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21 March 1980

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 7/80)

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INTERNATIONAL

WEST TRIES TO USE VIENNA TALKS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 1, Jan 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80
pp 44-60

/Article by V. F. Petrovskiy, senior scientific worker of the Institute of the USA and Canada and member of the Bureau of the Scientific Council for Research on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament: "The Talks on Mutual Force and Arms Reduction in Central Europe"

/Text One of the most important directions of the foreign policy activity of the USSR is the drive for mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe.¹ Talks on this issue have been under way in Vienna since 30 October 1973. In accordance with the understanding reached at the preliminary consultations in Vienna in January-June 1973, 19 nations are taking part in them: 7 socialist countries (the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia) and 12 western countries (the United States, England, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the FRG). The composition of the parties to the agreements on mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe has also been agreed upon. They are four socialist countries--the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia--and seven western countries--the United States, England, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the FRG. As direct participants in the talks these countries have been granted the right to make decisions on the questions being discussed. The region of the proposed force and arms reductions has thereby actually been predetermined: it includes the territories of the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, as well as the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The other participants in the talks--the "flank nations"--will not reduce their troops and have a special status which gives them the right to take part in the discussion of questions at the plenary sessions and to distribute documents on the questions being examined. In conformity with the protocol adopted at the consultations on 14 May 1973,² the immediate participants in the talks "make the necessary decisions on the basis of consensus."

The Vienna talks became possible owing to the change in the political atmosphere in Europe, which was the result of the active peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and of the important

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actions undertaken by them. The agreements between the USSR and the United States on the prevention of nuclear war and strategic arms limitation, as well as the treaties between the USSR, Poland, the GDR and the FRG and the four-power agreement on West Berlin, in particular, played an important role. Detente in the relations between European nations was clearly expressed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which drew up a platform for further collective efforts aimed at strengthening security and developing cooperation in Europe. The conference participants unanimously affirmed in the Final Act "the interest of all of them in efforts, which are aimed at reducing military confrontation and at promoting disarmament and are called upon to supplement political detente in Europe and to strengthen security."³

The assurance of European security is one of the most important problems of modern international relations. The particular importance of the region of Central Europe is confirmed by historical experience. The seats of the two world wars, which claimed 65 million human lives, emerged precisely here. Strategically this region holds a key position, since it has a highly developed system of all types of lines of communication, which link it with practically all other countries and regions of Europe, as well as with the rest of the world. A military clash on the territory of Central Europe could easily engulf any other region of the continent, especially if you take into account the range of modern conventional and nuclear weaponry. In Central Europe the most powerful armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are concentrated and a large number of conventional and nuclear weapons and combat materiel have been placed. This is the direct result of the policy of the Cold War, which was conducted by the ruling circles of the United States and the other NATO countries during the post-war period, and their reliance on the use of military force or the threat of force.

A sharp political and diplomatic struggle is being waged over mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe, the opposing interests, approaches and concepts of the nations belonging to different socio-economic systems are clashing. During the preparation of the western countries for the talks in Vienna significant differences between them in the common aspiration to achieve a greater reduction of Soviet armed forces in Central Europe than of NATO forces were clearly revealed.

The U.S. position was formed under the influence of a complex set of contradictory factors and trends. On the one hand, the Nixon Administration experienced earnest pressure on the part of a group of influential congressmen headed by Senator M. Mansfield, who supported a substantial unilateral reduction of American troops in Europe. On the other hand, neither the Administration nor Congress were interested in having the reduction of the number of American troops in Europe entail a reduction of the troops of the NATO allies of the United States. Moreover, the increase of their contribution to the overall military efforts of NATO and the increase of their military strength were regarded by American ruling circles as the main goals of U.S. policy in NATO.

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The elaboration of the position of NATO took place at a time when the United States was making an analysis of its foreign military commitments with allowance made for the parity of the USSR and the United States in strategic nuclear forces, as well as the lessons of the Vietnam War. For political and strategic military reasons the American Government considered it extremely important to link the problem of reducing its forces in Europe with the plans of the NATO countries and to achieve, alluding to the "geographic factor," a considerably greater reduction of Soviet troops in this region. In the foreign policy report of the president to Congress in 1972 it was indicated that since major unilateral reductions of the number of American troops in Europe would upset the balance between the conventional armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, U.S. policy would consist in "maintaining and improving our armed forces in Europe and not in reducing them, except through mutual reductions which are agreed upon during the talks with the Warsaw Pact."⁴

The United States began to exert ever increasing pressure on its allies in order to change the position of NATO on the question of force reduction. The point is that primarily the West European countries, first of all the FRG, were behind the first proposals of the North Atlantic bloc, which were advanced at the sessions of the NATO Council in Reykjavik, Rome and Brussels in 1968-1970. In particular, the NATO countries proceeded at that time from the possibility of reducing both the "positioned" (foreign) and the "local" (national) armed forces, as well as weapon systems. The U.S. policy of closely linking the reduction of Soviet and American troops in this region made itself quite definitely felt in counterbalance to this approach. In 1972 the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the House Armed Services Committee prepared a report. "Owing to the relatively greater burden of the expenditures borne by the United States," it was stated in it, "the subcommittee firmly believes that any initial reductions in accordance with the agreement on force and arms reduction in Central Europe should provide for the withdrawal of American and Soviet troops."⁵

At the final stage of the elaboration of the position of the NATO countries the United States was able to achieve from its allies an agreement to focus attention on the reduction first of all of Soviet and American land forces. The United States persuaded its West European partners that an "asymmetrical" reduction of the personnel of Soviet and American land forces in the ratio of 2.5 : 1 and of tanks in the ratio of 1,700 : 0 with the simultaneous maintenance at the former levels of the air forces and tactical nuclear weapons would correspond much more to the interests of the NATO countries than any other possible models of reductions. The West German magazine EUROPA-ARCHIV wrote openly about the interests of the NATO countries first of all in "pushing back the maximum number of Soviet troops several hundred kilometers to the east, while losing at the same time the minimum number of American troops."⁶

By submitting an "extensive" program of measures on the limitation of the Soviet military presence in Central Europe, the United States was able to

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diminish to some extent the negative reaction of the governments of the West European countries to a possible reduction of the American military presence in this region, and at the same time to persuade Belgium, the Netherlands and the FRG to reject the initial intentions to take part in the reduction of their troops at the first stage, postponing this to a later period. At the same time the inclusion of the question of the reduction of the American military presence in Europe in the unified NATO position gave the West European countries a certain lever of influence on the United States in this process. Belgium diplomat A. (Villot), who took part in developing the NATO position at the talks in Vienna, wrote in early 1973 that by means of them it is becoming possible to slow and, probably, even to check for a long period "the inevitable tendency to reduce American conventional armed forces in Europe."⁷

Having eliminated to some extent after the opening of the Vienna talks the pressure on the part of Congress in favor of the unilateral reduction of American troops in Europe, the United States, like the other NATO countries taking part in them, began to noticeably lose interest in the more rapid elaboration and implementation of mutually acceptable steps on force and arms reduction in Central Europe. Some circles in the United States and the other NATO countries clearly object to the use of the talks in order to restore the shaken solidarity in their ranks and to step up the rate of military preparations of the North Atlantic bloc. In this lies one of the main sources of the difficulties which have arisen at the talks in Vienna.

The USSR position at the Vienna talks is governed by the fundamental aim of the CPSU at the strengthening of peace and the security of nations. The Soviet Government considers it important and possible in the interests of the assurance of security in Europe to supplement political detente with military detente. Only the making of a mutual and equal reduction of armed forces and arms in the center of the European continent will make it possible to raise the security of all the nations of Europe to a new level, without giving anyone one-sided military advantages. The principles agreed upon at the preliminary consultations in Vienna are the criteria for the achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding. In the Final Communiqué of 28 June 1973 it was indicated that the measures on force and arms reduction in Central Europe "should be carefully worked out according to the amount and time so that in all respects and in any feature they would conform to the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties."⁸

At the very start of the talks two opposing approaches to the solution of the problems of the mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe came to light. The initial factors for determining which of them conforms to the task of force and arms reduction in this region with the strict observance of the agreed on principles, unquestionably are: the degree of consideration by the parties of the realities existing in Central Europe, including their estimation of the established balance of forces in this region, on which the current level of the security of the nations taking part in the talks is based; the notion of the parties on the end results

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of future reductions (that is, the goals which each of them sets for itself), the ways and means of achieving them.

It is well known that the structures of the military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe are different: the general organization of the armed forces and the individual branches of the armed forces and arms and services, the number of certain arms and combat materiel were determined by each party with allowance made for their own military political strategy, the assessment of the situation on the continent and many other factors. When developing its armed forces in this region, each party took into account the needs of defense support, the material and manpower resources of the states belonging to the military alliances and so on. Back in the 1950's the NATO countries primarily relied on the massed increase in Europe of tactical nuclear weapons, which they regarded as the most effective means as compared with conventional arms. According to the data of the American press, 60 percent of the entire U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, which numbers more than 7,000 nuclear warheads, is now concentrated in the region of future reductions.⁹ In spite of this, approximate parity of the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact now exists.¹⁰ Precisely this made it possible to begin the process of political and military detente on the European continent.

The socialist states are not making it their goal to gain any one-sided advantages during the future force and arms reductions. They are not seeking a change in their favor of the balance of forces, which exists in this region. The Soviet Union sees the goal of future reductions in that reduction of the present concentration of troops and arms, which is excessive for peace time, in case of which the established balance of forces would not change in favor of one side or the other, while the situation in the center of Europe would become more stable. "Historically it has turned out," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "that enormous numbers of troops and arms of the two military political blocs have been concentrated here against each other. Different in structure, the forces of each side as a whole are approximately equal to each other. Such a military balance has existed in Europe for several decades now. But the enormous build-up of armies and arms is dangerous in itself. It will be much easier to form peaceful ties, if this build-up is reduced on both sides, without upsetting the established balance of forces. We are trying to achieve precisely this at Vienna."¹¹

Consistently supporting a reduction of the level of the military balance in Central Europe, which would not upset it in favor of anyone and would not endanger the security of anyone, the Soviet Union, unlike the NATO countries, for a long time has not increased its armed forces in Central Europe and does not intend henceforth to increase them either by one soldier or by one tank.¹² Moreover, the Soviet Union, in trying to create an additional stimulus for the talks, has already begun the reduction of the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe: in conformity with the decision announced by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979 in his

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speech in Berlin, on 5 December 1979 the USSR began the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 of its servicemen, 1,000 tanks and a certain amount of other military equipment from the GDR (its territory is included in the region which is being discussed in Vienna). Thus, the position of the socialist states at the Vienna talks both in its essence and in its individual elements is characterized by the consideration of the existing situation and clearly demonstrates the lack of discrepancy between the goals, which were officially declared at the talks, and the actual intentions.

In the position of the NATO countries at the Vienna talks the contradictoriness, which is displayed both in its very essence and in the specific details, attracts attention. For many years leading NATO figures, including the former secretaries of defense of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations--R. McNamara, W. Rogers and J. Schlesinger--admitted that approximate parity existed between the military groupings in Central Europe. In the annual report to Congress in 1974, that is, when the talks in Vienna were already under way, Schlesinger admitted that an approximate balance existed between the available forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the central region of Europe.¹³ Basing themselves on such an appraisal of the balance of forces, the representatives of the NATO countries have more than once come to the conclusion that the existing balance of forces provides the West European countries with an adequate level of security. The official organ of NATO Headquarters declared before the start of the preliminary consultations: "A simple list of facts confirms that since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty the members of the alliance on the whole and its West European members in particular have had and as before have genuine security, which is therefore acceptable. The problem, which arises on the practical plane, consequently consists in assuring a situation in which the MBRF will not lead to a decrease of this adequate level of Western security."¹⁴

Having come to the talks in Vienna, as the West German magazine EUROPA-ARCHIV wrote, with a quite definite goal--"to change the existing balance of armed forces in Central Europe, ... and not to maintain this balance"¹⁵--the western countries in fact disavowed their official appraisal of the balance of forces in this region.¹⁶ The balance of military forces, according to their new approach, should be determined according to the ratio of the personnel of the land forces of both sides on the basis that this branch of the armed forces ostensibly plays the main role under the conditions of Central Europe. Here the NATO countries assert, basing themselves on arbitrary data on the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in this region, that the latter as if have considerably more personnel in their land forces. Consequently, they state, in this case there are "serious disproportions," which are a "destabilizing factor," and, consequently, there is no balance of forces of both military groupings as a whole.

The artificial nature of this assessment is obvious. It is now an utter anachronism to determine combat effectiveness by "the number of bayonets." Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution the role of modern weapon systems has increased sharply. Former U.S. Secretary of

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Defense McNamara said in this connection that "comparisons only according to the number of personnel cannot serve as the decisive criterion for measuring military strength."¹⁷ Hence it follows that it is illegitimate to assess the balance of forces only according to one branch of the armed forces--land forces. It is inadmissible to proceed only from the number of servicemen, while knowing that in the same region both sides also have other branches of the armed forces--mighty air forces and nuclear weapons. The experience of the latest wars, including in the Near East, confirms that military operations under present conditions are inconceivable without the close cooperation of all branches, arms and services. Moreover, the different type of structures of the land forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in itself cannot give an objective idea about their real relative strength. The point of the concept "disproportion," which is being advanced by western countries, is to change the existing balance of forces in their favor and to achieve military advantages at the expense of the security of the socialist states.

Militarists in the United States are using even the very fact of the talks on mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe as grounds for raising demands about the further increase and improvement of the American military potential. "The Vienna talks," states J. Polk, who has close ties with the military-industrial complex, "require that we modernize our equipment, our thinking and tactical alternatives, which are available and required at the lowest level of the nuclear spectrum."¹⁸ "The idea of reaching an understanding on reductions during the talks should be combined with the compensatory strengthening of the potential," American political scientist R. Wesson echoes him.¹⁹ The practical actions of the United States also attest to the aspiration to change in its favor the balance of forces, which has formed in Europe. Whereas the Soviet Union during the Vienna talks did not increase its armed forces in Central Europe, the number of U.S. troops, according to American data, increased by 17,900 in 1977 and another 16,900 in 1978.²⁰

In this lies the main contradiction in the approach of the NATO countries to the talks: it is impossible to seek a replay of the established balance of forces in their favor and at the same time to pretend that they are not attempting to obtain one-sided military advantages and are adhering to the principles which were agreed on at the preliminary consultations. It is possible to overcome this contradiction only on the condition that the NATO countries renounce their one-sided goals and groundless attempts to change the existing balance of forces in Central Europe during the reduction. Soon after the start of the Vienna talks the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicated: "A certain military balance already exists in Europe, and the present talks, instead of jeopardizing this balance, should be aimed at its maintenance, although at lower levels of arms and with fewer expenditures. The maintenance of this balance probably is important for the successful outcome of any talks between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on mutual force and arms reduction in Europe."²¹

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By attaching great importance to the elaboration of measures on force and arms reduction in Central Europe, which would make it possible to augment political detente on the continent with military detente, the Soviet Union along with the other socialist countries has sought from the very start to lend a business-like, specific nature to the talks in Vienna and thereby to expedite the achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding. Guided by the line agreed on at the Prague session of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries in January 1972, the delegations of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia introduced at the talks on 8 November 1973 a draft of the corresponding agreement.²² It contained a detailed program of specific steps, the implementation of which would make it possible to reduce on the basis of reciprocity the high concentration of opposing troops of both military groups in this region and to ensure the security of the sides with lower levels of armed forces and arms and fewer military expenditures. This draft received a high rating even on the part of western specialists. Its "most logical consistency," in particular, was noted.²³

The plan submitted by the socialist states fully accorded with the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties on the basis of the strict observance of reciprocity and the equality of the specific commitments, which the parties would assume as a whole and at the individual stages of reduction. The socialist states did not demand of the western countries the assumption of any commitments which they themselves are not willing to assume. It was proposed to place at the basis of future reductions the method of reduction in equal number and equal percentage, which covers all the components of the arms forces and arms, namely the land forces and air forces, as well as the units and subunits equipped with nuclear weapons. During the first year (1975) the armed forces of both sides would be subject to a reduction by 20,000 men with the corresponding arms and combat materiel, and the size of the reductions of each state would be determined in proportion to the number of troops, which it has in Central Europe. During the second year (1976) each of the nations participating in the future agreement would reduce its armed forces and arms by 5 percent and during the third year (1977) by another 10 percent. It was proposed to implement the reduction on the basis of the approximate similarity and uniformity of the combined units, units and subunits being reduced, as well as the arms and combat materiel, with proper consideration of the differences in the structure of the formations, the number of personnel and the combat materiel, which are available in the combined units and units of the parties to the future agreement. Taking into account that the troops of some of them are on their own territory, while the troops of others are on the territory of their allies, the draft stipulated that the units and combined units of foreign troops being reduced along with their arms would be withdrawn to within the boundaries of their states. The national troops subject to reduction should be disbanded with the simultaneous demobilization of the personnel. After the start of the reduction the states participating in the agreement should not increase the number of their troops in the region of the reductions.

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On a practical level the reduction of the armed forces and arms of both sides in all by approximately 17 percent would mean that the total concentration of troops and arms in Central Europe would be reduced with the maintenance of the balance of forces existing here and the observance of the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties. Such a reduction would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the cause of military detente in Europe and would impose certain restrictions on the arms race.

However, the NATO countries took a different position. Their "Outline of Proposals," which was introduced at the talks on 22 November 1973,²⁴ differed sharply from the goals and principles they had agreed on. Citing the ostensibly existing "disproportions" in the number of personnel of the land forces and tanks of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, which as it serves as the main "source of instability" in Europe, the NATO countries insisted that the elimination of these "disproportions" become the goal of the talks. They gave as the reason for their position the fact that reductions on a proportionate basis (that is, in equal number and equal percentage) would only aggravate the balance in land forces, which was unfavorable to NATO, and would not lead as a result to the establishment of approximate parity between the land forces of both sides. At the very start of the Vienna talks the West stated that only land forces, and not air forces and nuclear weapons, should be subject to reduction. Here the NATO countries raised the issue that the socialist states should reduce three times as many personnel of their land forces along with arms (the West refused to reduce the arms in its land forces).

The understanding on the reduction of land forces, according to the initial western outline, should be worked out during two phases of the talks, at each of which a separate agreement should be concluded. The connection between the two phases was established by the inclusion in the agreement for the first of them of a clause on the intention of the parties to achieve as a result of the second phase "equal" collective ceilings of the number of land forces. At the first phase the land forces of only the USSR and the United States would be subject to reduction. Here it was proposed to the Soviet Union to withdraw 2.5-fold more of its troops than the United States--an entire tank army. At the same time, as compensation for the "geographic disproportion," that is, the greater distance from Central Europe as compared with the Soviet Union, the United States would receive the right to withdraw 29,000 servicemen on an individual basis or in small sub-units and to store the heavy arms and combat materiel, which were thus released, in the region of the reduction. After the conclusion of the first phase and only on the condition that the West European countries considered its results satisfactory, should the second phase of the talks be started, at which the reduction primarily of the land forces of the other immediate participants in the talks would be discussed.

Some NATO theorists explained this position by the fact that since the balance of forces in Central Europe is determined by the number of land forces and tanks, the examination of other branches of the armed forces would be

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inadvisable, since this would complicate the already difficult talks. But such an explanation does not hold water. The absolutization of any one branch of the armed forces and especially its individual components cannot be justified under conditions when the combat strength of troops is determined by the close cooperation of all the branches of the armed forces, arms and combat materiel. This also fully pertains to tanks. Moreover, when assessing the arms of the sides one must also take into account those types which, like tanks, for example, are stored at the depots of the American army in the FRG for the units of "dual basing," as well as in the reserve of the Bundeswehr. It is clear that, by excluding arms and combat materiel, as well as the air force from future reductions, to say nothing of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies were trying to reserve for themselves freedom of actions for the further increase of the combat strength of the air force and the improvement of their tactical nuclear potential in Central Europe. Thus, the "asymmetrical" reduction proposed by the West, that is, a reduction unequal in terms of the number of personnel and arms, and its different deadlines for the immediate participants in the talks contradicted the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties and was a serious obstacle to the achievement of a universally acceptable understanding.

The USSR and the other socialist states subjected the western outline and the tactical line of the NATO countries at the talks to well-reasoned criticism. They convincingly showed the flaws of the concept of "disproportions." It was emphasized that its real point is to achieve a change of the established balance of forces in Central Europe in favor of NATO by means of unequal commitments and the "asymmetrical" reduction of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. Insisting that all types of armed forces and arms would be covered by the reductions, the socialist states cited numerous arguments which show that only on this condition would it be possible in fact to reduce the high concentration of armed forces and arms in this region and to prevent the possibility of their build-up.

In supporting a just solution of the problem of force and arms reduction, the socialist countries called upon the participants in the talks on the part of the West to assume firm and unambiguous commitments to carry out on the dates, which were strictly agreed upon, the reduction of the armed forces and arms, which they have in Central Europe. Consistently supporting the simultaneous reduction of both foreign and national armed forces and arms, they have proceeded from the fact that the achievement of military detente is the common cause of the immediate participants in the talks. The granting of the right to the immediate participants to make decisions on the basis of consensus at the preliminary consultations imposes upon them the duty to directly participate in the mutual force and arms reduction. The significance of the achieved understanding consists precisely in this.

In criticizing the thesis advanced by the United States that the reduction of American and Soviet troops in Central Europe is only their redeployment within the boundaries of these states, while for those West European countries, including the FRG, whose territory is included in this region, a

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reduction essentially means partial disarmament, in connection with which they can begin the reduction of troops only after the completion of the reductions of the land forces of the United States and the USSR, the socialist countries cited the appropriate examples which show that the NATO countries knew about the differences in the procedure of the reduction of foreign and national armed forces when they consented to participate in the talks. For a number of years not only the different status of the armed forces of the participants in the talks with respect to the region in which they were deployed, but also the fact that in case of a reduction the foreign troops should be withdrawn from Central Europe, while the national troops should be disbanded, were taken into account in the studies of the NATO countries. Moreover, they knew that not only the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but also the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia would disband the armed forces being reduced. Thus, the arguments in favor of granting some special rights to the West European states located in Central Europe are unfounded.

In connection with the attempts of the United States and other western countries to exaggerate the significance of the "geographic factor," that is, the unequal distance of the USSR and the United States from the center of the European continent, and on this basis to demand the "asymmetrical" reductions of Soviet troops, the socialist states showed that this factor was constantly taken into account by the sides when arranging their armed forces in this region and developing means of transportation. The United States is offsetting its distance from Europe by developing means of long-distance rapid troop and arms deployment. Moreover, it has in Europe, outside its central region, an extensive network of military bases, at which arms and combat materiel are located. If we examine the "geographic factor" from the point of view of the mobilization capabilities of the sides, as the NATO countries do, in this case it is illegitimate to take only it into account, while ignoring other important factors, including the size of the population of the countries, their military and economic potential, the system of communications and the defense expenditures of both military alliances.

The constructive proposals, the firm fundamental position of the socialist states at the talks and the well-reasoned criticism by them of the approach of the western states in the problem being examined at them forced the NATO countries to make some adjustments in their position. On 16 December 1975 they expressed the willingness to reduce a portion of the U.S. nuclear potential in Central Europe: 1,000 nuclear warheads, as well as 36 Pershing launchers and 54 F-4 carrier aircraft.²⁵ On its part, however, it was stated that the proposed measure was of a "one-time" nature and did not provide for any further steps in this direction. The western participants in the talks also emphasized that the nuclear weapon delivery systems, with which the other direct western participants were equipped, would not be subject to reduction. The remaining provisions of the western plan remained unchanged.

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In spite of the narrowness of the western proposals, for the purposes of achieving a compromise on 19 February 1976 the socialist states met the western countries halfway.²⁶ Consent was given to divide the process of force and arms reduction in Central Europe into the two phases. In the first phase the armed forces of only the USSR and the United States would be reduced--by approximately 2-3 percent of the total number of troops of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Central Europe. The types of weapons, which were proposed by the West: nuclear warheads and some of their delivery systems and tanks, would also be reduced on an equal basis. The other direct participants of the talks should "freeze" the number of their troops at the existing level and reduce them in the second phase, so that as a result all the states, which are a party to the agreement, would reduce their armed forces by an equal percentage, as the socialist countries proposed at the very start, namely by approximately 17 percent.

The western countries refused to take the proposals of the socialist states as a basis. They attempted in every possible way to evade the discussion of the main issues and in fact directed the matter toward the dragging out of the talks. And only on 19 April 1978 did the West make some refinements in its initial outline of the reductions, which do not change, however, its sense and direction.²⁷ The demand on the withdrawal of an entire tank army of the USSR was "substituted" for the condition of the reduction of five Soviet divisions and 1,700 tanks (in exchange for 1,000 American nuclear warheads and the number of their delivery systems, which the NATO countries mentioned in December 1975). The deadlines and the total amounts of the reductions of the land forces of the West European countries and Canada were included in the agreement on the first phase (and as before it was not indicated by how many each of these states individual would reduce, whether this reduction would be carried out by military units or on a selective basis and so on); with respect to the United States it was indicated that it was withdrawing two-thirds of its troops in units and subunits.

Although the proposals made by the West to some extent took into account the considerations of the socialist countries, the western approach continues to preserve its former nature and is clearly aimed at obtaining military advantages to the detriment of the security of the Warsaw Pact countries. The western side, as before, is attempting to achieve the accomplishment of significantly greater reductions of the land forces of the socialist countries. It is conditioning the changes, which it made in the initial outline of reductions, on the achievement by the participants in the talks of an understanding on the number of troops of both sides in Central Europe, that is, in fact the agreement of socialist countries with the estimate, which was overstated by the West, of the number of their troops in this region. As before, the West refused to discuss the question of reducing arms, apart from the above-indicated number of Soviet tanks and American nuclear weapons.

For the purpose of stepping up the talks, on 8 June 1978 the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia advanced new important proposals, which took into account in a constructive spirit the essential elements of the western

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approach to the problem in question.²⁸ In these proposals there is expressed the willingness to establish as a result of the reductions equal collective levels of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the center of the European continent--900,000 men each, including 700,000 men each for land forces. Provision is made here for such conditions which would not enable any of the parties to the agreement, on the pretext of "maintaining the overall ceilings," to restore and, what is more, to increase the number of troops which they had before the reduction. So that it would be truly equal, the troops of all the direct participants in the talks should be covered by the overall levels, and no individual limitation on the number of USSR troops, which the West supports, should be set within these general levels, or "ceilings." The USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia expressed the willingness to limit the reduction of the size of the armed forces to land forces, if at the same time a maximum level of the number of personnel of the air forces would simultaneously be set. Meeting the western countries halfway, the Soviet Union, in particular, was willing to carry out the reduction of its troops in the first phase by divisions with the simultaneous withdrawal of American troops from Central Europe by brigades. In the first phase provision is made to carry out the reduction of troops of the USSR and the United States in proportion to their present number in this region. The proposals of 8 June 1978 also take into account a number of other elements of the western position.

The particular significance of these proposals consists in the fact that they retain those elements of the approach of the socialist countries, without which a truly effective force and arms reduction in the center of Europe cannot be ensured with the maintenance of the balance of forces, which has been established here. Among them there is first of all the recognition of the fact of an approximately equal ratio of the size of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this region: the assumption of specific commitments by the immediate participants in the talks on reducing their troops and arms approximately in proportion to the levels of their military potentials in the second phase; the need for all the immediate participants in the talks to take part in the force reductions. While agreeing to the establishment of collective levels, the socialist countries envisage a mechanism of their maintenance and operation, which, first of all, rules out the assumption of any "special" commitments by the Soviet Union and, second, does not enable the individual states to exceed the level of the number of their troops, which existed before the reduction. Without this it would be impossible to speak about the effectiveness of reductions and fulfillment of the main principles of the talks, first of all the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.

Characterizing the new proposals of the socialist countries, L. I. Brezhnev stated on 25 June 1978: "The socialist countries are offering their partners a reasonable, realistic compromise. Having made their proposals, they have gone even farther than halfway. We appeal to the NATO countries: let us at last get down to business. A basis for agreement undoubtedly already exists. Everything now depends on the political will of the West."²⁹ The proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries creates a practicable basis for

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elaborating the principles of the future agreement on force and arms reduction in Central Europe. It is not by chance that leading figures of the United States, England and the FRG were forced to emphasize the constructive nature of the approach of the socialist countries to the talks. U.S. President J. Carter characterized the proposals of the socialist countries as "a very concrete step in the necessary direction." FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt called these proposals "a major basis for achieving the goal of the Vienna talks."³⁰

After the proposals of 8 June 1978 were made by the socialist countries, the group of controversial issues at the talks was narrowed considerably. Now on the whole there is a mutual understanding concerning the fact that the reductions will be carried out in two phases, and the USSR and the United States will be the first to undertake them, the establishment of equal collective levels of the number of troops of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the center of Europe will be their result, only the land forces will be subject to reduction, the reduction of Soviet and American troops in the first phase will be carried out in proportion to their number of Central Europe. An understanding has also been reached on a number of other issues. It would seem that the western participants in the talks will at last display political will and perhaps will undertake the direct elaboration of the appropriate understandings. However, the NATO countries have dragged out for a year and a half the official response to the proposals of the socialist countries, placing in the forefront issues of a secondary nature. The West is artificially putting in first place, for example, the question of the number of troops of the immediate participants in the talks in Central Europe.

In spite of the fact that the official data, which are provided by the parties, on the size of their armed forces in Central Europe as of 1 January 1976 convincingly attest to the approximately equality of the troops of the socialist and western states, the delegations of the NATO countries as before are disputing the data on the troops of the socialist countries and are stubbornly sticking to their estimates, in conformity with which a disproportion in land forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact states in the amount of 180,000 men, including 150,000 more in land forces, ostensibly exists.³¹ It is quite obvious that it is simply impossible to conceal such a mass of troops. And the discussion during the talks of the numerical data on the number of troops of the countries taking a direct part in the talks quite obviously showed that the NATO countries cannot cite any facts or arguments, which support their estimates.

Hoping to find a solution to the situation which had formed, the socialist countries invited the western side to expound its methodology of calculating the number of troops, in order to establish by joint efforts the source of its overestimation of the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, especially as different criteria of the calculation by NATO countries of the size of the land forces and air forces in the armies of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were detected back in 1975. For these purposes it was proposed to exchange data on the degree of full strength of the

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forces of the individual states in Central Europe.³² However, in response the NATO countries demanded the rejection of the above-cited real figure of the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries and agreement with the arbitrary NATO estimate, moreover, the West is trying to achieve the replacement of the discussion of the number of troops with the examination of the organizational structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, which has nothing in common with the agreed goals of the talks. Judging from commentaries of the western press, the question of figures is being placed by the NATO countries on such a level in order to complicate the working out of an understanding and to impose on the socialist countries conditions of the reduction, which would provide the West with one-sided military advantages.

In characterizing the situation which was forming at the Vienna talks, L. I. Brezhnev noted that they "have bogged down in disputes concerning the methods of calculating the personnel of the armed forces of the parties--down to the last cook and medic. Frankly, this is simply a tactic of the western countries, an attempt to evade an understanding precisely when the positions of the parties on the essence of the matter have drawn considerably closer. In the end it is a fact that an overall military balance exists in Europe, even if the structure of the armed forces of each side has its own differences. We must proceed from this fact."³³ This is obvious to any sensible politician. The leading disarmament expert of the FRG Bundestag, A. (Pavelchik), reasonably advises "to put an end to the 'numbers game' and to set down to serious work: to reduce the level of military confrontation in the center of our continent on the basis of the established balance of power and to work out criteria of equal security."³⁴

The so-called question of commitments of the immediate participants in the talks remains another problem which is impeding the progress of the talks. Since the very start the West has been stubbornly pursuing a policy of artificially dividing them into two groups: on the one hand, the USSR and the United States, which should have assumed the commitments which were worked out in detail during the talks, and, on the other, the remaining countries, whose specific commitments on force reduction should ostensibly be assumed within the corresponding alliances. In fact this means that the West is willing to discuss only the problem of withdrawing American troops from Central Europe, while the question of reducing the main component of the military potential of NATO³⁵ is to be solved at its own discretion in conformity with its plans and programs. Precisely for this reason the West European countries and Canada so far have refused to assume any individual commitments and oppose the reduction of their troops by military formations and the reduction of arms. This approach contradicts first of all the principle of reciprocity of the assumed commitments, as well as the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.

It is true that in December 1978 the NATO countries stated their willingness to make some modifications in their position on the question of the assumption of individual commitments by the western immediate participants in the talks on the reduction of their troops, having proposed to include

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in the agreement for the first phase a reference to the fact that these countries would make "a significant contribution" to the overall western reductions in the second phase, as well as to inform the socialist states prior to signing the agreement on the first phase of the decision which would be made in NATO with respect to the specific extents of the reductions of the troops of the individual countries.³⁶ However, this step made no changes in the position of the West, since the West European countries and Canada as before refuse to assume within the framework of the agreement commitments on the reduction of their troops in proportion to their number in Central Europe.

An exchange of opinions on the state of affairs at the talks with respect to the mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe was made during the Soviet-American summit meeting which was held in Vienna in June 1979. The parties emphasized that the solution of this problem would be a major contribution to the strengthening of stability and security. They came out in favor of taking new steps which would lead to the successful conclusion of the talks in the area of arms limitation and disarmament.³⁷

Only 10 days had passed since the signing of the joint Soviet-American communique, when the Soviet Union along with the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia introduced a new compromise proposal at the Vienna talks. It ensures the convergence of the positions of the countries participating in the talks on the important question concerning the nature of the commitments of the states on reducing the land forces in the center of the European continent. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, taking into account the unwillingness of the West European states and Canada to assume individual treaty commitments on the specific extents of the reductions of their land forces, in the new proposal expressed the willingness to agree that the individual contributions of all the states taking a direct part in the overall reduction of troops would not be set down in the agreement on the first phase. The specific extent of the reduction in conformity with the initiative of the socialist countries of 28 June 1979 will be determined by each state individually within the alliance to which this state belongs, and will be approximately proportion to the total number of its troops in the region of the reduction. The socialist states also accepted the wish of the western side that the number of troops being reduced by the USSR and the United States in the first phase would be the greater part of their total contributions to the reductions which they would carry out during both phases. At the same time, all the provisions, which are contained in the document of the socialist countries of 8 June 1978 and are not affected by the proposal of 28 June 1979, continue to remain in force.

Thus, the new initiative of the socialist countries, which was advanced with allowance made for the point of view of the western countries, once again clearly confirms the genuine aspiration of the socialist countries to achieve progress at the talks and to lend them a more dynamic nature.

Under conditions when specific agreements on mutual force and arms reduction do not exist, the socialist countries attach great importance to the

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taking of at least partial steps which are aimed at the checking of their increase. Precisely for these purposes they advanced back in December 1974 the proposal to freeze the number of troops of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the center of Europe during the conducting of the talks.³⁸ On 30 November 1978 the delegations of socialist countries introduced supplements to this proposal,³⁹ which provide that the commitment against an increase would pertain to the total size of the armed forces of each of the sides and can be drawn up as two parallel declarations--of the Warsaw Pact countries, on the one hand, and the NATO countries, on the other. The desire of the West for a collective method of maintaining the overall level of troops within each military alliance was taken into account in this proposal. At the same time its implementation would not harm the positions of the sides, since it would have the nature of a temporary measure which would create, however, an atmosphere of trust and thereby promote progress at the talks.

Under present conditions, when the official data submitted in 1976 confirmed the existence in Central Europe of approximate parity in the armed forces of both sides, such a step is especially urgent and easy to implement. At the same time it would promote the strengthening of stability in the center of Europe and would attest to the sincerity of the intentions of the participants in the talks to make their contribution to the cause of limiting the process of the build-up of armed forces and strengthening peace and security in Europe. Sober-minded figures in the West realize this. Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee F. Church declared while speaking at the University of Utah in December 1978: "What convincing arguments, for example, can be opposed to the suggestion to freeze the armed forces of the countries participating in the Vienna talks on force and arms reduction in Central Europe for the period when these talks are being conducted? None. Back in June 1978 the socialist countries presented in Vienna detailed proposals which were aimed at bringing the views of the parties closer and called for the creation of a basis for quick practical results. Many government and political figures in the West were forced to recognize the constructive nature of these proposals. But where is the response? Nothing followed except vague promises to draft it. Meanwhile the tone of western commentaries on the essence of the June initiative of the socialist countries is changing for the worse."⁴⁰

Without responding to the set of compromise initiatives of the socialist states, which were advanced in 1978-1979 and which create the conditions for a breakthrough at the talks, the NATO countries have been undertaking steps which are clearly aimed at stepping up the arms race and aggravating the international situation. The adoption of long-term (up to the 1990's) military programs for the modernization of their armed forces, the results of the December (1979) session of the NATO Council, at which the United States in fact imposed upon its allies the decision to deploy new American intermediate-range nuclear missile systems in a number of West European countries, the latest January speeches of J. Carter--all this attests that the United States with the support of its allies in the North Atlantic bloc, first of all England and the FRG, intends to take an even harder line in

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building up in Europe the American military potential and the armed forces of NATO in general.

In light of this aspiration to achieve at any price one-sided military advantages over the Warsaw Pact countries the internal logic of the position of the western participants in the Vienna talks, at which they are hampering in every possible way the achievement of practical understandings, becomes clear, for the latter would be a restraining factor in the implementation of the plans of their military preparations. The latest proposals of the western countries of 20 December 1979,⁴¹ in which they not only did not respond to the constructive proposals of the socialist states, but even made a significant step backward from the position which they held just a year ago, are also subordinate to this goal. Whereas earlier the western countries, apart from the United States, were willing to give guarantees, be they even of a general nature, that during the agreed period they all would reduce the number of their troops in the second phase, now, by withdrawing these guarantees, the West is unambiguously demonstrating its aspiration to withdraw from the reduction six of the seven immediate western participants, whose troops constitute 75 percent of the total combat potential of NATO in the center of Europe.

The aspiration of certain West European states in essence to evade the reduction of their armed forces is also attested by the fact that in the new proposals they refuse even to limit the number of their troops during the implementation of the Soviet-American reductions in the first phase. Having withdrawn their old proposal on the reduction of a certain number of American nuclear weapons, the NATO countries have cut the ground from under another element of mutual understanding, namely the idea of reducing arms and combat materiel on a selective basis. Moreover, the West is making the conclusion of the first agreement on Soviet-American reductions conditional upon the adoption by the socialist countries of a comprehensive system of so-called attendant measures. These measures, which do not have the slightest bearing on the agreed goals and the region of reduction, are aimed at establishing strict control over the activity of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries not only in the region specified in the communique of the consultations, but also on the territory of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, as well as of Soviet troops on a considerable portion of the territory of the USSR. From this it quite obviously follows that in the western proposals of December 1979 little is left of the compromise. On the contrary, they are in essence bringing the Vienna talks to an impasse.

The socialist countries, however, will henceforth hold to the understandings and principles, which were agreed upon at the preliminary consultations, and will not allow the Vienna talks to be turned into a tool for the achievement by anyone of one-sided military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other participants in these talks. A basis for the achievement of understandings exists, and whether it will be taken advantage of depends on the realism and political will of the West. No threats and political blackmail will be able to sway the Leninist foreign policy line of our country, which combines consistent peaceableness with the firm

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repulsion of aggression. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in his responses to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, this course "proved its value in past decades, we will follow it henceforth. No one will put us off this course."⁴²

FOOTNOTES

1. The Vienna talks have been covered quite extensively in the press. In the literature an entire set of questions pertaining to these talks is examined in general form in the book: V. Basmanov, "Za voyennuyu razryadku v Tsentral'noy Yevrope" /For Military Detente in Central Europe/, Moscow, 1978; see also A. Sandstrom, "Prospects of Mutual Force Reduction in Europe," Stockholm, 1976; T. Fifka, "Windenska jednani (1937-1977)," Prague, 1978.
2. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye" /The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament/, a collection of documents, Moscow, 1977, pp 73-75.
3. Ibid., p 94.
4. "Foreign Policy Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States," White House, Press-Release, 1972, p 49.
5. "The American Commitment to NATO, Report of the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, August 19, 1972," Washington, 1972, p 74986.
6. EUROPA-ARCHIV, Issue 15, 1974.
7. NATO REVIEW, No 1, 1973, p 7.
8. Ibid., p 76.
9. "Annual Defense Department Report FY 1979," Washington, 1978, p 130.
10. This approximate equality of the forces of the two opposing military groupings in Central Europe is based not only on expert estimates of the overall balance of forces in the strategically crucial region of Europe, but is also confirmed by the official data on the number of personnel of the armed forces, which the participants in the Vienna talks exchanged in 1976. According to these data, the total number of armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in the region of the reduction is 987,300 men, including 805,000 men in the land forces; NATO--respectively 981,000 and 791,000 men (see V. Basmanov, Op. cit., p 71).
11. PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.

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12. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress on 25 April 1978," PRAVDA, 26 April 1978; A. A. Gromyko, "Speech at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 26 May 1978," PRAVDA, 27 May 1978.
13. "Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975," "Press-Release," Washington, 1974, p 88.
14. NATO REVIEW, No 17, 1973, p 5. MBFR--mutual and balanced force reduction--is a term used by NATO in official materials and studies.
15. EUROPA-ARCHIV, Issue 15, 1974.
16. But after this admissions of the existence of approximate military equality in Europe were heard more than once in the West. This is attested, in particular, by a study of prominent American figures, including current Secretary of State C. Vance, which contains the conclusion that "at present there is approximate military equilibrium in Central Europe" ("Controlling the Conventional Arms Race," "UNA-USA National Policy Panel," New York, 1976, p 31).
17. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 1969-1973. Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget," Washington, 1968, p 80.
18. J. Polk, "The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Warfare," ORBIS, No 17, Summer 1973, p 447.
19. R. Wesson, "Foreign Policy for a New Age," Boston, 1977, p 59.
20. PRAVDA, 26 January 1979.
21. "Force Reductions in Europe," A SIPRI Monograph, Stockholm, 1974, p 68.
22. V. Basmanov, Op. cit., pp 50-51.
23. EUROPA-ARCHIV, Issue 15, 1974.
24. V. Komlev, "Around the Vienna Talks," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1974, pp 45-48.
25. ATLANTIC NEWS, 19 December 1975.
26. V. Komlev, "Four Years of the Vienna Talks," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 115.
27. V. Basmanov, Op. cit., pp 122-124.
28. PRAVDA, 27 June 1978.
29. PRAVDA, 26 June 1978.

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30. PRAVDA, 11 December 1978.
31. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
32. V. Basmanov, Op. cit., p 71.
33. PRAVDA, 3 March 1979.
34. PRAVDA, 11 December 1978.
35. About 50 percent of the number of NATO armed forces in Central Europe is made up of troops of the FRG, while the number of troops of the West European states and Canada, which are immediate participants in the talks, is equal to 75 percent of the number of all NATO troops in this region (calculated according to "The Military Balance 1978-1979," London).
36. PRAVDA, 14 December 1978.
37. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
38. See V. V. Viktorov, A. V. Stoleshenikov, "The Vienna Talks: Two and a Half Years Later," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1976, p 34.
39. PRAVDA, 14 December 1978; 23 March 1979.
40. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 8, 1979.
41. PRAVDA, 22 December 1979.
42. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.

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INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL PROBES INTO HUMAN RIGHTS REJECTED

Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 91-99

[Article by Prof S. V. Chernichenko, doctor of juridical sciences:
"International Procedures and the Struggle Against Violations of Human
Rights"]

[Text] The adoption of the United Nations Charter established in modern international law the principle of respect for human rights, reflecting the states' acknowledgement of the necessity of conferring on individuals a particular complex of vital rights and freedoms and regulating international cooperation to promote the effective exercise of such rights. However, international-legal regulation of inter-state cooperation in the field of human rights has definite frameworks. They are conditioned, first of all, by social factors (cooperation between socialist and capitalist states in the field of human rights has limits relating to the differing social-economic structures of these states) and, secondly, the fact that individuals cannot be participants in inter-state relations. This means that although international law recognizes certain rights to be basic and essential for all people, they are conferred on particular persons not by the international community as a whole but by the respective state. Because of objective laws governing social development, consistent exercise of human rights is possible only under socialism, which creates conditions for all-round development of the individual. The 23 November 1978 Declaration of states participating in the Warsaw Pact asserts: "The banner of human rights and freedoms is the banner of socialism."¹

In the field of human rights, the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism is especially acute. On the one hand, we have here a collision of class-based opposing ideas about democracy (including human rights), and on the other this sphere of inter-state cooperation touches upon the internal competence of the states. ". . . It is the theme of 'concern' for human rights," emphasizes L. I. Brezhnev, "that has been chosen in recent times by leading representatives of the capitalist world as the main thrust of their ideological assault against the countries of socialism."²

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One of the most important directions in inter-state cooperation in the field of human rights is the struggle against massive and gross violations. A definite role here is assigned to relevant international procedures. Mention must be made of certain fundamental postulates³ affecting international cooperation with respect to human rights: a) human rights and basic freedoms comprise an aggregate of vital (that is, essential to characterize the legal status of the individual) general democratic rights and freedoms: general democratic in the sense that conferring them does not touch upon the social-economic structure existing in the specific states; consequently, the social content of such rights and the extent to which they are exercised in the various states will differ depending on which historic type the states belong to; b) according to the principle of respect for human rights, the states are bound to confer such rights on persons located within the bounds of their jurisdiction; but the specific content and volume of the rights conferred by the states' internal legislation; c) massive and gross violations of human rights (a particular political-legal situation) constitute a violation of this obligation (the principle of respect for human rights), entailing international-legal consequences, whereas the question of liquidating individual, isolated violations of the rights of specific persons relates to the internal competence of the various states, because it does not require inter-state efforts for resolution; d) human rights are indivisible and constitute a unitary complex (in the sense that no right or freedom or group of rights and freedoms can conflict with another right or freedom or another group of rights and freedoms); e) the full exercise of the whole complex of human rights and basic freedoms is possible only under conditions of the consistent exercise of social-economic rights--which, of course, does not diminish the significance of other categories of rights and freedoms; f) the principle of respect for human rights should be taken only in the context of other basic principles of international law and not conflict with them; g) inter-state cooperation in the field of human rights is a component part of international cooperation to strengthen peace and security.

A subject of sharp diplomatic struggle is the matter of criteria for distinguishing violations of human rights that are of an international character and violations relating exclusively to the states' internal competence. The examination, in the United Nations and other international organizations, of questions concerning human rights violations must not lead to interference in the internal affairs of the various states, to encroachment on their sovereignty or the imposition of any resolutions contrary to their will. On the other hand, references to sovereignty and the principle of noninterference must not serve to cover up human rights violations. In the practice of inter-state cooperation in this sphere a rule has developed which provides the sole possible interpretation of the correlation of the principles of respect for state sovereignty, noninterference in the states' internal affairs, equality, and respect for human rights: massive and gross violations of human rights are recognized as human rights violations

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having an international character. The wording "massive and gross violations of human rights" is a criterion which makes it possible to distinguish questions of human rights violations of an international character from questions of violations of such rights relating to the states' internal competence. In the former case, references to sovereignty and noninterference cannot be considered substantiated, because it is a matter of situations that have gone beyond the bounds of the states' internal affairs. As a rule, these are situations which present a threat to peace, acts of aggression, and other disturbances of the peace, for example the political apartheid practiced by South Africa, Israel's violation of the rights of Palestine's Arab people, the crimes of the Pol Pot and Yeng Sari regime in Kampuchea, and so on.⁴

Attempts to raise in the United Nations the question of real or imaginary isolated violations of the rights of individuals should be qualified as interference in the internal affairs of various states. True, there have been cases in the United Nations of sending in the name of the Human Rights Commission or other organs telegrams to the rulers of particular states, mentioning the names of specific persons (for example, to the Chilean junta in 1974).⁵ But these telegrams contained or assumed demands to halt massive and gross violations of human rights, in which the names of the particular persons were cited only as the most glaring examples of such violations. It is of course possible that voluntarily, via the conclusion of an international agreement, particular states may also agree to raise as an object of discussion in international organs what are known as "individual cases," that is, questions of actual or supposed violations of the individual rights of specific persons. But outside of the framework of agreement--that is, where particular states impose the examination of such cases on others in some international organ or other, this is unacceptable, because such actions constitute a violation of the principles of respect for state sovereignty, noninterference, and equality.

At the present time, imperialist circles are attempting to create in international organizations conditions for examining "individual cases" without the consent of the states concerned. For this purpose they are doing everything they can to establish corresponding international procedures (or to utilize existing ones). Attempts are also being made to raise such questions in circumvention of any procedures, directly during plenary meetings of particular international organs or at international conferences. This took place, in particular, at the 33rd session of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, when the United States delegation attempted to get the commission to send in its name a telegram to the Soviet government with an inquiry relative to measures undertaken by Soviet organs with regard to particular persons portrayed in the Western press as "fighters for human rights," but who were in reality brought to justice for violating Soviet laws. The United States delegation, having been rebuffed by the USSR delegation and finding no support from most members of the commission, could

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not bring itself to insist on voting for its motion.⁶ Attempts to raise the question of imaginary violations of human rights in the USSR were also undertaken by the American delegation in Belgrade, at the meeting of representatives of the countries participating in the All-European Conference. The political aim of such actions is to lay down a legal basis for unleashing a propaganda campaign directed against the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth at the interstate level.

Most often, however, attempts to create for these purposes precedents of examining in international organs the affairs of individual persons are undertaken by Western delegations utilizing various kinds of international procedures, generally in a veiled form, under the pretext of discovering massive and gross violations of human rights. These are the goals that were aimed at in creating in the United Nations and certain other international organizations procedures for examining so-called reports concerning human rights violations. In attempting to substantiate the necessity of examining particular complaints in order to detect massive and gross human rights violations, the Western delegations generally utilize the following argumentation: Establishing facts of gross and massive violations of human rights requires reliable information, and this requires the creation of an international procedure making it possible to objectively evaluate incoming information; information of this type, moreover, comes primarily from the victims of alleged human rights violations--that is, from individual persons and nongovernmental organizations. Hence the conclusion that it is particular complaints (individual or collective petitions, appeals, reports--they are called various things) which constitute the decisive source of information concerning human rights violations. Ultimately this leads to the creation of procedures allegedly designed to estimate and determine what number of complaints allegedly constitute proof of massive and gross human rights violations. We can predict in advance the result of this kind of "estimation" in international organs where capitalist states have a greater number of votes than socialist states and where resolutions are passed by a majority vote.

It is not a question as to what kind of resolution (in terms of its juridical force) will be passed with respect to such matters. Without the consent of the state concerned it will always remain merely a recommendation. The main point is that such procedures make it possible to discuss questions of isolated, sporadic violations of the rights of individual persons, matters relating to the internal competence of the various states and, moreover, to raise and discuss questions of imaginary human rights violations that never did occur. In the latter case, inevitably the burden of proof of its innocence rests on the accused state--that is, it gives rise to a kind of presumption of the state's guilt. Regardless of the outcome of discussions of "questions" of this type, the very fact that they were discussed should be viewed as interference in the internal affairs of the respective state, because

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without its express consent the state should not have to explain itself, much less justify itself to other states with respect to its own internal affairs. Such discussions do nothing but worsen inter-state relations and thereby damage international cooperation in the field of human rights.

It should be mentioned that the Western states are striving to limit the discussion of such questions within the framework of international procedures just to violations of civil and political rights, ignoring--for understandable reasons--even a hint of the possibility of discussing violations of social-economic rights. They attempt to represent international cooperation in the field of human rights as an isolated sphere of inter-state relations standing "above" politics and pursuing the aim of securing "genuine freedom" ("pure" democracy) to all people, and they attempt to represent the relevant procedure as the best international-legal means to secure such "freedom," which allegedly can in no way hinder the process of detente.

It must be kept in mind, however, that no international procedure can promote the securing of greater freedom than is possible under conditions of the social-economic structure and political system prevailing in a particular country, nor can it substitute for the activities of a state's organs of jurisprudence and other organs with respect to securing human rights. Since cooperation in the field of human rights is an inseparable part of inter-state cooperation as a whole, it cannot exist outside politics, and any attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the various states under the pretext of securing human rights must inevitably have a negative effect on the general condition of inter-state relations. Moreover, massive and gross violations of human rights are so obvious in character that it does not take the creation of a special procedure of examining information about them to determine whether they have been committed, much less a procedure to examine one source of such information, because this would, objectively, entail disregarding other, more substantial sources. It was not the complaints of individual persons that brought to light the politics of apartheid or the terror of the Chilean junta. Reports concerning them came in from a variety of sources, and it was unnecessary to "filter" them via various international procedures in order to evaluate them properly. Such sources, in particular, include the racist laws of South Africa, the terrorist laws and decrees of the Chilean junta, declarations of officials, and so on.

Summarizing the above, we may state that as far as international procedures in the field of human rights are concerned, the diplomatic struggle frequently revolves around questions as to what character they should have, whether questions of procedure rather than substance can or cannot be placed in the forefront within the framework of international cooperation on such matters, whether to deal with the examination of obvious, generally-acknowledged gross and massive violations

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of human rights or whether to accord crucial significance to the formal-judicial aspects of detecting human rights violations, and so on. The political content of this struggle consists of the efforts of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth on behalf of peaceful coexistence and strict compliance with generally-acknowledged principles of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter and against attempts to hinder the process of detente via interference in the internal affairs of states under the pretext of "protecting" human rights. Behind all of this, of course, stands the ideological struggle of states having different social-economic structures. It is of interest, therefore, to make a general survey of international procedures having some relation to the legal status of the individual, primarily human rights, also revealing tendencies of their development.

International procedures on matters involving various aspects of the legal status of the individual differ considerably; in the past 20 years, moreover, their number has increased noticeably. Normative material now available, and existing practice, make it possible to classify them by various criteria. In terms of legal foundation, such procedures may or may not be based on agreement. If not, they are created by decision of an international organization (for example, the procedure adopted in UNESCO to examine reports). In terms of goals, the procedures may be subdivided into those designed to obtain information concerning positive aspects of cooperation with regard to questions affecting individuals (for example, periodic reports concerning the implementation of human rights pacts) and those designed to obtain information concerning violations of international-legal norms affecting individuals (for example, violations of statutes of the Convention on Liquidation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination). Appropriate procedures may be instituted to examine a specific case or group of cases (the Nuremberg Tribunal) and to examine a particular category of cases as they arise.

In terms of the range of questions investigated, all procedures of interest here can be subdivided into those dealing with basic rights and freedoms (for example, in the Committee for Human Rights, provided for by the Pact on Civil and Political Rights) and those dealing with the special status of individuals (for example, the administrative tribunals of international organizations). Many existing procedures deal to some extent with basic rights and freedoms (promoting the exercise of them, or making efforts against violations of them, or both). The functioning of such procedures may be activated by periodic incoming information (usually of a general character, for example reports), by resolution of an appropriate organ to examine a particular question at the motion of a particular state, group of states, higher-level organ, and so on (for example, the human rights situation in Chile), the receipt of a claim (complaint) from a specific state, a complaint from a nongovernmental organization or from private persons,

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the presence of a special agreement between the states concerned with regard to examining some question in a particular way, and so on.

In terms of the nature of matters to be examined, the procedures in question can be subdivided into those dealing with international questions and those which to some extent deal with matters essentially belonging to the internal competence of the various states. Depending on the form of examination of the particular matters, the procedures can be subdivided into those involving court procedures and those that do not. The latter, in turn, have a tendency to fall into two varieties: quasi-judicial (for example, in the European Commission on Human Rights) and the general political (for example, on the basis of Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII)). Representatives of the capitalist states prefer to call both of these varieties humanitarian procedures, attempting to emphasize its allegedly nonpolitical character, and to represent the matter in such a way as to assert that the defense of individual rights is its sole purpose, ignoring the fact that unless social-political factors are taken into account--especially the status of relations between states--no formal procedure can even encourage the exercise of individual rights, much less secure them. Practice has shown that attempts to absolutize the formal aspect of the matter in this regard at the present stage are utilized by reactionary forces for specifically political aims. Finally, depending on the nature of the judgment to be pronounced, the procedures in question can also be subdivided into two categories: those which end with the handing down of an obligatory judgment and those which end with the handing down of a nonobligatory judgment.

It must be noted that the above listed typical features of the relevant procedures are encountered in various combinations. Frequently, various procedures may be used within the framework of the same organ. Clearly, it would be purposeless to attempt to find optimal combinations of these features in order to create the most effective procedure. First of all, effectiveness cannot be based only on the formal features of a particular procedure. It is essential to take account primarily of social factors and in general those conditions in which the particular procedure is to be followed. For example, in relations between states of differing social structures such a procedure should be different than in relations between states of the same historical type. Secondly, the effectiveness of a procedure generally relates to the characteristics of the object of influence of international law, which is to be made more effective by means of it (that is, the characteristics of the particular rights and duties of individuals). Third, effectiveness depends on the political goals the creators and participants in the procedure have set for themselves. In reality these goals may require not strengthening but only the creation of the appearance of such effectiveness, contrary to official declarations, as can be seen clearly in the work of the European Commission on Human Rights.

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It can be stated that procedures which are to a large extent what is known as supranational in character, as broadly proclaimed in the political and legal literature of the capitalist countries, in general deserve only negative evaluation. In the broad sense of the term they are also inter-state procedures, because they are based on international agreement or the decision of an intergovernmental organization. They are supranational in the sense that questions which are examined by means of them by their nature belong to the sphere of states' internal competence. If such a procedure, moreover, functions as complaints come in from individuals, nongovernmental organizations, or even, at best, various states, if it is set up on a non-agreement basis (that is, contrary to the wishes of certain states which are drawn into it), then it leads to interference in the internal affairs of the various states and, consequently, is of an illegal character. If such a procedure does in fact influence the status of individuals, it is only a negative influence, quite aside from the fact that it cannot be effective, for the reason that it is not able to substitute for the state mechanism, as its advocates in practice claim.

It is difficult to predict the paths of development of international procedures in the field of human rights. Of crucial importance here will be the dynamics of the correlation of social forces in the international arena and the attendant characteristics and nature of the ideological struggle. There is no doubt that the capitalist states will continue to attempt to develop procedures giving individuals direct access to international organizations which include states having different social-economic structures for purposes of utilizing them chiefly to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist states. Proof of this is seen, in particular, in their attempts to revive the idea of creating the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,⁸ and also their attempts to standardize criteria of acceptability of petitions from nongovernmental organizations and individuals. In order to see this, it is enough to focus attention on the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, participated in by most of the Western European states; also on the criteria established by the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Defense of Minorities in accordance with United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), which the USSR delegation voted against; and on criteria established by the Committee for Human Rights with regard to individual appeals specified by the optional protocol to the Pact on Civil and Political Rights. Ultimately this is a manifestation of the more general efforts of the Western states to universalize procedures of examining individual petitions in order to achieve political goals, as mentioned above. The procedure specified in Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) dated 27 May 1970, which established confidential rules governing the examination of so-called reports concerning human rights violations coming into the United Nations, was a not very successful attempt at such universalization. First of all, the procedure was not universal, because many states objected to it; secondly, in the long

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run, it permitted the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to examine only human rights situations rather than "individual cases."¹⁰

In the sphere of cooperation between states having different social-economic structures, it is obviously most advisable to apply the procedure provided in the Pact on Human Rights. The basis of this procedure is a system for submitting and discussing reports--in effect, reports from states concerning their implementation of the pacts' provisions.¹¹ At the same time, the Pact on Civil and Political Rights, and the protocol to it on an optional basis, permit the examination of inter-state and individual petitions. This procedure is generally characterized by flexibility. It encompasses a number of varieties of existing procedures and makes it possible for the participating states to select the procedure most acceptable to them without imposing their own point of view on other participants, because in all cases the relevant procedures function on the basis of the general consent of all concerned. The Soviet Union, for example, does not participate in the above-mentioned optional procedure of examining petitions.

It is already possible to observe the attempts of certain participants in the pacts to free themselves of all human rights procedures pretending to universality not provided for by the pacts themselves. A definite step in this direction was made by the Economic and Social Council in resolutions 1988 (LX) dated 11 May 1976 and 1978/20 dated 5 May 1978, which respectively released participants in the Pact on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Pact on Civil and Political Rights of the obligation to submit reports concerning their implementation to the Periodic Reports Committee, because according to the pacts such reports were to be submitted via a different procedure. At the same time, the capitalist states clearly do not wish to allow the release of participants in the Pacts on Human Rights from the procedure established by resolution 1503 (XLVIII) (this also applies to those taking part in the pacts), obviously hoping that it will still give them a small chance of utilizing it at least against the developing states of socialist orientation. It should be noted that the Soviet Union is in principle not participating in the procedure established by resolution 1502 (XLVIII).

In recent years there has been a certain increase in the number of report-givers and special task forces dealing with various matters affecting human rights, especially in the United Nations, chiefly on the level of the Human Rights Commission and the Subcommission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Defense of Minorities. Clearly, such practice may promote a deeper study and condemnation of massive and gross human rights violations, for example, the policy of apartheid, the aid provided by a number of capitalist states to the racist regimes in the southern part of Africa, and so on. It must be kept in mind, however, that the mandate of each such task force or report-giver is determined by the specific decision of the organ which designated them,

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and the procedure for selecting and examining the information to be studied is determined by the report-giver or the task force itself. It is perfectly clear that the mandate of any such group or report-giver should not go beyond the bounds of the United Nations Charter. Here again, however, we may detect on the part of the Western states an attempt to create the same old procedure of examining "individual cases," with all its negative political consequences, as mentioned above. We also cannot fail to note a desire on their part to confer corresponding powers on the United Nations Secretariat.

The increasing complication of forms of inter-state cooperation, and the worsening of the ideological struggle under present conditions, entail further complication of the international-legal regulation of inter-state contacts. At the same time, the materials discussed here give grounds for concluding that attempts to make use of a special international procedure to determine, on the basis of analysis of appeals (complaints) from individual persons and nongovernmental organizations, whether gross and massive violations of human rights are being committed in some state or other, do not guarantee objectivity and pose the danger of interference in the internal affairs of other states; they may worsen the international situation and thereby also damage cooperation in the field of human rights. It is also perfectly clear that matters of substance of international cooperation in this sphere must be given preference over matters of a procedural nature, otherwise the cooperation itself will be meaningless.

FOOTNOTES

1. Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo konsul'tativnogo komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora" [Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of States Participating in the Warsaw Pact], Moscow, 22-23 November 1978. Moscow, 1978, p 23.
2. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [by Lenin's course], Speeches and Articles, vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 531.
3. Various aspects of these matters were discussed in a number of monograph studies by Soviet authors (see Movchan, A. P., "Mezhdunarodnaya zashchita prav cheloveka" [International Defense of Human Rights], Moscow, 1958; Ostrovskiy, Ya. A., "OON I PRAVA CHELOVEKA" [The United Nations and Human Rights], Moscow, 1968; Chernichenko, S. V., "Lichnost' i mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [The Individual and International Law], Moscow, 1974; Kartashkin, V. A., "Mezhdunarodnaya zashchita prav cheloveka (Osnovnyye voprosy sotrudnichestva gosudarstv)" [International Defense of Human Rights (Basic Questions of Cooperation Among States)], Moscow, 1976; Chkhikvadze, V. M., "Sotsialisticheskiy gumanizm i prava cheloveka" [Socialist Humanism and Human Rights], Moscow, 1978.

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4. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/130 dated 16 December 1977 presents as examples of gross and massive human rights violations those which "result from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign dominance and occupation, aggression, and threats to national sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity, also the refusal to recognize the basic rights of a people to self-determination and the rights of each people to exercise full sovereignty over their own wealth and natural resources" ("Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at the 32nd Session, 20 September-21 December 1977. Supplement No 45 (A32/45), p 166). This resolution also emphasizes the indivisibility of human rights and the special significance of social-economic rights (Paragraph 1, subparagraphs a and b).
5. See United Nations Document E/5464, E/CN.4/1154, p 78.
6. See United Nations Documents E/CN.4/SR.1416-1418; E/CN.4/L.1352; see also Zorin, V., "Human Rights From a Realistic Standpoint," NOVOYE VREMYA, No 15, 1977, pp 18-19.
7. On the concept supranationality see Valki L., "Sovereignty, Supranationality, and Decision-Making in the Common Market. Questions of International Law," Budapest, 1970, pp 251-252, 259, 270.
8. See United Nations Document E/1978/34; E/CN.4/1291, pp 60, 63; E/CN.4/1320 (paragraphs 49-51), pp 13-14.
9. See United Nations Treaty Series, vol 213, 1955, pp 236-238; United Nations Documents E/5464; E/CN.4/Sub.4/1154, pp 79-80; Report of the Committee on Human Rights. General Assembly. Official Reports, 32nd Session. Supplement No 44 (4/32/44) pp 69ff (the Soviet Union did not sign the protocol). For the text of resolution 1503 (XLVIII) see Official Reports of the Economic and Social Council, 48th Session. Resolutions. Supplement No 5 (E/4621), p .0.
10. Attempts by the capitalist states to create a system for examining "individual cases" in other international organizations can be seen, for example, in the following UNESCO documents: 77/EX/Decision, p 6; 98/EX/Decisions, p 44; 102/EX/19 (this document, dated 7 April 1977, is a survey of all procedures of this type and contains detailed proposals on their "implementation" in UNESCO"; 104/EX/3.

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11. For a discussion of the first USSR report concerning measures to implement civil and political rights at the Fifth Session of the Committee on Human Rights, created in accordance with the Pact on Civil and Political Rights, see: Chizhov, B., "Complete Concord of the Law and the Will of the People," NOVOYE VREMYA, No 47, 1978, pp 14-15.

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INTERNATIONAL

NEED TO REGULATE MEANS OF MASS INFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 99-103

[Article by S. O. Shevtsova, junior scientific staff member, Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, Academy of Sciences USSR: "International-Legal Regulation of Mass Information"]

[Text] The sharpening of the ideological struggle in the international arena is making more timely the question of legal regulation of the use of the mass media in international relations. Normal, good-neighborly relations between states serve as the basis for such fundamental principles of international law as that of respect for state sovereignty and that of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. States are obliged to observe these principles when carrying out any activities, in particular the use of the mass media on the international level. Compliance with basic principles of international law in this sphere is especially vital, because the mass information media are actively used for purposes of the ideological struggle. One feature of this struggle is that it is inevitable and logical, and there can be no compromises and covenants. But the uncompromising nature of the ideological struggle does not allow the possibility of using forms of it which are incompatible with peaceful coexistence.

Soviet jurists proceed on the basis that "the ideological struggle can be and to a certain extent already is subject to international-legal regulation. . . but in these cases it is not a matter of compromise with respect to questions of ideology . . ." but rather "the norms of international law which bind states not to allow the propagandizing of certain concepts directed against peace and peaceful coexistence but to utilize only means permitted by international law in the ideological struggle in international relations." Further development and deepening of detente sets before the states the task of using the mass information media in accordance with the basic principles of international law; this requires bringing international mass media into the mainstream of peaceful coexistence, the rejection of propaganda leading to international conflicts, the rejection of interference in the internal affairs of other states or encroachments on their sovereignty.

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Under such conditions, great importance and practical significance attaches to the Declaration adopted in November 1978 at the 20th session of the UNESCO General Conference concerning the basic principles governing the contribution of the mass media toward strengthening peace and international mutual understanding, toward development of human rights and the struggle against racism and apartheid and incitement to war--the first international document summarizing general principles governing the international use of the mass media. The idea of drawing up such a document came from the Soviet Union, which proposed it within UNESCO as early as 1972. The declaration resulted from lengthy and complicated negotiations which took six years. The necessity of adopting it arose from the fact that in today's world the dissemination of mass information exerts a substantial influence on the shaping of public opinion, and through it the development of international relations and the level of detente. "The establishment of firm law and order in the sphere of cultural and ideological exchanges would help to prevent friction between states and, in the long run, would be directed toward maintaining the general peace and further development of the cultural progress of all nations."³

The socialist and developing states have come out in favor of banning the propagandizing of war and racial and national hatred, against interference in the internal affairs of other states, and in favor of balance in the international flow of information. This is especially vital in the case of the developing states, because at the present time the amount of information coming into them from the bourgeois states is 100 times greater than the information coming out of them. This sharp disproportion confronts the developing states with the task of developing and strengthening their own national mass media, setting up their own information agencies, and also activating the mass information organs they already have. Combining their efforts, in 1976 the developing countries set up a pool of information agencies of the participating states.

The developing countries have evaluated the Declaration adopted at the 20th session of the UNESCO General Conference as an important step in the struggle against "information imperialism"--that is, the major imperialist information agencies' use of the mass information media to disseminate information beneficial only to them--in the struggle to eliminate the disproportion in the conveyance of information between the developing and the capitalist countries. Since they possess powerful technical means and material capabilities for a successful competitive struggle with the newly-forming mass information media of the developing countries, the Western states do not wish to bind themselves with any juridical obligations whatsoever in this sphere. For a number of years the United States and its allies were against the adoption of the Declaration. Only the fear that they would be completely isolated among the overwhelming majority of the UNESCO member states compelled the Western countries to compromise and adopt the Declaration.

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The Declaration's preamble lists the already well-known international-legal documents which to some extent apply to the activities of the mass information media in the international arena. Special emphasis is placed on the importance of the contribution of the mass information media toward strengthening peace, trust, and friendly relations among states. Thus, the UNESCO document officially acknowledges that the international community ascribes great importance to the character of international mass information. All of the articles of the Declaration embody the premise that the mass information media must serve the cause of peace, mutual understanding, and mutual respect among nations.

At present, scientific, cultural, artistic, and economic development gives rise to the objective necessity of exchange in these spheres, leading to more intensive use of the mass information media in international relations. The sharpening ideological struggle between the two social systems does not constitute a barrier to cooperation among the states in the sphere of exchanging international mass information and the use of the media. One feature of international mass information--that is, information transmitted to other countries--is the influence it exerts on the population of not one but many countries, on the shaping of public opinion on an international scale. Its content depends on the particular goals set for itself by the state or the organs under its jurisdiction involved in the dissemination of information. Depending on this, international mass information may serve the cause of peace and social progress or reactionary aims. Just such aims, attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, are served by the mass information media of the capitalist states which are conducting foreign policy propaganda directed against the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

There are possible cases in which a state, under the guise of national domestic transmissions, transmits mass information specially to foreign states. In terms of the technique used, such transmissions can be used by the transmitting state to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states, to create situations posing a threat to the internal order and security of the other states. Such transmissions entail the international-legal responsibility of the transmitting state.

While a state has free dissemination of its national domestic mass information, the dissemination of international mass information should be based on cooperation among states in this sphere, which requires concluding appropriate agreements and achieving certain accords with regard to this matter. The activities of various states in the sphere of exchanges of mass information should be based on principles of respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. This postulate is especially vital in connection with the development of new, powerful mass information media, in particular television satellites.

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Promotion of the free exchange of information by the various states, as specified in the UNESCO Declaration, proposes that such exchanges be carried out on the basis of appropriate constitutional provisions and international agreements. This reflects the position of the socialist and the developing states, which are against the uncontrolled flow of international information. The principle of respect for state sovereignty requires that mass information exchanges on the international level must be carried out in accordance with the constitutions and other laws and customs of the countries cooperating in this sphere.

Because of the fact that the mass information media, especially radio and television, exert a strong impact on people's consciousness, the shaping of public opinion, no country can permit itself a "free, uncontrolled flow of information" on the national level; this assumes internal regulation of the activities of the mass information media by all states, without exception. The dissemination of national domestic mass information in the socialist countries is based on the relevant provisions of their constitutions and on compliance with their domestic legislation. All the mass information media in the socialist countries, which belong to the state and to social organizations, are obliged to promote the development of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of other countries, to support and strengthen the general peace. The propagandizing of war is prohibited by the USSR Constitution.

In the capitalist countries, contrary to the claims of bourgeois propaganda, there is not unrestricted freedom of information; the mass communications are essentially a sphere of Big Business. It includes both state and private mass information media, but in effect control over their activities is in the hands of representatives of financial-monopolistic capital, who allow the dissemination only of information beneficial to themselves. In addition, the owners of the mass information media make extensive use of veiled censorship, which is a particular form of limiting freedom of information. Limiting freedom of information is in fact stipulated in the national legislation of the capitalist countries. In the United States, for example, the 1967 federal law on the freedom of information lists all categories of information that are classified. And the other capitalist states directly or indirectly exercise legal regulation of their mass information media, subordinating it to the interests of the country's ruling circles.

In most of the newly developing independent states, the mass information media have been nationalized, and the states themselves regulate them on the national level. As yet, however, the developing states have only a weakly developed system of mass information media; this allows the big capitalist states to carry out policies of "information imperialism" against these countries. Article 6 of the UNESCO Declaration states that a beneficial condition for improving mutual exchanges of information, establishing a just and firm peace, and ensuring the

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economic and political independence of the developing states would be to eliminate inequality in the dissemination of information "intended for and coming out of the developing countries, and also between these countries." We may assume that this wording expresses the gist of the requirements of the developing countries concerning the establishment of a "new international information order" in the world. The Declaration sets forth the appropriate ways to achieve this goal, emphasizing the necessity of providing the mass information media of the developing countries with conditions for strengthening and expansion, also the various states' fostering of mutual cooperation of the mass information media of the developing countries with the information organs of the developed states.

The Declaration states that the mass information media should make an effective contribution to the cause of human rights. For these purposes, in accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 3, of the Declaration the mass information media should help "to hear the voice of oppressed peoples struggling against colonialism, neocolonialism, foreign occupation, and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and lacking the opportunity to express themselves in their own territories." The mass information media should also serve the cause of indoctrinating young people in the spirit of peace, mutual understanding, and mutual respect. In analyzing the Declaration's provisions concerning the activities of the mass media with respect to developing human rights, it must be stated that the rights and freedoms of each individual cannot be viewed as unrestricted. In present-day international law a complex of norms and principles has been formed which apply to basic human rights and freedoms; in particular, they include the right of each individual to freedom of speech and expression. These norms and principles do not confer rights directly on individuals but merely stipulate the obligations of the states in the sphere of exercising these rights and freedoms. The assignment of the individual's right to freedom of speech and expression to the internal competence of the state presumes that the exercise of this right is regulated by national legislation and means that the principle of freedom of speech and expression is more of a national-legal than an international-legal character.

In promoting the principle of "freedom of information," Western jurists classify it as a basic human right. "Freedom of information," in their opinion, entails the individual's unrestricted right to convey and receive information and ideas regardless of state borders, regardless of the state. In this, however, they do not take account of the particular obligations and the particular responsibility involved in exercising this right. This is why Article 19 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights stipulates the possibility of establishing by law restrictions that are essential in order to respect the rights and reputation of other persons, in order to protect state security, public order, and the health or morals of the population.

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In carrying out their professional duties, journalists are obliged to obey the laws of the country in which they are working. Neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press give the right to propagandize war, national and racial hatred, or apartheid. This provision is precisely stipulated in Article 20 of the International Pact on civil and political rights. More than strange, therefore, is the assertion of THE NEW YORK TIMES that "for Americans there can be no freedom of speech or 'balanced' information unless those who come out in favor of racism and apartheid, or even for war, are also given freedom of speech."⁴

The UNESCO Declaration lacks any provision concerning states' responsibility for the international activities of all mass information media under their jurisdiction. The draft declaration's article which deals with states' responsibility for the activities of national mass information media has evoked the fierced attacks by opponents of the Declaration, who are against any kind of control over the activities of such media. But the Declaration's lack of an article dealing with states' responsibility for the activities of mass information media does not mean that the states are free of all responsibility in this matter.

In accordance with the principle of state sovereignty, all physical and legal entities within the territory of a particular state are under its jurisdiction, and the organs of that state are obliged to see to it that the activities of these entities do not conflict with the international obligations of the particular state and international law and order. This provision applies fully to the activities of all mass information media within the jurisdiction of a state.

The generally-acknowledged imperative principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states obliges them to take the necessary legislative measures in order to ensure that the activities of all mass information media are in strict compliance with provisions deriving from this principle. Violation of this principle by the mass information media must be viewed as violation by the state itself, because a state is obliged to halt unlawful activities of all its mass information media, regardless of their affiliation.

In an article dealing with the Declaration, THE NEW YORK TIMES was obliged to acknowledge that the Declaration adopted at the 20th session of the UNESCO General Conference "requires that all signatory countries be guided by the 'relevant principles' of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, which stipulates that propagandizing of war and incitement of discrimination are prohibited by law."⁵ It must also be said that the ban on the dissemination and propagandizing of certain reactionary ideas and views is embodied as law in a number of fundamental international-legal documents. Thus, the preamble of the United National Charter stipulates that the states are obliged "to

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manifest tolerance and live together as good neighbors at peace with one another. . . ."

In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the states are obliged to carry out international cooperation in resolving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian nature, and also foster and develop respect for human rights and basic freedoms for each individual regardless of race, sex, language, or religion. Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter prohibits interference in matters which are essentially within the internal competence of any state. Article 4 of the International Convention on Liquidating All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1965, declare as illegal any propagandizing based on ideas or theories of racial superiority, also any dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority. Article 4 of the International Convention on Stopping the Crime of Apartheid and Punishing It, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973, specifies the states' obligation to undertake any measures of a legislative or other character in order to halt and also prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and segregationist policies or manifestations similar to it. The Declaration of Principles of International Law affecting friendly relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the United Nations Charter, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1970, emphasizes the indivisible right of each state to choose its own political, economic, and social system without any kind of interference on the part of any other state. The Concluding Act of the All-European Conference stipulates that "the participating states are to refrain from any interference, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in internal or external affairs falling within the internal competence of another participating state, regardless of their interrelations."⁶

All of these provisions relate directly to the activities of the mass information media on the international level, which must be carried out on the basis of strict compliance with the basic principles regulating relations between all states. For violation of these principles, states bear international liability.

The UNESCO Declaration concerning basic principles affecting the contribution of the mass information media toward the strengthening of peace and international mutual understanding, toward developing human rights and the struggle against racism and apartheid and incitement to war, is an important step along the path of utilizing the mass information media for purposes of peace and social progress. The Declaration is a convincing example of the possibility of working out international-legal norms and principles of activities for the mass information media.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Tunkin, G. I., "Ideologicheskaya bor'ba i mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [The Ideological Struggle and International Law], Moscow, 1967, p 28.
2. UNESCO Document 20/C/20Rev. corr., dated 21 November 1978.
3. Kolosov, Yu. M., "Massovaya informatsiya i mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [Mass Information and International Law], Moscow, 1974, p 5.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 November 1978.
5. Ibid.
6. "Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami" [Collection of Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions in Effect Between the USSR and Foreign States], Issue 31, Moscow, 1977, p 547.

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REGIONAL

TEACHING OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE IN KIRGIZIA EVALUATED

Frunze RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE in Russian No 5, May 79
pp 61-64

[Article by Candidate of Philology A. D. Zhizhina (Moscow): "The System of Textbooks and Accompanying Methods Literature for the Subject 'Russian Literature in the Kirgiz School'"]

[Text] A new curriculum in Russian language and literature in Kirgiz for the republic's schools has been approved. Kirgizia's Russian philology specialists are embarking on an improvement in our programs and textbooks in accordance with this plan and also with regard for the modern requirements of the theory and practice of teaching the subject. It will be useful for this, naturally, to evaluate objectively what has already been done in this field. In publishing the brief problematical-critical survey of the Moscow methods instructor Alevtina Dmitriyevna Zhizhina the editors appeal to the readers to send in their reviews of and observations and proposals concerning the current programs and textbooks and also concerning paths for their improvement or the creation of new textbooks for individual grades (concentric cycles) of the Kirgiz school.

The textbooks on Russian literature and the reading material for the Kirgiz school constitute a definite unity. The material becomes more complex gradually, thanks to which it succeeds by and large in avoiding the abrupt leap in the transition from the fifth to the sixth grades typical of many national schools and also from the seventh to the eighth and, most important, from the eighth to the ninth grades. Thus the transition to a systematized course of literature is better prepared than in the schools of many republics.

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One perceives in the group of textbooks for the Kirgiz school an aspiration to cater for a unified method of familiarization with the subject:

1--A comprehensive problem-clarifying discussion with elements of research reading is employed.

The montage-discussions in the textbook for the eighth grade--the discussion on the novel "Yevgeniy Onegin," for example, which extends to the reading of the minimum number of particularly significant stanzas (episodes)--serve this purpose. One notes in the textbook for the ninth grade the section devoted to a study of N. A. Nekrasov's work "Komu na Rusi zhit' khorosho" [For Whom Life Is Good in Rus'], whose apprehension is difficult for a student of a national school: the content of the poem is surveyed, and there is a brief description of the chapters from which the quoted extracts have been taken. Fragments which are ideologically and artistically the most significant have been selected for textual presentation. The extracts are given headings, which lends them a certain completeness. The montage is supplemented by questions and assignments organizing the students' reading and leading them to independent conclusions. The questions and assignments are varied: "Choose quotations from the poem for the pictures portraying the people's difficult life"; "Compare the situation of the people and the nobles. Support your comparisons with examples" (p 205; here and subsequently the page numbers of the corresponding textbooks are of the latest editions thereof); "What judgment did Nekrasov pass on the landowners of his poem?" (p 235); "What did Nekrasov bring that was new to the portrayal of the Russian peasantry in the character of Saveliy?" (p 238); "Compose a short oral or written composition entitled 'We will live for the happiness of our native parts!'" (p 311). The subject concludes with a final analysis (pp 235-237). There is also an accompanying annotation of the text in the process of the clarifying discussion. However, the comprehensive clarifying discussions are not equally successful in all textbooks (or in individual chapters of the above textbooks). This applies particularly to the readers for the seventh and 10th grades.

2--There is an orientation toward the unified structural pedagogical organization of the material and the methods of its presentation.

The majority of textbooks has adopted a common system of adapting program works of art (abridgments, the additional division of the text into separate parts, providing headings and so forth). Uniform typesetting and the use of parallel and intratext vocabularies are bringing these books into closer resemblance. True, the latter requirements are not kept up in all textbooks; the above-mentioned methods of presentation are not employed in the textbook for the 10th grade, for example (a parallel vocabulary has only been introduced in the 10th edition and only for certain texts).

The structure of the textbooks as a whole provides for a gradual transition to a systematized course of Russian literature which begins in the eighth

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grade. However, the structure of the textbooks of the seventh and eighth grades in this plan prompts certain questions. Thus the textbook for the seventh grade opens with the section entitled "Order-Bearing Kirgizstan," which features two poets: Alykul Osmonov and Raykan Shukurbekov. The following is given as the reason for the insertion of the section: "To arouse the children's interest in literature on the basis of material of their native republic which is close to the students and to create a certain emotional and linguistic basis for studying the works of Russian prerevolutionary and Soviet writers" (K. V. Mal'tseva, Ye, N. Kurbatova, "Metodicheskoye rukovodstvo k uchebniku 'Literaturnoye chteniye na russkom yazyke dlya VII klassa kirgizskoy shkoly'" [Methods Guide for the Textbook "Russian Reader for the Kirgiz School's Seventh Grade"], Frunze, Mektep, 1970, p 7). But this reasoning, it seems to us, fails to take due account of the fact that in the system of textbooks material from native literature is presented in the sixth and even fifth grades. The textbook for the eighth grade, on the other hand, has partially assimilated the structure proposed by Latvian authors: the texts and an analysis thereof are part of feature stories on the life and work of writers--which has its positive and negative aspects, which the reviewers mentioned at the time.

3--The textbooks realize the aspiration, not to an equal extent everywhere, it is true, to continuity in the work on vocabulary support for the courses. The following rubrics have been introduced for this purpose: "You and I Met... Where?" (sixth grade), "Vocabulary Practice" (eighth grade) and "Familiar Words" (ninth grade), which makes it possible to trace the movement of the words in the texts and educational articles, that is, reflects the life of the word and the possibility of its use. For example, in the textbook for the ninth grade: "Slave ([kul], p 5). After the victory in the war of 1812, the peasants again became...their own landlords" (Bio. of Pushkin, eighth). "And...blessed fate" (Pushkin, "Yevgeniy Onegin," ch. 2, eighth). "And I will die, as I have lived, on foreign soil...an orphan" (Lermontov, "Mtsyri," ch. 4, eighth). "And in the face of authority the contemptibles..." (Lermontov, "The Duma," in the bio., eighth), (p 7). The vocabulary work is varied. Attention is paid to the development of both the spoken and written language: "Paraphrase the lesson "Meeting and Friendship With Belinskiy" (on Nekrasov), "Which Russian word might convey the Kirgiz term...? "Fill in the gaps in the following sentences: 'Turgenev reflected his childhood...in "Zapiski okhotnika"' [A Huntsman's Diary] (textbook for the ninth grade, p 197). Word and phraseological tables are used (ibid., p 214).

The textbooks employ a differentiated approach to works of the active and passive word stock. Sufficient attention is constantly paid to consolidating the vocabulary.

At the same time it has to be mentioned that the interpretation of words in the textbooks is not always successful. For example, in the textbook for the eighth grade: "Confession--a frank avowal just prior to death" (p 29; compare the explanation given in the S. I. Ozhegov "Slovar' russkogo yazyka"

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[Dictionary of the Russian Language]: "1. A frank acknowledgment of something, communication of one's thoughts, views... 2. Among believers: repentance of sins before a priest..."; "Legend--traditional tale, account of a real...or imaginary event which occurred long ago" (p 5; but legends about Chapayev appeared during the civil war).

4--The intention of the pedagogical juxtaposition of two national cultures (Russian and Kirgiz) is typical of all the testbooks on Russian literature for the Kirgiz school, but it far from always achieves its aim to an equal extent. Thus the interconnection of the literatures (more precisely, their coexistence) is shown even in the textbook for the sixth grade; however, sufficient consideration of the psychology of the Kirgiz school students' apprehension of Russian literature is not perceived here. The textbook for the eighth grade elucidates the following questions: "Gogol' and the Kirgiz Theater" and "Ch. Aytmatov on the Significance of Pushkin's Prose and His Creative Life"; there is a comparative-stylistic analysis of translations into Kirgiz of Pushkin's poems "Memorial," "I loved you" and others. The textbook for the ninth grade shows the beneficent influence of the revolutionary democrats on the progressive part of the intelligentsia of the oppressed peoples of Russia (Chokan Valikhanov, Ibragim Altynsarin); there is a description of the performance of A. N. Ostrovskiy's plays on the Kirgiz stage and the actor's portrayal of Catherine, which helped in the struggle against vestiges of the bai attitude toward woman. The textbook for the 10th grade contains sections of the type "Mayakovskiy and Kirgiz Literature" (pp 194-195) and others.

5--Other "standardizing" factors may also be mentioned; for example, unity of approach to the use of pictorial materials ("videostimulants"), which is also not effected consistently everywhere, in our view.

The textbooks solve the problem of the comprehensibility of the material in planned but unequal manner. The chapters of the textbook for the ninth grade are typical in this respect. Complicated wording (?...lyric poetry is characterized by a special type of construction of image representing...") (textbook for the eighth grade, p 71). However, the complaints about complexity usually from methods instructors of certain republics with respect to Kirgiz textbooks are to a certain extent made without regard for the entire system of previous years of tuition, including the fourth and fifth grades, where abridged or summarized texts are introduced (in the fourth grade--S. Ya. Marshak, S. V. Mikhalkov, V. M. Garshin's "Signal," A. P. Chekhov's "Van'ka" and others).

The ideological-political full-blooded nature of the basic material in the textbooks is not in doubt. The authors avoid works which are artistically weak. The texts incorporated in the readers possess serious educational potential.

An attempt is made to link the study material with the present day (see the examples cited above). Thus the section "Korchagins of Our Day" (pp 246-249) has been inserted in the textbook for the 10th grade.

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The authors of the textbooks aspire to take account of the contemporary state of methods and literary-criticism thought, particularly the recommendations (and also research) of the Russian Literature Teaching Methods Sector of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Scientific Research Institute of the Teaching of Russian in Public Schools. The textbook for the ninth grade is distinguished by literary critical soundness. It should at the same time be mentioned that the Kirgiz methods instructors do not always realize modern requirements at a sufficiently high level. Thus the textbook for the 10th grade sets the assignment of preparing an oral reproduction of "Lines on the Soviet Passport" (p 152) and even provides a plan of the reproduction. An assignment such as "prepare a comprehensive description of the character of V. I. Lenin from Mayakovskiy's poem 'Vladimir Il'ich Lenin'..." (p 192) would have been more meaningful and interesting, in our opinion. If in the textbook of the seventh grade the biographical data on Pushkin has been presented skillfully and is successful, Lermontov's life has not been described entirely successfully (p 73). The textbook for the ninth grade contains the section "Singer of Russian Rustic Nature" (pp 192-193), but, as a whole, there is insufficient stress on the poetry of peasant labor so magnificently conveyed by Nekrasov.

Work is underway in Kirgizia on the creation of an educational package. It will include textbooks and methods guides for the textbooks. Methods guides are being published, but, unfortunately, these are books of very slight volume (approximately 6 printed sheets or even, which is more often the case, far less); if this were to be augmented, it could be of more solid help to the teachers. Short brochures of a monographic nature like, for example, L. A. Sheyman's "Discussion on the Writer-Citizen (for Study of the Life and Work Path of the Russian Classical Author in the Kirgiz School)" (Frunze, Mektep, 1970) and also articles published in the journal RUSSKIY YAZYK V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE, in the collections O PREPODAVANII RUSSKOGO YAZYKA I LITERATURY V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE and VOPROSY PREPODAVANIYA RUSSKOGO YAZYKA I LITERATURY V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE and in other publications of the Kirgiz Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogics supplement the methods guides. Brochures from the "Kirgiz Schoolchildren's Library" series (see, for example, E. A. Polotskaya, "Rasskazy A. P. Chekhova. Uchebnoye posobiye dlya vneklassnogo chteniya v IX klasse kirgizskoy shkoly" [Stories of A. P. Chekhov. Study Aid for Home Reading in the Ninth Grade of the Kirgiz School], (Frunze, Mektep, 1970) could also prove a certain help to the school. However, these are only individual editions and, like the methods guides, are not reissued in good time, and, consequently, far from all teachers can take advantage of them. Among other components of the package, mention should be made of the companion readers (prepared for each grade) intended for the students' independent reading, compulsory class discussions on home reading envisaged by the program and also for elective classes. These readers are linked in subject and language with the basic textbook. The book "Po stranitsam sovetskoy literatury. Uchebnik-sputnik (chrestomatiya) dlya IX klassa kirgizskoy shkoly" [From the Pages of Soviet Literature. A Companion Text (Reader) for the Ninth Grade of the Kirgiz School] may serve as an

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example. Its authors are E. Sh. Abdulina, I. P. Karaseva and L. A. Sheyman (under the general editorship of L. A. Sheyman, Frunze, Mektep, 1973). The book includes the sections: "Beneath the Labor Red Banner," "The USSR at the Construction Site," "People's War," "To Be a Human Being on Earth-- A Splendid Office!" and "Time, forward!"

Literature for home reading is also included in the basic textbooks (in the textbooks for the sixth and seventh grades, for example). The creation of packages and other auxiliary material is planned.

The current textbooks will be issued in an improved layout in 1980.

The methods literature being published in the republic is devoted to questions of school practice and (which is the case in far from all republics) questions of the creation of the theoretical basis for the further development of the corresponding fundamental and applied sciences.

It would be desirable for the above-mentioned remarks to be taken into consideration in the subsequent perfection of educational-methods material with respect to Russian literature for the Kirgiz school. It would also be useful, as mentioned by the republic's methods instructors themselves, to increase the attention paid to elements of linguistic-poetic analysis and to the various types of the students' comments and creative quest.

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