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JPRS L/9196

16 July 1980

Latin America Report

(FOUO 15/80)

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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COLUMNIST CONTRASTS, COMPARES ARGENTINA, BRAZIL

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 27, 28, 29 May 80

[Articles by Estela Araujo: "Argentina and Brazil, Two Economic Dimensions," "A Trend in Foreign Policy" and "New Chess Game in the Plate Basin"]

[27 May 80, p 8]

[Text] The rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, which materialized on the presidential level, was accompanied by a real confrontation.

That confrontation need not be negative, inasmuch as it may help both sides attempt to make an improvement in the various aspects being questioned about the plan for economic complementation that is starting to be developed.

The comparison between Argentines and Brazilians always begins with the demographic area. The situation, in millions of inhabitants, has been progressing as follows:

- a. Brazil, with a population of 93.3 up until 1970, and an index of demographic growth of 3.2, will reach 225 by the year 2000.
- b. Argentina, which had 23.3 at the same date, with an index of 1.5, will reach 35 million by the year 2000.

And the logical conclusion is that there will be six Brazilians for every Argentine by the year 2000.

The next questions are: Will it be possible to be fed with the grain that is produced? Will it be possible to be supplied with the oil that is available? Will it be possible to have education on all levels?

The Land

Argentina has an area of 2.8 million square kilometers, with an additional 0.97 million from the Antarctica sector and the southern islands. Without counting the latter, the population density is 8.5. Brazil covers an area of 8.5 million square kilometers, giving it a density of 11 inhabitants.

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Usable area in:	Argentina	Brazil
(millions of hectares)		
1. Land with little cultivation	20	30
2. Pasturage	125	123
3. Suitable land in general	10	40

With these calculations as a basis, Argentina has a ratio of 6 suitable hectares for each inhabitant, and Brazil has a ratio of 2, considering that the present population of both countries has a ratio of 1 to 4. If we take into account the figures for the year 2000, the gap increases. Without counting technological advances, the figure for Argentina would be over 4 hectares, and for Brazil less than 1.

Brazil, which many consider to have an optimal geographical status, is located in the tropical region, and is preeminent among the other tropical countries in the world for its degree of development.

Argentina, on the other hand, lies between the countries with a temperate climate, and has the advantage of possessing tropical areas and cold regions. The possibility of increasing its arable areas is due to the fact that all it requires is more irrigation. The rainfall does not interfere with future production in areas which are now marginal.

Irrigation, by means of the dams resulting from hydroelectric development, could increase the arable land to a great extent.

The reservation area, Polimazonia, the so-called green desert, is the region in which progress could be made with planted land. For this purpose, the jungle must be cut down or burned. It is considered likely that the ecological change that this would produce would entail major flooding, owing to the reduction of natural defenses provided by the vegetation, circulating the rain water more quickly.

Argentina, as a country with a temperate climate, has great opportunities for expanding its grain growing area (wheat, corn), and also unused marshland (Ibera), where rice and sorghum could be grown.

Energy

It is thought that Brazil has a water-power potential of about 80,000 megawatts. The same sources attribute 30,000 MW to Argentina, which would indicate a considerable advantage for the former.

Brazil's real advantage lies in the fact that, in 1970, it had 10,000 MW, as compared with 600 MW for Argentina.

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The Plate country unquestionably began to use its rivers at a late date, because various plans did not attach to that area the importance that it deserved. However, during the last decade, it began to acquire an awareness of the energy problem, which led it to surpass Brazil, first in oil, wherein it has achieved almost self-sufficiency (7 percent imports), while Brazil had to import 80 percent; and second, in atomic energy, which has enabled it to lead the Latin American countries with the Atucha I nuclear powerplant, and a plan for energy self-determination which is a matter of special pride in the nuclear field. Water-power has represented a great step forward, the results of which will not be evident until the end of the century; but, with Chocon-Cerros Colorados and Salto Grande, a new dimension has begun. Yacyreta, Corpus and the Middle Parana, combined, represent approximately 13,000 MW, of which 10,000 MW are Argentine.

In the case of Itaipu, which is considered the undertaking of the century, Brazil's share is 5,000 megawatts. This does not mean that one can overlook the fact that, in the Upper Parana alone, Brazil has far exceeded that figure, and that the Amazon region has an enormous potential which is still virgin.

Argentina has one real advantage in energy, namely, the diversity of sources; and one disadvantage: Its hydroelectric development began later, and will be impossible to equalize in the long run.

Education

The statistics in the cultural area may be assessed from the circulation of newspapers for every 1,000 inhabitants: 126 for Argentina, and 35 for Brazil. The percentage of illiteracy is shown by the following figures: Argentina, 9 percent; Brazil, 29 percent.

Elementary Education

Among the population between 5 and 13 years of age, the figures are 71 percent for Argentina, and 40 percent for Brazil. For intermediate education, the figures are 27 and 14 percent, in the same order; and for higher education, they are 7 and 2 percent. The analysis is too superficial for a population which is growing more than twofold. Either the education budgets must be doubled, or the gap will increase even more. If we consider the fact that the expenditures on government-run public education amount to 3 percent for Argentina and 2 percent for Brazil, we realize that the gap will be difficult to close.

This contrast occurs, of course, in the economic area. The 30 March issue of LA OPINION, in an article entitled "Unequal Behavior of the Latin American Economies," states:

"Brazil, with its large foreign debt of about \$50 billion, is the one reflecting the greatest economic problems in this part of the continent. Although the total renegotiation of the debt has been rejected at the moment, there

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are quite a few international banking entities which are viewing with concern not only the heavy schedule of commitments for the next few years, but also the constant need for external financing required for the development of its extensive growth program

"It is estimated that, in order to prevent the deterrence of its economic model, Brazil would have to increase its level of indebtedness even more in 1980, to a figure which could range between \$17.5 and \$23 billion, a sum that would, moreover, include \$9.5 billion for financial services and over \$7 billion for capital amortization. Thus, it would not be surprising if the gravity of these figures, combined with the recent price hikes that have occurred for oil on the international markets (from which Brazil imports 80 percent), were to increase the deficit in its balance from \$6 billion in 1978 to over \$12 billion by 1980; a situation which would also make it impossible to reduce the inflationary pressure on its economy beyond the 70 percent registered in 1979."

Brazil, a colossus which would appear to be tottering, has an acute growth crisis. We must add to the foregoing figures the gross domestic product per inhabitant:

1969	Brazil	480	Argentina	1,292
1972	Brazil	513	Argentina	1,366
1977	Brazil	1,390	Argentina	1,730

Argentina has unquestionably pursued an irregular growth process. At the present time, after having experienced difficult bottlenecks, its economy can be said to have good prospects, based upon an almost self-sufficiency in oil, a search for new markets for its crops, a balance of payments that will exceed \$1.5 billion by the end of the year and an inflation which has not been curbed, but which is declining slightly. The major problems are the policy to be carried out from now on in the industrial area, the maintenance of the financial system and the achievement of the great national plans.

Brazil, for its part, is experiencing a wage of strikes and dissent, in its search for democracy. President Joao Figueiredo, in describing the situation, said: "There are potholes in the road which will not interfere with the process."

The arrival of the current president of the Federative Republic of Brazil in Buenos Aires on 14 May was a milestone in Argentine-Brazilian relations, a meeting point which cannot be ignored. In his welcoming speech, President Jorge Rafael Videla said: "The opportunity has been afforded to initiate a cycle of widespread agreement and a phase wherein the realistic acceptance of the true limits of interdependence, objectively established, will replace any other aspiration."

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President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo replied, with a brief but definitive text, from which we quote one paragraph: "Heedful of the desire for cooperation which inspires Argentines and Brazilians, and convinced of the mutual benefits, our governments must intensify the bilateral contracts. Frank, uninterrupted and cordial dialog, aimed at exploring new areas for agreements, will bring particularly auspicious results."

As President Videla summarized, "The opportunity has been afforded to initiate a cycle of widespread agreement." Those who believe that it has been started are confused.

[28 May 80, p 9]

[Text] The relations between Argentina and Brazil cannot be dissociated from the historical context of the two countries. They experienced the deepseated discord of the 19th century when, as enemies (war with Brazil, 1825-28), or as allies (war with Paraguay, 1865-70), they upheld opposing views. The beginning of the 20th century brought a new era of understanding. The so-called First Republic, which emerged in 1889, began traversing a new path wherein receptiveness to democratic ideals typified the affinity.

Thus, the presidential meetings began with Gen Julio Argentino Roca's visit to the Brazilian capital in August 1899. He was received by President Manuel Ferraz de Campos Salles, who returned the visit in October of the next year. On both occasions, the activities took place on a level of pomp and ceremony germane to the "belle epoque." Both countries were starting to extricate themselves from institutional crises. Brazil had changed from a monarchy to a republic; Argentina had withstood the serious financial crisis of 1890, and the resignation of President Luis Saenz Pena in 1895, which brought Jose Evaristo Uriburu to the position of chief executive. The issue with Chile over boundaries became increasingly difficult. When Roca came to power for the second time, an era of prosperity began, which coincided with a rapprochement with Brazil fostered by the personal attitude of both presidents, a democratic ideal and a need in the realm of foreign policy which was intensified as the disagreements with Chile occurred.

It took three decades for similar circumstances to take place. President Agustin P. Justo began the first of three visits between the Argentine president and his Brazilian colleague, Getulio Vargas. In 1930, the reduction in coffee prices created the conditions for the rise of a strong coalition opposed to the age-old preeminence of Sao Paulo in Brazilian politics. The revolution in that year supported by the politicians from Minas Gerais, Paraiba and Rio Grande brought the "Gaucho" governor, Getulio Vargas, to power, for an almost uninterrupted period of 24 years, ending tragically.

The Argentine Republic also had its revolution of 1930, wherein the radical government of the illustrious president, Hipolito Yrigoyen, fell. The military coup of Jose Felix Uriburu was followed by pro-conservative administrations beginning with Agustin P. Justo's in 1932.

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It was in this context that the second rapprochement between the two countries occurred, after the wave of unemployment which accompanied, on a world-wide scale, black Friday on the New York Stock Market and the period preceding World War II.

In October 1933, Agustin P. Justo began the journey that was to take him to Rio de Janeiro. At that time, when the war between Bolivia and Paraguay was under way over the Chaco (1932-35), the "anti-war pact" was signed, to which Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Paraguay also adhered. In this way, the extent of the conflict was confined to its two opponents. In May 1935, the Brazilian president traveled close to Buenos Aires, on that occasion going as far as Tandil. The third meeting between the two presidents took place in January 1938, the year in which Justo's term in office ended.

The propitious occasion was the opening of the International Bridge at Uruguayana, the site of the official ceremony. The happy celebration was marred by a subsequent incident, the tragedy of Itacumbu, in which one of the airplanes of the Argentine presidential party crashed in flames. The son of the president, Eduardo Justo, was traveling in it.

World War II caused a natural dissociation. Brazil took part in the conflict, and Argentina remained neutral almost until the end. For a long period of time, there was a marking of time in presidential contacts, interrupted only by Gen Pedro Eugenio Aramburu's intention of meeting with President Juscelino Kubitschek in 1956, an intention which, however, was not fulfilled. He only saw President Joao Goulart, who at that time was serving in the presidency.

It took over two decades for the dialog to be resumed. In 1961, in the border locality of Uruguayana, the two presidents met again. This time, it was Dr Arturo Frondizi (1958-62) and Janio Da Silva Quadros. The agreement was signed on 22 April, and in August of the same year the Brazilian president, who had not been in office for 7 months, resigned.

The strategy devised by President Frondizi, whereby Argentina would serve as a mediator in the Cuban affair, was related to the spirit of the Alliance for Progress and President Kennedy's view of South America. Subsequent events, the fall of both Quadros and Frondizi, brought about another period of silence.

In March 1972, there was a fourth attempt at rapprochement, through President Agustin Lanusse's trip to Brasilia, Rio and Sao Paulo, during which he held a dialog with his colleague, Emilio Garrastazu Medici, also a general. In 1964, Brazilian President Joao Goulart was forced to leave the government; whereupon, through consecutive elections in Congress, Garrastazu Medici was appointed to the term from 1969 to 1974.

General Lanusse was the third president of the Armed Forces government, which overthrew the constitutional president, Arturo Illia (1963-69). The openness

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toward the Andean Pact nations which was started by Lanusse did not coincide with a rapprochement with Brazil. The visit only served to intervene in the gap that existed between the two nations.

Hence, thus far in the century, this is the fifth attempt to improve the relations between the two countries, attempts which have all been separated by decades: 1899-1900, 1933-35-38, 1961, 1972 and 1980; the only one taking place during a shorter period (if we count President Lanusse's visit as rapprochement) being the fourth.

President Joao Baptista Figueiredo's arrival coincides with increasing demonstrations in Brazil and receptiveness to political dialog in Argentina. Both governments have a more or less military origin, and it is no coincidence that both presidents are generals.

Joao Baptista Figueiredo has two conflicting connotations with respect to Argentina: the first, that of belonging to the military group of Gen Golbery do Couto e Silva, author of "The Geopolitics of Brazil," and of the theories that have continued up until now on Brazilian leadership in South America; and the second, of a personal nature, his long period of residence in Buenos Aires, which would appear to indicate an affectionate relationship with this country.

If one attempts to question the two forces, it may be thought that one conveys the essence and the other the form.

But one cannot make an analysis on a merely personal or irrelevant level. It is obvious that the status of Brazil has changed, with its new economic requirements, something which has prompted it to change its foreign policy.

[29 May 80, p 8]

[Text] The 3-day visit paid by the president of Brazil, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, was regarded internationally as being of vital importance to the new relations among the South American nations. As part of a series of meetings which both presidents have been holding on a worldwide scale, its significance cannot be disregarded.

General Figueiredo had held a conference with the president of Venezuela, a nation to which he is linked by the Amazon Pact (1979), and to which he became closer, starting in January, through the Andean Pact.

The Peruvian president also visited Brasilia, and is expecting the arrival of the head of state of the Federative Republic of Brazil this year.

Chile is also expecting the arrival of General Figueiredo.

Gen Jorge Rafael Videla received President Morales Bermudez of Peru; he met on three occasions with Stroessner and President Aparicio Mendez of Uruguay. On an international scale, he is about to start his second tour of the Orient.

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This characteristic of traveling presidents does not detract significance from the meeting, because it is unquestionably the beginning of a change in international policy for both countries, which will affect all the relations in South America. The Argentina design with respect to Brazil needs a new revamping. It will also require a new overall view of all the countries which Argentine-Brazilian relations used to consider in a static manner in calculating probabilities in the Southern Cone.

The new situation has been manifested by praise. The Chilean newspaper EL MERCURIO says: "Brazil and Argentina are setting an example, by solving problems related to many vital interests by peaceful means and with mutual advantage." The government press organ is of the opinion that there should not be blocs, but rather friendly nations. Perhaps it is assessing the importance of Figueiredo's opinion on the issue of the Beagle Channel, or Argentina's intransigent attitude toward the Brazilian proposition of including Chile in the South Atlantic defense pact. This proposition is explained by Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in an article published in EL ECONOMISTA (16 May 80): "The organization of a defense treaty for the South Atlantic is an idea which is not included on our agenda."

The Uruguayan Government, which could be affected by the matter of the dams on the Upper Uruguay, received advance information from San Martin Palace: Through its ambassador to Buenos Aires, Luis de Posadas Montero, it expressed the certainty that those projects would be carried out in such a way that they would not upset the waterways or the construction on the binational Salto Grande dam.

The treaty on the Uruguay River establishes the legal and political framework that will govern the future development on the Uruguay and Pepiri Guazu Rivers. The provisions which are called for, to guarantee that there is no damage downstream, and that shipping is not hurt, are obviously accomplishments, since they represent the adoption of international legal systems regarding the stated Brazilian position on "faits accomplis." The Argentine position of considering the issue of the Upper Uruguay as a whole appears to have won over the urgency over energy which wanted to start the Garabi dam as soon as possible (see: "Garabi, an Economical Energy Solution?", LA OPINION, 14 May 80).

The NEW YORK TIMES notes in two articles that the new Argentine-Brazilian relations refute the theory of a nuclear race between the two countries, and remarks that, despite the problems with the United States over the issue of human rights and the transfer of technology in the atomic field, no hostile policies are being promoted against Washington.

The nuclear topic, and the agreements that have been reached, which are positively the most important among the 15 documents that were signed, do not have only one internal goal, progress toward self-sufficiency. Vice Adm Carlos Castro Madero stated: "The Argentine nuclear plan is experiencing an important period, wherein all the projects have been started without any

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obstacles, at least apparently; something which makes them quite favorable to the development of Argentine nuclear activity." And he also added: "The signing of the agreements with Brazil is of great political importance, because they discredit the arguments that are being put forth abroad to prevent technology from being supplied to both countries, maintaining that the latter are engaged in a rivalry that is dangerous to world peace."

In addition to the parties directly concerned, the atomic issue has two obvious destinations: the United States and Germany.

Through KWU, the Federal Republic of Germany has arranged with Argentina and Brazil a supply of technology covering the Southern Cone. If the accords allow for only a transitional phase, Argentina will have definitely achieved its self-sufficiency. If it is caught, it will be part of a plan for a division of labor wherein one part will remain in Brazil, and another in Argentina, with the actual control in Germany.

The issue of gas is not dissociated from the Plate Basin political chess game either.

The PETROBRAS [Brazilian Petroleum Corporation] enterprise is due to conclude the agreement on gas through the visit made by its president, Shigeaki Ueki, to build a gas pipeline to the border at Rio Grande do Sul.

This decision affects the relations with Bolivia as a supplier to Brazil and Argentina, which at first also seemed to be affected by agreements on iron ore coming from Uruguay. Uruguay also expects to be supplied with gas by Argentina. The three components of Urupabol (Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia) are viewing with a wait-and-see attitude these new situations that are taking place in the Plate Basin. Uruguay may even feel certain misgivings, owing to the great friendship of its only two neighbors.

Paraguay has lost part of its negotiating power in the energy area, although it may have accrued very sizable benefits in the recent dealings with Argentina.

Although Yacyreta represented Argentina's emergence from isolation, at a cost higher than normal, this new appearance seems to have been unnecessary. Corpus will make it possible to view the real new positions of both countries. Bolivia, staggering in its unique kind of democracy, may mistrust a strong friendship that changes its role as a center for contacts. The Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement will definitely restate Urupabol from the time that Argentina temporarily gives up its image as a defense attorney.

The importance of the agreements in the international realm is due to the new moves of chessmen that they cause on the South American chessboard. Brazil is replaced with the smiling image of Figueiredo who, nevertheless, in his latest message delivered in Buenos Aires, did not fail to quote a comment, apparently one of reconciliation, from the Baron of Rio Branco, who

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was so little liked by all the countries bordering Brazil. The "patron of Brazilian diplomacy," as the president called him, gained many square kilometers of neighboring territory for his country in diplomatic contests. Was it an allusion or a warning?

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

ARGENTINE COLUMNIST CITES BRAZIL'S EXPANSIONIST TENDENCY

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 18 May 80 p 10

[Article by Sergio Ceron: "Two Policies Toward the World and Latin America"]

[Text] "We are, because of our situation, a Third World country, and from this fact stem our individual positions in the international context, especially with regard to the matter of the transformation of the worldwide political and economic order." This was Joao Baptista de Figueiredo's response to the Argentine agency TELAM, during the course of a recent interview.

Our country, on the other hand, even when underestimated and harassed by the United States and Europe, knows that it is irreversibly united with the West; not only because of its national interests, but essentially because it shares with the nations included in that controversial, contradictory and at times disconcerting West, a vision of the cosmos, a concept of the dignity of man and of the self-determination of peoples.

To be sure, we Argentines clearly understand that we must strive to have our role as a nation in search of its historical fulfillment recognized. But, at the same time, we realize that we are potentially a country that must be taken into account from a strategic and economic standpoint when the ground-rules of a new international order are being debated. Despite all the current difficulties, the future appears propitious for us. In a world beset by the energy and food crisis, we are about to become exporters of hydrocarbons and uranium, and we have sufficient capacity to multiply our food production over the next two decades until it is tripled. Hence, we have excellent arguments for negotiating our inclusion in the present world and for forcing the Western nations to give us a worthy place in the common family existence. For this purpose, Argentina is also counting on moving in the endeavor of constituting a geoeconomic and geopolitical area integrated into the rest of Latin America. The basic goal of its foreign policy on the continental level is integration, because, in the 21st century, no nation in our region will be able to confront the challenges of the times all by itself. Some day, Latin America will be a nation, and what exactly defines the concept of a nation is the awareness of sharing a destiny.

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Brazil, on the other hand, has had its steps guided since the 1930's by a political concept that has led it (a legitimate ambition to be sure) to become converted into an emerging power and to lead Latin America. Gen Golbery do Couto e Silva, the intellectual inspirer of the Brazilian ruling class and a constant presence behind the throne in all the governments that have succeeded one another since 1964, developed the doctrine of his country's "manifest destiny" which, in the final analysis, is nothing but the "aggiornamento" [updating] of the goals assigned for Brazil's foreign policy by the great foreign minister who indelibly marked Itamaraty with his personal stamp: the Baron of Rio Branco. At the turn of the century, the key points in his strategy cited the need to choose the United States as a protective power, to back Brazilian influence in South America, foster pan-Americanism, win the continental leadership and consolidate Brazilian prestige in the world.

Some of those steps were achieved and are still in effect, others have become obsolete; but the fact is that the guidelines of Brazilian national strategy have remained constant. The present doctrine, that of "manifest destiny," is based on a nationalist, developmentalist and expansionist criterion, at odds with Latin American integration.

Let us observe what Golbery do Couto e Silva says in his book, "Geopolitical Aspects of Brazil": "We too (like the United States) can invoke a manifest destiny, and all the more so when it does not interfere with the interests of our older brothers to the north in the Caribbean. The superiority in Latin America is obvious. There are only possible rivals: Argentina, Colombia and Peru."

The policy of rapprochement with the United States reached its high point during the government of Richard Nixon, when the latter, encouraged by Henry Kissinger, announced the delegation of hegemonic powers for South America in Brazil. But various events, including the intensification of an implicit alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany to create a new political pole in the West (a "peak" episode, the signing of the agreement on nuclear cooperation against Washington's wishes) and Brazil's openness toward the Third World and to the oil-producing Arab nations subject to the Soviet Union's influence (the contracts with Iraq) put an abrupt end to the idyll. The "responsible pragmatism" of Itamaraty's policy indicated for Brazil other courses of action to serve its national interests.

On 2 June 1977, the then undersecretary of state for Latin American affairs, Terence Todman, proclaimed in Caracas, a few hours before leaving for Brasilia, that James Carter's government was "unwilling to accept the policy of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, claiming that Brazil is the leading country in Latin America."

Then there began a slow, arduous rapprochement between Washington and Buenos Aires, often concealed by the harsh debates on the doctrine of human rights and the controversies that were aroused regarding Argentine nuclear policy.

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It is likely that 1980 marks the certain start of a new phase in the bilateral relations, wherein understanding will prevail over confrontation, and wherein a realistic view of the world strategic chessboard will prompt the North American leaders to give more consideration to their security requirements than to the doctrinaire speculations of their ideologues. Washington must somehow fill the void left by the estrangement from Brazil. Argentina could play that role, provided the United States understands that its efficacy is contingent on Buenos Aires' ability to fully implement its policy of integration with the rest of Latin America. The strategic rear area of the United States would be covered by an integrated, developed region, endowed with political stability. It is here that the interests of the two Americas become not only compatible, but also complementary.

A few years ago, I had the privilege of hearing in Buenos Aires, at a meeting reserved for politicians and analysts, a speech by Aristides Calvani. The former Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs, then chairman of the related Senate committee, came to propose that Argentina head the integration process. For many reasons, the astute Venezuelan statesman felt that the responsibility for leading this historic endeavor should be assigned to our country; because the first step to be taken was to integrate the Spanish-speaking countries, in view of the fact that Brazil had a geopolitical concept aimed at insuring its continental expansion and its leadership in the region. But, Calvani clearly explained, that could not be the final goal, since neither Brazil nor the rest of Latin America apart from it would have sufficient power to counteract the pressure from the centers of political and economic power in the next century.

The proposal was to integrate Hispanic America, so as then to negotiate between one power and another, with a nation which, during the last decade, had tripled its gross product, and which had a potential that was not matched by that of its neighbors, considered individually.

And it is here that we reach the explanation for why, although Joao Baptista de Figueiredo claims that Latin American relations must be inspired "by non-intervention, peace and the search for harmony and equilibrium," he refuses any commitment to employ a policy of continental integration. To Itamaraty, integration means bilateral agreements with each one of the Hispanic American countries. To Argentina, on the other hand, it implies making the negotiations universal, so as to form in Latin America a single, powerful, political and economic area, with a decisive influence on international relations; an alliance of interests and cultures wherein all are united in the service of an endeavor, in "common and jointly involved endeavor," as the old writers of commercial treatises used to say when referring to the association of individuals for reasons of profit. The difference being that, in addition to economic interests, a united Latin America could strive on behalf of its concept of life which, after all, is merely the result of its Greco-Latin and Christian heritage. A necessary requisite for attaining that goal is to thwart any attempt to destabilize the region. The advent of new

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Marxist regimes, particularly in South America, would represent a destruction at the roots of the attempt to achieve this historic enterprise. At this point, we must understand the concern of the San Martin Palace over the fate of other nations on the continent; not, as Brazilian spokesmen have erroneously claimed, as an attempt to create subregional alliances and shared leaderships. At the beginning of the month, with correct geopolitical insight, Carlos Washington Pastor told the newspaper O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO that the fall of Honduras and Guatemala (the presumable new targets of the extreme left after Nicaragua and the possible collapse of El Salvador) would virtually cut the Central American continent in two; and, after such an event, it would become a pole of ideological irradiation which would exert pressure on Mexico to the north, and on the nations of the Andean Group to the south. In the first contingency, the Marxist presence would reach the borders of the United States; and, in the second, the doors of Brazil.

Pastor's probe met with a wall of resistance in Itamaraty, and so much so that the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia hastened to explain that its government was not sponsoring an ideological alliance, and that, on the contrary, it upheld its traditional policy of "non-intervention."

The Argentine naivete (or diplomatic slip?) enabled the Brazilian foreign minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, to take advantage of a dialog with newsmen and emphasize: "Neither Argentina nor Brazil has to form blocs. Mutual integration and cooperation are more useful."

The Brazil of the "manifest destiny" had an opportunity to generate the image of a country opposed to all types of pressure on its neighbors, while Argentina had to bear the burden of attempting to create hegemonic blocs.

The underlying reality consists of the confrontation of two strategies: Argentina, aiming for continental integration within the context of what Charles De Gaulle once described as the "Europe of native lands," that is, an associations of equals, united to demand their right to live in dignity; and Brazil, which has not changed its ambition to be a power that dictates rules in which it considers its "sphere of influence."

The world situation requires a break in the doctrine of "manifest destiny"; it does not expunge it. This is why Joao Baptista de Figueiredo, with the image of a cordial, open Brazilian leader (replacing the Germanic sternness of Ernesto Geisel) is a lofty emissary of the policy of "bilateral" relations: bilateral today with Argentina, a few months ago with Venezuela, a few days before arriving in Buenos Aires, with Paraguay, and, in the near future, with Peru. Itamaraty is hastening to disarm the Caracas-Lima-Buenos Aires geopolitical triangle which was once cited as a bone of contention for Golbery's expansionism.

Brazil needs energy. Venezuela, Peru and Argentina can supply it (oil, gas, hydroelectricity and uranium). It also sorely needs to win new markets, to

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make up for the decline created for its exports by the world recession. Its economic model demands an aggressive policy of foreign sales and a search for other markets for its products. Latin America (and Argentina in particular) meets some of its needs; the others can only be met by the socialist and Third World countries. Therefore, Brazil has been virtually prohibited from becoming enlisted in the West.

Such is the dilemma created by two national and two geopolitical strategies. Each one upholds legitimate interests. In the case of Argentina, the situation requires clarity and firmness, in understanding the Brazilian circumstances, and in accepting everything that is mutually beneficial in a policy of cooperation and friendship, while on the other hand rejecting what would represent subordinating the nation's permanent interests to the explicable and legitimate needs of our neighbor.

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ARGENTINA

THREE MONTHS OF POLITICAL DIALOG SHOW CONSENSUS

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 18 May 80 p 11

[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes: "The First Results of the Dialog Show a Coinciding Trend"]

[Text] Let us continue with the topic of the dialog, because there has been a great deal of "off the record" reporting on the subject. The most recent to exchange views with the minister of interior, Gen Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy, were five members of the board of the Junior Chamber, an entity which became popular as a result of its annual contribution to the traditional "10 outstanding young men," but which is also the author of a methodical and little publicized work on behalf of the training and catapulting of leaders. It seemed an exaggeration to many for the Junior Chamber to be invited to the dialog, also because it is assumed that the young men whom the entity is projecting toward decision-making are no longer so young (individuals between 35 and 45 years of age are usually selected) and belong to a kind of elite group, not through their own fault, but through the fault of those who propose them for this status wherein it is so difficult to excel. However, the sources who were questioned noted that the entity is sufficiently representative to be regarded as one of the few organizations of young people that do not reflect a particular political label, much less a partisan cause.

The Ministry of Interior has been painstakingly following the partial evaluation of the political dialog since its beginning, and could claim that, last week, it made an overall assessment of its effects up until the twelfth meeting, that is, the contact with Francisco Manrique. Important elements in that evaluation have been disclosed.

The Battle Against Subversion

The sources stressed that there was almost unanimity among those invited on analyzing the subversive phenomenon that has occurred in the country, and that, at the same time, they consider the action taken by the Armed Forces in defending the national integrity attacked by the terrorists to have been both effective and just. A large majority of participants agreed with the

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military theory that there should be no investigation of what has occurred; although several (in what appeared to be more of a spirit of desire than of knowing a means of achieving it) thought that the Armed Forces should bring the matter to a final end, a kind of "wax seal" that would shelve the issue, but without leaving any doubts about the existence of a last word. There were some who proposed the official publication of the list of missing persons and, in this instance, the minister explained that such a list existed, but that it related solely to the reports of missing persons made to his ministry, which did not agree with others circulating among national and international entities concerned with the issue of human rights.

Then there reportedly arose the question that produced the so-called "Balbin theory," floating in the political atmosphere since the Radical leader said in Spain that, in his opinion, those who were missing in Argentina were dead. In the opinion of the observers, this, regardless of how hard it might be for many, would enormously simplify both the drama produced by a intrigue of that kind and the strange legal aspect caused after the definition of a missing person was made to determine those cases. The minister's position in this regard is clearcut: He does not add nor subtract anything from what has already been stated by the supreme leaders of the three branches of the Armed Forces on the matter.

On the other hand, however, he cited a generalized idea which, rather than resolving the issue in the past, seeks to put an end to the problem in the future: the absolute and responsible control of the forces by the state.

Closed Book

There has also been unanimity to date among those invited to the dialog on approving all the concepts in the political bases of the national reorganization process devised by the Armed Forces and submitted to the public, not as an exclusive document, but precisely as the starting point for an increased enhancement of that endeavor (and this phase of the dialog is especially useful for that purpose), in order to find a model of a country to which the majority of Argentines aspire.

But the same coincidence existed in the detailed analysis of the bases, regarding an admitted flaw: the lack of emphasis on the federalist proposals in the plan.

Presidentialism

The evaluation of the dialog indicates that the large majority of participants therein were inclined to retain the presidentialist system, considering it more closely allied to our history and to the political idiosyncracies of Argentines. The opposing view was put forth by Prof Americo Ghioldi, the top-ranking leader of the Social Democratic Party, who advocated a semi-presidential system, with the election of a president through a general

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agreement among parties, and the election of a prime minister belonging to the ranks of the party with the most votes. Thus far, the latter has evoked a certain amount of skepticism on the part of the military, but it should be noted that (as the columnist and political analyst, Jose Claudio Escribano, has already noted at a meeting with colleagues) Professor Ghioldi was obviously not referring, with his proposal, to the progress of a stable political system, but rather to the forced transition to it by a civilian-military convergence that would make it possible to definitively establish a democratic way of life. In other words, Ghioldi's proposal involves a practical method for an electoral solution which, through an agreement among parties, would allow for the election of a military president, a politician prime minister and a congress representing the electoral tendency of the citizens.

With respect to this part of the future institutionalization, the sources pointed out that there was a proposal emanating from the dialog that, when the phase of electoral consultation occurred, only one third of the congress would be elected, while the other two thirds would be provided for with appointments, apparently by the military authorities. It would be ridiculous to assume that the Armed Forces have already formed a homogeneous opinion on that matter. The method, a way of curbing the possibility of a congressional excess that would cause a conflict of authority, indicates that, in the consecutive elections to renew congress, legislators should be elected in thirds, until it was completely filled in three elections every 2 years. It was in the aforementioned discussion among newsmen that Escribano's erudition evoked a shared amount of admiration for his knowledge, and guffaws over a strange ethnic association: It so happens that the method was used in Thailand by the military when they began their institutionalist breakthrough. It was columnist Jose Ignacio Lopez who finished off the irony by talking about a "Thai model." The informants declined to identify exactly who proposed that solution for the future means of restoring the legislative branch, but common sense indicates that the notion is merely an isolated remark, also aimed at making the transition from a state of exception to one of definitive normalization, and not at keeping it as a permanent method.

Municipalism

Another point stressed by the sources was the unanimity that has existed thus far on attaching special institutional importance to a strong system capable of attaching special importance to municipalism, to be sure, with very different viewpoints. While some of the participants in the dialog view the municipal task as an administrative method of vital importance for raising the living standard of the citizen with respect to the work that he is starting in his own backyard, rather than looking at what is going on in the government residence...others, however, view municipalism as the seed of the citizen's participation in the political life of his country, far removed from the merely statutory and efficiency-oriented positions relating to the common task. This second position (backed for obvious reasons by the representatives of political parties) is one which observes in the development of municipalism the best school for governors, with the theory (by

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no means preposterous) that those who become intendents or aldermen create in the municipality a major school for subsequent access to the provincial or national legislatures, or to more important echelons in the executive branch. It is a means of guaranteeing, in time and on the basis of tangible facts, the famous suitability which everyone admires and proclaims, but which cannot be achieved other than by a practical demonstration of the amount of intelligence, integrity and executive skill that meritorious public office requires.

The Military Authority

The issue of military participation in the future institutionalization of the country, according to the statements made by our sources, appears to have been better interpreted in the news media than among politicians, among whom there have arisen expectations which are as irritating as they are dubious concerning the military's desire to participate in running public administration.

The Armed Forces have actually never said that they wanted to be converted into an authority above the state authority, because that would result in a political format that had nothing to do with the democracy that they sincerely advocate. It is claimed that a military commander currently serving in the government, upon analyzing the matter with his advisers, humorously introduced the term "militaritocracy" as one pertaining to that unwanted system, which in reality would be nothing but a common military dictatorship with democratic trappings.

What the Armed Forces want, logically, is not to remain dissociated from the high-level policy decision-making in the country, after having been responsible (at a high cost of lives, sacrifices and the inevitable internal friction) for the total assumption of political power in the country in order to start the national reorganization process. To put it bluntly, they want to prevent this from ending in a complete transfer of political responsibility to the civilians, returning to the traditional fluctuations between civilian and military governments. But the Armed Forces have in no way established the form of that participation, much less hinted at a departure from the constitutionalist spirit which inspires their leaders who, not because they felt obliged to suspend the force of the Constitution, renounce the spirit of the Constitution of 1853.

The politicians in particular are the ones who have unnecessarily suspected that this need that has been proposed to definitively establish the military authorities' participation in the running of the government has anti-constitutional connotations.

And, up until now, and quite effectively, the dialog has served to clear the way toward the forms of participation. It was apparently a jurist who spoke at length about the historical considerations reflecting the issue. Until

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the institutionalization of the Air Force, there were Ministries of War and Navy. Later, the constitutional practice of calling for a law on ministries which did not necessarily establish the eight portfolios separated the Armed Forces from the national cabinet. Most of the participants in the dialog are inclined to return to the military ministries, and even to a second course of action, which was already taken during the Radical government of 1963-66: the formation of a National Security Council, with obvious, extensive military participation.

In this respect it should be pointed out that something is afoot in the military ranks: what has not worked is the appointment of military ministers who are not answerable for the leadership of the commanders-in-chief. To find a really constructive formula, when the president forms his cabinet, he should reach an agreement to have the military ministers be a real reflection of each branch in the executive branch, and not mere appointments which were often made but were seldom agreed to by the commanders and the high command.

It should be said that the issue is a priority one for achieving the pattern for a realistic policy. But we must point out that, nowadays, the Armed Forces are hearing, through the dialog, ideas on the subject expressed by the sectors that have been consulted. And there has been considerable progress in the idea of achieving a future military participation, which is, moreover, institutionalized in all Western governments, within a political system that is perfectly geared to the philosophy of our Constitution.


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COSTA RICA

COMMUNIST PARTY CONDEMNS U.S. POLICIES

PA171304 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0005 GMT 17 Jun 80

[Text] San Jose, 16 Jun (PL)--The participants at the 13th Congress of the Costa Rican Communist Party have condemned the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism against the countries of the socialist community, the national liberation movements and democracy. The congress of the Costa Rican Communists scored the U.S. attitude in the Caribbean, Central America and other regions of the world, an attitude aimed at undermining the detente process.

During today's session, the delegates studied and approved the report presented by Manuel Mora Valverde, the party's secretary general. The report analyzes the national and international situation and some of the activities carried out by the party since the last congress. The participants agreed that the country is going through a serious political, economic and social crisis, pointing out Costa Rica's dependency on the International Monetary Fund and monopolies and noting the failure of the "development model" imposed by the United States.

The Communist Party imposed on itself the task of creating a broad democratic front that may unite all the patriotic and anti-imperialist forces in the country to struggle for true national independence.

The congress also examined statute changes and elected a new Central Committee that has 35 members, 5 more than the previous one. The congress also elected 15 alternates.

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CUBA

'GRANMA' DENOUNCES CARTER'S SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY

PA071445 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1330 GMT 7 Jun 80

[Text] Havana, 7 Jun (PL)--The support of U.S. President James Carter for the Uruguayan Government's plan to obtain an alleged return to constitutionality is denounced today by the newspaper GRANMA.

In an item in its international page, the Cuban paper comments on the statements by the U.S. President, on receiving former Uruguayan President Jorge Pacheco Areco as ambassador, according to which "He is following with interest the process aimed at returning this Latin American nation to a constitutional government system."


Carter, the paper said, offers his confidence to the deceitful plan which the Uruguayan military has set in motion with the obvious purpose of maintaining the reins of power under the guise of a return to constitutionality.

GRANMA questions the success of a popular referendum in Uruguay where--noting the prisons are filled with political prisoners--there are many persons missing and one of every five Uruguayans has decided to leave the country in view of the existing political persecution and unemployment problem.

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
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HAITI

OPPOSITION DISCLOSES U.S.-DUVALIER AGREEMENT ON INTERVENTION

PA091714 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0335 GMT 9 Jun 80

[Text] Mexico City, 9 Jun (PL)--Haitian President for Life Jean-Claude Duvalier, in an act of treason, has signed agreements with the United States authorizing intervention by foreign troops in Haiti in the case of internal political conflicts, it has been charged here.

HAITI INFORMACION, the organ of the Haitian Democratic Committee, has published an agreement signed by Duvalier after a visit to Haiti by U.S. Gen Robert Schweitzer. The agreement authorizes intervention by Dominican troops in Haiti. The agreement states:

"In view of the current difficulty the U.S. Armed Forces are having in intervening in Latin America, and particularly in Haiti, where an outbreak of political and military tension can emerge at any moment; in view of the great numerical, material, technical, tactical and morale weakness of the Haitian Armed Forces, which do not have a navy, air force or artillery; and in case a real guerrilla front emerges in Haiti, the Haitian and U.S. governments propose to the Dominican Government and armed forces that they directly intervene in Haiti to become the main fighting force against the Haitian guerrillas.

"Therefore, the U.S. Government firmly declares it is willing to help the Dominican Government and forces in all fields (political, military and economic) so they can fully carry out that possible role."

HAITI INFORMACION added that as a result of the Schweitzer-Duvalier agreement, Lt Gen Mario Imbert McGregor, chief of the Dominican armed forces, announced on 15 April the construction of 12 new military camps along the border with Haiti.

The general also ordered the construction of a new military garrison, housing and training areas for troops in Mecasi and the expansion of the Pedro Santana and Elias Pina forts.

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According to the agreement and to talks subsequently held by Dominican President Guzman and Duvalier, the Dominican Army began "Operation Border Confraternity."

HAITI INFORMACION charged that this is an exercise for the mobilization of an intervention force coordinated by the operating center of the Dominican armed forces and the national police.

HAITI INFORMACION concludes by issuing a call on behalf of the Haitian immigrants and the Haitian Patriotic Nationalist Organization to all the continent's progressive forces to denounce Duvalier's treason, U.S. arrogance and the attempts to promote the Dominican Republic's intervention to crush the Haitian democratic movement.

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NICARAGUA

COMANDANTE DOS APPEARS ON DIRECT LINE PROGRAM

PA132200 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2005 GMT 13 Jun 80

[Text] Managua, 13 Jun (PL)--The Sandinist Front includes Marxists and Christians united under the symbol of Sandino. That is our militants' ideology which, we believe, will help us in the advance of this revolution, said Dora Maria Tellez.

Comandante Dos, well-known for her participation in the assault of the National Palace on August 1978, appeared last night in the Radio Sandino "Direct Line" program to answer questions to the Nicaraguan people.

The vice president of the State Council explained that those who are Sandinists maintain flexibility and are receptive to and able to synthesize the best of any theory and apply it creatively to conform to the needs of each country.

She noted that the revolution is Sandinist because it responds to the legacy of Sandino, because it considers the workers as the backbone of the process and because it is anti-imperialist and rejects any foreign intervention which may try to exploit the country.

Dora Maria Tellez explained that the release of the members of the Workers Front and the Central of Labor Action and Unity (CAUS), who had been arrested for promoting antigovernment activities, was possible thanks to the magnanimous nature of the revolution which believes in man's ability to correct past mistakes.


Notwithstanding, she warned, the people will be on the alert against those who work against production, economic recovery and the revolution as a whole, and added that the National Sandinist Liberation Front policy is not to adopt harsh measures, but, due to its moral and political authority, to offer those confused the opportunity to mend their ways.

Referring to the participation of the petty bourgeoisie in the revolution, she said that many companeros of that sector are engaged in reconstruction

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
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
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NICARAGUA

MINISTER CARDENAL'S VISIT TO USSR CONCLUDES

PA261748 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1955 GMT 25 Jun 80

[Article by Leandro Pubillones]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun (PL)--Nicaraguan Culture Minister Ernesto Cardenal has said here that the Nicaraguan people are the masters of their culture as they are the masters of their means of production, the land and the mines which were controlled by the Somoza dictatorship.

Cardenal today ended an official visit to the Soviet Union. He headed a delegation which included writer Lisandro Chavez Alfaro, chief of the National Art Department, and Silvia Gutierrez.

Cardenal said that during the first year of the Sandinist revolution there has been a major cultural rebirth in Nicaragua with the creation of culture houses and folk, theater and music groups.

He noted the high artistic level of current craftsmanship, primitivistic painting and the new protest songs.

But the most important thing of all is the people's access to culture, Minister Cardenal summed up, because culture used to be accessible only to the privileged.

In addition to meeting with Soviet Culture Minister Pietr Demichev, Cardenal and his party spent almost 10 days touring historic and architectural monuments, museums and art centers.

We visited heroic Leningrad, birth of the socialist October Revolution, this revolution which is a great source of inspiration to our people and for which mankind must be grateful, he added.

The Nicaraguan delegation and its Soviet counterpart drew up a work protocol for Cultural Cooperation 1980-1981 in line with the agreement signed here in March by a delegation of the junta of the Government of National Reconstruction which included commanders of the revolution Humberto Ortega, Tomas Borge and Henry Ruiz, and also Moises Hassan.

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The protocol will permit the exchange of artistic groups and soloists, cultural experts, exhibitions and representatives of the unions of composers, writers, painters and others with the Sandinist Cultural Workers Association.

Our experts in the conservation of historic and architectural monuments and our library scientists will come to the Soviet Union and we will receive experts in these and other fields in Nicaragua, Cardenal noted.

Soviet-Nicaraguan cultural exchange will also cover the promotion of the study of Russian in Nicaragua and the translation and publication of Soviet literary works there, and the publication of books by Nicaraguan authors in the Soviet Union.

They will also exchange radio and television programs, athletes' visits and tourists.

The poet and culture minister was very enthusiastic when he spoke about the emergence of revolutionary literature in Nicaragua: "We have created poetry workshops in factories, communities, military units, study centers. We now have 100 poets who have come out of the mass of the people as a result of that work."

Nicaragua is composing realistic, vital, revolutionary poetry, Cardenal explained, and when the literacy campaign is over several Ruben Darios will surface in our country because we have always had a poetic tradition, he stated.

Regarding repeated attacks on the Sandinist revolution in Nicaragua, Cardenal said that the reactionaries are trying to put obstacles along the way to development by creating difficulties.

That is the normal way of the reactionaries, he said, but the enemies of the Sandinist revolution have been defeated. He added that nothing will prevent the accomplishment of the goals of the revolution for which so many martyrs gave their lives.

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NICARAGUA

RANCHER CONFESSES COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TIES

PA061525 Havana PRELA in English 1510 GMT 6 Jun 80

[Article by Francisco Urizarri]

[Text] Managua, 6 Jun (PL)--Rancher Odel Incer Barquero, arrested three days ago by state security, confessed his collaboration with counterrevolutionary bands, announced Jaime Wheelock, commander of the revolution and farm development minister.

Incer Barquero is deputy representative of the Nicaraguan Cattle Producers (UPANIC) in the Council of State and his arrest was given wide coverage in the press media with links to private business.

In this regard, at a press conference Wheelock labelled "tendentious and alarmist" reports in the daily LA PRENSA under the heading "Mass Arrests of Ranchers in Boacoa."

The irresponsible report, added the member of the national leadership of the Sandinist front, is designed to suggest that the government is launching an offensive against the producers when in fact those arrested are in that situation because of their counterrevolutionary activities.

Incer signed a confession admitting he contributed 500 dollars for the counterrevolutionary activities of the self styled "Democratic Armed Forces" (FAD) which was partially dismantled by the Sandinist security.

This cattleman, said Wheelock, was well aware that FAD was a pro-Somoza organization led by such elements as former sports leader Carlos Garcia, who was also a lieutenant in the Somoza security agency.

He added that the Incer Barquero brothers (both are under arrest) are also linked to counterrevolutionary bands in the zone of Matigua, Boaco, Boaquito, Chontales and other center-western cattle zones, as well as in this capital.

One of those bands killed a Sandinist policeman during an attack two weeks ago on the San Jose de los Remates garrison 100 kilometers northeast of Managua.

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Wheelock also spoke of the release under a pardon of five members of the self styled "workers front" whom he described as elements whose ideological confusions and deviations turned them into obstacles for the revolutionary process.

"We've spoken with each of them to work for their integration in the revolutionary process," said Wheelock, who added that they will be able to continue to defend their ideas and dissent, but not fall into illegality because that means acting against the revolution.

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PANAMA

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR DISCUSSES MEDIA INFLUENCE, FAMILY

PA120418 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0345 GMT 12 Jun 80

[Text] Panama City, 11 Jun (PL)--Several examples of manipulation of the news by the international news agencies were given today during the second session of the seminar on mass media influence.

The delegations from Chile, the Soviet Union and the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) presented their position papers to the delegates from 41 nations who began to discuss them in four committees during the seminar on the influence of the media on women, children and the family.

Hortensia Bussi, Allende's widow, discussed some examples of the international press campaigns waged against the Popular Unity government, which was presided over by Salvador Allende, in order to destabilize it and lead it to the military coup d'etat.

She cited the extensive coverage that the media, backed by capital, gave to the maneuvers of the rightwing opposition to destabilize the popular government while silencing its achievements.

She also noted the coverage that the media give to the alleged economic accomplishments of the military junta led by Gen Augusto Pinochet, disregarding the poverty, unemployment, lack of education and health of millions of Chileans.

The participants in the seminar also heard a lecture by an old Soviet news-woman, Valentina Vaniti, who denounced the constant campaign undertaken by the international news agencies against the socialist countries and their constant warmongering.

Efrain Ruiz Caro, IOJ representative in Latin America, presented a position paper on media ownership.

He explained the media are closely linked in Latin America and most belong to family groups which defend interests alien to the people whom they claim to serve.

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Ruiz Caro advocated the collective ownership of the press and briefly referred to Peru's experience with this which, he said, has been interrupted, but its basic guidelines should be studied and furthered.

The seminar which is being held at the conventions palace in Panama City will end on 14 June.

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