

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9077

7 May 1980

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 23/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content call (703) 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9077

7 May 1980

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 23/80)

### CONTENTS

#### THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

#### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRG, Brandt Criticized for Nonacceptance of Cold War Policy (Editorial, Jean Daniel; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 24-30 Mar 80).....	1
--	---

#### COUNTRY SECTION

#### FRANCE

Presidential Ambitions of Socialist Party's Michel Rocard (LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 25 Feb-2 Mar 80).....	4
Style, Public Image; Editorial, Jean Daniel Political Strategy, 'Non-Candidacy'	
Rocard Support Threatens Mitterrand's Presidential Ambitions (Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 3-9 Mar 80)...	12
PCF's Marchais Believes 'Russians Will Win' (Michel Gonod; PARIS MATCH, 7 Mar 80).....	15
Alexandre Sanguinetti on Corsican Nationalist Movement (A. Sanguinetti Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 24-30 Mar 80).....	20
Aircraft Defense Techniques, Methods Described (Francois d'Orcival; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 24 Mar 80).....	23
Briefs	
'Real' Results of Gulf Trip	27
Budget Cuts	27

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)

SPAIN

Briefs

PNV Contacts With ETA	28
ETA To Control Commandos	28
Extremadura Nationalist Party	28
ETA in Algeria	28

-b-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRG, BRANDT CRITICIZED FOR NONACCEPTANCE OF COLD WAR POLICY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24-30 Mar 80 p 38

[Editorial by Jean Daniel: "Nonacceptance of Cold War"]

[Text] Are we in a state of cold war? In Bonn, the supersensitive barometer of disturbing portents, the most varied personalities whom I encounter there reply: No, not yet. The threat exists. It is in the minds of men. However, former chancellor Willy Brandt, president of the SPD, told me that the pipeline which carries natural gas from the Soviet Union to the Federal Republic of Germany has not been turned off; that hundreds and hundreds of thousands of West German citizens visit their brothers in the East every week; that coal from Poland is still coming into the country in great quantity; and that 30 percent of the FRG's exports continue to be directed toward countries of the East.

Willy Brandt is in a good position to evaluate the threats which weigh upon the present equilibrium. It is his country which most profits from detente: detente alone permits the FRG to assert a policy independent from the United States. As mayor of Berlin for 10 years, he was able to form a number of clear-cut ideas about Soviet behavior. It was he, finally, who instituted Ostpolitik, the policy of interchange with the East, thanks to which he was to become the "friend" of Leonid Brezhnev. Now Willy Brandt thinks that the two superpowers, the one in Asia with its colonial logic, the other with its election logic, are incapable of resuming a real dialog. All the achievements of Ostpolitik and detente could well be the price.

What, then, is there to do? Wait and count the blows? Willy Brandt was given assurance by Carter that "nothing would be done to complicate the lives of Europeans," i.e., first of all the Germans, the principal target of a return to the Cold War. He saw high American officials "as dry and thirsty as sponges waiting for water": they are ready to listen to advice of any kind. However, they are obsessed by the Kabul coup and refuse to place the Soviet intervention within a more general framework. Brandt said: "Firmness is required, doubtlessly and absolutely. However, such firmness is irresponsible if it is not accompanied by a willingness to negotiate whenever the occasion presents itself."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

According to him, the occasion presented itself last October, well before the invasion of Afghanistan, when Brezhnev delivered his major address in Berlin, proposing to withdraw a certain number of Soviet forces. It was said that this was a symbolic withdrawal: that was true. And afterward? The meaning of the symbol continued to be that the Soviets had a desire or need to negotiate. Nothing would have been lost, in any event, had they been put to the test. According to Brandt, on that occasion, NATO lost an opportunity to know better the intentions of the adversary.

In disagreement with the apostle of Ostpolitik, some officials responsible for German foreign policy feel that it is precisely the fact of too greatly emphasizing the economic and political profit which the FRG derives from detente which leads the Soviets to underestimate the Germans' need for security. According to them, the story of the "Pershing" missiles is the most obvious illustration. That speech by Brezhnev in Berlin which was brought up by Brandt was in fact intended to dissuade the Europeans from agreeing to the installation on their soil of American medium-range missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin leaders knew perfectly well the position of Bonn. On four occasions, publicly, with a certain degree of solemnity, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had informed them that the deployment of Soviet missiles, the notorious SS 20, aimed at the FRG was a measure which was not very compatible with the climate and intensity of German-Soviet exchanges.

Helmut Schmidt also told Moscow that it would be difficult for him to oppose the American proposal to install Pershing missiles destined to offset the SS 20's. Leonid Brezhnev seemed not to understand this. He left it to his ambassadors to reply first that the SS 20's did not exist, then that they were not operational, next that they were not aimed at Germany and, finally, that their deployment had only been decided upon after the news that the Americans were themselves manufacturing medium-range missiles. In the meantime, despite his age and infirmities, Brezhnev, in his charm offensive, personally put all of his energies without reserve into increasing his amiabilities, with Willy Brandt, of course, but also with the very reactionary Franz Josef Strauss himself. Never had the Soviets shown themselves to be so open, receptive, liberal in their relations with Europe. They allowed veritable economic and cultural axes to be established between Warsaw and Paris, Budapest and Rome, Berlin and Bonn...

This was the situation which prevailed until that day in December 1979 in Brussels at the time of the NATO meeting when a positive vote was taken on acceptance of the Pershing missiles. Stupefaction for the Soviets: it was Germans themselves who overcame the reticence of the Dutch and Danes. It was thanks to the Germans that installation of American missiles was approved by a large majority. The Soviet reaction was immediate, and the expression of that reaction was revealing: the "German betrayal" was denounced. One does not betray unless one has made a promise. Who indeed had been in a position to promise anything? The secret services, perhaps...

In spite of all that, which he readily acknowledges, Willy Brandt seems to think both that negotiations on the SS 20's and Pershings should be sought

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and that they are possible. The Europeans could explore the possibilities of such negotiations on condition that European affairs not be mixed together with Afghanistan. The economic boycott, for the Germans, is a mistake which could be turned against the Westerners. The Olympic Games is another mistake; "however, there is no question of the German flag flying over the stadiums of Moscow if the American flag is not there." The Europeans suffered a setback by proposing guarantees of the neutrality of Afghanistan. That is because they did not understand the reasons for the Soviet intervention. Since Willy Brandt is not in the government, he can be outspoken.

Should Europe, therefore, forego Atlantic solidarity? Obviously not, Brandt says impatiently. The proof that there is no thought of this is the Brussels' meeting and the presence on German soil of American soldiers. However, it is a question of knowing what one wants; if one really wishes to recapture the spirit of detente, appropriate methods must be used. The Germans are not sure that the Americans really want to die for Berlin and, before themselves dying for Kabul, they wish to know the real intentions of the Soviet Union. They do not believe in the premise of expansionism in all directions on the part of the Kremlin leaders.

Last week, we said that the Soviet Union adamantly refused any kind of compromise on the subject of its presence in Afghanistan, at least as long as its armies, like those of France previously in Algeria, are occupied with armed "pacification" of the population, as well as by promises of reforms. Willy Brandt feels that if there is one country in a position, if not to negotiate, at least to talk with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan, it is of necessity Indira Gandhi's India: it certainly is not a European nation.

The confirmation of these observations, moreover, has been established almost everywhere--except in France, and particularly in the audio-visual press where the orientation of foreign policy seems to be effectively guided by the government. Probably it is a question of demonstrating that the initiatives--and discretion--of the Elysee are not in vain and that Paris has some influence in Moscow. Not inconsiderable assistance has been supplied at this juncture by the communists, who are only too happy to put a reassuring face on the Kremlin. Once again, it is the alliance of the government and the CP which is imposing the "line." It is once again this "domestic Yalta," which has been denounced with rare timeliness by Francois Mitterrand.

COPYRIGHT: LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris, 1980

8143  
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS OF SOCIALIST PARTY'S MICHEL ROCARD

Style, Public Image

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 25 Feb-2 Mar 80 p 24

[Editorial by Jean Daniel]

[Text] He is less feverish, less of a technocrat, less of a boy scout, less of an imitator of Louis Jouvét. It is as if the immobility forced upon him by his injury had given him detachment and weight. He is no longer the eternal extreme leftist student nor the perpetual candidate for the post of undersecretary of state for the budget. It is as if his disciplined silence, counterbalanced by increased popularity, had caused him to lose his greedy and voluble greed for words. He is ready for anything, save parricide. It is as if the immensity of the tasks in the ocean of difficulties suddenly made him fear solitary responsibility. Such is this Michel Rocard, a possible contender for the candidacy, about whom everyone in Europe, however close to the dark corridors of the Socialist Party he may be, wonders what would differentiate him from a François Mitterrand.

Every career requires a strategy. Even those which have supposedly been preceded by an irresistible calling. Baudelaire, at the time he decided he was a poet, said to himself quite plainly: I have genius but I must find the space left by Victor Hugo where I can flower. He found it and Hugo saluted him. Similarly, Rocard is seeking a space left empty by François Mitterrand. Because of his impatience, he had not found it in the Socialist Party. Had he played the game of the faithful lieutenant, he would probably have had only to take up the legacy, or accept the donation inter vivos. But he found it, and with what brilliance, in the nation, where one of his qualities worked wonders--the total adaptation of the idea to the language, the impression he gives of thinking exactly what he is saying at the moment he is saying it. A mixture of rough spontaneity and precise competence. It is this freshness, in brief, which has made of this politician who is no longer so young, a "different" man of politics. It is doubtless a gift, unjust like all gifts, from which he benefits and which is

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

such that even when he claims to be "an apparatus man," one thinks more of the militant than the leader.

But any strategy presumes a relentless analysis of the situation. What is this situation for Rocard, as for any other candidate who might seek to oppose Giscard d'Estaing? The French are the prey of three basic obsessions: economic deterioration auguring a substantial drop in purchasing power and an increase in both unemployment and inflation; anguish and uncertainty as to the likelihood of a world conflict; and the conviction that the leaders of the leftist parties are destroying each other, giving joy to the communists and bringing sadness to others.

In fact, the third element in this analysis, laughable to Frenchmen as a whole, is certainly the most important for this political society which encompasses not only the category of apparatus leaders but the militants and what is termed the mobile faction. It was known, in fact, that Georges Marchais had no fonder dream than to guarantee the reelection of Valery Giscard D'Estaing. But no one would have suspected he would undertake it so far in advance or that, in trying to achieve his dream, he would evidence such untimely zeal. Henceforth it is known that the Socialist Party is not only the leading enemy: for the PCF [French Communist Party] it is the only enemy. "We thought we had joined a good soccer team and we find ourselves in the boxing ring," Francois Mitterrand said cheerfully in the forceful interview he just gave to a quite unsocialist daily newspaper. It would be hard to put it better. Except that in the ring, the boxer who responds to blows by appeals for reconciliation risks the imminent loss of his title. The situation is clear, however, and two men, Edmond Maire and Edgard Pisani, have said out loud what everyone everywhere is indeed almost forced to think: Any socialist candidate must prepare to deal with the objective and powerful alliance of Giscard d'Estaing and Georges Marchais.

The great idea of the "unitarians" is that it is necessary at all cost to recover the electorate which votes communist, without however seeking to put the communists in power. The surprising thing is that those who set forth their thinking in this way do not realize that they are faced with an irrational, affective, almost ritual procedure. If the communist electorate does not seek, for the most part, the victory of its elected officials, it must indeed be acting for reasons which lie outside reason. Despite Budapest, despite Prague, despite Kabul, the French Communist Party remains, in the eyes of a large part of the workers' class, the best defender of the interests and the rights of the most neglected strata. It is this myth, and it alone, which must be overcome. The unitarian proclamations are likely, on the contrary, to give the impression of weakness and tolerance.

It is on this line of resistance that the likes of Michel Rocard may continue to be judged "different." In view of the evidence, because of his image, he will be able to allow himself neither reticence nor

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

deviation. The sinister clowning of Marchais gives off a worrisome force, which, in its populist truculence, should not encounter as its only obstacles maneuvers which are too subtly skillful. This perverse development must be opposed by a socialist vigor--if not violence, and it is perhaps on this point that the highest hopes will be placed in what is expected of the deputy from Yvelines.

Whether it be a question in fact of the candidacy of Michel Rocard, Francois Mitterrand or any other representative of the noncommunist left; whether it be a question of seeking victory or affirming a presence; if we do not want this electoral campaign, already prematurely begun 14 months before the election, to be time lost for the French and for France, all those with any responsibility whatsoever, must demand clear language in the service of simple ideas. This is the only sign by which one can recognize true democracy.

Political Strategy, 'Non-Candidacy'

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 25 Feb-2 Mar 80 pp 25-27

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "Is Michel Rocard Really Different?"]

[Text] On Monday, 25 February, on "Cards on the Table," the enfant terrible of the Socialist Party will reiterate that he is not a candidate for the presidency of the republic. . . but he will try to prove that he has the qualifications for the post.

On Monday, 25 February, Michel Rocard has set aside three hours. With some colleagues, including Christian Blanc and Jean-Paul Ciret, he will deal with the press and settle the final details before going before the public that same evening on the Channel Two program, "Cards on the Table." A number of preliminary meetings have already been held to select the subject and draft responses. A new and revealing detail is that Rocard is no longer content to mobilize the mobil socialist faction. He is turning to the experts, in particular in the field of defense and with regard to international athletic problems. All are willing to call upon him, whatever their personal political options may be: His profile as a "presidential likely" outweighs any other recommendation.

On Monday evening, the deputy from Yvelines will be accompanied to Studio 102 by journalist Claude Marti, the man who was the kingpin in the famous "image group" which undertook the task of initiating Rocard in the techniques of television. The training period is over today and Rocard is content with a test run each month, using a video circuit. Above all, he owes it to Marti that his gifts as a teacher are no longer restricted to the universe of the militants alone. He now undertakes to carry his message to the whole of the country, to speak

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to that "Madame Michu" invented by the journalist who symbolizes Mrs Everybody.

Blocked by the Socialist Party apparatus, Michel Rocard has made the definitive choice to play to the nation. Commenting on this choice himself as an expert in political sociology, the deputy from Yvelines points out banteringly: "This is a great European premiere. An apparatus joined together as a bloc, internally, but by the pressure of an outside opinion. This has never occurred so clearly. The fact remains that the apparatus is not the party, far from it, and that happily, it is the party which will make the decision." There is no question, then, of yielding to those of his friends who are impatient and who, desirous of pressing on, are asking when and how a faction of opinion desiring Rocard's candidacy should be organized and should appeal directly to the members and the officials of the PS.

Nor is it a question of remaining within the confines of the internal interplay in the PS. To seek the nomination against Mitterrand would be to allow the dramatization of the conflict and to take the risk of attempting some sort of parricide. "There will be no primary elections within the PS." Categorically, Michel Rocard reiterates this constantly. In no case will he seek the candidacy against Francois Mitterrand. And this despite the fact that the first secretary has solemnly released him from any commitment and even urged him, last December, to declare himself. The PS would not be able to tolerate such an internal crash, Rocard explains. "This would, of course, be the normal play of democracy. But the PS is a young party. Moreover, it is not a problem of personalities but of the coloring of socialism. Thus it is not desirable to make antagonisms more acute, for there would not be time for the necessary reconciliation. I value the unity of the party highly."

In voicing this opinion, the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine is also thinking of himself. If the first secretary of the PS should decide not to try his chances a third time, a possibility which cannot be excluded, Rocard hopes to be able to avoid an internal fracas. For the main obstacle standing in his path remains his own party.

He has abandoned the hope of reconciling the PS apparatus. He even claims never to have sought to win control of it for himself, with the complicity of Pierre Mauroy. The conditions during preparations for the Metz congress might challenge this. Today, however, Michel Rocard says categorically: "In Metz, I chose divorce in order to be able to breathe." In fact, he allowed himself room. His broken leg even provided an opportunity to stand aside from the political quarrels, and to avoid in particular finding himself cramped in the mediocre European election campaign. While absent, Michel Rocard was perceived as different.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

For example, he has not appeared on any major telecast for 13 months. This is why he is devoting particular care to his return. Perhaps too much. One of the main trumps the deputy from Yvelines holds lies in his spontaneity of expression. This has won him a reputation of sincerity. If he seeks to weigh all his words too carefully, he will run the risk of being classed back with the "politicians" again. In fact, the tape-recorded repetition of his pathetic appeal just after the second round in the 1978 legislative elections contributed to depriving this address, after the fact, of a large part of its emotional effect. One cannot fail then to think of the period following the events in 1968, during which as national secretary of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] he endorsed an address the contents of which he disagreed with intellectually.

This aptitude for double language is moreover one of the main arguments used by the adversaries of Michel Rocard within the PS. It is also said that he is the main tool in a "Christian plot." Francois Mitterrand is persuaded that such a peril exists. "The forces which come together in him are those which have always confronted me when it came to rebuilding the PS, laying the foundations for unity on the left and setting up the 'joint program'," he explained to Kathleen Evan in September of 1978 ("Michel Rocard, or the Art of the Possible," Simoen). Rocard is in a way the heir of Pierre Mendes France. The two men have in common, in addition to their economist training, a taste for responsibility and administration which fails to exclude a prophetic and sometimes moralistic dimension. They also have in common a very individual approach, even when they find themselves at the head of a political structure.

When he refers to the coming presidential election today, Michel Rocard never speaks, for example, of the PS candidate. He prefers to speak of "the socialist left" or "the candidate endorsed by the PS." He has integrated the logic of institutions perfectly, and he knows that a presidential candidacy should not appear to be strictly partisan. In addition, he does indeed hope to sweep along in his wake, if nominated, the PSU, the leftist radicals and, in addition to the PS, all of those orphans in what was formerly called "the noncommunist left."

He is not unaware that the basic element which led to the electoral advance of the PS between 1972 and 1978 was the shift toward the left of a sizable portion of the Christian electorate. This was a particularly clear phenomenon in the western and eastern parts of the country. The signing of the "joint program" suddenly gave back its virginity to the noncommunist left. Much more than the radicalization of the advance of the PS, it represented its moralization, symbolized by a contract in good and proper form which won over an increasing number of voters, particularly among the Christians. As of that time, any reappearance of "political" practices, became particularly serious for the PS, because it represented a challenge of its main original feature. Now it is precisely this image which gives rise to uninterrupted internal struggles.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

#### A Possible Blind Roller

To this is added the awakening of the "lay" reflexes designed to block Rocard. The socialists, by the same token, find themselves in the wrong with regard to a number of their new supporters. In seeking to exclude one of its own, the leadership of the PS is in danger of sawing off the branch by which it gained ascendancy. For Rocard, for more than 20 years, first went along with and then embodied this movement of the Christian faction toward the left. As of 1958, he had joined the CFTC [French Confederation of Christian Workers], from which he was able to popularize his analyses in the political world. Subsequently, the definition of "self-managing socialism," which became the official doctrine of the PS, was developed through a kind of continuing exchange between the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]--in particular its chemical federation, which produced Edmond Maire--and the PSU.

However, it is not possible to align Rocard completely with the CFDT, even though the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine maintains, unlike Francois Mitterrand, trusting and friendly relations with Edmond Maire. On the one hand this is because the more likely Rocard seems as a candidate, the more the secretary general of the CFDT takes pains to maintain the autonomy of his organization. And on the other hand, because the CFDT, faithful in this to the traditions of the French trade union movement, has a tendency to limit the role of political organizations singularly in the process of transition to socialism. In the past it was opposed to Rocard, when the PSU sought to establish itself in the enterprises.

The fact nonetheless remains that the deputy from Yvelines remains the man in politics who is most heeded in this union, as he knows how to make himself heard by the owners and cadres and to retain the respect of the majority of the "veteran combatants" of May 1968. Thanks to this audience, Rocard can pursue his main goal, which is--and this is the message he will try to communicate in his television address--to revive the hope of a leftist victory. "Everything is still possible," the supporters of the deputy from Yvelines never cease to repeat. He willingly relates a comment made by Valery Giscard d'Estaing to a journalist. "I would say that Mitterrand is the most dangerous adversary, but Rocard is unpredictable. Some of my colleagues say that he might fade away during the campaign but that he might also be the source of a blind roller. Against waves of this force, there is no defense. The presidential election is too important to allow such unknown factors."

#### Modified Dreams

To justify this hope, Rocard will, in his own style, resume to constitutional analysis pursued by Edgard Pisani with the Press Club of Europe 1. The presidential election will make it possible to avoid any negotiations

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

with the PCF, even between the two ballots. The PS can simply commit itself to refrain from profiting from the campaign to attack the communists, asking them in exchange to observe the same rule. For the rest, the socialists will have an opportunity to develop their analyses and their proposals in autonomous fashion. On this level, Rocard is quite decided to continue hammering at the nails as he has for some years.

As an economist, he is suspicious of "economism." The current crisis confirms this view. "The science of economics, official or otherwise, is unanswerable. It only provides us with disparate and contradictory advice," he stated in a plea for more pragmatism. For his part, he has always, in matters of social change, emphasized democratic procedures, and access to power for the greatest numbers. This was the language he used as early as 1966 in the Grenoble colloquium when he expressed his distrust of nationalization. This is a thesis he never ceased to defend in the course of the development of the "joint program," when he explained that the concepts of ownership and power must not be confused. This is what he is repeating today when he differentiates the functions of administration and those of management.

Finally, in economic matters, he admits that the dreams of the left must be modified. The volume of the national income which can be distributed for "social purposes" each year will be much less than was hoped at the time of the drafting of the "joint program." Consequently the inertia, the social antagonism caused by any redistribution, any substitution, will also be more acute than the left had thought. Yet a further reason, therefore, to emphasize reforms in methodology, to organize real administrative decentralization and deconcentration.

But if Rocard wants to restore the hope of victory to the left wing, he must at the same time reassure it. He knows that insecurity leads voters to change their minds. Also, he was not pleased by the mention of the "threat of war" in Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's message of greeting. "We are in a country protected by strategic nuclear weaponry," he explained, "and thus in my view relatively removed from the threat of war with direct involvement." Which does not dispel all the worry. As early as the national convention of the PS which adopted the "socialist project," Michel Rocard had the opportunity to develop the main guidelines of his analysis in the realm of foreign policy. "The soviet military apparatus," he stressed, "was still still totally defensive 15 years ago. Today it is totally offensive." Its mission? To exercise an overall and continuing power of intimidation, such as to control the status quo with the west, in positive imbalance for the USSR.

#### The European Void

In view of this situation, the deputy from Yvelines urges for France diplomacy based on four guidelines:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1) A clear reaffirmation of French fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance, although, to be sure, without plans to reestablish the NATO military structure. It would in fact be well to avoid raising any doubt with the Americans as to the attitude of Europe.

2. The establishment of a military structure adapted to the particular threats which weigh upon the old world because of its exceptional vulnerability in terms of oil supply and the elements of instability represented by such countries as Yugoslavia, and even Austria and the FRG and GDR. Now Europe, a fact Rocard never ceases to bemoan, "represents a void, a gap." France is the only country capable of establishing the necessary military structure. Which means, for example, that it would not plunge massively into the nuclear submarine policy urged by Jacques Chirac. Without daring to admit it, the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine is still weighing, as far as he is concerned, the advantages and disadvantages of the neutron bomb.

3) A policy with regard to the Third World such as to limit the potential for Soviet penetration. Now at the present time, any country seriously undertaking noncapitalist development must enter into relations with the USSR and become dependent upon it. And this is the reason for the need of the Western countries to develop aid for these countries more oriented toward equipment than consumption, without seeking too much profit in exchange.

4) The intensification of exchange of all kinds, intellectual and cultural in particular. For example, Rocard asserts his faith in Olympic activities, even if, for his part, he has decided not to go to Moscow although he had planned to. "I support the thesis that one should not go," he has explained, "but also the thesis that it is not for the politicians to decide."

It remains to be seen if this address will be of a kind which will consolidate the Rocard image in the public opinion, and even start him moving forward again. The latest polls reflect a certain decline in his popularity. Speaking means risking accentuating this trend. The deputy from Yvelines differentiated himself from the politicians by his silence, but his profile remained vague, based more on his style than on his political choices. Now that he has decided to set forth his positions, he may offend some of his listeners and disappoint others. However, he needs to comfort his partisans and to mobilize that portion which supports him, if he wants, through them and the socialists elected, more sensitive to the country's state of mind than the apparatus is, to succeed in imposing his will on his own party.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"

5157.  
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ROCARD SUPPORT THREATENS MITTERRAND'S PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 3-9 Mar 80 p 24

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "The Rocard Effect"]

[Text] "The speaker who preceded me (Georges Marchais) said: 'Never Giscard!' Well, then, let him not leave him where he is! There aren't 36 ways to do this. Of course, there is revolution, the big day of upheaval, but these conditions are far from being fulfilled by those very persons who are advancing in that direct at, I would say, a snail's pace. It is not sufficient to say 'make the revolution,' as Popeye would say 'eat spinach.' On another side, there remains democratic combat. It requires the adding of votes. Those who subtract votes betray the interests of the people. They say 'never Giscard.' But they leave him at peace." Francois Mitterand, caustic, took advantage of a new censure debate in the National Assembly on Wednesday to recall these clear and true realities. The first secretary feels at the top of his form--whence his irritation when he hears his age mentioned or when he sees Rocard, on television, stressing his "historic role." He has no desire to beat his retreat.

Yet Francois Mitterand nurses no illusions about the situation of the left. If the vote for president were to take place now, he would not throw himself into it. Tomorrow, things may be different. Once the American primary elections are over, the international tension should decrease, he hopes. The economic and social difficulties will then come back to the forefront, and Giscard will again be vulnerable.

But it is still necessary for Mitterand to be in a position, at that time, to be the candidate of the Socialist current. Since Michel Rocard went into "Cartes sur Table" [Aboveboard], he has known that his rival has officially started his campaign. Never had the deputy from the Yvelines declared so clearly that he was aiming for the Elysee. And there is a "Rocard effect," to use the title of a book by Heve Hamon and Patrick Rotman which is just being published by Stock. This is why the first secretary and his partisans immediately their counteroffensive via the press, and then this weekend, on the occasion of the steering committee meeting. The confrontation is polarized on three themes.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Can the PS [Socialist Party] Candidate for the Elysee Be Nominated by Consensus?

Michel Rocard has hoped that the PS would spare itself an internal confrontation and therefore a "primary" aimed at deciding on the candidates for the candidacy. A pious wish. To be sure, the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine never stops saying that he would leave the way open to Francois Mitterand if the latter wanted to try his luck again; but this rule would not hold in the other direction, in favor of Rocard. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, chief of the CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education], and Lionel Jospin, the first secretary's trainee, have been categorical. They will not in any case leave the way open to the deputy from the Yvelines. If he wants to be chosen, he will have to promote himself through the voting of the sections against the present PS majority. What is more, Francois Mitterand mentioned again on Monte Carlo radio that the leadership of the PS will remain in place until the presidential balloting. Even if nominated, Rocard would therefore be a candidate under tutelage-- a fussy tutelage, one can readily imagine.

Upon Coming to Power, Must the Socialists Set Up a Homogeneous Government?

In a FRANCE-SOIR interview, Francois Mitterand declared: "Since we are refused union, we will not eliminate the possibility of governing alone." A little sentence that might have led one to believe that the first secretary was drawing close to the point of view of the minority. Whence the initiative by Pierre Mauroy and his friends, who submitted to the steering committee a text through which they are trying once again to impose a synthesis among all the currents, to the exclusion of the CERES. One nuance remains in this debate (a very theoretical one!) on the composition of an eventual government of the left. Whereas Michel Rocard declares that it was the PCF who shut the door and that it is therefore up to the PCF to return, Francois Mitterand indicates that he would take the initiative in proposing to the Communists that they join the government, and that the PS would form a cabinet by itself only in case of refusal by its former partners.

What Becomes of Self-Management?

On "Cartes sur Table," Michel Rocard sharply reduced the importance of the self-management demand by speaking of a long-term process and favoring the notion of "socialism of responsibility." He is indeed not unaware of the fact that if he manages to impose his candidacy, the right will not fail to remind him of his inflamed pleas in favor of "worker control" that he developed from the time when he was secretary general of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party]. Already, Rocard's moderation and prudence are drawing nothing less than tears from his comrade Lionel Jospin. "I have been a little sad," he explained to LE MATIN, "to see that the representative of a current that has done so much to help convince us of the reasonableness of self-management appears, in the face of the perspective that he is setting for himself, to be suddenly abandoning it."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Michel Rocard can therefore nurture no illusions. He will win over his party only by triumphing politically over the present leadership of the PS. Did he really have any doubts about this? In mid-December, he paid a discreet visit to rue de Bievre, to the first secretary's home. At Mitterand's request, the two men had a face-to-face talk centered on the problem of the candidacy for the presidential election--a lucid conversation but without a conclusion, if one believes Herve Hamon and Patrick Rotman, who disclose this meeting.

The logic of confrontation therefore seems to be set in motion once again. As before the Metz congress, an implacable race for support is under way. The first targets are the party's elected officials. To succeed, Rocard is counting on a fear reflex in their ranks. They need the representative of the PS to get the best possible score, under penalty of finding themselves in a position of weakness in their geographical districts. And one-third of the members of the Socialist Party are elected officials.

It remains to learn what state the PS will be in when it comes out of this confrontation, which will last at least until autumn. Will it still be capable of mobilizing itself completely in favor of its spokesman?

COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"

11267  
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF'S MARCHAIS BELIEVES 'RUSSIANS WILL WIN'

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 Mar 80 pp 74-75, 77

[Article by Michel Gonod]

[Text] This is the general opinion: if Georges Marchais is often seen on television it is due to the fact that he wins votes for the Head of State and the majority. He is so bad, so caricatural that each of his appearances increases the popularity of the President. Many French people believe that it was at the request of the Elysee or Matignon, [i.e., the president's or the prime minister's office]--or maybe both--that Marchais spoke for fifty minutes direct from Moscow last 11 January. However, Giscard having recently met some television officials complained to them about this communist invasion. He regretted the program schedule changes that were made that day to allow the Secretary General of the Communist Party to express himself longer. Of course, the Head of State knows that the language excesses of Marchais only reinforce his own position and that of his supporters. However, he realizes also that the French people could be asking themselves the following question: why the apparent weakness on the part of the state in facing a man that spends his time on national television insulting those who do not think as he does, that is the majority, and who turns a democratic debate into a masquerade that is on the borderline of being grotesque? Is it normal for the Communist Party security to lay down the law with the television networks as it happened on 21 January when Marchais was the guest on the show "Cartes sur table"? Is it normal that it did not occur to any single member of the government to reprimand the secretary general of the Communist Party after having heard his delirious press conference on 20 February on the subject of liberties?

However, on that day, Marchais spoke out as much as he possibly could, describing our society as apocalyptic and disqualifying, on the issue of liberties, "the representatives of the French bourgeoisie" and "the conservative and social-democratic majority of the European Assembly". Marchais throws those persons that are not communists all into the same bag and in the same "oppression and exploitation" camp, that is the "enemies of mankind" camp. He sees freedom reigning only in the socialist countries, as he said on 20 February, and he explains the American boycott of the Moscow Olympic

0:15

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Games as the fear of imperialism at having 500,000-600,000 visitors discover Russian reality. . . Yes, you have read correctly, and if, some day, you learn that since the last world war, more than 5 million men and women (3 million of whom were German) have fled socialist regimes to join the capitalist camp, that 35,000 of them risked their lives while attempting to scale the Berlin wall and that 180 were killed by the East Berlin police while doing so, either you have been dreaming or you have been a victim of imperialist propaganda. In the last decade, 80,000 French have visited the USSR each year and if, of this [nearly] million persons, you know of one who has chosen to remain in Russia by seeking asylum, please write to Marchais, for his statistics are obviously not up to date.

Finally, and maybe this is why no one from the government has wanted to respond to the communist leader: what kind of language can one use when confronting a man who affirms that it is daytime at midnight and who, no less, insults you for holding an opposite view? What really counts, beyond the appearances, is the reason for which the French Communist Party leaders have chosen this attitude. What magical potion was Marchais steeped in during his last visit to Moscow? Has he read into the Russian cards and does he know something that might justify this insane policy? It is clear that there is a link between Russia's foreign policy and the hardening of the French Communist Party. Rivalry has increased between the East and the West and it has at the same time worsened in our own country between the two blocs, by the mere fact of the Communist Party. In the expectation of a worsening of the international situation, the French communists have chosen their camp. As Marchais said in December 1978, "our own strategy finds one of its essential foundations in the worldwide reality, in the change that has occurred in the relation between forces in favor of socialism, independence, and peace. To forget this, he continued, would be suicidal." The change in the relation between forces that Marchais spoke of over a year ago is an issue that is presently being brought up often at the Quai d'Orsay. What is being said? That the Russians have attained "nuclear parity" with the Americans. That we are no longer in a time when a frown from the White House would make the Russian bear behave and go home (for example: Cuba in 1962). The USSR is very strong militarily and this fact should be kept in mind. However, as Jacques Chaban-Delmas reported having heard directly from Leonid Brezhnev, the Russians consider themselves threatened in Europe by the setting-up of Pershing rockets in Pakistan and China where, they believe, the Americans are playing with fire. To avoid having this fear really harden, our diplomats believe that the dialog must be maintained, even if it appears to be weakness or blindness. Under other circumstances, one would stiffen up while waiting for better days.

Many "kremlinologists" and most French communists, in conflice with the leadership of the Communist Party, denounce this as being wrong. Just as Moscow wants to destabilize the world - take a look at Africa for instance - the French Communist Party wants to destabilize our democracy. Marchais is ready to encourage any kind of disorder to prove his point: namely, that capitalism is dying, the energy crisis is going to precipitate its fall,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and socialism will soon triumph. He believes this to be true. A communist "critic," as it is said nowadays, recently met with a member of the political bureau of the French Communist Party who informed him that important changes were about to take place and that it was a shame that he was in the wrong camp. This leader was speaking of this bright future with such passion that he could not understand how one could remain indifferent to this certainty. In effect, it just so happens that this leader was present with Marchais in Moscow this past January and that his information is thus first hand.

If one goes along with this analysis, the attitude of Georges Marchais, television superstar, becomes more comprehensible. Since there are important changes about to take place and landslides are expected, it is necessary for the Communist Party to be ready, and therefore united. However, the party is being shaken by a deep crisis. The leadership must, in order to keep things under control, adopt a siege policy that is expressed in the audacities of Georges Marchais. Playing on the party's patriotism, Marchais is well aware of the fact that the ranks get tighter when the party is under attack. And the party is unquestionably being attacked. The leadership knowingly organizes this anticommunist offensive by multiplying the provocations. And it works. One communist, not at all sectarian, whose friend was trying to explain to him that one of Marchais' arguments was wrong, replied in the following manner: "I am not really interested in knowing if it is true or false; what counts is the fact that it is being used to fuel the anticommunist campaign." This type of reaction shows that the Communist Party leadership is on the right track. By practicing the policy of one against all, it is strengthening the unity at its base. All communists that have become challengers will tell you that when the party is under attack, no criticism is tolerated. At the cell meeting, the militant that reasons and contests the analysis of the federal delegate will never find support amongst his other comrades, even if they are strongly in agreement with him. The reasoner, thinking that he is clever, discovers however, to his amazement, that between his indisputable argument and the opinion of the leadership, it is always the latter that prevails, even if it is absurd. This explains why at each change of direction, the Party prefers losing members rather than concerning themselves with lukewarm, hard-to-convince people. It is a filtering party which has a record of losing 15 percent of its membership each year, compensated for by new members whose average longevity does not exceed 6 years. The stable nucleus of the party never goes beyond 25 percent of the total membership. The others are only transient. This is valid at the lower level as well as at the head of the party.

In the 180° turn that Marchais has imposed upon his party since 1977, some of yesterday's stars have been left by the wayside. Paul Laurent or Roland Leroy, considered only three years ago as possible successors to Marchais, are now very rarely seen in the entourage of the Secretary General. Presently, the new strong figures are Charles Fiterman and Maxime Gremetz.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The latter is especially rising fast. Following the death of Jean Kanapa, he has become the party's "Foreign Affairs Minister". Strangest destiny, that of this 40 year old man whom the intellectual communists in the opposition describe as a non-educated "metal-worker", who would have not even become foreman had he remained in the factory, a man who does not ask questions of himself and of others, who owes everything to Marchais and who does not waver in the slightest from the official direction. He is made of flexible wood, which is needed to obtain seconds in command that are submissive and without excessive ambition. He travels often but without much publicity, which allows him to carry out secret missions for the Communist Party, namely in Lybia, turning plate for world destabilization. It is interesting to follow the influential struggle that he is having with Charles Fiterman in the last few months. The latter should logically feel threatened. He had been promoted to first rank in 1977 by Marchais to brush aside Paul Laurent more effectively. Today, isn't Gremetz incidentally commissioned to eliminate Fiterman, guilty of having been responsible for the actualization of the common program with the socialists. In these conflicts of persons, the Party leadership is merciless, even Machiavellian. Jean Elleinstein who has received several letters from militant communists requesting him to "spontaneously" resign from the Party where he would no longer have a position, noticed that one of the letters came from the cell in the 19th district of Paris, the one of which Paul Laurent is a member. It is a well-known Stalinian rule to entrust a militant in disgrace with the task of bringing about the fall of a parent or a friend that has become undesirable. Elleinstein and Laurent are, in fact, childhood friends. In 1978, when Rene Piquet, member of the political bureau, was asked to complain to the author of this article about the use of some pictures of Marchais that had been published by "Paris-Match" and that were judged devaluating by the Party leadership, the party was applying the same rule, all things considered. Rene Piquet has since been reduced to a lower rank, thus being punished for having maintained an almost friendly relationship with an "enemy" editorial staff, for nothing justified his taking this step, the Party press service being responsible for this. However, behind this impressive discipline facade, and in spite of the famous "democratic centralism", the Party does take action, is moved and becomes anxious. The cases of public dissension are multiplying. The eight federal secretaries of Paris, one being Henri Fiszbin, ex-deputy who is completing a book recounting his disgrace, have all resigned, and 9 out of 17 journalists have left the weekly "France Nouvelle". The crisis is evident. "People have become perturbed, says Antoine Spire, an ex-permanent from the Communist Party, who has also recounted his own experience in a book. One is finding more and more incomprehension and dissension but, he adds, the consciences of the people are out of step, which means that the evolution will be slow." Antoine Spire, put on the blacklist, receives, like Elleinstein, letters from other militants condemning his conduct, but four members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party have also written him to encourage him. Four out of 150 is few, but if one takes into account the intellectual terrorism exerted by the leadership on the whole

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

system, it is a number that would have been unheard of several years ago. In the book "Under the Communist Party, the communists" that she wrote in collaboration with Jean Tornikian, the journalist Yvonne Quiles defines the communist malaise as follows: "Yesterday, we were content with believing, today we want to understand and our eyes are being opened. This is the reason for the present crisis."

COPYRIGHT © 1980 par Cogedipresse

9592-R  
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ALEXANDRE SANGUINETTI ON CORSICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24-30 Mar 80 p 48

[Interview with RPR Central Committee and Politburo member A. Sanguinetti, by Thierry Pfister, place and date not given]

[Text] Alexandre Sanguinetti: "You don't understand a thing about Corsica!"

Le Nouvel Observateur: You recently addressed an "open letter" to your fellow-Corsicans (Albin Michel), but one gets the feeling that you were writing it at least as directly to readers on the continent.

Alexandre Sanguinetti: People on the continent have never understood a thing about Corsica. Just listen to them talk respectfully about "Corsican nationalism," and then dismiss the Afghan fighters as "rebels." I should like all kinds of nationalism -- Corsican, Basque, Flemish, whatever -- to be important; but French nationalism? Is it the only one that should be scorned? To draw distinctions among ethnic groups is to be guilty of racism. I am a committed advocate of universalist civilizations. And you have to admit that they have got at least as much as they have given. So what's the problem? Corsican is not a language solely because we are French. If we were Italians, our language would be treated as merely another Tuscan dialect. Besides, all of Paoli's writings, for example, are in Italian.

N.O.: The fact remains that land purchases by non-Corsicans can beget a feeling of being dispossessed.

Sanguinetti: Who is buying? Non-Corsicans. But who is selling? Corsicans. And they don't even put their money to use on the island. I can, in spite of everything, understand the "Palestinian reflex" of my countrymen at the influx of "pieds-noirs" [French colonists in Algeria] whose arrogance is not the most lovable trait you can think of. And I admit even more readily

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that these piers-noirs have been granted moratoria, while the Corsicans are stuck with their debts. You really have to grasp the fact that there is a little bit of everything mixed into what is going on right now: the determination to get a moratorium, the desire to get rid of the competition, not to mention plain old-fashioned racketeering.

N.O.: How does it make you feel when you see young countrymen of yours sent to prison on the mainland, and then turning up at Fort de l'Est?

Sanguinetti: I sympathize with them because I am Corsican. That doesn't mean that I approve of what they are doing. They must admit that no government in the world would tolerate anonymous bombings. Kids who act like damn fools are lucky to be in Western Europe. The risk they run is minimal compared with the repression they would encounter under other regimes. And yet, even with that, these two-bit heroes haven't even got the guts to take the responsibility for their actions. You can't have it both ways -- win the martyr's palm and expect to be let alone.

N.O.: You don't think their disgust at political and electoral customs peculiar to Corsica is genuine?

Sanguinetti: The Corsican problem with elections does exist, or used to exist. That is our problem. It stems from our customs. The young separatists are dreaming of doing the same thing themselves. The reason they are so furious is that they can't bring it off. We shall see where they are 15 years or so from now. The instigators play on this feeling of utter powerlessness among the very young: that's why they do most of their recruiting in the high schools.

N.O.: Who are these instigators?

Sanguinetti: Once again, let's be frank. Everybody on the island knows very well who they are. This is the revenge of the 1943 losers, the diehards and the former "collabos" [people who collaborated with the nazis]. And it's revenge, too, for people who have never been reconciled to the loss of the empire, particularly the loss of Algeria.

N.O.: And yet there is a malaise, at least an economic malaise, these days.

Sanguinetti: From 1914 to 1962, Corsica declined steadily. And yet there has been neither genocide nor deportation, and we have enjoyed all the rights of French citizens. Nothing, for example, like the situation of the Muslims in Algeria. Corsica was drained because its young people left to make their careers far away,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in the vast reaches of empire. What a paradox, when you come to think of it! Corsica is essentially a colonizer. What can you do, as an Ajaccio city councilman said to me: "We are a people of middle-managers, and we need people to manage." To-day this situation has turned around. It's not nearly so much fun to be a customs inspector in Moselle as it was in Laos. And so the youngsters stay home. And the result is that they are at loose ends, suffering from identity crises and loss of self-confidence. This is one of the aftereffects of France's relative decline in the pecking order of power. It's a phenomenon that affects all the old nations that go back to the days before there were nationalities: Spain and Great Britain are examples.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"

6182

CS0: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

AIRCRAFT DEFENSE TECHNIQUES, METHODS DESCRIBED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Mar 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Francois d'Orcival]

[Text] At 0930 hours the weather is clear. An unknown aircraft is crossing France on a north-south line near the Rhone Valley. The radars of the air defense command describe its speed--Mach 1.9 (about 2,000 kilometers per hour) and its altitude - 48,000 feet (16,000 meters).

From his underground command post at Taverny, in the Val-d'oise, the chief of the air defense command's operations center issues the alert and orders an interception mission. The 2nd Fighter Squadron based at Dijon has two of its Mirage III E aircraft take off. Execution time: 1 minute.

The Mirage airplanes proceed to meet the unknown aircraft, locate it, and get ready to intercept it. By firing. But a red indicator lights up on their on-board panels--poor alignment? Distance from the target too great? Bad firing angle? Insufficient speed? Or even electronic fog coming from the "hostile" airplane? In any event the red light means: interception has failed. The unknown aircraft continues on its path.

This took place on Friday, 1 February. On the 18th VALEURS ACTUELLES stated that between 29 January and 2 February a Mirage patrol based at Dijon unsuccessfully pursued a Soviet spy plane above the Rhone Valley. The Ministry of Defense made a formal denial. In its following issue, on 25 February, VALEURS ACTUELLES maintained that the incident had been observed by several air detection centers and stated that the aircraft in question could only be a Mig 25.

The Ministry of Defense and the Air Force general staff then broke their silence. An event did indeed take place at the time, and of the general nature, which we described.

But it involved an exercise (usual) and not an actual incident. It was not a Mig 25 but a Mirage IV (simulating a hostile airplane), interception of which (by means of practice missiles which reproduce the maneuver but without being fired) was aborted.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The information published in our weekly was therefore misinterpretation of an event actually seen upon radar screens at 0930 hours on 1 February.

Present detection capabilities are such that everybody knows what everybody else is doing, says General Philippe Archambeaud.

Fifty-three years old, graduated from the War College before becoming director of the Air School, General Archambeaud has been commander of air defense for less than 1 year. Defense of the air is defense of all French sky, 24 hours every day.

He has his warning radars, 140 Mirage airplanes, and missile batteries. And in his command post a television screen--the direct connection with the Elysee [President's official residence]. His previous command, for 2 years, was of the strategic air force: the Mirage IV airplanes with nuclear bombs and the rockets on the Albion Plateau.

His command post constitutes the heart of the underground installations in the Taverny limestone. Air conditioning, subdued lighting, light walls, at the center of the command post, a console with its orange screen. On the right a control lever; on the left the indicator boards upon which the computers display their data.

Upon the screen, the whole of the European sky, from Brest to Prague, from Glasgow to Rome. The French radars are linked to allied listening posts (those of NATO, and also those of Spain). They see the movements of airplanes from the GDR or Czechoslovakia as well as those from Italy or Southwestern France. All movements between 400 and 40,000 meters altitude.

Each aircraft in flight is signaled by a luminous line upon the screen: a "track." The officer constantly in front of the console designates the "track" with his control lever: the computer immediately provides him with the speed, altitude, and identity of the aircraft.

I was able to observe the track of an airplane above the GDR: altitude 69,000 feet (23,000 meters), speed 1,600 nautical miles (2,960 kilometers) per hour; it was a Mig 25. The only fighter capable of such performance.

The screens at Taverny and the whole of our radar network record 400,000 "tracks" per year in French air space.

There are no longer any unidentified movements, General Archambeaud says.

But 20 years ago a reconnaissance airplane could still, sheltered from detection or interception facilities, fly over foreign territory and photograph objectives. The American U2 spy planes flew over the Soviet Union for 4 years before a missile brought one of them down on 1 May 1960.

Today the controllers at Taverny know the identities of their 400,000 "tracks." Except for five or six which escape them. Five or six question marks. Literally, unidentified flying objects.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the opinion of the Air Force General Staff the development of detection and ground-air missiles preclude Soviet Mig 25 airplanes from engaging in reconnaissance flights over countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Not without risk of an adventurous or hostile act. Possibly, for a "test" of NATO air defense.

Where, then, are the Mig 25 airplanes with their cameras going when they leave Soviet airspace? Over territories with little or no defense from radar networks. They have flown over central Asia, as our Mirage IV airplanes have effected reconnaissance missions over Africa. And there is the ocean; there one can observe the positions of surface ships, of aircraft carriers and record radio transmissions from any fleet, possibly even from submarines.

A simple fly-over by an unauthorized foreign airplane above French territory is not necessarily a hostile act, General Archambeaud says.

Even if it is a Mig 25, it would be up to the chief of state to decide. Things would be different in the event of several fly-overs. The air defense command has a sort of precise code of actions which call for immediate intervention with orders to fire.

Upon an immense panel in the command post at Taverny which frames a map of France and two boards giving the situation of all available interceptor aircraft: The Mirage airplanes ready to take off in a minute upon each of their bases. And the time required to pressurize squadrons.

In toto the whole of the air arms can count 470 fighter aircraft (as many as West Germany or Czechoslovakia). The ambition of the air force was to have 650 fighter airplanes (as many as Poland). An ambition cut down by lack of funds.

On 1 February, west of the Rhone Valley, the Mirage III E airplanes which failed in their interception knew that their adversary was a Mirage IV. What if it had been a Mig 25? No airplane either French or European can equal its performance. None can fly so fast or so high. Only the American F 15 (itself based in Europe) can keep up with it. Our aircraft cannot get near enough to threaten it; they can only attack it with missiles. In particular, the Matra Super 530 with which the Mirage F1 is armed.

The air force had specified the characteristics of an interceptor for the 1980 decade. The air force chief of staff, General Grigaut, made them known, on 6 April 1975, to the Institute for Advanced Studies of National Defense, as follows:

The performance essential were for interception, the ceiling, 20,000 meters, and the radar range, 100 kilometers (all this in order to intercept the most modern aircraft now in service). The capability for air combat, on the other hand, necessitates a high thrust-weight ratio (thrust of the jets and weight of the aircraft). As much as to obtain this ratio as to house a radar capable of a range of 100 kilometers we found that we were obliged to build a twin engine airplane.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Mig 25 is a twin engine airplane; so are the American F 15 and F 14. General Grigaut's airplane was the ACF. Nine months later it was abandoned. The government gave the air force a choice: with the same funds it could have either 200 single engine Mirage 2000 airplanes or half as many ACF airplanes. He took the Mirage 2000.

Today that Mirage 2000 is flying. It has the best performance possible from a single engine airplane. It obviously cannot have the radar of a twin engine (because of the airframe dimensions).

Marcel Dassault all the same wants to build his twin engine Mirage 4000. A prototype which the aviators can look at but not touch. Too expensive. Only the Arabs, it is said, are interested in it. The French twin engine fighter aircraft has been put off to the 1990 decade.

[Photo captions]

Air Defense Command Operations Center at Taverny. Surveillance of European airspace from Brest to Prague by means of its links with allied systems.

A Mirage F 1 being refueled in flight. Four refuelings to connect Corsica with Djibouti.

Mirage IV bomber escorted by two Mirage F 1 aircraft armed with Matra missiles under the belly.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"

11,706  
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

'REAL' RESULTS OF GULF TRIP -- In economic and business terms, the "true" results of Giscard's trip around the Persian Gulf turn out to be pretty meager, when compared with expectations. Oil: France wanted to expand its share in Kuwait with at least a letter of intent to back it. All it got was a vague "moral guarantee." (The Emirates, though, provided more concrete guarantees on that score.) Contracts: nothing sure for the Airbus sale to Kuwait, and a flat no on the (Technip) refinery at Qatar despite strenuous efforts to make the price irresistible, as well as on the (Heurtey) ammonia-urea plant in Abou-Dhabi. Cooperation agreements (sought to enable our salesmen to back company efforts in the future): no firm commitment. [Text] Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 31 Mar 80 p 2] 6182

BUDGET CUTS--Some serious budget cuts are foreseen for the information service of the prime minister's office. The funds used for investigations and polls will probably be considerably reduced. [Excerpt] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 21 Apr 80 p 3]

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

PNV CONTACTS WITH ETA--Leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the majority party in the Basque parliament, have already established contacts with the two wings of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Groups] (the ETA Military and the ETA Politico-Military) with a view toward obtaining a cease fire. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Mar 80 p 5]

ETA TO CONTROL COMMANDOS--ETA Military has begun a wide-ranging investigation concerning the autonomous commandos. These have acted, at times, outside the control of the terrorist organization. One sector of ETA is concerned over the lack of coordination within the armed organization, especially given the new political situation in the Basque country. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Mar 80 p 5]

EXTREMADURA NATIONALIST PARTY--Preparations are underway for the creation of an Extremadura Nationalist Party [PNE] which will overcome the present differences existing within the centrist party. The man who reportedly will bring this party into being is the former UCD [Democratic Center Union] deputy for Badajoz, Antonio Masa Godoy. He is currently the president of the Agrarian Enterprise Union. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr 80 p 5]

ETA IN ALGERIA--The Spanish foreign minister is awaiting a detailed report from State Security regarding those ETA Politico-Military militants who were recently detained. Those militants had been training in the Algerian police school. After [receiving] the technical report the Spanish Foreign Ministry will take the necessary steps. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr 80 p 5]

CSO: 3110

END

28

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY