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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 669



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ROLE OF ACDA AID PROGRAM EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Sophie Bessis: "The Aid War Will Not Take Place"]

[Text] The ACDA: Under these initials, the new Concerted Action for Development in Africa has, since 28 December, joined the long list of associations that have flourished for the past several years to help Africans emerge from underdevelopment. Unlike its elders, this newborn organization is the offspring of France.

Ulterior Motives

It was actually at the French-African conference that met in May 1976 in Paris that President Valery Giscard d'Estaing launched the idea. It was an ambitious project: The French chief of state proposed to persuade four other major Western countries (the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Belgium) to participate in the creation of a development fund endowed with a financial package of \$1 billion to be spent in 5 years in Africa, in the southern Sahara. Since the initiative was French, Valery Giscard d'Estaing undertook to sponsor the operation from beginning to end and thereby make France appear to be one of the main instigators of African development.

After 3 years of negotiations, the mountain seems to have given birth to a mouse: The ACDA does not have a penny to its name and is but a structure for concertation between six of the main Western financial backers, with Canada having joined the initial team. Experts will therefore meet regularly to coordinate the aid awarded individually by the six new partners and encourage the startup of projects to open up countries without access to the sea, fight natural disasters (drought and major endemic diseases) and promote agricultural development. None of these things are new, inasmuch as the cooperation organizations of the different states did not wait for 1980 before getting together regularly, even if each one does have its own policy.

In order to understand this half failure suffered by France, one has to go back to 1976 and even further, to the time of the launching of the little

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aid war whose origins are -- as one might have suspected -- much more political than strictly economic. Beginning with the upheavals from 1970 to 1975 on the African continent and elsewhere: the oil crisis, the drought in the Sahel and its consequences, the fall of the Ethiopian empire, Soviet-Cuban penetration of southern Africa and the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, Africa ceased being the reserved domain of the former colonial powers.

## Suspicion and Distrust

In the initial stage, it was a question of breaking down the de facto economic monopoly of countries such as France and of enticing nations by large amounts of financing. This is one of the reasons why for the past several years, there has been an increasing "multilateralization" of financial aid under the aegis, among other organizations, of the World Bank, and the establishment of development organizations such as the Club of the Sahel, sponsored by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], in which the United States and Canada have played an overwhelming role, at least at the outset. At first, France looked askance at all of this. It was all the more concerned since the stagnation of its financial aid to development in real terms did not allow it to oppose the reorientation effectively. However, Giscard d'Estaing is not a man to abdicate and he knows that prolonged brooding does not pay off. It was therefore a matter of moving with the current, while giving France a preponderant role in the drafting of the policy of aid to development.

These seem to have been the objectives that presided over the idea's inception in 1976, ideas since renewed at every French-African summit conference. However, the rival partners were not so easily convinced, reluctant to have France shine thanks to their dollars or marks!

How was the current compromise then achieved? First of all, on the political level, President Carter was to accede -- at least partially -- to France's desires, since the nation had become the principal defender of Western positions in Africa. Moreover, it is significant that in this matter, the State Department supported the creation of the ACDA, while the U.S.-AID (the American organization for aid to development) was hostile to it. Because of their ideologically unbiased aid (the Congo and the Ivory Coast are on the payroll along with the European Development Fund), the Europeans have many more trump cards than the United States for "bringing around" the countries situated in the Soviet sphere and which receive many weapons from their great ally...but few machines or factories. The possibility of detaching certain African countries from their alliance with the Eastern bloc seems to have won out.

## Great Solemnity

On the economic level, finally, the experience of countries such as France and Great Britain, fellow travelers in Africa, can be of great help in

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drafting projects important on a regional scale. Without a doubt, the French president goes a little overboard when he declares: "The ACDA is one of the most significant undertakings in international cooperation." Nevertheless, he has managed to have the "permanent liaison group" of the new association set up its headquarters in Paris. Diplomat Edouard Theysset has already been named as France's representative, while the United States chose the former representative of U.S.-AID in Dakar, Mr Schoonover. A meeting of high officials from the six countries will take place twice annually in order to coordinate aid programs.

The enterprise was announced with great solemnity to the African countries and the OAU. Was it in order to make them forget that it will not increase the financial flow to their continent one cent? At most, the undertaking will make it possible to speed up joint financing procedures for costly programs and prevent rivalries between backers.

There is great hope in Paris that other major countries such as Japan will soon join this "Club of the Six." But it is obvious that for the time being, at least, the birth of the ACDA will not bring any major changes in Africa's long march toward development.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GUINEA SEEKS UDEAC MEMBERSHIP--Equatorial Guinea would like to join the UDEAC (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa), consisting of Cameroon, Central Africa, the Congo, and Gabon. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbazogo confided this to his host, Mr Ahmadou Ahidjo, during his official visit to Cameroon on 24-27 January. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 p 55] 5058

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ANGOLA

## BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION--These are the statistics for Angola's oil production: 9,318,000 tons in 1973, 10,036,000 tons in 1974, 5,464,000 tons in 1975, 6,552,000 tons in 1976, 10,069,000 tons in 1977 and 8,198,000 tons in 1978. The statistics for 1979 have not yet been specified; according to the PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, production will hover around 9,000,000 tons. In 1978, Angolan refinery capacity was as follows: fuel-oil, 445,318 tons (of which 431,917 tons were exported); gas-oil, 201,271 tons (with 6,804 tons exported); kerosene, 93,000 tons; gasoline 68,629 tons (3,788 tons exported); crude oil, 27,912 tons; butane, 7,659 tons; asphalt, 3,810 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 399]

EXPORT STATISTICS--The commercial section of the French Embassy in Luanda has estimated that the total amount of Angolan exports for 1978 rose to \$1,100 million. This total is apportioned as follows: oil, \$800 million (72.7 percent); diamonds, \$85 million (7.7 percent); coffee, \$145 million (13.18 percent); other products, \$70 million (6.36 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 399]

EDUCATION MINISTER TO GDR--Mr Ambrosio Lukoki, a member of the Politburo of the MPLA-Labor Party and education minister of the People's Republic of Angola, has been touring Europe since early January. In the GDR, he was received by Mr Hermann Axen, a member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party. Mr Axen assured Mr Lukoki of the GDR's support for the action which Angola is taking "to defend itself against South African aggression," the ADN [General East German News Agency] reported. With Mr Oskar Fischer, GDR minister of foreign affairs, on 14 January Mr Lukoki signed a 2-year operational agreement providing among other things for expansion of bilateral cooperation in education and culture. Mr Lukoki then went to Yugoslavia, where he arrived on 17 January, for a "working visit." After landing in Belgrade, the Angolan minister said that he intended to talk with his Yugoslav hosts about cooperation between the two countries in education and training of cadres. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 215] 11915

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CAMEROON

## BRIEFS

PADDY RICE PRODUCTION--In Northern Cameroon, thanks to the efforts made during 1978-79, paddy rice production rose to a total of 30,000 tons, of which 18,600 tons were obtained in the rainy season. Paddy production has been on the increase since 1974. In fact, for the period 1974-1975, 6,602 tons were harvested; 1975-1976 saw a gain to 17,000 tons and 1976-1977 to 23,000 tons. In 1977-1978, the improvement was smaller: only 24,300 tons, but in 1978-1979 the figure rose to 30,000 tons. However, the situation insofar as marketing is concerned is quite alarming. There are 11,000 tons of paddy stocks, of which approximately 1,500 tons are not under cover of any kind owing to the lack of space in the warehouses, a stoppage at the processing plant and congestion in the final products warehouses. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 86] 7129

FRENCH AID FOR KRIBI PORT--Mr Youssoufa Daouda, Cameroon's minister for economy and the plan, on 22 December (1979) signed a financing agreement whereby France will grant the Cameroon 250 million CFA francs for the construction of the port of Kribi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 87] 7129

POPULATION PREDICTION--In the year 2000, the Cameroon expects to have 14 million inhabitants, as compared with the 8 million at present. It is estimated that the gainfully employed population will exceed 7 million, according to a statement made on 7 January, last, at Yaounde by the Cameroon's deputy minister for economy and the plan, Mr Pierre-Desire Engo. As chairman of the meeting of the Cameroon's Commission for Production, entrusted with the task of examining the country's development prospects, Mr Engo stressed that it was important to consider the means of providing employment for everyone. At the same time, it was necessary to offer educational facilities to some 3 million children between the ages of 6 and 14, who will be attending school by the end of the 20th century. After indicating that some 48.5 percent of the population would live in urban areas by the year 2000, the deputy minister emphasized the need for the country's growth in order to be able to meet all the demands of its population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 p 87] 7129

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BOKASSA OVERTHROW, LIBYAN RELATIONS, DACKO POLICIES NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 50-56

[Interview with Henri Maidou, CAR vice president by Sennen Andriamirado et al.]

[Text] An interview with Henri Maidou, vice president of the Central African Republic, led by Sennen Andriamirado, with the participation of Jos-Blaise Alima, Sophie Bessis, Abdelaziz Dahmani, Siradiou Diallo and Jean-Pierre N'Diaye.

They called him "Mr Contradiction" during the last months of Bokassa. Under David Dacko, he is suspected of being the real wielder of power. Former prime minister of the empire, now vice president of the republic, Henri Maidou knew that when he came to JEUNE AFRIQUE no punches would be pulled. Why had he supported Bokassa to the end?

Why had he called on France to dethrone the emperor in a half hour? Why had he yielded first place to David Dacko? He told us everything.

"Bokassa had no reality other than that which he himself had created." This incisive judgment is a testimony which has historical value. It comes from Henri Maidou, current vice president of the CAR, but especially the close collaborator of the fallen emperor during nearly 10 years.

Former prime minister of "His Majesty," he is one of the striking figures of that period of terror and humiliation which the Central Africans would like to forget forever. Under these conditions, it is understandable that the person of Henri Maidou would be debated for the role that he had played in the recent past.

Why hadn't he resigned if, as he claims, he had already long been in disagreement with Bokassa's methods? The reply is instantaneous: "Nobody willingly quit his position during the 14 years that the monarch's dictatorship lasted." And he continues: "I had to be extremely careful, because if Bokassa had had the slightest evidence of my plan, I would have been liquidated immediately, and his removal would have been postponed until a snowy day in July..."

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Henri Maidou is not stingy with confidences. He willingly states that despite the banning of JEUNE AFRIQUE under Bokassa, he read it regularly thanks to the collusion of friends coming back from trips who carried the newspapers under their coats. He still remembers, with a smile on his lips, the grotesque decision of Bokassa to forbid his subjects from listening to Radio France's international broadcasts. So many facts which demonstrate the state of mind of a tyrant who did not shy away from ridicule, and whom Henri Maidou describes as a man who "did not hesitate to use all methods for pursuing his ascension to eternity."

Keystone of the core of conspirators who had resolved to undermine the regime from inside, this pleasant man, well-built and with graying hair, set off by a shock of white at the forehead, has an elegance which is rather rare among African politicians. From his training as a teacher, he has retained a certain taste for instructing. This tendency clearly wins out over the subtlety and sensitivity of the politician, as shown by his little inclination to dodge even the most embarrassing of questions. The man has a real mastery of words and ideas. Without searching for the striking expression, he goes right to the point.

The point? "Bokassa had to be gotten rid of, no matter what the means used," he replied to a question concerning the role of France. And he added, "The people were inhibited. The army had neither ammunition nor weapons. We were all waiting for Bokassa to die in bed."

The complete understanding which he has of his countrymen and of his country comes from long experience gained in the field. On-the-job-trained as a teacher, Henri Maidou left his country in 1960 to go to Brazzaville, Congo, where for a year he attended courses at the Institute of Higher Studies. Next, he went to Rennes, in France, where after three years he became a CEG (general studies high school) teacher. After returning to Bangui in 1964, he left again immediately for France and enrolled in the Nancy Faculty of Letters. With a license degree in geography, he tried to pass his certification exams, which he took one time. Without success. Even today, he regrets not having had the time to start over again....

When he went back to his country in 1969, Henri Maidou, who was a member of the Central African Students Association, a subsidiary of the restless FEANF (Federation of Students of French-Speaking Black Africa), knew that the holder of the presidency of the Republic had changed. David Dacko had, in fact, been replaced four years earlier by Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The Central African students had, at the time, condemned the coup d'etat. But for Maidou, it was a new life that was starting because Bokassa called him to his side.

In rhythm with the ministerial musical chairs which "Papa Bok" liked to play, he became, starting in 1970, in turn minister of national education, of health, and of territorial economic organization. In 1977, he was again back in the department of national education, before being named vice prime minister in 1977 and then prime minister in July 1978.

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This is to say that the current vice president of the CAR knows perfectly well how the wheels of administration of his country turn. It is understandable that today he passes for the pillar of new regime. He is none the less at ease when he recalls the policies of the old regime, which he summarizes in a concise phrase: "Bokassa had raised terror to a system of government." But he is far from being merely a man from the past. In some circles, they're betting that he'll some day take over the reins of the Central African state. Does he want it? For once, Henri Maidou dodges a question, that of whether he considers himself "as a back-up for the republic." He states that he will support David Dacko in the coming presidential elections. Since at 43 years of age he feels he has his future in front of him, he can still be content to play second fiddle. But can one pick one's own time in politics?

For the moment, the economic revival of the CAR appears to be foremost in the eyes of the leaders in Bangui. An interim 2 year plan has been prepared. It involves three essential sectors: transportation, agriculture, and mining. At the time of reckoning, one must indeed judge the tree by its fruit. Can the team which Henri Maidou is leading successfully pass this difficult hurdle? More than ever, the old student recalls with bitterness having been flunked once in the geography certification exams. That didn't stop him from pursuing a long political career and from surviving Bokassa. But he is no longer allowed the smallest failure. Because the Central Africans are waiting for him at the turning point.

"By January 1979, I Had Perfected My Plan With the French"

[Question] Henri Maidou, you were No 2 under Bokassa, you have remained No 2 under David Dacko. Do you have any trouble saying "Central African Republic" after so often saying "Central African Empire?"

[Answer] No, I don't have any trouble. And we have become very quickly reaccustomed to saying Central African Republic. In the administration, some secretaries had even saved the envelopes of the first Republic. We took them out to use!

[Question] You worked a long time with the emperor. Minister during eight years, you made a major jump in July 1978. Named prime minister, you had to collaborate very closely in developing the imperial policies.

[Answer] Should I have refused? No statesman, no Central African leader ever refused or willingly left a post during all that period. We all lived in terror. Nobody was any longer in a position to react intelligently. The instinct for survival reigned supreme. That will give you some idea of the risk we took in staging the coup d'etat.

[Question] At the beginning, what did you think of Bokassa? And more precisely in 1969 when, having finished your studies in France, you returned to Bangui?

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[Answer] Bokassa had then been in power four years. But things didn't really go bad until after 1975. When I returned to Central Africa, what struck me was the artificial side of things. One day, Bokassa called together all the government officials. He started by telling us: "I have just completed 5 years. I don't intend to continue. What do you think?" Certain ones spoke up to ask him not to leave power. After five or six speakers, he declared that, in order to comply with the requests presented, he had decided to stay on. Then, having finished the meeting, he invited us to his palace for cocktails. To celebrate the event. Actually, the festivities had been prepared even before the consultations!

[Question] All that did not prevent you from working with Bokassa.

[Answer] When I was appointed minister in 1970, things were more or less going well. On the economic level, we were well off. Even at the time of the coronation we were well off because the coffee market was at the highest level ever. Even so, the coronation cost five billion CFA francs.

[Question] Then you lived under what you call the terror. And you worked with Bokassa? How did he govern? What means did he have at his disposal? As a member of his government, were you consulted before his coronation?

[Answer] The decision to have himself crowned emperor was, for Bokassa, the culmination of a long road. He became marshal, president for life, then emperor. At each stage, he convened a congress of the party. Each time, the congress served to provide approval for his ascension to the eternity of power.

[Question] But did you never, as prime minister, have anything to say about it?

[Answer] When I was appointed prime minister, the dream was already accomplished. Bokassa was emperor.

[Question] After that, one had the impression that you added to it. For example in May 1979, you knew what was going on. Why deny the massacres of the children?

"Nobody Would Have Had the Courage to Kill Bokassa"

[Answer] Everyone knows that there would not have been that French intervention if the prime minister, which was me, had not made the decision. I called in the French government, and we together prepared the plan which culminated in the coup of 20 Sep 79. It is therefore easy to explain what you are criticizing me for: if Bokassa had had the slightest doubt about me, I would have been neutralized.

[Question] You mean eliminated?

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[Answer] At the very least, I would not have remained prime minister. It was necessary to lull Bokassa. Something which I clearly succeeded in doing. And that fact alone was what would rehabilitate me. Because I state that I took the responsibility for calling in France, all the while staying at the side of Bokassa.

[Question] When did you call on the French for help?

[Answer] In January 1979, at the time of the first incidents--for which Bokassa later claimed I was responsible whereas I was not there. I was in Belgium at the time. I went back through Paris before returning to Bangui. At that time, I began to alert the responsible French officials and to put together a plan with them. On my return to Central Africa, I spoke again with Dacko.

[Question] You always say "I" and not "we." Does that mean that from the start you were the only heart of the "plot."

[Answer] There was a small core of us taking the responsibility. But I say "I," because as prime minister, I was the legal authority who had to approve the decision.

[Question] Why get David Dacko into the coup?

[Answer] I have known Dacko a long time, and I always discussed the problem with him.

[Question] Did you consult with General Sylvestre Bangui who was then the ambassador to France, or with Ange Patasse?

[Answer] Never.

[Question] So who was in your core group? The present prime minister Bernard Ayandho, vice prime minister Alphonse Koyamba?

[Answer] Ayandho was not part of the structure. On the other hand, I Dacko and Koyamba were.

[Question] Why did Dacko become No 1 and not you?

[Answer] Our goal was not that one or the other become president, but that the CAR not sink lower than it already had. It was essential to get rid of Bokassa. The choice of a president would come later. It was not said that this would be me. Besides, I was not all that interested in it. Since David Dacko had been in France at that time, since he had already been president of the Republic, since he was older than I, I accepted it quite normally.

[Question] Who picked David Dacko?

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[Answer] It was not a somebody that picked him. Together, we were at the source of the action; it was only a matter of knowing who, he or I, would become president.

[Question] Afterwards, the die was cast. In your opinion, is David Dacko going to be president for a long time?

[Answer] That wouldn't bother me. I'm young.

[Question] Wasn't France involved in the selection of president?

[Answer] France was the arm.

[Question] Do you think that France is satisfied with it or will be satisfied? Was it only in the name of friendship or human rights that it helped you?

[Answer] I don't think that in today's world there are any philanthropists who would only act for humanitarian reasons. Ourselves, we profit from what has happened. There is no reason why, if there must be any profit, France would not also benefit on its side. If we had called on the United States or the Soviet Union, the situation would have been the same. Provided, of course, that there be no blatant despoiling of Central African interests.

[Question] Under what conditions was French assistance given to you?

[Answer] None. We didn't bargain, and France didn't haggle either over its intervention.

[Question] And you claim that the Central Africans by themselves could do nothing?

[Answer] The Central Africans were paralyzed, I tell you! I'll give you an example: on 20 April, there were massacres. On the 21st, Bangui was back to life. The Central Africans were reduced to waiting for Bokassa to die from natural causes, from an illness or from an accident. But nobody would have had the courage to go try to kill him. Once again, that gives you an idea of what it took for us to decide to act, while staying next to him. Because once the plan was decided, we were exchanging messages with the French authorities.

[Question] And yet France waited a long time. Contacts were started in January, and action took place only in September. Meanwhile, there were other massacres in April.

[Answer] France waited because such an operation could not be done in one or two months. In a country where spying had reached such proportions that one distrusted his own wife, it was difficult to mount a plan of operation. Having spent his military service in counter-espionage, Bokassa knew all the tricks of the trade!

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[Question] If France had decided to keep him on his throne, would you have been able to get rid of Bokassa?

[Answer] It would certainly have been harder. But other countries would perhaps have helped us.

[Question] So Bokassa's fate was sealed. Was his departure for Libya on 17 Sep 1979 part of the plan? Did you encourage him to leave so you could spring the trap on him?

[Answer] No, it wasn't a trap. The treason was empty, and Bokassa needed money to pay the government workers. In addition, he had come to realize that his men were ineffective because they had no training. He wanted to ask the Libyans to contribute.

[Question] What did he offer the Libyans in exchange?

[Answer] He wanted to cede the north-eastern tip of Central Africa to Qadhdhafi. But in September events had him by the throat. He had to have money.

[Question] We thought that France was still picking up the tab.

[Answer] The report of the commission of African magistrates on the events in Bangui had been published. France drew its conclusions.

[Question] If he hadn't gone to Tripoli, would he have kept his throne?

[Answer] No. At any rate, 48 or 72 hours later, the operation would have been under way. I knew that he wouldn't make it past September.

[Question] That night of 20 September you were calmly at home. Without having taken the basic precautions to protect yourself. Didn't you know that the coup d'etat was going to take place that night?

[Answer] That wasn't the question. A single false move would have put my life in danger. Moreover, that same day around 1800 hours I saw Bokassa's plane flying over Bangui. I got sick, thinking that he had returned. Then I realized that it was the Corvette making a training flight. Bokassa had taken the other plane.

"Libya Does Not Hold Us Dear"

[Question] Everyone knows that you subsequently took refuge in the French embassy. Everyone also knows that David Dacko arrived that night. Where did you get together?

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[Answer] In the radio building. As for my presence at the French embassy, I'm not hiding anything. Every one of us had his own execution squad assigned to kill us at the slightest alert. The people of his guard, whom Bokassa had put around us, had been given the mission of killing us even if he himself was probably already dead.

[Question] Is it true that David Dacko hesitated at the last moment?

[Answer] I don't know.

[Question] Once the coup had succeeded, you appeared before the people and the press. It seems that President Dacko made some gaffes. He declared, for example, that he intended to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa, before saying that this was a "joke." One of us was there at the scene and saw you on several occasions whisper more proper responses to him.

[Answer] You have to understand our state of physical and mental fatigue. We were in the second day of what I would call "the assault of the press." We had not slept the night before. It was a real marathon. For the second time in the same day, President Dacko was being interviewed. His answers were a little hasty.

[Question] If tomorrow there were to be a public election, would David Dacko be elected president of the Republic?

[Answer] By a wide margin.

[Question] And yourself, would you not be a candidate?

[Answer] We are not there yet. The party convention is to take place in March. If a consensus favors me, I will be the candidate. If it favors David Dacko--and that will be the case--I will support him with all my power.

[Question] Some say that you are on reserve, to pick up the relay.

[Answer] I don't know if I'm worthy of it!

[Question] You have set up a single party, the Central African Democratic Union. And this party is to designate a candidate which the people will have to ratify. Aren't you justifying the caricature of elections won by 99.99 percent of the votes?

[Answer] That caricature is exaggerated, especially by the Westerners. We have a single party, but after all in the United States there are only two parties. In Great Britain, the same. In France, for 53 million inhabitants there are never more than three big parties.

[Question] But even so there are at least four!

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[Answer] Yes, but there are three big currents: the socialists, the communists, and the right which is split into factions. In Central Africa, where the state of mind is still burdened with tribal differences, it is dangerous to let a multitude of parties flower who would do nothing except divide the people and lead them into an unhealthy parliamentarianism. Something which we in fact did for a month after Bokassa's overthrow.

"I Thought Bokassa Had Come Back. I Got Sick"

[Question] In October, all the Central African forces in fact organized a round table. Why did you fail?

[Answer] Because of Patasse and his friends! Instead of coming to talk of general policies, they came to insult everybody. This is how they missed the boat. And we were on the road to adopting a multiparty structure!

[Question] After that, things got worse again. Foreign powers have even been implicated. The ambassador of Libya and his associates were asked at the beginning of January 1980 to pack their bags.

[Answer] I was not there when that decision was made. But Libya does not hold us dear. Some Libyans no doubt wanted to use certain persons to carry out subversive activities.

[Question] In what way?

[Answer] Those who were against Bokassa came back to Bangui. We should have worked together. Certain ones tried to split the country along ethnic lines. That would have led us into a fratricidal fight. They thought that they should necessarily and immediately come to power. Like we had made the coup d'etat just to step aside for them!

[Question] What are or what were your relations with Ange Patasse, with whom you worked for a long time under Bokassa?

[Answer] I was a friend of Patasse even before we each became statesmen. Within the government, we had friendly relations. Right up to the time he resigned as prime minister. He has even claimed that it was he that had suggested to Bokassa to appoint me his successor.

[Question] Is it true?

[Answer] I don't know whether Bokassa was one to accept suggestions!

[Question] Afterwards, Patasse is your political adversary.

[Answer] He has made himself the political opponent of the men who are now in power!

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[Question] What do you really disagree about?

[Answer] Patasse has never clearly expressed what it is that he wants. Concerning the nature or form of the government, for example.

[Question] Is there a place today for an Abel Goumba in Central Africa?

[Answer] I don't even know if he exists on the national level!

[Question] You have now set yourself the task of rebuilding the country. And to do so, you are again calling on France which has already helped you gain power. In the final analysis, is the Central African state independent?

[Answer] We are sovereign and independent.

[Question] Isn't the Central African Republic a state under trust, not to say a protectorate?

[Answer] It is not because France helps us that our country is under trust!

[Question] What would you say are Central Africa's trump cards?

[Answer] First of all, on the geographic level we have very interesting possibilities. We are in the heart of Africa. The Central African Republic, if it is well equipped, can play the role of a crossroads between all parts of Africa, from the point of view of rail, highway and air transport. Central Africa will be a veritable roundhouse the day when the African nations, and the other nations who are inclined to help us, become aware of it.

[Question] All the same, it is strange to note how, whenever the question of development is approached, African leaders always talk about the future! Rarely about the present. And Africa has been independent for 20 years. Why?

[Answer] The reason is simple. Up till now, by virtue of the politics of cooperation--multilateral or bilateral--nobody has yet found the appropriate formula for the aid to be given to the underdeveloped nations.

[Question] You talk of foreign aid. What about the internal dynamics of the countries?

[Answer] Do you think that, at the present level of technology, one can start anything serious without foreign involvement? What we're dealing with is determining the most effective means for aiding the nations which have decided to undertake real development themselves. The Central African Republic is potentially very rich. But we have perhaps not yet found the best means of exploiting our riches. And underdevelopment, what is it? It is first and foremost a human underdevelopment. In a nation where out of a hundred persons only two or three are high level staff, that's what the problem is.

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"Anything Can Still Happen"

[Question] Thus, you have uranium but not the means to exploit it.

[Answer] Uranium we have a lot of. And with our partners we are currently seeing how we can ensure a good start-up. We have to get the country going again. We have to build the major axes of communication. Including to the Atlantic, i.e. to Douala, in Camaroon. To do this, we already have the support of France, West Germany, the EEC and Japan. Besides these major axes, we must also open up the hinterlands to serve the coffee or cotton areas. In agriculture per se, we must revive the agricultural research stations for improving seed, distributing the fertilizers, the insecticides, the equipment, and popularizing cultivation techniques.

[Question] Where does the production of diamonds stand?

[Answer] It is barely a third of what production was in 1968, but its value has exceeded that of 1968. If it could get back to its level of ten years ago, the income would go a long way to relieving our budget. But we have to get organized again to block the frauds and the loss of our diamonds.

[Question] Speaking of the loss of diamonds, Bokassa's crown which was encrusted with gems has disappeared. Do you know where it is?

[Answer] Unfortunately, no! It's too bad, because that crown is extremely valuable!

[Question] And Bokassa himself? They say that you have dropped your request for his extradition from the Ivory Coast.

[Answer] No way! We have demanded his extradition and will continue to do so.

[Question] President Dacko has said: "As long as Bokassa is alive, we are all in danger of death." Do you, Henri Maidou, consider yourself in mortal danger?

[Answer] It is not beyond possibility that Bokassa still has friends and money. If we don't have any fears on the level of national security, on the individual level, anything can happen. We can be afraid of everything.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRENCH COOPERATION MINISTER'S DECEMBER VISIT REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464

[Text] Robert Galley, French Minister of Cooperation, was in the Central African Republic [CAR] from 4 to 10 December on an official visit.

He was received by President Dacko as soon as he arrived. His talks with some Central African ministers were completed by a visit to Banbari, 300 km northwest of Bangui, where the National Institute for Textile and Foods Research [INRTV] is located.

The French minister also visited the fish-farming station in La Bengue.

Two financing agreements, one dealing with budgetary aid of 19.25 million French francs, the other with financial assistance of 749,000 French francs, were signed during Galley's visit.

Jean-Pierre Lebouder, the Central African minister for cooperation, signed with his French counterpart a report on the talks that Galley held with the Bangui authorities. The document contains a pledge on France's part to contribute to the resolution of the most serious economic problems which the CAR is experiencing.

Under the terms of this report, it was decided to provide a speedy solution to supplying the country with hydrocarbons. France proposed to support Central African requests to the Congo and Zaire, as well as to the petroleum companies.

As far as the road infrastructures are concerned, France has pledged to continue the operations begun on the Berberati-Carnot-Baoro main road (in the western part of the country). Some 180 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs will be requested early in 1980 from the management committee of the French Aid and Cooperation Fund [FAC] and a new installment of 160 million CFA francs will be considered in 1981.

France and the CAR have agreed to intervene with the European Development Fund [EDF] so that the projects financed by the EDF on the Bossemble-Garoua-Boulai main highway may soon be started up again. The French and

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the Central African governments have thus decided to ask for bids for the repair of the roads in the cotton-growing region in the central part of the country.

The two delegations spoke in favor of a reform of the Central African Agency for River Transportation [ACCF], which could be partially put into private hands. The financing of a certain amount of equipment of the Bangui Airport will be considered.

The development of agricultural production was also the subject of extensive talks at the conclusion of which the French delegation stated that it was prepared to examine supplementary financing as part of specific projects. A mission of French experts will go to the CAR to define ways to implement training and education in the fields of agriculture, stock raising, waters and forests and hunting.

The French delegation agreed to ask the FAC for supplementary credits amounting to 160 million CFA francs for the development of forest and cynegetic resources and 90 million CFA francs for projects for the management and protection of fauna in the national park of Manovo-Gouda-Saint-Floris (northwestern part of the country).

Lastly, the delegation headed by Galley suggested that foreign aid be requested for projects which have not been the subject of a French-Central African agreement. It stated that it was ready to provide aid for the preparation of the files to be presented to the financial backers and to use its influence to obtain the necessary financing.

Commenting on the French-Central African talks, Lebouder said that they were meant to "strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the fields where it already exists and, in view of the disastrous results left by 14 years of dictatorship, to see what can be done to straighten out rapidly the situation."

For his part, Galley was of the opinion that the "CAR ought to make an immense effort to get out of the present stagnation" and asserted that French aid "within the limits of its means" will not be spared.

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CHAD

TWO GROUPS WITHDRAW FROM FACP

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 pp 3468-3469

[Text] The Fundamental FROLINAT and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad [MPLT] announced on 4 December that they were withdrawing from the Provisional Front for Joint Action [FACP], established last May and grouping six of the 11 political movements which make up the Transitional National Union Government [GUNT] of Chad.

The withdrawal of those two movements, led respectively by Hadjaro Senoussi, minister of reconstruction and territorial development, and Aboubakar Mahamat Abderahmane, took place after the withdrawal of Dr Abba Siddick's original FROLINAT last 16 November.

The fundamental FROLINAT and the MPLT accused El Hadj Mahamat Abba Said, state minister for the interior and security and president of the FACP and Ahmat Alkabacne Acyl, state minister for foreign and cooperation affairs and president of the Revolutionary Democratic Council of "tribalistic intrigues" with the purpose of orienting the FACP toward objectives jeopardizing the Lagos agreements on national reconciliation. Those agreements were signed last August by all the Chadian political movements. They also reproached the two ministers for having divided the important ministerial posts between themselves.

In Ndjamen a strike of teaching personnel (who must face long delays in the payment of their salaries) has been going on since early in December and there have been wage demands in several sectors.

France will grant Chad priority aid for the purpose of getting on its feet again the administration of that country. This was announced on 5 December in Ndjamen by Jean Sriber, directeur de cabinet of the French minister of cooperation.

Drawing his conclusions from the work of the mission of experts of the Ministry of Cooperation, which stayed 10 days in Chad for the purpose of estimating the needs of that country to get its economy going again. Sriber pointed out that the most important thing for the moment was to help the Chadian administration to function normally once more.

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He stated in this regard that France would provide "priority technical assistance in the field of the reconstruction of the tax services" so that the state may once again find the resources which it has lacked so grievously since its administration was upset after the fighting in February, March and June between northerners and the southerners.

He also stated that France would ensure "a very significant part of the salaries of the civil servants" for the next 4 months. France's effort, Sribier further emphasized, will in particular have to do with the material equipment that the ministries need, as some ministries were pillaged during the clashes early in the year. In the same way, the civil servants who have taken refuge in the south will receive help if they return to the capital.

Lastly Sribier pointed out that he was taking away "a very comforting impression" from the talks that he had with the Chadian leaders and that he hoped that after that 4-month period of cooperation reorganization on a level comparable to that of past years could be established between France and Chad.

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CHAD

GUNT EXISTS ONLY ON PAPER; PETROLEUM PROSPECTS NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 25, 26

[Article by Jos-Blaise-Alima: "Only the Bodyguards Govern"--passages in slantlines published in italics]

[Text] The National Union Government could not do anything in 3 months. And the ministers have turned into heroes of a bad Western.

The first Congolese soldiers of the Neutral African Force, which must act as a buffer between rival Chadian brothers, arrived in Ndjamena on 18 January. But the bloody incidents that broke out near Amy-Dam, in the eastern province of Ouaddai, on 8 January, are a reminder that Chad lives continually on top of a powder keg that can explode at any time. For several days in fact, violent encounters leaving over 50 dead pitted the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) of Hissein Habre (minister of defense) against those of the Joint Action Front (FAC), which include three political factions represented in the government: the Popular Liberation Forces of Mahamat Abba Said (minister of the interior), the Volcan Army of Adoum Dana (public works), and the Democratic Revolutionary Council of Ahmat Acyl (foreign affairs).

On Paper

It was to be expected that the agreement signed in Lagos last August by all the brothers who are political foes would not solve the Chadian problem. If it is true that a Transitional National Union Government was set up on 10 November, after 3 months of equivocations, it is equally true that it exists only on paper. The different factions coexist, neutralize each other, and paralyze a government that cannot claim to have done anything at all since it was formed. Each faction has the power of veto, and uses it when it wants to. The meetings of the ministers, run by President Goukouni Oueddei, unfold like a bad Western. Of course, the representatives of each group sit side by side around the same table. But behind each minister stands his personal guard of five or six bodyguards armed to the teeth. Should a member of the government get up because of physiological reasons, he is immediately surrounded by his guardian angels who escort him to the lavatory and return with him to the council room.

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### Split Power

This "close protection" remains just as impressive in the streets of the capital, Ndjamen. No minister would take the wheel without having a Kalishnikov or a gun with him. An excess is a must: rifles, guns, and heads of guards stick out from the windows of the cars. Michel Nganbet, minister of the economy and of the plan, confided that, like his colleagues, he has a radio which, at all times, enables him to be in contact with the headquarters of Colonel Wadal Kamougue (the leader of his faction), who is staying at 25 km from Ndjamen. /"In case of danger,"/he says, /"I immediately send a distress signal."/

Besides, the ministers of the National Union Government do not have lodgings, they camp out. Those from the South are in two villas used as dormitories. It is true that most of the old administrative lodgings in Ndjamen were sacked or destroyed. The rest are occupied by those who control the area around the Chadian capital. As for private houses, they were confiscated by those who were armed best.

Each ministry has become a "stronghold." Each minister has called for a squad from his faction, most often from his native region. /"The atrocities committed during the civil war have left deep wounds which have not yet healed,"/ said Michel Nganbet.

In the meantime, insecurity reigns everywhere, and no one is truly in power in Ndjamen. Each faction is set up in a zone over which the government has no control whatever.

Only a neutral military force could put an end to such anarchy. Though the Congolese soldiers are here because of the Lagos agreement, those of Benin and Guinea have not yet arrived. And those of France remain in Chad.

This does not please the southerners who have not forgiven France for choosing to play the Habre card at the time of the February 1979 incidents, and since then to have chosen him as its "protege."

In fact, for Paris, the nationalism of the former jailer of Françoise Claustre was a shield against the expansionist designs of the neighboring Libyan head of state, Colonel Qadhafi. And it is true that French-Libyan confrontation in Africa is best illustrated in Chad.

The unexpected alliance of Colonel Kamougue--having become since then president of the Chadian Government--and of Colonel Qadhafi can be explained for similar reasons. Under the pretext of fighting French influence, Libya does not intend to be excluded from the Chadian problem. The only nuisance: France follows the same line of reasoning, and feels it should not stay out of the internal struggles in Chad. Obviously, this means going around in circles, while the end of the tunnel recedes.... Yet this chaos does not stop the World Bank from being interested in Chad.

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During his stay in Washington (from 6 to 9 January), Michel Nganbet met with several managers of the bank. The discussions centered around petroleum.

Latent Miracle

The outlook is so rosy that a mission is supposed to go to Chad at the end of this month of January. In the beginning it will be a question of building, in Ndjamena, a refinery that will handle the petroleum earmarked for local consumption. With time, they plan to build a pipeline linking Moundou with the Cameroonian port of Douala. According to the estimates of the Chadian minister of the economy, Cameroon will get a right of way costing about 500 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs per month. As for Chad, the reserves discovered so far will bring in a mere 750 billion CFA francs a year. For this "miracle" to take place, the political situation has to be stabilized.

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CONGO

FRENCH AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3469

[Text] The French JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 5 December 1979 published Law No 79-1032 of 4 December 1979 authorizing approval of the agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of the Congo on the movement of individuals, signed in Brazzaville on 1 January 1974, the general codicile was signed in Brazzaville on 17 June 1978 (These texts will be published later in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL).

The report made by Charles Ehrmann on the proposed law, on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee, recalled to mind the fact that French cooperation continues to play "a significant and appreciated role" in the Congo. However, this aid has had a tendency to level off. After having reached its maximum in 1976 with 239 million francs, it fell to 136 million in 1977; then it climbed up again to 209 million in 1978.

Technical assistance in personnel is slowing down temporarily due to the spectacular increase in cost, the manpower decreasing slightly: 1974: 37 million francs; 1975: 49 million; 1976: 75 million; 1977: 79 million. It must be noted however that the Congo is no longer paying its contribution to the maintenance of those technical assistants either and that the cumulative debt has reached thus nearly 30 million francs. In 1979 the number of technical assistance personnel was 485 officials, of whom 302 were employed in education. It must be recalled to mind that there were more than 500 officials in 1976.

French military assistance is almost nonexistent both in personnel and in material aid. However it must be noted that the Congo has requested that a larger number of military scholarships be granted to Congolese military personnel in training in order for them to travel to France.

Before the coming into force of the agreement on the movement of individuals, (which has just been passed by the French Parliament) the migratory flow from the Congo had not been subject to any restriction: indeed, the Congo is a signer with France of the multilateral agreement on the basic rights of the nationals of the states of the French Community, which in

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its Article 2 provides for complete freedom of movement among nationals of the member countries.

The Congolese had not used that freedom to any great extent up to a recent date, since, according to the statistics of the Ministry of the Interior, only 3,398 of them were living in France on 1 January 1976. The migratory flow seems to have speeded up somewhat since then: on 1 January 1978 they numbered 5,118.

Article 1 of the new agreement introduces the obligation to be the holder of a valid passport for the Congolese who travel to France and reciprocally for the French who travel in Congo, as well as the international compulsory vaccination certificates, as is customary.

Article 2 provides for the institution of an entry visa whenever the duration of the planned stay is greater than 3 months. This provision is new since the principle remained that of free movement.

Articles 3 and 4 provide for the obligation of guaranteeing repatriation. These are provisions which are found in all agreements of this type and which, as is customary, are applicable neither to politicians nor diplomatic and consular officials, nor in a general way applicable to civil servants and to a certain extent to students and sailors.

Article 5 is the one which most restricts the conditions under which the Congolese may stay in France. It institutes the obligation of a labor contract for those who want to come to France and work there. Chiefly, Article 5 provides for the obligation of being in possession of a residence card for the Congolese in France as well as for Frenchmen who live in the Congo. This residence card should, furthermore, for those who want to engage in any paid activity, carry a special clause and be renewed under conditions provided by the legislation of the state of residence. This indeed permits France to refuse a French job to a Congolese national just as it may to any foreign national. As for nonwage earners, they must give proof of their means of existence.

Article 5 quinquies makes applicable to Congolese students the provisions until now applicable to all foreign students. In practice this amounts to providing for preregistration of persons concerned before they travel to France. Article 5 sexto concerns family groups.

Article 6, extending to Congo the benefits hitherto applicable to several African nations including Niger, permits sailors of that country, of whatever rank, to board French ships. Up to now that possibility was open only to officers. In practice it will be noted that this provision is rather balanced, since at present French sailors are employed as officers on Congolese fishing boats in the Gulf of Guinea.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH SPAIN--A technical cooperation agreement between Equatorial Guinea and Spain was signed on 5 December in Malabo at the conclusion of a meeting of the joint commission. This announcement was made by Sanchez Teran, minister of transport, who headed the Spanish delegation to Equatorial Guinea. The minister added that a fishing agreement, granting \$4 million in credits to Equatorial Guinea, was also signed, as well as several cooperation agreements on air and sea transport and the sending of Spanish experts to Malabo. Lastly, the joint commission determined the priority sectors where all of the credits granted by Madrid will be allocated, or a total of \$23 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Dec 79 p 3469] 12116

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GABON

AGRICULTURAL, OTHER RESOURCES' DATA ANALYZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 pp 171-181

[Article by Francois Gaulme: "Ambitions and Realism"]

[Excerpts] President Bongo was reelected for 7 years on 30 December. A new National Assembly is to be formed for 5 years on 10 February in Libreville.

The national scene thus continues to be dominated, as it has been since 1968, by the same man, Mr Omar Bongo, who directs policy according to how he considers it to be best suited to the country's interest. Some observers, who also express satisfaction with Gabonese stability, have come to believe that there is more government management in Libreville than true political life, with its debates, confrontations and choices that have hardly anything to do with the economy.

Beginning in 1980, the government is expected to put into practice the congressional resolutions passed to combat various abuses. The government has pledged to do so on several occasions and it is therefore believed that partial replacement of Gabonese political personnel, in the sense of a rejuvenation, is on the verge of taking place.

Improvement and Priorities

This expected improvement of moral standards and rejuvenation should not occur in an atmosphere of crisis: it is said that the climate will instead be optimistic in the Gabonese capital in the early '80s.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Banque Lazard (acting as official financial adviser to the government) are satisfied with the results of the austerity policy started in 1977. The Ministry of Finance has since regained control, which it had lost during the years of euphoria, over government expenditures and operations. This policy will be continued in coming years through the 1980-82 Three-Year Plan prepared with IMF assistance. The Third Five-Year Plan, extravagant and unrealistic, has in fact been abandoned.

When the 1980 budget was submitted (314 billion CFA francs as opposed to 328 billion in 1979), Finance Minister Jerome Okinda said that he was

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determined to limit foreign borrowing as much as possible. If Gabon's indebtedness, which reached 570 billion CFA francs in 1977 (1977 gross domestic product: 636 billion CFA francs) has since been reduced, debt servicing still remains quite sizable: 143 billion CFA francs in 1979. Thus despite the government's intention to maintain an adequate level of public spending to stabilize the economy, the long period of convalescence, which Gabonese finances will still have to undergo, calls for moderation. Major projects will be limited to those whose continuation is an absolute priority: construction of the transgabonese railroad and the development of agricultural potential.

Work on the transgabonese railroad was slowed beginning in 1979 for financial reasons as well as technical considerations. Part of its layout actually had to be resurveyed. Operations are nevertheless continuing at a regular pace. The government, which had turned to a European consortium named Eurotrag (with SPIE-Batignolles as coordinator) for construction of the railroad, today seems to be considering applying to American and Romanian companies for completion of certain sections.

#### A New Place for Agriculture

Everything remains to be done in the agricultural sector. The Gabonese climate, with a rainy season lasting practically 9 months of the year, is a major obstacle. The slightest penetration into the forest does not make it possible for the layer of humus thus cleared to withstand very rapid furrowing. Gabonese women are well aware of this and their manioc fields do not have the regular, well-kept appearance that you would naturally expect to find on plantations. But the stumps left behind after trees are cut down stabilize the soil and make it possible to produce tuberous plants (preferable to corn, which exhausts the land) in accordance with a fallow-land system.

Truck-farm projects in Gabon have not produced the expected results. Growing vegetables outside the dry season is quite a feat. A system of growing hydroponic crops under glass has been tested in Port-Gentil in the last few years. But its technical level is such that it cannot be considered on a large scale, nor can it be left to the initiative of rural Gabonese.

These projects originated with the amazement of foreign experts, who saw the most ordinary produce on European tables being imported to Gabon at great expense. The most realistic way of considering Gabon's food problems (15 billion CFA francs of fresh produce imported each year) is probably not by encouraging European eating habits. Gabonese farmers know how to grow certain vegetables on favorable land, which they can locate due to their familiarity with the region. But they must not be expected to one day become producers of carrots, potatoes and beans in the French style.

In contrast, rice growing has produced encouraging results in the southeastern part of the country. Started by Taiwanese experts in the '60s, it was given a new impetus by the People's Republic of China a few years ago. With undeniable success among well-equipped farmers, this crop is a definite hope,

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but its production has not yet reached 1,000 tons per year. The Japanese company Nippon Koei is supposed to implement a program in Ndende, making it possible to produce 4,000 tons of rice annually in two harvests, as well as a processing plant.

Rice (12,000 tons are consumed in Gabon annually), plantain bananas and manioc have every reason for remaining the basis of Gabonese agriculture. It is on this sound principle that Gabon's most recent food crop projects are based, either in the Franceville area, where moderate rainfall favors agriculture as it does throughout the south, or in Ntoun, where a banana plantation is currently being laid out. The plantation should produce 5,700 tons of fruit in 1981 and thus supply Libreville markets, which are only 40 kilometers away and are accessible by railroad.

Cash crops must also remain an economic priority: this involves reviving cacao growing in Woleu-Ntem. It had reached 6,000 tons prior to dropping below 4,000 tons since 1976. Paralleling the drop in tonnage, production quality has also declined. To stimulate cacao growing, the producer's price has again been raised and the four quality categories reestablished. Plantations must still be reconditioned and cacao trails restored. A similar program is to be carried out in the case of coffee in the Makokou region: Gabonese production has been less than 500 tons since 1973.

Sugar production by SOSUHO (Haut-Ogooue Sugar Company), with 6,000 hectares of sugar cane plantations and highly mechanized operations, is in its initial stages. With 8,000 tons in 1978, it already satisfies national consumption. Production of 20,000 tons was scheduled for 1981, but the cost price of Gabonese sugar is far above world levels. As long as the transgabonese railroad is unfinished, shipment of produce from Franceville is difficult and the company's deficit already exceeded 5 billion CFA francs at the end of 1978. The government appears determined to save it. It is today considering converting part of its production into alcohol.

The success of a policy that is primarily agriculturally oriented does not depend only on these major projects of an agroindustrial type. The Gabonese Government has shown that it wanted to establish a rural cooperative movement in the country. With the appearance since 1977 of a phenomenon practically unknown in Gabon, unemployment, it is becoming necessary to stem the rural exodus and, in terms of employment, to take measures other than swelling the ranks of public office (28,500 civil servants in 1979 as opposed to 25,700 in 1977 and 19,600 in 1975, whereas private employees declined from 124,500 in 1977 to 90,000 in 1979).

Returning to that former agricultural prosperity in Woleu-Ntem, based on cash crops, would be a model success that could change the direction of future action. Unfortunately, such goals depend just as much on the restoration or improvement of road infrastructures throughout the country as on the attention given to agricultural problems.

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The Nation's Real Wealth

Agriculture's recognized primary importance must not mislead us: if its social function is of prime importance, its economic role, today almost nil, will not be able to develop to the point of one day representing a share of the GDP (gross domestic product) comparable to that of petroleum: with an officially\* estimated total of 508.6 billion CFA francs in 1978 (down 20.1 percent from the previous year), agriculture's share is 42.2 billion (including 15.7 billion for timber) in comparison to 208.4 billion for extractive industries. There has been the same disproportion every year since 1974 due to the increase in oil prices. Although crude oil production, which has again dropped to less than 10 million tons annually, should decline in coming years, the current rise of prices will make it possible for this situation to continue: the barrel price of Gabonese crude oil has doubled in 1 year and its value today exceeds \$30.

Thus regardless of the improvement in the economic situation for timber (in 1979, even small yards of zone "A," reserved for Gabonese, resumed their operations), for manganese (1978 was an exceptionally poor year), and the good prospects for uranium, petroleum remains the principal source of national wealth: customs statistics show that if hydrocarbons bring in more than 200 billion CFA francs annually, manganese and timber only account for barely 30 billion in good years and uranium for about 20 billion.

Gabon thus possesses a revenue situation that is independent of its citizens' labor: according to the World Bank (based on an estimate of 540,000 residents), petroleum provided Gabon with a per capita GNP of \$3,580 in 1978, the second highest in Africa after Libya and far above that of its neighbors (Cameroon, \$460; Central African Republic, \$250; Congo, \$540; or even Ivory Coast, \$840).

This exceptional advantage should produce the greatest expectations. Yet we are familiar with the debilitating effect of the overabundance of oil revenues. Gabon has managed to return to its budgetary wisdom, but in the future it must no doubt beware of the taste for great projects, even when they appear justified. It is this taste, in fact, which almost caused its downfall and we shudder at seeing a study being made of a tuna fishing project estimated at more than 8 billion CFA francs, huge road works in Port-Gentil and other investments that do not appear to be essential for the future.

\*Source: General Department of Statistics, Libreville

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GABON

BRIEFS

ALLEGED MERCENARY CAMPS--The Gabonese government has approved the establishment of new training camps for Angolan mercenaries whose goal is to organize destabilization operations against the People's Republic of Angola. In another development, it has been learned that Col Robert, the new French ambassador in Libreville, whose activities include the organization of secret agent and mercenary commandos, has reopened the "Benin File." Under his direction, mercenary Bob Denard had attempted to overthrow the Beninese regime through the assassination of its principal leaders. Reportedly, his smarting defeat did not discourage him. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 298, 3-6 Mar 80 p 21]

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL STRENGTHENED--President Ahmed Sekou Toure headed an important delegation of the Guinean government on an official visit to Brazil, from 4 to 10 February. In the southern part of Brazil, the chief of the Guinean government in particular visited the giant Itaipu dam (under construction) and the agronomic institute of Londrina. According to the joint communique, Brazil is going to purchase some alumina from Guinea and grant it some credits. Moreover, the two countries have agreed to intensify their cooperation in all domains: small industry, trade, construction, extraction of minerals, agriculture, livestock, transports, culture, and technical cooperation. Brazil and Guinea believe that there are great possibilities for the development of trade. One notes in this connection that economic relations between Guinea and Brazil are not very considerable. In fact, from January to September 1979, Guinea imported \$14,000 worth of merchandise from Brazil and exported to that country \$21,000 worth. During the 4 preceding years, the Guineans had not exported anything to Brazil. On the other hand, the Brazilians had exported \$114,000 worth to Conakry in 1977 and \$130,000 worth in 1975. Sekou Toure on 6 February had contacts in Sao Paulo with Brazilian businessmen. Finally, both countries agreed to open embassies in their respective capitals. General Figueiredo accepted the principle of an official visit to Guinea, the date to be determined later. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 378] 8255

CEREAL DEFICIT--Appeal to friendly countries. A big deficit has been ascertained in the commercialization of cereals in Guinea. According to a report of the minister of commerce, this "deficit is due to the appearance in middle and upper Guinea of caterpillars that destroyed the young shoots in rice fields at the beginning of the agricultural season, and thus impaired the harvests." It was decided to appeal to friendly countries for help in providing food. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 378] 8255

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RAILROAD DELEGATION TO USSR--The "very disturbing frequency" of accidents on the Bebele-Conakry railroad, built by the Soviets, has caused Guinea to entrust its minister of foreign affairs with an "urgent mission" to the USSR. In 5 years, 4 accidents that occurred on this track that connects the bauxite mines of Kindia (100 km from Conakry, exploited by a joint Guinean-Soviet company) with the port of Conakry, have resulted in 4 deaths, the loss of 147 cars, of 5 locomotives, of 54,307 tons of bauxite, and of 500 meters of railway track. The most recent and most serious accident occurred this past 26 December, when a 3,600-ton convoy, advancing at 100 km per hour, collided violently in the city with a locomotive transporting workers. The cause of this accident, which resulted in four deaths (three Guineans and one Soviet), was "failure of the brake system of the convoy cars, the failure being due to the concept of the system." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 378] 8255

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTION -- On 27 January, the Guinean voters elected a new National Assembly. The new parliament includes 210 members, as against 150 in the former, 56 of whom are women, as against 30 previously. In a message to the nation, President Sekou Toure indicated that the legislative sector in Guinea could not digress from the line of the "Party-State" (decided on in November 1978) which establishes the primacy of the Democratic Party of Guinea over the state. He added that the new Assembly "will have the responsibility of freely taking a position on all bills, on all budgets, on all the accounts of the nation and finally on all the actions which could have a direct or indirect influence on the collective future of the people of Guinea." The new Guinean Assembly, whose members were selected at the close of the meetings of the regional revolutionary councils (regional authorities of the single Guinean party in charge of control over the management of the Guinean production units), includes notably: 27 professors, 5 doctors and physicians, 2 magistrates, 8 engineers, 20 administrators and economists, 17 officers and non-commissioned officers, 16 nurses and midwives, 65 teachers, 2 skilled laborers, 10 farmers and craftsmen and 30 office workers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 256] 8463

PRC VISIT FOR TOURE -- In 1980, the Guinean president, Mr Sekou Toure, will make an official visit to the People's Republic of China. This was announced on 22 January by the Chinese prime minister, Mr Hua Guofeng, while entertaining Mr Daouda Kourouma, the ambassador of Guinea to Peking. On the political level, the Chinese prime minister underscored Peking's desire to take advantage of the growing reservations in Conakry with regard to the Soviet Union. On the bilateral level, this visit by the Guinean president should mark the actual launching of cooperation between the two countries -- which, beginning with a visit to Conakry in 1978 by a high level Chinese official, Mr Geng Biao, has been rather modest up to now. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 256] 8463

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JAPANESE TRUCK DONATION -- The Japanese government donated 35 trucks to the government of Guinea. The donation was made on 21 January to the Guinean minister of transportation, by the Japanese ambassador to Guinea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 256] 8463

TECHNICAL, CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH DPRK--Radio Conakry reported on 19 January that Guinea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have concluded an agreement for technical and cultural cooperation. Among other things, this agreement concerns agriculture, sports, plastic and decorative arts and will take effect in April with the arrival in Guinea of North Korean military serving in a civilian capacity. The cooperative agreement, signed by the Guinean secretary of state for international cooperation and the North Korean deputy minister of cooperation, follows the official visit which Mr Sekou Toure, president of the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, made to the DPRK in November. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 195] 11915

AGROPASTORAL COOPERATION WITH FRG--A semipublic corporation, SAPAL (Agropastoral and Vegetables Company), has just been established between the Guinean Government and an FRG company for developing and financing agro-industrial projects in Africa. An agreement to this effect was signed in Conakry between the Guinean minister of agriculture and the president of the German company. SAPAL, which will be set up in Faranah in central Guinea, will farm 20,000 hectares of land before 1984 and raise 5,000 heads of cattle and 1 million broiler chickens. The company will also provide for training Guinean personnel in agriculture and livestock breeding. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 195] 11915

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IVORY COAST

DETAILS GIVEN ON OPERATIONAL BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 11 Jan 80 pp 79, 80, 81

[Text] After the accelerated economic development of the Ivory Coast over the years 1975 to 1977, there was a slowdown in 1978 and 1979. This trend, associated with the evolution of world prices for primary exports, was to some extent attenuated by an active policy of mobilization of external financial resources.

For the year 1979, the development of GNP, although not as noteworthy as the average trend for the period 1976-1978 (+9.5 percent annually) did nevertheless hover around 5 percent.

As in the 3 preceding years, the operational budget for 1980 reflects three major requirements: rigorous maintenance of budgetary balance by strictly limiting any increase of expenditure against available resources; a limitation on any expansion for the operation of the administration, in order to be able to devote the maximum possible to financing investments which are essential to the country's development; and, lastly, intensification of capital formation efforts.

In 1979, the balance of trade showed a small surplus, although the deficit of current transactions weighted it down.

The mobilization of foreign aid and capital has always provided the economy of the Ivory Coast with the necessary additional financial resources for its development. After the 1978 pause, which had enabled the country to hold down the level of foreign loans, a number of new commitments were undertaken in the course of 1979. These obligations will raise the debt total, current and committed, to approximately 1,200 billion CFA francs in 1979.

The budget for the fiscal year of 1980 also includes a number of fiscal measures designed to provide the Autonomous Fund for Amortization with resources necessary to guarantee servicing of the public debt.

Expenditures and Receipts

The operational budget for fiscal year 1980 was cut off at 338.4 billion CFA francs, insofar as receipts and expenditure are concerned, as compared with

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304.6 billions of CFA francs for the corrected 1979 budget, the initial forecast of which (277.4 billion CFA francs) was established in the course of the year. The rate of increase of the indebtedness in the 1980 budget, as compared with 1979, thus comes to 11.1 percent, a figure which stands approximately midway between the data for 1979 (up +9.4 percent) and 1978 (12.6 percent higher).

## Receipts

Table No 1 affords a comparison of the resources shown in the budgets for 1978, 1979, and 1980:

Table 1 - Resources of the Operational Budget  
(Billions of CFA francs)

	1978 <u>Corrected</u>	1979 <u>Forecast</u>	1979 <u>Corrected</u>	1980 <u>          </u>
Direct taxes	51.5	59.8	71.2	80.1
Property Tax	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.6
Patents & Licenses	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.8
Indirect Domestic Taxes	36.7	38.2	42.9	46.6
Import duties & taxes	116.8	132.0	138.4	156.8
Export duties & taxes	36.6	33.7	36.4	35.7
Stamp & Registration tax	5.6	6.5	8.2	10.8
National receipts	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
Receipts from services	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.1
Miscellaneous receipts	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
T O T A L	253.6	277.4	304.6	338.4

In dealing with direct taxes, it should be noted that the revenue from the profits tax for 1980 was estimated to be 34.9 billion CFA francs (11.2 percent higher than the corresponding 1979 figure). This increase was justified by substantial activity in the private sector. The ordinary Income Tax returns were computed at 21.4 billion CFA francs (up 10.7 percent) while employers' contributions, based on wages paid, should provide 13.5 billion CFA francs (an improvement of 20 percent). Finally, it is anticipated that the tax on wages and salaries will bring in 5.7 billion CFA francs (or 17.1 percent more than in 1979).

Domestic indirect taxes, basically, consist of the value added tax, calculated to produce 29.1 billion CFA francs (or 7.8 percent over 1979), and the tax on the rendering of services which should raise 15.1 billion CFA francs (9.6 percent above the figure for the preceding year).

Duties and taxes on imports are expected to account for 56.9 percent of total budgetary resources for 1980, as compared with 57.4 percent thereof in 1979 and 60.5 percent the year before that. At 156.8 billion CFA francs, the increase over 1979 will amount to 13.3 percent.

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A small downward correction (of -2.0 percent) was made in the forecast of receipts from export duties and taxes, given the estimated decline of coffee and cacao exports for 1980, resulting from climatic conditions, and of sales of undressed (rough?) timber. The tax on exports (with the exception of timber) should provide 27.5 billion CFA francs (a drop of 5.5 percent) while the receipts from timber exports should reach 7.5 billion CFA francs.

## Expenditure

The bulk of the expenditure in the 1978, 1979 and 1980 budgets (in billions of CFA francs) can be shown as follows:

Expenditure	1978 <u>Corrected</u>	1979 <u>Forecast</u>	1979 <u>Corrected</u>	1980 <u>          </u>
Personnel	127.5	146.1	154.3	182.7
Material	5.8	6.0	6.4	7.8
Development	67.6	65.1	76.7	70.2
Contractual debts	1.4	1.4	2.2	2.3
Transfers & claims	51.3	58.8	65.0	75.4
T O T A L	253.6	277.4	304.6	338.4

In 1980, the figures for personnel expenditure cover the cost of new activities in the fields of training, technical instruction, health and social welfare; in short, those which call for an increase in the number of civil servants, their total being 68,535 on 31 December 1979, as compared with 51,537 as of 30 September 1978.

The division of budget expenditure by government service was as follows: (shown in billions of CFA francs)

	1978 <u>Corrected</u>	1979 <u>Forecast</u>	1979 <u>Corrected</u>	1980 <u>          </u>
General services	45.8	51.9	53.4	61.9
Social services	89.2	102.4	110.8	133.8
Economic services	117.0	121.4	138.0	140.1
Miscellaneous	1.8	1.7	2.4	2.6
T O T A L	253.6	277.4	304.6	338.4

As compared with 1979, the increase in the expenditure for general services represents an expansion of 16 percent (as compared with 16.4 percent for 1979 in relation to the preceding year), while the expenditure on social services rose by 20.8 percent (as against 24.2 percent in 1979 over 1978).

The expansion observed in the item "Transfers and claims" (up 15.9 percent) stems from higher allocations (ordinary; the Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar - ASEANA; the Transit & Storage Company - SOTRA;

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cooperatives and education), that is, a total of 29 billion CFA francs (9.6 billion francs more), as well as subsidies to divers public agencies and private institutions.

The division of the operational budget by ministry, including the major allocations, is indicated in Table 2, below:

Table 2 - Spread of Operational Expenditure  
(Billions of CFA francs)

	1978 <u>Corrected</u>	1979 <u>Corrected</u>	1980 <u>      </u>
Economy, Finance & the Plan	73.9	87.9	80.6
Elementary Education	33.2	44.0	52.6
National Education	25.2	30.6	39.4
Public Works, Transport, Urbanism	27.0	31.7	38.3
National Defense	19.8	21.9	24.9
Public Health	18.4	21.1	23.9
Interior	8.5	11.4	13.0
Technical Instruction	5.4	6.9	8.2
Internal Security	5.4	5.7	8.0
Agriculture	4.9	5.3	6.2
Foreign Affairs	3.8	5.4	6.2
Commerce	2.2	3.6	3.8
Information	3.7	3.3	3.8

Fiscal Measures

The 1980 financing law involves a series of fiscal arrangements, including the following:

- an increase of 10 percent on the beverage surcharge;
- a 10 percent rise in the tax on imported tobaccos;
- increase in the rate of the consumer taxes on petroleum products;
- higher inland revenue levy on vehicles;
- a two-point rise in the tax rate for debt income (interest?);
- raising of the rate on certain domanical (state?) revenue taxes.

Altogether, the enactment of these measures should produce 6.2 billion CFA francs, in additional resources, of which 4.2 billion CFA francs will be for the benefit of the Autonomous Fund for Amortization.

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## Additional budgets

The additional budgets together represent a total of 9.4 billion CFA francs, for 1980, as compared with 8.2 billion CFA francs in 1979 (up 14.4 percent), and may be broken up as follows (in billions of CFA francs):

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
Material for public works programs	3.1	3.6
Ivory Coast Radio-television	2.7	3.1
Ivory Coast press agency	0.4	0.5
National printing office	0.6	0.6
University hospital center	1.4	1.6
T O T A L	8.2	9.4

Two of the above, namely Material for public works and the national Printing Office, are balanced by their own receipts. The remaining three items draw almost their entire resources (95 percent to 98 percent) from subsidies obtained from the operational budget.

## The Balance of Payments

After 3 years, during which the Ivory Coast's balance of payments reflected a surplus, in 1979 this item showed a deficit of some 30 billion CFA francs. A comparison of the data for 1978 and 1979 indicates the following situation prevailed:

	1978	1979
Transactions involving merchandise	+ 49.4	+ 35.4
Services balance	- 124.6	- 139.2
Transfers	- 87.0	- 97.0
Capital movements	+ 176.0	+ 171.0
Balance	+ 138	- 29.8

In 1979, transactions involving merchandise emphasized the great increase in the cost of petroleum supplies and the very serious decline of receipts in exports of processed cacao, bananas and pineapples.

Despite the expansion of the Ivory Coast's merchant navy, the freight factor did not affect the anticipated increase of transport receipts, which failed to occur.

The deficit arising from transfers rose because the Ivory Coast authorities participated in the cost of France's technical assistance, and also because of the country's higher contributions to international agencies.

Insofar as capital movements are concerned, it should be noted that in 1979 private investment left a net balance of 15 billion CFA francs (3 billion less than in 1978). The net inflow of foreign capital to the public sector amounted

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to 112 billion CFA francs (7.5 million less than in 1978). These investments serve to finance infrastructure projects, such as the dams at Taabo and Buyo, and new undertakings in the agricultural sector (industrial production of soy beans, manioc and various types of rubber). In 1980, the semi-public sector will provide 44 billion CFA francs of foreign capital (to continue the agro-industrial program of the Company for the Development of Sugar (Sodesucre), as well as for the extension of the electric power network belonging to Electricite de la Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast Electricity) and, finally, the doubling of the treatment capacity of the Ivory Coast Refinery.

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LIBERIA

POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF OPPOSITION MEMBER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464

[Text] Since the bloody riots in Monrovia last April (MTM, 20 and 27 April) and the violence that occurred at the Lamco Mining Company in August (MTM, 17 August), which justified the establishment of a Ministry of National Security in September (MTM 20 September), Liberia is not experiencing as calm a social and political climate as before. The attempted assassination of an opponent of the regime which took place on 1 December is a new example of this. The attempt on the life of Oscar Quiah, secretary general of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia [PAL], took place in Yekepa, the town of the mining company where Quiah works. Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, the president of the PAL, has asked the government to open an investigation. The PAL, drawing inspiration from Africian Socialism, was founded in New York in 1975. It has been tolerated in Liberia since 1978 and is therefore not officially recognized. It recruits most of its supporters in student circles which have long been hostile to the regime, whose antidemocratic nature they denounce. Although it does not enjoy real popular support like the party in power, the True Whig Party [TWP], which is now the only legal party, this opposition organization is very influential in the university. It is reportedly also influential among the bulk of the unemployed, chiefly among the young people, and among some cadres and skilled workers. It is furthermore this party which in connection with a planned increase in the price of rice, last April organized the demonstrations which turned into a riot. A fortnight before the attempted assassination on 1 December the PAL had sent to the government an official request for official approval as an opposition party. That request is awaiting approval.

As a matter of fact, the constitution of Liberia provides for party pluralism, which furthermore has existed in the past, but it is to be noted that no group has ever before demonstrated drawing inspiration from a leftist ideology.

In any event, the chief of state remains very attentive to the development of the situation in his country. In particular, he has already initiated some purges in his entourage and he has made several minor reshuffles of his cabinet. In October, he even submitted to the congress of his party

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some proposals conducive to bring about reform both within the party and the constitution. "Despite important accomplishments," he said, "the TWP has too often considered things as if they got along by themselves. Now it is vital and imperative," he added, "that the party agree to reform itself and become a mass party so that the quiet revolution that it has begun may continue."

On the constitutional level, he in particular advocated abandoning the property clause, which grants the right to vote only to the sole land owners who have a minimum of 1,000 square meters of land, and the extension of the franchise to all tax-paying citizens. He also advocated an extension of Liberian citizenship "so as to eliminate all forms of racism or oppression."

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MALI

BRIEFS

FOOD DEFICIT -- The food deficit in Mali for 1979-1980 amounts to 250,000 tons of grain. This evaluation was made on 23 January 1980 by the Malian authorities and a mission from FAO-WFP (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization - World Food Program) which was dispatched to Bamako at the request of the president of Mali, General Moussa Traore. Mr Fiere, former chief of the West African branch of the WFP, who led the mission, and the authorities in Bamako "made joint recommendations aimed at adequate aid from the international community." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 256] 8463

CCCE LOANS -- On 25 January, the Malian minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, Mr Alioune Blondin Baye, and Mr Roland-Billecart, director general of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) on a visit to Mali, signed two loan agreements totaling 1,896 million Malian francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 256] 8463

COOPERATION WITH BRAZIL--Mr Lamine Keita, Malian minister of industrial development, met on 17 January with Mr Cesar Cals, Brazilian minister of mines and energy, whom he informed of Mali's interest in Brazil's possible participation in oil prospecting in Mali. Mr Keita had previously discussed possibilities of technical cooperation in the area of transportation with Mr Eliseu Resende, Brazilian minister of transportation. An agreement on cooperation in this area was to be signed by both countries following negotiations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 194] 11915

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MOZAMBIQUE

## BRIEFS

DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE -- The authorities in Mozambique are in the process of finalizing development projects of collective agricultural production units in order to provide them with the technical means which will allow them to achieve in the short term the objectives set by the higher authorities of the party and the state. Those projects have three directions: the pilot cooperatives, the program for use of animal power and the development of cadres. The formula for the training centers for the management cadres of the cooperatives has been reexamined and will be shifted toward another solution within the same perspective: that of a national school for cooperatives, which would not only train the cadres, but also plan the use of animal power by using pilot cooperatives as distribution centers. One should also note the creation of the Department for the Organization and Development of Agricultural Cooperatives (GODCA, according to the Portuguese abbreviation), whose task it is to organize, manage, direct, plan and control the process of setting up and developing agricultural cooperatives, to reorganize the family sector in order to achieve a progressive changeover toward collective production and to contribute to the development of community villages in close cooperation with the National Commission of community villages. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 275] 8463

BUTANE AVAILABILITY -- The sale of bottled gas to the public is experiencing fewer difficulties than was previously the case in Beira. The distribution is carried out by the Mocacor-Gascidla company, which launched a vast information campaign among the consumers to encourage them not to keep the empty tanks after they have been used. The shortage of tanks thus created is the main permanent difficulty which the company must face. Moreover, the shortage of gas which existed up to a short while ago was due to insufficient means of transportation between Maputo and Beira. The distribution of bottled gas in Beira is carried out through the intermediary of four permanent stations (to which sometimes two mobile stations are added, which circulate three times a week in certain quarters: on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays). In the remainder of the province of Sofala, the distribution is carried out by agents who come to Beira to lay in supplies at a Mocacor-Gascidla warehouse, located at Munhava. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 275] 8463

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CASHEW NUT PRODUCTION DOWN -- The collection of cashew nuts in Mozambique's Sofala province -- and specifically in the largest producing districts, those of Buzi and Chibabava -- which officially began on 1 December last, will continue into March. The production is low and will probably not reach the expected objectives. Furthermore, the transportation of the collected nuts is difficult because of the shortage of means of transportation. In principle, the agents must take care of the transportation of their purchases, but most of them do not have the trucks necessary for this. Provision has been made for the creation of permanent collection stations which will provide temporary storage and will give the civil servants of the Ministry of Internal Trade time to put into place the necessary structures for the selling of cashews. This system will also make it possible to facilitate operations in the hard to reach areas. It should be noted that a substantial quantity of cashew nuts arrived at the Caju of Mozambique plant, in Beira. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 275] 8463

STEAM LOCOMOTIVES TO REMAIN -- Mr Alcantara Santos, national director of Ports and Railroads, has declared that Mozambique has no intention of taking the steam locomotives of the CFM [Mozambique Railroad] out of circulation, but that, on the contrary, it will prolong their service to the maximum, because the country produces coal domestically while it must import products derived from petroleum. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 275] 8463

BUDGET FOR 1980--The 1980 budget appropriations act provides for expenditures of 37 million contos (or 22.8 million more than in 1979), with 20 million contos for investments and 17 million for current expenses. This is the first time that Mozambique's budget has been submitted in this form. It should also be noted that the budget plan is coordinated with the 1979-80 central government plan. With regard to investments, 4.5 million contos are allocated to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, another 4.5 million to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and 3.8 million to the Ministry of Agriculture. Finance Minister Rui Balthazar said that this involved reaching a better level of planning and that the budget was considered to be a document of a political nature and not only a text prepared by economists and accountants. The minister also stressed the risks which the country took by introducing into the government a high number of personnel who do not always have the necessary qualifications: "We cannot encourage incompetence, parasitism and dead weight in government." The 1980 budget also provides for 15 million contos in revenue. Taxes on tobacco, beer, beverages, textiles and shoes are expected to be raised for that purpose. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 215] 11915

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RHODESIA

FUTURE OF WHITES IN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE PONDERED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Jan 80 pp 46-47

[Article by Francois Soudan]

[Text] Nostalgia can also be sold. Ivan Day-Jones, a mediocre Sunday painter in Salisbury, realized this a few months ago when a settler from Kariba, in the North, came to buy from him his stock of naive daubs. The canvases of Day-Jones describe massacres, ambushes and outrages; they tell of what existed yesterday, along with beer and rugby, the Rhodesian way of life of Zimbabwe's 200,00 whites. As he laid out 30-40 Rhodesian dollars on the counter of the stall, the settler explained to him that he was leaving the country for South Africa and that his paintings would remind him of the "good old days". Since then Day-Jones has resumed painting and his notebook of orders is always filled.

From Beitbridge to Karoi, the souvenirs are being sold off within the white community. Coins, pennants, PATU (Police Antiterrorist Unit) insignia, stories of the colonies, everything is bought, sometimes for gold. T-shirts on which, with a slightly bitter ridicule, was printed "Come to Umtali [a city in the east not far from the Mozambican border] and get bombed/" are in great demand. Rhodesia's Europeans are caught up in a nostalgic frenzy. The end of an era, no doubt.

Eighteen thousand emigrants in 1978. Without a doubt, almost as many this year. It is not exactly an exodus, but the beginning of a hemorrhage. Since the first armed engagements (1972), nearly 100,000 whites have left Rhodesia. There were 280,000 even years ago. Today there are barely 200,000.

One Single Priority: To Form National Cadres

The least prone to leave, yet the most exposed to guerrilla raids, are the farmers. Regrouped within the very powerful Commercial Farmers Union, they still number 5,500 today (as opposed to 6,300 in 1975). The richness of their lands is such that, as soon as a farmer "let's go", the others repurchase his property. But will they stay in Zimbabwe in

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the event of an electoral victory by the nationalists of the Patriotic Front? Even if Ian Smith, their former prime minister, now declares himself "confident" and shouts from the rooftops that "if Mugabe and Nkomo win, it will be necessary to adapt and stay put," many will no doubt set out for South Africa rather than see the terrorists come to power. It remains to be seen if this exodus will be small enough to keep the country from being plunged into prolonged economic chaos.

An independent Zimbabwe--no one, from Muzorewa to Nkomo and to Mugabe, denies it--needs the white community. In all the inhabited colonies where independence came about as the result of armed struggle accompanied by a massive exodus of Europeans, the national economy found itself disorganized.

As far as farm production is concerned, in Algeria, Angola or Mozambique, the results were, with minor differences, regardless of the "objective" reasons, the same: an exodus of whites, nationalization of abandoned properties or partial redistribution of lands (which profited either a bureaucratic middle-class, or the State as landowner, rarely the small farmer) and drop in production. In Angola, the production of coffee and tobacco fell by 50 percent between 1975 and 1978, that of bananas by 80 percent.

The same stumbling block exists with regard to industry: the case of Angola here is very significant. This country's situation in 1974 was, in fact, due allowance being made, relatively comparable to that of Zimbabwe today. Almost all of the 200,000 Portuguese who lived there left Angola within a few months. The main nationalist movement, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which was soon to come into power, did nothing to hold them back, persuaded that the Cuban technicians could very easily replace them. But not only was the renewal of the economy a global failure (four years after independence, only the petroleum sector, exploited by the Western companies, regained the 1973 production level), but Angolan authorities, beginning in 1977, had to call on Portuguese, Italian, British, even South African advisors. Furthermore, Agostinho Neto, on several occasions, had to fight the influence of the Cuban assistants on all the economic decision-making centers, and to remind that the only true objective was to form national cadres. At this level, Angola is hardly different from the "moderate" countries where Western capital and investors colonized the economic apparatus.

Thus the main lesson that, without a doubt, the Zimbabwe nationalists have drawn from the preceding experiences is clear: it is of little use to replace the Western cadres with "socialist" cadres who, often, have only a lesser knowledge of the economic realities of the country. The important thing is, at first, to retain the European personnel already in place lest production, and therefore the standard of living, drop, all while controlling its activity by limiting its influence and by actively preparing its relief.

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## Angola and Mozambique Were Poor Examples

A difficult balance. But do other choices exist? After all, when the Chinese and North Vietnamese revolutionaries came to power, they did not act any differently towards their national middle-class. Having acquired a great deal of economic experience in the liberated zones (which was not the case with either the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front) or the Angolan MPLA, nor today with the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe), they were eager, during a certain period, to use the technical expertise of this national middle-class by affiliating it closely with mixed enterprises.

Paradoxically this necessity is reinforced by the exceptional broadness of the influence of the Europeans on the land, commerce and industry of Zimbabwe; and by the very inferior the number of black laborers and cadres. The industrial and mining sector, dominated largely by the Anglo-American-South African multinationals, employs 100,000 black workers and 25,000 white technicians. But it is in the rural area that this stranglehold is the most patent: barely 1 percent of the farm population owns 40 percent of the arable land. And, obviously, the best, those of the Salisbury-Umtali-Bulawayo triangle.<sup>1</sup> These "ranches" for cattle-raising or tillage (coffee, maize, tobacco, tea) are all highly mechanized and employ 350,000 black farm workers (2 million people with their families). Their great profitability has allowed Zimbabwe not only to be self-sufficient in feeding itself, but to obtain 50 percent of its foreign currency income thanks to farm exports.

To break this production chain in the immediate future by wholesale expropriation of white farms and their redistribution to Zimbabwe peasants or by nationalizing them would no doubt have disastrous effects on the economic balance of the country and, hence, on the people's standard of living. To be sure, the distribution of lands in Zimbabwe is fundamentally unjust, but median and progressive solutions exist to make this injustice disappear, such as one which would consist of distributing at first to the peasants (in the form of cooperative organizations) the national "frozen" lands, the "African purchase zones" and the underutilized "white" lands.

As far as the industrial sector is concerned, the economic embargo, under which--theoretically--the country has been placed since 1968, has permitted the creation of a network of "integrated" enterprises which produce current consumer items from start to finish. Here too a hasty departure of European technicians would be catastrophic. No doubt the same would hold true for the functioning of the chromium and coal mines and the Kariba dam on the Zambesi.

The nationalist leaders, including Robert Mugabe, the most radical among them, are aware of the dangers that a white exodus would present. When questioned by the Johannesburg weekly, FINANCIAL MAIL, he specified: "Not

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all of the industries can be nationalized. Likewise with agriculture: the large plantations owned by the whites and which are operational will not initially come under state control." Words of wisdom, no doubt, but which will probably be difficult to apply, so great would be the push at the "grassroots" for an immediate redistribution of land and wealth in the event of an electoral victory by the Front.

It remains to be seen if, in the absence of certainty, the whites will stay in any case. Quite often mass exoduses obey irrational principles based on racism and fear. It is important, therefore, to reassure them so that at least 100,000 of them (a figure below which the economy would risk being paralyzed) will stay in Zimbabwe.

FOOTNOTE

1. By way of comparison: in Algeria, before 1962, 25 percent of the arable land was owned by Europeans; there were 20 percent in Tunisia and 7 percent in Morocco. In South Africa today 87 percent of the land is in the hands of the whites.

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SENEGAL

SENGHOR DISCUSSES EARLY INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES, NONALINEMENT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Feb 80 pp 68-84

[Interview with President Leopold Sedar Senghor by Mohammed Aziza, date and place not given]

[Text] Chiefs of state are generally uninclined toward confiding. What is surprising in the fact that one of the few exceptions to this rule is the inventor of the already-famous "right to differ"? A poet and president of the Republic of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor, long known as "the most African of the French and most French of the Africans" is still, at the age of 72, a special case. A member of the Socialist International, a Catholic by conviction in a country with a Moslem majority, the champion of African independence after having served as a minister under the Fourth Republic, he is one of the rare nonalined national leaders who have refused the "Third World" tutelage of the countries of the East. There is seemingly no end to the evident contradictions in this son of the Serer tribe who was a fellow student of Georges Pompidou at Louis-le-Grand, this graduate in grammar and champion of the French-speaking world who, together with Aime Cesaire of Martinique, imposed the concept of black Africanism. The prestige he enjoys today, even among those who, in Africa or elsewhere, criticize his "reformism" tends to be explained by one statement. To teach this professor of non-conformism any lesson would be a very difficult task for his detractors. The interview we are publishing here is taken from "The Poetry of Action," which Stock is publishing this week.

[Question] President of the republic and a poet--isn't there a contradiction here?

Senghor: It is my impression that if I had remained a professor, my poetry would have been poorer, more gratuitous, for what feeds it is community life, that of my people. In this poetry I do indeed express my personal life, but I express myself above all as a Black and as an African. It is when I am in the countryside, relating directly to the peasants, that I see fully. My public life would be incomplete, because it would that of a mutilated man, if I were not a writer. The first priorities in Senegal today, as you know, are education, training and culture, to which we are allocating about 30 percent of our public budget.

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If there is a contradiction, it is a basic one. I could in principle organize my life to accomplish both my duties as president of the republic and my work as a writer, but a chief of state is often obliged to make difficult decisions, when that is not consistent with his temperament nor in his thoughts a priori.

I will give you an example. In 1966 I almost became the victim of a fanatic who attempted to assassinate me. I was profoundly moved by that. I put myself in his place, and I tried to understand his fanaticism, that he could risk his life for his beliefs. I wanted to spare him, but all of the authorities I consulted, everyone, told me that this man should not be pardoned, or we would no longer be able to govern Senegal. For three weeks I had terrible nightmares. There you see the profound contradiction of my situation. One must not consider the personal aspect of things, but the community aspect.

But it is not an insoluble problem for a poet-chief of state to reconcile his duties as an official with the fidelity of the poet to his ideas and feelings. It is enough for the chief of state to rise above electoral matters, petty politicking, in order to identify once again with the soul of his people. It is thus that Third World chiefs of state such as Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh were able to be statesmen and poets fully and simultaneously.

[Question] You have told me that your two given names might seem to be a kind of harbinger, in any case an encouragement for what was later to be your battle for racial mixture.

Senghor: As you know, I was named Leopold Sedar. My baptismal certificate shows only Leopold and my birth certificate only Sedar. I was given the name Leopold because one of my father's friends had that name, but also because, thanks to the crown prince of Belgium, the future Leopold III, the name was fashionable. I learned later that St Leopold was an Austrian margrave. I have had an opportunity to pay my respects at his tomb. Sedar was a kind of nickname meaning "without shame" or "one who cannot be humiliated." Under certain circumstances, as you know is the custom in Africa, you are given a nickname. Fortunately I was not named "you are ugly" or "no one wants him." My mother told me that I was puny when I was born. That was why I was given the nickname Sedar. Senghor is a name of Portuguese origin.

My father told me that his ancestors came from Gabou, which is a region in upper Portuguese Guinea. The Senghors are found above all in Casamance, on the frontier of the former Portuguese Guinea, and a part of Casamance, as is known, is a former Portuguese colony ceded in an exchange to the French. Senghor comes from the Portuguese word "senhor," and that is probably why there is an "h" in it. It would thus mean "mister." I probably have a little Portuguese blood, because my blood group is A, which is common in Europe but rare in black Africa.

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Until 1913, I lived in an animist world. It was my uncle Waly, my mother's brother, who saw to my moral and religious education. My father was more inclined toward social and public life. My private life was rooted in the Tabor clan, that is to say my mother's family. It was my uncle who took me to the tombs for the ceremonial libations. When I was ill, he saw to my care. I was an animist 100 percent. All of my intellectual, moral and religious world was animist, and it marked me profoundly. That is why, in my poems, I often speak of the "kingdom of childhood." It was a realm of innocence and happiness: there were no boundaries between the dead and the living, between reality and fiction, separating the present, past and future. During my escapades with the shepherd boys, we spoke of both the living and the dead as if they were there, beside us: we talked to them. At noon, which is the most solemn hour, we sometimes thought we saw those who had died that year parading across the "tanns." The "tanns" are the great expanses of bare earth, rich in salt, from which bodies of salt water receded. I was 7 years old when my father sent me to school, a Christian school ( . . . . )

[Question] During your studies in France, what were the trends of thought which interested you most?

Senghor: Basically I learned to assimilate the concepts of organization and above all method. This was perhaps the essential thing I retained from my teachers at Louis-le-Grand. Apart from that, I did not learn to be either braver or more worthy, or in general, more virtuous.

It was also at that time that I began to find arguments to defend black Africanism. First of all, I met people from the Antilles, including Louis Achille, Auguste Boucolon and Aime Cesaire. Louis Achille gave me the works of black American writers of the Negro renaissance to read, as well as those of poets such as Langston Hughes and Countee Cullen. With Cesaire, I began to develop the theory of "negritude." One of my friends, Professor Robert Schilling, director of the Latin Institute at the University of Strasbourg, told me that the philosophical dissertations in which I began my reflections on black Africanism had interested the philosopher Andre Cresson greatly. At the same time, I began to discover the surrealist writers and the painters of the School of Paris, such as Picasso, Matisse, Chagal, etc., who owed much to Negro art. The great jazz vogue was also during these bewildering years. In brief, it was in Paris that I tried, along with Aime Cesaire, Louis Achille and Leon Damas, to take weapons from the hands of the colonials to defend and clarify black Africanism.

I cannot fail to mention the influence of my secondary-school comrades, including Georges Pompidou, who led me into reading. Very methodically, we spent Thursdays and Sundays reading, visiting museums, going to concerts, to see and hear the plays of the great dramatists being put on then: Claudel, Montherlant, Giraudoux. We went to all the big premieres.

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Those years, from 1928 to 1931, were for me decisive years. In the final account I took the examinations for entrance into higher normal school twice. The second time I ranked highest among those rejected. A meager consolation. However in 1931 I obtained a bachelor of arts degree (French, Latin, Greek), with honorable mention on all my certificates but one. In 1932, I received a certificate of higher studies with honorable mention on a thesis which bore the title "Exoticism in the Works of Baudelaire." In 1933 I took the examinations to become an instructor in grammar. I knew that by working hard and methodically I would certainly succeed. To my great surprise I qualified 25th out of some 300. But I had not prepared for the oral examination, and thus failed. I was not accepted until 1935, during my military service. Thus I had only lost 1 year.

The intellectual climate in that era, in the 1930s, marked a great turning point for the West; indeed for world history. Discursive reasoning had reigned supreme from the time of Aristotle, indeed since Socrates, to the end of the "stupid 19th century," to what I called the "revolution of 1889," the date of Bergson's "Time and Free Will" (*Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience*). It was at that moment that Europe truly opened up to the overseas civilizations, the black African civilization in particular. It was in 1906 that Picasso discovered the famous "Baul mask" and the "black revolution" began to function, to use Emmanuel Berl's term. As of the end of the 19th century, then, the pioneers in Western Europe placed the emphasis on intuitive reasoning and the powers of the imagination animated by sensitivity, by "desire." All of this was reflected in works in the 1930s, with the surrealists in poetry and the School of Paris in plastic art. This was the epoch in which the greatest French writers of the 20th century lived and created. The era, following the death of Peguy, of Andre Breton, Tristan Tzara, Paul Claudel, Saint-Jean Perse, and Andre Gide, to mention only those our group of black students admired the most.

We as black students had a particular predilection for Bergson and these latter writers. I have often spoken of the "black style of Peguy." At the first colloquium in Brangues, a year or so ago, I gave an address entitled "The Eloquence of Paul Claudel and the Black Africans." The entire surrealist movement, like cubism and expressionism, the triumph of Claudel, for whom emotion underlay all great art, the vivid memory of Peguy and the Creole charm of the "mulatto on the Quai d'Orsay"--dixit Leon Daudet--all of this revolution in the art of painting and sculpting, thinking and writing, but above all of feeling--it all gave us the weapons we sought. The white students themselves felt close to us, accepted us as black. I recall students at the Louis-le-Grand school, in the classes preparing for higher education, from the Antilles, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, etc.

It was under these conditions that I established friendships with certain class comrades. On the cultural level, the Louis-le-Grand Secondary School was also a "kingdom of childhood" in which freedom and imagination reigned.

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I was immediately attracted to Georges Pompidou. He was one of the best students. Out of the 60-some in our class, Pompidou was in the first 10, and often he was 1st. He ranked 8th in the competition for entrance to higher normal school and 1st in the competition for acceptance as instructor. Physically, he was a curious type. He had black hair, very white skin and light eyes. He was a bit nonchalant and as lazy as he was gifted. He spent most of his time reading. I recall a certain history composition when, after 2 hours of work, Pompidou--who was sitting beside me, said: "Ghor, I'm finished. I'm going to have a smoke outside." As for me, I had to work three times as long. Eight days later, our papers were handed back and Pompidou ranked 1st. It was he who urged me to read a lot of books I would not have read otherwise, leading me above all to know and love French poetry. He often recited poems to me in a monotonous voice as we recited in black Africa. We truly developed a brotherly affection for each other. It was more than friendship. I spent 10 summer vacations with Dr Pierre Cahour, his step-father, at Chateau Gontier.

It was when he went into politics that the bonds became a little less close. He was defending French interests, while I defended Senegalese interests. However, no test could separate us, he was that honest and loyal. An anecdote illustrates this. When he was president of the French Republic, I wrote him a somewhat bitter letter of a dozen pages in which, supported by figures, I tried to show him that France, despite its fine words, often violated both the letter and the spirit of the Franco-Senegalese agreements.

Seeing him again about 2 months after I sent the letter, I asked him: "Georges, I am well aware that this is the 'white habit' when one is embarrassed, but tell me, why didn't you answer me?" And he replied: "Well, you clever fellow, it's because you were right from the start to the finish. Damn the offices!" For me his death was a traumatic experience. A month later I paid an official visit to the Far East--China, North Korea, India and Bangladesh. Just after his death, I thought of writing an elegy for him, but I told myself this would be bad--a political poem! One morning in China, however, I awoke early and began to write a verse about him. I continued, and it was in Madras that I finished the final line of the "Elegy for Georges Pompidou." You can read the poem in my last collection entitled "Major Elegies."

[Question] Was he interested in politics at the time you met him?

Senghor: Not too much, although he was a socialist. It was he moreover who converted me to socialism. When I arrived in France I had been educated, yet again, by priests from Brittany, Alsace and Normandy. I was somewhat of a monarchist. I had been considerably influenced by Barres. It is curious, for Barres led me to understand France better and to love it, but at the same time he strengthened in me the sense of blackness by stressing race, or at least the nation.

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[Question] In the view of many, the world in which we live is one of crisis, very profoundly marked by an end to certain lyrical illusions. Do you share this uncompromising view of the modern world?

Senghor: We have been in crisis since the triumph of Hitler, which put an end to Wilsonian optimism. Since we have been in crisis, and in all sectors.

First of all there is a religious crisis, in the developed world, naturally, where Christianity is on the decline, and not only in the USSR, but in China as well and in the Third World countries, where political fanaticism is a form of religious degeneration. The process has affected India, the Middle East and Africa, although not so perceptibly. There is also a cultural crisis, which has affected the Third World, even though decolonialized, which is little by little adopting the values of Europe and America, even when it scorns them, and this crisis is affecting Europe and America themselves. And the division here between West and East is only a seeming one, both being agreed on the same objective, if not the same materialist goal. And finally, there is a more serious political crisis than is realized. Capitalism has begun to question itself and Eurocommunism is the proof that there is a crisis within the communist world.

Moreover, the problems are not only within nations, but currently exist between the developed and the developing worlds. This is the "main contradiction," to use the Marxist expression. To be specific, the crisis exists, despite the appearance of the cold war, between the North and the South, while in the past it was between the East and the West. The crisis is no longer between the "two great white nations." And the problem of socialism itself is today less a matter of eliminating the inequalities among the classes within a given nation than a matter of the inequalities between the North and the South, between the well-endowed countries and the proletarian nations. We are in full crisis, aggravated by the fact that the developed countries, whether in the East or in the West, can no longer control their technology. Euroamerican civilization is in the process of destroying nature, of destroying itself, from within, by its inventions. Look at the atomic bomb, the pollution of the oceans!

[Question] The crisis affecting the modern world is not only a matter of equality, there is an economic dimension as well, and a cultural dimension.

Senghor: Along with the dangers of pollution there are, you are right, economic dangers which are not of just recent date. They are linked with the development of discursive reasoning and the means it fabricated for dominating the world.

In order to understand the problem, one must go back to the 15th century, to the great discoveries, when tradesmen and soldiers took precedence over the missionaries, for opposite reasons. It was then that black slavery, which lasted for 3 1/2 centuries and led to the exile of 20 million and the massacre of 200 million blacks, began. This was the greatest genocide

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in history! It was as of then that capitalism began to develop. It was not the great navigators by themselves or the missionaries who thought of and organized the slave trade. It was basically the work of merchants of all kinds, the rising bourgeoisie. It was thanks to the blacks taken by force to the Americas, thanks to the development of the exotic crops and famous spices that the accumulation of capital began to develop. This was the beginning of the economic power of Europe and America.

In the 20th century, after the African and Asian nations gained their independence, the slave economy continued in the form of the deterioration of the terms of trade. I have calculated this deterioration for Senegal, or more precisely, our National Statistics Department has done so. It established that between 1973 and 1975 the average price for our exports increased by 57 percent, while the average price for our imports, for its part, increased 196 percent, representing a loss of 139 percent. Since then, the prices of things we import have continued to increase, and those of our exports to decrease, relatively, including the price of peanut oil, which is however regarded as of superior quality.

There is another problem which is, as you have said, the cultural dimension of today's crisis. In general, politicians minimize this aspect, beginning with the OAU chiefs of state. Now what is remarkable is that the economists are telling us ever more loudly that to resolve economic problems they must be studied from other points of view, particularly from the cultural angle. This is what Mesarovic and Pestel say, as I noted, in their first report to the Club of Rome entitled "A Strategy for Tomorrow." For myself, although I am not an economist, I have said that behind the economic problem and conditioning it lies the cultural problem. Speaking to an American friend I specified as follows: "You think that \$10,000 is not enough income for a U.S. citizen, but that for an African, \$150 to \$200 should suffice. Those people there, you think, do not have needs. This is not racism--I do not have great faith in racism, which never prevented the mixture of races even in South Africa. It is more serious, for there we see cultural contempt."

Thus to resolve the economic problem, we must start with the cultural one. For, contrary to what is believed, not much progress has been made in the matter. The industrial nations in general, whether in the East or the West, and the European and American nations in particular, do not recognize equality for different cultures, and do not even accept the principle of difference. Still today, black culture is not accepted by the majority of the Euroamerican intellectuals. Even in France, the black culture is not recognized by the majority of the men of the left. We have experienced this, not without bitterness, since the end of World War II. For example, among all the black Africans who have submitted doctoral theses on subjects exalting black values, I do not know one who has obtained a "very honorable mention."

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When our leftist intellectuals jeer at African chiefs of state and regimes, they can find publishers, but when they undertake to think by and for themselves, when they try to effect an Arab or black African re-reading of Marx and Engels, the publishers become difficult. And there is more, when the drought cycle plagued the Sudanese-Saharan nations between 1966 and 1973, French professors and researchers published a kind of manifesto in which they asserted that the African chiefs of state were responsible for the drought, as if such cycles had not existed during the colonial era. At that time I read this kind of thing in the main French newspapers from LE FIGARO to L'HUMANITE. No one, even among the communists, ever said that the drought in France was the fault of Mr Giscard d'Estaing.

[Question] Faced with these multiple crises, and the opposition between the two hemispheres, north and south, what in your view is the basis of the claims of the Third World?

Senghor: The first aspect is thus of a cultural nature. It can be formulated in this way. In order to build the pan-human civilization of the 21st century, it is necessary that the cultures of the Third World be recognized by Europe and America as different but complementary cultures which should participate in the dialog, which began in reality after the discoveries of the Renaissance.

The second demand is of an economic nature. It is a matter of creating a new world economic order. It involves basically waging a battle against the inequalities between the rich nations and the proletarian nations by indexing the prices of raw materials and establishing a common fund which could serve to regulate the prices of these raw materials. It was I, at the conference organized by the Club of Rome in Salzburg, who launched the concept of indexing.

The third demand is political. Decolonialization must be achieved in Africa, particularly the southern portion. It is essential moreover for the Euroamerican nations which are trying to organize the policy of detente to help us--at least leave us free--to develop a third path stressing cultural problems, for all conflicts, as Aristotle said and as Marx confirmed, serve the final goal of cultural development.

[Question] What would be the most appropriate response for the Third World to perfect in answer to the challenge of the modern era?

Senghor: The Third World should respond by developing a doctrine, a model, but above all by action.

Having developed, and not just repeating the little catechism of capitalism, Marxism-Leninism or even democratic socialism--thus having drafted a doctrine, or I would say more modestly a method, born of the confrontation between ideology and the national reality, it is a question, within the framework of a development plan, of defining a model. This should point a third way between the parliamentary democracies of the West and the popular

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democracies of the East, without necessarily being social democratic, and assimilating contributions from the Euroamerican civilization. As opposed to the white European model, we must develop a countermodel, based on the symbiosis of opposites.

It is time in fact to rise above the contradictions of discursive reasoning and intuitive reasoning, the culture and the economy, prosperity and happiness, socialism and democracy. Each of us, African or Asian, Tunisian, Senegalese, Indian, Vietnamese, etc., must define our own models, but based on an African, Asian, Latin American, Oceanian humanism.

[Question] You have spoken of developing a specific model, halfway between that of the West and that of the eastern democracies. Does it seem to you that the nonalignment project meshes with this step, despite the fact that nonalignment itself would seem to be in crisis today?

Senghor: I agree with you: Nonalignment has been an effort to take up the Euroamerican challenge. This is why one must begin by rendering homage to the founding fathers, to such men as Tito, Nasser, Nehru. I call them the "trinity of the Third World." In 1975, on the occasion of my official visit to Yugoslavia, I discussed the North-South dialog, the new economic order, etc., with President Tito. He advised me to pursue discussion always to the end, but never to break off relations. That is the spirit of nonalignment--discussion with this side and that to find the middle way, but without ever losing heart, without ever breaking off, which does not mean accepting everything.

Nonalignment is thus an effort to respond to the challenge of the Euroamericans. The first conference in Bandung defined a collective political line of nonalignment, while sketching out a third way. The fourth summit meeting in Algiers in 1976 established firm foundations for a new world economic order. The result was the first victory won in Nairobi.

It is natural that there should be a crisis, many crises. The Colombo conference should have drafted a cultural line. It did not. This was a problem I discussed with President Tito. We agreed to submit a resolution on cultural cooperation and on dialog between civilizations. Unfortunately, I was unable to go to Colombo. Because there is a crisis, we must make an effort to avoid the dangers which threaten the nonaligned movement.

The first of these dangers is our inclination to take an automatic position against the West, and align ourselves with the East. In doing so, we cease to be in internal agreement. This was reflected for example at Colombo by a categorical position of hostility toward France. For 15 years I have denounced the slave economy pursued by France. That having been said, one must not forget that France, in the person of General de Gaulle, was the country that undertook the most profound decolonization, and that the General was the only European chief of state to have risked his life for decolonization several times. He was the

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first to practice a policy of nonalignment. The second danger is again dealing with the cultural problem as a minor one. As with Arab-African cooperation, the basis of nonalignment must be cultural.

However, that Colombo conference was not entirely negative. The adoption of categorical positions, the opposition of part of the nonaligned nations to the others on such burning problems as that of the Western Sahara, was avoided. If the political problem of the path between the East and the West, between democratic socialism and Marxism-Leninism, was not entirely resolved, at least the nonaligned nations carried off a great victory in Nairobi. Agreement was reached on the principle of the common fund, and such problems as that of the debts of the poorest countries were postponed for later meetings.

Unfortunately, this last conference of the nonaligned nations held this year in Havana, Cuba almost carried us backward to alignment pure and simple with not even just the communist world but European communism.

[Question] What do you think about the events which have characterized these last few years? For example the phenomenon of Khomeyni?

Senghor: The "Khomeyni phenomenon," as you call it, seems to me to go precisely counter to what the left wing in Iran hoped for as a possible and desirable revolution. That is why I said, on Khomeyni's advent, that he "could not take Iran back to the Middle Ages."

In saying that I was not thinking of the religious level but the political, economic and social levels. But after only a few months in power, alas, the Khomeyni regime is in the process of proving that it is in the etymological sense of the word a reactionary one, that it is trying in fact to go backward, but that it cannot because this leads to deception and revolt. Is it truly a revolution, that is to say a new and more humane order than the other, when, seeking to revise not the spirit but the badly deteriorated letter of an old and therefore outdated order, arrest, imprison, and more serious, undertake to kill without allowing the defendants the democratic means to defend themselves? Is it truly a revolution when the leftist parties are persecuted and the men of the left resign from the government?

If only this regime could resolve the economic and social problems! But note how production is dropping, unemployment is increasing and the regime even has to turn to yesterday's enemy, the United States of America, to obtain certain products derived from oil.

[Question] What do you think is happening in Asia: a more or less admitted retreat from Maoism in China, wars between communist regimes despite the dogma of proletarian internationalism?

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Senghor: Where China is concerned, the decline of Maoism is natural. Any true revolution, because it means profound, overwhelming change, has its strong periods and its weak periods, its ups and its downs, in brief, tension and detente.

What is more important and more serious for Marxism-Leninism is the enduring and mutual hostility between Moscow and Peking, and above all the wars between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese and the Cambodians, etc.

This shows that the ideologies are sick--some say they are already dead--and that what is winning, in this last quarter of the 20th century, is nationalism. It is proving even more permanent and stronger than continental or racial solidarity in the broad sense of the word, because the peoples of Southeast Asia are all members of the yellow race of one of its mixtures.

[Question] One of the most critical aspects of the foreign policy of Senegal for African intellectuals is the fact of its privileged relations with France, and also support of the French-speaking project. Can you justify these two aspects of the international policy of Senegal?

Senghor: Our policy is based on principles rather than preferences. The first principle has to do with our situation, geographic but also historical. We are Africans and Blacks situated in the extreme western part of Africa and in the northern part of the black world. This explains our privileged relations with the Arab-Berbers on the one hand and with the French on the other. Working from this situation and bearing in mind in particular our identity as French-speaking black Africans, we use dialog as the key method in foreign policy. In fact we think that the truth is not the prerogative of any race or nation, each having only a part of it. This is why only the dialog can lead to the totality of the truth.

What is the reason for our privileged relations with France? I would answer that it is because of geography, but above all because of history. Just prior to independence, in 1959, we were I repeat the oldest French colony, for the city of Saint-Louis in Senegal was founded in 1659. Moreover, democratic life in the European fashion began in the 18th century in Senegal. The first Senegalese commune dates from the Louis XV era. On 15 April 1789, we sent our "most humble protests and remonstrances" to the "French people in the Estate General," in which we declared ourselves to be "black" and "French." Our first representation in the French parliament, in the Council of the 500, began in 1795. Thus we were subject to the cultural, indeed the ethnic, influence of France, for the mixture of race, with the French as well as the Arab-Berbers, is one of the realities in Senegal. A nation cannot deny its history with impunity. Why reproach us for our "privileged relations" with France, while finding it natural that our English-speaking neighbors should be members of the Commonwealth. This reminds me of Nkrumah, asking me "in the name of Africa" to leave the

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Community. I told him: "Very well, if you will leave the Commonwealth." "But," he said, "it is not the same thing." To which I retorted: "Definitely, logic is not your main virtue, you English-speaking Black."

Thus we accept the French influence, but trying to assimilate what is best in French culture, that is to say the spirit of method and organization, added to a certain sense of what is human. The main error of the French in their relations with us is to have wanted us to be "black Frenchmen." We have always been the first to protest that our nature as "Blacks" is not well enough understood. And it is we who, since the 1930s, have been the most critical of anyone in Africa of the French policy of passive assimilation, substituting our roots in blackness for it, in order, it is true, the better to open up for ourselves the virtues of other cultures, among which, it is also true, the Arab and the French cultures figure. For any great civilization, as history proves, is a cultural mixture.

On the political level, I was the first black African deputy to state, in 1946, that independence was our ultimate goal. In the commission entrusted with drafting the constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958, a Malagasy member and I were the only ones to demand the inclusion of the principle of self-determination.

And these are the facts. They are positive. This is why we refuse to make of France the main enemy. We reject the elements in the French culture we do not want to assimilate, but we take from it life-giving contributions. Thus after we won our independence, we maintained privileged relations with France, while its cultural, and also economic, influence diminished.

Where the cultural influence is concerned, if French has remained our official language, that is to say the language of international communication, we have once again made of our six main black African languages "national languages," in which we have begun teaching efforts. Moreover, educational programs have been reviewed in terms of manuals to place the stress on Africa, or more accurately on black Africanism. Finally, since independence was achieved we have created, as I have said, not only a new literature but also a new painting, new sculpture, new tapestry, and we are in the process of developing a new music, new dance, new architecture, indeed a new philosophy.

I almost forgot the "French-speaking project," as you call it. Once again, whether we like it or not, continents, races and nations are moving toward a universal civilization, through intersecting dialogs: North-South and West-East. The Eurafrican association is developing in the north-south direction and the French-speaking affiliation from east to west. It is a fact that following the Commonwealth, mixed cultural groups are in the process of defining themselves and developing--Spanish-speaking, Portuguese-speaking, French-speaking--by means of a language for international communication, with the unique characteristic that it must be a tool of

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cultural development, one of its tasks being, paradoxically, encouraging the rebirth, by enriching them, of the languages and civilizations of the Third World.

As you will have seen from these facts, the criticisms addressed to Senegal as to its relations with France do not reflect the truth. It is true that we Senegalese are also reproached for our battle for Arab-African cooperation! "Let fools say what they will . . . "

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SENEGAL

FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENTS SIGNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 316

[Text] Two French-Senegalese financing agreements were signed at Dakar at the end of January. They involve a total aid volume of 3 billion CFA [African Financial Community], granted by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation.

1. The first agreement involves 2.5 billion CFA. This is an advance granted by the Central Fund to the BNDS (Senegal National Development Bank) in order to procure long-term funds for the latter, intended for the financing of various development projects listed in the economic and social development plan of Senegal.

This loan, taken out by the Senegalese government, for a term of 15 years, with 3 years deferred, brings the total amount of credits given to Senegal by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to a figure of 11,610 million francs CFA in less than 2 years.

2. The second agreement involves a subsidy of 500 million CFA, granted by the FAC for various activity areas, including 55 millions for public health; 55 millions likewise for vocational training; 50 millions for the civilian conversion of the former advanced training center at the Dakar arsenal to the functions of training personal for the Dakar-Marine company; 340 millions covering the long-term support program of the FAC for the Delta Development and Operation Company.

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SENEGAL

DATA ON PRICE INCREASES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 316

[Text] Starting on 12 February, prices on three major consumer items will go up in Senegal; oil will go up about 20 percent, sugar by 15 percent, and regular bread by 60 percent. These increases involve different proportions and constitute the second phase of the price and wage adjustment announced by the government; this adjustment does not involve another major consumer item--rice--where prices will be kept at the present level.

For oil in drums, the price will be raised from 198 francs CFA [African Financial Community], per liter, to 238. For oil in bottles, not including the bottle, the price will go up from 200 to 240 francs CFA; finally, for oil in plastic bottles (throwaway), the price will go up from 240 to 295 francs CFA. This increase comes from the "truth-in-pricing" method which is designed to reduce government subsidies for daily necessities. For oil, the government each year spent 4.5 billion francs CFA and has been doing so for the past 3 years. In spite of the rise in peanut purchasing prices paid to the farmers (from 41.50 to 45.50 francs CFA per kilogram), the wages of oil refinery employees and especially the cost of energy, the oil prices had been kept at their old levels. The important thing today, therefore, according to the daily LE SOLEIL, is not to stop subsidizing oil but to distribute the costs among the consumers and the government.

The rise in sugar prices is less severe. Lump sugar prices will go up from 225 francs CFA to 260 francs CFA per kilogram; the price of sugar loaves will go up from 265 to 295, for granulated sugar, from 210 to 245, for confectionary sugar from 250 to 285, and finally for bag sugar, it will go up from 238.15 to 288.15.

The last increase involves bread whose prices will go up from 67 to 105 francs CFA for a loaf of 440 grams and from 43 to 70 francs CFA for a loaf of bread weighing 280 grams. The price rise is explained by the ceiling placed on bread prices since 1974. The current price rise is due to the fact that costs for shipping and wheat flour have gone up considerably since then. Prices on millet, which is used to the extent of 15

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percent in making "pamible" [wheat bread], also are to go up from 35 to 40 francs CFA per kilogram. The government is still subsidizing the millet sold by the ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] to the millers as well as the millet flour intended for the bakeries. This subsidy came to 184 million CFA in 1979 and will be 335 millions this year.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FIDA RURAL DEVELOPMENT LOAN--Under the terms of an agreement signed in Rome on 16 January, the International Fund for Agricultural Development is giving Senegal a loan of \$13.6 million, or 2.8 billion CFA [African Financial Community] for the financing of integrated rural development projects in the department of Mbour and in the region of Louga. This loan, the first one given to Senegal by the FIDA, is repayable within 50 years, including 10 years deferred; the interest rate is only 1 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 316] 5058

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SIERRA LEONE

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT VISITS KUWAIT, QATAR--President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone spent 8 and 9 December on an official visit to Kuwait, where he had talks with the local authorities concerning in particular possible participation by Kuwait in the development of the Sierra Leonean mining industry: diamonds, iron chromium and titanium. A joint commission has reportedly already been set up and a delegation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development will reportedly soon travel to the African state. After Kuwait President Stevens, accompanied on his trip by several ministers and high dignitaries was to pay another 48-hour visit to Qatar. His talks with the ruler of that country were to bear on the procedure for effecting an expanded cooperation between West Africa in general, Qatar and the other Gulf states. The Sierra Leonean ambassadors in Saudi Arabia and France were to meet on that subject with the large delegation of President Stevens when it arrives in Doha. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464] 12116

DIAMOND DEPOSITS EXPLOITABLE PROFITABLY--In a report presented on 19 November to President Siaka Stevens by Anthony Oppenheimer and Ashworth officials respectively of the Diamond Corporation of West Africa and the local Diminco Company stated that the diamond deposits discovered in the country have proved to be large enough to be exploited for at least 20 years. A study on the profitability of the deposits was requested 3 years ago by the chief of state who welcomed the fortunate outcome in these words: "This important piece of news delights us to the highest degree, since it is a delight which will greatly help our economy." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464] 12116

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AID--The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) both agreed in November to provide financial assistance to Sierra Leone. The FAD signed a loan agreement for \$12.45 million which will permit in particular the financing of an agricultural development project extending over an area of more than 3,000 square kilometers in the northwestern part of the country in the vicinity of the city of Magbosi. Another loan of \$300,000 will be added to the former one by way of technical assistance. As for the IMF, it has responded favorably only to a request for a loan drawn up by the African

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state for the stabilization of its economy. It is to be moreover noted that also during November a mission from the World Bank visited Sierra Leone. The mission was headed by Shalobih, director of the West African department of the bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3464] 12116

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

SISAL EXPORTS--Tanzania will export 20,000 tons of sisal, worth \$15.5 million, to the Soviet Union, according to a contract signed recently in Moscow, as announced on 31 January at Dar es Salaam by the president of the Tanzania Sisal Authority. According to this official, the USSR, which purchased 7,600 tons in 1979 and which will purchase 20,000 tons this year, is one of the principal clients of Tanzania for this product. On the other hand, the Tanga Twine and Rope Works Ltd, which makes sisal rope, will export 16,000 tons of products to Great Britain, Canada, and the United States between January and August 1980. The company had to interrupt production in 1979 due to lack of fuel. It has now regained an output rate of 2,000 tons of finished products per year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 331] 5058

DANISH AID--Denmark will, in 1980, give Tanzania aid amounting to \$21 million and a loan of \$18.75 million, under the terms of an agreement signed on 2 February at Dar es Salaam between the two countries. These amounts will be used to develop water supply in rural areas, to build roads, and to promote the country's electrification. A Danish delegation had arrived at Dar es Salaam at the end of January to prepare this agreement. DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency) is planning to increase its financial aid to Tanzania even further in 1981 and 1982. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 331] 5058

FLOWER MILL OUTPUT INCREASE--According to its general manager, Mr C. Y. Mpupua, the NMC (National Milling Corporation) of Tanzania intends to increase its flower mill output capacities. At Dar es Salaam, the output capacities are to be increased from 50 tons of grain ground per day to 120 tons. A new flour mill, with a daily capacity of 120 tons, is also to be built at Dodoma, the future capital of Tanzania. Built with the help of the FAO, it is to process sorghum and millet. The NMC is also planning to build flour mills at Shinyanga and Mwanza. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 331] 5058

DATA ON IRRIGATION--Tanzanian agriculture minister John Malecela at the end of December at Dar es Salaam said that the irrigated surface areas for crop cultivation in Tanzania today amounts to 11,200 hectares and that

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another 8,500 were about to be turned into cropland. So far, 3,200 hectares of irrigated rice land were put up at the Mbarali farm, in the region of Mbeya; 8,000 hectares of sugar cane has been irrigated in the plantations of the Kilombero Sugar Mill. Feasibility studies conducted in the area of Chimala, 64 km east of Mbeya, were concluded as to the possibility of creating 5,900 hectares of irrigated rice cropland here. Plans also call for the creation of 4,000 hectares of similar cropland in the district of Same (region of Kilimanjaro). In the zone of Kagera, 4,800 hectares of sugar cane are to be irrigated to supply the Kagera Sugar Mill which will start operating in 1981. Irrigated cotton cropland is also planned for an area of 1,700 hectares at Bugwema, on the shores of Lake Victoria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 331] 5058

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TOGO

AGRICULTURAL, MINERAL, FINANCIAL STATISTICS PUBLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 p 384

[Text] Recent factors in the economic situation.

The Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) has devoted one of its recent economic and monetary statistics bulletins to Togo.

The 1978-1979 agricultural season produced 12,147 tons of cacao (-4,539 tons, compared with the preceding season), 5,709 tons of coffee (+1,002 tons), 12,610 tons of cottonseed (+8,093 tons), 1,217 tons of karite (-5,492), tons), and 5,418 tons of areca (+4,590 tons). At the beginning of the season, the producer's selling prices rose, with the exception of cotton. Consequently, the worth amounted to 2.4 billion CFA for cacao, 0.9 billion for coffee, and 0.8 billion for cottonseed.

In first place among Togolese exportations are phosphates: 2.7 million tons, worth 20.7 billion CFA in 1978. From the beginning of exploitation (1962) to the end of December 1978, its extraction has produced about 26.3 million tons, representing an overall worth of 154.6 billion CFA, at the places of production.

The commodities index turnover of the principal commercial enterprises was recorded as 434.8 at the end of June 1979, compared with 373.4 the preceding year, on the basis of 100 for the year 1970.

At the end of April 1979, the overall price index for African family consumption was 230.5, compared with 219.9 at the end of March 1978, also on the basis of 100 for 1970.

During the first 4 months of 1979, duties and taxes collected by the customs service amounted to 9.1 billion CFA, nearly 78 percent of it from importation. Customs resources for the period under consideration showed a great increase over the corresponding 4 months of 1978.

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The 1979 fiscal year budget was closed with a balance at 64.8 million CFA (+4.2 billion, compared with the preceding one). Among the receipts, the statement of the Togolese Phosphates Office amounts to 7.5 billion CFA. Among the expenditures, expenses for the public debt absorb 13.8 billion, and credits for equipment account for 12.6 billion.

For the year 1978, Togo's balance of foreign payments shows a deficit of -5.8 billion CFA (the deficit of the trade balance amounting to 6.2 billion), compared with an also negative balance of -16.3 billion in 1977 (trade deficit: -15.1 billion).

At the end of July 1979, bank bills and currency in circulation amounted to 22.4 billion CFA (+3.3 billion, compared with the end of July 1978). On the same date, the volume of deposits in banks amounted to 49.3 billion CFA (29 billion of it for the private sector and 19.4 billion for public organizations) and showed an advance of +7.9 billion, compared with the end of July 1978. Compared with this, credits incurred by the economy amounted to 53.4 billion CFA, an increase of 4.3 billion, compared with the end of July 1978.

The net position of the treasury resulted in a debit of 9.1 billion CFA on 31 July 1978 (the deficit at the issuing institute amounting to 9.8 billion), compared with the preceding year's debit of 5.9 billion.

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TOGO

BRIEFS

SUPPORT FOR EYADEMA--About 350 Togolese nationals demonstrated in Paris on 20 January to express their support for President Gnassingbe Eyadema's government and to denounce the occupation on 30 December of the Togolese Embassy in Paris by opponents (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 4 December, page 27). The embassy had been occupied by opponents who denounced human rights violations in Togo, the high number of political prisoners despite the pardons announced by the government, and protested the nonissuance of Togolese passports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jan 80 p 199] 11915

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ZAIRE

NEED FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC REFORMS OUTLINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 pp 122-125

[Article by Claude Jadoul, special correspondent: "On the Eve of IMF Mission: No Hope for Zaire Without Profound Political Reform"]

[Text] Is Zaire capable of self-reform? This is the question that we asked different people--economic leaders, Zairian and expatriate businessmen, politicians--during a trip of nearly 1 month, made to President Mobutu's country at his invitation.

It is well known that the originality of his political course consists of fierce self-criticism of the administrative errors which have involved his country in supporting a foreign debt of \$4.6 billion. Indeed, during a speech made on 25 November 1977 the Zairian head of state announced that every possible means would be used to fight the "Zairian Malady," specifically the venality which is profoundly corrupting society. At the same time President Mobutu revealed the principle lines of the recovery plan which bears his name and also confirmed the end of the disastrous policy of Zairianization and radicalization which had led to an incredible mess in all commercial channels for want of a sufficient number of qualified, competent and honest Zairian personnel.

Two years later it is possible to make an initial evaluation of the "new Zaire" without pronouncing a definitive verdict on the current operation's chances. In fact, it seems to us that the success of the new Zairian economic and financial policy has been interrupted by the adoption of a certain number of measures of a political nature, adoption of which has been deferred until now. This is what we shall attempt to explain in this article.

It will soon be 15 years that President Mobutu has been at the head of his country. He took power--and with him the general staff--in a State ravaged by a civil war which would come to an end only after 2 years of fighting. His principal achievement has been to unify his country and to give it institutional, administrative and political structures which correspond to the necessity of the moment. The creation of the Popular Movement of

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the Revolution (MPR), the sole party, in 1967 undoubtedly marked an important stage in the work of the pacification and unification of a country torn by fratricidal strife after the attainment of independence on 30 June 1960. The Zairian head of state was helped in his efforts by obvious charisma and by the no less obvious concern of the Zairian populations to live henceforth in peace after such troubled years.

This is the reality upon which the rise in copper prices was superimposed. So for several years Zaire lived on a regular cushion of dollars...and in a climate of euphoria which no doubt masked the mistake of several fundamental economic choices made at the urging of Bisengimana Rwena, then director of the Office of the President. Roughly speaking, Rwena defended the thesis that Zaire had no need of an economic plan, the country being sufficiently rich to do without one. It is in this context that Zaire principally brought its efforts to bear on the industrialization of the country while neglecting the famous "top-priority agriculture" which was, however, the regime's official credo. The realization of such projects as the Maluku steelworks (near Kinshasa) which is today operating at low capacity, the technological gamble of the Inga-Shaba electrical power line, the VOIX DU ZAIRE or the giant and sophisticated Commercial Center of Zaire bear the mark of this policy of grandeur which attempted to "do everything at the same time."

Today President Mobutu is more realistic and more exacting in his choices, while maintaining that Zaire is a potentially rich country and that it has every chance of succeeding in its take-off. In Kinshasa itself, however, it must be understood that opinion differs on the ways to break free from the real "vicious circle" in which the country seems to be caught.

The heart of the question is the absence of currency, which is forcing the economy to slow down to the rhythm of the oxygen balloons authorized by the Western countries at the Brussels conferences on the Mobutu Plan. In this regard it must, of course, be noted that if Western aid with the balance of payments should reach \$324 million in 1980, the country would in principle have to repay \$400 million as the result of agreements made with the "Club of Paris" on 10 and 11 December last. These agreements concern the rescheduling of the debt, which will be staggered over 10 years. The Zairian authorities are counting on an increase in cobalt exports (projected at 16,000 tons) by air and on a rise in the price of copper to honor their commitments in this respect, but the situation is still too fragile for us to be able to express an opinion on this exact point.

#### Demonetization Measures

In order to rectify the management mistakes and to promote Western agreement to the Mobutu Plan, Zaire agreed to proceed with several important reforms which are proving relatively inefficient as long as they are based on the corrupt "system" which has survived, for better or worse, in Kinshasa. Thus successive devaluations of Zairian currency have not

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succeeded in strengthening the national currency and the divergence between the official rate and the unofficial rate had not stopped increasing on the eve of the demonetization and deflation measures taken by President Mobutu on Christmas Day 1979.

This example also indicates the climate reigning in Kinshasa. The essential reasons for this measure are known. Despite several appeals by President Mobutu, the phenomenon of hoarding Zairian currency had never been capable of being regulated. This unhealthy situation had caused an excessive monetary flux; prices were set according to the unofficial rate, and the reduction of Zairian currency was fueled day after day by speculators who were persons of substance in Kinshasa and who did not hesitate to resell massive quantities of Zairian currency against currencies at increasingly advantageous prices. And that with the complicity of operatives living in Brussels, Bangui, Bujumbura or Brazzaville. This channel itself was fueled by high dignitaries of the regime--who, as the Kinshasa press denounces daily, also act as the "grave-diggers of the economy," indeed, the "starvers of the people"--through certain Lebanese and Pakistani aliens established in Zaire with apparent impunity.

To be sure, the deflationary measure at Christmas had obvious causes. It was a question of reducing the circulation of 5- and 10-Zaire bills from 850 million Zaire to 250 million Zaire, i.e., to sterilize most of the money in circulation. Individuals were authorized to exchange a maximum of 3,000 Zaire and enterprises, 20,000 Zaire, while bank accounts were frozen as of 21 December 1979. It has been said, however, that Zairian society's extraordinary capacity for adaptation once again manifested itself on this occasion and that corruption once again played its destructive role. According to the bankers of Kinshasa themselves, close to 90 percent of those exchanging money had 3,000 Zaire a fact that cannot fail to inspire scepticism, since it is known that the average Kinois earns in the vicinity of 100 Zaire when he has a job...So it is evident that traffickers were able to recruit exchangers at their leisure--(contre matabiche)--and send them to the bank windows. Certain channels thus used hundreds of persons. Even before the operation was announced, the revealing signs of a "flight" did not go unnoticed: certain Kinshasa gas stations had stopped delivering gas in exchange for 5- and 10-Zaire bills since the Saturday before the presidential speech, and bankers claim that bank accounts abruptly increased by large amounts on 21 December, the closing date...

While impressive amounts of Zairian currency have now been taken out of circulation, it is nonetheless true that this measure has been partially distorted; so much so that the first indices of a resumption of the illegal rate are reappearing and the circles of traffickers do not seem to have given up speculating on the national currency, thanks to evident high-placed collusion.

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#### Parliament's Role

The profound disturbance in the administration of the State has been evidenced elsewhere by the work of Parliament, which over the course of several sessions has demonstrated the mechanisms of the mistakes, prevarication, appropriation of funds, negligence and embezzlement by several representatives of the State (ministers) and, not least important, by general delegates of public enterprises. With the exception of the general commissioner of the Plan, Citizen Bokana (accused of contempt of Parliament and obstruction of its work), few of these high dignitaries were able to provide coherent explanations of their administration and their dubious dealings. More than one was caught red-handed in public, each session being directly rebroadcast by radio and television, a situation which makes it possible to think that these interpellations had the chief of state's approval and that they are part of his plan for combatting "the Zairian Malady."

Many observers in Kinshasa emphasize, however, that President Mobutu seems to have conceded this democratization of public life under American pressure and that he has no intention of Parliament's work going beyond the limits which he himself has set. It is easy, however, to retort that for its part Parliament is well aware of its foreign support and does not intend henceforth to follow President Mobutu's lead, as several parliamentarians proclaimed to Parliament. The deputies are aware that the institution that they represent is the best chance for realizing the moralization for which the president is praying.

To this extent it is possible to conclude that there is a certain conjunction between the head of state's intention, real or supposed, to proceed to new, in-depth reform and his instrument, Parliament. The latter has naturally attempted to take more power; star performers have emerged, and it is clear that the structure of a minority within the administration is taking shape in Kinshasa with the advantages and disadvantages of such a situation.

If there is a Zairian opposition with a popular base, it is undoubtedly in Parliament that it must be found henceforth and not in Brussels or Paris where exiles, be they ever so respectable, appear to be singularly "cut off" from the realities of their country. So true is this that we are prepared to reveal that close contacts have been formed between different leaders of the OLC (Liberation Organization of the Congo) and several high-ranking Zairian officials thanks to a "friendly country" in order to negotiate their return to their native country. This inquiry is proceeding in the same direction as the contacts with Jean Tshombe, the eldest son of the late prime minister, attributed to President Mobutu.

To return to Parliament, it should also be revealed that its composition quite naturally disposes it to wish that phenomena like corruption be limited to a certain extent. The Zairian deputies are in fact being

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recruited among the same social stratum of businessmen. The latter are perfectly aware of the enormous benefits that they are able to derive from rational and more rigorous exploitation of their country's resources. For example, they feel that the management of the currency should be subjected to stricter control and that the budget should be respected by the different departments, something which is not the case at present.

In any event, these businessmen want to establish a viable economic framework for their country, normal and reformed channels, rid of sinecures and excessive privileges. Up to now, the latter have been held by a small social stratum close to President Mobutu which lives parasitically, occupies the avenues of power and confuses the budget of the ministerial departments with its own "affairs." This class is thus the principal obstacle to reform in Zaire. Nothing serious can be undertaken until it has been taken out of a position to do harm. Moreover, these big land owners are oriented to commerce, speculation and "coups" rather than to investments at risk. Their fortunes are essentially banked abroad, and up to now nothing has been able to induce this social stratum to show its confidence in its country by making available to it the capital which it needs for its development and, more specifically, in order to relaunch production, the key phase of the Mobutu Plan. Under these conditions it is, moreover, possible to ask: Why do Westerners show more enthusiasm for investing in Zaire than nationals?

Thus today President Mobutu faces a dilemma: to continue non-interference and thus expose himself to Western criticism or to take radical measures, more specifically to discipline "the profiteers of the regime" and their agents. This is evidently a delicate measure to take, to the extent that these "big land owners" up to now have been his principal social base, whom the regime has served, often in a scandalous way. Not to mention the fact that they often belong to his family, his ethnic group, his region...

The Kinshasa press is presently orchestrating a vast campaign accusing all these persons and demanding judicial proceedings and sanctions against the dishonest representatives of the State and general delegates. For, paradoxically, Parliament is capable of accusing, but it is impotent to require the removal of a demonetized government.

The ball is thus in the President's court, and many observers feel that he cannot long delay before making the clean sweep that the population, the low-salaried staff and Parliament are hoping for. It is this political decision that is slowing down the pace of the economic and financial reforms. Moreover, Mamadou Toure, the principal director of the Bank of Zaire and the expert delegated by the IMF to this organization said to us, "What is needed is a radical measure; Zairian society must be purged. In this country, when piecemeal measures are taken they are immediately directed into the 'soft underbelly' of Zaire."

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#### IMF Requirements

This remark is all the more striking since a delegation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was expected any day in Kinshasa and since Mamadou Toure would evidently make an initial report after nearly 3 months in the capital of Zaire. The group of experts will in fact attempt to evaluate the Zairian economy and determine new objectives and new rules of conduct to impose on President Mobutu's country in order for it to be able to continue to benefit from IMF aid.

How far have they gotten from this point of view?

It is known that Zaire sent a "letter of intention" to Jacques de Larosiere, the general director of the IMF, on 18 July 1979. This document establishes the conditions to which Zaire agrees to submit in order to receive international aid, which will be increasingly dispensed after the decision of the IMF (which is perhaps not sufficiently considering the "social" fallout of the economic and financial measures which it requires of the countries benefitting from its assistance).

On the eve of the Kinshasa meeting, there seems to have been no particular optimism in the Western banking circles of the capital of Zaire. Specifically, they do not hesitate to contest the granting of a new \$20 million in special drawing rights of "stand-by" credit for 18 months, granted by the IMF. This payment was to have been made next month within the framework of measures for the recovery of the Zairian economy, but the IMF directorship is calling attention to the fact that Zaire is not honoring the assigned objectives of a common agreement within the framework of the plan for stabilization.

The objectives set for 1979 have not been attained, nor have the experts' directions drawn up last August been followed--something which causes ill-will at the IMF. This situation is the more delicate for Zaire since discussions are presently in progress to obtain more reasonable staggering of its foreign debt to its principal Western creditors (the Club of Paris and the Club of London).

Two indices are particularly unfavorable: the budgetary deficit and the situation with Zairian foreign trade. In these two fields the IMF accuses Zaire of having "displayed bad faith." It must be understood, however, that the Kinshasa authorities have very limited scope to manoeuvre, that they are caught between their evident concern to honor their commitments while managing the fate of the populations, which is far from enviable, particularly in Kinshasa. In this respect, Citizen Nguza Karl-I-Bond, the state representative for foreign affairs (minister), who is acutely aware of the budgetary difficulty, emphasized to us that "the population has suffered enough." Clearly, that means that the Kinshasa government should assign a very considerable portion of the international aid intended for the balance of payments (\$324 million in 1980) to import staple

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foodstuffs. The risks of a population explosion are too evident in Kinshasa for President Mobutu Sese Seko not to take the measures necessary to alleviate the impact of the measures recommended by the IMF.

The Zairian budgetary deficit was in the vicinity of \$240 million in 1979, a perceptible reduction in comparison with the preceding year (\$283 million). The discrepancy is still very great compared with the goal of \$175 million set by the IMF.

#### A Vicious Circle

As we emphasized earlier, it is also true that smuggling and corruption figure among the most important causes of the Zairian difficulties. Up to now the measures taken have not succeeded in suppressing these phenomena or at least in reducing them to more acceptable proportions. And it is too early to judge the real impact of the recent demonetization measures concerning which General Mobutu himself emphasized at the reception of the diplomatic corps on 5 January last that "grave failures" had occurred.

The parliamentary debates have brought to light the prosecution of coffee and diamond smuggling, which reached the sums of \$300 million and \$150 million, respectively, in 1978, and which further increased in 1979. The illegal sales of cobalt denounced by the IMF were also prosecuted in 1979.

The gross national products decreased by four percent per annum over the last 4 years, and it is expected to decrease further in 1979 and 1980. There is a good explanation for this: industry is operating at only 30 percent of its capacity for lack of raw materials and detachable parts... and of currency to import them. Agriculture is feeling the repercussions of this situation, and the peasants prefer to organize in a structure of self-sufficiency rather than to sell products for which they are assured of neither removal nor a stable price. This problem is accentuating the supply problems of the Kinshasa markets, which are the prey of intense speculation on the part of those whom the press calls "the starvers of the people."

It must be understood, however, that most of the agricultural regions of this immense country are virtually enclaves for lack of roads, ferries in working condition, reconstructed bridges. The general commissioner of the Plan, Bokana W'Ondangela, undoubtedly has a very accurate view of things when he explains that only "abundance" could reduce the prices of food products and that this goal can be reached only by improving the infrastructure in such a way that the removal of products from traditionally agricultural regions could be normally ensured. This is the case with Nord-Kivu, which is now living in a closed circuit and which could supply other regions when connected with them.

The setting up of such a plan is all the more urgent since malnutrition has made its appearance in the capital, where 42 percent of children are

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its victims: the hospitals are recording numerous cases of kwashiorkor, which is sufficiently indicative of the acuteness of the situation.

As for salaries, they are ridiculous compared with prices, and it must be understood that the elementary notion of "purchasing power" has totally vanished following successive devaluations (real index: 160 percent) and galloping inflation of 80 percent since 1972 (reduced between 65 and 80 percent this year). Real salaries have diminished by one-third compared with their level in 1970, and while the IRES [Institute of Economic and Social Research of the National University of Zaire] sets total inflation at 602 points as of 1 January 1968, this index was 29,578.9 as of 30 November 1979, an increase which reflects exactly the extent of the hardship of which the millions of inhabitants of Kinshasa are victims.

Employers are particularly aware of the danger that such a situation presents. Up to now the official planning has never succeeded in re-establishing the major fundamental equilibria, it is stressed at ANEZA (National Association of Zairian Enterprises) where the adoption of a liberal policy, better adapted to the market conditions, is desired. Zairian employers especially stress the maladjustment of the financial (the fiscal scales remain unchanged since 1968 despite the changes in monetary parity) and social systems in force. In fact, these systems are not based on any economic reality, a fact which fundamentally vitiates the economic context. One example: it is virtually impossible to proceed with amortizations, a fact which falsifies annual balance sheets. One employer had this astonishing remark to make: "The Zairian economy is based on Galbraith, while the environment requires Adam Smith."

Another aspect of things: The absence of currency is forcing importers to resort to purchases "SAD" (without purchase of currency), which are officially forbidden but which in practice assure the essential provisioning of Kinshasa. The existence of this SAD system is obviously fostering the black market and speculation on Zairian currency, the reduction of which was accelerating on the eve of the demonetization measures. The authorities hesitate to lay down the law definitively on this point to the extent that the black market assures a good many needs...This is one of the numerous aspects of this "vicious circle" from which Zaire has not managed to escape for lack of the means to adopt another policy.

#### The Gecamines Case

One isle of certainty in this ocean of non-interference is Gecamines, which for better or worse is continuing to assure 70 percent of Zaire's receipts in currency. Indeed, it is the country's "milch cow." This mining company is facing multiple difficulties, including those resulting from the removal of its products from Shaba. The Benguela railroad has recently made it possible to send 300 cars of manganese (stockpiled for several years) to Lobito, but the operation of the line remains uncertain following incursions by Jonas Savimbi's (UNITA) guerillas into Angolan territory.

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Gecamines refused to ship its copper toward Dar-es-Salaam following landslides on the Tanzam line and placed all its hopes on the maintenance of the status quo in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, since most of its convoys are going toward the South African port of East London to the extent that the numerous transshipments on the "national road" to Matadi are appreciably prolonging the length of the voyage.

All these elements explain why copper production is doomed to "flatten out" for a certain time yet and why the fabulous Tenke-Fungurume copper deposit assigned to the (French) Geological and Mining Exploration Office (BRGM) is still not close to being exploited. Unless there is an appreciable increase in copper prices (which could happen following the replenishment of strategic stocks of this product) Gecamines will undoubtedly not succeed in having currency come in, in as large amounts as it predicted recently.

Moreover, the mining company is confronted with the problem of reconditioning its equipment, which would force it to mobilize part of its treasury and borrowing power during 1980. In this regard the IMF was alarmed by the fact that Gecamines had had to devote its own currency to the financing of projects extraneous to it, such as the setting up of a model farm for President Mobutu in Kisangi, the construction of locomotives and cars for the Zairian railroad, etc. The IMF mission to Kinshasa is all the more important to Zaire since the latter's public creditors are making their final agreement to the rescheduling of the foreign debt dependent on a satisfecit from the Fund.

The 130 commercial banks united in the Club of London will shortly meet their Zairian partner for analogous proceedings as far as the auditing of debts is concerned, but there is reason to believe that they too will take shelter behind the IMF's authority.

This plan is quasi-identical to that of the World Bank, which in a few weeks is to examine with a Zairian delegation the financing of certain priority projects (mining, agriculture, transportation, energy) intended to relaunch production and to encourage investments. The World Bank experts in Kinshasa seem to have set the need for funds at a sum bordering on \$1 billion, but there, too, Zaire will have to submit to a difficult entrance exam, and draconian conditions must be expected in order for the dialogue to turn to its advantage.

Up to now it had been thought that the nomination of experts to the key positions of the Bank of Zaire (Blumenthal, then Toure), the Department of Finances (Battuck) and the National Transportation Office--Onatra--(Paelinck) would facilitate normalization of the situation. It seems, however, that these same experts are questioning the effectiveness of their mission to Kinshasa and the real possibility that they have of changing the laxism of the respective organizations to which they were detailed. Some of them feel that their efforts are being attacked vehemently because of the shortcomings of the local administration and

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the generalized climate of corruption. "Until the impunity of certain individuals is brought to an end, nothing can be accomplished," one of them told us, specifying that "the problem was not technical but political."

It must be understood, however, that despite the bad humor and grouching of the IMF, the administrative errors, the corruption, the smuggling, the black market and the speculation, Zaire is a potentially rich country, a genuine "geological scandal," as President Mobutu likes to repeat. This country, an enormous reservoir of raw materials, has every chance of becoming one of the first economic, political and financial powers of the continent, once it has successfully performed its take-off. Western circles are very responsive to this reasoning as well as to the implications of the destabilization of the country in geo-political terms.

It is in this context that the pessimistic declarations of some people and the scepticism of others must be appreciated. The West will not abandon Zaire. President Mobutu, a fine tactician, is well aware of this; since then he has tried to raise the stakes while avoiding a state of affairs in which the restraint of the IMF on his country would create a neo-colonial type situation conducive to the radicalization of the elites, who are already greatly encouraged by the debilitating climate which reigns in Zaire.

This being said, it is incontrovertible that the Zairian head of state is determined to carry out his crusade against the "Zairian Malady." As we have shown, the latter is being subjected to the setting aside of his direct entourage and the renunciation, by Mobutu as well, of the management practices which have made him lose credibility in Zaire. "Who made you duke; who made you king?": the saying is too well known for the question not to be asked of General Mobutu, about whom it is still unknown whether he has the "means for his policy."

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BRIEFS

PRC AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT--A cooperation agreement covering agricultural techniques was signed on 27 December (1979) at Kinshasa between Zaire and the PRC. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, China will send 14 technicians to UMAZ (Zaire's agricultural material plant), where they are to spend a year training local elements and at the same time direct their attention to the management and administration of the enterprise. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jan 80 p 34] 7129

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