPIMA [Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment]) returned to France on 12 December according to an announcement by the French defense ministry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p. 3683] 5058

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CHAD

GUNT'S FIRST CABINET MEETING HELD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340

[Article: "First Council of Ministers of Transition Government"]

[Text] The Government of the National Union of Transition of Chad [GUNT], presided over by Goukouni Oueddei held its first council 24 November in Ndjamena, 2 weeks after its organization.

According to the government spokesman, this council specially examined the problem of prisoners of war, for whom the principle of liberation has been "established." The practical methods for this liberation are to be studied by the next council, the date of which has not been set.

The Lagos accords of 21 August last on Chadian reconciliation in fact provide that all prisoners of war should be liberated 15 days after the formation of the government. According to AFP, 1,700 soldiers of the Chadian Armed Forces (CAF) are still in prison in the north and east of the country.

In addition, the council is at work on the problem of the installation of the ministerial cabinets in order to make possible the "immediate" functioning of the administration.

Finally the council studied the way to avail itself of the diverse emergency aid granted to Chad in order to make relaunching of the country possible. Numerous friendly countries have promised to participate in the construction of Chad, on the sole condition that the government be formed. Yet, except for France, no country has yet acted concretely.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

MINISTER REMAINS IN FRG--Ahmed Acyl, Chad's minister of foreign affairs, has not yet returned to Ndjama, following the formation of the new national union government, on 10 November, and his nomination by the Goukouni Oueddei government. Acyl is being treated in Germany after having campaigned in France to correct his image as the "man of the Libyans." [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Dec 79 p 60] 5157

FRENCH EMERGENCY AID--France has decided to give Chad emergency financial aid in the amount of F49.5 million, AFP [FRENCH PRESS AGENCY] announced at Ndjama on 22 December. This emergency aid, intended for a period of transition extending until 31 March, will be devoted primarily to the restoration of the Chadian administration and the resumption of cooperation with France. France in particular will contribute to the payment of civil servants with F20 million. Funds have also been allocated for the renovation of certain ministries that were damaged or sacked during the fighting in February, March and June, as well as the purchase of office equipment. Several other operations were included in this emergency program, to wit: maintenance and repair of the Shari ferry between Ndjama and Cameroon; operation of the electric power plant in the capital on a permanent basis; supply of school equipment, and dispatch of medications. On the other hand, some of the funds will be used to demilitarize the capital and to beef up the military police who have been handling security in the capital since the start of November. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3683] 5058

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FRENCH MISSION'S VISIT--A mission of technicians from the French Ministry of Cooperation has been in Ndjama since 25 November in order to evaluate the assistance which the Chadian economy requires in order to be relaunched. According to AFP, in anticipation of the reinstatement of the Chadian administration, France is contemplating initially reactivating projects already planned in 1978 but interrupted during the crisis of February 1979 before launching out into new activities. The Chadian leaders expect a great deal from the assistance which Paris could grant them, because apart from the GDR and Egypt, which have made symbolic gifts of medicine chests and various implements, no other country has come forward to participate in the reconstruction of the country. Two thousand tons of wheat are to be supplied to Chad within the framework of food assistance from France. The distribution of these 2,000 tons will be carried out by the Government of the National Union of Transition depending on local requirements. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380

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CONGO

BRIEFS

GDR GIFT TO MILITIA--The German Democratic Republic has made a gift of materiel consisting of vehicles, motorcycles, spareparts and blankets to the People's Republic of the Congo. In giving this gift, intended for the Congolese People's Militia, Horst Khol, the GDR ambassador to the Congo emphasized that this gesture translates the principle of his country's foreign policy which is international solidarity with all its friends everywhere in the world. The GDR will insure the training of militia officers for 3 years, starting next year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3342] 9380

1980 BUDGET ADOPTED--The budget session of the Congolese National People's Assembly ended at Brazzaville on 23 December, after 48 days of activity. The 1980 Congolese government budget was adopted during that meeting. It comes to 86.02 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community]. Presiding over the closing ceremony of this session, the chief of state, Col Sassou-Nguesso, in particular declared that "The year 1979 was a year of struggle and victories for the Congolese people." In his opinion, the "political confrontation," which failed "to upset the party's correct line," had several results: "The rehabilitation of the party as a leading authority, the democratic functioning of the institutions, the permanent consultation and mobilization of the masses, and better management of the affairs of state." National People's Assembly president Jean Ganga-Zanzou thought that this parliamentary session permitted the assembly first of all to take up all of the problems touching upon the country's economic and social life. Mr Ganga-Zanzou added that the work of the budget session particularly dealt with the bill determining the number of days of vacations, leave, and paid work in the People's Republic of the Congo, the agreement of SONEL (National Livestock Company), the "Kayes" agreement dealing with the permits for petroleum prospecting, and the bill on youth as well as the finance bill. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3685] 5058

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

ARMY DIVIDED INTO PRO-SPANISH, PRO-MARXIST FACTIONS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Dec 79 pp 27,29

[Text] King Juan Carlos is again risking his personal prestige by supporting the fragile regime of Equatorial Guinea which has begun a fascinating policy of national reconstruction with the vital collaboration of Spain.

In a country isolated from the rest of the world and that has lived for 11 years horror stricken by one of the bloodiest dictatorships in the world, under unfavorable diplomatic conditions and in a difficult internal political situation, the King and Queen of Spain took the risk last week of visiting Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, so as to give a "big push" to Spain's actions for the reconstruction of a totally destroyed country.

With the official visit to Malabo and Bata, the capitals of the island and of the continent, which is also the first visit by a chief of state to the former tyranny of dictator Francisco Macie Nguema, the interest that the Spanish state has taken in the relations which since August have governed the collaboration between two countries separated for 10 years, is also confirmed.

African Offensive

This royal visit which, according to diplomatic observers, has to be placed within the context of the "African offensive" initiated in May with the visits to the Ivory Coast, Conakry Guinea and Senegal, also opens up a period of serious reservations not only with respect to France, which is playing an important role in the area, but also the Soviet Union which is seeing with concern how it is losing influence in a strategically situated country, the center of all the petroleum traffic traveling across the Atlantic and a key observation point for all maritime traffic from Latin America to the European continent.

The serious faces of the Soviet Union's and Cuba's representatives at the official dinner offered by Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Obiang for the king and queen and at which the new president pronounced himself against those countries seeking to "import" ideologies alien to African views, the attacks upon the

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Russians (in the midst of the popular clamor in the Malabo stadium on the occasion of the national day) and the disinterested assistance which Spain has begun to give the new regime, aroused every sort of suspicion in Moscow.

Virtually coinciding with the royal visit, the new military authorities of Equatorial Guinea let the Soviets know that they must give up the Luba base located in the southwest of the island and which more than a supply point for the Russian fishing fleet is a strategic observation and communications center. In fact, when CAMBIO 16's special correspondent who was traveling with the king and queen tried to photograph the Soviet installations at the Luba port, a small incident occurred which a Guinean official settled by arguing that since Macie's death, the port has been "Guinean territory" and "we are the only ones in command."

For the new Guinean regime the visit of Don Juan Carlos and Dona Sofia has meant political consolidation. Lieutenant Colonel Obiang, accompanied by Don Juan Carlos, visited the continent (he had not visited it since the military coup) and received the support of his people who, fearful and superstitious, thought that the new ruler was not capable of going to Bata, the fief of Macie, or live in the Palace of Africa where, according to popular legend, the spirit of dictator Macie shot in September by the new regime still lives. More than that, the tribal leaders told him his power would not be secure until he went to Bata accompanied by the king and queen.

For Spain the royal visit means the "great thrust" in rebuilding a country devastated by misery, hunger, disease and poverty.

Although during the Hispano-Guinean talks and in the public addresses there was a major surrender to the point that President Obiang even proposed that Spain draw up and implement the budget for the next 5 years (which would mean Spain even taking over tax-collecting), Spanish reaction has been moderate and cautious because it does not wish to fall into a neocolonialism which might create insurmountable problems in the future.

Principles of Equality

During his addresses Don Juan Carlos took upon himself to reiterate that cooperation between the two countries has to be founded on principles of equality between sovereign nations, that his objective has to be freedom and justice and that the community of culture and especially of languages, is the key factor of that cooperation.

Passing over all of the difficulties, living under tough conditions, risking even the prestige of the crown by a trip which, because of the country's disorganization could have ended in a resounding failure, Don Juan Carlos wanted to take the first step in supporting the new Guinean regime and place his international prestige at the service of a new policy of cooperation with the former colony.

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The royal action at a time such as the one the country is experiencing, in which the tendency among politicians is not "to face up to things," for the time being, according to the comments of Guineans themselves, has served to give President Obiang political security. The new regime has encountered an ally which, as Lieutenant Colonel Obiang pointed out, may serve as an intermediary with Latin America and with Europe.

In any event, the path Spain has to follow and which has been opened up by the king and queen, is not without difficulties especially because of the interaction of the great powers' interests. The country's internal political situation itself as yet is not stable. In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Obiang who is protected by Moroccan forces because he does not trust his own army, has declared that the country will not have any political parties and that the military will remain in power as long as the country's reconstruction has not been achieved.

So the answer rests with the army. An army which was decimated by dictator Macie through successive purges and executions and which is divided into two different factions: One clearly pro-Spanish because its members studied at Spanish military academies (from the rank of captain on up), and the other trained in the countries of Eastern Europe, educated in Marxism-Leninism and taught Macie's hatred of everything Spanish and of the whole West.

And, in the middle, a whole bureaucracy of the old regime. A scanty and tiny bureaucracy which sees how the former assassins, the torturers, those who used dogs to eliminate the prisoners in the tens of concentration camps, remain clinging to power waiting for any opportunity.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

REPORTAGE ON CURRENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SITUATION

Prevailing Conditions

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 pp 57-58, 61, 63

[Text] As if it had suffered through a long war, Equatorial Guinea is almost at the brink of survival, beset by hunger, disease and the specter of the former regime, which has not yet been decisively defeated.

Mambo, a lean man in his sixties, is perhaps the most famous sculptor in Equatorial Guinea. He is missing his left leg up to the knee, but he has hands of silver that can do fine, delicate work with ivory.

He lives in an isolated little house, surrounded by the jungle, near Ntobo, 6 kilometers from Bata, and attached to it he has his shop. Commissioned by the government of Equatorial Guinea, Mambo is now working on the shield of Spain on two elephant tusks measuring 1 meter in length and 7 kilos in weight. They will be the gifts of the Supreme Military Council to King Juan Carlos during his visit to the African republic on 13, 14 and 15 December.

For Queen Sofia Membo is preparing a set of bracelets and a pink ivory necklace with typical motifs. "But I've sort of put this aside while I wait for them to tell me the dimensions of the Queen's wrists," he explained to Pedro Paramo, CAMBIO 16's special correspondent.

This is all that Mambo is doing at the moment. Diplomats, businessmen and his traditional customers will have to wait until he finishes the royal gifts. It is not a question of price, and the people who know him realize this.

Moreover, Mambo is an inexpensive sculptor, despite his mastery. "Bring him the ivory and a bottle of Spanish cognac, and that's enough," people in Bata comment.

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Mambo, the man with the delicate hands, the magician with ivory, is a good symbol of this country, tortured by Masie's 10-year dictatorship, which brought it to moral and material ruin, and now in the midst of a chaotic hangover in returning to normalcy.

Mambo, Equatorial Guinea's most famed sculptor, lives in a hovel. His house, with two rooms and a kitchen, is made of wood, with a zinc roof, a veritable oven under the hot equatorial sun. The red African earth is the floor, and there is no running water. Mambo has to rise at dawn and retire at nightfall because he has no electricity. His only furniture is two cots and two small tables, one of which he uses as a work bench on the porch at the entrance to his shop.

When you close your eyes and listen to him speak of his troubles in finding medicine to combat the arthrosis that is eating away at his only knee, you think of a man poor by necessity. But when you open your eyes and observe his skinny black body draped over crutches, in the light of an oil lamp, you feel a violent desire to shout for the WHO, the FAO, heaven itself.

In any case, Mambo is lucky, because men of his age are not easy to come by in Equatorial Guinea. He has lived almost 20 years longer than the average Guinean, who according to the current estimates of the Health Department, can expect to live only 40 or 45 years at birth.

Eleven years ago, when Spain hastily took down its flag in the area, the life expectancy of a new-born Guinean was 10 years greater.

At the time, Equatorial Guinea was one of the richest and healthiest countries in black Africa. Malaria had been practically eradicated; leprosy barely existed, and you could count on one hand the number of cases of sleeping sickness, caused by the tsetse fly.

All of this was thanks to a health care network that was a model for the African continent. In the 1950's, when the Bata hospital was inaugurated, the colony paradoxically had a more modern hospital facility than the mother country. In that part of the world it was surpassed only by South African hospitals, where years later Dr Bernard was to do heart transplants.

At that time, the country, with its 310,000 inhabitants, was a pearl nestled in the armpit of Africa called the Gulf of Guinea. On the island of Fernando Poo, called Bioko today, the ocher soil, which never manages to dry out under the torrid year-round humidity of the environment, produced 45,000 tons of cocoa, 7,000 of coffee and 5,000 of the reddish palm oil.

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The 40,000 school-age children had 567 educational units at their disposal, in addition to almost 500 primary school teachers. Per capita income was among the highest in Africa.

But the 11 years of Masie's tyranny were like a tornado, an earthquake or a civil war, or all three.

Health Care Breakdown

Bata Hospital now lies in ruins. "Although its structure is still standing, we would have to spend, at first glance, some 150 million pesetas to get it back in shape," say Francisco Fuster and Salvador Cerda, the architect and foreman builder, respectively, from the Spanish Health Ministry who inspected 6 hospitals and 14 clinics on the island and the mainland during the last week of November.

The most serious development has been that the breakdown in the health care network has rekindled old diseases. Malaria now affects 95 percent of the population, and although no studies have been conducted, the incidence of venereal disease and sleeping sickness is alarming enough to constitute a serious concern of the new government of Lt Col Teodoro Obiang. There are 2,000 known cases of leprosy, and the Health Department estimates that another 2,000 are unreported.

The purges of the Masie regime and the departure of almost 40,000 Nigerians who worked the cocoa and coffee plantations have reduced the harvests by nine-tenths. According to the latest estimates, only 4,000 tons of cocoa will be harvested this year.

Since Masie vented his wrath at teachers in particular, of whom he executed a good number, and supplanted classes with teachings from his book "Supreme Decision" and with group gymnastics that he brought over from a trip to Mao's China, there is now a lost, illiterate generation of Guineans who barely know Spanish.

The degradation has pervaded society. Ritual cannibalism is known to have returned to Rio Muni. "Bokuku," a coarse, quick-acting poison that causes gross swelling in victims, has reappeared in tribal vendettas. Spanish-educated natives, even those who have been in higher education, are reverting with conviction to witch doctors to ask for traditional medicines.

"If Masie has planned the destruction of his country and made every effort to do so, he certainly would have never achieved such devastating results," was the comment made at the Bantu Hotel in Malabo by Owen J. Lustig, an American official who has spent 15 days

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touring the country and interviewing all its authorities for the purpose of drafting the report that will channel U.S. aid to the new regime.

Lustig, who has known several Third World countries in critical situations, confesses that he has never seen anything like the current situation in Guinea, except after a war.

He acknowledges that the city of Malabo, which now has 15,000 residents and which has been given an advanced layout and buildings of considerable architectural beauty, must have been lovely during the good times. Nevertheless, from his crumbling room in the state hotel, furnished with a pillowless, sheetless cot and a table discolored with 10 years of filth, he cannot picture it in his imagination without the cracks in the asphalt, mold on the walls of houses and dirt in the streets, and smelling of jasmine instead of the stench issuing from the garbage piled up at corners.

No Food

The hotels have no food, but neither do the state-run stores, which only from time to time put some rice and Chinese beer and mineral water on sale.

The meat and fish markets closed their doors years ago. If you want meat, you have to go into the jungle and hunt a porcupine or squirrel, and with traps because the military have practically all the firearms.

There are no cows left. Masie banned bread and milk as foods befitting "Western capitalism," and the large herds that grazed in Moka, a sort of Asturias that lies at an altitude of 2,000 meters in the foothills of the volcano that dominates the island, were slaughtered. Cut into fillets, the meat was consumed in a few months.

And if you want fish, you ask the Russians. Masie sank the people's fishing vessels, even the coastal canoes, to prevent them from fleeing, but to offset this he signed an agreement with the Soviets whereby they would fish the rich Guinean banks, with a pledge to supply the natives.

For years the hake, tuna and sea bream wound up in the freezing vaults of the Soviet fleet based in Luba, while the starving populace was given the pork rinds that sizzled for days under the tropical sun.

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In Guinea today, the word "Soviet" is synonymous with exploitation, and the people cannot forgive them for the rotten fish and their other thefts. For example, there was the weather station that the Spanish left in Moka and that, so goes the account in Malabo, the Russians dismantled and took to the mainland as a fraternal gift of the Soviet people to the people of Angola!

The new regime terminated the fishing agreement last month, and now the Soviets enjoy no privileges. Just in case they might drag their feet in leaving their base, President Teodoro Obiang forcefully warned them in statements to the French press: "We do not like violence, but..."

Without meat or milk and short on fish, the Guineans are limited to a diet consisting of bananas, pineapples, coconuts, mangos and roots and tubers, such as yucca or malanga, which nature provides in abundance.

Black Market

And if mother nature should fail them, not all is lost. That is what the black market is for, and it offers almost everything. All you need is enough money to afford what you want.

Today, Equatorial Guinea is an immense, unconcealed black market. Ekueles, the national currency, move at an incredible pace on it, as if they were bottlecaps. An ekuele is equal to 1 peseta on the official market and 25 cents at the black market exchange rate. A peon earns from 6,000 to 7,000 ekueles a month, as does a teacher. A specialized worker, a tractor operator for example, earns no more than 15,000 ekueles a month.

A small loaf of bread weighing less than 50 grams costs 50 ekueles; a small container of condensed milk, 300; a liter of palm oil, which could be bought for 30 ekueles 6 years ago, now costs 800; an egg, 100; a small goat or pygmy deer (no more than 3 kilos of meat), 7,000 ekueles, when available.

The shortages have given rise to a market of miniature portions at out-of-this-world prices: a slice of onion costs 25 ekueles; a teaspoon of fried tomato, 25 ekueles; one macaroni, 25 ekueles.

Inexplicably, Scotch whisky is not in short supply and is readily available at 4,000 ekueles a bottle; nor is beer (Chinese on the island, Gabonese or Cameroonian on the mainland), at 600 ekueles a half-liter bottle. A bottle of Spanish brandy, for which they say Mambo will carve an ivory bracelet, could cost 6,000 ekueles.

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As we can see, Guinea now has an insane economy, in which a cigaret (25 ekueles) costs just a little less than a liter of gasoline (30 ekueles). Of course it would not be much different even if gas were free, because there are barely 300 cars that work in the entire country, not counting military vehicles and the presidential escort. The lack of spare parts has paralyzed the fleet, and the cars that do run have to be push-started because their batteries discharged months ago.

No News

Little remains of its former splendor. Malabo has intermittent electric power, in exchange for the din with which the six generators recently donated by Gabon break the steaming nighttime peace. The stores without signs and the display windows that have been empty for years give the streets the death-like air of ghost towns during the hottest part of the day.

A single public telephone links the island with the rest of the world, and only official business can be conducted over telephone lines to the mainland.

There are neither bookstores nor books, news nor newspapers. The Bata and Malabo radio stations interrupt the records of the Dynamic Duo and African "salsa" with three news programs a day. The TV antennas on the roofs are waiting to pick up who knows what airwaves, because the country has no television station. A TV crew has been working for a month now to reactivate the station that Spain left in working order when it left the colony. Old sets are being dusted off in homes in the hope that the visit by the king and queen will bring back the picture that was lost a decade ago.

There are two movie theaters in Malabo that show Chinese and Soviet films, most of the time without Spanish dubbing or subtitles; they are not very successful. The movie theater in Bata, which is more in keeping with the times, now shows Western films. On Sunday, 25 November, it played an action film with characters from the old TV series "The Man From UNCLE," but without sound because the projector has no audio. The theater was filled, at 75 ekueles a head.

Four months after the military coup, there is something of a pathetic surrealism about the chaos in which Guinean society is operating, a society which the new authorities have not yet been able to get a handle on.

African Surrealism

For example, it cries out to heaven that people are starving while the Spanish vessel Ciudad de Pamplona, which docked in Malabo last

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28 November with all-terrain vehicles and foodstuffs, was forced to seek warehouse space at the higher elevations of the city because the port warehouses were filled to the brim with food from China.

There are also complaints that there is a lack of serum at the hospital in Malabo, while on the mainland, at the hospital in Mongomo, Masie's town, which was never inaugurated, Spanish technicians found more than 200 boxes filled with serum bottles 2 weeks ago.

The new government is doing what it can to get things moving, whether with good or bad luck. The Foreign Investment Law, which authorizes the repatriation of invested capital and the transfer overseas of foreign exchange profits, has been applauded by all, but it contrasts with the plan to bring in 40,000 immigrants from the continent to do the hardest farm work. The laborers would apparently be recruited in Angola, Nigeria and Rwanda, but the plan has a number of experts working with the Guinean Government knitting their brows.

"If they bring in more people, with this disorder and this pervasive indifference, it's going to take them many long years to recover, even if there are places here where the soil produces a potato crop every 45 days," opined a Spanish economist and businessman who is looking for new horizons for his products in Malabo.

But the disorder that is to be expected in the aftermath of the coup or the country's neglect is not the only problem. Last 27 November, a mere Guinean Army corporal was on the verge of triggering a diplomatic conflict by attempting to search two Hercules aircraft from the Spanish Air Force that were bringing in medicine, food and furniture, the latter for the presidential palace that will house the king and queen of Spain.

The Spanish ambassador and the head of the mission argued heatedly for an hour with the corporal, while the crews, confined to their planes, awaited the potential order to fly back to Spain with their cargo.

"Those are Masie people who are determined to boycott the new government," explained a high-level Guinean official who had recently returned from Spain to join the new administration and who had witnessed the embarrassing scene. "Until a thorough housecleaning is done, the people who prospered under Masie are going to keep taking advantage of their privileged status to benefit as much as possible."

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Corruption

The corruption fueled by the dictator's regime is still around. Several Spanish businessmen have been urged to pay money to streamline the administrative procedures required for them to do business in Guinea. Manuel Fernandez Tarin, a brave ATS [expansion unknown] who has spent 10 days in the jungle on the mainland vaccinating some 1,000 children in the most foresaken towns, has learned that the first shipments of vaccine that Spain and the United States sent in immediately after the military coup are being sold in neighboring Gabon.

To many observers, as long as powerful men from the former regime continue in leadership posts, the spirit that spurred Col Teodoro Obiang will not be consolidated. The president himself seems to realize this, surrounded by some 100 Moroccan bodyguards, who are the ones maintaining order in the country.

The purge, which the populace is demanding as a necessary move, could come in the next few weeks, at the start of the new year, sources close to the Supreme Military Council note.

While the situation is returning to normal, Spain is carefully doling out its contributions to make sure that they wind up among the Guinean people, not in the pocket of some loafer. "The Malabo Hospital needs mattresses," explains one of the people in charge of Spanish aid to Guinea, "but we know that if we do not supervise the deliveries, they will never get to the hospital, and tomorrow they will be selling for 5,000 ekueles on the black market."

The Spanish authorities plan to distribute the foodstuffs, clothing and medicine directly, but in no case will they be free of charge. They will be priced low, but high enough to discourage callous hoarders, and the money that is collected will then be handed over to the Supreme Military Council.

Thus, the hope is that all Guineans will benefit, the current psychosis of need will disappear, the black market will become part of the history books, the country will rise up from the depths and Guineans will recover their pride.

Conditions Facing Spanish Businessmen

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 pp 63, 64

[Text] Drawn by the new situation, dozens of Spanish businessmen are descending on Equatorial Guinea. In addition to anti-malarial quinine and the appropriate vaccinations, they have to have a good dose of patience.

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On the night of 28 November in the banquet room of the Bantu Hotel in Malabo, a dozen Spanish businessmen gathered to dine on roast goat seasoned with spicy sauces in West African style.

That same morning, the OFFICIAL BULLETIN of Equatorial Guinea published the Foreign Investment Law, which opened up the country to foreign capital under extraordinarily favorable conditions and which Spanish financiers were awaiting like rain in May. But this was not the reason for the banquet. The industrious businessmen had a more important job to do: to finish off the young goat that was bought on the black market and slaughtered by one of their fellow diners with his own hands.

Those were the first slices of fresh meat that they had bolted down after 6 days of a forced diet in a country in which there is hardly any food and in which the search for nourishment is the populace's main concern.

Farewell and Sorrow

The dinner had a certain air of a sorrowful farewell. Most of them would be leaving the next day for Spain on Iberia's weekly flight, the only regular service linking the island with the rest of the world, after a week's stay in search of new markets for their businesses, in light of the new political situation in the former Spanish colony.

Most of them were returning with empty hands; others, with a series of vague promises. In any case, behind them was a week of negotiations left pending, of kind words, of administrative silences and of bureaucratic delays in starting talks that on occasion required bribes of a few thousand pesetas or a wristwatch.

Very few were leaving with the consolation of a signed and sealed contract or the green light for their activities in Guinea.

"Someone should have told us what we were getting into and what kind of people we were going to deal with," complained an industrialist who preferred to remain nameless in case his business eventually works out. "This is chaos; the administration doesn't work; there are no clear-cut norms...I came here thinking that the Spanish Government had gotten really involved with all of the aid that the papers are talking about, but it turns out that absolutely nothing has made it through, and we're more alone than a solitaire player."

Until the Transmediterranea's "Ciudad de Pamplona" docked that morning at Malabo with all-terrain vehicles and foodstuffs, official

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Spanish aid had, in fact, been more symbolic than anything else. In reality, it was limited to shipments of vaccines and to the presence of the Aviocars of the Air Force, which linked the island with the mainland twice a day in transporting persons and goods free of charge.

Accustomed to air conditioning and fine cuisine, the industrialists and merchants suddenly found themselves in a ruined, poverty-stricken country in which the hotels have no food to offer, in which the rooms are unfurnished and the beds without sheets and in which dirt and grime are everywhere, as if there had just been a war.

Instead of doing business in the five-star establishments that they are familiar with, they were forced to walk, sweat-drenched, through the streets of Malabo, ever in search of something to eat or a cold beer, while awaiting the meeting with the ranking official who was to give their business the OK.

More Patience Than Job

They were the pioneers. But after them came the French, the Italians and the Gabonese, and there would be no favored treatment for the first Spaniards.

"You have to have more patience than Job here," says a resigned Manuel Diaz de Teran, a farm machinery manufacturer with houses in Madrid and Valencia, who was the first to arrive, as Masie was being tried. "It does no good to be the first."

Diaz de Teran wants to set up an import-export enterprise, and his request, submitted in late September, has not yet been acted on one way or the other.

Julio Chillida, from Sogeha, Alicante, was the first Spaniard who succeeded in placing merchandise in the new Equatorial Guinea. As soon as he learned of the coup, he loaded two Aviacos DC-8's with 60 tons of food, beverages, clothing and footwear and flew to Malabo with them, without an import license and with the new government's word as guarantee that they would authorize the remittance of profits to him.

No Foreign Exchange

Two months later, Julio was still waiting for authorization, because "for the time being there is no foreign exchange," Guinean officials tell him. Nonetheless, Chillida, who met with President Teodoro Obiang, had so much faith in the Supreme Military Council that on 2 December he was waiting in Malabo for a ship transporting 1,500 tons of general cargo for him.

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It took Marciano Martin, a hotel owner from Saldana (Palencia), 2 months and 4 trips to Malabo to secure the use concession for the Bahia Hotel, which the state had run until then. The concession had been authorized since the end of October but because of bureaucratic red tape did not take effect until 29 November, the day of the goat dinner.

Marciano was one of the few happy men at the banquet. Like Chillida and Diaz de Teran, he has faith in the new country and is confident about starting a hotel management school that will lay the groundwork for tourism to become one of the country's major sources of income. But the delays and procrastination do not always have a happy ending. "There's no way you can come to an understanding with these people," complained a textile dealer who was returning to Spain with empty hands. "You never know whether they want money or whether no one knows what to expect."

"Of course they know; the technical secretaries know perfectly well," asserted an Andalusian manufacturer. "Those are the ones who have the upper hand and want companies worth 200 million and up to come in and give them 10 percent of the action."

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

MINISTERIAL DELEGATION IN PARIS SIGNS AGREEMENTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340

[Article: "Equatorial Guinean Delegation to Paris"]

[Text] On 28 November a six-member Equatorial Guinean ministerial delegation headed by Capt Salvador Ela Nseng, the military commissar (minister) of the economy, finance and commerce, signed cooperation agreements with France. The Equatorial Guinean ministers were returning the visit made last October by the French minister of cooperation, Robert Galley.

During the visit to France the delegation met Elf-Aquitaine and BRGM [Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration] representatives. It was also to meet officials of the French Petroleum Institute and the CFP (French Oil Company).

The Elf-Aquitaine and CFP companies have already participated with other companies in boring off the Equatorial Guinean seacoast (particularly off Fernando Poo), which would have given "positive" results.

In terms of mining, Equatorial Guinea has manganese, titanium, uranium and gold.

In 1978 trade between the two countries was balanced: F 4 million for exports and imports. France exports textiles, industrial products and vehicles and imports essentially wood. Spain remains Equatorial Guinea's principal partner.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

NEW PHASE IN SPANISH-GUINEAN RELATIONS OPENING

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Dec 79 p 15

[Article by Jose Oneto: "The Guinean Challenge"]

[Text] Through the royal visit to Equatorial Guinea Spain has launched the most ambitious and stimulating project that a European country has implemented in recent years.

Guinea, a Spanish colony until 1969, an example of one of the worst decolonizations in Africa, if one goes by public opinion and all of the political forces, can now be turned into one of the principal goals of Madrid's foreign policy and into a valid model of what cooperation between developed and underdeveloped countries means. Spain, as Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez has been saying, is a medium-sized power which has Europe as its goal and which finds its entire historical justification in Spanish America, now has the great "historic opportunity" of getting a country started that was destroyed by the paranoid tyranny of dictator Francisco Masie, another of colonialism's by-products brought forth in the final stage of the Franco era. The case of Guinea, a country of somewhat over 28,000 square kilometers and a population of 350,000 inhabitants, should be a great "challenge," a challenge suited to Spanish dimensions and aspirations for a policy of cooperation that may turn into an example for other powers.

It is not a matter of improvising cooperation like France, which is devoting \$2,689,000,000; nor like Germany which is dedicating \$1,984,000,000; it is almost a matter of carrying out a laboratory test which may transform this old country into an international model.

Since August, when a military coup ended Macie's dictatorship, the Spanish Government has spent over a billion pesetas in aid to Guinea in the form of food, medicine, basic assistance, transport and plans for an infrastructure which have come out of the various ministries.

After this initial state, serious reflection is essential in which all of the political parties with parliamentary representation must participate and pass in Parliament an entire aid plan which has to be approved by and fulfill the

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dreams of all social sectors. Without these collective dreams, without this ambitious planning everything done in Guinea will be futile and will lack that spirit which all great historic collective undertakings possess.

Now, when one starts from zero and endeavors to reconstruct a whole country from nothing, one must build on solid and stable foundations. One must flee from, one must avoid "economic self-seeking" which in the end was one of the factors in the collapse of a country. And one must manage not to fall into a neocolonialism which would again create tensions and frustration.

Those who made fortunes for themselves in the colony cannot return there nor those who profiting by the opposition to Franco contributed (e.g., Antonio Garcia Trevijano) to the consolidation of Macie's tyranny.

The stage that has just begun is completely new and there will be a bit of everything in it. There will be inevitable tension, attempts at corruption and, above all, international pressures which will have a consequent impact on Spain.

Guinea is the sole little Spanish-speaking "island" in an area under French influence. The first differences will arise with Paris because of the dispute setting Guinea against Gabon over the jurisdiction of waters where petroleum may lie.

But the big struggle, the big concealed struggle will occur with the Soviet Union, one of the major powers in Africa which has seen with concern how its influence over a territory, which served it as a strategic cover for other areas of Africa, evanesced in hours. The Soviets who supported Macie to the end despite the denunciations throughout the world of his regime's crimes, will attempt to change the situation by every means. And for that it is relying on a group of young officials, educated in Eastern Europe, lightly "glazed" with Marxism-Leninism and brought in at all levels. Because of that, in the grand "Operation Guinea" one must rely on public opinion in its entirety.

In the meanwhile, the nomination of Jose Luis Graullera, who is close to Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, is a guarantee that Moncloa is interested in the operation and that there will be direct ties between Malabo and Madrid. But something else is lacking. Above all a state policy, and not one of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], is missing.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

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SPANISH EXPERTS--Approximately 500 physicians, armed forces and police instructors, agricultural experts and various other technicians will meet soon in Equatorial Guinea within the framework of a plan for emergency aid from Spain, if one believes the Madrid weekly newspaper CAMBIO 16, which adds that Spain has granted a loan of \$19 million to Malabo in order to finance the most urgent work. According to CAMBIO 16, the Spanish economic experts at Malabo are optimistic as far as the economic future of Equatorial Guinea is concerned because the country possesses reserves on the order of \$20 million, and it is all the more able to request large loans because it has no external debt. Finally, according to these experts, the emergency plan submitted by the Spanish economists to the Equatorial Guinea authorities provides for rapid return to the production levels of the 1960's, a fact which will mean an increase of exports which may be as much as \$250 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380

OPEC LOAN--On 22 November the OPEC Special Fund granted a \$1 million loan to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in order to help it reestablish the equilibrium of the balance of payments. This loan was granted without interest for a term of 15 years with 5 years' moratory interest. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380

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GAMBIA

BRIEFS

ELECTRIC POWERPLANT PROJECT--The Gambian minister of transportation and telecommunications, Bakary Sanyang, has announced the construction of a \$6 million hydroelectric powerplant near Koter, at the mouth of the river, thanks to a loan from the African Development Bank (ADB). Intended to remedy the frequent electricity cuts which Banjul and its suburbs have been experiencing since September, this electric powerplant should go into operation in 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330] 9380

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

REQUEST FOR FAD FUNDS--The Guinean ministers of Oil and Economy, Messrs Navamra Kitta and Mars Crousse, paid a visit to the United Arab Emirates on 16-18 December; during this visit, they met with high officials of the Abu Dhabi Arab Development Fund. Guinea submitted a request for the financing of a dam to be built at Conakry, which was approved. A delegation from the Arab Development Fund will go to Guinea after it has examined the studies and blueprints for the dam. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3677] 9394

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

DECLINE IN FRENCH INFLUENCE--France is losing ground in relation to the Ivory Coast's other Western friends. President Houphouet-Boigny has reportedly reproached Giscard d'Estaing for treating him in cavalier fashion, as opposed to the French president's predecessors who never failed to consult him on all major African issues. This development is more than the Belgians, British, and Spaniards needed and expected in order to take steps to supplant the French in certain investment fields. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Dec 79 p 59] 8041

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KENYA

PRESIDENT PESSIMISTIC REGARDING 1980 ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687

[Text] In the course of his public address on 12 December on the occasion of the day marking the 16th anniversary of the country's achieving independence, president Daniel arap Moi surrounded by his vice-president, Mr Mwai Kibaki, and members of his new administration, presented a rather somber picture of Kenya's economic prospects for the eighties. "We are going to have a very difficult time," he said, "in pursuing our development at the same rate as during earlier years and we are certainly going to have to modify our programs." The chief of state also mentioned the current food shortages among the population but he said that the country has sufficient reserves. He blamed the shortages on dishonest merchants and fraudulent exports. On that subject, he promised "firm measures" and announced a certain number of confiscations, both in Nairobi and in the province.

During the first meeting of the new parliament emerging from the 8 November elections, on 4 December, the chief of state had already expressed his worries about the future. "Looking at the challenges which our nation will have to face during the eighties, I have arrived at the conclusion that the government machine requires a substantial reorganization. I do not want to alarm you but the eighties will be difficult, especially because of outside forces. We must thus assure maximum efficiency in government," he emphasized.

Mr arap Moi also remarked that the responsibilities of the presidential office had been increased considerably since independence and he explained that three ministries of state were created in order to guarantee better coordination on that level and that defense was attached directly to his office.

Finally, since Kenya is not a petroleum producer, which is why there is reason to worry about the future, Mr Moi stressed the importance which he assigned to the prospecting and operation of new energy sources, such as wind and sun, within the new ministry of energy under Mr Munuya Waiyaki.

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KENYA

MUNGAI ARRESTED IN NAIROBI

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687

[Text] Mr James Mungai, the high official in charge of the Kenyan police for the province of Rift Valley--who had disappeared from the country following the announcement, early in November 1978, of an attempted plot during the month of August of that same year (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS] 10 November 1978, p 2976), which was discovered after he had fled to the Sudan and then to Switzerland (MTM, 12 January 1979, p 92)--was apprehended on 19 December at the Jomo Kenyatta international airport at Nairobi as he left the aircraft that had brought him from Geneva. He was taken in a station wagon, with a big escort, to an unknown destination. This event caused a certain sensation in Kenya where Mr James Mungai--who, it was said, upon his return, was accompanied by four members of Interpol--was considered by the authorities to be a particularly dangerous personality.

Mr Mungai had been principal vice-commissionaire of police who for 10 years was in charge of security in the Rift Valley, a region which includes almost the entire western portion of the country, from the Tanzanian border to the Sudan; Mr Mungai was also in command of the cattle-rustling combat unit, a special police section, some of whose members had gotten special training and were to carry out a certain number of assassinations following the death of president Kenyatta. These assassinations, first disclosed to parliament by justice minister Charles Njonjo, who stated that he was to be one of the victims, supposedly were intended to prevent the current president, Daniel arap Moi, from coming to power.

Nobody knows the reasons that persuaded Mr Mungai to return to Kenya, especially without being assured of sufficient guarantees. His

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immediate arrest in any case shows that the climate of uncertainty, which deteriorated further prior to the recent elections (MTM, 2 November, p 2965) has not been completely dispelled as yet, even after the organization of a new cabinet.

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KENYA

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ARTICLES SMUGGLED HERE--The smuggling of various articles, especially Chinese, coming from Tanzania, is currently worrying the Kenyan police. This smuggling, it was said, is encouraged by the strength of the Kenyan shilling which is quoted twice as high in Tanzania. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687] 5058

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

NEW OPPOSITION PARTY--Monrovia. Officials of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) requested the recognition of the Progressive People Party (PPP) as an opposition party. We may recall that the PAL had organized, last April, a demonstration to protest a plan for raising the price of rice, a demonstration which degenerated into a riot and caused the death of over 70 people. Since that request no other reference has been made to socialism which the PAL is said to support. The ideological line of the PPP will be determined at a congress during which the leaders of the new party will be elected, stated Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, PAL president. For the time being, the representatives of the future PPP state their willingness to "obey, protect and defend the constitution of the Republic of Liberia." According to Liberian law, such a request for confirmation, accompanied by 5,000 signatures, will be publicized for three days, to enable those who oppose it to speak out in front of the Monrovia Probate Court which will have final say on the request. The party currently in power in Liberia, the True Whig Party (TWP) is de facto the only party, even though nothing in the Liberian constitution bans the formation of different parties. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 12] 5157

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

LILONGWE AIRPORT FINANCING--Malawi received a loan of US\$40 million from an international consortium of banks, designed in part to finance construction of an international airport at Lilongwe, according to a statement made by Malawi's finance minister, M. Edward Bwanali, before parliament, on 23 November last. Another portion of the loan will be applied to financing a number of agricultural development projects, the minister added. The new airport, which it has been estimated will cost US\$60 million, is to replace one at Chileka. The first stage of the work--programmed to be concluded by next year--was financed by loans from the African Development Bank, the Japanese Government and an international consortium of banks, led by the Chase Manhattan Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 7129

FRENCH TRADE DELEGATION--A 10-member French trade delegation arrived in Blantyre on 24 November to hold discussions with the Malawi Government on the development of trade relations between the two countries. The head of the delegation, Gerard Dorle, of the French Foreign Trade Center, stressed right from the start that the field for trade between France and Malawi was quite limited and that the target of his visit was to study the sectors where development was possible. The delegation has already visited Tanzania and Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 7129

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MALI

STUDENT UNREST MAY HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 992, 9 Jan 80 p 23

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Mali: An Alarm Bell"]

[Text] The year 1979 has ended on a note of uncertainty, and 1980 is beginning with concern. Today's protagonists are the same as yesterday: the students on one side, the forces of order on the other.

At the basis of the conflict is the strike launched on 16 November 1979 by high school and university students and by some teachers. The motives: a protest against the continued use of the "common stream" in high schools and against the examinations which, following the baccalaureate degree, decide on who will have access to the university and who will enter the professional field--or the field of unemployment. Since that time, action has escalated, with the fatal spiral of strike-sanctions-manifestations-repression. The balance sheet: new arrests (almost 300 at the end of December), 5 dead according to some sources, 15 according to others. In Bamako, mothers are taking to the streets. In Paris, students occupy the Malian Embassy.

These December 1979 explosions are the worst incidents which have taken place in Mali since May-June 1977. At the time, young people had again taken to the streets, and for the same reasons as today's.

In truth, the economy cannot absorb a plethora of diplomas awarded by an obsolete and monolithic system, just as establishments of higher learning cannot accommodate all those with a baccalaureate degree. In other words, Mali has too many of these for the positions it can offer them: the ideal conditions to nurture a revolt.

The authorities let it be known that the young people had been induced into error and manipulated by subversive troublemakers. Nevertheless, if it is true that spontaneous movements are rare, the fact is that they do grow out of a genuine malaise. Youth organizations are regularly sounding the alarm bell. It would be suicidal not to listen to them. Keeping the proper proportions in mind, it must be noted that other revolts elsewhere have upset regimes stronger than Mali's. In France, the month of May 1968 will

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mark the turning point for this second half of the century in the annals of history. In Senegal, May 1968 (as well) made authorities more circumspect. In Madagascar, May 1972 finally brought an end to a regime which considered itself very strong and very stable: President Philibert Tsiranana had been reelected with more than 98 percent of the vote in January; in October, he was swept away by a referendum in which the tally was approximately the same.

In Mali, it would be a gross error to believe in a similar arithmetical stability. Admittedly, Moussa Traore was elected in June by 100 percent of the vote less eight [sic]. In Africa, however, we have always been taught to vote for the strongest candidates. Until such day when the cup overflows: more often than not, a simple revolt of the youth. Bokassa can testify to that. His dictatorship was not unmasked suddenly in 1979. But it is in 1979 that the young people of the Central African Republic decided to say no to him.

What to do in Mali? Admit that a malaise is not necessarily provoked by third-party forces. And do everything to prevent baccalaureate-degree holders from having to choose only between unemployment and revolt.

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NIGER

BRIEFS

BID LOAN--On 11 November the Islamic Development Bank (IBD) granted a technical assistance loan of 780,000 Islamic dinars (approximately \$1 million) to the Government of Niger. This loan will finance the final studies on the Niamey-Balayera-Filingue highway (185 km). The realization of this highway will make it possible to reduce the distance by road between Niamey and Tahoua via Birni N'konni from 550 to 430 km. The project will be launched early in 1980, and the studies will require a year to a year and a half. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3334] 9380

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RHODESIA

GUERRILLAS ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS

Elections Are Ultimate Test

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 63-64

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Zimbabwe Between War and Peace"]

[Text] A few months ago, nobody foresaw that Zimbabwe would be knocking at freedom's gate as this year drew to an end. The country's future independence is still highly fragile, however, because of the extreme divisions among the various forces that are to vie for voter support in the coming elections. Rarely has there even been such a narrow distance between miracle and mirage.

In one of history's turnarounds, the British Union Jack was once again hoisted above public buildings in Salisbury on 11 December. A few minutes earlier, the aircraft carrying Lord Soames, representative of Her Majesty the Queen, landed at the Rhodesian capital's airport. Through a governor, Great Britain had now reassumed responsibility for the administration of its colony. The official cease-fire agreement was finally signed in London on Monday night, 17 December. The Zimbabwe people had been waiting 14 years for this moment. In the space of just a few months, the "rebel" colony resumed the status it had had prior to 1965 when Ian Smith, defying the whole world, proclaimed the country's "independence." In several weeks, Lord Soames will have to return to London permanently after having handed over power to the new leaders chosen to govern the affairs of an independent Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has certainly come a long way, that's the least that can be said. Everything had been tried to bring the descendants of the first British settlers to their senses. Admittedly, however, the succession of governments in London after Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence had all displayed an extreme degree of complacency toward the "rebels." It is also true that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) itself never took any concrete action to take up Ian Smith's challenge. Lastly, it is true that the economic sanctions ordered by the OAU, as well as the United Nations, were unevenly enforced by the major powers.

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Actually, it was the determination of the people of Zimbabwe that influenced the course of events. It was the people's will and the sacrifices of the masses that compelled the white minority and its last-minute allies to negotiate.

It was the Patriotic Front's real representativeness that finally compelled Great Britain to assume its responsibilities.

Has total victory been achieved? The procedural questions having been settled in the Lancaster House Peace Conference, Zimbabwe's future will now be determined in the field. There are several opposing forces and the elections will be a crucial test. The "men of the interior"--particularly Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole--are opposed by representatives of the Patriotic Front. But the actual election picture is much more complicated, given the disagreements and alliances resulting from the long war of liberation. Dissidents from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) were the ones who in 1963 formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that is headed today by Robert Mugabe, the other co-leader of the Patriotic Front. The 1973 meeting of the two "separated brothers" within the Front has not been enough to dispel all suspicion and mistrust. As a consequence, the alliance between the two men is very precarious. There are fears that the lust for power may trigger a split in the Patriotic Front. ZANU's internal leadership has already let it be known that they want the Front's two wings to run separate candidates, and then form a coalition after the elections.

This view is shared by conservative elements within the ZAPU who have always advised Joshua Nkomo to keep his distance from Robert Mugabe who is considered to be more radical. Each of the two branches of the Front actually hopes to be in the better position at that decisive moment when governmental responsibilities are apportioned between them. This systematic power struggle between its two leaders does not help the Patriotic Front which, even now, will enter the electoral campaign with many handicaps. Its in-country following has yet to be determined and there is reasonable doubt as to whether a few weeks of campaigning will be enough for the Front to gain the required support. Especially since the local press is controlled by local Muzorewa supporters. In addition, votes are liable to be scattered among the 11 political groups vying for the support of 7 million Africans.

In any case, the only foreseeable solution, once the election is over, seems to be a coalition government. The situation remains totally uncertain, and anything can happen, including an alliance between former enemies. The main thing is that the politicians must display enough clear-sightedness to avoid any repetition of the Angolan experience.

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Opposing Armies Analyzed

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 64-66

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Seven Years of Bush Warfare"]

[Text] Some 22,000 persons killed. That is the overall price in human lives of 7 years of war in Zimbabwe. The most reliable sources place the number of national guerrillas killed at 7,700 and the number of civilian victims among the black population at 15,000. On the Rhodesian side, some 1,500 soldiers--950 of them black--and 800 white civilians have perished since 1972, the date real military operations began. All things considered, this is a moderate toll when one recalls that another war of decolonization, the Algerian War, resulted in nearly 500,000 civilian and military victims in slightly more than 7 years of fighting.

There are two reasons for the relatively moderate toll in Zimbabwe. First, the very nature of the fighting: a guerrilla war consisting of hit-and-run attacks and lightning raids with no large-scale offensives or deadly sweeping area-wide hunt-and-kill operations. Secondly, the relative weakness of the forces and equipment employed by both sides: the Rhodesian Air Force began its systematic heavy bombing of guerrilla camps only in 1977, and national troops practically never attacked urban targets. It is true that the nationalists have never been very popular among the black urban population.

By late 1979, a combined total of 100,000 armed men were fighting over Zimbabwe's future.

The Patriotic Front has 45,000 men. Throughout the entire conflict, they operated on two fronts and as two separate armies. The ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army)--the military arm of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU--is based in Zambia and stationed in some 20 camps around the capital city of Lusaka and throughout the southeastern part of the country. ZIPRA's 23,000 men are armed with Soviet weapons and trained by Angolan, Cuban, and East German instructors.

The ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army)--the military arm of Robert Mugabe's ZANU--is based in Mozambique along the Rhodesian border. The Rhodesian Army raided and destroyed its headquarters at Chimoio in September 1979. ZANLA's 22,000 men have Soviet and Chinese weapons and are trained by Mozambican, Ethiopian, Tanzanian, Soviet, and East German instructors.

Theoretically united since June 1979--Addis Ababa agreements--under a joint command led by General Josiah Tongogara, the Front's two armies have never actually operated in a coordinated manner. Mugabe's ZANLA was the only army to actually fight inside Zimbabwe where it succeeded in gaining control of a few "liberated areas" in the north. Nkomo's ZIPRA infiltrated

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only 4,000 men into Zimbabwe (in comparison with ZANLA's 11,000). They always avoided any contact with the Rhodesian Army, limiting their activity to conducting propaganda meetings in the villages. Admittedly the terrain in the western part of the country where Nkomo's men operate (a flat and barren area) differs from the terrain in the east where Mugabe's troops fight (mountainous and wooded region, and thus easier to infiltrate). Furthermore, ZIPRA is definitely more of an army organized to seize power than an army organized to wage guerrilla warfare. Concentrated in vast camps along the Zambezi River, it became one of the favorite targets of the Rhodesian Air Force pilots who bomb it almost as if were a bombing exercise target. We must add that there have been occasional violent clashes between "brother" units of the ZANLA and ZIPRA.

The Rhodesian Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Peter Walls, has 16,000 men (plus 8,000 police). The majority of the troops are black and the officers are white. Approximately 2,000 mercenaries have swelled the army's ranks in the past 3 years. Taking everything into consideration, this army is one of the world's most efficient and well-trained military forces. Through a multiplicity of collusive arrangements it has been able to equip itself with relatively modern materiel suitable for antiguerrilla warfare, such as Mirage 3 aircraft, "Huey" helicopters, etc. It controlled 90 percent of the territory by day and 60 percent by night. Its crack units, the unfortunately famous Selous Scouts excelled in fomenting discord between the Patriotic Front's two armies. The Rhodesian Army was deployed in seven "war zones": Ranger, Grapple, Flasher, Hurricane, Tangent, Splinter, and Thrasher.

Private militia units form the "Praetorian" guard of the two moderate black leaders who signed the transition agreement of March 1978: Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau. Composed primarily of deserters from the Rhodesian Army and the Patriotic Front, these militia units total 5,000 men. They live almost exclusively on pillage and rapine, but authorities in Salisbury have used them to "hold" certain Tribal Trust Lands highly infiltrated by national guerrillas.

The problem raised by the unification and partial disarmament of these three armies was at the core of the London negotiations on Zimbabwe's future. The task of resolving this problem in the field is now the responsibility of the British Governor, Lord Soames, and his military deputy, Major General John Acland, who commands the Commonwealth truce-monitoring force. Lord Carver, whom the British Government had assigned in 1977 to an "exploratory mission" in Zimbabwe, recently said that "the real power is the army. Any peace initiative must take it into account." It remains to be seen how the peasants feel. They constitute the great majority (90 percent) of Zimbabwe's black population. As in any conflict of this type, there is every indication that their sympathies lie with neither one side nor the other: neither with the Front's guerrillas who suddenly appear in the middle of the night and demand food, nor, of course, with the government forces who burn down the houses and kill the livestock of villagers suspected of having "helped" the Freedom Fighters.

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RHODESIA

LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT ASSESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Dec 79 p 20

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Peace of the Greats"]

[Text] Will this twelfth month of the year 1979 mark the dawn of a new epoch in the history of southern Africa? On the same day, Wednesday, 5 December, almost at the same hour, two events suddenly changed the future of the southern end of the continent. In London, after 3 months of tedious negotiations, an agreement in principle on a cease-fire in Zimbabwe was reached between the nationalists of the Patriotic Front, the British colonial authorities and the government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. In Pretoria, the South African prime minister, Pieter Botha, announced that his country was accepting the main points of the Western plan on Namibia, to which the African states in the region and the Namibian guerrillas had already agreed.

A sudden reversal in the history of what, just a short time ago, was one of the hot spots of the planet?

Certainly, it seems possible now that 1980 will see the appearance of two new independent states on the map of Africa. But the important thing is to know to whom Africa will owe this "victory." During the entirety of the London conference on the future of the "rebel colony," it was outside interventions, more or less direct, coming from the United States or the Soviet Union, that provided the necessary prodding so that everything did not fall apart. And this pervading presence of the great powers is hardly surprising given the fact that one can scarcely fail to notice the absence of any clear political plan among the African protagonists with respect to Zimbabwe.

Abel Muzorewa, resigning prime minister, is playing by ear with a single objective which seems to be nothing more than to regain power, even if that has to be done with the massive financial support of South Africa. The Patriotic Front, which, by its fight, has acquired a certain moral and historical legitimacy, is divided and has not formulated any concrete proposal on the society and the state which it wishes to build. Independent Africa,

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and more particularly the OAU, excluded from negotiations in London, has always acted as if the problem of Zimbabwe was a classic case of decolonialization which was up to Great Britain to solve. The frontline, finally, is torn between its "moderates" and its "hardliners." So there is nothing surprising in the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have their own plans. For the moment, it is a discrete consensus: Washington, which fears an internationalization of the conflict if the war continues and believes to have found in Abel Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo two "moderate" cards, is playing for the fastest peace possible. Moscow, for its part, has neither the desire nor the means to support forever the war economy of its Mozambique, Angolan and perhaps, if the conflict continues, Zambian allies.

The probable independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia should not, therefore, be celebrated too triumphally by the Africans. They are much more the result of a desire for consensus among outside powers than of action by the governments of the OAU.

Will it be the same for the last stronghold of white domination on the continent, i.e. South Africa? Already, since the beginning of the year [1979], the South African authorities have, with remarkable intelligence, begun to cleanse apartheid of its least presentable features while favoring the creation of a black lower middle class capable of assuming certain jobs reserved heretofore to the whites. This internal "updating," which it would be dishonest to deny the reality of, runs a strong risk of ultimately making the fundamental racial inequality of the Pretoria regime acceptable in Western eyes. It is thus necessary for the Africans to dump some well established scenarios: the theoretical resorting to armed conflict or to the development of a suicidal guerrilla war are now not on the agenda, and the "liberation" of South Africa is still only a distant perspective. For "free" southern Africa, the most urgent task seems then to be concretely to detach itself economically from Pretoria. Given this, the month of December, 1979, will merit inclusion in the history books.

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RHODESIA

DETAILS ON NEGOTIATIONS GIVEN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Dec 79 pp 21-22

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Miracle at Lancaster House"]

[Text] In the triumphal decor of the Victorian rooms of Lancaster House, a historic residence in the middle of London where numerous decolonization agreements were signed in the sixties, Great Britain has succeeded in undoing the last link in its African empire: Zimbabwe. After more than 3 months of haggling, shouting and handshaking; 3 months after negotiations between the government of Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa and the exiled leaders of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, sheltered--iron fist in a velvet glove--by the British Foreign Office Secretary Lord Peter Carrington....

Nobody, on Monday, 10 September, opening date of the tripartite conference on the future of Zimbabwe, would have bet a penny on its chances for success. On the contrary, everybody remembered that on 5 December 1960, 19 years ago, also in Lancaster House and already with Joshua Nkomo present, the first constitutional conference on Rhodesia had collapsed in general indifference. Passing through the heavy wood door at 1000, the huge Joshua, 64 years of age, muttered to one of his aides, "I don't much like this place; it's haunted." However, the results which came out of the conference can henceforth be called historic.

On Wednesday morning, 12 December, a VC 10 of the Royal Air Force landed at Salisbury airport with Lord Christopher Soames aboard, the British governor assigned to organize the general elections and lead the nation to independence. A Rhodesian police orchestra was playing God Save the Queen on the runway, wet with the first downpours of the rainy season, and a black Daimler took Lord Soames to "Government House" to see, raised for the first time in 13 years, the Union Jack waving in the sky of Zimbabwe. Three months ago, who could have foreseen that?

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As frequently happens in this type of conference, everything started off badly. The four major participants, Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith, the rebel exprime minister on one side; Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo on the other, each surrounded for all their movements between their hotel and Lancaster House by some ten bodyguards, refused during the first week to say a word to each other and carefully avoided looking at one another. "We have come for talks with the British, not with the terrorists of the Front," declared Muzorewa upon his arrival at Heathrow airport. "In our eyes, only Lord Carrington is worth talking to. The bunch of bandits seated around Muzorewa do not interest us," replied Joshua Nkomo to him the next day. But very fortunately, these statements for external consumption did not prevent the British, Tanzanian, Zambian and Mozambican "mediators" from working in the wings for a softening of the positions of each. (See JEUNE AFRIQUE NO 985)

It was thus that each step of the "Carrington tactics," which consisted of getting a partial agreement with the Muzorewa delegation and then giving the Patriotic Front an ultimatum of 3 or 4 days to answer yes or no, was preceded by intense consultations with the "sponsors" of the front, notably the Tanzanians. And in fact this reduced the risk of it appearing to be the blunt act of the British Foreign Office secretary. The conference thus took on the character of a succession of crises quickly resolved after exhausting night sessions where strong tea flowed by the gallon in the cups of the participants.

On 24 September, after 20 hours of tension, the front accepted the draft constitution which stipulated that the white minority of Zimbabwe (4 percent of the population) would hold 20 percent of the seats in Parliament. On 18 October at 2300 hours, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe decided to agree to British proposals for indemnification to be paid in case of expropriation to the white colonists. Two hours later, everyone believed a breakdown was imminent. Finally, on Wednesday, 5 December, the front delegation accepted the decisions of Lord Carrington on the major aspects of a cease-fire in Zimbabwe, after the observers had once again been talking about the conference collapsing.

Drawn in filigree behind the success of the talks and the incontestable diplomatic talents of Lord Carrington are the interventions at each critical moment of the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, outside Lancaster House much note was taken of the discrete actions of Nikolai Lunkov, ambassador of the Soviet Union in London, with whom Lord Carrington had two crucial meetings which each time were followed by a softening of positions of the Patriotic Front and its Mozambican and Angolan allies.

Likewise, it was after a secret meeting held Tuesday, 16 October, with Kingman Brewster, representative of the United States and its African affairs advisor, that the head of British diplomacy was able to present on the following day to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe "acceptable" proposals on

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the problem of lands. It was likewise the Americans who seem to have required that Ian Smith be ranked only in the eleventh spot in the delegation of Bishop Muzorewa. The white exprime minister was moreover treated like the plague by his South African friends, who accused him, due to his intransigence, of "playing the Marxists' game." Muzorewa himself referred to him as a "museum piece."

The military offensives conducted in the field by the men of Abel Muzorewa and Lt Gen Peter Walls, commander in chief of the Rhodesian army, during the entire conference likewise played an important role. For the biracial government in Salisbury, the primary thing was to force the Patriotic Front to break off the negotiations. In fact, the commando raids produced exactly the opposite effect.

Eight aerial and airborne attacks and three spectacular sabotage actions took place in Zambia and Mozambique between 15 September and 20 November. Held by the throat and with little assurance of much Soviet support, the Zambian president, Kaunda, and Mozambican president, Samora Machel, multiplied the pressure on the two leaders of the Front to get them to come to terms. The great skill of Lord Carrington must lie in his knowing how to play all the cards, contradictory ones, which he held in his hand. Don't they say in London, among the "higher society" that Lord Carrington is a great fan of bridge?

Next week, JEUNE AFRIQUE will publish a complete file on Zimbabwe: the present situation on the country, the balance sheet of 7 years of war and the new perspectives which appear to be open to it.

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RWANDA

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT KIGALI-KONOMBE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347

[Text] The Government of Rwanda proposes to undertake the setting up of equipment of the international airport at Kigali-Kanombe, and to do so with the assistance of the Central Economic Cooperation Fund. In this connection, the government is desirous of contacting enterprise interested in the execution of the program, the total cost of which will be approximately 1 billion Rwandan francs, and which will include the following:

--Earthwork: 100,000 cubic meters; strengthening of the airport aprons and their coating: 60,000 tons; paving of highways: 35,000 square meters; sanitation (drainage?) works;

--Construction of housing for a power station, with an area of 400 sq.m.; construction of a shed to store equipment, with an area of 400 sq.m.; relocation of an aeroplane hangar with an area of 1,000 sq.m.

This inquiry is addressed solely to French or Rwandan enterprise, or those in the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL). The allocation of the contracts will be made on the basis of a call for tenders by the prequalified enterprise. All those interested should submit an application, with qualifications, to the Minister of Post & Communications, BP 720, Kigali, Rwanda, with a copy for Sofreavia, 75, Rue de la Boetie, 75008, Paris, France.

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RWANDA

BRIEFS

FRENCH AIR TRANSPORT AID--The fact that Rwanda is landlocked makes it essential to insure adequate equipping of the international airport at Kigali, in order to facilitate landing of large-scale freight planes. The French aid and cooperation resources and the Central Economic Co-operation Fund will assist in financing the infrastructure, a project to be executed in accordance with the program studied by Sofreavia, and budgeted for 60 million French francs. The Central Fund on 16 October, agreed, on its part, to lend 50 million French francs for the purpose. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2905] 7129

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SENEGAL

PDS SECRETARY DISCUSSES ECONOMIC SITUATION, OPPOSITION'S PROSPECTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10-23 Dec 79 pp 33-35; 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 25-26

[Interview of Abdoulaye Wade, secretary general of the Senegalese Democratic Party, conducted by Simon Malley and Ginette Crochet. "No Senegalese Will Ever Go To Battle For King Hassan II Against the Sahraoui People. . . ."]

[Text] We are against using Senegal as a base for anti-Angola aggression forces. In general, the Senegalese people support the struggle of the Palestinian, Sahraoui, and Southern African peoples for their independence. We do not appreciate the method of taking Dacko to Bangui under military protection for the sake of imposing him on the Central Africans. The 1 November Algerian military parade was of a peaceful nature while proving that Algeria can defend itself.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Mr Wade, on 1 November you attended in Algiers the ceremonies in honor of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution. Unquestionably, you must have had interesting talks with political personalities of several parties and diplomatic representatives. . . .

Abdoulaye Wade: I had contacts with the Algerian FLN [National Liberation Front] in its role as a party and, more especially, with the people in charge of the party's foreign relations, even though I did not conduct talks with the Algerian government proper. Conversely, I used the occasion to talk with party leaders from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, as well as with representatives of liberation movements in Southern Africa with whom I exchanged a number of viewpoints. Even though the problems of Senegal did not dominate such talks, for it was a celebration of the Algerian revolution, we were able to assess the distance covered by Algeria since 1954 thanks, on the one hand, to the efforts made in the building of socialism and, on the other, the struggle waged by Algeria, leaving Third World countries in the defense of their interests.

What impressed me greatly in the course of the 1 November ceremonies in Algiers was the serious, peaceful, and constructive nature of this

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demonstration. Unquestionably, we saw a parade of sophisticated modern weapons, proving that Algeria can defend itself. However, I particularly appreciated the features of this demonstration which showed the progress achieved in the field of economic development, the struggle against the desert, and the efforts to strengthen education, and everything else which was accomplished for the benefit of the Algerian masses. I also greatly appreciated President Chadli's speech, his moderation, his firmness and, above all, his orientation toward the future. Naturally, my associate in charge of foreign relations, Alioune Badara Niang and myself had talks with political personalities of the Third World and the developed countries such as, for example, officials from the Spanish Socialist Party or the French trade unions. However, we spent more time in talking with delegates from the African parties with whom we exchanged information as to our respective orientations and the means we are using. All in all, this stay in Algiers was quite beneficial to the PDS.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Unquestionably, the question of the Polisario was raised in the course of such conversations. You also talked with Polisario Front comrades. What are your impressions on the future of the struggle waged by the Sahraoui people?

Abdoulaye Wade: As to the FLN and the PDS, a real convergence has been achieved on this matter. I would like to point out that the Senegalese Democratic Party is second to the FLN as an African political party to have given its official support to Polisario. We know that in the course of his trip around Africa, at the time of the founding of the Polisario Front, its former secretary general Sayed el Ouali, had visited Senegal first, where we welcomed him as proved by the joint communique published in LE DEMOCRATE (journal of the PDS) in 1975.

Therefore, we have quite freely always supported the Polisario Front on the basis of one of the principles of the basic constituent charter of our party. Therefore, the question discussed with the FLN dealt mainly on the dangers threatening this subarea. Bearing in mind the fact that Senegal's prime minister went to Morocco to offer Senegal's support to King Hassan II, I insisted on changing targets. Specifically, I pointed out, once again, the stand of the PDS, already stated in Senegal, according to which in no case would Hassan II rely on the support of the Senegalese people in the unfair war he is waging against the Sahraouis. Consequently, I specified that the PDS totally disapproves of this step taken by the prime minister in Dakar and that no Senegalese soldier would ever go into battle and die for Hassan II.

The king of Morocco should abandon his illusions on this subject, whatever promises may have been made to him. Such being the case, we held discussions with Sahraouis officials, specifically with Mohamed Lamine, prime minister of the SDAR. I used the occasion to reassert our position and ask about the development of the situation. We noted with satisfaction

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the success achieved by Polisario and the SDAR in both military and diplomatic areas, specifically in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the nonaligned countries.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Speaking of national liberation movements, it is also known that the PDS has always favored the struggle waged by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in Angola. If I am not mistaken, you were among the first to recognize the people's republic proclaimed by the now mourned President Neto. Yet, as you undoubtedly know, the leader of the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] shadow movement has left Zaire for Dakar where he would like to settle. On the other hand, you are equally aware of the relation existing between Savimbi, the leader of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] shadow movement and Dakar. How do you explain such relations with movements which are in effect fighting against the independence and sovereignty of their government with Pretoria's blessings?

Abdoulaye Wade: In this case the answer could be very simple. As you pointed out quite accurately, we have always supported the MPLA, and it is proper to emphasize that our support given to this movement far precedes Angola's independence. Even when Portugal was still very powerful in the area, we, in Dakar, were the correspondents of the MPLA and the Frelimo, whereas, as one may remember, the Senegalese government was not welcoming Angolan nationalists. This is a question of implementing one of our steady principles. The Senegalese Democratic Party, as such, has always fought, since its founding, on the side of the MPLA. On the Senegalese level our action has always tried to make Savimbi and his gang lose the use of our country as his base.

Recently, in the Dakar National Assembly, we objected to the decision of the Senegalese government to issue diplomatic passports to Savimbi and his accomplices and to appoint Kakumba (its representative in Paris) Senegal's honorary council in Liechtenstein for the only purpose of allowing him to reside in France. We opposed this and we have not given up the fight. We have equally opposed Savimbi's stay in Senegal and we would do so a fortiori in the case of Holden, should the latter work to stay in our country. After all, what a paradox! Whatever the feelings of President Senghor may be concerning the Angolan regime (for, unless I am mistaken, at least officially, Mr Senghor has raised the question of the Cuban presence in Africa and of what is described as the "Soviet penetration" in the continent, as a reason for withholding recognition from the Angolan government), this support given to governments which are openly supported by South Africa seems incomprehensible. That is why, as far as we are concerned, we shall continue our struggle on the side of the MPLA and oppose allowing Senegal to be used as a base for such aggressive forces. In fact, this would constitute Senegal's interference in Angolan domestic affairs. For example, imagine that a movement for

1. Something he was first refused by the Senegalese government.

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the liberation of Senegal would be set up in Luanda! Would Mr Senghor not be the first to consider this an abnormal situation? One can hardly see how a member of the Organization of African Unity could shelter a movement which is conducting an armed insurrection against its own government, also a member of the Organization of the African Unity!

AFRIQUE-ASIE: The third problem which, obviously, is of great importance to the peoples of the Third World is that of Palestine and the PLO. Here again, your party has taken avant-garde positions opposing the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and against the Camp David agreements. . . . Could you give us an idea of the feelings of the Senegalese people and, naturally, of your party, on the question of the cause of the Palestinian people?

Abdoulaye Wade: Our party, as we know, supports as a matter of principle all liberation movements, unconditionally. In other words, we let such movements define their own positions, for they are more familiar with the problems concerning them, while we give them dynamic support. That is what we have done with the PLO. Furthermore, it is worth noting that we have always attended all conferences and meetings of support of the PLO. As far as the Senegalese are concerned, let me recall the fact that the break of diplomatic relations between Dakar and Tel Aviv was largely caused by the reaction of the Senegalese people. It is well known that this popular pressure was manifested in the mosques where, in the course of their prayers, the people cursed Israel and asked the government to break relations with that state. This means that the Senegalese people are far from being indifferent to such problems. The average Senegalese considers it scandalous for a people to be expelled from their fatherland. That is why we can state that the majority of the Senegalese people support the PLO and the Palestinian people in their just struggle.

Let me add, incidentally, that Mr Senghor's government itself agreed quite early to the opening of a PLO bureau in Senegal. This clearly proves that Senegalese public opinion is largely favorable to the Palestinians.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Still within the framework of foreign politics, I would like to remind you of a statement you made to LE DEMOCRATE, your party's journal, on the French intervention in Bangui. In this declaration which was found somewhat surprising, not to say disturbing, by some people, specifically among progressive African circles, you considered that the French intervention which overthrew Bokassa was, if not legitimate, at least justified because of his crimes and his bloodthirsty and corrupt system. Is this assessment not conflicting with your basic positions and those of the PDS? Namely, that it is unacceptable for France to resort to colonial methods and that Africa should be the mistress of her decisions. Yet, everyone knows that Dacko arrived in Bangui supported by French bayonets after French paratroops had virtually occupied the capital and set up their system of fake "protection" of the people. . . .

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Abdoulaye Wade: There is no contradiction. I believe that the people show too big a tendency to forget that Bokassa was put in power by the French. Naturally, Bokassa made a coup de 'etat. However, in the view of the PDS it is obvious that without the complicity of the French authorities he would not have been able to remain at the head of the Central African state. Under such conditions I do not see the reasons for which those same Frenchmen could not intervene to overthrow him. I believe that the problem should be considered from this viewpoint. In my view, one must be a realist: Principles are one thing, but each specific case should be examined. Dictatorships are durable and I believe that without foreign intervention Bokassa could have not only remained emperor for life but also, perhaps, placed his offspring on the throne and thus created a real dynasty. Once dictatorships become rooted, the native population finds it tremendously difficult to get rid of them. This is the reason for which we considered that the fact of helping Bokassa's departure was a positive element.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Nevertheless, we find this strange. By what right does a foreign power which, furthermore, has a colonial past and a neocolonial present, intervene under the pretext of having been asked to do so by some individuals, individuals who, themselves, bear their share of responsibility in the massacre of the people? Do you not see the danger of such a precedent?

Abdoulaye Wade: Then let someone tell us what other means could the Central Africans use to get rid of Bokassa? However, our judgment does not stop there. The moment Bokassa was overthrown, and since France having been more or less directly responsible for the conversion of the Central African republic into an empire merely by providing Bokassa with the means to pursue his policies, Paris should not have intervened on the level of individuals in order to impose anything whatsoever. France should have insisted that the essence of the republic be maintained and that the different political groups engage in a dialogue with a view to establishing a democratic system based on free elections. One may think that this is an abstract and politically impossible matter. Yet, such is our party's stand.

Nevertheless, we do not appreciate the method used to bring Dacko in, giving him military protection, and imposing him on the Central Africans.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Nevertheless, the very principle of the intervention of armed forces which have occupied our continent for quite some time, and their return through methods which, alas, remind us all too strongly of the colonial period, is triggering, even if it were a question of overthrowing Bokassa, a strong hostility and a malaise in African public opinion, particularly because of the thus established precedent. France had many other means for overthrowing Bokassa, the more so since the latter subsisted only thanks to French subsidies and armaments and,

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finally, thanks to the protection offered by Paris. Therefore, there was no need whatever to send an army which today appears like an army of occupation in charge of protecting Dacko against, unquestionably, a popular opinion which does not want him.

Abdoulaye Wade: Obviously, we agree on the fact that France got rid of Bokassa. Now, however, the question is that of the means. I believe that this is a value judgment. Bokassa's reactions had to be taken into consideration. He could have made new alliances which, in fact, he tried to promote.

I believe that it was the question of speed which led the French to use military means. I would like to remind you, however, that the Cuban intervention in Angola was of a military nature and that we approved of it. . . .

AFRIQUE-ASIE: There will never be a comparison between interventionist France and internationalist Cuba. Furthermore, Cuba sent its volunteers on the request of a sovereign and legal government, to oppose the invasion of South African racist forces and of Zaire mercenaries. . . .

Abdoulaye Wade: Naturally, we approved of this, for we considered that to the extent to which Angola and its people were the victims of aggression on the one hand, by South Africa and, on the other, by interventionist forces through Zaire, it was entirely normal for the legal government in Luanda to ask its foreign friends to help.

However, in the Central African case, who could have asked for a military intervention? As to democratic principles, the Bokassa regime, which had come to power through a coup d'etat being illegal, in my view, the other Central Africans had perfectly the right, in turn, to request foreign military assistance. . . . Actually, I publically approved of the Tanzanian military intervention in Uganda to overthrow Amin Dada, and of Vietnam to overthrow Pol Pot. . . .

Naturally, there are differences. The Cubans have no wish to colonize Africa, any more than Nyerere has the intention of colonizing Uganda. It is only a question of knowing, in the Central African case, the means which they had to get rid of Bokassa at that time. Therefore, in my view, there was no contradiction in the PDS positions.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Currently Africa is undergoing a crisis. Some consider it a growth crisis. We believe that it is rather a question of an essentially political crisis or, more accurately, of a manifestation of the struggle waged on the international level against powers which try to dominate the continent and recolonize it. What is your assessment of this period?¹

1. See AFRIQUE-ASIE No 202.

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Abdoulaye Wade: I share your views. Our position is African. Unquestionably, we should use our foreign relations and foreign alliances. However, they should be such as to help us protect our identity and help Africa to ensure its political independence. Such is our objective.

Within this framework, some of my friends and I thought of promoting the idea of an African alternative to development, in order to break the vicious circle which consists of wondering whether we should ally ourselves with the East or the West. We believe that an African position should exist between these two attitudes, a position which, so far, has never been defined and which we would like to define in order to help the Africans find themselves after crossing a certain number of gaps inherited from the colonial system or more or less imported from the outside. Naturally, we do not want to involve the states. It would be a question of meetings among African personalities, political parties, etc. This is a way of expressing nonalignment in development terms. Such is our target. The idea is in the air. We have prepared a draft letter and are calling for a meeting by the African political groups and personalities which have always proven their unconditional loyalty to the continent.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Let us discuss briefly Senegal. How do you characterize its present situation?

Abdoulaye Wade: My answer will be extremely clear: It is catastrophic. First, the economic and financial situation is bad. It is believed that, normally, the indebtedness of a country should not exceed 10 to 15 percent, whereas, currently, Senegal's indebtedness is 27.5 percent. Starting with 1980 we shall have to meet annual payments of 24-25 billion CFA francs. Whatever the government may be saying, we are no longer able to pay. Our balance of payments is chronically negative and we do not see what economic mechanism would enable us to repair the situation.

Our position in terms of the Central Bank of West African States is disastrous. The Central Bank may advance funds to a state within a ratio of 15 to 17 percent of its revenue. Yet, we have exhausted all our facilities in this area and this very day drawings by Senegalese financial institutions can no longer be honored.

From the economic viewpoint the situation is worsening. As a result of poorly spaced rains, we should not expect the type of harvest which could promote an economic upswing. There is one financial scandal after another. Companies in which the state owns stock are failing one after another. A number of misuses and misappropriations, with complicity on the highest levels, are being discovered.

All this creates a particularly grave situation.

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AFRIQUE-ASIE: What are your solutions and how do you hope to have them implemented, by parliament for example, where the PDS has only 18 deputies?

Abdoulaye Wade: The "drama" of Senegal is that it is seeking solutions without undertaking the required structural reforms. The problems I mentioned are merely the symptoms of a deeper ill which could be healed through structural reforms alone. Yet, the Senegalese Socialist Party is unable to do so. Obviously, the party in power is trying to make changes, borrowing from the PDS program. However, we believe, first of all, that even from the point of view of political ethics, a party which has failed should yield its seat. The only solution today is for the Socialist Party to abdicate the power. I believe that this idea is advancing. As far as we are concerned, we believe that the PDS is a replacement properly conscientious and organized, and supplied with a realistic program.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: Yet, how to achieve such changes? Would it be through elections and, in such a case, do you believe that the party of Leopold S. Senghor, which enjoys a parliamentary majority, could yield? Secondly, do you consider possible the formation of a government of national union in which your party and, perhaps, other political groups would be represented? Finally, the question which is asked by sympathizers of the PDS and of the other parties is to know why you are not trying to organize a front of opposition political parties, specifically in order to strengthen the opposition.

Abdoulaye Wade: The next elections are scheduled for 1983. However, I do not believe that Senegal could wait until then to implement a new policy. The economic circumstances which lead to an ever worsening social situation could result in disturbances which could break out anytime unless the government is contemplating the holding of elections, which is not a hypothesis to be dismissed.

AFRIQUE-ASIE: You believe, therefore, that the Assembly should accept the anticipated elections?

Abdoulaye Wade: It is a possibility, for the Assembly no longer precisely reflects Senegal's political panorama.

As to the creation of a government of national union, that is yet another possibility! However, in any case, a national union government led by the Socialist Party would be absolutely unacceptable, for it would mean an attempt to implement with new faces a program which proved incapable of changing the situation. Therefore, the possibility of a national union government can be entertained only if the government is headed by the PDS. Our party has an extremely broad concept concerning this viewpoint. Furthermore, everyone well knows that were we to be asked to head such a government, we would do so in association with honest, credible, and

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competent elements, whether members of the Socialist Party, the RND [National Democratic Rally] or other political groups.

We have always said that after sincere and democratic elections which would the level of representation of each political group, the various parties should set up what we call a national front, based on a minimum program. It is not a question of a front consisting of two or three parties or of a common program, but of a truly national front. At such a point a government could be formed under the guidance of the party which has won the election, so that this minimum program could be applied with the participation of members of all political groups which took part in the elections. Outside this minimum program each party would be free to defend its own specific program and to promote it with an eye to new elections. Let us further specify that, in any case, the PDS would reject such a government headed by the Senegalese Socialist Party.

Some African countries have chosen the one-party system. In Senegal we have four. We believe that all we would need would be two large parties plus a Marxist-Leninist party. Some may say that we are presenting the Marxists with a rather large gift. The point is that the Marxists have such a particular design for a society that they should be given the opportunity to defend their ideas. Conversely, we believe that all other Senegalese should either be members of a group holding the power or of an opposition group. Senghor, who recognized a conservative party, went further. Experience justified us, however, since, subsequently, we saw a number of other applications for the founding of parties. It is a question of making a courageous choice, and being firm about it, whatever imperfections might exist and go forward. The Marxists aside, there are no basic ideological differences between the other opposition elements and the PDS. To blame us for having established a party before them is human. However, the problem of the Senegalese opposition is one of personalities and goes no further. Therefore, we should be able to find the means to settle this matter. We are sufficiently democratic to be able to tell the other opposition elements, as we have always done, the following: "You have no political groups while our party is here. It is ready to open its doors to you." Anyone could apply for any position, including the one I hold presently, but democratically.

To sum it up, I believe that there are two problems which arise. The first is that of a certain unification among opposition forces. Therefore, we have repeatedly issued appeals and are currently discussing with the Marxists a means for engaging in joint action, either within the framework of the PDS or otherwise. Before the founding of the PDS I had contacted all political personalities and had asked them to set up, with me, a party which I had no intention whatever of leading. However, these people did not believe in the possibility of setting up a political opposition group. They believed, at that time, that such an initiative would have only enhanced the Leopold S. Senghor government. In my view, this was a wrong estimate. I had answered them as follows: "I would not

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fail to open my umbrella, if I needed it, even though someone else might seek shelter under it."

The second problem is external. I believe that the realities of Senegal are understood very poorly abroad. The reason for which we are so popular among the peasant masses is because we are fighting for the elimination of the ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development], and because we are supporting the farmers' claims.

As to the question of recognizing the parties, an eventual amendment to the constitution, etc., this should be a problem to be resolved among the Senegalese. It is not up to the people abroad to express their views on such subjects.

Therefore, we find it incredible to hear some people abroad speaking of an "institutional crisis" in Senegal!

AFRIQUE-ASIE: We are witnessing today in Iran an extraordinary growth of the power of Islam. Have these events had repercussions on public opinion in Senegal, an Islamic country?

Abdoulaye Wade: Naturally, the situation in Iran has led to happenings throughout the world and, a fortiori in Senegal. However, such happenings have remained limited. I recently received statements of affiliation with the PDS of Senegalese priests who made public statements. They requested of me the application of the principles of the Koran, should the PDS one day come into power.

It is obvious that this is more or less inspired by the events in Iran. However, personally, I am not worried on this subject, for I am a practicing Moslem myself, as are many PDS members.

As to the principles of the Koran, the population has never observed them, ever before colonization, because of the power of African customs. Therefore, it is hardly likely that a Senegalese system would ever adopt the ayatollah system. . . .

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SENEGAL

RICE SUPPLY, DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3329

[Article: "The Rice Supply Problem"]

[Text] Rice, a high-consumption commodity, was in short supply on the Senegalese market in mid-November. In Cape Verde the shortage of this product threatened to turn into dearth, and rice was selling at 100 CFA francs, instead of the official price of 80 CFA francs.

The Senegalese consume approximately 18,000 to 20,000 tons of rice a month. ONCAD (National Office of Marketing and Assistance for Development), which is marketing this product, has a rice stock capable of satisfying national requirements for several months. On 19 November, however, ONCAD decided to suspend the distribution of rice.

The origin of this situation is the fact that the minister of finance and economic affairs asked the office to sell during the month of November the stock of "old rice" which it has been holding for several years. A committee of experts has found the rice to be fit for consumption.

After this decision only 124 quota-holders agreed to take their shares, or 4,000 tons of "Siam" rice and 827 tons of Argentinian out of a total quantity of 12,896 tons for both rices. Seven thousand nine hundred sixty-nine tons still remained for 57 other quota-holders who delayed coming forward.

It seems that certain quota-holders had sought to put pressure on ONCAD for this stock of old rice to be sold off cheaply, indeed, given up to certain persons, as used to happen in the past, affording certain persons an opportunity to speculate and make considerable profits.

The director of internal trade indicated that the refusal to collect the quotas will be penalized by the reduction of certain enterprises' quotas. The quarterly revisions of the quotas are based on the effective collection of the preceding quarters.

An agreement was finally reached, however. At the close of a meeting with the minister of finance and economic affairs on 21 November, the Office of

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Economic Pools of Senegal required traders to collect their quotas before 28 November. Under this agreement, the traders thus agreed to yield to ONCAD's requirements, that is to say, to take one-third of their quota in Argentinian rice, the other two-thirds being composed of "Siam" rice. As L.E. SOLEIL of 23 November wrote, the contest of strength between certain quota-holding traders and ONCAD has thus been resolved, a fact which makes it possible to avoid selling off cheaply 4,000 tons of entirely edible rice.

Reform of ONCAD nonetheless stands a good chance of being realized. In particular, the marketing of rice would be entrusted to the Price Equalization and Reduction Bank.

The Senegalese press wish that the minister of finance and economic affairs would seize this opportunity to eliminate from the market distributors who give little thought to regularizing distribution or who are incapable of adequate stocking for want of financial means.

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SENEGAL

DATA ON NEW LANDS COMPANY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3329

[Article: "New Lands: Four Projects Spread Out Over 7 Years"]

[Text] On the occasion of the meeting on 6 November last of the Regional Committee of the Development of East Senegal, Moctar Tall, the director general of the New Lands Company (STN), declared that 20 years from now the population directed by this company in East Senegal could reach 100,000 persons, members of 10,000 families (versus 7,000 persons and 900 families at present) cultivating a total area of 70,000 hectares. This is the objective assigned to 4 projects for extending the perimeters of the STN, which will cost 11.5 billion CFA francs in total. In return, the value of the added production would be on the order of 2.5 billion per year. Diversified agriculture and integrated livestock-raising are provided for.

The first project is located in the Sandougou Valley (the province of Tamba) and involves the improvement of a zone presently occupied by classified forest and having a very high percentage of high quality lands in terms of agriculture.

In the second project, located in the district of Bala, the improvement of virgin lands at the Nieriko-Mayel Samou perimeter is contemplated.

The third concerns the classified forest of Maleme-Niani Sud (the district of Koumpentoum), while the fourth project involves the improvement of a potentially irrigable zone by bringing in new population.

The realization of these different projects should theoretically be staggered over 7 years, from the 6th to the 10th Plan.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

PROJECT REPLACING BUD-SENEGAL--The liquidation of Bud-Senegal has left a void in Senegalese market gardening that will be difficult to fill, given the ambitions which accompanied this exceptional agro-industrial project at its start. In order to fill this gap a more modest project has been begun. It involves a popularization project employing some 200 persons, plus a framework which would insure crop rotation and cultivation and marketing techniques. This would be a temporary solution, since the liquidation of Bud-Senegal has put some 3,000 persons out of work. At the production level, the former Bud workers would prefer to grow tomatoes, for example, instead of melons, whose yield is too uncertain. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330] 9380

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SIERRA-LEONE

BRIEFS

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT--In its last annual report for the 12-month period ending on 30 April, Amnesty International expressed its satisfaction with the reconciliation policy conducted by president Siaka Stevens and his government in dealing with the old opposition members of the SLPP (Sierra-Leone People's Party). It noted that, since the implementation of this policy--which, we recall, made it possible to include certain former opposition members in the ministerial team constituted on 15 August 1978 (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS], 25 August 1978, p 2255)--there were no more scenes of political violence similar to those early in 1977. In February of that year, it was necessary to declare a state of emergency; it was again ordered in February of the next year and even last February. In May 1978, there were 150 political prisoners but almost all were released one month later following the approval of the new constitution, by the population, establishing the single party (MTM, 23 June 1978, p 1751). In March of that year, Amnesty International--in spite of the continuation of the state of emergency--was informed by the government that no prisoners were being held in the Freetown prisons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 December 1979 p 3625] 5058

FRG FORESTRY EXPERTS--At the end of 1978 six experts from the Atlanta Consult Company, in Hamburg, had gone to Sierra Leone to consider the problems related to the reforestation of the country. Its mission, financed by the European Economic Community, was to be the basis for a national development program of forestry resources. The Atlanta Consult team noted that the local forestry administration could not, as it was said, with its lack of skilled personnel and of organization, undertake a proper development project. It also noted that the somewhat obsolete legislation in this area would be another handicap. Therefore, they suggested the modification of both the administration and the legislation. Studies concerning such modifications would be conducted until next spring and make it possible at that time to consider the implementation of a program within satisfactory conditions. The studies cover, on the one hand, the reorganization of the administration, strictly speaking, and, on the other, all regulations, ranging from the right to the utilization of the land and measures for forestry protection to the standardization of concessions, fiscal measures, and measures related to the conversion and treatment of the timber. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3680] 5157

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRICES INCREASED--The Tanzanian government increased prices on petroleum products and lubricants between 41 and 56 percent, the Tanzanian ministry of water, energy, and mineral resources announced on 15 December. This decision is in keeping with the demands of the local oil companies whose prices had not been raised since 1976. The rise in petroleum prices will also affect Zambia which gets its petroleum from Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3632] 5058

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

ZAIRE DELIVERS HYDROCARBONS--Zaire has just supplied 90 tons of gasoline and gas-oil to the Central African authorities, the Kinshasa authorities announced on 26 November. This motor-fuel, the delivery of which follows a request by President Dacko, was sent on 25 and 26 November via C-130 Hercules airplanes of the Zairian Air Force. It has also been indicated that 30 Central African students registered at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Zaire (UNAZA) at President Dacko's request are expected very shortly in Kinshasa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380

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