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JPRS L/8919

12 February 1980

Latin America Report

(FOUO 2/80)



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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

CASTRO SENDS LETTER TO NICARAGUA ON JOINING NONALINED

PA260034 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1815 GMT 22 Jan 80 PA

[Text] Managua, 22 Jan (PL)--Fidel Castro, president of the Cuban Councils of State and Government, has expressed his joy "over the fact that Cuba was the site where Nicaragua joined with dignity" the non-aligned movement.

The greeting of the Cuban leader and president of the nonaligned countries is included in a letter dated 24 October, published yesterday in the National Reconstruction Government Junta's press bulletin.

Following is the text of the letter:

I assigned myself the task of writing a few lines to thank each government of the nonaligned countries for their participation in the sixth summit. On reaching Nicaragua, I realize it would not make any sense to do that. How can I thank you, our most affectionate brothers-in-struggle? How can you, guerrillas and revolutionaries, be thanked when you were by our side in the not-too-easy battle waged to make the conference a success? No, those formalities have no place between us.

Thus, if there is any justification for this letter, it is to express to you my joy over the fact that Cuba was the site where Nicaragua joined with dignity the ranks of our movement, to tell you with what emotion I listened to the magnificent speech delivered by Companero Daniel, when he announced that his country--with its wounds still open and only 41 days after the victory--was present among the nonaligned with extraordinary force, and to congratulate you for the inestimable role that Nicaragua, with its immense moral authority, played in the results of the sixth summit.

I am sure the new battles will continue to find us side by side, in the same cause of revolution, freedom and anti-imperialism.

Fraternally yours,

[Signed] Fidel Castro Ruz

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

PEACE GROUP CHARGES INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR

PA281748 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1622 GMT 28 Jan 80 PA

[Text] San Jose, 28 Jan (PL)--The Third Costa Rican Peace and Solidarity Congress, which has concluded here, has charged the government and armed forces of Guatemala with intervention in the internal affairs of El Salvador.

The final plenary session also warned of the serious threat of a massive military intervention by U.S. forces in that Central American country.

Artist and cartoonist Hugo Diaz was appointed president of the Costa Rican Peace and Solidarity Committee. The committee marked the importance of the Nicaraguan people's victory against the Somoza dictatorship, which had constituted a permanent threat to peace in Central America.

Scoring the annexation claims of Guatemala over Belize, the third congress accused that country's military dictatorship of trying now to become the rearguard of Central American reaction.

The congress was attended by political and labor delegations of Costa Rica as well as from other nations of the area.

The final plenary session expressed its concern over the U.S. decision to install nuclear missiles in Europe with the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It also noted China's announced support of NATO's position.

The attendants censured the colonial regime imposed on the Puerto Rican people and charged that the installation of military bases on that island constitutes a threat to peace.

The congress fully supported Panama's claims of sovereignty over the Canal Zone and described the U.S. refusal to comply with the agreements already signed as a provocation.

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ARGENTINA

FUTURE OF PERONISM WITHIN POLITICAL PROCESS VIEWED

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 16 Dec 79 pp 12-13

[Column by Eduardo J. Paredes]

[Text] Last Thursday's press conference by President Videla did not provide any spectacular surprises, but it did confirm the president's thinking on various basic issues in the political process.

But the eagerness with which the private news media emphasized his reply concerning the future of Peronism demonstrated what a really basic issue Peronism is in Argentine politics. It is logical that it should be so, and there is even historical precedent for it. When General Justo became head of the government known as the Concordancia, everyone wondered what would happen to the Yrigoyen movement, since the Radicals were then divided into personalists and antipersonalists, depending on whether they followed the trend of thought represented by the great leader of the UCR [Radical Civic Union] or the Alvear line, which in many parts of the country fostered what later became the "union" group. And what happened? After Yrigoyen's death, the personalist movement flailed about in internal polemics until the famous and definitely juvenile convention in Avellaneda, when men like Moises Levenson, Crisologo Larralde, Ricardo Balbin, and others vitalized what was called the intransigent radical line in opposition to certain union groups whose tendencies were conservative. Talking about personalism or antipersonalism in the Radical Civic Union today, so many years after those historical episodes, is an absurdity. Out of a great movement of the middle and lower middle class and a large percentage of the proletariat--a movement that followed an important leader and dominated Argentina's political scene from 1916 to 1930--there arose in time an organized and democratic political party. In that party, today's Ricardo Balbin is not yesterday's Hipolito Yrigoyen but the party chief who associates with a group of top leaders from all over the country--Raul Alfonsin, Juan Carlos Pugliese, Antonio Troccoli, Arturo Illia, Carlos H. Perette, Fernando de la Rúa, Cesar Garcia Puente, Eduardo Angeloz, Rodolfo Leyenda, Miguel Angel Zabala Ortiz, and a large number of provincial leaders--who can aspire to compete at any moment in an internal struggle to be elected within the party or as candidates for public office.

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Any political analyst of the 1930's--if indeed there then existed that accursed journalistic breed to which I belong and which consists of those who specialize in being permanently wrong to help others not be wrong--might have thought that the Radicals were doomed to disappear. With the leader dead, his party politically defeated and divided in one aspect over the issue of "concordancia," and the local leaders being pulled this way and that by socialists, conservatives, and the incipient rightwing nationalism that was to culminate in the Peronism of the 1940's, there was not much room for speculation. But the UCR not only resisted the assaults of the time but also became stronger internally and is now expected to be a permanent party in Argentina's political panorama--a party with a greater or lesser degree of electoral impact.

What elements played a part in transforming into a vigorous party what had appeared to be a chaotic dissolution?

1. Historical roots.
2. National ideology.
3. A class of leaders.
4. Proven honesty when its time came to be the government.

Those four elements are objectively palpable. Now let us look at the situation of Peronism to see if historical comparison will allow us to play at a kind of futurology.

There are very clear similarities and differences. At the death of its leader, Peronism presented the following picture:

1. Historical roots.
2. A national ideology infiltrated at each end by pro-Nazi or pro-Marxist tendencies.
3. Few fit leaders.
4. A very heterodox mixture of honesty and corruption in acts of government.
5. Multitudinous popular support.

The historian Gabriel del Mazo says in his book "History of Radicalism" that Yrigoyen, almost on the point of death, whispered to Elpidio Gonzalez: "Marcelo must be supported." He was referring to Marcelo T. Alvear, the former Radical president who governed between the two Yrigoyen periods. Yrigoyen knew that Alvear represented continuity of neither his thought nor his activity, but he also knew that Alvear was the leader with the greatest personal prestige left in the UCR. It was not a matter of a personal heir.

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It was a matter of saving the party. "Supporting Marcelo" was a practical strategy for seeing that the UCR would not dissolve. And Alvear, an anti-personalist and fierce critic of Hipolito in many respects, had to resign himself to playing a personalist role. But he had more than enough intelligence to understand the leader's strategy. So he accepted the challenge in a perfect demonstration of political fervor. He attended meetings that he did not like, spoke with leaders inferior to him, plotted although he loathed plots and even fought in a revolt, and had to go into exile--and he got off cheap, because others wound up in Ushuaia.

Peron did not have an Alvear--perhaps by his own fault, because he was a leader scornful of other leaders, while Yrigoyen, although he did what he wanted and was rather arbitrary, never denied political space to important Radicals--and so Peron could not say, in the republic's most difficult hours, who was to be supported. But 2 weeks before his death, he made a statement of real importance to anyone who really wants to take it at its absolute value: "Peron's only heir is the organized Peron movement." That statement contains his legacy. Peron, as a military man--because let us not deceive ourselves, he did not exactly graduate from the Sorbonne--could not speak of a party. During his lifetime Peron did not believe in parties. He believed in Peron. But in his old age and from his experience in Europe, he realized that the modern world is moving toward large organized political movements. And in a nontotalitarian system, organization can be achieved only through the party. It is therefore clear that Peronists who want to continue with the movement are either very innocent or ill-intentioned. Because the movement cannot function without the leader, and if it hopes to have another leader it is running the risk of becoming even more frozen than it is and of living in continual doubt as to whether the new leader is or is not interpreting complicated Peronist ideology--a kind of socialist, corporatist, and liberal conservatism that no one can figure out, since no political thinker has ever explained it except Peron himself in his book "The Organized Community," which basically was written for everyone except Peronists. If Peronism does not want to enter a new and permanent diaspora, it must organize a political party, and the best advice it can be given is to copy the Radical model exactly in its organization, because they are sort of like first cousins, and so everything will remain in the family.

The problem lies in the fact that while Peronism's class of leaders is not nonexistent, it is atypical. A leader is someone who leads, and if one thinks of Peronists such as Hipolito Jesus Paz, Italo Luder, Ricardo Guardo, Angel Robledo, Raul Matera, or Jorge Daniel Paladino, who are, among others, men of great experience, irreproachable conduct, and a significant share of what is known as the benefit of intelligence, one notes that in reality they do not lead anyone. But a former town councilor who places about 20 public employees can have the run of any slum quarter simply by painting his name alongside the party symbol.

In that connection, it was interesting to note the recent statements by the former Peronist national legislator Raul Busto Fierro--a man who has the

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virtue of being considered a leftist by the Nazis and a rightist by the Marxists--in which he practically advocated giving Peronism the status of an assembly (a way of disorganizing the disorganized in an organized manner). That is not bad if it serves to make Peronist leaders stop the pantomime of a movement and join together in internal factions with women and men, be they workers or doctors in philosophy--and thus do away also with that ovarian-proletarian anachronism of female and trade-union branches--in order to discuss the ideological problem seriously and organize a party which, in accordance with the future statute, will be ready to face honest internal elections and have, as all parties do, its different internal wings.

Peronism's problem is not structurally difficult. It is complicated morally. In Peronism, in its form as a movement, no one ever learned how to lose. And to be democratic, it is necessary to know how to lose, and that is the most difficult thing. Winning is easy and agreeable. Losing is what enables one to gage greatness of spirit and a sense of responsibility, because the one who loses must give way to the one who wins but continue to work without ostentation or sinecures.

In the Peronist movement no one has ever lost. A great ideological conglomeration was produced in which everyone spoke well of Peron from differing viewpoints, and so no one lost, at least his per diem. Obviously, serious things happened, and there were some who lost their lives and some who were responsible for others losing their lives. Without the leader, the movement means anarchy, violence, and disintegration.

As far as Peronism's historical roots are concerned, they cannot be denied, even though at the same time they produce hate and love that are equally unbridled. Peron and Peronism are realities in Argentina, and while criticism is appropriate concerning methods, it is also appropriate to honestly acknowledge various sensible legislative moves which meant, in their practical application, a leap ahead in 10 years on issues that had been debated for decades. The negative aspects--demagoguery, political intolerance, the cult of personality, and disorder in production--are phenomena that corresponded to political circumstances. No American would say that all Republicans are deceitful just because Nixon fell into the temptation of Watergate. No impartial Argentine could say that all Peronists are demagogues just because Peron knew how to say they were going to build 500,000 houses when there was only enough money for 10,000 and because, moreover, people believed him. Now the Peronists are facing other circumstances, including the crucial circumstance: Peron is no longer here to tell them what should be done.

And the element of popular support is also tangible. That support probably does not equal the 64 percent achieved by Peron in 1973, but if an election were held today, about 40 percent would lean toward any kind of Peronism that entered the fray, even if its candidate were Dracula. The perfect Peronist talks to the anti-Peronist today and tells him that Peron was betrayed, that Isabel was a poor unfortunate woman, that Lopez Rega was a

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scoundrel, that Campora was a traitor, and that the trade unionists are unscrupulous. But don't say anything bad about Peron to him, because he will take out after you with a cudgel.

And now we reach the point where the finger is placed in the wound. If Peronism organizes itself as a party, will that be good or bad for Argentine democracy? Is it desirable to root for a diaspora so that the mass of Peronism's traditional voters will split up among the existing parties or abstain? Is it desirable that Peronism in Argentina should be a sort of Labor Party which, instead of liberal democratic roots, has--for example--nationalist roots and incipient Christian Democratic features?

If a historical comparison is made, we see that based on the Radical Civic Union's experience at the death of Yrigoyen, Peronism should organize itself so as to be able to compete democratically for the nation's political power and subscribe in good faith to a system of conduct guaranteeing that if it returns to power, it will not change the country's structures to establish a totalitarian system.

But no matter what kind of party statute is approved, if Peronist leaders are not prepared mentally to set up a democratic party in the historical shadow of personalism and to live together within it, diaspora will be inevitable, and there will be no need for anyone to plan it.

The finger of "fingerocracy" is headed for the wound. And the echo of the bass drum is fading away as the life of the one who caused it has faded away, just as yesterday's "shirtless ones" are today's workers who, when they get a wage increase, go for a stroll in Florida better dressed than more than one reporter.

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ARGENTINA

HEALTH SECRETARY SPEAKS ON MEDICAL CARE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 26 Dec 79 p 8

[Interview with Rear Adm Dr Manuel Iran Campo, secretary of state for public health by Daniel Gomez Lopez; date and place not given]

[Text] Obviously it is a complex undertaking to put together a consistent and continuing health policy, incorporating into it all the connected sectors: state, private and social services. Even more so, when--as actually happened--the first thing to be done was to immediately reverse a deteriorated health situation.

"Health policy basically endeavors to insure a good level of health care for every member of the population by setting up the institutions which provide health services in accordance with the cultural and social level of the country, "the secretary of state for public health stated in the course of an exclusive interview with LA OPINION. These are the views of Rear Adm Dr Manuel Iran Campo.

LA OPINION: What are the national health objectives established by your ministry?

Campo: The Secretariat of State has determined seven main areas where specific objectives have been identified, along with the respective associated policies. These are: primary health care and extension of coverage; arrangement of health services by region and area; cleaning up the environment; human resources; financial resources and application of the principle of financial aid. One of these highly important objectives and policies that I can mention is the organization of a level of primary health care which would allow the development of a group of simple programmed health operations. Another priority is to bring about the efficient functioning of a system of welfare services arranged by area and region so as to give the whole population access to health care.

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LA OPINION: The effective installed capacity that now exists is intimately linked to the achievement of those goals. Is Argentina up to standard in that regard?

Campo: The Republic of Argentina has a sizeable and widely distributed installed capacity. Altogether there are 56 beds and 19 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants, and according to the 1970 census, 75 per cent of the population is concentrated in towns of more than 2,000 people. Comparison with other countries, even the most highly developed in terms of installed capacity, shows that a satisfactory level has been reached from that point of view. But it should be emphasized that the solution of problems of medical care to a great extent is not determined by an increase in those possibilities. The essential problem in the nation is the achievement of adequate distribution, maintenance and recovery, so as to achieve greater efficiency in using them, so as to care for the needs of the population.

LA OPINION: What relationship is there between the social work subsector and the state subsector?

Campo: The social services medical aid grants should be understood in the framework of a national health policy and of the plans and programs intended to implement them. One of the principal factors in the present situation has been the lack of coordination between the different subsectors: public, social assistance and private. Without reducing the introduction of the highly complex technologies which may truly be necessary, we will try not to imperil the extension of coverage by allotting resources for excessive consumption which, in the vast majority of cases, has nothing to do with the health of the general population. At present, a permanent inter-sector committee is in operation between Social Security and Health, under the ministry of social welfare, which deals with these relations. The social services subsector should participate in the on-going process, which emphasizes primary health care operations and extension of coverage through area and regional services.

LA OPINION: In the area of preventive medicine, what have been the most important steps taken during 1979?

Campo: We have put special emphasis on mass immunization projects, obtaining highly encouraging results. For example, we have reduced the incidence of measles by 50 per cent through operations carried out. In 1979, 2 million anti-measles injections were given, at an expenditure of 3.6 billion pesos. Poliomyelitis was eradicated in the course of the year, for which 550 million pesos was invested. Another success has been the anti-rabies campaign, which allowed the incidence of animal rabies to be reduced by 76 per cent.

LA OPINION: What is the picture in regard to Chagas disease?

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Campo: As is known, this disease has been progressively spreading throughout the country, except in Patagonia. The number of persons infected is around 2.5 million, and there are some 300,000 people ill with chronic heart problems and other progressive disease. Control of this problem is basically directed toward the elimination of the triatomas in the houses by means of insecticide, toward adaptation and improvement of housing and toward health education. Laboratories have been set up, and since 1977 a campaign against Chagas disease has been in operation, with its headquarters in the province of Cordoba.


LA OPINION: What consideration does the secretariat for public health give to this disease in the budget?

Campo: The struggle against Chagas disease represents an investment of 6 percent in the annual budget of the secretariat. For 1979, 27.05 billion pesos have been allotted, that is, 6.1 percent of the total allotted to the health sector, which amounts to the sum of 449.26 billion pesos.

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
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CUBA

BRZEZINSKI'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS ASSAILED

PA021807 Havana PRELA in English 1650 GMT 2 Feb 80 PA

[Article by Carlos Mora Herman]

[Text] In this epoch, regarded as one of the most dynamic in the history of humanity, the concept of national security, according to the interpretation of some U.S. leaders, means to head the changes, since the United States of America has been called on to play a special role in the world.

The former is part of the imperialist philosophy of President James Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The U.S. magazine DEFENSE MONITOR sums up that policy in the following words:

"The current explication of national security means a global estimation of the policy of force. It is a dangerous line which clears the way to direct intervention and to war. A line which differs greatly from our true national interests and leads to the isolation of U.S. foreign policy."

In the present stage, the United States is trying to recover the position which it had in the world, aspiring to its military or political interventions in the domestic affairs of other states being confirmed.

In 1965, the United States succeeded in getting the Organization of American States (OAS) to confirm its invasion of the Dominican Republic. A U.S. State Department document set down the troops which should be sent to each country. Brazil received two divisions, Mexico and Argentina a division each, Peru, Colombia, Chile and Cuba (prerevolutionary), a regiment per country.

There were similar plans regarding Vietnam.

At the present time the dust is being shaken off some of those outdated ideas and an attempt is being made to bring them up to date adapting them to the new circumstances.

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According to U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the world of the 1980's will demand more of the United States and from its capacity to react in the face of crisis.

In the United States hegemonic dreams an important role is played by what Brzezinski calls the "instability belt" which stretches from southern Africa to the summit of the Himalayas.

The so-called "quick action force" created by Washington is an attempt to drown all the United States adversaries who may arise from Tehran to New Delhi and the Mekong Delta.

It is a question of the "contention doctrine" practiced by the United States and which already has a chain of victims: Iran, with Mossadegq, in 1953; the Guatemala of Arbenz in 1954; the Lebanon in 1958; the Congo in 1960; Cuba in 1961 (Bay of Pigs); Vietnam in 1964; the Dominican Republic in 1965; Kampuchea in 1972, and Chile in 1973.

Also, in recent years, the U.S. Government has meddled in the domestic affairs of an infinity of countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Lebanon, Jamaica, Grenada, Iran, Afghanistan.

The turn in U.S. foreign policy, which involves the return to the worst times of the "cold war" and the blackmail of military might, opens gloomy prospects for the decade which is just beginning.

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CONTRADICTIONARY REMARKS BY CARTER ON CARIBBEAN REPORTED

PA020040 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2110 GMT 31 Jan 80 PA

[Report by Jose Gonzalez Tosca]

[Excerpt] [No dateline as received] President Jimmy Carter has said that he is not aware of any foreign threats in the Caribbean, and therefore, does not see the need to reinforce the area militarily. His words are in open contradiction to the activities of the countries in the area.

The President's remarks, published today, were made yesterday to a group of newsmen visiting the White House when he was asked what priority he would attach to the situation in the Caribbean.

Carter said, "I am not aware of any foreign military threat to the integrity of the countries in the area, and therefore, do not see the need to label it as a vital interest zone in which military action is necessary."

Political observers, however, point out the obvious contradiction to statements made previously by the President and by other high U.S. military and government officials.

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CUBA

MARI BRAS: U.S. ADMIRAL BEHIND ATTACKS IN PUERTO RICO

PA021803 Havana PRELA in English 1645 GMT 2 Feb 80 PA

[Text] San Juan, 2 Feb (PL)--Juan Mari Bras, secretary general of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, said that Admiral Arthur Knoizen, chief of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean, is behind the terrorist plot aimed against the progressive forces in Puerto Rico.

He added that there is sufficient proof of Knoizen's guilt and he mentioned the fact that the explosives which were used in the dynamite attack on the headquarters of the Puerto Rican Lawyers Guild, in San Juan, came from the arsenals of the U.S. Navy.


He underlined that this is affirmed in a document of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in which an agent accuses a U.S. Navy lieutenant, Alex de la Cerda, of being guilty of the dynamite attack on the Lawyers Guild, as well as attempting to dynamite a plane and the offices of the Fishermen's Association of Vieques, an organization which is opposed to the military maneuvers of the U.S. Navy in that territory.

Together with La Cerda, the ex-president of the "Pro-Navy Vanguard" organization, Roberto Lopez Gonzalez, and the Cuban-born counterrevolutionary Rene Fernandez del Valle, are also accused.

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CUBA

COOPERATION WITH CEMA MEMBERS AIDS CUBAN AGRICULTURE

Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHELOV SEV in Russian No 5, 1979 pp 58-60

Article by Rafael Francia Mestre, minister of agriculture of the Republic of Cuba: "The Role of Cooperation in the Development of Agricultural Production of the Republic of Cuba"

Text Significant reforms have been carried out in the national economy of the Republic of Cuba, especially in agriculture, during the 20 years following the victory of the revolution. At present on more than 80 percent of the agricultural land production is organized on the basis of a higher form of socialist property and extensive work on collectivization based on the principle of voluntary participation is carried out. These reforms are aimed at the formation of a new economic structure and at the establishment of the necessary base for gradually bringing the level of development of the national economy of the Republic of Cuba closer to and equalizing it with the levels of other CEMA members.

In 1959 vast efforts were made to develop agriculture and to introduce advanced agricultural technology. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of virgin land were developed and included in agricultural production, which doubled the cultivated areas. Among the major agricultural crops special place is assigned to sugar cane, which occupies an area of 1,514,000 hectares, as well as to rice, which occupies 180,000 hectares and whose cultivation is fully mechanized. Citrus crops are grown on more than 100,000 hectares and tobacco, on 70,000 hectares.

More than 7.3 million tons of raw sugar were obtained in 1978, which is the second indicator in its magnitude in the country's history. In 1978, as compared with 1977, the volume of raw sugar increased by more than 11 percent.

In 1978, as compared with 1977, the procurement of citrus crops increased by 28 percent and of root crops and vegetables, by more than 20 percent, totaling approximately 1.1 million tons, and of cocoa, by more than 15 percent.

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There is no doubt that Cuba's entry into the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance acquires ever greater importance for the process of transformation and development of the country's national economy.

The existing forms of cooperation among CEMA members enable them to receive long-term credits, to engage in mutual deliveries and in an exchange of technology and scientific and technical documentation of a significant value and to train technical personnel and skilled workers for utilization at various cooperation projects in the country.

Discussing this aspect, we cannot fail to note the valuable assistance received by our ministry from CEMA members. Many specialists from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria gave us great help in the development of irrigation systems and livestock breeding sectors and continue to do so.

The significant contribution of the USSR to the development and implementation of the long-term plan for the mechanization of Cuban agriculture should also be noted.

Other CEMA members--the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--cooperated with our country in the area of veterinary science, plant protection, poultry breeding, mechanization of agricultural production, genetics of cattle and artificial insemination and continue to do so.

This cooperation enabled us to improve the skills of Cuban specialists, to exchange experience in almost all agricultural sectors and to conduct joint investigations aimed at obtaining new varieties and improving the techniques of mechanization of soil cultivation, as well as at refining methods of selection in hog breeding, organizing agrochemical services in the country and testing agricultural crops and various machines and equipment under tropical conditions.

In the last few years the participation of the Republic of Cuba in CEMA activities has increased considerably and at present there is a search for economically effective solutions for a large number of scientific, technical and economic problems of agricultural production.

The extensive utilization of combines for the harvesting of sugar cane and of equipment for irrigation and nitrogen fertilizers, which we were able to receive owing to the cooperation with the countries of the socialist camp, is an example of the cooperation in the field of agriculture.

Instead of the 9,000 tractors available before the revolution today there are more than 50,000 large-capacity tractors in the country. A national network of repair shops and service stations is developing.

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The achievements in the harvesting of sugar cane resulting from the use of combines are of great importance. Almost one-half of all the processes in the harvesting of this crop have been mechanized. It can be stated that the KTP-1 cane harvesting combine and its improved variant KTP-2, whose design we developed in cooperation with the USSR, played a decisive role in the mechanization of harvesting and continues to do so. The plant for the production of these combines in the country's eastern province Holguin was built with the help of the USSR.

Cuban and Soviet specialists participated in the modernization of the Soviet-made sugar cane loader, which made it possible to mechanize the loading of manually felled sugar cane on transport facilities 98 percent.

Our country takes part in the development of the International Machine System carried out by CEMA members for several years. From 1973 we have gradually joined in this activity, taking into consideration its great importance for Cuba. The countries that produce agricultural equipment now can take into consideration the technical and agrotechnical requirements when developing agricultural machinery and equipment for our country.

We consider Cuba's participation in the national and international tests of agricultural and timber machines very important. In our opinion, within the framework of this work it would be advisable to establish in Cuba an international testing station, which would meet the requirements of the testing of machines of CEMA members under tropical conditions. The need for the establishment of such a station is also confirmed by the considerations of its further possible use in Latin American and other countries with climatic conditions similar to ours.

The application of CEMA standards when testing tractors and agricultural and timber machines in Cuba represents a significant step forward in science and technology and once again stresses the need to establish an international testing station in our country.

In 1977 Cuba signed an agreement on multilateral specialization and cooperation of the production of equipment for the repair and technical servicing of agricultural machinery, which enables us to receive highly specialized equipment not produced serially, a large part of which cannot be received on the basis of regular trade.

Cuba's participation in the international competitions of plow operators of CEMA countries enables us to improve plowing production operations, to familiarize our machine operators with the latest equipment and to develop and strengthen friendship among the agricultural workers of CEMA countries.

The results obtained in the use of the new irrigation systems (especially sprinkling systems) for almost all agricultural crops are also significant.

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We must not fail to note the advantage that the participation in the implementation of the long-term specific cooperation programs approved at the 32d meeting of the council's session gives Cuba. These programs map out not only the development of our traditional sectors, but also contribute to an accelerated development of some other sectors.

Among the most important measures for our national economy the country's specialization within the CEMA framework in the production of citrus crops and sugar can be mentioned. At present the interested CEMA members examine the drafts of long-term agreements with technical and economic substantiations. According to these agreements, the export of citrus crops to CEMA countries in subsequent years should increase approximately by a factor of 9.1 and the export of sugar, by more than 25 percent.

For an overall fulfillment of these two programs for cooperation among CEMA members in our country provision has been made for an expansion of plantations, establishment of new irrigation systems, construction of sugar plants, expansion of ports, construction of refrigerators and acquisition of modern machines and transport facilities.

A successful fulfillment of these long-term agreements on multilateral cooperation will make it possible to more fully integrate the national economy of Cuba with the national economies of other CEMA countries and will create the material basis for the further development of agriculture and the food industry in Cuba. In turn, the increasing needs of CEMA members for citrus crops and sugar will be met to an ever greater extent.

Provision has also been made for Cuba's active participation in the work of the international economic association the International Center for Poultry Breeding, which will make it possible to give an objective evaluation of the possibilities of our genetic stocks and to obtain new genetic materials.

Our country's accession to the agreement on multilateral specialization and a mutual use of the genetic stocks of cattle of black-and-white breeds contributed to an intensified cooperation with CEMA members in problems of selection, breeding and improvement of the dairy properties of cattle.

Cuba's official accession to the agreement on multilateral specialization and cooperation of the production of veterinary preparations is envisaged this year. This will enable us to acquire certain drugs, which are scarce in our country and which we now receive from capitalist countries, as well as to offer some Cuban-made biological preparations.

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We must note another important problem, which was discussed at the Permanent CEMA Commission on Agriculture and which is of special importance for our country, that is, the establishment in Cuba of a station for the international testing, selection and production of seeds of some agricultural crops.

The station could operate as the head institution managing scientific activity in the field of genetics, selection and testing of varieties in the country and be the center for the introduction of materials of plant origin, as well as for the testing and reproduction under our conditions of species and varieties of agricultural crops of interest for all CEMA members.

Most of the work done within the framework of the Permanent CEMA Commission on Agriculture is very useful for Cuba, which ever more actively joins in the processes of specialization, cooperation and integration of agricultural production.


We are convinced that the solution of these and a number of other problems, which we did not mention here, will contribute to the further strengthening of reliable friendship and multilateral cooperation among CEMA members.

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
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
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
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
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
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
BRIEFS

EGP SAID OCCUPYING TOWNS--Mexico City, 13 Jan (PL)--The Mexican paper EXCELSIOR has reported that the Guatemalan poor people's guerrilla army [EGP] has occupied several towns and villages on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala. The Mexican paper reports that a communique released to the media here claims that the Luis Turcio Lima guerrilla front of the EGP occupied the town of Chirin and other areas near Mazatenango in Suchitepequez department. The communique states that Heledoro Pelaez, chief of the military garrison and a member of the death squad, was executed when he resisted. [Text] [PA132244 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1910 GMT 13 Jan 80 PA]

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
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
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
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
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
BRIEFS

DEATHS, INJURIES IN PEASANT BATTLE--Lima, 13 Jan (PL)--The newspaper LA PRENSA reported today that a confrontation among peasants from six communities who attempted to occupy property owned by a cooperative in Huancavelica left six dead and three injured. According to the report, the violence occurred when Deputy Land Magistrate Augustin Lapouble Cherd, accompanied by a group of police, went to Los Limites, Huinan, Pucajocha and Achapata, owned by No 40 limited cooperative. According to the paper, the communities had reportedly attempted to invade Jarahuasa lots 1 and 2, 25 km from Huancavelica (440 km southeast of Lima and the capital of Huancavelica). LA PRENSA added that when the magistrate appeared for a firsthand inspection, the peasants of the six communities objected to his presence and attacked the vehicle in which the team of 15 police were traveling, using sticks and stones. Members of the cooperative then intervened in defense of the policemen. In the ensuing confrontation, some persons were killed, wounded or bruised, the latter including some policemen. The incident is reported only by LA PRENSA, which gives no precise details regarding the exact causes of the deaths or the participation of the various sectors in the conflict. [Text] [PA140109 Lima PRELA in Spanish to PRELA Havana 1915 GMT 13 Jan 80 PA]

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
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
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
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