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JPRS L/8916

11 February 1980

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 1/80)



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CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROLE OF SUBMARINE IN CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [CONMILIT] in Chinese, 1 Jan 80 pp 17-22

[Article by Ch'en Kuan [7115 0385]]

[Text] By paying a high price and at considerable sacrifice, the Chinese are building their country into one of the world's top military powers. China's military expansion is considered a necessary step in realizing the country's objectives.

China's national objectives must be supported by a strong military force, to do the following:

--guarantee territorial integrity and security;

--assure that China will be a developmental model for the nations of Asia and for other developing countries and will be accepted as the leader of the Third World.

To mention security of Chinese territory does not necessarily imply that the United States and Soviet Union harbor imperialist ambitions; it simply means that the Chinese believe this threat exists. The deployment and defensive nature of China's armed forces, China's untiring development of nuclear weapons, and the Chinese Government's public statements still make it clear that China is still concerned for its territorial security.

In order to achieve these objectives, Beijing has begun to seek a "nuclear safeguard," and the most practical method is to develop its own retaliatory force to avoid being destroyed in a preemptive nuclear attack by its enemies, and in addition to deal its enemies a heavy political blow and put them in a hopeless position. Such a strike could be delivered by a small, apparently inferior unit, and accordingly it can well be imagined that Beijing believes that even if China's nuclear retaliatory force is very small, it still can deter the "paper tigers."

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But this does not mean that if China has a deterrent force which can just barely protect it, it has no intention of developing a strong strategic offensive capability. The retaliatory capability is necessary to guarantee its superpower status and to protect its territory, but in the "limited dispute" and the national liberation struggle, only the deterrent effect of Chinese strategic offensive systems can eliminate the nuclear threat from the other superpowers. Accordingly such a strategic offensive capability is necessary for the Chinese to influence the underdeveloped nations and use them to open a new front.

Serving National Objectives

The Chinese stress that because in the last 150 years the invasions and humiliations suffered by China have almost all come from the sea, building a strong navy is a sacred historical task of the Chinese people. Currently Soviet warships arrogantly sail along the Chinese coast, and the stationing of a Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has increased the threat to China. Japan has the potential to become a naval power again. In the period encompassing the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Vietnam War, the United States Navy roamed China's coasts unchecked and with impunity. All of this has unceasingly warned China that the coast requires a strong modern navy to protect it. China's current naval strategy is still built around coastal defense, as it has been since the late fifties when the Soviet Navy departed. However, as the Chinese Navy has continually increased in size, improved technically and acquired greater experience, its options have expanded. Beijing will discover that a different strategy is more suited to its aims.

Most deserving of attention is the fact that in China's naval expansion it has no need to follow in the footsteps of other naval powers. Beijing has already expressed the view that taking others' outmoded paths of technological development is "crawlsism." Accordingly, China must break with tradition and do everything possible to absorb other countries' advanced experience.

Submarines and Naval Strategy

China's submarine force has already expanded from its initial eight obsolescent Soviet boats to a current 70-plus, with the added submarines being primarily ones developed by China using indigenous resources and methods. The submarine force is still defensive and is still a system of weapons to be used by a weaker nation in dealing with much stronger naval powers. Beijing's stress on submarine production does not mean that China is content with its interior naval position. The successful deployment of a nuclear-powered submarine has already shattered the traditional concept of submarine use, because a nuclear-powered submarine is not only an effective offensive weapon, but is also the main force of the superpowers' navies. Chinese deployment of nuclear-powered submarines may well mark a milestone in Chinese naval strategy's transition from defense to offense.

Conceptually, the historical foundation of the theory of developing a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) combined the following elements: defense in

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depth; interdiction of sea lanes; protection of ocean commerce; countering the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) threat of potential enemies; and establishing prestige. Let us discuss these elements one by one with reference to Beijing's naval strategy and political objectives.

Defense in depth. China's zone of submarine activity is almost entirely within 90 miles of its coastline. But this ocean area has a maximum depth of about 150 meters, and generally is much shallower. The shallow water increases the danger of high-speed underwater navigation, because of the possibility of hitting bottom. On the other hand it imposes limitations on the great capabilities of modern nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, in doing battle near the coast the continuous sailing capabilities and range of nuclear submarines are unnecessary. Accordingly, the cost effectiveness of such a plan becomes a grave problem.

The capabilities of such Chinese-produced diesel-powered submarines as the Romeo class are great. The Romeo has a submerged cruising range (submerged or with snorkel) of easily 3,000 miles, and can stay at sea for 30 days. On conventional patrol (at much less than its maximum capability) it can reach a sea area 1,040 miles from base and "roam" for 520 nautical miles in its patrol zone. If it takes 6 days to reach its patrol area (12 days round trip), then each patrol can last 18 days. Range arcs centered on the Shanghai and Yu-lin-kang bases encompass the entire Yellow Sea and South China Sea as well as most of the Japan Sea and Philippine Sea, and extend into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. If China chooses an island in the South China Sea as a submarine base, these patrol zones will be further expanded. But the expanded submarine patrol area that would result would be of offensive significance.

The use of nuclear-powered attack submarines for defense in depth may have been temporarily shelved by Beijing until it needs to expand its submarine combat area outside the area accessible to conventionally-powered submarines.

Interdiction of sea lanes. Interdiction of sea lanes is an offensive tactic, and other than the sea lanes within China's defensive area, sea lanes are probably not currently an object of concern to the Chinese Navy. All sea lanes within its defensive radius could be controlled by Romeo class submarines. If China's nuclear-powered attack submarines appeared in relatively large numbers in the vicinity of the United States Seventh Fleet, they would be viewed by the Americans as a threat, and America would have to maintain or reinforce its current strength in the Western Pacific. Such a strengthening of American power in the Western Pacific is not desired by Beijing.

Guaranteeing ocean commerce. China's merchant marine is expanding steadily, and the area which it plies is increasing, while the facilities themselves are being modernized in accordance with Beijing's desire to extend Chinese influence and prestige throughout the world. This type of expansion requires a certain guarantee of the security and free access to international sea lanes, and the current Chinese Navy is not strong enough to provide such guarantees. Guaranteeing the security of international sea lanes requires strong long-range surface ships, an air force which at least will not hand

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over air superiority to the enemy, and a long-range submarine force. It appears that China still has not given serious consideration to this objective and developed the necessary surface and air forces. Moreover, China could not simply build nuclear-powered attack submarines for this purpose without having surface and air forces. Currently China seems content with the equilibrium between the naval superpowers and the maintenance of international sea lanes for the use of all.

Countering the SSBN's of potential enemy. For China, creating and maintaining a nuclear-powered attack submarine force, staffing it with high-quality personnel and enabling it to counter the threat of Soviet and United States nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines is currently not very feasible. Beijing's only countermeasure against this type of threat (real or imagined) is deterrence. Beijing knows that even the United States and the USSR cannot deploy nuclear-powered attack sub forces sufficient to overcome each other's nuclear missile submarine forces, so that it is extremely realistic for China not to make the attempt.

Establishing prestige. Judging by the lack of strategic or tactical motivations for a Chinese plan to develop a nuclear-powered attack submarine, we can only believe that its purpose is to establish prestige. Thus we may consider that the "prestige" embodied in a nuclear-powered attack sub results mainly from its nuclear propulsion system. Since this prestige would also accrue any nuclear-powered submarine, in the case of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine the prestige would be even greater.

Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines

One of Beijing's problems is that the level of economic resources and national economic output that must be allocated to military items entails a sacrifice of agricultural production, light industrial goods and consumer goods. The fastest and cheapest route to implementation of China's national goals with a stress on the military is to use a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force. Because it both has strategic deterrent value and can function as an offensive weapon system, such a force could give the greatest return on investment and capital, would provide powerful support in case of nuclear blackmail, and would raise China's international prestige and standing above the actual strategic value of this type of system.

Starting out from China's naval bases and carrying a 2,000 nautical mile missile system, a submarine would have a rather wide range of targets at which it could strike. Of particularly great significance are the following factors: a boat in the Indian Ocean could include the European USSR among its targets; and a boat setting out from the Chinese mainland could very easily reach an operating area from which it could include Hawaii and the U.S. mainland within its 2,000 NM range. In view of China's economic and military (particularly naval) aid to Tanzania, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, Chinese SSBN's could possibly use these friendly nations' port facilities in the Indian Ocean, so that the Chinese Navy's target areas could be greatly expanded.

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The Nuclear Submarine and Deterrence

Westerners generally consider that a deterrent force can only have its intended deterrent effect when it is understood by potential enemies and when its effectiveness is constantly proven. But from the viewpoint of Chinese fear and suspicion of foreigners, if you can prevent potential enemies from getting any information it does not necessarily decrease your credibility but may cause an enemy to overestimate China's strength. In that case it is incorrect to consider that the fact that China makes little public mention of nuclear-powered submarine production and SLBM's means that Beijing is not concerned about and is not developing these systems. Similarly, it would be a very costly error to believe that before the capability of these systems is demonstrated they cannot be used as a deterrent.

The Chinese may think that deploying an SSBN, even with its combat capabilities unproven and with its missiles and their potential unknown to outsiders, can still produce a "fear" mentality in the USSR and the United States, and thus will effectively put an end to the period in which these two superpowers can threaten China with impunity. The high survivability of the SSBN has already incontrovertibly established its credibility as a strategic deterrent. The idea of "defense" may be used by Beijing to avoid attracting undesirable attention, and thus may be consistent with Beijing's declaration that China "will not be the first to use" nuclear weapons and that its purpose in developing them is purely defensive. The most classic of these statements came in September 1969, when China, having completed two nuclear weapons tests, once again assured the world that it was developing nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes and in order to break the two superpowers' nuclear monopoly. Chinese officials stated that China would never under any conditions be the first to use nuclear weapons.

But why not rely on land-based ballistic missiles or conventionally-powered submarines? Because if a country is to have an effective nuclear deterrent its total system must be able to deter both a limited nuclear attack and a large-scale nuclear attack. This additional condition requires that it acquire all types of weapons and delivery systems. Similarly, in order to guarantee that the basic nuclear retaliatory capability will not be eliminated by a defensive system or engineering breakthrough, it must have different types of deterrent systems. The nuclear-powered missile submarines are mobile over an extensive launching area, so that it is even harder for weapons systems to defend against it, and a higher price must be paid; this is an advantage which land-based missiles, whose warheads can be launched only at a limited target area, do not possess. Although land-based missiles can be a portion of the overall deterrent force, they cannot stand alone, nor is it possible to rely solely on numbers to replace the effect of an SSBN force.

A deterrent force based on conventionally-powered missile submarines (SSB's) is not a desirable option for the Chinese, because nuclear-powered submarines have already been deployed. If Beijing adopts this approach it will lose

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international prestige. Moreover, conventionally-powered submarines will be subject to serious limitations on their range and continuous cruising capability. It is also impossible to use conventionally-powered missile submarines as a temporary deterrent force, because this will greatly weaken the ultimate international effect of deployment of nuclear-powered submarines, and will also increase the Chinese economic burden. It is believed that China's only Golf class conventionally-powered missile submarine is a research and development boat, and that China will not be likely to continue producing this class of submarine.

The Han Class Submarine

When a country first uses nuclear power in a new-design, streamlined submarine, the danger of failure is very great. Accordingly, it should not install its first set of SLBM systems developed by domestic methods and with domestic resources on this submarine, thus further decreasing its probability of success. If the Han class nuclear-powered attack submarine's power plant proves unsatisfactory, they could produce another hull until an acceptable, high power, long-cruising-time system is successfully tested. Accordingly the Han class nuclear-powered attack submarine is an experimental submarine for testing the nuclear propulsion system rather than the prototype of a nuclear-powered attack sub force. China's goal is to deploy an SSBN force, and in the interim to create one or several nuclear-powered attack subs in order to take some of the logical steps on the way, and does not constitute a change of strategy.

China has thus far not made any major alterations in the defensive naval strategy which it inherited from the Soviet Union. Accordingly its naval force will naturally be a "guerrilla" force--an extension of the PLA. Submarines, gunboats and missile subs have given this force a naval combat capability, but it can only conduct combat according to Mao Zedong's hit-and-run theory. Thus we may believe that the decision to modernize China's navy from a guerrilla-type force to a strategic nuclear deterrent was a decision taken in the mid-sixties during the Sino-Soviet split and after China had achieved several successes in the development of ballistic missile submarines. This decision was in accordance with China's national goals and economic capabilities. But progress in this direction was shattered by political turmoil (the Cultural Revolution, the Lin Biao incident, the "gang of four's" anti-party action and attempts to disrupt the military), unforeseen economic difficulties and ultimately by Mao's death. However, the Chinese have felt deeply for a long time that it was reasonable and logical to favor nuclear-powered missile submarines; but when will the outside world finally see this Chinese SSBN with its own eyes? This is not yet known.

[Inset, p 22] China's Romeo Class Middle-Size Conventionally-Powered Parol Submarine Displacement: 1,100 tons at surface, 1,600 tons submerged.
Dimensions: 75 meters long, 7.3 meters wide, draft 4.4 meters.
Power plant: Two 2,000-HP diesel engines; two 2,000-HP electric engines twin screws.

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Capabilities: Surface speed 17 knots. Submerged speed 14 knots. Capable of traveling 11,294 nautical miles at 10 knot surface speed.
Armament. Six 533-mm forward torpedo tubes; forward storage for 18 torpedoes or 36 submarine mines.
Crew: 65.

China received four Romeo-class submarines from the Soviet Union in the early sixties and began to produce them on its own in 1962. Currently 50 Romeo class subs are on naval service, with new ones being produced at the rate of six per year. It is reported that a new enlarged Romeo variant has gone into service; it is longer than the Romeo by 2 meters, has a surface displacement of 1,400 tons and a submerged displacement of 1,800 tons, and has eight 533-mm torpedo tubes.

China gave North Korea two Romeo class submarines in 1973, two in 1974 and three in 1975. Subsequently, North Korea has produced two of its own.

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CHINESE GROUND FORCES: SOVIET REVIEW AND COMMENT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to press 4 Sep 79 pp 21-26

[Article by Col A. Marov and Lt Col V. Timofeyev: "The Ground Forces of China"]

[Text] As the foreign press reports, the military and political leadership of China is, as before, continuing a policy of militarizing the country in order to realize its far reaching great power aspirations. Today, the policy of the Beijing leaders is quite close to the positions of the most extreme reactionaries in all the world--from the militarists and enemies of relaxing tensions in the Western countries to the racists of Southern Rhodesia and the fascist rulers of Chile.

In striving to carry out the great khan ideas and achieve world domination, the Maoists extol war in every way possible. Beijing regards a new world war as one of the major ways to achieve China's hegemony over all the world. In this regard, the main consideration is placed on a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the results of which the Beijing leaders would like to use to realize their military and political goals.

Beijing is actively coming out against the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth, it is continuing to discredit the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, it is advertising its hostility to the USSR, and it is demanding the strengthening of the military preparations of the United States and NATO with clearly provocative purposes.

The aggressive intentions of the Beijing leadership are confirmed by the war unleashed by China in February of this year against socialist Vietnam. This was one of Beijing's dangerous provocations and adventures against sovereign states. This aggression also testifies to the unremitting attempts of the Maoists to plunge the world into the abyss of a destructive war.

When speaking to the voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district, comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman

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of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "By their unprecedentedly blatant and lawless attack on a neighboring small country--socialist Vietnam--the present Beijing rulers have once and for all revealed to the whole world the perfidious and aggressive essence of the great power hegemonistic policy being conducted by them. Now, everyone sees that this policy at the present time represents the most serious threat to peace in all the world."

Thinking that military might is the main factor for transforming China into a strong power, the Beijing leaders, as the foreign press reports, are pursuing ever more stubbornly and persistently a policy of building up the country's military and economic potential, equipping the armed forces with modern combat equipment, improving the organizational structure of large units and units, and raising the combat and operational training level of the troops and staffs. In doing this, a lot of attention is being devoted to the ground forces.

Organization. The ground forces, in the estimation of foreign military specialists and in particular in that of the author of the book "Kitayskaya voyennaya sistema" [The Chinese Military System]--the American H. Nelson, are the basis of the Chinese armed forces and number more than 3 million people (more than 80 percent of the overall number of armed forces). The Chinese command assigns them the main role in the destruction of an opposing enemy. The tasks of inflicting decisive blows on his troop groupings, seizing territory, and holding on to occupied defense lines and areas in coordination with the other branches of the armed forces, have been placed on them.

The book points out that there is no ground force headquarters in China. Its functions are performed by the general staff whose chief is also the commander of this branch of the armed forces. The large units, units and subunits of the ground forces are located in the 11 category 1 (large) military districts into which China's territory is divided from a military administrative respect. Xinjiang, Lanzhou, Beijing, Shenyang, Chengdu, Wuhan, Nanjing, Jinan, Fuzhou, Kunming, and Guangzhou. The headquarters of the Xinjiang district is located in the city of Urumqi, and those of the others in the cities of the same name. The large military districts are subdivided into provincial ones (two-three in each).

The ground forces consist of field and local forces. The former are subordinate to the command element of the category 1 military districts, and the latter to the headquarters of the provincial districts.

The field forces are composed of infantry, airborne and armored troops; artillery; and special troops--chemical, engineer, signal, and railroad. They are meant to carry out combat missions in any area of the country and beyond its borders.

The main and most numerous branch is the infantry. The primary task of destroying an enemy, seizing, and holding positions has been placed on it.

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According to foreign press information, organizationally it has 121 infantry divisions as well as other units and subunits.

The airborne forces (three divisions) are the most maneuverable and mobile. They are capable of conducting combat operations both in the enemy's rear and with troops operating at the front.

In the opinion of the Chinese command, armored troops are the shock forces of the ground forces and the decisive means for achieving success in an attack. As the foreign press reports, they have been brought together into 12 tank divisions which form the reserve of the High Command.

Artillery is considered to be the primary firing force for suppressing and destroying enemy tanks, artillery, personnel, and other objectives. It is composed of 20 artillery divisions as well as a large number of artillery units and subunits organizationally included in the combined arms large units and units. As the English reference book the Military Balance reports, they are armed with about 18,000 guns, more than 20,000 mortars, and a large number of multiple firing rocket systems and antitank systems.

The chemical troops consist basically of a small number of separate regiments and the chemical defense battalions and companies included respectively in the composition of army corps and infantry divisions.

Engineer troops are grouped together in engineer construction divisions and separate regiments (construction, ponton-bridge, and others) which are subordinate to the commanders of the military districts and the main Directorate of the rear (all told up to 30 regiments). In addition, each infantry division has one combat engineer battalion.

Signal troops consist of separate regiments and battalions located in the composition of army corps and divisions. As H. Nelson notes in his book, they are insufficiently equipped with modern technical equipment and primarily use wire communications.

The composition of the railroad troops numbers 15 divisions which are engaged in the construction and repair of railroads. Sometimes, the duty of maintaining separate railroad lines is imposed on them.

As Nelson points out, the majority of field force divisions are grouped together into 38 army corps of the following types: reinforced, heavy, light, and mountain infantry. They differ from each other in their purpose, organization, arms, transport equipment, and number of personnel.

In the estimation of foreign military specialists, the reinforced army corps is the highest tactical large unit which possesses comparatively high mobility. It is capable of transporting at one time no less than one-third of the personnel in the infantry units using its own transport equipment. It has been noted that the fire power of this large unit is rather

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great. The corps is designed for operations on level terrain or in areas with a well developed road system. Normally, its large units and units are located at a considerable distance from the state border on the main operational avenues, and are primarily intended for conducting mobile combat operations.

According to information in the book "Kitayskay voyennaya sistema", the corps numbers about 50,000 men. Its armament includes: 279 medium and 30 light tanks; 12 152-mm and 48 122-mm howitzers; 48 122-mm guns; 48 76-mm howitzers; 36 76-mm guns; 36 120-mm, 253 82-mm and 168 60-mm mortars; 12 85-mm and 324 57-mm antitank guns; 54 each 75-mm and 57-mm recoilless weapons; 72 37-mm antiaircraft guns; about 200 armored personnel carriers, and 2,385 trucks.

A heavy army corps is equipped with lighter weapons and a lesser amount of combat equipment as compared to a reinforced corps. It is intended for the conducting of combat operations in areas with difficult terrain relief.

The light and mountain infantry army corps are intended for operations under special conditions (forest massifs, swampy flood lands, individual islands, mountains, and mountain plateaus).

Infantry divisions are subdivided into the same types as the army corps and differ from each other in the numerical and qualitative composition of weapons and combat equipment. They consist of three infantry and one artillery regiment, a tank destroyer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and other combat support and service subunits. Besides the above listed units and subunits, a reinforced infantry division has a tank regiment (93 tanks).

Local forces are a component part of the Chinese ground forces and, in the opinion of the author of the book "Kitayskaya voyennaya sistema", are intended for the conducting of combat operations with the field forces primarily within the limits of those provincial districts to whose command they are subordinate. They are also enlisted in the defense and protection of important objects and structures, the battle against enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, the suppression of antigovernment demonstrations, etc. At the present time, they number -- as THE MILITARY BALANCE reports -- 70 divisions and 30 separate regiments. It notes that local forces are equipped with more obsolescent weapons and have extremely less transport equipment than large units and units in the field forces.

Grouping. According to data from the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the major forces of the Chinese ground troops are concentrated in the border areas with the USSR and MPR [Mongolian People's Republic]. A total of 75 field force divisions (more than half of the overall total) and 33 local force divisions are located here; In north and northeast China (Shenyang and Beijing military districts) -- 55 field force divisions and 25 local force ones, north and northwest China (Lanzhou and Xinjiang military districts) -- 20 and 8 respectively.

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In east and southeast China (Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou military districts) there are 28 field force divisions and 18 local force; in central China (Wuhan Military District) -- 12 field force divisions and 11 local force divisions as well as the three airborne divisions; and in west and southwest China (Chengdu and Kuming)-- 18 and 8 respectively.

An especially important role is allotted to the Wuhan Military District whose ground force grouping is regarded by the Chinese military leadership as the strategic reserve. The presence in central China of a developed road and water network permits the Chinese command to move, when necessary, the large units and units of this grouping to any area of the country.

Recruitment and service are organized in accordance with the law, "Active Military Service" adopted in 1978. The period of service for servicemen in the ground forces has been set at three years and for voluntary admission-- 15-20 years.

Levies are made once each year from October to February. The draftees undergo a careful medical examination and a check for loyalty. As a rule, a recruit is sent to a temporarily formed training unit where he studies regulations for two months and also undergoes drill and firing training. During this period, the young fighter* is subjected to intense ideological indoctrination in Maoism, nationalism, chauvinism, anti-Sovietism and blind obedience to the chief's orders.

In the estimation of foreign military specialists, the recruit acquires during basic training firm skills in handling his individual weapon, learns the fundamentals of conducting combat operations as part of a subunit, and strengthens his physical hardiness. After this, he is sent to a unit to perform further service.

According to information in H. Nelson's book, the training of junior commanders for the ground forces takes place in special training divisions attached to the headquarters of the military districts. The most intelligent servicemen who are most dedicated to the ideas of Mao Zedong undergo training here. The middle command element is filled by graduates of military schools or by assigning junior commanders, who have undergone the appropriate training, to the positions of platoon commanders.

Demobilization of servicemen, who have completed the prescribed service periods, normally takes place in April. First, personnel who do not have any prospects for service advancement, are discharged. Personnel, who have a good technical training in rare military specialties and who are needed for the forces, are enlisted with their agreement for voluntary service.

* In 1965, the system of military ranks in the armed forces was changed and at the present time the ranks "commander" and "fighter" exist.

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Combat training in the ground forces is organized so as to further raise the combat capability and combat readiness of large units and units. Major attention is devoted to making training as close as possible to the actual conditions of conducting combat operations and to carrying out the specific tasks facing large units (units) as determined by their combat designation. The basic stages in the combat training of ground force personnel are: basic (individual) and as part of a subunit (unit) and large unit.

According to the latest reports in the foreign press, the Chinese command at the present time allots 60 percent of training time to combat training, 30 percent--to ideological indoctrination, and 10 percent to construction and economic needs. A total of 40 percent of the training time allotted for all combat training is spent on the fighting man's special training and on tactical exercises.

In forcing the militarization of the country, China's military leadership is placing primary stress on the troops' field training during which the conduct of offensive (breakthrough, envelopment, turning movement, encirclement, pursuit), defensive, meeting and night combat is practiced. A lot of attention is also being devoted to questions on combating the tanks, aviation and air assault forces of the enemy; on protecting against weapons of mass destruction; on overcoming natural obstacles; on forcing water barriers; etc. Mao Zedong's "military ideas" about "actively luring an enemy into the depths of the territory", "concentrating superior forces and waging a battle for destruction" etc., are studied in combination with combat training assignments.

As the foreign military press points out, the Chinese command organizes courses and assemblies to retrain the higher command element in order to train command cadres for the forces and headquarters in operations as part of large troop units. During them, Mao Zedong's "military ideas" and strategic and tactical questions are studied, and the direction of large unit combat operations and the work of headquarters in organizing coordination between branches when solving specific combat missions are worked on.

The Chinese military and political leadership attach no small importance in their plans for further raising the striking power of the ground forces to their equipping with modern weapons and combat equipment. During the last ten years, according to the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of tank divisions has increased from 5 to 12 and tanks--up to 10,000. At the present time, the forces have about 40,000 field artillery guns and mortars. Attention is being paid to increasing the maneuverability and fire power of large units and units and their equipping with more modern air defense systems and systems for combating tanks.

A large role in the implementation of these plans is assigned to the West. Chinese leaders are trying to use the military industrial circles of the United States and other NATO countries as suppliers of modern types of weapons and combat equipment. As the foreign press has reported, China is

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displaying great interest in the purchase of the English "Harrier" fighter bomber, helicopters, antiaircraft missile systems, ATGM's, tanks, antitank weapons, small arms, and other combat equipment. Attempts are being made to conclude long term programs for cooperation in the military field with individual NATO countries.

The analysis of the Chinese ground forces, which has been made by foreign military specialists, testifies that now they are already one of the largest in the world. The country's military and political leadership is taking steps to further increase their combat capabilities so that they just as all armed forces in general, will be capable of carrying out its hegenonistic great power aspirations.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. p 23. Organization of a reinforced army corps. Diagram from H. Nelson's book "Kitayskaya voyennaya sistema."
2. p 24. Organization of an infantry division (number of personnel -- 12,900 men, 16 76-mm howitzers, 12 76-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars, 81 82-mm mortars, 54 60-mm mortars, 108 57-mm antitank guns, 18 each 75-mm and 57-mm recoilless guns, 18 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 54 flamethrowers, more than 400 trucks). Diagram from H. Nelson's book "Kitayskaya voyennaya sistema."
3. p 25 Tactical classes in a ground force small unit. Photograph from the magazine NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS.

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