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West Europe Report

(FOUO 32/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION'S BIGEARD INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 13 Jun 80 p 81

[Interview with Marcel Bigeard of the National Defense Commission by Florence Portes]

[Text] [Question] Should France be equipped with a neutron bomb?

[Answer] The neutron bomb is an improved Pluton, a still more modern arm which does still more harm by destroying people without destroying property. As ours is a dissuasive policy--it is the end of the world or nothing--we should therefore do some research on the neutron bomb, for we cannot lag behind the United States or the USSR. General de Gaulle, who was not one to lag behind, and who contrary to everyone else resolved to develop nuclear power, would most certainly not be against it.

[Question] On the strategic plane, what are the different points of view among the four political units who are seated at the committee?

[Answer] It is not my place to disclose these differences to you. At any rate, the Communists, Socialists, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF [French Democratic Union] are all in agreement on strategic power. A few years ago, that was not so. Moreover, the entire committee is not against a reasonable increase in the number of nuclear submarines.

[Question] Has France the means of pursuing its nuclear policy while at the same time it is developing the neutron bomb?

[Answer] Here we go back to the neutron bomb again. But we have not yet reached the stage of asking for research. I'll say once again: at this point, the Americans would like to have it--under certain conditions--and the Russians do not have it. And if neither one nor the other has it, perhaps there is no need to keep on trying to see which one can outdo the other, for at this stage of the game neither one is going to stop trying. Having made my point, I am calling for an increase in our budget which from 3.76 percent of the PIB should go up very quickly to 4 percent and soon after to 4.5 percent. Now that the largest amount has been reached (220 billion funded in 20 years), if we do our utmost, what can prevent us from having 8 to 10 nuclear submarines and a neutron bomb into the bargain?

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[Question] Do you believe that there is a risk of war? Some 72 percent of the French people believe there is, according to the EXPRESS opinion poll.

[Answer] That is why now is the time to increase the budget: the French people will understand this. Personally, I do not believe we are headed for the end of the world. As for war, we are already in one, an economic, demographic war, which is why we need to maintain a standing army in order to be able to take action as in Kolwezi, for example. But why would the Russians launch a nuclear attack on us? They have always said: we shall not engage in war with you with our tanks and our planes. We shall not engage in war until your countries are undermined from within. However, we must be ready for anything. France is separated from the Warsaw Pact countries only by Germany, a 200 kilometer strip, a half-day's run away.

[Question] While in France, the Pope took up the cudgels against nuclear escalation. Yet, you practising Catholics, are all in favor of the neutron bomb.

[Answer] The best policy, of course, would be world disarmament. But we must consider what kind of world we are living in. France is not trying to pick a quarrel with anyone. We took action in Africa only at our friends' request, to keep the Russians out. But to enter into face to face conflict with the Russians, that would be a very different situation. Confronted by a wolf-dog, a little pug that yelps "Stop" is very cute, but it gets him nowhere. You would have to see how hard they exert themselves: 2 or 3 years of military service, the Soviet soldier vows to die for his country, and what discipline 4 million men under arms, 15 percent of the PNB [Gross National Product], 80 nuclear submarines, a 12-million kiloton power, a sophisticated airplane, the "Back-Fire," which the Americans do not have... This is by no means just to go strawberry picking with. Consequently, faced with a power such as this, it is better to be on the defensive.

[Question] The RPR has just proposed a 4-month decrease in military service. Are you in favor of this?

[Answer] I am against it. In my opinion, it should be 1 year or none at all. This is the way to develop patriotism, an ideal. Just when our armies are reorganized and morale is good is not the time to go and reduce the ranks...

[Question] Is sending the privates to clean the beaches defending the country?

[Answer] And the paratroopers? The 9th in Brittany? Our fighter pilots? What are you doing with them? There were only 3,000 conscripted men on the beaches. But as much as I am against soldiers being used as street sweepers, I believe that when there is a question of a national tragedy, it is only natural that the army be called in.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

FIRST THREE YEARS OF MILITARY PROGRAMMING LAW REVIEWED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 56-57

[Article by Capt Yvan Noel--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[Text] "...A review of the first 3 years of the programming law makes it apparent that legislative goals were attained not only with respect to nuclear forces--improvement of which was a feature of the three preceding programming laws--but also with respect to the main armament programs, general and defense research, as well as the peace of activity of the forces and living conditions of military personnel."(1)

Law No 76-531 of 19 June 1976 covering approval of the military programming for the years 1977-1982, in its special article, called for "Parliament to be delivered, before 31 October 1979, a report bringing up to date for the period 1980-1982 the objectives and their relation to military expenditures and equipment for the armed forces."

This report, covering the carrying-out of the law, was delivered by the government to the Assembly office at the beginning of September 1979 and was the object of a debate, but not a vote, during the last parliamentary session.(2)

Midway through the period covered by the law, we can review the overall performance in the first 3 years; to do that, we must look at the main objectives set in the law in the following different fields: financial resources, activities, equipment programs, study and research....

It is also possible to assess the usefulness of the new programming method in force.

One must first of all recall the main features of the 1977-1982 military programming law, and emphasize its clear innovations with respect to previous programming laws.

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It covers /overall programming,/ that is, it takes into account all the expenses of the forces, both operating expenses (Title III) and equipment outlays (Title V).

Expressed in /parliamentary credits/--covering the totality of expenses-- it thus offers the armies a guarantee of resources by which they are assured a growth in purchasing power.

It fixes /precise objectis/ to attain in the area of equipment; annexed to the law, a catalog recapitulates the delivery orders to be realized during the period covered by the law for the 39 main materiel programs of the 3 forces, while the priority given to the improvement of the nuclear forces and necessary efforts in study and research are underlined.

The performance review of the first 3 years of the law can be broken down into the following areas:

/In the financial area/ first of all, overall resources devoted to Defense for the first 3 years were higher by 3.943 million Fr. than those prescribed in the law (in total 204.558 million Fr.(3) compared to 200.615 million Fr.).

These supplementary resources reflect, in part, the real change in economic parameters which existed at the time the law was written.

It must be noted, in looking over these credits, that there has been a more rapid return than anticipated to a better balance between operating and capital expenditures, the Title III portion decreasing from 59 percent in 1977 to 56.8 percent in 1979, while that of Title V increased correspondingly from 41 to 43.2 percent.

The appropriations in program authorizations were--in conformity with the law--annually adjusted to the resource packages expressed in parliamentary credits. They increased from 26.550 million Fr. in 1977 to 42.892 million Fr. in 1979, for an average growth rate of 27 percent.

Priority for Achievement of the Primary Materiel Programs

/In the area of equipment,/ the following observations can be made:

--the priority given to /nuclear forces/ (Strategic Nuclear Forces/Tactical Nuclear Forces) has on the one hand allowed for completion of the research and production envisioned in the law, and on the other hand, for the carrying out of new decisions made since 1976: manufacture of additional M-20 missiles in order to supply four of the five SNLE's (Missile Launching Nuclear Submarines) in service starting in 1980; ordering, in 1978, the sixth SNLE, "Inflexible," due to go into service in early 1985, armed with new M-4 missiles, extension to 1985 of the Mirage-4 of the strategic air forces...

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The expenses for strategic and tactical nuclear forces have stayed at about 33 percent of Title V credits;

--Regarding/conventional materiel/, effort has been directed at the main programs figuring in the catalog annexed to the law; the latter have thus without exception been able to be accomplished under the conditions set by the legislature. The only delays, as a consequence of delays necessary for technical considerations, concern /for the land forces/ the 155 mm rapid-fire gun, and for the air force, the Mirage 2000.

The new decisions made since 1976 have been taken into account: they consist basically of:

--/for the air force/, increasing the Transall fleet, in 1977, and acceleration of the program for anti-aircraft defense of vulnerable points, and especially of FAS (strategic air forces) bases.

--/For the navy,/ the adoption in 1978 of a group of long-term objectives called "Navy 2000" as well as development of the new-generation naval patrol aircraft (A.N.G.).

But it must be noted that the priority given to realization of the main materiel programs has had repercussions on the progress of operational environment programs--support, infrastructure, stocks--some of which have had to be stretched out.

Progress in Various Areas

/In the area of active duty strength,/ the law stressed that personnel in the forces had to be given suitable living arrangements and conditions, and that this responsibility had to be met no matter what. The agreed effort on behalf of personnel enabled the carrying-out of the reforms promised by the new statutes put in place. The most significant measures concern the indexed ranking of officers and N.C.O.'s, improvement of career planning, creation of the rank of major, extension of enlistment bounty provisions to the legionnaires and female personnel, and the creation of merit and [length of] service bonuses.

/In the area of operational activity of the forces,/ the law set numerical objectives to be met as soon as possible, in order to bring back up the level of activity, which was judged insufficient: 15 hours of flight per month for each combat pilot, 100 days per year at sea for naval units, 100 days of training in camp, maneuvers or exercises outside garrison. The effort committed since 1977 has permitted the three forces to make significant progress toward reaching these goals.

/In the field of operations,/ the increasing cost of salaries and fringe benefits (R.C.S.) as well as activity-related expenses, and the priority given to weapons and materiel manufacture, have not allowed for freeing up for this sector all the credits desired.

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/In the area of study and research,/ the previously observed trend has been reversed, in conformity with the objectives of the law. In carrying out the decisions of the Council of Research and Defense Studies (C.R.E.D.) created in 1976 within the ministry, expenses devoted to research were increased quite significantly: in 3 years, credits for upstream development research alone grew by 60 percent. This sizeable effort, while assuring in the medium and long term the realization of our future in materiel, also reflects the determination of the French armaments industry to provide high technology and competitiveness.

Finally, the performance review on the military programming law would be incomplete without mention of the supplementary expenses born by the forces because of exceptional circumstances. We are speaking of the interventions undertaken both within our borders, in the context of national solidarity operations--the Polmar Plan (1978)--and on other continents for the benefit of states linked to France by international agreements, in Africa (Chad, Mauritania, Zaire) and in the Middle East (Lebanon).

According to the programming law, the defense budget should reach 20 percent of the state's budget in 1982, this objective being defined by comparison to its 1976 structure. Now in 1977, then in 1978, exceptional increases hit public assistance expenditures and modified the budgetary structure; the changes were accelerated in 1979 by the great increase in the public debt and in the state's intervention credits. The reference to the state budget having thus lost its practical significance, the Government decided to link the growth of military expenditures to a more permanent measure, namely the Gross Internal Product (mercantile), in order more concretely to measure the growth of the agreed financial effort for Defense.

In this way Defense's share of the budget, as a portion of the Gross Internal Product (mercantile) grew from 3.41 percent in 1976 on the eve of the law's coming into force, to 3.67 percent in 1979, this being an increase of 0.09 percent per year on average. For the years 1980 to 1982, this share should grow, as during the first 3 years, by 0.09 percent per year, to reach around 4 percent at the end of the period covered by the law.

Because it gives, over a period of 6 years, a picture of all the forces, the new programming method showed itself to be a valuable and efficient tool of analysis and decision-making for general staff, directorates, and services, and for facilitating parliamentary oversight of execution.

The military programming is developed each year through the internal work of the ministry, and in the context of a 6-year horizon; at that time, the authorities responsible for preparation and setting up of forces can devote their thought primarily to the medium term, watch over the coherence between the different programs in process of realization, measure the variance between the objectives to be attained and the results obtained, and adapt their activity to this fact in a continuous manner.

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Though naturally improvement is always possible, the new programming method represents a tool well adapted for attaining the objectives of the law.

FOOTNOTES

1. Report to Parliament on performance and results of Law No 76-531 of 19 June 1976 concerning approval of military programming for 1977-1982 (September 1979).
2. On 2 October in the National Assembly, on 8 November in the Senate.
3. Resources figuring in the catalog annexed to the law: /58,000 million Fr. in 1977, 66,460 million Fr. in 1978, 76,155 million fr. in 1979./
--/Initial budgets:/ 58,412.2 million Fr. in 1977, 67,654 million Fr. in 1978, 77,110.8 million Fr. in 1979.
--/Final budgets:/ 58,616 million Fr. in 1977, 68,282 million Fr. in 1978, 77,660 million Fr. in 1979 (estimate).

(Captain Yvan Noel entered Naval College in 1951, has diplomas in submarine weaponry and advanced military studies. He has commanded the minesweep guardship "Paimpolaise," the fast escort ship "Lorrain" and the squadron escort "D'Estrees." He is presently chief of the "Programming Studies" section of the "Plans/Programs/Budget" division of the general staff of the forces.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MORE EFFICIENT USE OF DEFENSE RESOURCES CALLED FOR

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 38-39

[Article by Bertrand Lenicque, commissioner in chief]

[Text] Created in 1970, attached to the army general staff and located at the War College, the Center for Study of Methods and Techniques of Action (CEMTA) aims to help promote within the ministry of defense the attitudes, methods, and techniques of modern management.

CEMTA each year organizes informative 1-week classes for general officers and month-long training classes for high-ranking officers, classes in which civilian personnel of equivalent rank also participate. It also lends its assistance to higher military education facilities in matters of training in economics and management.

The main objective of its activity is to help the senior staff of the armies to best use the resources of the Ministry of Defense to accomplish their missions. To this end, it tries to make modern management better known and understood, and to convince everyone that he can and should put it into effect in his own field and at his own level in order to improve the efficiency of his own action.

Myth and Reality in Management

In France and above all in the public sector, including the armies, management is still a sort of myth for many.

It is often taken for a passing fashion spring from a primitive "Americomania," perhaps good for large capitalist enterprises avid for profit, but certainly harmful or inapplicable to public services devoted to the general interest. It is also taken for a disorderly collection of vague methods or sophisticated techniques which delight esoteric specialists but which only serve to add further complications to the tasks of responsible officials and men of action.

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It is true that management is done a disservice by its more or less Anglo-Saxon sound, which some pride themselves on their ability to pronounce correctly, but the word actually does not conceal its Latin origin, and it is recognized by the Academie Francaise. It is also true that the esoteric language and perfectionistic comportment of some experts in modern techniques do not contribute to revealing the real essence of management and its real utility. It is true, finally, the management has often suffered from premature transpositions from the United States to France and from the private sector to the public sector, without taking into account intelligently the human, social, and economic characteristics proper to each of these countries or sectors.

But it would be a pity if the distortions of management poorly understood or poorly practiced should lead to a rejection of well-regulated management the only object and effect of which is to permit everyone to use more efficiently the human, financial, and material resources available within his field of action.

For the real utility of management is precisely to improve the efficiency of organizations, in the public as in the private sector: this economic efficiency, through an optimal use of always limited resources; and their social efficiency, through a better satisfaction of the material and intangible needs of their members and of the beneficiaries of their activity.

The uniqueness of the public services and the uniqueness of defense, in comparison with private sector enterprises, are indisputable but should not be exaggerated. For the basic problems that leadership of any organization, public or private, poses, are identical: the desired efficiency can only be attained through good decisions, good choices, and by virtue of good execution and waste-free management. Now public and military uniqueness often serve as convenient alibis allowing modern management as a whole to be condemned and permitting total or partial rejection of its innovative attitude, its rational methods of thought and action, its modern techniques to aid enlightened decision-making and efficient management.

Management and Defense

The move to "rationalization of budgetary choices" (RCB) was officially begun in 1968 in the ministries in order to improve overall efficiency in their activities through recourse to an attitude, methods, and techniques of modern management adapted to the public sector.

The ministry of defense was one of the first to move in the directions opened up by RCA and the only one to use the approach of starting with missions and long and medium term objectives and then descending to daily and concrete activity in terms of financial and material resource management.

The ultimate goal of this approach is to improve the cost-benefit ratio of defense. The way of getting there is, on the one hand, to deploy resources in an optimal way to the functions most conformable to the missions, through

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rational decision-making methods and multi-year programming of activities. It consists, on the other hand, in using as efficiently as possible the resources thus distributed, through modernization of management by the system of administrative budgets, total operating budgets, and program budgets.

Thus the most efficient use of defense's financial and material resources is delineated and the resources are put in place.

But much progress remains to be made. Inertia, reservations, and misunderstandings remain to be surmounted, for the decision-making tools remain all too often the province of experts in the central echelons, and decision-makers at the less centralized levels rarely can, want, or know how to have recourse to them. The spirit and methods of multi-year programming still seem to remain too confined to the higher levels of the hierarchy. And modernization of management still appears to the eyes of most resource-users as a heavy and useless burden requiring an excess of work to no profitable end.

Moreover, a vast field remains to be exploited: that of good usage of manpower. For the methods and techniques of modern activity remain focussed on good use of financial or material resources, neglecting still the problem of the efficiency of human resources.

It must not be forgotten that half the military budget is devoted to people, their remuneration, their training, and their maintenance. And one must not lose sight of the fact that if the overall efficiency of defense results from weapons systems and human systems, any increase in the efficiency of weapons systems necessitates an increase in investment expenditure and in new operating expenses, while a considerable increase in the efficiency of human systems can be obtained at no new cost by the revalorization of the human potential already existing.

Now concrete and participative processes of training and activity, proceeding from considerations of authority and the exercise of command, allow the mobilization of human energies toward a better accomplishment of the missions entrusted to the armies. The well understood and applied example of the "overall mission method" established since the end of 1976 in the schools and units of the ground army prove the point.

An Increased Need for Efficiency

The budgetary resources allotted to the Defense Ministry have increased every year for the last several years. From 1975 to 1980 the military budget grew from 44 billion Fr to 88 billion Fr, and the programming law anticipates a growth in the share of the gross internal product to be devoted to defense.


This increasing effort which France is making in the area of security should not blind defense personnel to the more and more critical situation in

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which over the last few years the nation's finances find themselves. For the slowdown of economic activity since 1974, the halving of the growth rate (from 5 or 6 percent to 2 or 3 percent) are bringing with them a stagnation with respect to state revenue, while the state's expenses continue to increase steeply. The state's budget has thus been in increasing deficit since 1975.

Such a situation imposes on all public servants and on all members of the defense ministry in particular--because of the vital mission they assume and because of the substantial size of the military budget--an increased need for efficiency in the use of financial, human, and material resources that are available for their use.

(Commissioner in chief Bertrand Lenicque served aboard several ships, and in ground units and services, in Indochina, Algeria, Dakar, and in metropolitan France. He was assigned to the special staff of the president of the republic from 1964 to 1968. After having directed the Navy School of Administration from 1973 to 1976, he became director of the Center for the Study of Methods and Techniques of Action in 1977.



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- KEY:
1. Land forces 19.1 percent
 2. Air forces 12.3 percent
 3. Naval forces 11.9 percent
 4. Constabulary 8.2 percent
 5. Overseas forces 2.7 percent
 6. Research and testing 4.3 percent
 7. Training organizations 8.5 percent
 8. Personnel support 5.9 percent
 9. Material support 4.3 percent
 10. General administration 3.6 percent
 11. Strategic nuclear forces and ANT [expansion unknown] 19.2 percent
 12. Forces 73.4 percent
 13. Support 26.6 percent
 14. Traditional branches
 15. Chart showing allocations according to destination among the 4 force systems and 5 support systems.

1 *Le budget de
Emploi*

2 **REMUNERATIONS ET
CHARGES SOCIALES
36,8%**

3 **DEPENSES
ORDINAIRES
55%**

4 **VIE COURANTE
12,6%**

5 **INFRASTRUCT.
4,3%**

6 **DEPENSES EN
CAPITAL
45%**

7 **FABRICATIONS
18,8%**

8 **ACTIVITE ET
STOCKS
OPERATIONNELS
14,5%**

9 **ETUDES ET
DEVELOPPEMENTS
13%**

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- KEY: 1. Defense budget for 1980. Where the money goes.
2. Remuneration and fringe benefits 36.8 percent
3. Ordinary expenses 55.0 percent
4. Operating expenses 12.6 percent
5. Infrastructure 4.3 percent
6. Capital expenses 45 percent
7. Manufactures 18.8 percent
8. Activities and operational stocks 14.5 percent
9. Research and development 13 percent

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MILITARY SERVICE REFORM EXAMINED IN DETAIL

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 7 Jun 80 pp 99-105

[Article by Michel Labro, with opinion poll report by Yann de l'Ecotais: "Should Military Service be Abolished?"]

[Text] "No problem. The little guys are ready to serve France." Named by the government in 1975 to end the unrest in the barracks, Gen Marcel Bigeard in his sarcastic way was optimistic about the morale of the troops after his visits to the mess halls.

Some 5 years later, before this same Bigeard now chairman of the national defense commission, Yves Lancien, Gaullist supporter from 18 June 1940, former second lieutenant in Indochina, said the opposite: "The army is partially motivated, partially trained and partially equipped for obscure missions."

Lancien proposed that most draftees serve a short time, like the Swiss. What would they do in the event of war? They would protect the country from panic, sabotage and enemy infiltration. Similarly, motivated volunteers would be urged to serve in the manoeuvring or strike forces. They would be paid for serving from 1 1/2 to 2 years and would receive benefits on leaving the army for return to civilian life.

Just 1 year before the presidential elections, a short time before the head of state will announce the new defense guidelines, the Lancien report touches on a taboo subject. Since the total mobilization decreed by the National Convention of 1792-1795 and the soldiers of year II, military service has been part of the common memory of the French. This reform proposal may revive the old debate between the supporters of the draft and those of the volunteer army. It may also deepen the divisions within the majority. On the draft as on the neutron bomb or nuclear armaments, the Gaullists take the opposite view to Giscardien military thinking and are closer to the socialists' ideas.

Draguignan, 10 September 1974. Here, in one of the most tranquil

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regiments of the capital, the first bitter confrontation broke out. For over 1 hour, 200 uniformed draftees marched in the streets. The same thing happened several weeks later in Karlsruhe, a garrison town for French forces in West Germany. Yes, friend private became a leftist. It was the shock of a repetition of the events of May 1968. The complaints subsequently became less political. The draftees demanded pay, leave, weekends with the conviction of oldtime trade unionists demanding a 40 hour week. Demonstrations are rarer today. Does it mean that the draftees have developed a taste for military life?

The Cool Underbrush

It Col Jean Bescond is happy. This officer with a fighter's build is in charge of the commando training center of the 26th Infantry Regiment at the Pont-Saint-Vincent fort, about 10 kms from Nancy. The guns which in the past looked down on the Moselle Valley have been removed from the fortifications. The steep walls, the moat have been made into an obstacle course. Everywhere, sweating draftees in combat uniform crawl from one to the other. It was very dark in a narrow underground corridor and targets lit up one after the other. The shots were on the mark. The soldiers left, crawling underground.

That night, the most formidable part of the apprenticeship began: a raid, 80 kms away, to be carried out in 2 nights. Silence! The platoon moved in columns. It was as if the darkness helped everyone to take it seriously. Despite the cool underbrush, people "were overcome with the heat." The next night, it rained. Their clothes were soaked, the rangers were sinking into the slippery earth, they could no longer feel their feet. They seemed to be walking in their sleep. However, no one complained...almost no one. "Here, at least the time goes quickly, it is not like at the quarters!" grumbled one draftee. "Despite the harsh commando training, we have few problems," stated the colonel. He has an infallible method for determining the troops' morale--the number of consultations at the infirmary. There are rarely more than two a day per company, which is five or six times less than at the barracks.

Boredom, the feeling of wasting time, combined with inequality are the two major problems arising from conscription. The army has an answer ready for the first accusation. During the year of active duty, a draftee has an average of 100 days of training outside the garrison (manoeuvres, one night camps or commando training centers.) There are 55 days of training and 50 days of general service work--the famous forced labor--or working in the fight against acts of God, oil spills, for example. The remainder is divided between classes--basic military training--and leave, weekends and holidays. "We would only need 6 months to learn what we are taught in 1 year," answered draftees. "Perhaps," admitted their officers, "but if military service is shortened, young men would leave just at the moment they become operational." It is

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understood: we will never have anyone under our command to wage war, we will train soldiers, not an army.

It is 0600 hours at the RMT [Chad Marching Regiment] at Montlhery in the Paris area when the sergeant on duty awakens the barracks rooms. Despite its name and its past--its first patron was Field Marshal Leclerc--the RMT is a mechanized infantry regiment like many others. It has logistics problems--not enough showers and meals which arrive cold at the dining-hall. It has equipment problems, like the maintenance of AMX 13 troop transport vehicles, for example. It takes 10 hours to change an engine, while the same job can be done on a modern AMX 10 in 2. The regiment will not be equipped for 4 years. It will not have the new army rifle, the Clairon, until 1981. The rate of introducing new equipment in the army is slow, much too slow.

In 1974, the RMT had "its" incident: draftees signed a petition sent to the minister. Since then, nothing to report. "We are over the hump," admitted Capt Claude Munk, an officer who came up through the ranks. "The draftees are available, but they are not patriotic. The country comes after their concerns."

On the edge of the rifle range, a small group is waiting dispiritedly to empty some small machinegun cartridges into cardboard targets. A warlike nature has very little appeal for them, even if they are aware of deteriorating international relations. "We have lived without war," said one of them, "so it is difficult to imagine anything else." Like his comrades, he is much more concerned by what he has just learned: the company has duty Saturday and leaves have been canceled. A bitter blow. Leave remains one of the primary concerns, along with pay. Today, it is 270 francs a month. One young man said: "Yesterday evening, I went with a friend to Paris. We went to the movies, had a bite in a fast food place; it cost 110 francs. You see how much is left!" Several of his comrades manages to be discharged during their "three days," in other words, by failing the selection tests. He envies them.

This is the second major problem of conscription: currently, one Frenchman out of four--the official figure--avoids the net. People in the barracks know this and it grates. The selection center at Rennes is the most modern of its type with the entrance hall decorated with green plants, fancy armchairs and a pleasant environment. It is the new-look reception. The first contact is designed to minimize the trauma as much as possible. We are far from the review board of the past where the hairy privates marched past a brusque medical officer. Here, in 3 half-days, medical examinations determine whether an individual is fit for duty. The psychiatrist has a difficult task. More than one self-styled mentally ill person, afflicted with problems of relating, is, above all, allergic to the uniform. In all, between 17 to 19 percent of the young men are exempt for medical reasons. This percentage is lower than that of

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neighboring countries, such as West Germany (22 percent) or the Netherlands (24 percent.)

Egalitarian Frenzy

"We try to be as egalitarian as possible," stated Gen Alban Barthez, director of national service. The exemptions vary, however, according to the principle of supply and demand. In the early 70's, there were more young men of draft age than the army could incorporate. They raised the requirements by taking the best; in other words, medical categories one to four. In 1973, those less well-qualified were once again recruited, category five. In 1975, overcome by an egalitarian frenzy, category 6 were declared fit for duty. That did not work out because of the number of exemptions granted from guard duty, marches, even for shoes and helmets after induction.

Another source of inequality: some could pamper themselves with an easy tour of duty in the Cooperation Ministry, in technical assistance or in one of the innumerable staff jobs. It is more appealing to be a clerk/orderly at the French Embassy in Ottawa than a G.I. in Mourmelon.

Today, the reprieve denied, most draftees choose their date of induction. Half serve in the region requested, even if the call often means a move to the east, France's true drill-ground. It is more difficult to choose one's service. Out of 100 young men, 75 go into the army, 14 to the air force and 6 into the navy while the latter services are most requested.

Although military service is boring for some, inequalitarian for others, does military service at least constitute a vital component of our defense? We have come to the heart of the debate. One of its basic *raison d'etre* was to supply reserves which the nation would need in the event of war. "However," said former Legionnaire Pierre Messner, "no country, not even the richest, can have on hand tanks, ships and planes which would go into action on D-day of the mobilization." The reservists could only be supplied with rifles and uniforms.... Gen Pierre Gallois, one mastermind of the French nuclear force, felt that, in any case, this immense outlay in men and equipment could no longer be justified. National independence is deterrence by nuclear force. There is no need for 500,000 men to explode the atom bomb and protect it from the enemy's grasp. No doubt, one-fourth that number would be enough, he estimated.

In this light, why not call on an army of technicians? An army ready to serve with highly sophisticated weapons having a great destructive capacity?

Volunteer army? Draft army? The debate is not a new one. Adversaries

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and supporters clash on several points. First there is the cost. In September, Arthur Paecht, UDF [French Democratic Union] deputy from Var compared the cost of an army of 500,000 draftees and a professional army, whose forces would be either 350,000 or 480,000. According to the figures used, the volunteer army would cost from 2.8 to 5.5 billion francs more a year for maintenance than the draft. The figures alone, however, do not provide an answer. What kind of army, what type of duties are assigned must be decided.

The supporters of the draft emphasize the need to make the country take part in its protection. "The French must feel involved," said Gen Jean-Paul Etcheverry. "The entire population wins or loses the war, not just the soldiers." The objection is raised that specialists already handle most of the defense since the army has slightly more than 52 percent enlistees on active duty (including the gendarmerie) as compared with 47 percent draftees.

No Coup d'Etat with Missiles

The debate also draws on history and political passions. According to some, the volunteer army might go beyond its role and intervene in the life of the nation. Is the volunteer army an army of coup plotters? "The image spread by the left is quite false," admitted Socialist Charles Hernu. "In Chile, an army of draftees overthrew the government of Salvador Allende." In France, there were also units of draftees among the rebellious regiments in 1962. "An army of specialists does not break up meetings or harangue crowds," said General Gallois. A coup d'etat is not carried out with atomic submarines and ballistic missiles.

On the other hand, a recent example favors the supporters of the draft-- the American example. Military service was abolished in the United States in 1973 when the Americans were withdrawing from Vietnam. Since then, the armed forces have only taken volunteers. They complain that they do not have enough applicants and above all, about their low intellectual level. Many are recruited from among Black and Hispanic-American minorities. There is the danger of emphasizing the division between the army and the nation. After the Kabul invasion, President Jimmy Carter announced he intended to revive draft registration. In West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt privately admitted that he considered the revival of the draft as a test of American ability to stem the Soviet tide.

The length and nature of military service depend primarily on the choice made about defense policy. Volunteer army or draft army, should it be well trained or not, how will these forces be used? Officially, France's military policy is still General de Gaulle's: strictly national defense supported by nuclear deterrent.

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In a major crisis, the government would use, as a last warning, small nuclear tactical weapons before unleashing large-scale nuclear force. For 15 years, conventional forces have thus been neglected. For financial reasons: one can not do everything at once. For strategic reasons, too: France for the first time in its history had the opportunity to be in second place. The doctrine has evolved. Political leaders, imply the military, will avoid premature use of even tactical nuclear weapons. This opens the way to a renewal of conventional means. The ground forces--hundreds of thousands of men--will be used to test the enemy's resolve, before deciding to go any farther. Some twit about the need to commit so many men and means to this task when it is unlikely that the adversary would limit himself to aggression by traditional weapons alone.

Second modification in the doctrine: the president of the republic stated in 1976 that in case of conflict "since there will be only one space, there must be only one military group." This concept was taken up, then developed by the recent UDF paper on defense. The French army must be planned, equipped and organized to do battle beside its European allies, in front of its own lines.

Socialists and communists see in this scenario a rejection of the strictly national concept of defense. The Gaullists do, too. They criticize it as weakening the credibility of deterrence. "France can not do everything and maintain several armies at once," said RPR [Rally for Republic] member Michel Aurillac. "The ground forces must provide a pause in the event of aggression and not fight on our allies' territory." "The definition of deterrence keeps us from having a battle strategy for the heart of Europe," advanced Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevenement. Gaullists and socialists logically agree on the idea of military service. A small number of divisions will be enough for the famous test of enemy intentions.

To achieve this goal, an army of volunteers with the most professional equipment would be better no doubt. Most draftees could do regional service, designed above all to protect the people. "The draftees of Le Puy-de-Dome would serve there," said Lancien, "and not in the barracks. In wartime, they would defend their turf, their region." This is one theme of the debate which the National Defense Commission is working on.

Signed: Charles de Gaulle

In proposing 4 months on active duty, supplemented by reserve tours and a volunteer army, Lancien thus satisfied men like Pierre Messmer who have never hidden their preference for an army of professionals. One may criticize Lancien for trying to establish a volunteer army without saying so, or one may carp about the regularity with which the French--who are not the Swiss--will do their reserve duty. Some will also

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criticize him, like Giscardist Jean-Marie Daillet for proposing a difficult costly reorganization of military structure in the context of international crisis and throwing tens of thousands of young men on the job market.

This foot soldier of Gaullism does not minimize the difficulties: "I will have part of the army against me," he said. "Its entire organization, its commands are based on maintaining active duty service. He added, I will not be the first to clash with the military." On his desk, he has a small book with a red, white and blue cover. He quotes a sentence underlined in pencil: "The army is by nature unwilling to change." The author was Charles de Gaulle.

French Opinion Poll and Commentary

Military service: a duty

Is it the duty of young people to contribute to France's defense by fulfilling their military service?

Complete agreement	38 percent
Partial agreement	26
Partial disagreement	14
Complete disagreement	21
No opinion	1

What type of service?

Which opinion do you agree with?

We must maintain the current universal military service	25 percent
We must retain universal military service in its essence but reform it	25
Young people should have the choice between military and civilian service	20
Military service should be abolished and only a volunteer army retained	17
The army in all its forms should be abolished	11
No opinion	2

Disputed effectiveness

In France's military organization, obligatory military service is a factor which is

Very effective	10 percent
Somewhat effective	36
Rather ineffective	29 = 50 percent
Not at all effective	21
No opinion	4

Duration of duty

In your opinion, what would be the optimal tour of military service?

No service at all	16 percent
Less than 6 months	15
From 6 to 9 months	12
From 9 to 12 months	30
From 12 to 15 months	18
From 15 to 18 months	3
More than 18 months	2
No opinion	4

In your opinion, should the age for military service

Depend on an individual's studies	77 percent
Be the same for all, and the same age	13
No opinion	10

Reform

Among the possible reforms of military service, which one should have priority? (Percentage cited first)

The possibility of obtaining additional vocational training during the tour of duty	39 percent
Increase in the monthly pay of the soldier	20
Limited period of military training, then reserve duty after returning to civilian life (15 days a year for 5 years, for example)	14
Possibility of military service close to home	8
Greater freedom of expression in the barracks	8
Reduced length of service	6
More exemptions and assistance for family and professional reasons	3
No opinion	2

Volunteer service or shortened period of service
If you had the choice between the two following formulas, which would you choose?*

Duty for 4 months with 2 reserve periods every year for 5 years	36 percent
Volunteer service for 18 months with pay and various benefits	42

*Question submitted only to young men of draft age, 12 percent of the sample

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No opinion 22 percent

Financial Incentives

Some proposals call for the abolition of universal military service and the establishment of a volunteer army. In this event, would you volunteer for 18 months under the following conditions*

Proposals	Yes	Maybe	Probably not	Certainly not	No answer
Pay of 1,000 francs a month (upkeep, lodging and food included)	6	11	12	68	3
Pay of 2,000 francs a month (upkeep, lodging and food included)	9	12	12	61	6
Pay of 3,000 francs (upkeep, lodging, food included)	17	17	10	51	5
A bonus of 30,000 francs at the beginning or end of service	26	14	8	48	4

Conscientious objectors

In your opinion, should conscientious objectors

Do civilian service for the same amount of time as military service	51 percent
Do military service in non-combat units	20
Do civilian service for a longer time than military service	10
No answer (and refusal to contemplate service for objectors)	19

*Question submitted only to young men of draft age, 12 percent of the sample

Women

Do you think that young women with no family responsibilities

Should spend a year performing civilian duties of a social nature?

No	68 percent
Yes	26
No opinion	6

Should do military service in combat units?

No	66 percent
Yes	29
No opinion	5

Should do military service in non-combat units?

No	65 percent
Yes	30
No opinion	5

This poll was taken between 5 and 16 May 1980, with a representative sample of 1,200 members of the French population, 15 years of age and older.

A total of 70 percent of the French agree there should be military service. What kind of service should it be? Only half consider that it should be military and still another 25 percent believe it should be reformed. Another 20 percent of the population, on the other hand, believe young people should have a choice between military and civilian service.

These figures, taken from a Bernard Krief-"L'Express" poll are only superficially surprising. Although only one Frenchman in four ultimately favors traditional military service, this is because the country questions its usefulness at a time when defense, in the general opinion, is basically a nuclear problem (See "L'Express" poll of 31 May 1980.)

Quite obviously, those between 35 and 44 years old favor the possibility of choice between civilian and military service or a reformed military service. Among those over 45, we find the most supporters of the good old service.

There is a conservatism based on social-professional categories---retirees and farmers are the main supporters of the status quo.

A total of 25 percent of the young people favor the pure and simple abolition of the army and an almost equal percentage favor a professional army.

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In the left, (Communist Party: 23 percent; Socialist Party: 21 percent; Ecologists: 22 percent) most supporters of a professional army alone are found.

What reform should be undertaken? The poll isolated the young men who in the future must choose. Voluntary service for 18 months "with pay and various benefits" tempts 42 percent.

This would be enough to form a sort of reserve if military service for most of the others were reduced according to the Swiss model, on the condition that the financial arrangements were adequately remunerative. Even a wage of 3,000 francs would only persuade one-third.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MIRAGE 2000: TWO YEARS OF TESTING SUMMED UP

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 29 Mar 80 pp 23, 25-27

[Article by Jacques Morisset]

[Text] The Mirage 2000 program was the subject last Tuesday at the Centre d'Essais en vol (Flight Test Center--GEV) at Bretigny during an overall presentation organized by the General Delegation for Armament (DGA) together with the air force and the main aircraft builders involved in the program. This presentation took place shortly after the delivery to the CEV, for acceptance, of three prototypes of the latest creation of Avions Marcel Dassault. They have now completed 400 hours of flying time after 2 years of testing.

Seldom can one observe such a large-scale presentation: Besides the three Mirage 2000 prototypes, which came in from Istres (they had arrived at Bretigny 3 days earlier), this was in fact a demonstration of about 10 airplanes used by the CEV to perfect the weapons system, and of a test bench (researched and produced by Dassault) set up at Bretigny. Topping it all off was a much appreciated flight demonstration of the Mirage 2000-01.

Explanations were provided by Engineer General Bousquet, technical director of Aeronautical Constructions (DTCA); chief engineer Tamagnini, director of the 2000 program at the STPA (Aeronautical Programs Technical Service); Mr Benson, the leading engineer responsible for the weapons system at STPA; and Colonel Varin, CEV chief pilot, who explained the means of testing and the important CEV contribution to the 2000 program. Mr Hibon, director of International Operations of the DGA, and General Forget, assistant chief of planning at air force headquarters, were also present.

The manufacturers: Dassault, SNECMA, Thompson-CSF, EMD and MATRA were there also, but amazingly enough, they made no official presentations. However, the organization of this demonstration by the CEV and the SIRPA/DGA was remarkable.

Three Versions of the Mirage 2000

Considering the operational needs of several types of missions there are now, or more precisely, will be, several versions of the Mirage 2000.

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The present three prototypes, soon to be four, are actually the forerunners of a family of planes whose main missions are: 1) the interception of aircraft flying at very high altitudes (25,000-30,000 meters, or 80,000 to 100,000 feet) and speeds (up to Mach 3) and planes flying at medium, low or very low altitudes. This mission will take on additional importance as a consequence of technical advances (which have resulted in the best possibilities for penetration being at either very high or very low altitudes) and the appearance of bombers having an extended range of action at very low altitude; 2) air superiority (combat); 3) attacks on ground targets using various conventional weapons systems (guns, rockets and so on; and 4) attacks on ground targets using nuclear weapons, consisting of the future ASMP (Air-to-Ground-Medium-Range) missile.

The response offered by the Mirage 2000 is based on the conviction that it is possible, starting from a basic airframe, to adapt the weapons system to these different missions. However, the first mission above is the most demanding (with respect to the airframe and engine) and the Mirage 2000, particularly its engine, has thus been made suitable for the high-altitude intercept mission.

With respect to the airframe, let us remember that the 'delta' configuration has been maintained because of its considerable advantages: low drag in supersonic flight; ease of construction and capability of carrying more fuel. This same configuration does cause some equally well-known disadvantages, such as the need for high takeoff and approach speeds. This was overcome, however, by the electric controls and the maximum lift obtained by automatically-controlled leading edges combined with the flaps (elevons). The increased lift thus makes possible takeoff, approach and landing speeds that can be compared with those of conventional planes and heretofore obtainable with planes with no empennage but with delta wings. Likewise, the maneuverability was increased some 75 percent and the load factors 40 percent compared with the Mirage III.

Still referring to the airframe, one notes the use of considerable quantities of composite materials (carbon fibers and boron), especially in the rudder and elevons, resulting in a weight saving of some 20 percent for these components.

Concerning the motor, the M53 of SNECMA is a modular twin flux motor with a single body the construction of which enables obtaining great thrust at high altitude, an indispensable condition in a true pursuit plane. The choice of a twin flux motor with a lean fuel mixture has enabled a considerable attenuation of the consequences of this requirement on the rate of fuel consumption which is much lower than that in the ATAR.

Three Systems Are Under Development

As is known, the weapons system is completely number-coded and multiplexed. This has led to the replacement of numerous linkage cables by a single

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system (digibus) of data distribution. Three versions of the weapons system are under development: a system designed for intercepting aircraft flying at any altitude, perfected more specifically for detection of those that penetrate at low altitude, and including an impulse Doppler Radar (RDI); a multifunction system, for intercepting and attacking on the ground, with conventional arms, using a multi-function Doppler Radar (RDM); and a low altitude penetration system (linked to the use of the ASMP missile) and using a 'ground-following radar,' the future Antilope 5.

The Mirage 2000 versions for the first two systems are single-seaters, but a two-seat version, equipped with the same weapons system, is also being developed for training needs. In contrast, the 'low-altitude penetration version' will be a two-seater.

Progress of the Program

Resources drawn upon are considerable and their range would surprise the casual observer. The CEV is using 58 planes for various purposes in the Mirage 2000 program. About 10 of those selected as being the most representative were displayed at Bretigny. The list of major aircraft used to do the testing is impressive: a Mirage F1 and a Caravelle, five Mystere-20's, five Vautours, a Mirage III; two Mirage IV's and so on.

As for the Mirage 2000 itself, three planes are continuing testing including: the Mirage 2000-01 (maiden flight: 10 March 1978); it had reached a total of 125 hours flying time in 155 sorties by mid-March; the Mirage 2000-02 (maiden flight: 18 September 1978); it had a total of 180 hours flying time in 200 sorties by mid-March, and the Mirage 2000-03 (maiden flight: 26 April 1979); it had a total of 75 hours of flying time in 68 sorties by mid-March. This is a total of 380 hours in 423 sorties. In 10 months (mid May 1979 to mid March 1980), these three planes made close to 250 sorties and flew about 215 hours. The CEV evaluation flights started very early on: from the 14th sortie of the Mirage 2000-01. By mid March, the CEV had already completed 66 evaluation flights and the air force 16. The acceptance flights of the current prototypes are progressing well: 28 have been made including 18 in 7 working days with the Mirage 2000-02 alone.

The flight characteristics are remarkable. The plane, with its electric flight controls is very maneuverable and affords precision flying, a decisive advantage for firing, in-flight refueling, approach and patrol flights.

Flight capabilities examined can be summed up as follows:

--airspeed: 750 knots on the instruments and Mach 2.2; less than 100 knots for low airspeeds; up to 30° for large angles of attack; landing approach speeds: 140 knots (260 km/hr);

--altitude: 65,000 feet (about 20,000 meters); and

--load factors: 8 G's.

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As a matter of fact, the final preparation of the airframe is now practically completed, hence the acceptance flights at the CEV, whose aim is official verification of flight performance and flight characteristics. Performances announced for the Mirage 2000 follows: ceiling of operation 20,000 meters; maximum climbing speed 15,000 meters/minute or 250 meters/second; climbing time to 15,000 meters/Mach 2: 4 minutes; maximum speed in horizontal flight: Mach 2.3 + maximum sustained speed: Mach 2.2; landing approach speed: 260 km/hr; range of action with auxiliary fuel tanks: over 1,800 km, all of which have been demonstrated in practice.

The rather minor modifications made on the airframe (and first applied to the Mirage 2000-01) were mainly aimed at reducing drag at high speeds. They had to do with: the air intakes: The boundary at layer diverters have been redesigned and the lower intake lips were made thinner (they were originally thicker to improve flow at large angles); the new design is the result of a compromise that is considered satisfactory; the vertical stabilizer: Its sweep has been enlarged and its height diminished, resulting in a design giving the Mirage 2000 a more typical Dassault look again; the original stabilizer had really been designed in view of the need to maintain the yaw behavior at very high flight angles: this made it possible to revert to a more classical design and thereby reduce drag in high supersonic flight; the rear section of the airfoil-fuselage attachment; the new fairing junction, being heavier, allows the inside elevator to move a couple of degrees fronting the vertical wall that forms the end of the fairing and thus avoid a discontinuity that could create a disturbance in flow there.

All these modifications were retained for the series. The 01 prototype incorporates all of them, prototype 02 has some of them and the 03 temporarily keeps the original geometric design.

Prototype 04, which has had the series configuration from the outset, will fly at Istres at the beginning of May (see photograph of this plane in AIR & COSMOS No 799). The two-seater No 1 will fly at the end of September/beginning of October.

Future Mirage 2000 P

Two additional prototypes, to be prepared for the 'penetration' version, have now been announced and will fly in 1982. Their ground-following radar, the Antilope 5, is being developed by Electronique Marcel Dassault and Thompson-CSF the former being the project foreman this time, as opposed to the solution adopted for the RDI. Development of this radar is being done with a Vautour (No 358) and two Mystere-20. However, the preparatory studies (blind instrument setting by radar cartography) calls on a Vautour No 355 equipped with an Antilope 1 radar and an inertia center. One can deduce from this that the setting of the inertia center will be done by a process comparable to the one developed for the U.S. cruise missiles (TERCOM system) whose principle is now known: reconnaissance of relief and comparison with a memory map.

Finalization flights of the ASMP missile developed by Aerospatiale will be done, for their part, with the Mirage IIIIE No 498 and a Mirage IV; the systems validation flights, of course, with a Mirage 2000.

Deliveries

This Mirage 2000 version will be delivered during the second half of 1986; deliveries of the first version (multipurpose RDM weapons system) to the air force, however, will start in mid-1983 and those of the second version (intercept, RDI) in 1985.

From these three versions, plus those that might be purchased later, the French air force will acquire about 400 Mirage 2000's with a production schedule of between two and four planes per month for its own needs, which implies deliveries spread out over at least 10 years, a period of time that will allow exports to develop normally and assure future customers of a solid technical and industrial base with required follow-up.

The maiden flight of the Mirage 2000, first of its series, at the end of 1982 is in keeping with such a delivery schedule.

M 53: Toward the P2 Version

Development of the M53 engine is now in a very advanced stage throughout the entire flight range. Two versions were authorized at the test bench (M53-2 and M53-5), specified performances have all been attained and the mechanical condition observed after the tests was rated excellent.

The prototype airplanes have started their tests with the M53-2 version of 8,500 kg of thrust with afterburner. They are flying now with engines designated as M53-5. The latter will be incorporated into the first series of planes after receiving certain modifications perfected during the tests: adaptation of engine settings for high altitude and low speed and during fast power setting changes; structural reinforcement of the compressor, and so on.

This M53-5 develops for an (equipped) weight of 1,420 kg a thrust for takeoff in dry air of 5,550 kg and a thrust of 9,000 kg using the afterburner. The dilution rate is 0.3 and the pressure ratio 9.2. Consumption levels are 0.87 kg/kp/hr without afterburner and 2.05 with. An interesting feature of the M53-5 is in the thrust development as a function of altitude and speed. It in fact exceeds 11.7 tons at Mach 1.2 at sea level and 10 tons at Mach 2.2 at 36,000 feet. The M53-5 already allows better use of the maneuverability characteristics of the Mirage 2000 and obviously improves its performance.

However, the real Mirage 2000 engine, the one to be installed in series planes as of 1985, is the M53P-2. Its development started last year and it will generate a static thrust on the ground of 6,530 kg (+17 percent)

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without afterburner and 9,700 kg (+8 percent) with. The substantial gain in performance is mainly obtained by progress achieved in materials and their behavior at high temperatures. Partial bench tests have started and are yielding good results (turbine). The first complete M53P-2 will be running on the bench next year.

As of 1 March, the M53's had accumulated more than 11,000 hours in operation, including 1,450 in flight, on the Caravelle, the F1E and the Mirages 2000's.

We shall come back to the finalization of the Mirage 2000 weapons system, which is being pursued with the aid of various aircraft-bench tests of the CEV (see page 33). It should be noted, however, that the RDM radar, whose flight tests on the Vautour No 337 and the Mystere 20 No 131 are satisfactory, will soon be installed in the Mirage 2000-03. As for the RDI, it is flying on the Mystere 20 No 79 as a definition prototype.

2000-01 Flight Demonstration

One might conclude with the demonstration flight of the Mirage 2000-01 conducted at mid-day on 25 March with Guy Mitaux-Maurouard at the controls. In less than 6 minutes despite a disturbingly low ceiling, the Dassault test pilot showed once more that the Mirage 2000 and its electric controls have truly created a new flying standard: a short takeoff followed by a turning climb and a series of maneuvers that spoke very well for how well the plane handles: rolls, turns at 8 G's, inverted flight and above all, the always spectacular fly-over at low speed (100 knots, 25° angle of attack) with the M53 at partial thrust, performed this time with an unbelievable and near immediate return to level flight that left the spectators flabbergasted. The hyperlift of the 2000 is indeed astounding.

Only one plane in Europe leaves an even stronger impression of defying the laws of gravity and stress in flight. It is called the Mirage 4000....

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

IMPROVED OPERATIONS, FINANCIAL SAVINGS DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 80 pp 40-41

[Article by Lt Col Bertrand de Lapresle, ESM Saint-Cyr 1957-1959, Terre d'Afrique promotion is with the armored cavalry. Currently he serves in the management unit of the land forces headquarters, finance planning bureau: "The Ground Forces 'Enterprise'"]

[Excerpt] Today no one ignores the privileged role of the armed forces in the development of RCB* methods. In effect, the extensive discussions which developed in the country, specifically after the passing of the 1976 programming law, largely contributed to making public opinion realize the thinking and estimation work done within the defense establishment both in terms of targets and the necessary means to reach them.

However, the emphasis put on planning and programming should not make us forget that these instruments are valuable only if regularly readjusted on the basis of specific data on the factual changes in costs and physical achievements.

Such is precisely the role of management which must not only insure that budget credits are used as "productively" as possible, but also contribute to implement program decisions thanks to experience based on the study of the annual physical and financial disparities compared with the targets.

Search for "Economy" . . . Through Better Loan Profitability

The ground forces are among the biggest national enterprises both in terms of personnel size and annual turnover. Yet, it would be both trite and essential to emphasize that the specific nature of this enterprise lies in its role as a "producer of security" which is necessary to the life of the country at the cost of levying from the national wealth the necessary financial means strictly defined by the political powers.

* Rationalization of budgeting choices.

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Therefore, the management would be considered optimal not to the extent to which maximum "savings" would be achieved, but to which funds appropriated for the ground forces would be used with the best possible productivity for the development of its operational capacity which guarantees this security.

Therefore, any squeeze of general expenditures for the benefit of equipment, organization, or training of the forces in an "economy" similar to improving returns on means appropriated for the training of the units.

In this sense it would be easy to illustrate the permanent wish for "economy" which characterizes decisions implemented at all levels in the course of management operations in recent years.

This desire shows, above all, in the extensive reorganization of the structures, already drawing to an end. It is based on principles extensively involving the "alleviation of general costs" with a view to improvements in overall operational capacity within the stipulated ceilings. These are the purposes of the essential measures among which we could cite extending the quaternary structure to the corps in order to retain the same number of combat units despite the disbandment of a number of regiments, the merger of the territorial with the operational command, and the elimination of one level of command in order to reduce the number of staffs, the elaboration of guides thus enabling the services to expand extensively without raising costs, and the easiest and most effective mobilization of the reserve forces.

Specifically oriented toward the production of "security," the training and instruction of the units were also targets of redeployment, and the "economy" thus achieved was used to promote an increase in overall profitability, as follows:

- The planning of fuel allocations, restructuring of exercise areas and the formulation of a plan for their use benefit the expansion of activities aimed at acquiring the better mastery of the hardware;
- The finance-based policy of developing both firing and driving simulators and audio-visual techniques makes possible the faster and less expensive acquisition of skills;
- Finally, the quantitative growth itself is valorized through the quantitative improvement resulting from renovated training methods.

The strict reduction of current operational expenditures in the course of manual management operations is the expression of a deliberate policy of using all possible economy sources. However, no area is ignored in the effort to reduce general costs: The infrastructure, where a strict normalizing prevails both in terms of new construction and renovation, skillfully achieved through the use of substitutions or extensions of

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the life span of equipment, rationalization of logistic support circuits, etc. The activities undertaken in this respect, however, rapidly reach their limit and cannot be further developed without harming the operational training whose indispensable environment they constitute.

Modern Management Integrated Within the Overall Financial System of the Decision Making Process

The substantial redeployment of means thus practiced over the past five years in order to obtain better possible returns on budget allocations, has been possible thanks only to modern management methods which allow the evaluation of the financial consequences of planned savings and of possible decisions.

Such management is modern first of all because of its techniques. The automated data processing, indispensable in the management of either personnel or a variety of stocks, facilitates the use of accounting data in management. It allows the statistical use of records, and contributes to the simplification of administrative procedures. Furthermore, present-day methods used to optimize hardware design use modern procedures such as "value analysis," "the CCO method,"* multiple criterion analysis, etc. Furthermore, to modernize its management the land forces try to organize in accordance with the assignment related to the modernization and administration of the armed forces (MMAA) a coherent overall system whose data makes it possible to adapt practical experience to the stipulations of the program and the budget through cost analysis and the study of noted disparities.

Conceived in the sense of the participatory line by specific target, the purpose of the tools used within this system is to increase the operational capacity of the formation through deconcentration reaching the implementation levels in order to promote the active participation of all the necessary means for the reaching of set targets. In other words, on each occasion, it is a question of bringing as close as possible the area of decision making to that of action.

Generalized in 1974, today the "operational budget" is implemented by over 500 centers of basic responsibility and, to the general satisfaction, fulfills its role as a tool for coordination and management. While preserving the financial freedom of heads of the center it allows the gaining of specific knowledge of costs not only by type of expenditure but also in terms of implementation or activities concretizing the attainment of objectives directly related to such programs.

The advantages of the operational budget system focus current research on the increase in certain munition and clothing outlays. Furthermore, the "total operational budgets" of the schools and some departments of the armed forces are assessed and followed annually.

* Design based on optimum cost.

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The "management budgets" play a similar role for the services. Bringing closer the expenditures, broken down by budgetary item, to the funds appropriated by the various services for the armed forces, they make it possible to determine the added value generated by each of the services and the complete cost of operating the formations. Logistics, engineers, and materiel formulate their annual anticipatory management budgets and, at the end of the year, draw up an account which, when compared with the initial forecasts, makes the control of management and the study of noted deviations possible.

The management of the land forces, therefore, is firmly oriented today toward a system of contractual allocations of finances, whose use is controlled at meetings at which the coordination between the results obtained at all levels and the stipulations of the action plan, henceforth generalized, is examined.

The time is past when financial affairs were the area of a few specialists who were more accountants than managers. Henceforth, thanks to the development of a variety of techniques, some of which we mentioned, the command at all levels is assuming financial responsibility. The objective study of resources helps to clarify, with a view to returns, the choice of individuals who are responsible along the entire hierarchical chain within the forces and the services.

The spreading of such modern management methods, actually, is attained even better since, in fact, it is merely a question of adapting to the current environment the traditional military concept of "economy of forces," utilizing as best as possible the "financial means" to serve the "mission."

Simulators

Annual savings per simulator:	
- Driving the AMX 30.....	2.9 million francs
- Tank fire.....	2.0 million francs
- Artillery fire.....	1.6 million francs
Savings in munitions for 1981-1986 through the use of simulators.....	683 million francs

Example of "General Cost Savings" Used to Improve Operational Fitness

	1975	1979
Number of staffs	59	41
Number of corps	230	205
Number of combat units	740	730

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	1975	1979
Number of days of activity	70	100
Of which, with materiel with limited potential	35	47
Rate of command staffing	27.3%	28.5%
Thousands of tons hauled by military truck	65	240
Inferred cost economy (current financial means)	13	43

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF NEW GOVERNMENT-LABOR UNION ACCORD

Projected Increased Expenditures

Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 13 May 80 p 1

[Article by Claudio Alo: "The Cost of the Agreement"; additional material on the 10 May 80 accord between the Second Cossiga Government and the United Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL labor unions, including textual references as well as reactions and commentary by the political left and by the southern Italian areas may be found in JPRS 75970, West Europe Report No. 1594

[Text] The agreement arrived at during the wee hours of Saturday between the government and the labor unions was received in a substantially favorable manner by most commentators. This agreement as a matter of fact is being hailed positively for at least two reasons.

The first one is of an objective character: there is no doubt that the labor union demands, along with the issue of public employment contracts and family allowances, were on a sound foundation and that their acceptance by the administration represents a further step in the process of equitable redistribution of incomes now in progress in Italy.

The second positive element, which springs from last Saturday's agreement, is of a more strictly political character. The Second Cossiga government went into this meeting with the labor union organizations in a position of evident weakness.

The restoration of good relations with the labor union organizations was thus able to represent a solid point in favor of the administration, perhaps the only one on which the administration was able to do anything on its own, and Francesco Cossiga did not want to miss the bus. The operation came off well and the executive branch certainly came out less shaky than when it went into this long and tiring meeting.

From that angle, the agreement was positive although some by no means marginal questions remain yet to be raised.

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The Second Cossiga government took over a month and a half ago, submitting a program based in practice on two fundamental elements: firmly sticking to the priority character of the fight against inflation and avoiding the mistakes which the new Minister of Budget La Malfa had several times criticized the earlier administration for: little rigor in holding down the public deficit and weakness in dealing with labor union demands.

Well, the impression is that, precisely on these points, the administration in several respects came into conflict with its own prior statements. Let us see why:

(1) The understanding concerning public employment and family allowances will, in 1981, according to initial computations, cost another 5 trillion. This will further aggravate the public deficit or it will lead to a new wave of tax increases, in any case reducing the net amount available for investments.

(2) A further deterioration in the public deficit (which, without these new expenditures, would probably have been considerably below the 40-trillion figure for 1980) and the simultaneous increase in pay envelopes entails the risk of bringing about new tensions on the inflation front which, in 1980, according to an announcement by La Malfa himself, will hit 22 percent.

(3) Another 5 trillion in current expenditures will certainly cause a deterioration in the structure of public spending, where expenditures for investments will carry relatively less weight.

(4) The agreement worked out Saturday has a single meaning at least for the moment since the Second Cossiga government has not managed to get much more than a general inclination to hold hiring procedures coupled with unemployment benefits [integrative contract negotiations] down. This was so general that, a few hours after the agreement, the FIAT coordination procedure agreed on a bottom figure of 47,000 lire, in other words, higher than the one agreed upon a couple of weeks ago. Looking at the labor union commitment toward an increase in the productivity of the economic system and toward holding down our growing labor costs, the administration had to be satisfied with an opening of credit.

This is certainly important, as the budget minister maintained in the interview which we are publishing here, but there is nothing certain about it.

We may hope that the turnabout in relations with the labor union, which Giorgio La Malfa talked about, will facilitate a rigorous economic policy, as required by the difficult period which awaits us; but there is no doubt that many worrisome questions, arising from this substantially "political"

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agreement, have not yet been answered in any way.

And this is happening while the technical time frame for correcting the course of a year 1980 which promises growing inflation, trade deficits, and public deficit are getting shorter and shorter.

La Malfa Defends Program Costs

Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 13 May 80 p 1

[Interview with Budget Minister Giorgio La Malfa by Claudio Alo"]

[Text] Just 48 hours after the tiring negotiations leading to the agreement on public employment and on doubling the family allowances, Budget Minister Giorgio La Malfa is still convinced that there was a fundamental turnabout during the night between Friday and Saturday in relations between the government and the labor union. For many hours he tried to move to the conference table the old economic rigor of the La Malfa clan, along with his concern over a period of time which looks as if it is going to be extremely difficult and he is firmly convinced that the labor union developed a new awareness on economic policy problems. The economist who, until just a few months ago, talked the rigorous language of facts and figures and who now runs into a different policy, however does not conceal two main concerns: first of all, that the opening of credit, which the administration allowed for the labor union, would indeed have positive consequences and, next, that the awareness displayed by the labor union, during this meeting, will be up to the extremely grave problems which the country is going to have to face.

[Question] Minister, your fellow government minister Pandolfi said that he was satisfied with this agreement but that he is also worried. Are you more satisfied or more worried?

[Answer] I am substantially satisfied with the turnabout that emerged in relations between the administration and the labor union and I just want to wait and see where it takes us. As for any worries, I am neither more nor less worried than I was before the meeting and I am of course worried about an extremely difficult economic situation which I described with maximum clarity for the labor union leaders; I am also worried about the background conditions of the Italian economy at the start of the eighties. That is what I am worried about.

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[Question] And you are not worried about an agreement which can be interpreted as unilateral yielding by the administration, without getting anything in return?

[Answer] I do not agree with your interpretation. There is a significant novelty in the outcome of this meeting and it consists in the by no means minor fact that the administration and the labor union have signed a common document in which they accentuate the problem of inflation and in which the administration has confirmed that it will not allow the government deficit to exceed 40.5 trillion and that it will see to the financing of any major spending either through tax provisions or by cutting other current spending. For me, this is certainly a turnabout. I do not know whether this turnabout will be followed by successive steps in the direction toward a rigorous economic policy, which is necessary, but what we achieved today is this: the labor union is very familiar with the administration's objectives regarding economic recovery but also its opening regarding collaboration toward a policy of reviving the planning effort.

[Question] Minister La Malfa, the labor unionists are familiar with the administration's objectives but do they share the decisions that are necessary to attain those objectives?

[Answer] Their signature under the joint document says that they do. And they know that the situation is going to get worse and that we want to discuss rigorous measures in order to reduce inflation and restore the economy. The labor unions in summary agreed to a recovery policy instead of having it imposed by somebody else.

[Question] And what if the labor union should be disappointed in regard to your expectations and your opening of credit?

[Answer] There are direct instruments which the government has available, such as credit policy and tax policy.

[Question] In summary, the well-known "noose."

[Answer] Although I do not like that term, there would not appear to be any other.

[Question] Minister, how much did last Saturday's agreement cost the government budget which is already so lopsided?

[Answer] The cost for family allowances will fluctuate between 600 and 800 billions for 1980.

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[Question] And what about 1981?

[Answer] For 1981, it will be around 2-2.2 trillion, not counting public employment. But you have to keep in mind that a considerable portion of this higher cost is going to be financed autonomously by the increase in the salary amount. And you also have to keep in mind the commitment undertaken by the labor unions so that any further increases would be financed through forms of solidarity among the workers themselves.

[Question] What about the agreement's cost for public employment?

[Answer] That comes to about 2.3 trillion for 1980.

[Question] Minister La Malfa, a few months ago you bitterly criticized the First Cossiga government because it granted the quarterly setup for the emergency payments for government workers [state enterprises?] without opening a discussion on the question of the sliding scale. Do you not think that the Second Cossiga government granted more while asking even less in return?

[Answer] Absolutely not. And I will explain to you right away why. The First Cossiga government shifted the quarterly setup--a provision which extended the indexing mechanisms--to the deficit and outside an overall economic policy framework. Besides, this maneuver, like others, was justified by the need for providing support for the demand in view of a recession which has not yet arrived. Today, on the other hand, through this agreement, we are moving within a complex overall design and within the context of a policy essentially aimed at redistribution of funds.

[Question] But there remains the fact that the economic burden of this agreement will make itself felt heavily in terms of the public deficit, the quality of spending, and, by the same token, on the very inflation which the administration wants to fight. Do you not think so?

[Answer] Apart from the fact that we have emphasized that the public deficit will not increase the burden, there is another element that must be considered. Family allowances carry greater weight in the South. Their increase, other things being equal, favors incomes in the South which are most heavily struck by inflation. Having made this point, there is no doubt now that we are still stuck with all of the risks inherent in an extremely accentuated inflationary situation. A situation which absolutely requires that new atmosphere that was created through the agreement last Saturday.

[Question] Minister, do you not believe that the traditional La Malfian rigor is now clashing with political interests?

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[Answer] Absolutely not. Before the meeting, it appeared quite improbable to me that we would achieve a result such as the one we had. There was even reason to fear a quite different behavior on the part of the labor unions which however gave the impression that they are beginning to grasp the country's economic problems in their seriousness and urgency. What I have to underscore is that we have not yet arrived at an understanding at all costs.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

SUAREZ' ABILITY TO GOVERN QUESTIONED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 May 80 p 3

[Editorial by Juan-Tomas de Salas: "Suarez' Time Has Passed (I)"]

[Text] A political leader who served his country with distinction under certain given conditions has become a burden and a serious hindrance for the future, now that circumstances have radically changed. That is what has happened to President Suarez. After the latest government crisis, there is now way to hide the dismal evidence even one more day.

After almost a year of paralysis and silence, with the nation infested with problems demanding decisive leadership, the pressure of events took its revenge and handed him three successive resounding defeats: the votes in Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country. And then his moment of truth arrived. Either Suarez would radically change his policy and his government, or Suarez would sign his political death sentence rather quickly. After 3 weeks of anguished vacillation, the hermit of Moncloa finally managed to form a new government; so poor, so conditional, so whatever you want to call it, that it was almost like having the church bells toll the sad news that Adolfo Suarez already ceased to exist. It must be said this way: he can't function.

Adolfo Suarez worked hard to win himself a noteworthy place in the modern history of Spain. He was the right man at the right time. No one could have dismantled Francoism from within better than he did, thus permitting the peaceful transition from one-man rule to the democratic system. Adolfo Suarez carried out his role in history with courage, skill, and even haste. No one can deny him credit for actions in the first 2 or 3 years of his great political adventure, and least of all this publication, which consistently supported him at that time and even much later. For the last time, he did the job.

But the irony of history is that the qualities that were useful to Suarez in bringing down Francoism from within--skill, secrecy, and astuteness, fundamentally--are not anywhere near enough to preside over a democratic government. His deficiencies became increasingly obvious as the new regime was being built up and strengthened. Suarez knew how to destroy,

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but he did not have the least idea of how to build. What is worse, it is now clear that he never knew well what there was to build. From blunder to blunder, from clever move to cleverer agreement, the man was almost providential at a crucial phase was declining bit by bit. Silently, with a growing sense of harassment and persecution, Adolfo Suarez fell to his elephantine level of incompetence. What can we do about him?

What now? The normal inclination of a sector of Spanish public opinion would be to lose hope, faced with this problem. He's the only one we have, help out, everyone into the bunker, long live the "caenas," and up with Numantia. But no, my friends, just the opposite. Soon we are going to prove in our own flesh one of the sublime virtues of democracy: here, no one is irreplaceable. Anyone who is not useful is removed, and someone else is put in. And, remember, there always is someone else.

In the UCD [Democratic Center Union] itself there are leaders who are much better suited than Adolfo Suarez to the conditions in the country here and now. They are not well-known to many, but from now on they are going to be known, from now on the political discussions in the UCD should become public. Hidden debates should be banished forever from public life. The "off the record" chat in the hallways is already a thing of the past. Here, you must show your face. The nation wants to get to know its leaders and the solutions they propose. Anyone who is afraid--go back home.

One fundamental thing must be kept in mind: the relative majority of the country voted for the UCD and not for the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]. To betray this wish could have serious consequences for the system. Suarez must be replaced, inexorably, but unhurriedly, from within the majority. Criticize Suarez--yes; dismiss Suarez--also maybe, yes; but merge with the PSOE--no. A Frenchman said, "Yes, but...", and now is president of the Republic.

(CAMBIO 16 editor's note: Independent friends who still believe in Suarez ask me: And if the president revives? Although in that case I would be the first to applaud, my lack of faith that the miracle will occur I will explain in coming editorials.)

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES TERRORISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 8 Jun 80 pp 51, 53, 55

[Interview with Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson Perez by Jose Diaz Herrera; date and place not given]

[Text] Juan Jose Roson Perez, aged 48, with a degree in political sciences, and a retired military inspector-commander, is the government's new "super hardliner" against ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group]. Appointed minister of interior on 2 May, Roson Perez was forced to withstand one of the worst escalations of the Basque terrorists during the first days of his term in office: ETA assassinated eight persons in a week.

The state security forces reacted and, 2 weeks later, 45 ETA members were captured by the police and sent to jail. At the same time, on 21 May, the interior minister appeared in Congress and announced a 12-point plan against the ETA's terrorism. His plan may be summarized in a single phrase: "Against ETA, submachine guns." He spoke with Jose Diaz Herrera, of CAMBIO 16, about the terrorism of the extremists of both the right and left.

CAMBIO 16: As minister of interior, what is your main concern?

Juan Jose Roson: The number one problem in the country is the tremendous defiance of ETA. There is not the slightest doubt that the restoration of a normal situation in Spanish society entails the elimination of ETA.

C 16: And you want to conquer ETA by force?

JJR: To me, the ETA problem is a problem involving a battle and effectiveness on the part of the police. But it is not an easy problem to solve. There are political forces which are giving the terrorists a certain amount of protection. This is why I think that Parliament bears some responsibilities in this regard, something which I have requested in Congress. Those responsibilities include that of establishing and requiring democratic behavior on the part of certain political groups giving protection to the terrorists.

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C 16: You have resorted to Parliament in search of backing in the battle against ETA. If those measures should fail, would you request more severe measures for putting an end to ETA?

JJR: I described to Parliament some guidelines for action. They are necessary guidelines for action to focus on the ETA phenomenon and to combat it. They may be insufficient and, if so, I would return to Parliament and ask for further measures.

It is Parliament which must authorize those measures. The battle against ETA is not a partial one, nor a battle of a government or a police force against a terrorist group.

It is the battle of the democratic forces and those of the society to win some fundamental rights against ETA, which denies them.

C 16: There are some who claim that the terrorism might possibly be solved by a new amnesty, or by negotiating with ETA.

JJR: I am drastically opposed to both methods, because they are counterproductive; and I would refer you to history in this regard. The ETA's terms for negotiations are unacceptable.

If the state agrees to those negotiations and agrees to the terms set forth in the KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] proposal, a state no longer exists. After that, we are all superfluous.

Secondly, I think that there have been amnesties and possibilities of the elimination of the armed struggle. So long as ETA is killing, so long as it is cornering the society in a campaign of physical and moral violence, so long as it is intimidating all the citizens, no impunity can be asked for the terrorists.

C 16: However, on a different occasion you were going to be chosen by the government to negotiate with ETA....

JJR: That is absolutely untrue, and you can deny it categorically. Let the former director of human rights of the Basque General Council's Interior Overseer, Jose Ramon Recalde, author of that "report" tell me on what date and in what place I was going to negotiate with ETA, and who told him so. Because no one every made such a proposal to me, and I would by no means have agreed to it.

I can also state that, insofar as I know, the government has never attempted to negotiate with ETA. On the contrary, the opposite has occurred: Sectors close to ETA have suggested to the government the need for negotiating with ETA, something which the head of the government has always refused.

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C 16: Then do you maintain that the Basque problem cannot be resolved with political measures?

JJR: I did not say that. There are two problems in the Basque Country: the Basque problem, which requires political handling, and the specific problem of terrorism, which needs specifically police action.

When discussing the Basque problem, we must not forget that there is a group of Basque citizens giving protection to the armed struggle owing to a lack of information, which prevents them from observing the current political situation and the fact that, under a system of autonomies, the Basque problems can be resolved completely. Therefore, I am in favor of the political measures, and maintain that, in this respect, the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] government must be given definite support.

C 16: What will the entity called for in your 12-point program to plan, coordinate and direct the anti-terrorist battle consist of, and who will head it?

JJR: The battle against terrorism cannot be established as a battle in which the Gendarmerie, the National Police and officials from the Superior Police Corps each act on their own. If we want to be successful there must be coordination on the highest level of this ministry and among the groups engaged in concrete action. Therefore, it was necessary to create this entity for coordination and planning which will be headed directly by the interior minister himself.

C 16: That is all very nice, but while you were planning, ETA assassinated eight persons last week in its latest escalation of terrorism....

JJR: Because of the features of the terrorist battle, it is extremely difficult to curb the escalations. This escalation, as I see it, occurred because of an excessive number of coincidences when it was time for opposing sectors to request negotiations and amnesty. What ETA has done is make an escalation attempt to foster that campaign.

But it has ended now. Since 15 May the police have had noteworthy success. The material perpetrators of the assassinations have been arrested, as well as the members of the commando groups which participated in those acts.

However, what we must do is not only be prepared to react when ETA assassinates. The police must plan the battle against ETA with greater severity and greater continuity.

C 16: And reach the "head," as Manuel Fraga recommends.

JJR: That would be good, but it is not so easy. It is a well-known fact that the leadership of the terrorist battle in the Basque Country is not

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situated in Spain. From that standpoint, there has been no great cooperation from countries which should rightfully have aided the Spanish Government; because this is no longer a battle of a political nature, but rather a terrorist battle which, although it is concentrated in Spain at present, could become concentrated in that neighboring country later on.

Secondly, for some time there has been insufficient information. We have started to obtain it during the past few days. We know the real structure of ETA, how it recruits people and how and where the commandos are trained. However, so long as the brains continue to move about freely outside of Spain, the battle will continue. When we succeed in depriving them of their freedom, we shall have won the battle.

C 16: Since it is now known what the ETA is, could you tell us what backing it has, and how it operates?

JJR: The Ministry of Interior has considerable information. It has sufficient names, information on the supporters and on the arms supplies. It knows what ETA is, and how it operates. But this is not the time to make that information public.

C 16: In your 12-point program, you mention the need for diplomatic action to create a European police and judicial jurisdiction. Could a "Europolice" be the effective weapon against terrorism?

JJR: Thus far, the diplomatic action has brought few results. The European countries have thought for some time that the terrorist phenomenon requires a global, homogeneous treatment throughout all of Europe. It seems to have been proven that there is cooperation among the terrorist groups. Hence, the government must cooperate as well, so that the terrorists cannot take refuge in other countries, nor receive any type of technical assistance from any European country.

C 16: Has it been proven that ETA is cooperating with all the European terrorist groups?

JJR: It is obvious that there is a relationship among all the European terrorist organizations. The Ministry of Interior has a great deal of disconnected information in this regard, which must be put in order, so that we can plan a forceful action in that area.

C 16: In France, for example, where are the ETA "brains" concealed?

JJR: Not only in France, but in other countries. With France, we have the concrete problem that the southern part of its territory is the headquarters of ETA; but there are also connections with other countries, which are the ones that we are analyzing.

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C 16: Algeria, Libya, South Yemen...where is ETA being trained?

JJR: I would say that there are more countries giving support to the ETA terrorists, even countries closer to ours physically and culturally.

C 16: Is it Belgium where the ETA members purchase weapons through the trafficking networks?

JJR: Cutting of the ETA's weapon supply routes is one of our main objectives. But it must be realized that this will not be an easy job, because the arms market is highly complex. We have just received good news in this regard: The police have succeeded in breaking up a line of Y weapons, and we are engaged in that effort.

C 16: But does ETA have more backing now than it did previously?

JJR: ETA has grown from the standpoint of backing from the population. In this regard, the features of the battle have changed somewhat. Now we must decide how to convince the civilian population that it does not make sense to give backing to groups of the type and with the methods of action of ETA.

C 16: And how will you achieve that?

JJR: The effort is a very complex one. We must convince the population that its most important aspirations can be fulfilled through peaceful coexistence, in the normal operation of the autonomics and the state.

But this is not just my problem; it is a problem for the entire state, and a problem involving the government of the state and the government of the Basque Country. It is a problem involving backing for the PNV government.

C 16: In your 12-point program, you request the creation of parliamentary committees to investigate the connections between certain parties and the terrorist groups. Is there evidence that some parties are giving the terrorists protection?

JJR: The government has sufficient information to request parliamentary intervention in this regard, and in-depth intervention. There are parties of the "abertzale" [patriotic] left, the state extreme left and the extreme right which are in this category. Understandably, out of respect for Parliament, I must bring up the matter before the Spanish Cortes first.

C 16: If it is proven that there is collusion among members of legalized political parties or those negotiating for amnesty and terrorists, what action will you take?

JJR: The government's action will be very clearcut. In accordance with the Constitution and the Law on Political Association, the government will turn over to the public prosecutor's office all the dossiers that I am analyzing and preparing at present.

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C 16: Come now, are you going to put the individuals who are connected with the terrorists in jail?

JJR: The individuals who are connected with the terrorists will receive judicial treatment. And, insofar as there has been criminal conduct, the judges will have to act with the utmost severity.

C 16: What measures could the government adopt to protect the Basque business-owners who have been threatened with the "revolutionary tax"?

JJR: By making a frank, calm proposal to the business owners, something that I am ready to do soon with their organizations, the government could offer them protection of personal security.

But, in addition, the government will pursue very harshly all the systems whereby the extortion is taking place; and, thirdly, we shall demand that the neighboring countries not protect this type of extortion, which is a crime in all the European codes, and which appears to me to be a Mafia procedure similar to that in Chicago during the 1930's.

C 16: Will the police forces in the Basque Country be increased?

JJR: No; what we shall do is make a better selection of the individuals in command in the Basque Country. The battle against ETA is a battle with its own peculiarities, and demands people who are very well prepared. And that is what we intend to do. Police with a higher degree of expertise will be countering ETA.

C 16: Will those police forces have better facilities?

JJR: There need be no doubt of that. We shall not only create mixed anti-terrorist battle groups comprised of national police and gendarmery, but we shall also provide them with the best facilities.

The countries in which the anti-terrorist battle has progressed are those in which the police have had facilities for the investigation, detection and location of the terrorists. Therefore, we must also have the best communications systems, and the latest procedures for analyzing and observing those movements, so as later to combat them, as well as the latest control systems which will be placed in service very soon, after the installation work and the training of competent personnel.

C 16: Will the autonomous police forces be given the authority to battle against the terrorists?

JJR: The terrorist situation can only be resolved by the state security forces. The autonomous police forces will also have to lend their assistance at times. But their basic mission will be to assume a different sort of function which, in my opinion, is currently diverting national police forces from the anti-terrorist battle.

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C 16: Will you take harsh action against the press in the matter of making a defense for the terrorism?

JJR: I do not think that we can continue with a situation such as the present one. If we do not attack the defense of terrorism, we are not attacking one of the priority goals being sought by the terrorists: to place the civilian population on their side, through their psychological campaigns.

C 16: Will not this matter of defense of the terrorism have repercussions on freedom of speech?

JJR: Absolutely not. The fact is that freedom of speech is in the service of the community and of coexistence. Freedom of speech cannot be used to provide moral protection for terrorist acts or to justify them. And, unfortunately, there is some evidence of this in the Spanish press.

C 16: Are you referring to the Basque newspaper EGIN, which is claimed to be financed by ETA?

JJR: I don't wish to refer to any of the media, but you have as much information as I do.

C 16: What do you have to say on the subject of torture?

JJR: Since that problem does not exist, if it did exist I would say that I would not allow torture on the part of the police. In any event, there is a parliamentary committee to investigate that matter; and I can state that there is no real awareness that torture has ever existed.

C 16: What will happen to the people who do not cooperate with the police against the terrorists? Is this a serious problem?

JJR: It is very serious. Because of failure to act, there have been instances of moral liability on the part of the civilian population recently. In fact, there was cooperation with ETA in the assassinations of the members of the gendarmery of Goizueta, who were murdered in that Navarre town on 16 May, owing to the apathy of individuals who knew that the attack was going to take place. Such crimes are penalized in the civil codes of any Western country.

C 16: Will you be as hard and unbending toward the right wing terrorists?

JJR: To me, any kind of terrorism is serious, any kind of terrorism must be persecuted and checked, regardless of its type. The fact is that, at the present time, the most offensive terrorist group is ETA. But we cannot ignore the tendency toward violence among certain extreme right wing groups, a tendency that must be curbed.

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C 16: But do you think that the right wing terrorism is rather insignificant because (in your opinion) it is not organized?

JJR: I do not deny that the right wing terrorism may be organized, but it is my duty to speak quite clearly, and not with falsehoods. At the present time, I have no evidence that the extreme right is supporting an organized terrorist organization. This does not mean that I preclude its existence, or that I would not ask the police to try to ascertain whether such an organization existed, whether it was national or whether it had international ties.

C 16: In the event that such an organization were to be discovered, and the New Force were heading it, as some parties in Parliament claim, would you request the outlawing of the New Force?

JJR: What must be done through the parliamentary groups and the Congress is finding out the real position of each party. And if there are any parties, whether they be right or left wing, which are not engaged in absolutely clearcut political activity, repudiating violence and terrorism, they would automatically have to be turned over to the judicial branch, because they would obviously not be abiding by the system whereby our Constitution is inspired.

C 16: Do you believe that the police act with the same stringency toward the right wing terrorists as with the left wing terrorists?

JJR: The police are basically professional. But I shall change the question because it is passive. Would that we had the same success against the left wing terrorists as we are having with the right wing terrorists!

C 16: Nevertheless, on occasion some collusion is detected between certain state security services and the extreme right wing groups....

JJR: All the cases wherein a connection has been proven between the police and the extreme right have been turned over to the common or special jurisdictions. Moreover, there have been administrative actions which have been carried out in instances wherein such collusion occurred, and certain individuals were expelled from the police.

C 16: Last week, DIARIO 16 publicized the investigations that certain police forces had made of democratic deputies. Will you allow such activities?

JJR: I am concerned that this could have happened. Although the reports given to me do not coincide with the information from the newspaper, I have turned over the matter to the public prosecutor's office, and I have ordered the department undersecretary to open an investigation. In any event, I shall take steps to prevent such activities from taking place in the future.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

WORKERS PARTY LEADER GLOSSES OVER EXTREME LEFT'S SQUABBLES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 p 34

[Interview with Jose Sanroma Aldea, member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party; date and place not given]

[Text] On 1 July of last year, the Revolutionary Organization of Workers (ORT) and the Spanish Labor Party (PTE) combined their lives as Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. A new political group came into existence in the left wing of the left. At the time, it was rumored that the merger in the Labor Party (PTE) was more of a deal between leaders than a spontaneous inclination among the members. Twelve months later, the split is a fact viewed with bewilderment by both members and non-members, who have analyzed the situation as further evidence of the failure of the extraparliamentary left during this period of democratic consolidation. Jose Sanroma Aldea, a member of the Central Committee of the Workers Party (PT) and former secretary general of the ORT (Comrade Intxausti when he was underground) spoke with this magazine.

CAMBIO 16: The party is nothing but skin and bones.

Jose Sanroma: Not at all. Contrary to what might be inferred from certain reports, the defections have been minimal. Of the 90 members comprising the executive committee only 13 have become officially separated from the PT, and none of them are from the ORT.

C 16: Not formally, but the truth is quite different.

JS: Possibly, although it would have been democratic for them to submit to the conclusions of the special congress for clarification to be held from 24 to 27 June; but never that drop-by-drop separation of the old members of the Spanish Labor Party.

C 16: A congress which, to put it briefly, will be attended only by those of your faction.

JS: Well...although they have publicly promised to participate, I doubt the attendance of the so-called radical line members. At the moment, they have

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not attended the National Congress of Andalucia, the first one of those scheduled for the nationalities or regions before the special one. It should also be pointed out that many non-radical former members of the Workers Party will not go either.

C 16: That does not preclude the leaders of the dispute being ORT and PET.

JS: The existence of the original parties has not been a deciding factor in the dispute. We are suffering from the development crisis that is being borne by all the revolutionary forces in Spain at present. I would go so far as to call it the upheaval besetting the party system itself. This prompted the need for a very intensive debate in the new party and, if it were not held in the depth required, the old mistakes of sectarianism which were eliminated with the unification would be repeated.

C 16: With this general breakdown in the so-called revolutionary left, what are your short-term predictions on its activity?

JS: In our opinion, this phase will result in the advent of a plan for unification of all the Marxist-Leninist forces. This operation would entail the creation of a new political party, ideological renewal and the reinterpretation of the theoretical bases.

C 16: You are inventing another radical movement like the one sponsored by the "gang of four," your former colleagues Eladio Garcia Castro, Pina Lavez, Enrique Palazuelo and Heronimo Llorente. The difference is that they go beyond a party.

JS: I may recall it, but that is all. We are convinced of the practical in-viability of the radical movement. There may be a glimmer of reality concerning its role, but we shall have to see how far it goes.

C 16: Isn't it possible that what is happening to many "revolutionaries" who are actually extraparliamentary is that they are dying for a seat and, when they do not obtain everything they revert to quarreling? And the Workers Party obtained some representatives in the municipal elections.

JS: It is true that our separation would not have been so easy if we had a presence in Parliament, and that, at the present time, we lack sufficient leverage to influence the society. Wherein lies the mistake? It is possible that we have not adjusted well to the change. Our problem, retained since Francoist times, is that we have not subjected our theoretical bases to the necessary period of readjustment based on the development that has taken place in the European societies. We had other priority concerns at the time which prevented us from discovering those issues.

C 16: Is this your self-criticism?

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JS: It may be interpreted as such. And I might add that we have also erred in directing ourselves in an absorbing manner toward the inside of the party. It was a mistake to leave work, study and even personal life aside in order to concentrate all our efforts on concrete party activity. By not leading a life in society, we failed to relate to reality, to some extent. Now, we have nothing else to do other than what the population as a whole is doing.

C 16: To be specific, what is the party's chosen political task at present?

JS: To associate all the revolutionary and reformist forces and battle against anything emanating from the state which could damage the workers' interests; but without risky action which would offer an excuse for reaction. We are not better or worse on account of this. We want alternatives that will be part of a program that can be accomplished.

C 16: Finally, don't you think that the rapprochement between Peking and Carrillo's PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is a slap at the PT, and at the ORT's pro-Chinese group in particular?

JS: No one with a minimum amount of accuracy could accuse us of having undertaken action on behalf of the Chinese people that was not considered from the standpoint of the interests of the struggle in Spain. We never engage in imitation; and we differ with the Chinese leaders on key issues, such as NATO and the Portuguese revolution. We are observing day by day that the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Spanish Communist Party need not be exclusive. As a precedent in this regard there is the example of Romania, which has simultaneously been approaching the PCE and the former Workers Party.

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SPAIN

BRIEFS

ETA LEADER IN ALGERIA--Miguel Angel Apalategui, alias Apala and one of the high ranking leaders of ETA-Military [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Groups], was seen in Algiers at the end of May [1980]. Nothing had been heard of Apala--one of the most mysterious figures in the Basque organization--since September 1977 when he was put on trial at Aix-en-Provence (France) and subsequently released. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 June 80 p 5]

UCD CONGRESS--The Democratic Center Union [UCD] will not hold its congress during the planned dates. The congress, which was to be held in October, will be postponed for several months. It is hoped that it will be held before Christmas 1980. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Jun 80 p 5]

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