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24 July 1980

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 15/80)

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USSR REPORT .

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INTERNATIONAL

FRG INSTITUTE ANALYZES AFGHANISTAN VENTURE

Cologne BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUR OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN in German No 9, 1980 pp I-III, 1-26

[Article by Helmut Dahm: "The Afghanistan Venture as a Lesson in Soviet Russia's Political and Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Part I

It is therefore necessary to combine justice and strength; in order that that which is just may be strong, or that which is strong may be just.

Pascal

On the Question of Force

According to Friedrich Engels, whom Lenin liked to quote frequently, the essence of political force can ultimately be defined as a (revolutionary) act in which part of a country's population imposes its will on another part using extremely authoritarian means such as guns, bayonets and cannon. "And if the victorious party does not wish to lose the fruits of its efforts, then it must maintain its domination by means of the fear which its weapons instill in the reactionaries."

The possibility of peaceful development of a revolution presupposes that the so-called class enemy is unable to retaliate (theory of the balance of forces -- sootnoshenie sil). Basically, however, Lenin's short and concise observation must apply: "Forward development -- toward communism, that is -- proceeds via the dictatorship of the proletariat, and it can proceed in no other way; for no one can overcome resistance... in another way." From the standpoint of the bourgeois, destruction of the (old) order is an "illegal" process, meaning that the new power cannot at first rely upon the law since the law can be promulgated only after the old order has fallen. In other words: It -- the new power -- must use force. Once again a brief and concise remark by Lenin: "A dictatorship is a power bound by no laws."

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The result, according to the present Soviet view, is a threefold conclusion:

1. The opposing pairs of concepts -- "peaceful/forcible," "legal/illegal," "democratic/undemocratic" -- represent abstract, empty formulas at best and are nothing more than metaphysical structures detached from true reality.

2. With reference to the manner of effecting a socialist revolution, one must differentiate between two phases: on the one hand, that time period in which the proletarian dictatorship emerges; on the other, the ensuing period in which social, economic and political transformations take place.

3. The possibility of a peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the working class depends less upon the question of whether or not the ruling classes want to use force in extreme forms than upon whether they will be able to do so or not. According to Lenin, it is therefore imperative to bring about such a preponderance of material forces on the side of the revolutionary classes that reaction is rendered incapable of offering effective resistance. Only under this precondition can it be said that: "If no reactionary force exists which must be overthrown, there can be no mention of a revolutionary force at all."

And as far as the reliability of agreements is concerned -- as the Soviets understand it, the permissibility of the search for allies (including national bourgeoisle) and the willingness to make the necessary temporary compromises -- this has to be in line with Lenin's principle: "One must know how to combine the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the socialist revolution by subordinating the former to the latter. Therein lies the entire essence of the matter, the entire difficulty."

In offering evidence of the genuinely representative contemporary Soviet writing in this field, we shall limit ourselves to the very basics. The discussion of the word "force (Nasilie)" in the "Philosophical Encyclopedia" and G.N. Kireev's noteworthy article entitled "Revolutionary Force and Peaceful Transition to Socialism" in the journal FILOSOFSKIE NAUKI offer examples and unmistakeably clear confirmation of that which has gone before. Kireev says in this context: "Following the acquisition of political power, the organizational work of building the proletarian dictatorship is the first priority. Nevertheless, as experience and theory show, (not even then 7 is the problem of force completely removed from the list of concerns, for the internal and external forces hostile to socialism do not disappear immediately upon the establishment of a proletarian democracy. The events in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were convincing evidence that relaxation of the proletarian dictatorship proves to be extremely dangerous and fraught with grave consequences for the cause of socialism. (...) While the dictatorship of the proletariat is emerging, the 'work of destruction' constitutes the principal activity of this dictatorship, and therefore the scope and degree of the use of revolutionary

force depend upon the degree of resistance on the part of those classes and social groups whose power and privileges are being broken through the application of force."

More recent textbooks and basic works on the political science of Leninist Marxism leave nothing to be desired when it comes to clarity and intransigence in their statements on this problem area. Here as well, we offer only a few strong examples: "Scientific Communism," a popular interpretation by Viktor Afanas'ev (Moscow, 1966); "Scientific Communism" as an alphabetical dictionary, published by Aleksey Rumyantsev together with 67 other lexicographers (Moscow, 1969); "Scientific Communism as a Sociopolitical Theory of Marxism," by Eduard Tadevosyan (Moscow, 1977); and "Revolutionary Theory and Revolutionary Politics," by Yuriy Krazin and Boris Leybzon (Moscow, 1979).

In a chapter on various "Paths of Transition to Socialism," the last two authors mentioned deal in depth with the concept of peacefulness (developed by Jean Elleinstein in particular). A few samples of their point of view: "When one is working out the theoretical problems of revolutionary politics, one may not evade the universally binding laws of the transition to socialism. If one attempts to turn them away at the front door, they come back into politics through the back door." Or: "If one erases the line between democratic and socialist transformations, between evolution and revolution, between reform and upheaval, one basically arrives at a renunciation of the social revolution." And unequivocally: "Totally unconvincing are the attempts to justify a renunciation of the idea of the proletarian dictatorship by pointing out that conditions in Russia and other economically underdeveloped countries were of a special kind."

But let us proceed to the urgent issue of Afghanistan. Soviet literature in the field of political science categorizes and treats this "phenomenon" theoretically from the standpoint of the noncapitalist path of development, with the following comparatively harmless definition of the procedure: "A gradual materialization of the objective and subjective prerequisites of socialism in underdeveloped countries." But the following statements immediately make us prick up our ears: "For the noncapitalist path of development_of countries which have freed themselves [from the yoke of cclonialism7, universal support (vzestoronnyaya podderzhka) from the world system of socialism is of the utmost importance." In contrast to the word pomoshch (aid, assistance), here we see the expression podderzhka (support), which -- as we shall see -- is very important in interventions by the Soviet Union. And further: "The transition to the noncapitalist path of development does not take place automatically; rather, it is the result of an unyielding class struggle. The anticapitalist orientation of national liberation revolutions has merely the effect of a potential possibility which an unfavorable balance of class forces can cause to miscarry."

Omnia ad agendum requisita adsunt! All the arguments that define the problem are now at hand. However, as will be revealed in the pages that follow,

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these arguments will take on their true edge only via the doctrine of proletarian and socialist internationalism. In short: No matter how the tide may turn, according to those principles and criteria that are being applied in the political doctrine of Leninist Marxism today, apparently it is still only the others who can be blamed for the causative compulsion to actually use force.

The Foreign-Policy Function of the Soviet Armed Forces

At the end of 1975, Soviet military theoretician Timorin expressed the view that the continued development of the Soviet armed forces under the conditions of the mature socialist society would be marked by the feature of monofunctionality, which means that they would have only a foreign-policy function to fulfill. As far as the historically new structure and mission of the socialist army in general is concerned, this new type of armon force -- whose essence consists in the fact that it is the army of the revolutionary people -- would act chiefly as a tool of the proletarian dictatorship during the transition from capitalism to socialism. This would continue to apply as it had in the past to countries in which such a transition would be taking place.

Theory of Types of Warfare as Part of Soviet Military Doctrine

As early as the beginning of June 1974, Kondratkov had added a new kind of war to Soviet doctrine in an article on the problem of classifying wars: the so-called civil war of liberation by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie (grazhdanskaya osvoboditel'naya voyna proletariata protiv burzhuazii) -- in contrast to the generally familiar war of national liberation (natsional'no-osvoboditel'naya voyna). In further studies of this subject throughout 1975, other Soviet military theoreticians repeated and expanded upon the idea introduced by Kondratkov.

Meanwhile, the dispute of many years over Lenin's Clausewitz formula appears to have been resolved in favor of its unconditional validity, also with reference to nuclear missile weaponry: War remains the extension of the politics of classes and states, using forcible, armed means. Kondratkov, who along with others had vehemently opposed this view in the 1960's (according to Sushko), but who had been converted following the 23rd Party Congress (March-April 1966) to the unconditional acceptance that was even then being called for mainly by Epishev, became in the summer of 1974 a repeated and unreserved advocate of the political justification of a world war with nuclear missiles. Dmitriev noted in retrospect in 1975 that some Soviet writers had made certain errors with reference to this question. To this extent there is reason to assume that the debate over the validity of Lenin's Clausewitz formula has now been concluded and resolved. Epishev's book that came out in 1974 in Moscow, "The Ideological Struggle in Military Affairs," obviously made an essential contribution to this corroborative result.

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Kondratkov's 1974 theory of the types of warfare, which was modeled after a letter from Lenin to Ines Armand dated 19 January 1917, differentiated three main types which are based on three characteristic sociopolitical relationships:

I. The relationship of oppressed nations to oppressor nations (every war is an extension of politics; politics is the relationship between nations, classes, and so forth). The general rule is that war is justifiable on the part of the oppressed nation <u>(or class</u>] (no matter whether it is a defensive or offensive war in the military sense).

II. The relationship between two oppressor nations. Struggle over colonies, markets and so forth. (...) The general rule is that a war of this kind is for spoils on both sides; and its relation...to socialism comes under this rule: 'If two thieves do battle, may they both perish'....

III. Third type -- a system of nations enjoying equal rights. This question is far more complex!!!!.... A system has evolved in Western Europe... we live not only in individual states but also in a specific system of states....

Kondratkov initially assigned to the first category of armed confrontations both the war of national liberation (as a relationship of oppression involving nations) and the newly articulated civil war of liberation (as a relationship of oppression involving classes).

In March 1975, Izmaylov pointed up the special significance of the civil war of liberation for military doctrine's present perception of itself by elevating it to the level of a new main type. His article, which gave rise to the other statements, summed up present-day military doctrine from the following points of view:

- I. According to features that differ in kind:
- Wars between states (coalitions) of the two opposing social orders (system wars);
- 2. Wars between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or between the masses and the forces of extreme reaction, which are assisted by the imperialists of other countries (= civil wars of liberation);
- 3. Wars between imperialist states and peoples of colonial and independent countries (= wars of national liberation);
- 4. Wars between capitalist states (= wars of rivalry).

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II. According to morally distinguishing (qualitative) features:

- 1. Just Wars -- Izmaylov made a clear statement with regard to the second type of war: "Among the just wars of the present epoch are wars by the working class for its liberation from domination by the bourgeoisie."
- 2. Unjust Wars -- The following may be considered unjust wars: All instances of imperialist aggression against socialism's most progressive social order (in other words, against the Soviet Union), against socialist fatherlands, against the socialist world system and against the interests not only of the people of socialist countries but also of all men who are progressive.

III. According to geographic and dimensional features:

- 1. Local Wars -- with two or more states involved
- World Wars -- between the two opposing social orders (involving a considerable number of countries of the world, or even all of them together). "Since the formation of the socialist world system, the task of protecting the socialist fatherland has no longer been limited strictly to the boundaries of the Soviet Union; it has been extended to take in the entire socialist community.... It consists in the fulfillment of a patriotic /as well as/ an international obligation."
- IV. According to weapons-technology features:
- 1. Wars with nuclear missile weaponry;
- 2. Wars with conventional weapons.

It follows from the principle of the equivalence of all (5) branches of the armed forces that a system war with offensive strategic weapons naturally will also bring in the conventional weapons of the armed forces branches involved operationally and tactically.

All these views received official confirmation at the 25th CPSU Party Congress (February and March 1976).

With regard to the second main type of war discussed in Point I/2, since early 1978 it has been made even clearer ("War and Army," standard reference work of the Soviet Defense Ministry): "The civil war type [now] corresponds to internal state relations" as follows:

a) "in capitalist states" (as has already been stated previously) between working class and bourgeoisie;

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b) "in developing countries" between progressive and reactionary forces within the society.

The recognizable change that began in 1974 -- at least in the connotation of statements on Soviet military doctrine -- is proving to be relevant, effective and noteworthy in connection with the ideological function of the expression "proletarian and socialist internationalism" as well as the mutually exclusive contradiction contained in the terms "detente" and "class struggle." We offer a few essential comments in this regard:

From the ideological standpoint, the USSR possesses a comprehensive set of theoretical and practical machinery designed to maintain control over the political system which it dominates or influences. There is no doubt that the doctrine of proletarian (and socialist) internationalism that has emerged as the essence of "scientific communism" (of Marxist-Leninist political science) since the USSR's prerogatives were shaken in the CSSR is one of the most suspect instruments of intervention being used to substantiate its claim in this connection. The standard work entitled "Marksizm-leninizm o proletarskom internatsionalizme" (Moscow, 1969) indicates the direction of its long-range program as confirmed in articles by the highest-ranking communist party leaders of the opposing world.

Doctrines Justifying Intervention

Their thinking goes like this: "Under the new historical conditions that were established as a result of the building of socialism in the USSR, and especially after the world socialist system was formed, proletarian internationalism went on to develop into socialist internationalism as a consequence of its having been given new and heightened substance. Socialist internationalism became the basis of reciprocal relations on the part of socialist nations in multi-ethnic states as well as countries entering the worldwide socialist community." The "fundamental principles of socialist internationalism" provide further details on the political consequences that this entails: "They are 1 ideological and political union <u>a</u>s the foundation of the community of socialist nations and countries; 2/ mutual fraternal aid and support (podderzhka), which ensure the effectiveness of economic, military-political and cultural cooperation among peoples (narodov) on a national and international scale." We cite only the two most important obligations. Then, by way of socialist solidarity, national equality on the one hand and state autonomy and sovereignty on the other are brought face to face with the international "obligation of the people (naroda) of each socialist country toward the world socialist community and toward the international working class."

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This corresponds completely with Lenin's viewpoint, by the way. Indeed, he was the one to point out that "we are now emerging not only as representatives of proletarians of all countries but also as representatives of oppressed peoples." And on another occasion he asserted that internationalism was in fact only this one thing: "Unlimited work to develop the

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revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, as well as support (podderzhka) for the same struggle, the same policy, and only for it alone, in all countries without exception."

Consequently, the doctrine of internationalism is colored and varied only negligibly, accidentally and nonessentially by the specific characteristics of the differentiation in kind between the proletarian and the socialist in their connotations as described here. The present Soviet conception is that proletarian internationalism is not merely a temporary and incidental aspect of the ideology and policy of communist parties, but rather an expression of the essence of their theoretical and practical views. It thus forms the actual foundation of reciprocal party relations, thus at the same time the basis of the socialist community and its economic integration as well. As a conceptual feature of an absolutely preeminent relationship of parties (criterion of internal relations), proletarian internationalism represents the basic law of unity of action of communist parties in power in the countries belonging to the community of socialist states. From the Soviet standpoint it must, however, also apply in the case of communist parties all over the world that are not in power. By contrast, the expression "socialist internationalism" signifies two things: First of all a relationship among states (criterion of international relations) that takes in all those countries of the world which "have liberated themselves," which are striving to build a new society and social order, and which want peace and friendship and value their independence (from capitalism) -- in brief, on an international level all countries with a socialist orientation, "all revolutionary forces which are struggling against imperialism." But in the second place, also and similarly an internal class relationship within the state, one which draws upon so-called progressive forces of the nation, the people and a party that represents them while remaining loyal to the CPSU. As E. Bagramov commented in the journal KOMMUNIST, "internationalist principles quite naturally gain the status of state policy when the broad masses of people of these countries, the bearers of these principles, step forward under the guidance of the Marxist-Leninist parties."

To that extent, there is a very substantial difference between the principle of peaceful coexistence on the one hand and the doctrine of proletarian or socialist internationalism on the other. As the terminology used in Soviet doctrine with scholastic attention to detail would indicate, the former is concerned with relations "by states with different social orders -- mirnoe sosushchestvovanie gosudarstv s razlichnym obshchestvenny stroem" -- in other words, relations which establish and regulate an international relationship. Accordingly, it is stated that the main task of the policy of peaceful coexistence consists in avoiding a new world war, opposing the arms race, encouraging a willingness to reduce arms leves, conducting negotiations, making agreements, signing accords and concluding treaties -- in short, bringing one's own interests to bear among the states of the world and making them prevail. To be sure, those in the West are sometimes accustomed to overlooking deliberately the second task of the

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policy of peaceful coexistence: Namely, as the Soviet Union interprets it, this policy must also assure -- and nothing less -- that the so-called world revolutionary process can continue to evolve under the most favorable preconditions. This includes "assuring optimal conditions for the class-related /civil/ struggle for liberation as well as the national liberation struggle of every people by precluding the possibility of an export of the counterrevolution as well as interference (vmeshatel'stvo) from international reactionary forces." Although one unmistakeably finds oneself quite close to the criterion of internal relations here, it is the doctrine of proletarian and socialist internationalism that lays express claim -- and this is the real difference -- to internal validity, specifically with the aid of statements on the civil war of liberation (or recently, simply on civil war, differentiated according to such wars in capitalist states on the one hand and in developing countries on the other) as well as on the war of national liberation -- totally independent of the question of whether the respective country professes the "socialist" or the "capitalist" world system.

Not only all the aforementioned sources demonstrate that this is in fact true. The correctness of this interpretation is also confirmed beyond the shadow of a doubt by relevant essays from the third edition of the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" completed in 1979.

However, to remain within the context employed earlier by Krazin and Leybzon, if all this is decoded, put into plain words and made understandable to all, it can mean only this: Responsible political leaders of the Soviet Union, a great power, first address the countries of the free world at their main gate, so to speak, in order by referring to the international principle of peaceful coexistence -- thus seemingly respecting the domestic authority of those who are receiving them -- to negotiate internationally binding (binding under international law) treaties governing a thriving coexistence, treaties which promise their governments respect for independence, sovereignty, inviolability of boundaries, noninterference and the like. The same treaty partner thereupon gains access through the back door labeled the doctrine of proletarian and socialist internationalism to his opponent's internal domain which is closed to him under international law. He gains such access in order systematically and freely to undermine the agreements made previously by using the means of agitation, class struggle, support (podderzhka) of so-called progressive forces and so forth. He does this as long as the opponent's indulgence permits him to do it with impunity, whereas he himself strictly forbids such actions by the other side -- by threatening sanctions. He keeps to this policy -sometimes passed off as harmless -- which is known by the name of asymmetry: unequal conditions designed to permit a vigorous resistance to this suggestion and with prospects of success.

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Official Party Position and Confirmation

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"Proletarian internationalism" played a central role in Brezhnev's report to the 25th CFSU Party Congress (24 February 1976) concerning relations with the communist parties in capitalist industrial countries. This concept binds the communist parties so addressed to the principles of communist ideology and to general inherent laws under which -- according to these laws -- the development of the revolution and the building of socialism and communism take place. These inherent laws are said to be laid down in the theory of Marxism-Leninism, corroborated through practical experience and drafted jointly by the international conferences of fraternal parties.

It was for this reason that the criticism directed at the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party was cloaked in the ideologically significant disguise to the effect that some /parties/ were beginning to treat proletarian internationalism, one of Marxism-Leninism's main principles in such a way that in reality there was virtually nothing left of it. Brezhnev emphasized that he stood by the Soviet communists in their view that it was the sacred duty of every Leninist Marxist to defend proletarian internationalism. Significantly, Brezhnev, in his concluding remarks concerning the debate over his report as well as the resolution on the report, stressed that the unanimous affirmation of proletarian internationalism should be emphasized.

Resides the doctrine of social structures -- the so-called socioeconomic formations -- the ideological postulate of proletarian internationalism will be and continue to be the CPSU's means of legitimizing its future interference in the internal affairs of other parties, particularly the West European communist parties. For, as Brezhnev said at the end of his report, "the international alliance of communists" (internatsional'naya splochennost' kommunistov) does indeed fit in with this ideological concept. Certainly one could scarcely say the same about any other internationalism -- and very definitely not about other political parties.

Brezhnev's report ascribed an equally wide-ranging -- to be more precise, all-encompassing -- ideological function to the mutually exclusive contradictions contained in the terms "detente" and "class struggle." He commented extensively and with unmistakeable clarity on the question of how "detente" influences the "class struggle": K

It is Brezhnev's view that bourgeois politicians are either naive or out to deceive the public when they appear to be surprised and alarmed over "the solidarity of Soviet communists, of the Soviet people, with the struggle of other peoples for freedom and progress." "After all," it is "as clear: as it can possibly be (Ved' predel'no jasno), that detente and peaceful coexistence involve relations between states. This means above all that disputes and conflicts between countries must be solved not through war and not through the use or threat of force. _However/ detente by no means rescinds the laws of the class struggle and can neither

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abolish nor alter them. (...) It is for this reason that an indispensable condition of detente is a strict observance of the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other states, respect for their independence and sovereignty. (...) And if we should be reproached for this, then it would be difficult to suppress the thought that those who do so doubt the ability of capitalism to remain viable without resorting to aggressive acts and threats of weapons, without attacking the independence and interests of other peoples."

But as regards the "assertions of leftist chatter" to the effect that peaceful coexistence is scarcely helpful to capitalism and will by no means result in a "freezing of the sociopolitical status quo," he, Brezhnev, can only reply that "any revolution" is "above all the natural result of the internal development of a society." Thus, life itself refutes these notions with reference to such a "freezing."

According to Brezhnev, the Soviet Union is "categorically opposed to any interference (vmeshatel'stvo) in the internal affairs of Portugal." But this will not prevent it in the least from "expressing the passionate solidarity of Soviet communists, of all Soviet people, with the revolutionary Portuguese nation, with its communists, with all democrats."

The "tragedy of Chile" has not only given the lie to the communist doctrine "of the possibility of different paths to revolution, including a peaceful one," it has also shown "that the revolution must be able to defend itself." This bitter experience substantiates and justifies the "appeal to strengthen international solidarity with all those who take the path of freedom and progress."

The same is true with respect to the People's Republic of Angola. This progressive state has become "the object of foreign intervention." It is for this reason that "Angola's struggle to protect its independence has met with support (podderzhka) from progressive forces all over the world," and "the success of this struggle" has "become proof that no one can shat-ter people's aspirations for freedom." Also significant in reference to Angola was Brezhnev's remark that "the Soviet Union does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. Respect for the hallowed right of every people, every country, to choose its path of development is an immutable principle of Leninist foreign policy. But we do not conceal our views. We stand on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence in the developing countries as well as all others, and we behave toward them as we do toward our friends and comrades-in-arms. Our party extends support (podderzhka) to the peoples who are fighting for their freedom, and we shall do so in the future as well. (...) We act in accordance with the dictates of our revolutionary conscience, of our communist convictions."

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What Is "Interference (Vmeshatel'stvo), and What Is "Support" (Podderzhka)? In his ideologically extremely significant statement affirming the essential importance to the Soviet Union's foreign relations of whether the issue is relations between or within the various states, Brezhnev went along with the instructive views on "Interventionism as a Policy of Disgrace and Failure" expressed by Khmara in 1975 in the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYCH SIL. According to Khmara, "intervention is one of the most important forms of international capitalism's political struggle against the workers' movement (on the one hand) and (on the other against the national liberation movement, the forces of democracy and progress. Khmara made a clean distinction between the two forms of conflict by using the expressions "revolutionary civil war" (revolyucionnaya grazhdanskaya voyna; ibid) and "revolution of national liberation" (natsional'no-osvoboditel 'naya revolyutsiya). With respect to the seizure of power through intervention, Khmara continues, direct and immediate possibilities come into the picture, the realization of which means either an occupation regime or a puppet regime. Paramount in the direct seizure of power is "incitement to civil wars and rebellions, with the aim of overthrowing governments that are objectionable to the imperialists; added to this is the political and financial support of counterrevolutionary forces as well as propaganda campaigns of various kinds to build up individuals who are prepared to throw open the gates to foreign invasion." "Also counted among the methods of interventionism is the unleashing of local wars by inciting small states dependent upon imperialism to aggression against neighboring countries that have chosen the progressive path of development." Interventionism, however, is described not only as interference (vmeshatel'stvo) by one state in the internal affairs of another. It can also affect the realm of foreign policy, the relationship of a sovereign state with third countries. Khmara described as an attempt to disguise the class-related essence of interventions the bourgeoisie's legal interpretation that only the state, as the addressee of international legal norms, may be declared the intervenor, that consequently it is possible and makes sense to speak of intervention only with reference to the state. Khmara emphatically rejected this interpretation. He wrote in this connection: "If international law addresses only the state, then the members of the proletariat who have rebelled against the yoke of capitalism, the enslaved peoples who have risen up to fight their colonial masters, are robbed of all protection under the law." The act of addressing the intervention concept to the state and the state alone makes foreign imperialism's policy of oppression a "legitimate," a just cause." This design on the part of bourgeois lawmakers assures the imperialist powers of "exemption from punishment" (indulgence) from the very outset since it declares as law their violent acts against revolutionary demonstrations by the working masses the world over.

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In response to the question of how one should judge the case wherein a revolutionary people creates "its own organs of government" in its fight for freedom and independence, Khmara noted that even from the legal standpoint of the bourgeoisie, the right of sovereignty must then properly be extended to that revolutionary people as well. But even here a back door remains open to the ideologists of interventionism, for "according to their 'theories,' interference in the /internal/ affairs of a country whose government does not enjoy de jure recognition by other states cannot be looked upon as intervention."

With the following statement -- which only seemingly contradicts Lenin's saying that only insame people or instigators (provocateurs) could believe in the outbreak of a revolution upon order or by arrangement (po tsakatsu, po zoglazheniyu), Khmara then came to the real essence of his remarks: "Now as before, Marxism-Leninism holds the view that every nation, whether large or small, is sovereign; that only the people themselves can decide their fate; that all possible changes in the state are the domain of its internal jurisdiction (competency). The Soviet people, the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries profess solidarity with the revolutionary forces in the capitalist world (as well as] the national liberation movement by supporting both to the greatest extent possible (okatsyvaya im vzemernuyu podderzhku). But this support is being realized not through the export of revolution, of its 'thrust' from outside, but above all through measures whose aim is to stop the counterrevolutionary attacks by reactionary forces in the world and to prevent interference by imperialist powers in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples."

Khmara noted that the Soviet Union has been instrumental in having today's international law regard intervention as a violation of that law. It consequently cannot tolerate any form of interference, or threat of interference, which is directed against the political independence or the territorial integrity of any country whatsoever. Ahmara said that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, as set forth in the charter of the United Nations, prohibits anyone -- even this organization itself -- from actions that are the internal responsibility of a state. As early as 1965 (at its 20th session), the UN General Assembly approved the Soviet Union's "declaration on the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of states, on the protection of their independence"; England was the only country to abstain from voting. And late in 1974 (at its 24th session), the General Assembly also endorsed the USSR's definition of the term "aggression." Khmara notes that the wording of this definition makes possible not only a precise determination of the facts surrounding a violation of state sovereignty by intervenors; it also strictly condemned the use of force aimed at interference in the affairs of peoples, at depriving them of their political independence and so forth.

Khmara summed up these viewpoints in the following sentence: "The countries of the socialist community are implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence consistently in the international arena. But insofar as mutual

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relations among the fraternal countries are concerned, socialist internationalism has been and will remain for them the supreme principle." In Brezhnev's words, "socialist internationalism is the heavy responsibility for the destiny of socialism, not only in our own country but also in the world at large. It means the highest respect for the national and historical features of the development of each and every country and the resolve to provide the broadest support for one another. It is the profound understanding of that historical role which falls to the countries of socialism in the world revolutionary process, in the cause of support for the anti-imperialist struggle for liberation by the peoples of the world."

The preceding statements leave virtually no doubt that communist theory is seeking to legitimize the practical conduct of the Soviet Union by means of a strict and consistent, but merely terminological, dialectic of concepts which do indeed as a rule characterize the same circumstances in terms of power politics, but which manifest -- not to say feign -- totally opposite modes of thought and argumentation via their allusion to the principal contradiction of the times -- the contradiction of imperialistic capitalism and revolutionary world socialism. The most important of these ideological concepts are listed in the following synopsis, in which the difference in international relations and internal jurisdiction represents the decisive criterion for separation:

Capitalism

International relations Peaceful coexistence Detente Renunciation of force Interference (intervention) State Sovereignty Integrity Imperialist powers

<u>Socialism</u>

Internal jurisdiction Proletarian internationalism Class struggle Socialist world movement Socialist internationalism People Revolution Civil war of liberation War of national liberation

The true ideological key to the justification behind the Soviet Union's conduct toward Afghanistan lies in the difference described by Ahmara -- and used politically by Brezhnev with reference to Chile, Portugal and Angola -- between international relations and internal jurisdiction, or -- expressed differently (and as a part for the whole) -- between inter-ference (vmeshatel'stvo) in violation of international law and support (podderzhka) permitted, justified and even morally required by revolution-ary theory.

Forgoing a detailed account of current events, which would definitely change nothing of the essence of the issue, we should mention only one other noteworthy incident: Appearing on 2 August 1979 in Moscow's PRAVDA was an article on "The Myth of the 'Soviet Military Threat' and Reality,"

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written by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and first deputy defense minister of the USSR. In October 1979, the monthly SOVYETSKOE VOENNOE OBOTSRENIE (Soviet Military Review) reprinted the article together with, incidentally, an unsigned editorial on "The Leninist Theory of the Socialist Revolution."

Some of Ogarkov's remarks follow: "Voices in the West are rumbling that the Soviet Union is stepping up its military presence in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In Beijing they are sounding the alarm. There is a short and concise reply to all this: If we discount the limited number of Soviet military experts who are only helping people become familiar with the technology of the weaponry supplied by the USSR, then there has not been and is not now a single Soviet soldier, a single Soviet unit, much less a Soviet regiment in these areas. The Soviet Union has never interfered in the internal affairs of another state (ne vmeshivalsya) nor is it doing so today (ne vmeshivaetsya)." Three columns further on, he says: "The CPSU and the Soviet government are striving for detente to take on a global character, for people in every corner of the world to be able to enjoy the fruits of peace and be free to shape their own lives. (...) No one, neither the slanderers in the West nor the Chinese hegemonists [supremacists], will succeed in blackening the peace initiative of the land of the soviets. Reality itself dispels the myths of a 'Soviet military threat."

In conclusion, the chief of the general staff stressed that Soviet armed forces had "never been used to take over foreign territories, oppress peoples of other lands"; they served "solely" the "interests of protecting socialist achievements..., the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of the Soviet state." What does one say to this, especially when the marshal declares in the same breath that "the entire world" has "had the opportunity to satisfy itself that words and deeds are not different things to the Soviet Union"? -- Was this a coincidence? Hardly, considering the journalistically highly unusual reprinting of the PRAVDA article 2 months later. Was it then a conscious act of deception, or perhaps an aid to memory carefully calculated to lend legitimacy? -- Probably both: Anyone who took the matter lightly and backed only Point 1 of peaceful coexistence (without considering Point 2 as well) would be in error. Anyone who understood something of proletarian and socialist internationalism, of podderzhka and the like, would be well informed. Was there not adequate reason to assume that his admonition would go virtually unheard? -- All the same, the Soviet marshal is indeed right; a "slanderer" will attest to that. After all, he was only arguing along the lines of the internationalism criterion when he gave assurances that "interference" (vmeshatel'stvo) was out of the question. On the other hand, he said not one word about "support" (podderzhka) in line with the criterion of internal jurisdiction.

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Concluding Observations

Thus -- a piece of advice for political scientists -- for the time being there is nothing to do but recall to mind this ambivalence, this genuine dialectic whose method of reasoning is indeed nonsensical, this likeness of opposites in a single respect, this Janus-facedness, this dvulichnost', be it convenient or inconvenient, opportune or inopportune; there is nothing to do but keep an eye out for convincing sanctions in equivalent areas in order to remedy the obviously existing "lack of uniformity of conditions" (asymmetry). But he who should -- nevertheless -- still be unable to comprehend that these repeated ideological assertions, mechanisms and statements of facts are classical instruments designed to legitimize intervention in any conceivable and possible event, may justifiably no longer be indignant when charged with being ineducable. "There is unfortunately no further help for him with his prejudice." -- Or, to phrase it another way: The political belief -- and after all, it can in truth only be a belief -- that the aforementioned tenets of "scientific communism" would be suitable as a useful and reliable footing for measures aimed at building trust, this belief will have to remain at least an enigma for every reasonable person who still values the universally binding validity of logical and ethical principles. This is so unless he is prepared to be content with Pascal's discerning train of thought with reference to the relationship between justice and power. What was it that he discovered during his time, recognized as relevant and communicated to the enlightened public in the "Pensees" chapter on "La justice et la raison des effets"?: "Justice without power is powerless; power without justice, tyrannical. Justice that has no power will be denied because there will always be criminals And since we were unable to make powerful that which is just, we made justice of that which is powerful.

Under no circumstances should this situation be able to remain in effect today. "For we must not forget one thing: The law exists not for honest people but for those who do not care about law and order." And it is for this reason that a policy which wants to be credible must seek unconditionally to provide justice with the power it needs to assert itself and prevail, most especially in light of the fact that, according to Engels -thus in the Soviet view as well -- a "truly human morality that stands above class antagonisms and every reminder of them becomes possible only at a level of society where not only is the antagonism between classes wiped out, but its traces are eliminated from everyday life." In accordance with the Soviet concept presented by M. Mchedlov in the CPSU Central Committee journal KOMMUNIST, it goes without saying that this morality can only be a communist morality. If, however, we want a different concept of justice -- namely our own, which is based on the universality of ethical standards (consider human rights, international law and so forth) to prevail in a truly effective way, then it is essential that we place at its disposal -- at least in the interim -- the power that lies in the capacity to impose sanctions.

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INTERNATIONAL

ANTICOMMUNISM, SOCIO-POLITICAL DOCTRINE OF JEHOVISM EXAMINED

Kiev ANTYKOMUNIZM SOTSIAL'NO-POLITYCHNOYI DOKTRYNY YEHOVIZMU (The Anti-Communism of the Socio-Political Doctrine of Jehovism) in Ukrainian and Russian 1976 signed to press 19 Feb 76 pp 1-2, 213-215, 216

[Annotation, table of contents and summary from book by P. L. Yarots'kiy, Naukova dumka, 1000 copies, 216 pp]

[Text] This study criticizes the anticommunist trend of the socio-political doctrine of Jehovism. On the basis of primary sources the author exposes the petty-bourgeois reformist nature of the early ideology of Jehovism, its relationship to Zionism and the methods and techniques of social demagogy of the ideologists of the Brooklyn center during the early stages of the intensified crisis of capitalism.

The place of honor in the monograph is given to criticism of the Jehovist models of "the universal world government," the "world-wide theocratic nation" and other apologetic concepts that today determine the anticommunist trend of Jehovist clericalism in the struggle against the policy of peaceful coexistence and relaxation of international tension.

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Summary

Summary

The socio-political doctrines of Jehovism, particularly its "sociological concepts,"are elaborated by the ideologists of the international Jehovist center in the USA on the basis of the distorted world outlook of bourgeois reality and are used as universal dogmas for evaluating the so-called modern system of things throughout the world, including in socialist countries. Thus it can be understood to what extreme reactionary positions of alienation from social reality they push believers.

The consciousness of believers is undergoing extensive development in the spirit of the biblico-political apologies of anticommunism. According to the plans of the ideologists of the foreign Jehovist centers, this should conceal their direct political trend and thus serve as an adequate expression of the religious world view and the class attitude of believers.

The socio-economic preconditions which served as an impetus for the arisal of Jehovism and the shaping of its early socio-political doctrines convincingly corroborate Lenin's thesis of the class roots of the arisal of religion. The basic content of the ideological doctrines of the initial stage of early Jehovism was petty bourgeois illusions of "the great jubilee of peace" as a result of "reconstruction and restoration of all lost things." This predominant conception of early Jehovism manifests the essence of Jehovism--the ideology of a constantly selfdestructive petty bourgeoisie.

The antirevolutionary trend of "great reforms" and the so-called thousandyear jubilee of Christ's reign is acquiring an increasingly bellicose character with the intensification of the proletariat's class struggle. Jehovist preachers have tried to entice the proletariat with "the perma-nent idea of the kingdom of God on Earth." The ideologists of Jehovism present a whole series of concessions wrested by them in fierce class struggle with employers as proof of "the beginning of an era of great reforms." They urge the working class to wait calmly for the next stage of "development of the order of things into the theocratic supremacy of Jehovah" and categorically refuse class confrontation with employers. This was the petty bourgeois model of toning down the imperialist system of exploitation, the method of introducing reformist ideas in biblical packaging into the ideology of the working class. In this way the ideologists of early Jehovism retreated from positions presenting the views of a petty bourgeoisie ravaged by the attacks of big capital to to apology of imperialist exploitation. In the revolution, uprisings of oppressed masses and communism they perceived only world cataclysm, the

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annihilation of civilization, anarchy and regression. The present ideologists of Jehovism are not shy about reaffirming this "credo" of the founders of Jehovism, thus enhancing their value on the anticommunist market.

In the socio-political doctrines of Jehovism anticommunism has been consistently acquiring an increasingly bellicose trend in dependence on the intensification of the antagonism of the powers of peace, progress and socialism on one hand and the forces of reaction and imperialism on the other hand.

Creating antiscientific models of social development and undergoing revisions of evangelical doctrines about the nature, purposes and functions of the so-called higher powers, Jehovists are popularizing the ideas of "one harmonious society" and "universal government for all mankind." Propagation of these concepts and doctrines have aligned Jehovism with many ideological organizations and centers which specialize in the field of anticommunism.

The "universal war Armagedian is a reactionary, misanthropic doctrine which is always resurrected from oblivion in acute revolutionary situations and during the culminatory periods of the economic crises of the system of monopolistic capitalism.

The Jehovist concept of Armageddon is first and foremost a mystic reflection of the shattering of the petty-bourgeois classes' illusions. To the greatest extent apocalyptical moods are characteristics of small businessmen, shopkeepers and farmers. The strengchening of state capitalism and the bureaucratization of social life accelerated the progress of reappraising the values of social statuses, business and personal qualities, occupations, etc., and had a great effect on this part of the bourgeoisie. For this reason deep pessimism and a presentiment of ruin took root in bourgeois ideology. Such is the content of many influential trends in the modern bourgeois philosophy of history.

The intensification of class struggle and the deteriorating economic conditions in the capitalist countries stand out as a reliable symptom of imminent Armageddon. Thus the true cause of the incurable social sickness of modern capitalism society is overshadowed, and the deepening crisis of the capitalist system is mystified as a universal apocalyptic crisis of mankind.

The negative consequences of the economic development of capitalist countries with its irrational and often rapacious use of natural resources, pollution of the environment, etc., are leading to the arisal of ecological problems which are especially dangerous for the existence of mankind. On this basis the Jehovist ideologists are prognosticating universal cataclysm for all mankind. In this way speculative theories are cropping up concerning the ecological, energy and demographic

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problems of the present day. Hopeless pessimism is a characteristic feature of social classes leaving the historical arena.

The socio-political doctrines of Jehovism spread among believers of the socialist countries are directed at negating the objective mechanisms, scientific validity and practical implementation of the program of building socialist and communist society. Jehovist ideologists are constantly parading their "neutrality in matters of politics and ideology," and this should promote the calming and blunting of believers' vigilance to no small degree, for political calculations are forced through in the guise of veiled biblical apologies.

Sticking to general imperialist tactics of modern anticommunism, the Jehovist ideologists and propagandists have begun to implement the transition from frontal anticommunism to a more refined, modernized anticommunism.

Under the conditions of socialist reality, the anticommunism of Jehovist socio-political doctrines is chiefly focused on opposing the molding of the communist world view by implanting bourgeois ideology veiled in biblico-political apologies in the consciousness of believers, paralyzing the education of workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism by false references to the Jehovists' membership in a new, universal "theocratic nation," substituting "neutrality" to Marxist-Leninist ideology and CPSU policy for implacability to bourgeois ideology and counteracting the believers' socio-political activities by enlisting them in the ranks of Jehovist preachers of anticommunist apologies.

The Jehovist ideology of anticommunism is the result of the general crisis of capitalism and of its philosophy and morals. Fear of the victorious march of the ideas of scientific communism over the entire planet underlies the Jehovist ideology of anticommunism. This fear is intensified by the decay of the system of monopolistic capitalism and aroused in reactionaries by the progress of human society along the path to socialism and communism.

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