

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070055-2

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9062

30 April 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 15/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content call (703) 351-2833 (Near East); 351-2501 (Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North Africa).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9062

30 April 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 15/80)

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Tripoli Views Gafsa Incident as Internal Revolt (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Feb 80)	1
Unfair Aspects of Gafsa Trial Criticized (Ibrahim Tobal; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 17 Mar 80)	7
Lessons To Be Learned From Gafsa Rebellion Noted (Khemais Chamari; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 Mar 80)	9
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS	
Impact of Saharan War Analyzed (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Mar 80)	13
Introductory Comments Improved Moroccan Military Position, by Raphael Mergui War's Effect on Moroccan Economy, by Philippe Simonnot	
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS	
Islamic Conference Aide on Problems Facing World's Muslims (Habib Chatti Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Apr 80)	21
AFGHANISTAN	
Eyewitness Report From Kabul (Josette Alia; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 11-17 Feb 80) ...	24
ALGERIA	
1980 Budget To Launch Next 5-Year Plan (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 Feb 80)	28
- a -	[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)

New Petroleum Policy Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)	33
Briefs	
Threat to France	40
IRAN	
Bani-Sadr Ponders Way Out of Economic Ruin (Bani-Sadr Interview; IL MONDO, 28 Mar 80)	41
LEBANON	
Death of Publisher Makes Future of Magazine Uncertain (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 14-20 Mar 80)	45
MOROCCO	
Worried King Gets U.S. Arms, French Security Advice (Ali Gharbi; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Feb 80)	49
TUNISIA	
Prospects Regarding Successor to Bourguiba Analyzed (Adel Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 17 Mar 80)	51
Reasons for Nouira Visit to Paris Discussed (Francoise Hubscher; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 80)	54
Improved Coverage of Imports Reported (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)	57
Briefs	
Arms Contracts	60
Petroleum Prospecting	60

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

TRIPOLI VIEWS GAFSA INCIDENT AS INTERNAL REVOLT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 476-77

[Article: "For Tripoli the Gafsa Incident Is On the Order of a Generalized Revolutionary Action"]

[Text] The events in Gafsa, which have just created a very serious dispute between Tunisia and Libya unquestionably destined to be lasting, must be placed within the framework of the Jamahiriya general policy, which is revolutionary abroad as well as at home. It also seems to be of interest to retrace the debates of the General Congress of the Libyan People, held last January, particularly as far as the Jamahiriya's action beyond its borders is concerned. And although the commentaries of the Libyan high officials were fairly long, it would also seem to be very important to note these positions, taken after the Libyan news media had given a picture of the facts themselves and their repercussions in Tunisia which the foreign press has been practically unanimous in calling fantastic.

Libya's foreign policy was mentioned at length during the session of the General Congress of the Libyan People (1-6 January), particularly at the hearings of Ali Abdeslam Triki and Ahmed Chehati, the secretaries of foreign affairs and foreign relations, respectively.

First Triki observed that any foreign policy reflects the home policy of the country conducting it; thus, "the Jamahiriya's policy directly reflects the revolution." The people of the Jamahiriya "are leading the Arab Nation's struggle against the Zionist enemy, imperialism and the reaction represented by the Egyptian regime which has betrayed its cause...."

The secretary of foreign affairs next recalled the visit of the leader of the revolution to Algeria, which marked "the beginning of a unionist dialog," the Jamahiriya's action in Central Africa and in Chad, the support for Zimbabwe and Namibia's liberation movements, the raising of the question of the Island of Reunion before the OAU, the support given to Malta and finally Marshall Tito's meeting with Colonel Qadhafi, an event which, he asserts, helped the attainment of positive results at the conference of the nonaligned countries in Havana.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

After having expressed delight at the fact that Chad is finally governed by Moslems, Triki declared that "the Moslem world has experienced a great awakening" since the Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969, of which "the Revolution of the Islamic Iranian people is a continuation." He added "Today, thanks to God, minarets are being built and hundreds of Moslem preachers are scouring the world; Africa alone has received 422;...soon the first complete Islamic Center will be built in Rwanda... After the visit of the leader of the revolution to Central Africa more than 30,000 persons converted to Islam"... But "even more than the Moslems who are propagating Islam and building mosques, the moudjahidin like the Moslems of the South of the Philippines, who are fighting their enemies" with Libya's help must be supported.

To Destroy the Traditional Forms of Power in the World

"Again this year," said Triki, "the Jamahiriya is the Mecca of the free men and revolutionaries of the entire world."

In 1979, 40 heads of state, 5 vice presidents, 10 prime ministers and 111 ministerial delegations paid official visits to the Jamahiriya. Twenty-two joint commissions established between the Jamahiriya and friendly countries met at the ministerial level; 423 cooperation conventions with other states were in existence. Syria received 60 million dinars in aid; Jordan, 10, and the Palestinian resistance, 50.

Next taking the floor, Ahmed Chehatai, the secretary of the Office of Foreign Relations recalled that this organization had been created in 1975 in order to propagate the Libyan revolutionary spirit "on the Arab, Islamic and international scenes," for "the charter establishing the people's authority commits us to support peoples who are struggling for their liberty and to destroy the traditional forms of power in the world... Despite colossal achievements in foreign policy, there are certain commitments in foreign policy with regard to others who expect the support and help of the glorious revolution of 1 September."

Finally, the transformation of the Jamahiriya's embassies into popular committees in Federal Germany, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Malta was reported.

The Congress ratified the decision to proceed with aid to "Arab countries of confrontation" on the condition that they "open their frontiers to the armed action of the fedayin and stand fast against the enemy."

The Congress declared that the great majority of popular congresses had decided in favor of breaking off or terminating relations with China because the latter is supplying arms to the present Egyptian regime. It then examined Libya's relations with the Palestinian movement el Fatah, suspected of tendencies toward compromise with Israel; 145 popular congresses, or 83 percent, decided in favor of breaking off relations; the others adopted more complex solutions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Allusion to Soviet Action in Afghanistan

The secretary of foreign relations explained the position taken in favor of Former President Idi Amin Dada because of his "support for the Arab cause and for liberation movements;" the Jamahiriya had also helped him "when his country was the object of foreign aggression." As for relations with former Emperor Bokassa, they corresponded to "the latter's desire to open an era of Arab-African cooperation and to propagate Islam in his country." In Chad it was a question "of a majority of Moslems governed by a minority without any democracy being taken into account. We helped the FROLINAT revolutionaries because they have a just cause... Our elementary principles require sacrifices, and it is not enough to protest or be indignant, as was the case formerly with certain neighboring countries."

An allusion by Chehatai to the USSR was reported in the following terms by the JANA agency to which we owe this account of the session: "He alluded to what the Soviet Union had done recently, knowing the danger that sending soldiers into a neighboring country represents. We do not approve all its positions, in this case the aggression of one state against another."

Triki took the floor again to mention cooperation between the Jamahiriya and African states; 51 joint companies (agricultural, commercial, etc.) link them concretely. "The enemy must be given no chance to return to the African Continent."

Toward An "International Popular Revolution"

During the several weeks which separated the opening of the General Congress of the People and the start of the Gafsa incident, Colonel Qadhdhafi did not change his usual attitude in any way but continued to explain on various occasions his conception of the "era of the masses" and of the Jamahiriya's popular policy, a conception which involves the expansion of this system abroad--by revolution. The only allusion made to the disputes with Tunisia consisted of a mention of the Libyan-Tunisian declaration of union (12 January 1974) and of Colonel Qadhdhafi's already old commentaries on this subject: "This declaration is inscribed in the hearts of thousands of young people... Its enforcement has been delayed, but no one can oppose the generation of unity in Tunisia and in the Jamahiriya." This anniversary reminder is a sort of ritual in Libya.

Colonel Qadhdhafi did not participate in the work of the Congress. He explained himself on 13 January at a press conference: henceforth the Libyan people know that they are in power, and they are exercising it very fitly; "power will henceforth be in the hands of the popular masses; the leader (of the revolution) has the role of inciting the popular masses to revolt against all the bases, all the political, economic and social relations of oppression, to consolidate the people's authority and to announce the era of the masses at home and abroad." But he deplored the fact that it was possible to detect a certain absenteeism during this assembly's session; he explained to the periodical AL OUSBOUH ATH THAQAFI (4 January) that

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

people cannot for one instant lose the habit of considering whether the government is making decisions for them; he added that the popular committees are still not completely capable of mobilizing the masses.

During his press conference in Benhazi Colonel Qadhdhafi gave a significant explanation of his attitude with respect to the Palestinian revolution; he supports it because it pursues armed struggle; he recalled that his speech on the occasion of the Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People urged the Palestinian revolution "not to adapt itself to the present Arab reality which is only a political and governmental reality... The Palestinians should remain free in their action, should accept no pressure on the part of the Arab regimes and should have only the law of the revolution for law." It will be recalled, however, that the Jamahiriya had had a violent dispute with al Fatah whose expulsion it had declared, but according to Colonel Qadhdhafi this dispute is "unilateral and constitutes al Fatah's act alone." Triki corroborated these declarations in Damascus on 19 January, declaring that "the 1 September revolution is the permanent catalyst of Arab and international action for the Palestinian Revolution" and that "the Jamahiriya is fully determined to liberate the entire Palestinian territory by armed combat."

Interviewed by the Iranian daily newspaper ETTELA'AT (26 January), Colonel Qadhdhafi saw "the continuation of the Green Book" in the Iranian revolution which conjointly with the Libyan revolution is capable of "creating a world of the masses and an international popular revolution." And congratulating Ayatollah Khomeyni on 1 February, Colonel Qadhdhafi affirmed that "the Iranian revolution, whose fundamental principle is Islam, whose goal is liberty and which has a religious leadership, is the new model for the state of Islam," while "the parliamentary state, the professional army, capitalism and the power of one or several parties were born of Christianity in its decline and from the Western bourgeoisie of the colonial era."

"Where There Is Reaction There Is No Islam!"

At first the Gafsa incident was mentioned only very summarily and through foreign sources by the Libyan press. The secretary of foreign affairs took a position only on 1 February, refuting the official Tunisian communiques and affirming that the Jamahiriya had no connection, direct or indirect, with the events taking place in Gafsa. He added, "If the Tunisian authorities are suffering from a Libyan intervention in the form of the passage of the revolutionary spirit to the Tunisian masses, the Libyan people do not bear responsibility for it." He denied any participation by a Libyan in the "popular revolt in Gafsa" and blamed the Tunisian Government for its intention to resort to colonial and foreign forces, thus humiliating the Tunisian people.

Colonel Qadhdhafi mentioned "the French invasion of Tunisia" on 7 February to the Venezuelan president whom he was then receiving in Tripoli and affirmed "the Libyan people's solidarity with the popular revolution in Tunisia," but this subject would not be broached in the joint communique. Afterward he explained himself at length in an 11 February interview granted to AFP.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But it was Commander Abdesselm Jalloud who on 7 February before the General Congress of Libyan Students in Syrte made the first detailed statement by an important Libyan official. Four-fifths of his speech was devoted to the Tuniso-Libyan dispute, which was discussed with a vehemence which up to then had been unusual for Colonel Qadhdhafi's "first officer."

"If Brother Colonel," he exclaimed, addressing the Tunisian leaders, "has set forth a theory which poisons your life and threatens your power, your tyranny and your dictatorship, the theses of this theory have been inspired not only by the Libyan popular masses but also by those of Tunisia and of the Arab nation, the Islamic community and the community of the peoples of the entire world."

Commander Jalloud blamed the Tunisian minister of education for having talked of the "Tunisianness of education" whereas Tunisia cannot be an entity separated from the Arab nation;" but "the band which governs the Tunisian people...(and) trembles with fear...has the sole goal of isolating the Tunisian people from its Arab nation and of linking it to France and the West;" it is a collaborationist, reactionary, dictatorial, bourgeois and corrupt power" with which conflict will continue without any mediation being accepted.

"How are we at fault," Commander Jalloud further said, "who are a revolution endowed with a theory, a popular revolution, if the Tunisian masses respond to this theory and to this popular revolution?"

The Libyan first officer complained about the fact that the Islamic Conference had not responded to the request for convocation made by Libya: the United States had not allowed it. "Islam," he said, "is revolution. Where there is reaction there is no Islam... Where there is a true Islamic and progressive revolution, there is Islam... The danger for Islam is a new Christian crusade supported by capitalist monopolism and direct or indirect colonialism..."

The "French invasion" denounced at that time by Commander Jalloud constituted the principal theme of the interview given by Colonel Qadhdhafi on 11 February to the AFP. "From now on," he says, "any foreign intervention in the Arab world will provoke a popular reaction there, and we are determined to supply the spark of this revolution." He reaffirmed that Libya had not sent any commandoes to Gafsa: "The interviews broadcast by the Tunisian regime were in fact put together by intelligence agents instructed to say that they had been trained in Libya." He concluded by saying that "the Tunisian regime is antagonistic to the popular revolution in Libya... [W]e must fight until the antagonist, which has lost its sense of history and its justification for its existence, disappears... [N]o mediation, no mediation or truce will be accepted..."

Moreover, no foreign attempt at conciliation seems to have been sketched out yet. It will be recalled that the chief secretary of the Islamic conference is a former Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, Habib Chatti,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

who while maintaining or reestablishing correct Tuniso-Libyan relations seemed scarcely to believe in the possibility of developing them much... The chief secretary of the Arab League, Chedli Klibi is also a former Tunisian minister and has not been mixed up in any Maghreb dispute.

Algeria has been eager to have the Tunisian Government state that it was not involved in the Gafsa incident in any way; through its president, speaking in Constantine on 9 February it made it known without dwelling that it would not appreciate the presence of foreign troops in a neighboring country. Its obliging press has reserved very little space for the Tuniso-Libyan tension and has refrained from bringing the grievances raised on both sides up again. Algeria would be one of the best placed Arab states to work in view of a lull which, to be sure, it ardently desires.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

9380

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

UNFAIR ASPECTS OF GAFSA TRIAL CRITICIZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 20

[Article by Ibrahim Tobal: "The So-Called Gafsa Trial"]

[Text] It was on Monday 10 March that the 110 defendants in the Gafsa affair were to appear before the state security court in Tunis. They are threatened with the death penalty. The investigations pursued high-handedly, in the greatest of secrecy and in an atmosphere of mounting tension encouraged by the Bourguiba regime provide a foretaste of the procedures the Tunisian courts intend to use. These are the procedures which Mr Ibrahim Tobal, president of the Tunisian National Opposition Movement (MONT) has announced in a message addressed to the democratic organizations (including Amnesty International in London, the International Association of Democratic Jurists in Belgium, the International Federation on the Rights of Man in Geneva, the presidents of the Arab bar associations in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, as well as the secretary-general of the Union of Arab Lawyers, Mr Zouheir el Madani).

In his message, Mr Tobal demands "the establishment of a committee of democratic lawyers to provide the defendants charged following the popular uprising in Gafsa with a defense," as well as the "appointment of an international committee to investigate the assassination, summary execution and disappearance of a number of militants." He says that "according to the first reports from the families, more than 300 militants and citizens have disappeared since 28 and 29 January 1980."

"Allow me," the president of the MONT goes on to say, "to insist on the urgency of your action to aid the defendants in the Gafsa case in Tunisia. Following the events of 26 January 1980, 110 defendants have been ordered to appear on Monday, 10 March 1980, before the state security court in Tunis."

His message continued as follows:

"The speedy investigation by means of torture was carried out with no lawyers present. The defense was excluded and the appointment of any lawyer rejected.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

At the hearing on 10 March 1980, only the 60 officially appointed clerk lawyers can be present.

This judicial farce was prepared earlier by a statement made by Bourguiba in Nefta, Tunisia, announcing the immediate execution of two of the key defendants: Mergheni and Cherif Azzeddine.

As to the Tunisian national assembly, it has demanded the death penalty for all the defendants. One deputy, Hassen Kassem, has even demanded their execution in their home town.

You cannot remain insensitive and inactive in view of the executions being planned. This is why the MONT is addressing itself to you and reminding you of the following facts.

The Bourguiba regime was established by force and with the aid of the French army in 1956, within the framework of the formal independence granted. Aligned with French policy and having betrayed the goal of national independence and unity for the liberation of the Arab Maghrib, the Bourguiba regime has not ceased to repress and assassinate consistent Tunisian Arab nationalists, including Salah Ben Youssef, who was murdered in Frankfurt in 1961 and whose assassins were decorated by Bourguiba himself in 1974. After a quarter of a century, the many facets of the violence of the Bourguiba regime are manifesting themselves constantly. The most important trials were held in 1958, 1959, 1962 and 1968, leading to the conviction of several hundred militants in the MONT. Sixty-nine of them were executed by hanging. To this must be added 620 sentences of imprisonment and forced labor ranging from 10 years to life.

The national revolutionary explosion in Gafsa comes within this continuing conflict in which today our movement and its revolutionary, progressive and democratic youth oppose the autocrats in Tunis.

The nature of this conflict has not changed. It is still a matter of national independence, national sovereignty and participation in the North African and Arab community.

There is no interference by any Arab state whatsoever in this domestic conflict in Tunisia. On the contrary, those in power in Tunis, seized with panic, have asked for foreign intervention, as in 1956, by the French and the Americans. It was thus that the revolutionary national uprising in martyred Gafsa was crushed.

The MONT also asks you to organize a contribution to the court defense as soon as possible, as well as support of that defense within the framework of the defense of the rights of man.

Please inform the minister of Tunisian justice of your contribution to this defense."

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

5157

CSO: 4400

8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM GAFSA REBELLION NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 pp 48-49

[Article by Khemais Chamari, Tunisian opposition journalist: "The Lessons of Gafsa"]

[Text] It is in Tunisia itself, and not beyond its frontiers, that the main search for the roots of the revolt must be pursued. The first question is as to the reasons which pushed Tunisians, in the majority undeniably patriotic, to choose the path of rebellion--suicidal, in my view--and to take the risk of launching a process they would not, by force of circumstance, be able to control.

The economic and social blind alleys which are the results of a class policy based on business interests and dependence, the institutional blockage of the "Destour state," the frustrations, the hopes expressed, the anger of the people, and first and foremost the youth of the governorates in the interior (those in the Center-South in particular) neglected to the benefit of "coastal expansion"--this is the terrain in which the fearful evil in the grip of which our country finds itself, and which the Gafsa abcess brought to light, developed.

Iranian Shock Waves

DEMOCRATIE, the organ of the Movement of Socialist Democrats, says that "no one, domestically or abroad, would have dared challenge the regime and attempt the venture if the government had responded to the advice and appeals from all sides, if it had bound up the wounds of 26 January 1978."

To this diagnosis I would like to add the following remarks.

1. At a time when the framework is being set up for a new inquisition which will strike at more than 100 Tunisian citizens "legally," it must be reiterated that nothing could justify the televised questioning of those charged "with their faces swollen from earlier blows," the massive raids, or above all, the hasty exceptional court jurisdictions, in the eyes of a free man. Whatever the nature of the crime, whatever the ideological and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

political options of the persons tried, there is no reason, even reasons of state, which can justify failure to respect the principles which guarantee the right to a court defense free of all constraint.

2. There is a legitimate and necessary use of violence, precisely when all means of legal action, all legal recourse, is denied. There is also a legitimate principle of the right to resist oppression. I know this, but I say that it is dangerous for intellectuals, of which I am one--except in a situation of commitment to the physical risks this entails--to put forth those convictions which may launch, strengthen or legitimize the terrible and insidious machinery of civil war. I do not think that such confrontations are the inevitable products of the class struggle, and I think that we must spare our country such tragic tests.

3. The question which should be raised after Gafsa is the option for armed struggle and the circumstances which have made it foreseeable, not the existence of sanctuaries or foreign aid without which it has never had any chance of success anywhere. Permanently repressed, undermined by its ideological quarrels (in which the crumbling heritage of "Maoism" does battle with the donations inter vivos of pan-Arabism), the opposition has not been able, despite the effective existence of trade union battles in the field, to offer a political alternative. The Gafsa affair has served to cast a harsh and pitiless light on this lack for which each of us is responsible. Put forth by ultra-minority groups at the beginning of the last decade, the option of "armed struggle" has under these conditions seeped away. It has found new sustenance in the eruption of an Islamic movement carried along on the Iranian shock wave, and the continued existence of a Youssefist faction exacerbated by the bitter stubbornness and the defiance of the regime.

A Clear Attitude

Suddenly, the concepts of "people's war" have left both the realm of ideological debate where they were kept by the groups of the revolutionary intelligentsia and the limited circles of foreign conspiracy, to take on flesh and blood. Thanks to Palestinian, Saharan and above all Libyan contributions, they have become the practice of men ready to make any sacrifice and the possible subjects of all kinds of manipulations. It must be said again that the Gafsa operation was certainly not the signal or the detonator expected by its authors. However its failure will not, any more than the extent of the repression will, convince those who saw in this action its lack of adaptation to the potential and the needs of the hour. Exasperated despair has nothing to do with the arguments of reason and strict analysis. Only the prospect of a profound democratic change in the country could raise a believable hope and cause the future alteration of these convictions and these attitudes.

4. We are urged today to adopt a "clear" attitude with regard to the "Libyan manipulation and intervention." Well, so be it! More than anyone, the partisans of democracy and national independence must vigorously reject any political interference or foreign tutelage, whatever the source.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The destiny of our country should be exclusively the business of Tunisians, but we must also avoid walking blindly into the traps which may be set for us.

Sacred Union

The refrain of "sacred union" has unfortunately been widely accepted in a Third World in which the leading teams have mastered the consummate art of playing upon chauvinism. Let us say first of all that the errors or the excesses of others have never constituted good arguments for justifying one's own slips. This is equally true for the delirious radio battle being waged between Tunis and Tripoli, for the fallout of the conflict on the civilian population, particularly the Tunisian emigre workers in Libya, or the continental shelf affair in the Gulf of Gabes in connection with which we should adhere to the terms of the Hague court arbitration agreement. The Libyan leaders, in their desire to take up the challenges of the West and in particular of Sadat, are it is true unpredictable, and their choices are not always the best. But it is not possible to blame them for all the disorders on this planet nor to reduce the 27 January operation solely to the results of their efforts to destroy stability. The aspiration for unity between our two brotherly peoples (which is not synonymous with fusion) cannot be regarded as a temporary fact. The important thing then is not to yield to the incitement to a warlike attitude while promoting mediation by international bodies capable of leading to reconciliation procedures.

5. To say this, asserting our firm determination to safeguard the real territorial integrity and national independence of our country, is not, certainly, an easy thing. Above all at a time when chauvinist intolerance prevails.

There is a lack of proper measure, in any case, in the fact that leaders so ordinarily insensitive on basic matters should act out this scene of patriotic indignance for us. No, not them and not that! Fortunately the public has a memory and it cannot, in the long run, despite the necessary vigilance aroused by any flare-up on the frontiers, be deluded by abusive arguments seeking to justify hasty recourse to Western military support in the name of the "Soviet-Libyan peril."

The Imperial Chain

The aggravation of East-West tensions does indeed give rise to a worrisome situation, and it leads to a fresh debate among the anti-imperialist forces about the methods of nonalignment.

But today, from naval displays to "instinctive" military aid, we are risking in reality making our country, already so integrated in the world capitalist system, an important link in the imperial chain which is being reorganized all along this "crisis curve" of which we never cease to hear.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

To underestimate this danger would seem to me to be moving toward reprehensible blindness.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

5157

CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

IMPACT OF SAHARAN WAR ANALYZED

Introductory Comments

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "Sahara: The Price of War"]

[Text] Oscar Wilde used to say that one had to be superficial not to see appearances. Effectively, appearances fool only those who wish to be fooled. The Sahara affair, however, is an example of a conflict in which it is not easy to differentiate between the naivete of some and the bluff of others. Naivete consists in saying that the POLISARIO is rushing from one victory to another, that the Moroccan monarchy is at the edge of the abyss and that the kingdom's economy is bankrupt. Bluff consists in maintaining that the POLISARIO is nothing more than a passing Libyan outgrowth. When one goes to the scene, when one reads the communiques of the two parties, with the customary reservations, one must recognize that although the Moroccan army suffered serious setbacks, because of the initial absence of strategy, at present it is no longer in such a poor situation. At the diplomatic level, Washington has taken the side of the Moroccans. With a single condition: that the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, Mr Boucetta, from time to time make an apparent display of his country's goodwill. That is the initial political and military reality which Raphael Mergui describes in the first article. Philippe Simmonot describes a second reality, the economic reality, after an on-site investigation. He presents figures to support the fact that the war, unfortunately, has only had dramatic financial and social consequences which make the Saudi oxygen tank necessary. The war is also a moment of truth for the people. It is beginning to force the Moroccans to give their conscience a general examination.

There is a third reality which these articles do not describe: the POLISARIO, everything considered, has become a respected military force and a broadly recognized political movement. Is it in the process of pulling back definitively or temporarily? What is to become of it? It is not easy to answer these questions because when it comes to war things develop so quickly and, at times, very bizarrely.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Improved Moroccan Military Position

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 23, 25, 26

[Article by Raphael Mergui]

[Text] For 5 years now, there has been a confrontation on 1/4 million square kilometers of desert--abandoned by Mauritania in August 1979--between Morocco and the POLISARIO, which was organized by Algeria and financed by Libya. Which of the two parties can feel that it has attained its objectives or has come close to doing so? That is, provided these objectives are clearly defined by one or the other party....

For Rabat, things are apparently simple. It is a question of occupying terrain without paying for it with the stability of the country. Evidently unable to win a military victory over the Royal Armed Forces (FAR), the POLISARIO does not know too well whether its interests are ordering it effectively to destabilize Morocco or to utilize the spectrum of destabilization to cause Hassan II to pull back. The "prime minister" of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic], Mohamed Lamine, recently assured Andrew Young that his objective was not to overthrow the king of Morocco. Several days later, a joint POLISARIO and FPLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) communique called for the overthrow of the monarchy as forcefully as it could. This contradiction does not only reflect a show of diplomatic "cleverness" (the language changes with the speaker) or a division of the Front into "moderate" pro-Algerians and "extremist" pro-Libyans, but a real imprecision of strategy: what is the ideal degree of destabilization? Is a change of government in Morocco desirable? The strategic fuzziness of the POLISARIO is revelatory of the very character of the war in the Sahara--not comparable to other conflicts of the same kind.

Economic Attrition

In the first place, guerrilla warfare is not demoralizing the Moroccan army because the latter is convinced that it is fighting on its own territory and is not participating in any kind of colonial adventure.

Second, no guerrilla warfare is victorious on military terrain but in the sector of public opinion of the country which it is fighting. Algeria and the POLISARIO are obtaining paradoxical results: the more they strike, the more the unity of the Moroccans is solidified with respect to their having the right on their side.

Third, the economic attrition of Morocco is of concern. However, it has not (yet?) reached unbearable limits. This country is probably devoting nearly 20 percent of its national revenue to the war (see the article by Philippe Simonnot on p 26). The countries of the Middle East have been living with rates of 40-50 percent for a quarter of a century. And Rabat has a major trump card in reserve: it has not decreed a war economy. Such a measure

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

moreover would not necessarily be a catastrophe: it could cause Moroccans to adopt healthy habits of discipline and would teach them more rational economic behavior.

In the meantime, Morocco is experiencing serious foreign exchange problems. The ambassador of France to Rabat is even pressing for settlement of the bill for Mirages (3 billion francs). However, Hassan II brought back from his trip to Saudi Arabia enough [funds] to make 1980 a relatively peaceful year as regards foreign payments.

Fourth, the POLISARIO seems to have won a diplomatic victory without which it would be unable to have an outright victory: it has isolated Rabat in the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the UN. However, if we take a closer look at them, these successes are more moral than political. For how do we explain the fact that Hassan II was able to recover--or annex, as you will--Rio de Oro (former Mauritanian part) without aggravating his case? At the time there was no government to protest. It was necessary for a French journalist to bother the Spanish minister of foreign affairs in his pool to elicit from him a vague statement of a reproof.

The Moroccan diplomatic sector has brought about a certain amount of recovery. First in the United States, where it succeeded in "selling a bill of goods" to Carter, from whom it obtained reconnaissance planes and combat helicopters. Next in the Arab and Moslem world where Hassan II claims to be a rallier. Evidence gathered in Washington, Paris and Rabat lead to the same conclusion: the Algerian president, Chadli Benjedid, is seeking an honorable way out. He is a party to secret contacts with the Moroccans the objective of which reportedly is a meeting with Hassan II. Condemned to a profound change [reconversion] in its economy--at least a reversal of the present trend--Algeria is forced to seek a kind of detente with the West and Morocco.

Finally, let us recall that the world environment has become favorable to Morocco. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and the attack against Gafsa are divine surprises for Hassan II.

Social Problems...

The first social problem confirmed the king's continuing thesis: the existence of a worldwide Soviet plot of which the Sahara is only one element. Did not the king on the eve of his trip to the United States say that he was carrying with him maps to explain the political situation to Carter? The second problem--the attack against Gafsa--arrived at the right moment to demonstrate that the POLISARIO, whose ties with the commando force formed in Libya was now known, is one of the elements of the Qadhdhafian effort to destabilize North Africa and the Sahel. The Front's deal with Tripoli threatens to ruin 5 years of patient efforts to acquire international credibility. One Moroccan noted with humor that Qadhdhafi is Rabat's best agent....

In the final analysis, although the POLISARIO seems to be seriously bothering Morocco, it is not shaking that country. The war in the Sahara--added to the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

world economic crisis--is responsible in that area for many of the spontaneous reactions of discontent. However, the protests are essentially social. It would be a mistake to read into this demonstrations against the war. Recent strikes by students and workers show that the social climate is deteriorating. Arrests and sentences to long prison terms (5 years) are astonishing: does this mean limited, preventive repression or is the country at the threshold--as some leaders of the opposition believe--of once again questioning the process of democratization?

In any event, the only ones showing their concern over continuation of the war are members of the middle class--with many carefully phrased remarks, it is true. That is because the war is going to cost them in regular, if not supplementary taxes.

They are frightened because they are going to be asked to do something they are not accustomed to doing. A curiously Poujadist spirit of revolt is developing in the posh salons of Casablanca. In any event, if a general explosion of discontent is to take place there, it probably would not benefit the POLISARIO, so true is it that Hassan II, in his own words, is "the most unflappable" of Moroccans.

What is proceeding best in Morocco is military recovery, which continues to be essential. Army morale was at its lowest at the time of the Smara attack, at the beginning of October 1979, which capped the summer offensive of the POLISARIO. After that Morocco rose out of a long military lethargy to establish a mobile group called Ohoud, to be followed by two others, which are destined to make of the Western Sahara, in the words of a superior officer, "a region of total insecurity for the POLISARIO."

This demonstration of force was not long in producing political dividends. A diplomat told us recently, "I tried to be a friend of Morocco; but I could not commit myself to a country which did not seem able to win politically or militarily. Today, the situation is changing. The Moroccans seem to have understood that diplomatic action is in vain if it is not supported by military determination."

....and Military Successes

The score card of the first 4 months of "operation Ohoud" is easy to prepare. The FAR combed the former Tiris el-Gharbia (Rio de Oro) without finding a living enemy there. It is true that this is not the most difficult region. The Moroccans are even frustrated at not having been able to occupy the small city of La Guera, in the extreme south, as was their intention. France dissuaded them from doing so. However, they are said to have received appreciable compensation: Paris seems to be surveilling the Mauritanian border. General Dlimi's forces were all the more easily able to prevent the rebels from installing themselves in a region which Mauritania had just abandoned. These forces also contributed to alleviating the burden of troops stationed further to the north, by disrupting POLISARIO logistics.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is probably for this reason that the POLISARIO was unable to nullify the psychological and political effects of Ohoud by intensifying its operations further to the north. It attempted to do so but without tangible results. The siege of the Zag fortress (at the end of November-beginning of December) was certainly the response to Ohoud. However, the siege failed. The recent attack on Boujdour also resulted in a setback.

In a general way, during the last few months, the POLISARIO has directed its efforts against the "grey" areas; i.e., areas situated on the periphery of the large military concentrations. Thus Boujdour was located too far north for Ohoud and too far south for the forces encircling Ouarkziz. From November to February, the Front refrained from attacking in the south, in Tiris el-Charbia which is being surveilled by Ohoud and, in the east, in Saqia el-Hamra where the FAR, wishing to avoid a repetition of the October raid on Smara, are on the alert. The Front has concentrated its raids--generally of small scale--in uncontested territory (Akka, Zag) and in the center-west (Laayoun, Lemsied, Boujdour, Boucrad).

The task of the POLISARIO a fortiori will be more difficult in the future with the imminent entry into operation of the second group, Zellaqa, commanded by Colonel-Major Abrouk, former head of the southern front. The logistics of the group have already been set in place. The group will peck away precisely at this "soft underbelly" which is the center-west. Its mission in particular will consist in disengaging Tarfaya, which is connected to the rest of the country by Laayoun. Colonel-Major Abrouk will have more sophisticated equipment; however, he will probably suffer from a relative shortage of high-ranking officers.

A third and last unit is to be put in place in about 3 months. Contrary to what was thought at one time, the unit will not be commanded by Colonel-Major Loubaris, the hero of the two Shabas, but probably by Col Ben Othman (victor over the Algerians at Angala), who reportedly will be relieved of noncommand duties. His radius of action purportedly will extend to Saqia el-Hamra, a region chosen by the POLISARIO, backed up against Algeria.

War's Effect on Moroccan Economy

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 26-28

[Article by Philippe Simonnot]

[Text] "War sets everything in movement; it purges peccant humors, and it charms to a degree the vivacity of a nation that does not naturally like repose which is often harmful to it." Having reached the end of this investigation of the cost of the war to Morocco, it is natural to think of this sentence which was written by Boisguilbert in 1707 in his "Traite." All the more so since what is resplendent here, in this city of Marrakesh out of the Middle Ages, is a flamboyant market economy, similar to that which flourished in France at the beginning of the 18th century. Mercantilist France, but also warlike France--just like Morocco today.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moreover, what Boisguilbert teaches us, better than many contemporary economists, is to bring the costs and advantages of armed conflict into rapport. The "peccant humors" of the sharifian kingdom purged by war? How can one doubt it when one observes the evidence of the national consensus which has formed around Hassan II in the Saharan affair. What brings the left nearer to the chief of state in this sector is rather not engaging in total war....

The comments we heard in the most varied quarters are hardly peaceful. They cause one to think that, seen from Morocco, the Sahara affair is only an episode: "In any event, we will be involved with Algeria for 20 years." That is equal to saying that one day or another it will be necessary to do battle with this neighbor whom the Moroccans freely admit is detested.

Nationalist Awakening

The war in the Sahara is also credited with awakening this old kingdom which was inclined to bask in the glory of its thousands-of-years-old past and to consider the Algerian state as decidedly too young, too new, to really be dangerous. The initial reverses of the Royal Armed Force demonstrated that the patina of the centuries was not a good enough rampart against enemies coming from the east...as was the case before 1830, we might add.

Finally, account must be taken of the fallout of the war with regard to education, training and familiarization with the most modern technology. The war "sets everything in movement," including men and customs. It is not being a warmonger to observe that in this hard school the Moroccan nation has retempered its soul and that, with the return of peace, the economy could benefit from this resurgence. It can even be noted that all of this "movement" is making those on the scene fearful of a return to peace, which could be a dangerous moment for the regime.

It is in the light of these "advantages" of the war that we must try to evaluate its costs. This is a difficult evaluation because, as we were told by a man well-versed in Moroccan official statistics, this cost is "hidden." This is, moreover, a way of admitting that the cost is higher than is shown in state accounts.

Added to the management errors in 1974-1977, war expenditures have become such that they seriously endanger the foreign credibility of the Moroccan economy. From our own calculations, we have drawn the conclusion that Morocco will go bankrupt in the next 2 years without large supplementary foreign aid.

In this connection, financial aid from France is at its peak (1-1.2 billion francs worth of credit a year at a good interest rate). Morocco is the country to which France gives the most aid. Therefore, nothing was left to do but once again knock on the door of Saudi Arabia. That was the reason for the king's trip to Riyadh at the beginning of February. Hassan did not come back with empty hands--far from it! We have even been assured that the coffers were filled to such a point that Morocco will not have foreign payment problems in 1980. The figure most often cited for the new Saudi loan is

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

\$1 billion; i.e., 4 billion dirhams (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 999). To appreciate the size of this figure, it must be compared with the estimation we can make of the costs of the war.

Expenditures which are properly military in the budget have increased at a rapid rate: from 1.2 billion dirhams in 1973 to 4.4 billion dirhams in 1978. Everything indicates that they continued to increase in 1979. However, these figures do not tell the whole story. They should be complemented first by the "transfers" made by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of defense. In their confidential report, World Bank experts estimate these transfers at 1.5 billion dirhams for 1977 alone. This means that as recently as 3 years ago the budgetary share of defense had reached 10 percent of the Moroccan gross national product. Officially, the figure given for that year was less than 7 percent (6.1 percent according to the SIPRI [expansion unknown]).

Saudi Bail Out

What is more, the latest purchases have added considerably to the cost of the war. Considering only the 50 Mirages, most of whose cost is to be paid in 1980--a payout of 3 billion dirhams, according to top Moroccan officials--and the purchase of American materiel (20 F 5 E fighter planes, 24 helicopters armed with antitank missiles and 6 OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance planes) for \$250 million--that is, another billion dirhams--we come up with a supplementary cost of 4 billion dirhams. If we add these sums to current expenditures, we come close to 10 billion dirhams; i.e., 20 percent of the gross national product.

Of course, such purchases will not be repeated every year. Of course, payment extensions have been obtained from France. However, we must also take into account other military supplies and also costs of maintenance, replacement parts for these expensive marvels of military air technology: according to the experts, these costs total 1/2 of their purchase prices. Conservatively, that adds 1 billion dirhams to regular costs in the coming years.

In other words, after the 1980 peak, it is not unreasonable to think that, other things being equal, of course, the cost of the war will range from 10 to 15 percent of the GNP.

Until the king's trip, 1980 looked like a very bad year; and the Saudi bail out came at the right time. In the past, foreign aid had already been far from negligible. World Bank experts have estimated that these "gratuitous transfers" had totaled \$106 million in 1979, \$588 million in 1976 and \$512 million in 1977. These figures lend credibility to the estimate put forward for 1980 (\$1 billion).

Once again, this does not only entail the direct cost of the war. We must also take into account the indirect, negative effects of the war, principally the renunciation by the state of a certain number of civilian equipment programs, a renunciation that in itself has a ripple effect on the entire economic life of the country, which has been in the doldrums since 1978.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- Morocco, still according to the World Bank, has over 7 million persons
- living on the absolute threshold of poverty.

The slowdown in economic growth engendered at one and the same time by the war and the stagnation of world trade can only aggravate a potentially explosive social situation.

Complex Scorecard

We know that in many Third World countries the economy is extroverted. The same thing is true of the war. The Saharan conflict is very profitable for foreign "arms merchants" and has had no industrial fallout in Morocco.

This causes an increased deficit in the balance of payments that is financed by growing indebtedness which, at the beginning of 1980, was 25 billion dirhams (half the GNP). The annual service on the foreign debt has doubled in 2 years and now totals 3 billion dirhams; i.e., over 1/3 of the worth of exports. Such a percentage cannot be increased without danger.

Here, then, is an economy seriously hurt by the war, at a time when the world crisis had already placed it in a bad situation, an economy forced to make wagers, which are perhaps too risky, on aid and good fortune, particularly as regards the price of phosphates. Of course, we could consider that, in any event, Morocco must equip itself to balance Algerian military power and that the urgency created by the POLISARIO permitted the financing of a large part of this necessary arms effort by its allies.

In short, the overall scorecard of the war in the Sahara is complex and perhaps can be evaluated differently, depending upon the point from which one views the situation. However, for his part, the economist cannot but be concerned by the deterioration of an economy whose potential is nonetheless considerable.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

8143
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AIDE ON PROBLEMS FACING WORLD'S MUSLIMS

LD210653 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 pp 26-27

[Interview with Islamic Conference Secretary General Habib Chatti by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "For a Neutral Afghanistan"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Some 40 foreign ministers from Islamic countries are to meet in Islamabad (Pakistan) in a few weeks' time. On the agenda: Afghanistan, Jerusalem, the Muslim world's economic situation, boycott of Olympic games and the Philippine Muslims.

Making It Easy for the Soviets

The upcoming 11th meeting of Islamic Conference foreign ministers will have been preceded by an information campaign in Europe waged by King Hassan II of Morocco, as Jerusalem committee chairman, and former (1974-1977) Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Chatti who has been Islamic Conference secretary general since October 1979. Among other people, Mr Chatti met French head of state Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and Pope John Paul II in the Vatican 2 April. We discussed these problems with him.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: In your view, can Europe play a role in the Middle East?

Habib Chatti: Yes, and a very important one. Since Egypt signed its separate peace agreement, any attempt to recover Arab lands by military means would be doomed, while Israel is doing everything in its power to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. We now appeal to Europe to support more emphatically the Palestinian people's right to a state and, at the same time to safeguard the interests of the Muslim Arab countries. This is the best way not to make things easy for the Soviets, since the Americans do not seem willing to opt for just solutions.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: In al-Nasir's time, the Arab League was accused of being in Egypt's pay. Can the same not be said about the Islamic Conference with reference to Saudi Arabia?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Habib Chatti: It is true that, while hiding behind the slogan "positive neutralism," al-Nasir's Egypt often tried to use the Arab League in support of an expansionist policy, but Saudi Arabia now enjoys no dominant position. No pressure at all on its part can be felt even though the headquarters of the conference is in Jidda and even though Saudi Arabia is our principal financial backer.

This Is a Very Serious Problem

JEUNE AFRIQUE: And what about your relations with the Arab League?

Habib Chatti: They show a certain lack of coordination even though our objectives are complementary. Our field of action is broader. We may even be more effective at present because members of the conference are not quite so bogged down in Arab internal quarrels.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: You have been taken to task for being mainly interested in politics.

Habib Chatti: This is unjust. In the economic sphere, for instance, the conference has already created an Islamic Development Bank and a statistical and economic studies center in Ankara (Turkey), while an Islamic countries' trade center will be established in Tangier (Morocco). We have also concluded a draft agreement for cooperation among Muslim states. And all this is merely a beginning.

In the cultural sphere, we plan to create a university in Niger and (later) another one in Uganda. We also cooperate extensively in the educational sphere with many Muslim countries and help to organize seminars and conferences. We directly support a number of cultural movements. We feel, however, that, for lack of adequate funds, we do not do enough.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: The future of Muslims in the Philippines is on the agenda of the Islamabad meeting....

Habib Chatti: This is a very serious problem. Intervention by the Islamic Conference made possible the conclusion of an agreement with President Marcos' regime. According to this agreement, the 13 provinces in which Muslims are in the majority were gradually to achieve a certain degree of autonomy and, eventually, be merged into one province. However, the Manila government saw fit to disregard this and organize a referendum. Result: 3 of the 13 provinces have been deprived of the right to autonomy. Furthermore, the Philippine authorities decided to organize the 10 remaining provinces into 2 provinces (instead of 1 province) in order to be able to take advantage of any dissension. Result: The Moro National Liberation Front has resumed its underground activities and stronger than ever repressive measures have been taken against Muslims.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Have some other Muslim minorities not found themselves in a similar situation?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Habib Chatti: No, not in as bad a situation as this one. However, certain Muslim minorities--in the Soviet Union and China, for instance--have been confronted with many problems. In Africa, strong repressive measures have been taken against the Ugandan Muslim minority following Idi Amin's downfall. In that instance too the world has looked the other way....

Fait Accompli

JEUNE AFRIQUE: And what about Afghanistan?

Habib Chatti: We do not accept the fait accompli of Soviet occupation. We must strive to insure that Afghanistan embarks on the path of strict neutrality which would reassure the USSR, the West and the Muslim world. A neutrality which would be guaranteed simultaneously by Brezhnev, Carter and adjacent Muslim countries, especially Iran and Pakistan.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Should the Moscow Olympic games be boycotted?

Habib Chatti: There are so many opinions, so many "pros" and "cons".... Our advice is: Do not blindly follow the big powers. Each of our countries should follow its own judgment or, if necessary, follow the advice of its Olympic committee, provided that committee is really independent....

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

CSO: 4800

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AFGHANISTAN

EYEWITNESS REPORT FROM KABUL

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Feb 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Josette Alia]

[Text] The city is sad and the snow is red in Kabul. In the "Street of Chickens," poor shops are half open, half closed. A complete, shabby oriental bazaar can be discerned behind the dirty windows: Chinese hardware, electric lamps, plastic flowers. There are few customers. It is Friday and the weather is cold, everyone is staying home. If only there were tourists! But they don't come anymore, they are afraid. So carpet prices are tumbling: this old Baluchi rug, with faded rose hues and purchased for 20,000 afghanis, can be had for 7,000. No? A Belgian merchant couple carries away the finest pieces. "I know them, they are importers from Brussels," the salesman sighs. "Oh, if I had a passport, if I could leave, I would be the one making the money, not them. But now we have the Russians, those curs ..."

The silence is deafening when a scalding cup of tea is served by a small boy wearing an oversized coat. In the back of the store, at the foot of two large rolls of carpets, two other boys are sleeping under dirty limp quilts. Why do people sleep so often in the orient? In India because it is too hot, here because it is too cold, and everywhere because they are hungry. Suddenly one of the boys wakes up, raises a shaggy head and stares wide-eyed: What's this, a tourist, and a woman? He sits up suddenly, wide awake, straightening his old coat. Suspicious, he asks: "Ruski?" No, French. Oh good!... They talk. They say good-bye warmly, raising the blanket that serves as a door.

A Black Limousine

Outside, it is cold again, the mud frozen. Shop windows, pauses, antiques: all those old things thrown into a corner, those old copper dishes, those dented samovars, where do they come from? From what villages perched high in the mountains? From what black felt tent lost in the yellow steppe? Old, torn embroidered dresses flutter and flap in the icy wind. Some are marvelous, trimmed with velvet, old lace, fine silk. Who wore them, for what marriage, for what celebrations? The wind rages and the hem of a sleeve

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

unravels, losing its pearls. The shopkeeper doesn't care. Crouched near a portable stove, he bends his long-bearded head crowned with a huge turban. He looks at the street gloomily. Three Russian soldiers are wading in the mud at the intersection.

They are discreet, it's true. They are seen little, but felt everywhere. The military apparatus has been reinforced since yesterday. There are more tanks behind the post office, the Ministry of the Interior and around the "House of the People." Why? It seems that they too are afraid. An attack on the telegraph exchange started a huge fire that lasted 2 days. Not long ago, a large black Soviet limousine full of officers was passing through a street in the center of Kabul. A young man on the sidewalk took out a pistol and fired. Inside the car, someone appeared hit. The young man fled; but two soldiers had already opened the doors and jumped out, firing in turn. Among the passersby, there were one dead and two wounded, including a woman. True? False? In Kabul, everyone believes it: the story came from someone who met someone who saw it.

How is it possible to find out? Kabul has become the capital of rumors. It was said last week that Babrak Karmal had disappeared and that the Soviets were vainly searching for a possible successor among Afghan politicians decimated by purges. But from purge to purge, the circle of loyal followers--i.e., members of Parsham or Khalq, the two Afghan communist parties--has conspicuously shrunk: at the Ministry of Information, one high official is a communist student who was still in Grenoble 3 weeks ago. The official version of events is reported every day on the radio or in the KABUL NEW TIMES. The "beloved Amin" has become the "butcher Amin" and the "executioner Taraki" has just been crowned a "martyr of the revolution" by the same commentators in less than 2 weeks. But another version is being concocted clandestinely and in whispers: Amin, it is true, knew at the end that he had been sentenced to death by Moscow. He reportedly contacted the Americans, asking them to intervene before it was too late. But the American Government, traumatized by the assassination of its ambassador in Kabul on 14 February 1979, turned a deaf ear. So with a heavy heart, Amin continued to receive his Moscow visitors, kissing them at the airport and wondering each time which one would carry out his death sentence ...

The Man from the KGB

Naturally, none of this can be verified. This is not at all surprising in a country where information no longer circulates, where a cloak of silence thickens from day to day. Journalists can no longer enter: an official directive issued to all embassies. Those who have been there since the beginning have received a list of their "obligations": they cannot leave the city, cannot make contacts or hold interviews, cannot film or photograph without prior authorization from the Ministry of Information, to which the texts, films and photos must then be submitted. "In short, everything not forbidden is authorized," one of my colleagues sneered, exasperated. Downstairs at the hotel, a poster informs the "dear journalists" that "legal revolutionary regulations are finally in effect." "Oh, I remember, I remember

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the way it was in Prague!... Well, I'll go pack my bag," a British reporter soberly remarked. Are they afraid already? No, not yet. But already cautious: "Don't talk about that on the telephone, dear friend. Come see me instead." I too remember: winter 1969 in Prague, at the hotel switchboard, the telephone operator who rolled her terrified eyes, indicating to me that the man sitting behind her, the man in the black raincoat, was a KGB agent.

Are the men in black already there? For the time being, only Russian soldiers and Russian, Bulgarian and East German military draftees serving in a civilian capacity are visible. The Soviets come directly from Moscow by Aeroflot. The others arrive from everywhere: on my flight there were East Germans, probably engineers, with suitcases stuffed with sweaters, socks, documents--everything needed to spend the long Afghan winter. For they will stay, they will definitely stay. The civilians are at the "Kabul" hotel, where they speak Russian, eat Russian and sing in a choir in the evening. During the day, they are gradually taking over the Afghan Government.

It must be said that the average Afghan civil servant, weary of political purges and rightly apprehensive about the sudden reversals of history, has adopted a low profile. Which justifies what President Babrak Karmal calls "the fraternal, important and disinterested aid" of Soviet friends. The soldiers are much more conspicuous: around the city, beyond the airport, they are building permanent installations for their new encampments. The muffled rumbling of "Antonovs," which continue to bring in men and material, can be heard every night. How many are there? At least eight divisions, mostly installed along the Iranian border toward Herat and along the Pakistani border in Nuristan and Paktia, where guerrilla warfare is still going on, according to a Western military expert. Another expert claims that "they" are installing missile-launching ramps in Seistan in the south. How is it possible to find out?

One thing is certain: the Soviet army is there for a long time. It is taking up its winter quarters in Kabul discreetly and slowly--like the "T35" tank passing unhurriedly, transporting long tree trunks tied behind its turret. You almost feel like telling the Afghans that it's over, that they must become resigned, that Afghanistan will be an Outer Mongolia at best and a new Uzbekistan at worst.

You feel like telling them, but don't dare. For here you do not feel resignation, but hatred, the massive depth of a collective refusal. It is evident everywhere. In the wounded look of a young Pashtoon, with a nose like an eagle's beak, ragged and somber, draped in an old blanket and rolled in an endless turban. In the robust spittle of an old Mongol in a caftan and felt cap. In the hissing insults that my taxi driver makes under his breath--driving his old jalopy without chains over the snow as if it were a galloping horse. The street climbs, skirting a mountainside that drops almost straight down to the middle of the city. Women go by, ghostlike, fighting the wind in their long veil tucked in from head to toe, barely open at the eyes.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Here is the Sikh quarter of the city, sad, so sad: the men are numb, gray with cold, and their pink, purple and green turbans, so beautiful under the light of India, here resemble tropical island birds dying in the snow.

The Terrible Mountain

We have to leave this strange and fascinating city, this city-prison where people are already smothering. At the airport, the snowplough clears the runways. An Aeroflot plane flies off, rising vertically before the high circle of mountains, turning at the last moment and finally pulling out toward the sky. As we pass by, there is the Soviet base with its large kaki helicopters, some large "Antonov" transport planes, trucks and tanks. A black Soviet limousine follows along the runway for a moment. Two soldiers in schapska make their way through the snow, hampered by their long gray overcoats. Then the soldiers become very small and the tanks look like toys. Straight ahead, standing like a white wall, is Hindu Kush, the terrible mountain, jagged, gleaming, frozen, Hindu Kush, whose name means "killer of Hindus," because it was from its heights that Afghan warriors formerly descended, quickly and deadly, to devastate and pillage India, mired in its luxury and muggy climate. Afterwards, they would return to their mountain grottos and lay in wait in the high narrow passes, always free, never conquered, never vanquished.

Today, it is no longer enough to have courage and guns. Today, the snow is sad and the city is red. Love from Kabul.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"

11915

CSO: 4900

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

1980 BUDGET TO LAUNCH NEXT 5-YEAR PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Feb 80 pp 432-33

[Text] The Algerian budget for 1980 expresses perfectly Algeria's new concerns on the economic plane, which were defined 2 months ago at the country's highest political levels, on the eve of adoption of the next 5-year plan by the special congress of the FLN.

The year 1980 being, for the third consecutive year, a transition period between the last 4-year plan (1974-1977) and the next 5-year plan, the budget for this year remains nevertheless conspicuous for the impetus given to equipment expenditures favoring the sectors which will receive priority in the next plan, i.e., education, housing, hydraulics and agriculture. It expresses also the Algerian authorities' concern for preparing in the field for launching of the 5-year plan, while completing the major projects begun during the last few years, and, by massive investment injections and reforms of the structure of the productive apparatus, to endow the priority sectors with the means to tackle more easily the giant investments from which they are called upon to profit.

The country's general budget for 1980 is increased to 50,900 million dinars (1 dinar = about 1.10 F), as compared with 36,770 million dinars in 1979, or an increase of 38.4 percent. Operating expenses, which show an increase of 33 percent this year, mainly because of increases in civil servants' salaries, amount to 27.8 billion, of which a quarter (6.82 billion dinars) is earmarked, as it has been since the country's independence, for the educational sector (education and training). Expenditures for personnel, which represent more than 42 percent of the total operating allocations, show an increase of 28 percent. The governmental policy toward operating expenses will, however, remain marked by the same resolve to favor education, training and health while holding down as much as possible expenditures relating to the administrative apparatus, which has grown considerably in the last few years since the rise of crude oil prices. A series of social measures in favor of Moudjahidines (veterans of the Algerian war) and of Moudjahidine widows also explains the increase in operating expenses. It was in fact decided to increase by 50 percent to 100 percent the pensions of these Moudjahidines and their beneficiaries, as well as the pensions of civilian victims of the war and its effects; this led to a 60.9-percent increase over 1979 in the budget allocated to the ministry for Moudjahidines.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Moreover, the national defense operating budget has been increased by 46.7 percent, from 1.84 billion dinars to 2.7 billion dinars. However, the defense operating expenditures for 1980 constitute only 9.7 percent of the total operating allocations, as compared with 10.4 percent in 1979.

Another sector which has benefited from major allocations: the government's share in supporting the prices of staple products has more than doubled (1.9 billion dinars, as compared with 900 million in 1979). This expresses the authorities' concern for safeguarding the purchasing power of the poorest segment of the population which, paralleling the increases in civil servants' salaries, profits this year from a series of fiscal relief measures in addition to the increase of the SMIG [expansion not known] from 800 to 1,000 dinars, free of all tax.

With the exception of certain specific expenditures (national defense, for example), more than 80 percent of the operating allocations are assigned to social and educational sectors (training, education, health, price support, pensions, etc.).

One Half of the Equipment Expenditures Dedicated to Priority Sectors

Concerning the equipment budget, up 42 percent over 1979 (as compared with a 14.5-percent increase for 1979 over the previous year), it is going up to 23,122 million dinars (as compared with 14,200 million in 1978 and 16,260 million in 1979). The overall investment program for 1980 (budgetary and short-term assistance) is going up to 75,829 million dinars, i.e., an increase of 16.4 percent with respect to the 1979 fiscal law and 27 percent with respect to the estimated expenditures for the same year. Equipment expenditures relating to planned investments financed by short-term assistance are set at 52,050 million dinars.

Their breakdown is established as follows (in millions of dinars):

	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Budgetary Assistance</u>
Industry	35,000	630
Tourism	260	150
Agriculture	2,000	1,217 (1)
Transportation	2,000	500
Storage and distribution	2,680	50
Fishing	70	80
Communications	30	--
Telecommunications	900	--
Industrial zones	320	--
Contracting firms	2,700	70
Housing	6,000	2,350
PMU-PCD (2)	60	3,200
Administrative equipment	60	--

(1) Plus hydraulics: 2,000

(2) Urban modernization plans and communal development plans

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

One half of the equipment expenditures is dedicated to sectors which will receive priority during the next 5-year period in the country's economic and social life: education and training (5.12 billion dinars), hydraulics (2 billion), housing (2.35 billion dinars) and economic and social infrastructures. The funds assigned to agriculture (1,217 million) seem less than foreseen, but with the exceptionally high amount authorized for hydraulics (whose allocation has more than doubled in 1980 over 1979), agriculture's means are reinforced. Further, agriculture being the principal subject which will be examined next March by the central committee--which during its December session studied the three other priority sectors, i.e., education and training, hydraulics and housing--it is certain that it is intended to benefit from definitely higher allocations. Moreover, this year's fiscal law provides that the increase in the equipment budget is subject to revision--and the revision would then provide increases for agriculture--in conformance with the aims of the 5-year plan expected to be adopted without doubt next June.

In addition to the equipment expenditures, there is good reason to note in the planned investments of the enterprises that it is the same sectors, in addition to industry which takes the lion's share (more than half of the 52 billion of these investments), which benefit from the highest allocations; housing (6,00 million dinars [as printed]), which, with the 2,700 million dinars assigned to contracting firms (who have construction projects as their principal activity); agriculture (2,000 million); transportation (2,000 million), a sector which, together with telecommunications (900 million), is thus intended to benefit more and more from large allocations; storage and distribution means, another area on which the daily life of the population depends and which encounters enormous difficulties. According to the report of the National Assembly's commission for finance and the plan, the balance to be realized from preceding investment programs at the end of 1979 is evaluated at about 65.1 billion dinars, including 3.7 billion dinars for special programs of the south passed in June 1978. The main sectors concerned are education and training, with a remainder to be realized of about 32 billion dinars, i.e., 34 percent of the allocations concerned, the infrastructures of communication (including railroads) and administration (10 billion dinars, i.e., 12 percent), communal plans (6 billion, or 7 percent), rural housing (7 billion), hydraulics (6.4 billion), special programs (10 billion dinars). As for the temporary assistance, the remainder to be realized at the end of 1979 is estimated at 125 billion dinars and the sectors concerned are industry (78 billion dinars, or 62 percent of the remainders to be realized), rural housing (25 billion, or 20 percent).

Completion of programs in progress thus constitutes the Algerian authorities' basic concern for this year and without doubt this will be the highest priority which will be set down in the next plan, together with the exceptional efforts which the government intends to undertake in the social sector.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Two Thirds of Receipts Come from Crude Oil Revenues

The government's definitive receipts, set at 51.183 billion dinars, which is a little more than the operating and equipment expenditures, come essentially from crude oil revenues; these are valued at 31,750 million dinars, and take care of 65 percent of budgetary expenditures. Crude oil taxes on pipeline transport and on gaseous hydrocarbons have been aligned on crude: 85 percent of the profit realized by the operating companies, as against 70 percent.

The quantity of these oil revenues does not take into account the readjustment decided by Algeria on 4 February, which raises the price of Algerian crude from 30 to 34.21 dollars a barrel. The calculations of the new amount of the oil revenues for 1980 have been made, in fact, on the basis of a production of 50 million metric tons of crude and a price of 30 dollars a barrel, and of 23.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas, taking into account 1979 prices.

Ordinary revenues contribute some 35 percent of the budget (17.79 billion dinars, i.e., 13.7 percent with respect to 1979). While numerous measures of tax abatement or relief have been taken for the lowest salaries and for certain sectors (salaries below 1,000 dinars are free of taxes, as are turnovers of small businesses between 36,000 and 60,000 dinars a year and construction materials for industrial housing up to the amount of 150,000 dinars), certain indirect taxes have in turn been increased: modest increase in motor fuel prices (3 centimes per liter for regular gasoline and 10 for high-octane), a major increase in the customs duties on imported vehicles (149.57 percent for vehicles of 7 horsepower or less, 229 percent up to 10 horsepower and 500 percent for those over 10 horsepower). On the other hand, prices of food staples, supported through a special fund whose amount has increased from 900 million to 1,900 million dinars, will not go up in price in 1980, in conformance with the governmental policy of preserving the population's purchasing power. Other abatements are also anticipated, notably for books and works published in foreign languages (schoolbooks and university publications have already been exempt for several years), educational materials and cultural films imported or produced by Algerian radio-television or the film distribution center.

The budgetary debate in the National Assembly, very animated--several ministers who came to present their ministries' budgets to the deputies were cross-examined--was marked by critical interjections by the deputies, who considered that the oil revenues were assuming too important a place in the country's receipts with respect to the basic revenues.

They insisted that the country's operating expenses be held down better. The National Assembly's commission for finance and the plan, which was also active during these debates, stressed in its report that the state and socialist sector (national companies, notably) was far from producing

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the anticipated tax revenues, while for a long time it has monopolized almost all of the public investments. According to this commission, this sector should, as the driver of the country's economic and social development, produce more of a surplus to assure the accumulation of capital necessary to support development.

The critics in the National Assembly of such a state of affairs were even more vehement when it was established that the oil profits, which all the deputies demanded be assigned wholly to the productive apparatus, are to contribute--exceptionally it is true--toward settling the debts of certain state enterprises. Six of these companies are unable to pay back their loans; these are the National Iron and Steel Company (1.4 billion dinars), the SN Metal (250 million dinars), the Sogedia (food products: 350 million), the Scnic (chemical industries: 600 million), the Sonelgaz (electricity and gas: 400 million) and the SNMC (construction materials: 440 million dinars). This situation explains the government's decision to create an ad hoc commission charged with studying the restructuring of the state enterprises, where excessive size renders management more and more complex and difficult.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980

5586
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

NEW PETROLEUM POLICY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 pp 557-559

[Article: "Algeria's New Petroleum Policy"]

[Text] Algerian leaders face a thorny problem in attempting to reconcile two apparently contradictory political and economic imperatives--how to ensure Algeria's long-term energy independence by a policy of preserving its limited oil resources, while pursuing industrialization which is still heavily dependent upon the revenue from oil exports.

Debate was begun last December by president Chadli Bendjedid who opened a session of the FLN Central Committee by calling this high political authority of the regime to seriously reflect on the question. After a particularly ostentatious decade, marked by huge investments in the industrial sector, thanks to the petroleum "moneylender," Algeria seems to be recovering its self-control. The energy crisis, coupled with a worldwide economic crisis, seems to have played a fundamental role in Algeria's sudden awareness of the difficulties which await it 20 years from now when its oil wells will run dry.

Limited Petroleum Reserves

Algerian leaders have long been aware of their country's limited petroleum reserves. At their present export rate, varying yearly from 50 to 55 million metric tons (52 million in 1979), Algerian oil reserves, estimated at 1.1 billion metric tons, will be exhausted in some 20 years, precisely at the moment when the industrial apparatus which it is setting up progressively will reach the height of its consumption of energy products.

These forecasts do not take into account the constant increase in domestic consumption in the next 20 years. Presently estimated at 5 million metric tons, this should grow at an annual rate of 15 percent, reaching 14 million metric tons in 5 years and over 20 million at the end of the decade. This reduces the longevity of the country's petroleum reserves to less than 15 years, assuming that the country's consumption of energy products plus crude oil exports of 50 million metric tons per year doubled every 5 years until the year 2000.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The question is not new, already dating from the 1970's, but Algerian concerns at that time were of an entirely different order, making the question more or less academic.

However, with its economic recovery well underway and having reflected upon the lessons of a decade of accelerated development for over a year, it seems that Algeria, fearing a worsening of the worldwide energy crisis, has become more acutely aware of the progressively fragile future of its energy independence as its internal needs grow, carried along by the dynamics of development.

Now the fundamental principle upon which the country's development effort is based responds to a sacred goal for the Algerian leaders--assuring their country's independence.

Assuming stabilization of petroleum exports at their present level and accelerated growth of domestic consumption of energy products and taking into account the country's limited petroleum reserves, Algeria would become an importer of crude oil in less than 20 years. Such a situation would weigh tragically upon its economic independence and would wipe out decades of work to ensure this very independence.

Reexamining the Valhyd Plan

This not-too-promising vision of Algeria's future explains the December call by the FLN Central Committee in view of preserving "the strategic national oil reserves guaranteeing the country's long-term supply." The highest political body in the country thus echoed the proposal of President Chadli Bendjedid, in opening the work of the Central Committee, "to safeguard Algeria's petroleum resources, instead of converting them into multi-colored bills."

For observers, these two high-level stands constitute a reexamination of the Valhyd Plan [Oil Valorization Plan], formulated just 2 years ago by an American research group at the request of Sonatrach [Algerian National Oil Company]. This plan predicted, by the year 2005, the construction of seven natural gas liquefaction plants and seven giant refineries in addition to the drilling of 2000 new oil wells in the Sahara, for a total of \$36 billion.

Part of this ambitious program, necessitating international loans on the order of \$17.5 billion, is already underway, since the first giant liquefaction plant was set up at Skikda 4 years ago, while another plant (GNL 1) [LNG 1] was built 2 years ago at Arzew, where a third plant (GNL 2) [LNG2] is being completed.

Development of this plan, which was presented to the major international banks over a year ago, gave rise to a heated dispute between its promoters, the "oilmen" led by Belaid Abdesselam, then "boss" of the whole economic sector and currently president of the FLN economic committee, and other

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

state economic agents who feared the financial implications of such a project and the allotment of such enormous credits to a sector dominated mainly by "multinationals," as much on the financial level as on the technological level.

Necessary Revenue

Despite the opinion of the highest Algerian political bodies that "the utilization of oil exclusively as a means of foreign financing" for the development of the country has become an "unsettling" factor in the national economy and that these resources should be preserved to ensure the country's long-term energy independence, it remains that the industrialization effort begun over 10 years ago could not have been pursued without the essential, and vital, contribution of petroleum revenue. Thus, the other half of the problem facing Algerian leaders appears insoluble insofar as it conditions the country's economic future, which is more dependent than ever, and will be for a long time, upon the income from its petroleum exports (nearly \$10 billion in 1979, compared to barely \$6 million in 1978).

Almost all the purchases of hard goods necessary for industrialization and even, in recent years, of certain current consumer's goods have been financed by this income which increases along with the price of Algerian oil. The leaders may assume that Algeria is in a position to satisfy its own supply needs, and may take action to this effect, but it still would take only a moderate braking of petroleum exports to slow the rate of development of the country without prejudicing the repayment of international loans signed during the preceding decade. Heavily indebted for the set-up of its industrial equipment, especially the petrochemical complexes, Algeria yearly devotes from 20 to 25 percent of its exports to the repayment of its loans.

Reduction of Crude Oil Exports

While waiting to find a solution to the double imperative which conditions the long-term future profile of its petroleum production and which has been the topic of discussion at the highest political level for several months, Algeria seems to be opting for a temporary step--that of reducing its crude oil exports as its refining capability increases.

The largest refinery in the country, just completed at Skikda, should produce 7.5 million metric tons for export in 1980, which will entail an identical reduction in the volume of crude oil. This refinery is larger than the four older ones in the north and south of the country, and will reach its capacity, 15 million metric tons per year, next year. Another refinery of this size was to have been built in the Bedjaia area, nearly 200 km east of Algiers. But, since the land where it was to have been located has finally been judged impractical and since the country's petroleum policy is being revised, it is likely that construction of this refinery will be delayed indefinitely.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Costly Investments for Gas

Because of limited reserves, crude oil exports may be most affected by the preservation policy Algeria intends to apply during this decade. But the future of natural gas, with reserves estimated at over 3000 billion cubic meters, clearly appears more secure. Unlike oil consumption, which, even internally, may become progressively more restricted, domestic and industrial gas consumption, estimated at 3 billion cubic meters and increasing at a rate of 16 percent (greater than oil), is definitely encouraged to spare the crude oil reserves as much as possible.

However, exploitation of gas reserves for export, chiefly in liquified form, appears to be running into complex problems, both economic and financial. The expected exports of liquified natural gas [LNG], object of the ambitious Valhyd Plan 2 years ago, risk being profoundly affected by the FLN Central Committee steps to preserve the country's energy resources.

LNG exports increased to 14 billion cubic meters in 1979, corresponding to barely 10 percent of oil income, compared to 75 percent for crude oil and 15 percent for condensate.

Although Algerian reserves of natural gas are enormous, their export necessitates considerable investments and very costly advanced technology facilities, compared to the prices, considered too low by Algiers, at which the Saharan gas is sold, mainly to Americans.

Determinant Price

It is precisely the gas export prices, the raising of which has been the subject of negotiations for several weeks between Sonatrach and its American and European clients, which will no doubt rule Algerian choices concerning massive exports of liquified or gaseous natural gas.

According to Sonatrach, Saharan gas prices for the Americans and Europeans (essentially France, Germany and the Netherlands, which have ordered nearly 15 billion cubic meters from Algeria for a period of 20 years, beginning in 1983) are markedly low compared to their equivalent in oil (in terms of thermal units). Presently, France imports 4 billion cubic meters per years, at a price of \$3 per million BTU (1 British Thermal Unit equals 252 calories), while Canada sells its gas to the United States at \$4.5 per million BTU. According to information from another source, Sonatrach wishes to revise the price, increasing it to \$6 per million BTU.

For Algiers, then, it is a question of insuring, through renegotiating gas export prices and taking the energy market into account, a certain parity between petroleum and natural gas by a better formula of pegging the price of gas to a wider range of energy substitutes.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sophisticated Technology

For the Algerian leaders, the present natural gas prices do not allow for a profit on the heavy investments necessary to set up advanced technology liquefaction plants envisioned by the Valhyd Plan.

Already, the construction of two liquefaction plants, one at Skikda, the other at Arzew (GNL 1), is far from having achieved its objectives. Three years after construction, the first plant, built by the French company Technip, has had mishaps which an impressive number of technicians of all nationalities are finding difficult to resolve. Construction of the liquefaction plant at Arzew by the American firm Bechtel, then by Chemical, has also had its ups and downs, insofar as it cost Algeria four times what was estimated. This caused a political stir in the National Assembly, which called in the minister of energy and petrochemical industries and established a parliamentary commission of inquiry.

Uncertainty over GNL 3 [LNG 3]

Despite these bitter experiences, construction is continuing on GNL 2, which, with a production capacity equal to GNL 1 (10.5 billion cubic meters), will permit an increase in August 1981 from 16 billion to 30 billion cubic meters (gaseous in Algerian production of liquified natural gas).

However, the future of GNL 3, which is to deliver liquified natural gas to France, Germany and Holland, is now uncertain. The Algerians no longer wish to take on the enormous investment necessary for establishment of this new liquefaction plant with such unprofitable export prices.

The GNL 3 liquefaction plant was to have been built by the firm Foster Wheeler and equipped with cryogenic exchangers furnished by the French company Technip. Contracts with these two companies for the construction of this plant were signed over a year ago. If construction goes ahead, this plant, with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters, will essentially deliver its production to Germany and Holland, according to the terms of contracts signed with Rhurgas-Gasunie (8 billion cubic meters per year for 20 years) and Brigitta Thyssengas (4 billion per year), and negotiated by Sonatrach, but not yet signed, with Gaz de France (5 billion cubic meters).

Gas Pipeline Preference

Topics of current negotiations between Sonatrach and its European customers will include, in addition to the increase in price of natural gas, an examination of the possibility of delivering this gas in gaseous form, carried via Tunisia by the Algeria-Italy gas pipeline which is currently under construction, rather than in liquified form, as planned 2 years ago. In 1983, this "transmediterranean" gas pipeline will deliver 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Italy. However, its carrying capacity could be increased to 18 billion cubic meters deliverable to other European customers of Sonatrach.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This plan appears to be more advantageous for Algeria, insofar as it eliminates the establishment of giant liquefaction plants in its country and the purchase of equally gigantic methane tankers, all necessitating the investment of several billions of dollars. It also avoids construction of regasification plants in the client countries, but does oblige them to take a greater part in financing methods of land transportation. Negotiations between Sonatrach and its European partners could become heated, especially since Holland seems to have already arranged for construction of its own regasification plant.

Conditions of the Choice

Algerian exports of liquified natural gas to the United States as well as to western Europe should increase by 1984 to 44 billion cubic meters per year, taking into account only those firm contracts already signed by Sonatrach and its customers and approved by the proper authorities in the exporting and importing countries. Exports could reach nearly 60 billion cubic meters by the middle of this decade, by taking into account negotiated, but unsigned, contracts with other European countries, in case the new prices for Algerian natural gas are considered profitable enough for the construction of the costly facilities necessary for exporting the additional quantity of gas.

Thus, the choice facing the Algerian leaders in exploitation of the country's energy resources during this decade, from the perspective of greater profitability of its resources while maintaining the country's accelerated rate of economic development, depends greatly upon the results of current negotiations between Sonatrach and its American and European clients.

In one case, Algeria could arrive at some profitable prices for gas exports, justifying costly investments in liquefaction facilities, which would then permit an increase in natural gas prices which would compensate for a reduction in deliveries of crude oil, without affecting income in currency necessary for imports of equipment. In the other case, Algeria could be led to slow up its production of gas and to maintain petroleum exports at their present level, with domestic energy product needs being covered mainly by a part of the gas production which would progressively replace oil.

Belkacem Nabi Predicts Continued Oil Price Hikes for 1980

The movement to raise oil prices should continue in 1980 and place "the price per barrel at a higher level of effective rate than the levels attained during the 1970's," stated Belkacem Nabi, Algerian minister of energy and petrochemical industries, in an interview published 3 March by the Algerian monthly EL DJEICH (Army).

According to the minister, who considered "1979 to have been essentially a year of compensation," stated that "this evolution should be made progressively, in a concerted fashion, so as to permit all concerned to prepare for a new situation where the price of energy is a significant element in

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

economic policy." "It is necessary," he said, "to give the industrialized countries time to absorb the increase in the oil bill and the OPEC countries a chance to review their development plans with respect to the level of income and to define the means necessary for demonstrating their solidarity with respect to non-oil-producing developing countries."

Nabi is of the opinion that "everyone is concerned that the price of oil increases in real terms, if the world is to be spared the difficulties of an energy supply crisis." He also confirmed Algeria's intention to reduce its oil production in the coming years, recalling the recent decision of the FLN Central Committee.

Stressing that evolution in the price of oil would allow Algeria, while lowering production, to maintain a high income from oil and gas to finance its development, Nabi indicated that negotiations were continuing between Sonatrach and its American and European clients, chiefly Gas de France, for the upward revision of liquified natural gas prices which, he stated, must be tied to the "ascending movement" of the price of oil.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980

9171
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

THREAT TO FRANCE--"France will pay dearly for its support of Morocco" in the Saharan conflict, reportedly threatened "Colonel Hoffman," one of the leaders of the Algerian secret services, son of a legionnaire and an Algerian woman. For the present, however, two factors are apparently holding back Algiers: 1) the fear, in the event of open conflict [with France], of the wholesale expulsion of Algerian emigres, "dangerous because of the labor union members"; and 2) the risk of precipitating the overthrow of the Moroccan monarchy and its replacement by a hypernationalistic republic which would reclaim Tindouf and the Oran area. [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7-13 Apr 80 p 10]

CSO: 4400

40

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAN

BANI-SADR PONDERES WAY OUT OF ECONOMIC RUIN

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 28 Mar 80 pp 30,31

[Interview with Bani-Sadr by J.M. Cortes and A. Rafat]

[Text] "We are destroyed, economically. Just give us time to rebuild." So says the first president of the republic of Persia. Can Italy lend a hand? Maybe, and yet...

As the first president of the Iranian Islamic Republic since February 1980, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr has not thus far had an easy time of it. The hostages (and he was opposed to that caper) have yet to be freed from the American embassy in Tehran, despite all the efforts of the UN commission. As for the legislative elections (the first round took place on 14 March, and the second will be held on 3 April), the outcome is uncertain and for the moment seems to favor the Islamic hard-liners, the forces which Bani-Sadr, though he regularly quotes the Koran, is in fact fighting. Even so, Bani-Sadr remains the one solid point of reference the West can count on in the steamy welter of events in Iran. Furthermore, the president used to work as an economist (in Paris). Here are some of the things he had to say to IL MONDO about the way he sees Persia's future.

Question: People often talk of you as an economist. What are the main points in your plan for Iran's economic reconstruction?

Answer: I predicted the crisis of the late regime 4 years before it came; to do that, I had conducted a broad analysis of the country's economy in all its particulars. And it is for this very reason that I am in a position today to propose an alternative, a plan for rebuilding Iran. It is, of course, not a plan developed or approved by the entire body of people who contributed to overthrowing the tyranny of the shah, but rather a plan of my own. And yet, since there are no other plans, I must add that this plan of mine is, as of now, the only alternative. Iran

today must pick up an economy that has been totally destroyed and put it back together again. And this will call not only for careful, detailed planning, but also for the total commitment of the people.

Question: You speak of a ruined economy. Yet Iran under the shah was known as a tyrannical country, yes, but an industrialized one...

Answer: That was the image the former monarch projected of his regime, and one which, in my view, bore not the slightest relation to reality. If it is to move forward, Iran needs an independent economy. I think it is necessary to emphasize the point that by independence I do not mean autarchy. What I am talking about is stabilizing economic relations with other countries on a domestic foundation, one possessing a dynamics of its own. Once we have this, trade relations with the rest of the world will fall into place. In the future, oil will have its part to play in this direction in the establishment of our basic economy. There you have the main thrust of my views on Iranian economic reconstruction.

Let's look now at what the shah's economic policy was. He called it "protectionist." And I must admit that indeed it was that. But the interests profiting by that protection were foreign ones. Oil would leave Iran as a bulk commodity, and be transformed into capital in Europe. Once that was done, a portion of that capital would come back into the country in the form of imports. This relationship between Iran and the West increased buying power, but to the advantage of imports and at the price of all but complete destruction of domestic industry.

Question: Getting back to your own plan...

Answer: It is hard to build an independent economy in view of the fact that the world economy is based primarily on trade. And the whole thing becomes still more problematical when the base of an economy is export of one or more raw materials.

Bearing this difficulty in mind, one must first of all create and build up an economic "tradition." Our model is based on the principles of worker management. We shall build up local production units, but those units will operate as part of an overall plan elaborated by the government. Political management of production will, according to the principles of Islam, be the concern of the labor force. Capital will handle economic management.

Question: In other words, what you are proposing is something halfway between capitalism and socialism. A third way, if you like.

Answer: There is a classical definition that tells us economics is the organization of scarcity. Socialism handles that scarcity one way, and capitalism another. The Koran, on the contrary, tells us that nature does not suffer from shortages. It is man who, for social reasons, is

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

incapable of putting that wealth to good use. And so, from our point of view, the *raison d'etre* of an economy lies in avoiding or even eliminating these man-made obstacles.

For the Islamic economy, production must not be tied to a percentage of profit, but to the utility of the product itself. This is precisely why we are in favor of worker management of production, which will not allow capital and the market to impose their rules. In our economy, control exercised by the masses will not allow production of anything that is not needful to our society. This is the only way to fight communism.

Question: The world, though, is divided into blocs and spheres of influence. How realistic, then, do you think your argument is?

Answer: My argument is not merely realistic: it is necessary. Everybody knows that Iran is a strategic target for both the Americans and the Soviets. Our oil and our geographical position make everybody envious. There was a time when the United States controlled the Iranian market and economy, and it is ready to do anything in order not to lose that control. The Russians, on the other hand, are trying to get their hands on it, no matter what the cost. And we, here in the middle, must be on our guard and try not to fall into the trap of either of them.

Our revolution has driven out the dominion of the White House. This does not mean, however, that the Americans have accepted their defeat. The Soviets, in turn, are trying to fill the void left by the other superpower with "socialist aid." As an Iranian proverb puts it, we are between two fires, and we don't like burning.

Question: What will your next steps be?

Answer: An intensive campaign to get the masses involved behind the motto: "Use less, produce more." That done, we shall complete the restructuring of the country's entire economic apparatus.

Question: What role will petrodollars play in your plans?

Answer: More than 80 percent will go to national reconstruction. A starring role will go to agriculture. That is the sector that has been hardest hit. One need only consider the fact that not more than 15 years ago we were more than self-sufficient, while today we have to import more than half our food.

Question: There was a time when Iran was the paradise of western capital investors. Are you still interested in foreign investments and technologies?

Answer: Yes. I believe collaboration between Iran and the industrial world would be very helpful, but only on an even footing. We prefer to give priority to countries with greater independence of the two super-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

powers. We further prefer not to do business with the multinational corporations.

Question: Does Italy appear among these privileged countries?

Answer: Theoretically, yes. Lately, though, the Italian government has shown several signs of subordination to the White House. For example, it denied us some spare parts for our Italian-built helicopters, even though they had long been paid for. It did this as part of the boycott decreed by American President Jimmy Carter, and we do not like it at all. Attitudes of that kind could cause considerable damage in the future to economic, political, and cultural relations between Iran and Italy.

COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1980

6182

CSO: 4403

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEBANON

DEATH OF PUBLISHER MAKES FUTURE OF MAGAZINE UNCERTAIN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 14-20 Mar 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "AL-HAWADITH After al-Lawzi: A Tempting Sales Offer or a Change in Political Course? He Is the Only One Who Would Have Dared To Write About His Last Adventure"]

[Text] Perhaps the most exciting adventure of newspaperman Salim al-Lawzi is the one from which he returned recently, incapable of writing about it. His family, which has moved to London, is faced with a difficult task that may be summarized by a big question mark regarding the vacuum left by the big newspaperman. What will become of AL-HAWADITH after the death of its chief?

The family of the late colleague Salim al-Lawzi could not stand staying in Beirut. The atmosphere in the city became too oppressive for them after the tragedy. His third and his last wife, Umayyah al-Mar'ashli preferred to move with his daughters to the British capital.

Thus, the week of mourning will be held in London. The family will then devote itself to the burdens resulting from the major vacuum left by the deceased. Chief among those burdens are the affairs of his magazine, AL-HAWADITH, in the areas of editorial [policy], administration, and finance, and future political course.

With regard to family affairs, the prevailing conviction among the staff of the magazine and among the close friends of the family is that al-Lawzi left a will dealing with the distribution of his unknown fortune. Some people estimate al-Lawzi's fortune to be several million pounds sterling. This is in addition to the value of the magazine if it is offered for sale or turned into a joint stock company.

Friends think it likely that the family will sell the magazine so that it may not have the same fate as that of the successful Lebanese newspaper AL-HAYAH following the murder of its owner Kamil Marawah in 1965. He was a capable newspaperman like al-Lawzi, but the newspaper's qualities declined after his death, and then it died suddenly during the Lebanese War along with its English-language sister, THE DAILY STAR.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What may prompt al-Lawzi's family to sell the magazine is the fact that they may receive a tempting offer. The family is also convinced that the magazine will not be able to preserve the journalistic standards it maintained during the life of its chief, especially since a number of its best editors had left it recently.

The Policy of AL-HAWADITH After al-Lawzi

The political course which AL-HAWADITH Magazine must adopt after the death of its proprietor is a matter of considerable concern to his family, which has been advised by more than one Arab source to refrain from the politics pursued by its chief, especially in the last few years. Al-Lawzi's politics had involved him in disputes that were closer to being personal and temperamental struggles with more than one Arab regime.

But turning away from the political course pursued by AL-HAWADITH in the seventies would require making changes in the editorial staff and doing without those [staff reporters] who are inclined to oppose the nationalist Arab course and to support views of the "Lebanese Front" and its close and remote associates.

Our colleague al-Lawzi had returned to Beirut in 1955 after working successfully in the Egyptian press. He had come to Beirut to publish AL-HAWADITH Magazine which was then closer to being an artistic than a political journal.

As the fortunes of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir rose, AL-HAWADITH rallied around him. But colleague al-Lawzi left the Nasirist course after the defeat of June 1967. At the same time, he also gave up his agreement with the regime of the late President Fu'ad Shihab.

AL-HAWADITH then found itself involved in successive conflicts with Arab radical regimes that had come into existence late in the sixties. It also found itself involved in a conflict with the Palestinian Resistance Movement. When the Lebanese War broke out in 1975, AL-HAWADITH was described as being committed to the course of the Lebanese Front. It was sometimes openly and other times implicitly at odds with the opponents of the Front on both the Lebanese and the Arab scenes.

When the Lebanese Front became involved in a dispute with the regime of President Hafiz al-Asad in Syria, AL-HAWADITH sided with the front. Al-Lawzi wrote several commentaries and investigative articles against what he described as the sectarian regime in Syria.

The position of the Lebanese magazine that emigrated to London grieved not only the Lebanese left and the Palestinian Resistance, but also Moslems in general, since al-Lawzi was a Sunni Moslem from the city of Tripoli [which is known for] its ancient Arab and Islamic traditions.

Feelings of bitterness against the magazine grew when the magazine went along with President Sadat's initiative and its resultant Camp David Accords.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Many observers attribute the campaigns launched by al-Lawzi against some Arab regimes to his disposition and to the swift changes in his temperament. But he did not acknowledge this, and he insisted that his duty as a reporter required him to write about all forbidden or taboo subjects. Mere mention of these inevitably places a newspaperman on the "most wanted list" of several regimes. These campaigns have been costly for al-Lawzi. His brother was murdered last year in Tripoli, and the offices of his magazine in Beirut were destroyed. Then he himself received a warning that he would be killed. His visit to Lebanon for his mother's funeral was a major mistake that cost him his life.

A Horrifying End

Colleague al-Lawzi was kidnapped last February 24, and his body was found by a shepherd on the rocks in the hilly section of 'Armun in South Beirut on the 4th-5th of March.

It was clear from observation and from the medical report that he had been subjected to severe torture during the 8 days he was alive and in the custody of his kidnappers. There were bruises in various parts of his body, and the skin and flesh of his right hand, from the fingernails till the wrist had been stripped off. The bone had been eaten away, an indication that his hand had been immersed in a strong acid solution before he was fatally shot in the head and the temple. The significance of disfiguring his right hand was clear.

Al-Lawzi is 58 years old. He began his life as a self-made man. He achieved success in broadcasting in the Near East Radio Station that was established by the British in Palestine. It was then moved to Cyprus for propaganda purposes for the allies during World War II.

Afterwards al-Lawzi went to Cairo, the capital of the press and the arts in the forties. There he worked in several major press organizations, and he formed personal friendships with prominent figures in the press, in politics, in the theater and in the motion picture [industry].

He returned in the mid-fifties to Beirut to take part in several press ventures. Then he settled down independently with his successful venture, AL-HAWADITH.

In spite of his press preoccupations, colleague al-Lawzi lived the last 20 years of his life in comfort. He was married three times, and he had seven daughters. He lost his only son when he sought refuge in Damascus in the late fifties to escape pursuit during the regime of former [Lebanese] President Sham'un.

Regardless of his political course, al-Lawzi is considered one of the most successful newspapermen in the Arab world. He is known for his tireless activity and for always being "on the go" in spite of his advancing age. His colleagues who worked with him describe him as a dictator at work who believes that he is always right. But all his colleagues acknowledge that he is a skillful master of the indirect media.

47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Al-Lawzi wrote two novels and 43 short stories. He had hoped to become a successful novelist like Ihsan 'Abd-al-Quddus and Yusif al-Siba'i. But political events in the Arab world soon occupied his attention and attracted him. He wrote scores of successful press investigations, and he met hundreds of senior Arab and foreign officials. But he was as dauntless in writing about sensitive political articles as in tackling artistic issues, disregarding the fact that his words in the political arena had more far-reaching repercussions than his artistic articles.

Perhaps the most exciting and the most mysterious of Salim al-Lawzi's adventures was his most recent one. He is now incapable of writing about it to his readers who will miss him very much.

COPYRIGHT: Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 1980

8592
CSO: 4802

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOROCCO

WORRIED KING GETS U.S. ARMS, FRENCH SECURITY ADVICE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb 80 p 16

[Article by Ali Gharbi: "Clouds Over The Palace"]

[Text] King Hassan II is pleased and worried. Pleased because the U.S. Congress has agreed to sell him 6 OV 10 aircraft, 20 F5E fighters and 24 combat helicopters equipped with antitank missiles. He is worried because the Sacred Union and the social tranquility he had boasted of achieving have been widely attacked by the movement of popular protest spreading in the cities and the countryside. The threats hovering over his throne--evoked last year by a CIA report--are they perhaps about to take specific form?

The question deserves to be raised, for what could be the reason behind the "conversation" recently held at Rabat between the king and three French specialists: Robert Broussard, head of the antigang campaign, Raymond Sassia, chief of the Security Service in the Ministry of the Interior, and Captain Prouteau, chief of the Intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie, the same man who intervened at Mecca?

Clearly, there is on the agenda formation of "special antisubversive units" with French advisers and cadres. This project under way is related to the Gafsa affair, whose consequences show the role played by Giscard's power in that part of the world. The royal authority, up to its neck in the war in the Western Sahara, where Operation Badr has been beset by the same misfortunes as its predecessor, Operation Ohoud, finds itself compelled to tighten the bonds of dependence with France and the United States. All the more so as it expects aggravation of the popular struggles and consequently is preparing to step up measures of oppression, which have never slackened.

Since the escapes last October the political prisoners have had their conditions worsen; several among them have been refused hospitalization. Arrests and interrogations of students, trade union people and political militants are continuing. Among the latter are the president and four members of the UNEM [Students' Union], officers of the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces], and one in particular, Ahmed ben Jelloun, brother of Omar ben Jelloun, assassinated in 1975. All of them have been brutally interrogated at police stations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But the real anxiety of the monarchist regime lies elsewhere. For some weeks now, against a background of strikes with a political character conducted by students demanding liberation of prisoners, the workers and peasants have occupied center stage: the phosphate mine workers are now starting their third month of strike, truck drivers and railway workers lay on frequent job actions; peasant farmer demonstrations are brutally dealt with by the auxiliary forces, as was done last 29 December at Beni Mellal (Tadlas region) where two hundred peasants were arrested and taken to the military camp and twenty-nine of them were tried and condemned to heavy penalties.

This affair, which was recapitulated a month later at Azila in the northern part of the country (where thirty peasants, ten of them women, were arrested) was triggered by the monopolizing of collective pasture-grounds by a handful of big landowners who pasture some 10,000 animals there, guarded by auxiliary forces. This is not the first time that grazing areas have been monopolized by big landowners. One may recall the rural exoduses of 1959 (the Rif), in 1971 (in the Gharb), in 1977 (at Amizmiz), and in 1979 (at Temara). This policy is the root of the impoverishment of the peasants, reduced to swell the populations of the shantytowns, supplying the majority of the emigrants, or hiring themselves out--at 6 dirham per day--as farm help. Hence the discontent.

It is in this context of profound crisis that the royal authority seeks the means of its survival: American weapons and French protectors.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

2750
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

PROSPECTS REGARDING SUCCESSOR TO BOURGUIBA ANALYZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 21

[Article by Adel Wahid: "Operation Recovery"]

[Text] When he met for the second time within a month with Ahmed Mestiri, leader of the MDS (Movement of the Socialist Democrats), had Habib Bourguiba decided this time--as he has done with a certain number of his friends--to return his former minister of defense to the bosom of the Destour movement and entrust a ministerial portfolio to him? The "suggestions" of the Western imperial powers would not be unrelated to this change of tact by the Tunisian chief of state.

Ridiculed and humiliated by Bourguiba during the first interview he had with him in Nefta, a week after the armed popular revolt in Gafsa, the former minister was again summoned to the palace in Carthage on 5 March by the Tunisian chief of state. On his departure he said he had discussed "indispensable and major changes to meet the aspirations of the people and to protect Tunisia from the perils threatening on all sides" with Bourguiba.

Edifying subjects for one preparing to accept governmental responsibilities. Mr Mestiri relaxes and joins in the chorus of those who continue to blandish the "foreign threat," and just at the time when the French media, which also saw in the Gafsa rebellion a "Libyan coup," are beginning to reconsider their position and to recognize the Tunisian nature of the matter, and the existence of a serious crisis within the country.

The "Example" of Hassan II

The masks fall! Mr Mestiri, following Habib Boulares and others, is in the process of returning to the fold. Their "journey in the desert" and their presumed conversion to the opposition, it is true, never deceived anyone. What purpose would their joining the government serve if not to guarantee a regime shamed and discredited for good? The artificial

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"national union" effected by Hassan II is in the process of realization in Tunisia. "Those who want a national union government formed as soon as possible take their inspiration from an example which fascinates them: that of Morocco. The king, exploiting the Sahara affair, has won the support of the left and even the extreme left. Similarly, the tense situation with Libya would serve to rally the main opponents around President Bourguiba," wrote Paul-Marie de La Gorce in LE FIGARO (6 March 1980).

It is clear that the future change in the Tunisian political chessboard is a direct result of the Gafsa rebellion. But the political withdrawal of Mr Nouira has considerable to do with it.

The physical condition of the Tunisian prime minister (69 years of age) was not equal to the successive shocks suffered in the course of these recent months, to the point that thanks to the Libyan radio, Tunisians were informed of Nouira's profitable transactions in Europe and the United States as well as certain deplorable aspects of his private life. Rushed to the neurosurgical ward of a Paris hospital--where the physicians on duty diagnosed hemiplegia resulting in paralysis of the left part of his body--on the evening of 26 February, the designated successor to Habib Bourguiba convalesced slowly. His days may not be numbered, but as a result of the consequences of this kind of accident in particular, it seems certain that Hedi Nouira will not be able to continue in his duties as prime minister, at least for a long period of time.

Taken by surprise by the illness of his heir apparent, the president entrusted the responsibility for "coordinating government action" to his minister of national education, Mr Mohamed Mzali. A native of the city of Monastir, like Bourguiba and Nouira, Mr Mzali is a faithful adduct of the Tunisian chief of state. However, he has adroitly avoided involving himself in "the dirty business of the regime," which has won him a rather favorable reputation with the population. His role will, however, involve implementing Bourguiba's directives to the letter. No more. For apart from these adjustments dictated by circumstances, nothing in Tunisia appears to have changed. On the other hand, since the "Mzali solution" was only temporary, the race to become the successor of Hedi Nouira has doubtless begun, while the appointment of Driss Guigua to head the Ministry of Interior for its part augers more repression and violence.

A Petty Brainstorm

It is remembered in particular in Tunisia that the famous corps of watchmen at the university was a petty brainstorm of this same Guigua, in the era when he was minister of national education between 1973 and 1976. As to the return to favor of Tahar Belkhodja, former minister of interior and the creator of the BOP (Public Order Brigades), the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

pretorian guard of the regime, it is practically a fact. It is said that he will replace Driss Guigua as the Tunisian ambassador to Bonn.

There is no shortage of pretenders to replace Hedi Nouira. But Bourguiba has always nurtured the hope of seeing his son succeed him one day. And this, although the cerebral accident suffered by Habib Bourguiba Jr a few years ago, the consequences of which still plague him, upset the dynastic projects of the father for a time. And it was in order to obtain the investiture of foreign protectors that Bourguiba dispatched his son to Paris, Washington and London, where he was welcomed by Giscard d'Estaing, Carter and Margaret Thatcher, respectively. All of them took this opportunity to confirm their support of Bourguiba's regime, undermined by popular challenge. And Carter even gave his agreement on the delivery of heavy weapons to Tunisia.

Heavily dependent on the Western imperialist powers, the Tunisian foreign office has not yet been able to digest the attitude of the Council of Ministers of the Arab League. An implicit rejection served as an indirect illustration of the lack of any real basis for the Tunisian complaint based on allegations, of which the kindest thing one could say is that they rely on no plausible proof of any Libyan interference in the Gafsa rebellion.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie

5157
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

REASONS FOR NOUIRA VISIT TO PARIS DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Francoise Hubscher: "Nouira May Be Treated in Tunis"]

[Text] On Saturday, 1 March, the Ayahtollah Khomeyni was preparing to leave the Mehdi Rezai Hospital in Teheran, where he had been taken five weeks earlier following a heart attack. That same day, the Yugoslav President Tito, for his part, continued to grow slowly weaker, despite the sophisticated treatment at the Ljubljana Central Clinic. On Saturday, 1 March again, a communique reported the satisfactory condition of the Tunisian prime minister, Hedi Nouira, who had been hospitalized on Tuesday, 26 February, following a cerebral hemorrhage. "Since his arrival, the alertness and the language of the patient have seemed normal. His condition has steadily improved. His blood pressure has stabilized, his temperature is normal, and he has begun to eat without assistance." The communique was released by the neurosurgical department of Prof Pertuiset in Paris. Doesn't Tunisia have, then, as Iran and Yugoslavia do, a medical infrastructure equal to caring for the health of a high political leader?

A Disputed Medical Decision

The individual mainly concerned, Hedi Nouira himself, was surprised. "We are well equipped in Tunis and we have excellent physicians. Why was I brought here?" (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1000). The reaction of a politician? Without a doubt! But it was no different from that voiced by a number of Tunisian doctors.

We are precisely at the same level as the Yugoslav physicians. But they have refused to surrender to the complex to which we still subscribe with regard to the European, American and Soviet schools of medicine, a professor and doctor of medicine says. Another adds: "It is intolerable that Tunisia should continue to offer the developed world an image which is inconsistent with the reality. The transfer of Hedi Nouira to Paris is humiliating."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

An assistant to Prof Abdelkrim Bettaieb, a renowned neurosurgeon, explains for his part: "Since 1973 Tunis has had a neurosurgical university-hospital center endowed with marvelous equipment in which we have invested much money. Our most recent acquisition, a scanner produced by Siemens, which cost us more than 350,000 dinars (\$129 million CFA francs), allows us to X-ray the brain to the tolerance of a millimeter and painlessly, and in particular to locate cerebral accidents. This apparatus is recognized by the profession as the best. The quality of the pictures is even better than those produced by the older scanner available to Prof Pertuiset in Paris. In microneurosurgery," this same physician continued, "we are also perfectly equipped. The rather extensive operating areas are kept in remarkable aseptic conditions. And if we still have problems in training and qualification, we are capable of getting together an entirely adequate team with high quality specialists. The transfer of Hedi Nouria to Paris does harm to our reputation and that of our colleagues!" One could not be more categorical.

It was Prof Mongi Ben Hamida, summoned by the personal physician of the prime minister, Dr Zouheir Kallal, who made the transfer decision with the family and Mr Habib Bourguiba Jr present. Why? When questioned by JEUNE AFRIQUE, Prof Ben Hamida retorted: "Can't you delay your article for a week? Your question is indiscreet. Ask the family. I will not answer you."

Patients Lack Confidence

It is not a question of challenging the moral and professional conscience of the physician who, faced with the enormous responsibility which falls to him, has a natural inclination to refer it to the man who was his "sponsor": Prof Pertuiset. Nor is it a matter of the reaction of the family, concerned with saving the life of the dear one. But it does emphasize an attitude common to many Tunisians, and more particularly the more prosperous classes: they have little confidence in their physicians.

However, Tunisia has since it gained independence made a considerable effort in the health sector, placing it in a privileged situation in relation to the rest of the African continent. There were 895 doctors in 1973, half of them of foreign origin (about one per 5,900 inhabitants). By 1977 there were 1,451, including 977 Tunisians, or one for every 4,067 inhabitants (France has an average of one physician for every 610 inhabitants). There are currently three faculties of medicine, in Tunis, Sousse and Sfax, on a level comparable to those in Western Europe. There are 2,200 students being trained there, and as of 1981 Tunisia will have 2,500 practicing physicians (one for every 2,600 inhabitants) of whom 2,200 will be Tunisian. The fact remains that cadres and high officials continue to go to France, Switzerland or the FRG for medical treatment,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

like, it is true, President Bourguiba and his son, who nine years ago occupied the very bed Hedi Nouira now has in the same Paris hospital section.

"If the social security and welfare funds were to refuse to guarantee coverage for patients transferred abroad without good reason, nearly 500,000 dinars (275 million CFA francs) could be saved, providing priority benefits to cardiovascular surgery, orthopedics and traumatology," an official with the Ministry of Health estimates. "Since last year, the Tawfik Clinic, which cost 7 million dinars (3.85 billion CFA francs) has been in operation. It offers very comfortable facilities, as well as ultramodern equipment. A dozen accredited professors work there. But the rich clientele continues to go to France, and of the 116 beds, only a third are occupied!"

It is difficult to change habits. Particularly since the Tunisian hospitals do not always enjoy a good reputation. Because the rural zones still do not have an adequate medical infrastructure, the establishments in the capital are overburdened. The care provided is rarely satisfactory. Much equipment, and sometimes even medicines, are lacking.

"Without a doubt too, the attitude of the medical body contributes to strengthening the lack of confidence in it. What is particularly to be regretted in the case of Hedi Nouira is that no medical committee comprising the specialists involved met, if only to examine the patient before making the transfer decision.

This lack of teamwork, not to say rivalry, which is noticeable in Tunisian hospitals as well as institutes, also serve as hindrances to research work and the proper organization of services, and thus affect the quality of care provided.

Here lies one of the real problems in the Tunisian medical sector, until such time as the new generations can break the feudal bonds forged prior to the winning of independence.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980

5157
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

IMPROVED COVERAGE OF IMPORTS REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 pp 559-60

[Text] The latest statistics that have been established by the National Institute of Statistics show a clear recovery in Tunisia's external commerce. In fact, the figures for the first 10 months of 1979 show progress in both the total number of imports and exports.

	1978	1979	change
Imports	719,894	932,227	+29.5
Exports	357,297	576,758	+61.4
Deficit	362,597	355,469	- 2
Recovery rate	49.6	61.9	+24.8

Since exports have progressed at a rhythm clearly superior to that of the increase in imports, the chronic tendency towards a worsening of the commercial exchange deficit seems to have stopped. The recovery rate went from 49.6 percent to 61.9 percent.

Imports

Imports during the first 10 months of 1979 rose by 29.5 percent (212.3MD: MD = millions of dinars, 1 dinar = 10.2 FF) in relation to the same period during 1978, reaching a total of 932.2 million dinars. This increase affected all kinds of products with the exception of equipment, for which imports decreased from 32.7 percent to 25.2 percent. This drop concerned fork-lifts (-6.2MD), automobiles and spare parts (-15.3MD), and material for rail transport (-5.3MD) and naval navigation (-4.9MD).

On the other hand, a slight increase was recorded in the purchase of pumps and compressors (+3MD), extraction and drilling machinery (+2.8MD), telephone and telegraph equipment (+2.9MD) and optical and scientific apparatus (+4.5MD). All other groups of products recorded an increase. Almost half of this increase was in the energy group, for which the total amounts of purchases increased by 137.6 percent (+92.5MD) between the two periods compared.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The increase affected brute petrol oil (+37.1MD), kerosene oil (+20.8MD) and gas-oils (+27.2MD) above all. The increased import expenses for these products comes more from the increase in price than from an increase in quantities purchased. This is also the case for unrefined sulfur, for which import expenses totaled 13.2MD (+76.8 percent).

--Other raw material and semi-refined products (29.7 percent)--Purchases of products from animal or vegetable sources changed little, totaling around 42MD. In contrast, mineral products almost doubled their number of imports (9.9 - 17.9MD). Imports of other semi-finished products went from 155.1 to 201MD (+22.6 percent). The increase recorded in this area especially affected the purchases of products made of plastic materials, rubber, chemical products, tubes, pipes and accessories. Following an increase in the national production of cement, imports of this product dropped off a little in tonnage and in value (12.2MD against 12.9 in 1978).

--Consumer goods (+22.6 percent)--Purchases of consumer goods made up 16.8 percent of Tunisia's total imports, a sum of 156.9MD. Protective measures for Tunisian industry and the application of a special tax (March 1978) over a large array of imported products have somewhat slowed the continual increase recorded in this area.

--Food products (+36.2 percent)--Still under the effects of poor harvest and the fluctuation of world rates, purchases of food products rose to 119.5MD, an increase of 36.2 percent compared to the first 10 months of 1978. Cereal imports occupy first place, having increased by 23.5 percent. Insufficient production necessitated buying 250,000 t of hard wheat, 218,000 t of soft wheat and maslin, 69,000 t of barley and 125,000 t of corn.

Soya oil imports have quadrupled following a reduction in olive oil production and an improvement in the way the oil pours. Tunisia bought 20.2MD worth of soya grain oil, i.e., 15.1MD more than during the first 10 months of 1978. Purchases of a few other food products have decreased: coffee, hard wheat and barley.

Exports

Initiated in 1978, the increase in exports continued during the first 10 months of 1979 when it reached 576.7MD, an increase of 219.5MD or 61.4 percent over their level during the first 10 months of 1978.

--Energy products (+103.2 percent)--Energy products accounted for almost half of Tunisia's exports (48.5 percent). Practically all of these exports are made up of brute petrol. Compared to the same period in 1978, energy products have more than doubled, bringing in total receipts of 279.7MD and thereby surpassing those from the tourist sector; at the same time, these receipts amounted to 142MD more than was received during the first 10 months of 1978. Exports of brute petrol oils reached 4,408,000 t, sold for a total of 262.6MD. These quantities are doubled those of the previous year, and those of kerosene more than tripled (69,000 t).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

--Other raw materials and semi-finished products (+18.4 percent)--Raw materials and products from vegetable or animal sources were not part of the increase in Tunisia's exports. The level of sales fell 6.6 percent and their part in the amount of total sales decreased from 7.6 to 4.4 percent. The "other half products" registered a certain progress (+31.8 percent) thanks to the increase in receipts from the sale of phosphoric acid (+6.4MD) and from triple superphosphate (+6.2MD). Stabilization in the price of these products attributed to this progress.

--Finished products (+53 percent)--Finished consumer goods represent 20 percent of the total amount of exports. Exports of these items increased by 57.4 percent, thanks to the accelerated sale of clothing (27.5MD), cotton textiles (+3.8MD) and hosiery (+4.4MD). As for equipment, which accounted for 2 percent of the total number of exports, a slight progression was registered in the area of electric machines and appliances (+3MD).

--Food products (+25.3 percent)--The scale of these items brought in 74.2MD, which represents 12.8 percent of all exports. An increase of 25.3 percent was recorded thanks to the sale of 74,884 t of olive oil for 41.9MD (56.4 percent of all food exports). Other products also increased their export value (vegetables, almonds, shell-fish and molluscs, and dates). Sales of wine, oranges and live plants were the only products to record and kind of important decline.

Suppliers and clients

Geographically speaking, 80 percent of the commercial transactions is with European countries (461.4MD). Second behind Italy, France accounts for one-fourth of all European trade. The imbalance with this country has decreased somewhat, going from 187.9MD to 127.4MD in 1979. Exports to France have more than doubled. As for transactions with Italy, they have shown a net improvement in a 2.3MD surplus. In fact, only trade between Italy, Greece and Romania has shown a surplus. Other important deficits were with Spain (-36MD), the Federal Republic of Germany (-28.3MD) and Austria (-25.5MD).

Trade with the African countries has continued to be in Tunisia's favor, with Algeria and Libya remaining her principal clients.

As for North America, the deficit has become even more pronounced, going from 5.2MD (during the first 10 months of 1978) to 21.8MD. Imports from Canada have been responsible for this imbalance (-11MD), which has been somewhat counterbalanced by an American credit (5.3MD). As for Asia, the deficit favors Saudi Arabia (-47.4MD) and Iraq (-18.5MD).

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980

9572
CSO: 4400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

ARMS CONTRACTS--Arms contracts amounting to a total of 3 billion francs are reportedly being negotiated with, among others, Italy and France. Taking into account the internal political situation on the eve of a number of high-level political successions and the threat represented by Libya, the risks of destabilization in that part of the Maghreb are considered serious. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 7 Apr 80 p 3]

PETROLEUM PROSPECTING--At a cabinet meeting 27 March, Industry Minister Amor Rourou discussed prospecting for oil, noting that the number of boreholes would increase from 24 in 1979 to 36 in 1980; investment had increased from 20 million dinars a year between 1969-1978 to 55 million dinars in 1979 and would reach 71 million in 1980; and production had risen from 600,000 tons in 1966 to 5.5 million tons in 1979. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 859]

CSO: 4400

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development