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JPRS L/9283

3 September 1980

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 18/80)

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USSR REPORT  
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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON CIA ANTI-SOVIET OPERATIONS

Moscow TsRU PROTIV SSSR (The CIA Against the USSR) in Russian 1979 signed to press 28 Dec 79 pp 3-10, 279, 287, 288

[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction and chapter excerpts from the book by N. N. Yakovlev, Molodaya Gvardiya, 200,000 copies, 288 pages]

[Text] The book by the well-known Soviet historian, Prof N. N. Yakovlev, relates the subversive activities of the CIA against the Soviet Union. The ideological area is the focus of concern. For the first time documents are described showing the history of the CIA from the moment of its founding in 1947, and the place of the CIA in the system of the U.S. state bodies. The book is full of vivid interesting facts which are little known to a broad range of readers.

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[Introduction] A Necessary Explanation

The attempt at an objective analysis of the modern Western special services encounters great difficulties. The researcher and narrator must make his way through a maze, he is often led into a blind alley, and sometimes literally sees pitfalls. These difficulties are both of a conceptual

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nature and also related to the search for and selection of facts. Although the reviewed subject undoubtedly exists independently, and at times has its own motivating forces, the work of the special services is ultimately nothing more than a continuation of the policy of the corresponding governments by other means. However, in many instances this work is of such a nature that these governments officially and apparently convincingly disavow. For this very same reason, even forgetting the understandable secrecy, one feels a lack of facts which, as is known, is the very air of the researcher. It is like trying to catch your breath. Rather it is like breathing the fumes of a poisoned atmosphere for probably in no other sphere of state activities in the West is disinformation so often resorted to.

But it is imperative to investigate this sphere. It is completely impossible to understand the present-day world without considering the activities of the special services, in the given instance the U.S. CIA as these activities have involved all mankind. This is no exaggeration.

The father of American espionage (yes, yes, this sector has grown up so much that it has acquired fathers), A. Dulles, energetically ended the work of his life "The Craft of Intelligence" with: "The military threat in the nuclear missile age is well understood, and we rightly spend billions of dollars to offset it. This should be our attitude to all the aspects of the secret war.... The last thing we should do is to place fetters on our intelligence. Its functions of defense and information are essential in the age of exceptional and constant danger."<sup>1</sup> There is much worthy of note in this reasoning both as an indication of the value of intelligence (no less than the intercontinental missiles and the thermonuclear bombs) as well as the semantic import of what was said.

A knowledgeable person who in the past was the main liaison officer for the pentagon with the CIA, F. Prouty, in a rare moment of truth in the middle of the 1970's at the end of Vietnam and on the threshold of Watergate, wrote precisely about these words of A. Dulles: "The concluding, final notion of the book by the old boss is the best example of how the intelligence community feels it necessary to live in the nuclear age. They want us to have the most expensive and developed intelligence system which has the capability of automatically parrying everything that seems a threat to them. Although Allen Dulles did not say this in his book, his concept of intelligence would provide: 10 percent conventional intelligence and 90 percent secret subversive activities. In other words, we should, in the notion of Dulles, be busy around-the-clock throughout the world, countering 'all aspects of the secret war.'" By this he implies interference into the internal affairs of other countries regardless of whether they know of or permit this. The United States has been engaging precisely in this in an ever-increasing degree starting from the intervention in Berlin and Iran in the 1940's. The culmination point of this way of action was the terrible catastrophe in Vietnam, where the question began with a major operation by intelligence forces, and then entered the stage of secret subversive activities, inevitably leading to outright warfare in the Johnson era."<sup>2</sup>

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It is easy to see why such clear thoughts had come to F. Prouty. He was writing in 1973, when the United States with dissatisfaction was estimating the costs of the war in Vietnam. Different estimates were given, and having analyzed them, R. Sigford (in an unpublished dissertation "The Rhetoric of the Vietnam War: Presidents Johnson and Nixon," written at the University of Minnesota during the year the book by F. Prouty was published) concluded: "No matter how the estimates are tallied the direct and indirect cost of the war in Vietnam for the United States in dollars and cents was approximately 350 billion dollars."<sup>3</sup> Expensive! Of course, as befits the ultrapragmatic United States, the human lives, and above all the Vietnamese, are not counted.

In 1978, when the shock was over, the former CIA Director W. Colby calmly explained that in the 1970's, the expenditures on the CIA subversive activities "had rapidly declined. The CIA has cut its expenditures on political and paramilitary operations to such a degree that expenditures on subversive activities which had burdened down the CIA budget and had taken up over 50 percent of it in the 1950's and 1960's had declined to less than 5 percent." What, a reduction of expenditures on these purposes? Certainly not. Expenditures on subversive activities had simply begun to be accounted for in other items. No less a person than W. Colby himself pointed out how the CIA had reached such a state: "The expenditures for virtually all political and paramilitary operations...were assumed by the Pentagon," while "financing, for example, for Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Fund of Asia is determined by the State Department and Congress."<sup>4</sup> All of this was also described by W. Colby in his life's work "Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA" his wordy and poorly written memoirs.

For the title he used a statement by a peer, his predecessor in the position of CIA Director R. Helms who at the beginning of the 1970's publicly assured those who doubted the virtues of the department: "You should trust us. We are honorable men." It happened that a very short time later Helms was indicted by the legislative body, the Congress, for perjury, and for which an ordinary American would be held firmly and for a long time in prison. But the leaders of the CIA are a caste of untouchables for the laws of the overseas "democracy." When Helms was still summoned to court, his lawyer and he argued decisively against punishment, for "it would leave a scar for all his life." The court accepted the request, having fined Helms in November 1977 for a sum of \$2000 on surprising grounds. Instead of the grounds of "perjury," it created a misdemeanor not provided for by the criminal code, namely a reticence to give "complete, exhaustive and accurate evidence" to Congress.

As was maliciously pointed out by the magazine NATION on 19 November 1977, in the person of Helms the authorities were protecting themselves, for if he had so desired at the unheld "trial the former CIA director could have provided an enormous pile of dirty laundry for legal washing. Among other things, the bespotted shirts of Henry Kissinger could have been held up for universal review." Released from the courtroom with just a symbolic penalty of an accomplice, Helms, the magazine continued, "struck up a



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conversation with journalists, and that 'scar' was miraculously transformed into a 'badge of honor' or even a 'banner' won by a cunning lawyer."<sup>5</sup> For the CIA it is nothing less than a question of honor to successfully repel attacks and to understand the essence of the governmental system in the United States, from wherever they may arise. Aside from all else, it exists for this. But we are digressing.

There is no more profound misapprehension than to present the CIA as just an intelligence and counterintelligence body. No matter what corrections Colby would try to make, the correct proportion would be the one given by F. Prouty in referring to the authority of A. Dulles. Intelligence in the direct sense probably comprises 10 percent or a little more than the concerns of the CIA. If this were not the case, then there would have been no reason at all to set up the CIA. In the United States, as we will see below, there are more than enough intelligence agencies, and according to rough estimates, there are about 10. G. Kennan, a political thinker by calling, a diplomat, and as a second job an intelligence agent, quite rightly pointed out in his book "The Cloud of Danger. Current Realities of American Foreign Policy" (1977): "Intelligence per se has been a normal function of states long before the rise of the Soviet Union or the United States, and it is the purest utopia to hope for its complete disappearance. But everything should have its limits." What are they? "I myself have witnessed," writes Kennan, "how the American intelligence authorities time after time carried out or endeavored to carry out operations which not only directly undermined Soviet-American diplomatic relations, but the very possibilities of achieving better mutual understanding between the two governments."<sup>6</sup> This is but a mere shadow of what must be stated on the question of the policy carried out by Washington through the CIA.

This, of course, is not just intelligence. The CIA has been entrusted with the job of conducting so-called "psychological warfare," and conditionally 90 percent of the resources of the giant department goes for this. "Psychological warfare" in the official manuals of American intelligence is defined as follows: "Coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical (including military operations by the regular army, but utilizing their psychological results) by which the enemy's will for victory is destroyed, and its political and economic possibilities for this are undermined; the enemy is deprived of the support, aid and sympathy of its allies and neutrals or is prevented from receiving such support, aid or sympathy; the will to victory of our own people and their allies is maintained or increased; the support, aid and sympathy of neutrals is maintained and increased."<sup>7</sup>

The listed methods of "psychological warfare" are tantamount to the attempts to undermine the state system of a state selected as its target, and ultimately overthrow it. Espionage is the product and subsidiary of this aim. The brunt of the "psychological warfare" which is conducted by the CIA is aimed against the Soviet Union. This has been the purpose of

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the creation and existence of the CIA, an organization which has no precedent in the entire history of organized human society.

In the broad sense, the CIA is one of the most important and probably the sharpest instrument of the U.S. ruling elite for reorganizing the world in the American model and instituting orders to Washington's liking in it.

Regardless of the tone and coloring of the official rhetoric of the orators in the republic lying across the Atlantic, the dominant American political tradition is intolerance. This goes back to those times when the Pilgrim Fathers who found the Old World not to their liking set sail across the ocean to build a state in accord with their own views. Even then a narrow viewpoint had formed of either "us" or "them." A thoughtful observer in our times will easily realize that in using the words of political pluralism, the American statesmen do not tolerate this in practice, respecting only the form of government existing in the United States as the only possible one and one superior in all regards. Hence from reasons rooted in this American political tradition there is an inevitable permanent conflict between the United States and the rest of the world. The functional role of the CIA is to do everything to resolve this conflict in favor of the United States.

This is an intolerance of everything, both outside the land of the magnificent "democracy" as well as inside it. In truth the views of narrow sectarians. What proceeds from the White House is respected as wisdom ultimately. There is no reason to go far into the past, as recent examples will do. President L. Johnson established the following as the criterion of the fitness of candidates for higher state positions: "I require not general loyalty. I need a loyalty where they will kiss my ass in full daylight and exclaim it smells like a rose."<sup>8</sup> Well and good, but what about the mass information media and the notorious press? Certainly they are of a different opinion! Yes, they may write what they want, only the highest honor for an American journalist is to be in with the presidential inner circle, and there, as was noted with repugnance by a newspaperman not among the elect, "My God, just look how types like Meyers (W. Meyers, the representative of the Associated Press) and Semple (W. Semple from the NEW YORK TIMES) crawl on their bellies and kiss the ass of Ron Zigler (the White House press secretary under Nixon)."<sup>9</sup> Whatever one might say, "psychological warfare" is also directed inside the nation in the interests of establishing extreme conformism.

It has been stated that in the United States they have written and are writing about the CIA and have even "investigated" the activities of the agency. Let us take a look!

By now the extensive "plumbing" of the American state system has almost completely swallowed up the emotional wave of dissatisfaction which in the middle of the 1970's in the United States produced various "investigations" of the special services. At present, when even the foam from this wave

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has been dissipated in the bottomless sewers of "democracy," without any problem one can spot the solid residues carried by it to the surface from the administrative pipelines of the CIA, FBI and Co. One is immediately struck by the phenomenon that the "investigators" put their hands not on what they wanted or on what was in temptation's way, but rather basically were given only those facts which the state leadership and special services considered possible for release. These were a mixed bag, some of frightening nature, but inevitably passed through the sieve of careful political censorship.

This quarry was also the subject of an unprecedented hunt organized not only by the American but also by the Western mass information media. Now within the permitted limits Americans know of and are sufficiently indignant over the carefully selected information which has now become public knowledge of the functioning of the punitive system in the United States and American intelligence, and the attempts using human guinea pigs to control their behavior. The proper frightening words were said to condemn the unworthy practice, but one might ask what is the real functional role of this entire campaign ultimately in limits which have been set from above? It would not be an exaggeration to say that a rather detailed review (but with ominous reservations) of the efforts to control the mind is an essential part of the work to establish this control on the broadest scale. At least dissidents in the United States are warned by this of what awaits them. However the general purpose of all this is much broader, that is, to intimidate the world, having shown who is guarding the class rule by capital. And particularly outside the borders of the overseas "democracy."

The American magazine which selected PROGRESSIVE as its title and voices judgments worthy of the title has commented on the "investigations" organized on Capitol Hill: "The reports on them underwent rigid censorship. The Senate committee was rather frank about the legal violations and excesses of the FBI, but was almost flattering in some of its assessments of the CIA.... 'The best thing in this is that it is over,' said the senator from Tennessee H. Baker on the question of the 15-month investigation, when the great moment of its completion had arrived. 'We have finished and we have conducted the investigation without causing any damage or any harm to the corresponding agencies'."10 How is this harm, it is more like advertising! And for a very frightening property primarily for the Americans themselves who are perfectly aware of what awaits those who do not obey "law and order."

In the much-praised civilization, a circumspect subject seeks his niche in spiritual escapism, and some even endeavor to flee from the beautiful country. An instructive example of this is the thousand Americans called a sect who in the 1970's took shelter in the jungles of Guyana. And the reasons for the fate of the unhappy people in the maze of the tropical forests are obvious: they were endeavoring to gain freedom. While some may have suffered from a distorted notion of the priceless blessings and

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had fallen under the sway of the religious fanatic and mystic J. Jones, certainly not all of them did. Without having committed any crimes or misdeeds, they felt the hot clutches of the special services which had reached them in the jungles. For the zealots of American "democracy," the collective protest by leaving the United States was already a "conspiracy" with all the ensuing consequences. As a result there was the real prospect of again ending up in the clutches of "law and order," and virtually everyone preferred to end his life in November 1978. These were the next victims of "psychological warfare."

The subversive activities of the CIA are carried out in many directions. In our times, in all probability, without abandoning other means, the CIA is making a special effort in the area of ideology vis-a-vis the USSR and the other socialist countries. The choice for focusing attention on this aspect of "psychological warfare" was made for a number of reasons which in part do not depend upon the will of the agency leadership. Why? It would be worth our while to investigate.

It would be fundamentally wrong to represent the United States as a country where the forces of darkness are in unchallenged control. There are people there who realistically view the situation in the world and are in favor of good relations with the USSR. They make no secret of their convictions. The strategists of "psychological warfare" are endeavoring to undermine the influence of these circles which is tangible, in focusing efforts in the ideological sphere.

Let us endeavor to take up precisely this aspect in the activities of the CIA. It is completely impossible to fully disengage it from the overall picture of the subversive activities carried out by the Western special services, and for this reason other questions will inevitably be touched upon.

The first of these is why the CIA was set up in 1947. Neither sooner nor later. And how this can be traced from the American sources which have generally been used for the writing of this book.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A. Dulles, "The Craft of Intelligence," New York, 1963, p 264.
2. F. Prouty, "The Secret Team. The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World," Englewood Cliffs, 1973, pp 66-67.
3. R. Sigford, "The Rhetoric of the Vietnam War: Presidents Johnson and Nixon," University of Minnesota, Ph.D., 1973, p 193.
4. W. Colby and P. Forbath, "Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA," New York, 1978, pp 300-301.

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5. THE NATION, 19 November 1977, p 514.
6. G. Kenna, "The Cloud of Danger. Current Realities of American Foreign Policy," Boston, 1977, pp 212, 210.
7. "War Report of the Office of Strategic Services," Washington, 1949, p 99.
8. D. Halberstam, "The Best and the Brightest," New York, 1973, p 526.
9. H. Thompson, "Fear and Loathing: On the Campaign Trail '72," New York, 1973, pp 403-404.
10. "The Intelligence Investigations: Congress Cops Out," THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1976, pp 16-17.

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INTERNATIONAL

ERNST GENRI ON U.S.-CHINESE COLLABORATION

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 6, Jun 80 pp 100-111

[Article by Ernst Genri: "Beijing--Washington"]

[Text] Many commentators in the capitalist countries have viewed the rapprochement between Beijing and Washington almost as an "epoch-making" event which in the future should alter the entire international situation. In December of 1978, when the United States took the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, the influential West German magazine DER SPIEGEL wrote: "The alliance between America and China, regardless of all the phrases accompanying it, represents a classic 'coup in the system of alliances,' a coup in the balance of forces which has existed hitherto-fore and comparable with the end of hostility between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons in the middle of the 18th century or the animosity between England and Russia at the beginning of the 20th century." The chairman of the CCP Central Committee, Hua Guofeng, stated at a press conference on this question that it was an issue of an "historic turn."<sup>1</sup> The chief organizer of the deal on the Chinese side, the deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee and deputy premier of the PRC State Council, Deng Xiaoping, is depicted in many organs of the Western press as almost something like a modern-day Talleyrand or Bismarck.

At the same time, in the capitalist world the question is often asked of precisely what encouraged the U.S. administration and the government in Beijing at the end of 1978 to move openly toward one another? The opinion has been voiced that this deal is the handiwork of the present Chinese leadership which in 1976 replaced the "Gang of Four" which was close to Mao Zedong. At the same time, there is nothing unexpected in the agreement between the PRC and the United States. It cannot be considered that the rapprochement between these states started only in the 1970's. The roots of the deal go much deeper, to the middle of the 1940's, when the Maoist headquarters were in Yanan, the center of the Special Shaanxi--Gansu--Ningxia Region.

The mutual attraction of the two sides was clearly apparent even then. It took almost three and a half decades to bring things to an end, but the

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basic incentives of the partners were the same in the 1940's, in essence, as they are now. Both the Maoists and the United States proceeded primarily from their covert anti-Soviet and expansionist plans. And the contacts were established regardless of the fact that at that time the United States officially was most closely linked to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek which was in Zhongqing [Chungking] and hostile to Yanan. On 22 July 1944, an American mission arrived in Yanan and it was met at the airport by a band and the leadership of the CCP headed by Mao Zedong. The mission included the political advisors of Gen J. Stilwell, the commander of the American armed forces in China, Burma and India, and the senior staff officers of the U.S. military attache in Zhongqing. The talks started immediately.

P. P. Vladimirov who at that time was in Yanan and had an opportunity to watch events at the Maoist headquarters wrote in his diary after a night-time conversation with Mao Zedong that the chairman of the CCP Central Committee now intended to basically side with the United States and England and was counting on the fears of America and Great Britain vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. "And this fear should, in his opinion, force these states into a slow but sure rapprochement with the Special Region. Mao Zedong and his supporters clearly proposed to blackmail the Allies with the myth of the aggressiveness of the USSR which supposedly was dreaming of absorbing China (particularly Manchuria)... The chairman of the CCP Central Committee not only intended to receive arms and drive out Chiang Kai-shek, but also...exclude any effective involvement of the USSR in settling the Far East problem. And generally to neutralize any diplomatic efforts of the USSR."<sup>2</sup>

The American mission remained almost 2 months in Yanan. In August 1944, according to Vladimirov's notes, Mao Zedong told him "We are thinking of changing the name of our party. To call it not 'Communist,' but rather something else. Then a better situation will exist for the Special Region, particularly among the Americans."<sup>3</sup> It was not a question of a merely formal change of the name. Mao let the Americans understand directly that the party headed by him no longer needed to be considered Marxist-Leninist, and that he agreed to turn it into one that was bourgeois-nationalistic in spirit.

On 23 August 1944, the member of the American mission, the intelligence-agent diplomat J. Service, spoke with the chairman of the CCP Central Committee. As Service stated, Mao said: "Chinese and American interests are very similar and compliment each other. They agree with one another economically and politically. We can and should cooperate... America does not need to fear that we will not cooperate. We should cooperate and we need American aid. That is why it is so important for us to know what you, the Americans, are thinking and planning. We cannot take the risk of causing your dissatisfaction, and we cannot take the risk of any clash with you."<sup>4</sup> This was said by Mao Zedong 36 years ago, when in his dealings with Moscow and in public speeches he took great pains to show his unswerving friendship with the USSR.

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At that time Service telegraphed Washington from Yen-an: "Proceeding from very practical motives, the communists are not counting on Soviet Russia being able to play a major role in China."<sup>5</sup> At the end of September, Vladimirov commented: "Mao Zedong considers the Soviet Union too bled white by the struggle against Nazi Germany...and for this reason is not going to burden himself.... For him the chances with the Americans are much more preferential, and he is earnestly forcing a partnership on them. For Mao it is indisputable that at present the fate of the Far East and China is being determined. And the chief arbiter is the United States alone!... Even I (and I have seen enough here!) have been struck by how far he has gone in his promises, guarantees, assurances and candor bordering on treachery."<sup>6</sup>

Contacts continue between the Maoists and the Americans. On 5 October 1944, a new group of Americans arrived in Yen-an headed by the U.S. military attache in China, Col M. Depaas and the emissary of American intelligence, the "surgeon" D. Armstrong. They also were met at the airfield by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Finally, on 7 November, the personal representative of the U.S. President and the former minister of defense, Gen P. J. Hurley, showed up at Mao's headquarters. "The purpose of the Hurley mission," commented Vladimirov, "was not merely to impel the Special Region to begin active operations against the Japanese, but rather to drive a wedge between the CCP leadership and Moscow."<sup>7</sup>

A draft agreement was signed by both parties. The contents of the talks became known to Vladimirov.<sup>8</sup> "The authentic texts will scarcely see the light of day," he commented. "Everything has been spelled out there. The chairman of the CCP Central Committee has offered America an alliance, an unshakable alliance, he has guaranteed the independence of Yen-an from the political course of Moscow, and so forth.... For weapons and an alliance with the United States, Mao Zedong has guaranteed to reject the 'ties with Moscow.' On 14 November, Hurley informed Mao of his 'profound satisfaction with the results of the talks' which had been characterized by a 'brilliant spirit of cooperation.' He advanced the hope that this spirit would be strengthened after the victory over Japan, and expressed gratitude to Mao for his 'wise letter' to the U.S. President in which he hoped to realize the dream that after the war 'the two great nations (Chinese and American) would always move forward shoulder to shoulder in building peace throughout the world'."<sup>9</sup>

The notes quoted here by P. P. Vladimirov are affirmed by the actual material from the American side.<sup>10</sup> The American journalist T. White who was in Yen-an in the summer of 1944 and at that time was a representative of the Luce press organization, wrote that he had participated in "the great plan of testing out the possibilities of an alliance between America and the Chinese communists." For this purpose he held talks with his "old friend" Zhou Enlai. White added that when the China-born American diplomat J. P. Davis in meetings with Mao and Zhou "studied the possibility of military cooperation and an alliance..Yen-an at that moment embraced us as allies and friends." White went on to relate that in 1945 Zhou Enlai "through



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friends in the American embassy was seeking permission to fly to the United States to meet with Franklin Roosevelt and explain to him the revolution<sup>11</sup> (in China.--E.G.).

These were the plans of the Maoists in 1944 and 1945. At that time they did everything "to establish for them (the Americans.--E.G.) the correctness and necessity of an alliance," convincing them "of the complete national independence of the CCP," in letting them understand in every possible way that "the isolation of the USSR in the Far East meets not only American interests."<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, the hopes of the Maoists at that time did not come true, but not due to their fault, but rather obviously as a result of the fears of the U.S. President F. Roosevelt. Regardless of all their promises, the White House and State Department still could not believe that Mao Zedong was seriously ready to abandon communist ideas and switch over to the Western camp. At that time this seemed improbable even to the overseas politicians.

Ultimately it was decided in Washington that the risk of a political and military alliance with Yen-an was too great and it was preferable to continue betting on Chiang Kai-shek. According to the data of the same White, the influence of the extreme reactionary J. McCarthy could also be felt. The American authorities restricted themselves to a statement that the weapons supplied by them to the Chiang Kai-shek army were to be used only to fight against Japan. "But still," Vladimirov wrote, "Mao Zedong did not exclude circumstances under which the White House could alter its attitude toward the Special Region."<sup>13</sup> The CCP leadership was hoping that among the Americans there would be persons "with sober views" and that they also would be found in the higher U.S. administration. The final decision was deferred in Washington, but the "Chinese card" continued to be kept in reserve. The duality of U.S. policy in China remained in force. And they also were waiting in Beijing.

Moscow knew much of what was being done in Yen-an. But, proceeding from the realities of wartime international relations, and in particular the relations of the USSR with the United States, caution was observed. Mao Zedong was in no way trusted. The presence of currents within the CCP was also taken into account. The party was not homogeneous, and its leaders and functionaries held different positions. In 1944, Mao Zedong had still not been able to completely suppress the opposition and subordinate the party to his sole power. In the USSR hope had not been lost that the healthy elements within the CCP could promptly prevent the treachery of the Maoist clique and bring China to a truly socialist path.

The course of the Maoist group which was characterized by secret plans was also felt after the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung army by the Soviet troops and by the creation of the chief basis of the Chinese revolution in Manchuria with Soviet aid. Mao Zedong who in 1947 had escaped from Yen-an which had been captured by the Kuomintang did not agree with the group of Soviet representatives in Manchuria which was providing the day-to-day contacts with the CCP. They advised acquiring significant forces before

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going over to a drive to the south and to properly prepare the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for such a campaign, having ensured a rapid victory for it. But Mao wanted the Soviet troops to begin the offensive outside of Manchuria into the territory of North China.<sup>14</sup>

Certainly at that time Mao could not count on direct support in Washington, particularly as support was still being given to Chiang Kai-shek. As is known, Mao Zedong in those days was known to voice such statements as it would be better if China did not have diplomatic relations either with the USSR or the United States.<sup>15</sup> It was clear that in a concealed form an accent was being put on the disengaging of the Maoists from the USSR which had been the sole and natural ally of the Chinese revolution. Obviously the "American card" which had been kept in the hand since 1944 was to be played later. As it turned out, this was done by Mao Zedong 5 years later.

In 1949, when the PLA equipped by the weapons which had been turned over by the USSR from the crushed Japanese army began to crush the Chiang Kai-shek troops and Mao had been established in Beijing, the secret attempts to come to terms with the United States were resumed. Upon instructions of Mao Zedong, this time the initiator was Zhou Enlai who was appointed to the position of the PRC minister of foreign affairs. From documents which were declassified by the U.S. State Department in August 1978, it can be seen that in 1949 Zhou Enlai in a strictly confidential manner turned to the United States with a request to help China conduct a policy "independent of the West and the Soviet Union." Having established contact with American representatives in Beijing, he requested that his message be turned over to the highest American officials. Here he categorically demanded that his name not be mentioned, warning that otherwise "he, of course, would deny this message in the most decisive manner."

In this note Zhou Enlai also recommended that the Americans proceed from the view that "China still is not a capitalist nation, and if the policy of Mao Zedong is carried out correctly, it will not become a communist nation for a long time to come."<sup>16</sup> In other words, the same bait was thrown to the Americans as in 1944, that is, the abandoning of communist principles by the Maoists. To the amazement of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the deal fell through this time. According to official American data, the proposal of the Chinese caused debates in the State Department but "finally was rejected." Under President H. Truman the White House obviously felt that for U.S. interests it was much safer to rely on the secure U.S. positions in Japan and Taiwan than to carry out a risky game with Beijing.

The armed U.S. intervention which started subsequently in Korea finally assured the dominance of this viewpoint in Washington. As is known, the commander of the American Armed Forces in the Far East, D. MacArthur, proposed to the U.S. government that Manchuria be bombed. Things went so far that the U.S. Secretary of State J. Dulles, in meeting Zhou Enlai in 1954 at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference on Indochina, even refused to shake hands.<sup>17</sup> Beijing swallowed the insult. Over the following 10 years,

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Beijing and Washington were apparently irreconcilable enemies. But this was only an appearance. In deep secrecy, a new stage was already being planned in Sino-American relations.

It is not difficult to understand the reasons for the unrestrained desire of Beijing to come to terms with the United States. For Mao Zedong and the people around him, it was not merely a question of splitting the United States away from Chiang Kai-shek. And not even to drive a wedge in the relations between the PRC and the USSR, to suppress the internationalists in the CCP, and thereby strengthen their dictatorship in it. For Mao the main thing was to prepare ahead of time for a policy aimed at establishing the hegemony of China to the south, north and west. This was primarily the essence of his secret adventuristic plans. As was subsequently substantiated, the basic directions for the expansionistic policy in Asia were set by Mao several years before World War II, probably soon after his promotion to the post of the CCP leader at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in Zunyi in 1935 and the start of his conflict with the Comintern. Even at that time, Mao Zedong, in talks with the American journalist E. Snow, spoke of claims on the Mongolian People's Republic and the hopes for the "return" to China of Korea, Indochina, Burma and other Asian countries.

In Yenan they considered that the USSR would not tolerate the hegemony of any power in Asia, and for this reason began to look for a suitable ally against the USSR. Hence the siding of the Maoists with the United States in spite of the then constant assurances of Mao and his supporters of their loyalty to the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, and in spite of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid signed on 14 February 1950. When in 1944, Mao had held talks in Yenan with Col D. Barret, Gen Hurley and other envoys from Washington, he was clearly proceeding from his own plans for a great empire. Equally obvious were the motives which even then caused Washington to think about building bridges to the Maoists. The economic, political and strategic interests of the overseas imperialists were forcing them this way.

Among the American monopolies, even from the beginning of our century, a definite delimitation could be observed in terms of the main area of their activities. A significant portion of the large businessmen was interested primarily in expanding in Western Europe, Latin America, and later also in the Near East and Africa. Another very influential grouping of large business, in particular in the U.S. Far West, preferred to channel its capital investments and hence its expansionistic drives chiefly toward Eastern Asia and the Pacific. Their plans were based on the fact that investments in these regions, due to the vastness and the "youth" of the local markets, the cheapness of the labor force and the abundance of untouched natural riches, should bring a significantly higher profit.

The "Pacific" school of American imperialists had prepared for decades for extensive expansion in Asia. Even at the beginning of the 1900's, their ardent supporter, the U.S. President T. Roosevelt, stated: "The geographic

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position of America on the Pacific is such that in the future it will provide our world domination in its waters, if we use this situation with sufficient decisiveness."<sup>18</sup> Another time he emphasized: "I feel that in the future history to a greater degree will be determined by our position on the Pacific facing China than by our position on the Atlantic facing Europe."<sup>19</sup>

The program of "facing Asia" was also supported by a small portion of the American military, and particularly among the higher naval officers, and during the years of World War II also the generals who had fought in the Pacific area. In these circles, the main enemy was initially seen to be Japan, and later the USSR. During the war years, the given grouping had as members such prominent figures as the above-mentioned generals, D. MacArthur and J. Stilwell, the chief of the U.S. Army General Staff, and subsequently Secretary of State Gen G. Marshall, the commander of the American troops in China and the chief of staff of Chiang Kai-shek Gen A. Wiedemeyer, and others. This group of extreme militarists considered the main goal of American policy at that time in the Pacific zone to be not only a victory over Japan, but also the establishing of American control over China. The threads from it stretched to the State Department and to the persons around President Truman.

The large monopolies comprised the actual core of these forces. Prior to World War I, they had even attempted to turn China into an American fief, driving out the European imperialist competitors there. In 1905, T. Roosevelt proposed that after the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria be turned over formally to China, but in fact putting it "under the leadership of the Powers." Of course, American leadership was meant. The same thing was proposed for the Chinese Eastern Railroad.<sup>20</sup> Behind this proposal was a grandiose financial plan. The railroad magnate E. Harriman who had participated in paying for the expenses of the election campaign of T. Roosevelt proposed creating a gigantic around-the-world railroad and seaway which would cut across America, Asia, Europe and the two oceans. It was clear that the same plan for establishing American domination over China underlay the Harriman plan.

Because of Japanese resistance, the plans were not carried out at that time.<sup>21</sup> However, the idea of an actual, although concealed seizing of China by the United States and thus the creation of a great American Pacific empire continued to ferment in the minds of the overseas monopolists, generals and politicians who were convinced that in this manner the United States could achieve world hegemony. The financial support for these circles was the California Bank of America, the largest bank in the capitalist world which even at the end of the 1940's began to open up its branches in various Asian countries and invest large amounts of capital there.<sup>22</sup>

Even previously, the same forces had undertaken a significant political step. The Americans came to the support of Chiang Kai-shek who had usurped power in China. The Chinese government and army were put under the supervision of American advisors. It was assumed that subsequently American influence would be further strengthened and China would fall under full

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U.S. dependence. In addition to Japan, the chief enemy of the United States was now considered to be the USSR which had established fraternal ties with the communist movement in China. This is why, when 3 years after the entry of Japan into World War II, the Maoist leadership in Yanan turned to the United States with a proposal to conclude an alliance, Washington was immediately interested. Certainly there was an opportunity to achieve the old plans by a completely unexpected means.

It is difficult to understand present U.S. policy vis-a-vis China without considering the economic and strategic interests of the "Pacific" school of American imperialists. In September 1944, Service asked Mao Zedong "on what political and economic bases would it be possible for American capital to be invested in China" and how he would consider the idea of "leadership by the Americans (or their participation in such leadership) over large industrial complexes." At that time Service came to the conclusion that the CCP leadership was a "completely suitable partner" for the United States.<sup>23</sup> Eighteen months later, on 1 February 1946, being in Beijing as the personal representative of Truman, Gen Marshall transmitted to Washington the contents of his talk with Zhou Enlai. The viewpoint of this Maoist politician was formulated by Marshall in the following manner: "When we (the Chinese.--E.G.) say that we should follow a different path (that is, away from the USSR and toward the United States.--E.G.), we have in mind that we want to adopt the American model of democracy and science, and we desire above all to carry out agrarian reforms, industrialization and the development of the individual in our country, in order that we can build an independent, free and successfully functioning China."<sup>24</sup> The Americans were amazed hearing such assertions.

"In these talks," commented Vladimirov, "circumstances which were new to me were revealed. The Americans did not doubt the feasibility of a solid alliance with Mao Zedong. They even were not concerned by the Communist Party as the leading force in the Special Region, and possibly even for the future China. It was extremely important for them that the CCP be "independent and free of Moscow." This already presupposed definite nationalistic aspects in the CCP policy. In a word, 'nationalistic socialism' in the Special Region or in China was to the liking of Washington.... Characteristically here these desires were not rebuffed. Horsetrading was underway. The whole question was one of price."<sup>25</sup> Extreme nationalism under the guise of communism, on the one hand, and the economic and strategic imperialism under the cover of "democracy," on the other.... Both sides had begun to understand each other well.

Nevertheless, immediately after World War II the United States decided not to accept the enticing proposals of the Maoists. A particular setback was the Korean War started in 1950, when the American interventionists began to threaten China as well. Only several years later were ties resumed between the Maoists and American diplomacy, and again in even deeper secrecy. The increasing anti-Soviet policy of D. Eisenhower and Dulles caused Washington to finally take Beijing seriously. This was impatiently awaited on the other side. Mao Zedong was preparing for an open break with the USSR and

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the international communist movement. Having stated on 14 November 1957 at a conference of representatives of communist and workers parties in Moscow that it was essential to set a policy of a new world war, even if one-half of mankind would perish in it,<sup>26</sup> the Maoist leader began to move toward an alliance with the United States even more actively than in the war years.

The new contacts between Beijing and Washington started when the Maoists were trying to receive maximum economic aid from the USSR. As is known, after the war the USSR granted the PRC easy credits for a total of around 2 billion rubles, it helped China in building more than 250 large industrial enterprises which became the backbone of Chinese industry, and turned over gratis 24,000 sets of scientific and technical specifications valued at many billions of dollars.<sup>27</sup> None of this prevented the Maoist politicians from continuing to seek a deal with the United States behind the back of the USSR and precisely against it, as well as against the other Asian peoples. The carrying out of the plan dreamed up in Beijing of creating a Chinese superpower in Asia by that time had already started in practice.

Direct contacts with the United States were resumed in 1955. Meetings between the Chinese and U.S. ambassadors were held in Geneva and later in Prague and Warsaw. On the Chinese side, again the condition was imposed of keeping the content of the talks the strictest secret. Publically the Maoist leaders continued to attack American imperialism and stress the fact of Chinese friendship with the USSR. In speaking on 8 September 1958 at a session of the PRC Supreme State Council, Mao Zedong stated: "If the monopolistic clique of America continues to carry out its policy of aggression and war, inevitably the day will come when the peoples of the entire world will pass a death sentence against it and carry it out."<sup>28</sup> In the same year at a conference in Chengdu, he said: "We must be friendly with the USSR and with all the People's Democracies, with the communist parties and working class of different nations, we must work for internationalism, and learn what is positive from the USSR and other countries."<sup>29</sup>

The double-dealing game, the same as was at one time practiced by the Chinese mandarins, was not interrupted for a single day. Maoist diplomacy was directed by Zhou Enlai who was clearly specialized in intrigues with the West. P. P. Vladimirov, even during the war years, commented that Zhou "keeps to the Americans like an old acquaintance" and that "precisely he is preparing all the most crucial foreign policy actions" during the talks.<sup>30</sup> Mao Zedong at this time preferred to keep in the shadows obviously endeavoring to keep the alibi of the "communist" ideologue for himself. And the more the nationalistic and empire-building moods developed in the Maoist upper clique, the more its plans counted on an alliance with the United States. The one was inseparably linked with the other. The Americans were amazed how steadily a bridge was being built toward them from the other side. Nevertheless years were to pass before the concluding of a deal between the PRC and the United States.

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Among the problems discussed at the talks were, for example, the question of the war in Vietnam and control over atomic weapons. Mutual understanding was reached on the issue that in response to a guarantee for Chinese inviolability by the U.S. armed forces, China would not undertake broad intervention in the Indochinese war. Washington, in turn, promised not to support the Taiwan puppet Chiang Kai-shek, if he decided upon armed actions against Mainland China.<sup>31</sup> In other words, careful preliminary preparations were underway for a general deal. The interests of the parties and the possibilities of their coinciding or drawing together were discussed in all detail.

On 14 January 1962, the former U.S. President Eisenhower, under whose aegis the talks had been carried out, in commenting on the deterioration of relations between the PRC and the USSR, openly stated: "We are pleased by the development of these differences."

In instructions to the American embassies, the White House pointed out: "Although the United States cannot do anything to deepen this split (here Eisenhower was not saying what he thought.--E.G.), we should at least avoid steps which could contribute to the eliminating of it."<sup>32</sup> Literally the same notion was repeated by Senator H. Jackson. "The central problem which we must keep in mind that we should do nothing which could bring the Russians and the Chinese closer together.... The most valuable thing we have is the split between the Soviet Union and Red China."<sup>33</sup> This was the voice of the American military-industrial complex with Jackson being considered the leading representative of it in the Senate. Subsequently the ideas of H. Kissinger came down precisely to this same formula.

On 13 December 1963, now under President J. Kennedy, the assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, R. Hilsman, made a statement on the readiness of the United States to keep "doors open" for talks with the PRC on improving relations. Here it was stressed that the U.S. government was fully determined to keep these doors open, since such a development of events "could be for the good of our country." On this question the NEW YORK TIMES on 16 December 1973 commented: "This statement has not altered policy, but it has changed the position of Washington." In the following year, President L. Johnson received an invitation from Beijing to visit China. Later the Secretary of State D. Rusk in one of his speeches let it be known that talks with China were of much greater significance than might be assumed from their coverage in the press. On the other side, in speaking with members of the Japanese Diet, the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi emphasized that China would long ago have broken off talks with the United States if they were not considered useful.<sup>34</sup> This was said regardless of the fact that the armed intervention by the United States was already occurring in Vietnam.<sup>35</sup> The interruption in the Sino-American talks made at that time by Beijing for purely tactical considerations did not have any particular consequences.

On 12 July 1966, President Johnson, in speaking before the council of school graduates, laid out a new "Asian" doctrine of the United States.

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He emphasized that Asia, and in particular its southeastern part, was a "sphere of U.S. interests," and that the country would use American military might there in the future. Thus, Johnson's "Pacific" doctrine in essence differed little from the doctrine (of the same name) of T. Roosevelt which had been proclaimed at the beginning of the 1900's. In the same speech, Johnson came out for "a truce between the states (the United States and PRC.--E.G.) which call themselves enemies," and for creating in the Pacific basin and in Asia, under U.S. aegis "an international community of law and order," in which "Mainland China" was also invited to participate.<sup>36</sup> Characteristically precisely during the same days a rabid anti-Soviet campaign was organized in China, and this reached the point of mass outrages in front of the building of the Soviet embassy in Beijing.<sup>37</sup> Clearly neither event was an accident.

At the end of 1966, in Washington at the State Department a special consultative commission was set up on Chinese problems. It included such prominent American sinologists as D. Barnett, one-time deputy assistant secretary of state, and F. Straus the former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia who had lived 11 years in China and had repeatedly met with Zhou Enlai.<sup>38</sup>

In the 1960's the entire reactionary camp in the United States had already converged on the idea of the importance of a rapprochement with China, if one disregards the "Taiwan lobby" which had been bought off by Chiang Kai-shek. But the influence of this lobby which at one time was very significant in Washington was steadily declining. The former American Ambassador to Japan, E. Reischauer, wrote: "If representation of the two Chinas is impossible, then we should recognize that the loss by Taiwan of its seat in the United Nations, in all probability, is less harmful to American general interests than the continuation of our veto against Beijing." The same Reischauer made the proposal of removing American nuclear weapons from the island of Okinawa, and thereby clear the path for further talks with Beijing.<sup>39</sup> The special assistant of President Johnson, B. D. Moyers, called for the abandoning of the "rhetoric" which had accompanied the discussion of China in the United States, and assuming a "correct position" for the purpose of reaching agreement with Beijing.<sup>40</sup>

In a secret document sent out in February 1967 to the American overseas information centers, it was stated that for the United States it was desirable that "Mao and his group still remain in power," since "their main efforts were directed against the USSR." Here it was also pointed out that if the future ruler of China (obviously, after the death of Mao.--E.G.) began "to direct his main efforts against the USSR," then he could count on the tacit support of the United States.<sup>41</sup> In January 1968, President Johnson announced the intention of the government to discuss the question of delivering food to China and the relations of the United States and PRC in the cultural and educational area. The Deputy Secretary of State N. Katzenbach let it be known that certain questions raised by the PRC and the United States back in 1955-1956 could now encounter a more energetic approach from the United States.

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Washington was now ready to make concessions. Why? Obviously because Beijing by that time had been able to convince the United States of its anti-Soviet ideas and plans. When in March 1969, the Maoists organized an armed clash in the region of the Ussuri River and somewhat later announced their claims to 1.5 million m<sup>2</sup> of territory in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East, this gave Washington a decisive push to come to terms with Beijing. Precisely from that time, the U.S. President R. Nixon, the Secretary of State W. Rogers and other prominent American officials began to speak more and more frequently of the U.S. desire to improve relations with the PRC. The trade restrictions on China were eased, and the permanent alert of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Taiwan was canceled.

These were major decisions which could bode for much. The American-Chinese talks soon produced concrete results. At the Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in August 1970, certain data on these talks were made public for the first time. Then the fundamental change under way in the foreign policy course of China toward a rapprochement with the United States was also announced.<sup>42</sup> In April 1971, Zhou Enlai, had a meeting with American athletes in Beijing, emphasized that it was a question of a "new page in Sino-American relations."<sup>43</sup> In October of the same year, the assistant of President Nixon on National Security Affairs, Kissinger, suddenly appeared in the PRC capital. He announced that China was an "important ball in the game of forces on the arena of world politics."<sup>44</sup>

On 21 February 1972, Nixon accompanied by Kissinger and Rogers arrived in Beijing.<sup>45</sup> This visit which was held, regardless of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, excited the Western press. Only now did the capitalist world truly understand the importance of those talks which had been underway for years between the PRC and the United States. Nixon was received by Mao Zedong, and at a banquet in Shanghai announced: "At present our two peoples hold in their hands the future of the entire world."<sup>46</sup> No other American president had made such a statement about relations with another state. At a banquet in Beijing, Nixon, in replying to Zhou Enlai, stated: "What we are doing here should change the world. We have been brought together by the fact that we have common interests which exceed all differences."<sup>47</sup> The talks which had been resumed in 1971 by Zhou Enlai this time were held in secret. Journalists estimated that during the time that the U.S. President was in China, he met a total of 40 hours with Zhou Enlai.<sup>48</sup> It was pointed out that the Chinese side did not feel it necessary to condemn American aggression in Vietnam which was growing stronger at that time. Kissinger returned from Beijing convinced that the Sino-American talks were worth the effort. Diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC were still not established then. Obviously the United States at that time was still not ready to go rather far in meeting the Maoists. Further steps were demanded from Beijing, and these were taken.

The year 1972, the month of July. A new American visit to Beijing, and this time by the leader of the Republican Party in Congress, the future U.S. President J. Ford. His statement upon returning to Washington was: "They

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(the highly placed Chinese leaders.--E.G.) do not want the United States to leave the zone of the Pacific or any other region of the world. They feel that our presence is a guarantee of peace and stability and that the departure of the United States would lead to the outbreak of instability throughout the world."<sup>49</sup> At the same time the very large American Boeing military concern which had ties with Senator H. Jackson received a license to deliver the Boeing 707 jet aircraft to China. Also at that time a license was given to another leading military corporation McDonnell-Douglas for delivering the DC-10 aircraft to China.<sup>50</sup> The American military-industrial complex directly became involved in the deal, counting on the Chinese market in the future. This was also reflected in the question of the arms race. The U.S. representative at the Geneva disarmament committee J. Martin, in speaking at a press conference on 26 October 1972, stated that the United States and the PRC had actually arrived at the same position vis-a-vis the convening of a world disarmament conference, although they started from different premises.<sup>51</sup>

The year 1973, the month of March. Huang Zhen, the Chinese ambassador to France, was appointed the leader of the PRC liaison group in Washington, and the prominent career diplomat and former U.S. ambassador to France, England and the FRG, D. Bruce, became the leader of the American liaison group. At that time the Chinese representative at the International Conference on Vietnam stated that the PRC desired "to move forward at full speed to closer cooperation with Washington," and was not interested in meeting with representatives of the European socialist countries, since "we speak different languages from them."<sup>52</sup>

The year 1974, the month of July. Having returned from a trip to Beijing, Senator Jackson admitted that he had discovered a "coincidence of interests (of the United States and China.--E.G.) in many areas," and an understanding in Beijing of "the importance of preserving NATO." During his talks, "in no instance did ideology prevent a clear exchange of opinions."<sup>53</sup>

The year 1975, the month of April. The leader of the Republican Party (then in power) in the House of Representatives, J. Rhodes, upon returning from China announced that the Chinese leaders, in the course of the meetings, spoke very little about the situation in Southeast Asia, but on the other hand were in favor of supporting NATO and the continuation of the presence of American troops in Western Europe.<sup>54</sup>

The NEW YORK TIMES on 3 April 1975, wrote that China was showing an "obsession," in the statements against the policy of detente. Highly placed American guests continued to visit China. Washington was testing the mood in Beijing and receiving one assurance of friendship and loyalty after another. The U.S. President J. Ford, following the example of his predecessor Nixon, made a personal visit to Beijing in December 1975 and met Mao Zedong. In a speech at his reception, Deng Xiaoping stated that Europe represented the "strategic center of the clash" which "inevitably would lead to a new world war," and he called for the joining of "all forces" against the Soviet Union.<sup>55</sup> It was unambiguously hinted that in the event

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of a clash between the United States and the USSR, China would help the Americans. The WASHINGTON POST at that time wrote that China was the best assistant of the United States on the world scene. Regardless of its rhetoric, it was acting to strengthen the American presence in South Korea and Japan, the Philippines and in Thailand; it was restraining North Korea and North Vietnam; from time to time it was also helping in the United Nations.

The same thing was affirmed by the American specialist on Chinese affairs, S. Spector. In the summer of 1976, he visited the PRC, and drew the following impression from his trip. The Beijing leadership was insisting on the maintaining of an American presence in Asia, it was in favor of an increase in the U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and expressed disappointment over the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

In August 1977, now under President J. Carter, the U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance stated, after meeting Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, that "a very serious exchange of opinions on many questions, both global and bilateral," had been held, and the Washington administration viewed the establishing of ties with China as one of its central tasks.<sup>56</sup> In speaking on television, Senator Jackson proposed that large batches of American weapons be delivered immediately to China, and a "more reliable defense" created in the PRC.<sup>57</sup>

On 18 May 1978, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote on the question of the talks which had been conducted in Beijing by the presidential assistant on national security questions Z. Brzezinski, that he, like no other of the American officials is interested in a clash between China and the Soviet Union." In October of the same year, the American Secretary of Energy and the former CIA Director J. Schlesinger arrived in the capital of the PRC, as well as the prominent CIA specialist on China G. Lilly.<sup>58</sup> Finally, on 15 December 1978, a Sino-American agreement was concluded on the establishing of diplomatic relations. Two days before this, Deng Xiaoping, in an interview with the American journalists Novak and Evans, celebrated the concluding of an "alliance against the polar bear."<sup>59</sup> In essence, Deng merely repeated what Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had been assuring the Americans since 1944.<sup>60</sup>

What are the prospects of the Sino-American "alliance"? Who ultimately will gain in the deal between these forces? At present, the balance is clearly on the side of the United States. Although the Americans at times make certain enticements to Beijing, the Maoists are making more substantial concessions, foregoing the national interests of China. An example of this would be the fate of Taiwan which after all the "warm" Sino-American meetings, actually remains a U.S. outpost off the very shores of the PRC. Recently Deng Xiaoping let it be known that this politically and strategically important island, where the Chiang Kai-shek forces still maintain their base, had been surrendered to the United States. It can be asserted that Taiwan is to be turned into something akin to an American semidominion.

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But certainly it is not merely a question of Taiwan. The Chinese have also made other concessions to the United States, including in the economic area. The serious contradictions which exist between the PRC and the United States after the diplomatic deal between Beijing and Washington are not disappearing. They are merely moving deeper into their relations. One has merely to recall the obvious clash of the long-range U.S. and Chinese interests in the region of the Pacific, where the Americans are acting together with Japan and where the Maoists also have their plans. Even the region of the Indian Ocean, where the United States and China are presently jointly hatching intrigues against the peoples of the East and against the USSR, sooner or later can become a question of disputes between them.

Undoubtedly the American imperialists in the future will do everything to direct PRC policy along their own lines. But the Maoists, in turn, are counting on settling scores with the United States in the future. With good reason the head of the department of the CCP Central Committee and later the Politburo member and deputy premier of the PRC State Council, Geng Biao, on 24 August 1976, in speaking before the students of the Beijing diplomatic academy and in talking about the "two superpowers," stated: "In order to survive we should first of all side with one to be victorious over the other.... At the given moment, let the United States protect...the shores of the East China Sea so that we can concentrate greater forces to offset the northern power.... When we feel that the time has come, we will tell Uncle Sam: 'Be so kind as to pack up'."<sup>61</sup> In other words, the double-dealing game is being played by both sides. Each is hoping to win out over the other.

The main thing is that both the American imperialists and the Chinese nationalists are dreaming of world hegemony. In coming to terms with one another, neither for a minute is forgetting his own and in some places overlapping aims. But to endeavor to achieve world domination in our era means to come into an irresolvable conflict with life itself. History has already shown this once and for all. As for the immediate results of the deal between Washington and Beijing for the present, one thing is clear. In striving for world hegemony, China has presently become the de facto junior partner of the United States. And everything points to a continuation of this in the immediate future. Beijing itself has set out on this path.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>DER SPIEGEL 25 December 1978, p 80.

<sup>2</sup>P. P. Vladimirov, "Osoby Rayon Kitaya 1942-45" [The Special Region of China 1942-1945], Moscow, 1973, pp 302-303.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p 315.

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- <sup>4</sup>NEW YORKER, January 1972.
- <sup>5</sup>DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 86.
- <sup>6</sup>P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 349-350, 351, 352.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp 373, 377.
- <sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp 403, 505.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp 489, 505, 378-379.
- <sup>10</sup>For more detail on this see A. M. Dubinskiy, "The Talks of the U.S. 'Allied Group of Observers' with the CCP Leadership," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 1, 1979.
- <sup>11</sup>Th. H. White, "In Search of History," New York, 1978, pp 181, 182, 122.
- <sup>12</sup>P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 396, 422.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid., p 475.
- <sup>14</sup>O. Borisov, "Sovetskiy Soyuz i Man'chzhurskaya Revolyutsionnaya Baza. 1945-1949" [The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base. 1945-1949], Moscow, 1975, p 107.
- <sup>15</sup>O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovetsko-Kitayskiye Otnosheniya. 1945-1970" [Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1945-1970], Moscow, 1972, p 42.
- <sup>16</sup>PRAVDA, 15 August 1978.
- <sup>17</sup>Th. H. White, op. cit., p 122.
- <sup>18</sup>S. Nearing and J. Freeman, "Dollar Diplomacy," New York, 1926, pp 39-40.
- <sup>19</sup>A. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906," New York, 1928, p 406.
- <sup>20</sup>T. Dennett, "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War," New York, 1925, p 157.
- <sup>21</sup>P. P. Sevost'yanov, "Ekspansionistskaya Politika SShA na Dal'nem Vostoke (v Kitaye i Koreye v 1909-1911 gg.)" [The U.S. Expansionist Policy in the Far East (in China and Korea in 1909-1911)], Moscow, 1958, p 20.
- <sup>22</sup>M. and B. James, "Biography of a Bank," New York, 1954, p 480.
- <sup>23</sup>P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 335, 339.
- <sup>24</sup>DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 86.

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- 25P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., p 370.
- 26"O Chem Umalchivayut v Pekine" [What Beijing Does Not Mention], Moscow, 1972, p 32.
- 27PRAVDA, 1 October 1974.
- 28"O Chem Umalchivayut v Pekine," p 27.
- 29Ibid., p 26.
- 30P. P. Vladimirov, op. cit., pp 327, 533.
- 31K. T. Young, "Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: the U.S. Experience, 1953-1967," New York, 1968, p 461.
- 32Quoted in: M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: Dva Desyatiletiya--Dve Politiki" [The PRC: Two Decades--Two Policies], Moscow, 1969, p 197.
- 33Ibid., pp 346-347.
- 34"Vneshnyaya Politika KNR. O Sushchnosti Vneshnepoliticheskogo Kurasa Sovremennogo Kitayskogo Rukovodstva" [The PRC Foreign Policy. On the Essence of the Foreign Policy Course of the Present-Day Chinese Leadership], Moscow, 1971, p 169.
- 35One of the American senators stated at that time: "Clearly the support for Hanoi by Beijing was predominantly support more in words." Another senator commented that persons were wrong who considered China the chief enemy of the United States. "Russia and not China," he continued, "is the main supplier of weapons to North Vietnam" (quoted in A. Bovin and L. Delyusin, "Politicheskii Krizis v Kitaye" [The Political Crisis in China], Moscow, 1968, p 170).
- 36"Four Essentials for Peace in Asia. Address by President Johnson," THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, 1 August 1966, pp 158-162.
- 37Ye. Yu. Bogush, "Maoizm i Politika Raskola v Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'nom Dvizhenii" [Maoism and the Policy of Splitting in the National Liberation Movement], Moscow, 1969, pp 104-105.
- 38S. Sergeychuk, "SShA i Kitay (Politika SShA v Otnoshenii Kitaya 1948-1968)" [The United States and China (U.S. Policy Vis-a-vis China, 1948-1968)], Moscow, 1969, p 162.
- 39"Vneshnyaya Politika KNR," pp 159, 160.
- 40M. S. Kapitsa, op. cit., p 347.

- <sup>41</sup>TRIBUNE (Sri Lanka), 19 May 1968.
- <sup>42</sup>"Thirty Years of the PRC," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 3, 1979, p 19.
- <sup>43</sup>THE ECONOMIST, 17 April 1971; see also "Vneshnyaya Politika KNR," pp 170-171; "Vneshnyaya Politika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" [Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's Republic of China], Moscow, 1974, pp 249-255.
- <sup>44</sup>DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 87.
- <sup>45</sup>Let us recall that Nixon's political career started in California, the center of the "Pacific" school of American imperialists.
- <sup>46</sup>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 8 March 1972.
- <sup>47</sup>PRAVDA, 23 February 1972.
- <sup>48</sup>SVOBODNE SLOVO, 28 February 1972.
- <sup>49</sup>PRAVDA, 10 July 1972.
- <sup>50</sup>PRAVDA, 14 and 22 July 1972.
- <sup>51</sup>PRAVDA, 27 October 1972.
- <sup>52</sup>PRAVDA, 9 July 1974.
- <sup>53</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>54</sup>PRAVDA, 13 April 1975.
- <sup>55</sup>PRAVDA, 3 July 1975.
- <sup>56</sup>PRAVDA, 27 August 1977.
- <sup>57</sup>PRAVDA, 14 September 1977.
- <sup>58</sup>PRAVDA, 31 October 1978.
- <sup>59</sup>DER SPIEGEL, 25 December 1978, p 85.
- <sup>60</sup>Deng Xiaoping at one time was the closest friend of Zhou Enlai, and is presently considered his faithful follower. Zhou himself for decades tried to bring Beijing closer to Washington. In White's words, Zhou even convinced Mao to act precisely in this direction. If the "bridge" between the PRC and the United States remains standing, this will be the "greatest accomplishment of Zhou in the interests of both peoples" (Th. H. White, op. cit., p 122).
- <sup>61</sup>"Heading for Chaos and War," Moscow, 1978, pp 51-52.

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INTERNATIONAL

DIPLOMACY OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ANALYZED

Moscow NOVYYE TENDENTSII V DIPLOMATII LATINOAMERIKANSKIKH STRAN (New Tendencies in the Diplomacy of the Latin American Countries) in Russian 1979 signed to press 16 Mar 79 pp 1-12, 149-150, 151, 152

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction and conclusion from book by A.I. Kedrov, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 6,000 copies, 152 pages]

[Text] This monograph contains an analysis, which is based on rich factual material, of the appearance of independent, anti-imperialistic tendencies in the diplomacy of a number of Latin American countries and of the influence of these tendencies on the state of international relations and the activities of the Latin American countries in the world arena. It shows how the development of these tendencies, which are strongly influenced by the policies of the socialist countries, aggravates the crisis of the military-diplomatic bloc created by the USA in the Western hemisphere and contributes to the gradual application of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states to the practice of inter-American relations.

It is intended for specialists in international affairs, instructors and students in VUZ's specializing in the humanities and for a broad range of readers.

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Introduction

In recent years the struggle of the popular masses in the Latin American countries for total national liberation and the consolidation of sovereignty has acquired increasing scope. A characteristic feature of this struggle at the given stage is that it is carried over with increasing frequency into the area of international relations, into the area of diplomacy.

In particular, it is worth noting that the governments of a number of Latin American countries which have started to carry out socio-economic transformations and to conduct a policy to liberate their countries from the dominance of the imperialist monopolies are making broad use of diplomacy to ensure successful advancement toward these goals.

As a result, the role of the Latin American countries in the international arena has increased; their ties with the USSR and the other socialist countries, as well as their cooperation with the developing countries of Asia and Africa, have expanded.

These positive shifts in Latin America have become possible thanks to the interaction of a number of global, regional and domestic factors, the most prominent of which are the fundamental changes in the alignment of class forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, which is exerting an ever deeper influence on the course of world events; the rise of the national-liberation struggle and the successes of the progressive, anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa; the victory of the revolution in Cuba, which has led to a significant strengthening of the anti-imperialist struggle in the Western hemisphere; and the aggravation of the conflicts between the Latin American countries and the USA. The persistent efforts of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist alliance led to the turn away from the Cold War and toward the relaxation of international tension and this, as well as the tendency, which has developed in the world, toward the further easing of tension, toward normalization and the development of inter-government ties on the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage, have created favorable conditions for the further struggle of the developing countries, including those of Latin America, a struggle which supports the application to international relations of the principles of sovereign equality and noninterference in internal affairs. They have increased their aspiration "toward the strengthening of political and economic independence,"<sup>1</sup> which L.I. Brezhnev talked about in the CPSU Central Committee report to the 25th party congress.

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At the present time the aspiration toward economic and political independence is manifested not by individual countries of the continent; it is a policy which is characteristic of many Latin American countries acting in a coordinated manner. This exerts a serious influence on the state of inter-American relations, on the relations of the Latin American countries with the USA and the other imperialist powers, on the strengthening of ties with the developing countries of Asia and Africa, and on the determination of independent positions of the continent's countries with regard to the basic international questions. The tendencies toward the conduct of a sovereign foreign policy expand the opportunities for the further development of cooperation between the Latin American states on the one hand and the USSR and the other socialist alliance countries on the other hand.

The development of these tendencies in Latin America caused a crisis of imperialist "bloc diplomacy," on which the United States had counted for many years in order to preserve and strengthen the dominance of American imperialism in this part of the globe.

The forces of international and internal reaction are currently doing everything in their power to hamper the conduct of an independent foreign policy and diplomacy by the Latin American countries. However, the tendencies toward the assertion of an independent line in relations with other states are growing stronger thanks to the broad democratic forces in the continent's countries, which are fighting ever more decisively to strengthen these tendencies, as well as to the support which they receive from the socialist nations and from the progressive regimes in Africa and Asia.

The present monograph is devoted to a study of the present-day diplomacy of the Latin American countries, and primarily of the tendencies toward the conduct of an independent line, a tendency which began to be manifested in the early sixties in the diplomatic activities of these countries.

Thus the discussion in this work will concern primarily the official activities of the governments, which express the views and interests of the patriotically inclined forces with regard to the implementation of the basic goals of their foreign policy, goals which consist of persistently and efficiently contributing to the consolidation of the sovereignty and economic independence of their countries. In this regard, particular attention will be devoted to the so-called diplomacy of economic development, that is, to the solution of a number of the economic problems of the Latin American countries by means of diplomacy. In view of the great economic dependence, which the countries of this region still have on foreign monopoly capital, and of the enormous economic difficulties which they are experiencing, the Latin American countries attribute particularly great significance to the "diplomacy of economic development" (in a number of these countries it has been officially declared, for example, that the main task of their diplomatic service lies in the search for new overseas markets for sales and the promotion of foreign trade in general).

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In addition to the analysis of the diplomatic activities of the progressive regimes, this work contains an examination of the characteristics of the diplomacy of the bourgeois-reformist governments which are in power in a number of Latin American countries, as well as the nature of the diplomacy of the reactionary regimes, and their attempts to weaken progressive movements on the continent.

As for the time frame of the study, it encompasses the period beginning in the late fifties, i.e., from the victory of the Cuban revolution up to the present day, inasmuch as it is in this period that the tendency toward independence in the diplomacy of many Latin American countries has manifested itself most clearly.

An investigation of the new tendencies in the diplomacy of the Latin American countries has all the more significance in that these tendencies, like all the foreign policy activities of the countries in this region, attract the concentrated attention of politicians and scholars in the capitalist countries; they are becoming the object of widespread study and analysis. In this regard, certain prominent statesmen, politicians and scholars in the USA and other western countries are attempting to distort the essence of these tendencies or to completely ignore them.

Western authors frequently attempt to view the emergence of these tendencies in isolation from the social development and political conditions which have been established in a given country; they attempt to represent them as a simple consequence of the rapid but uneven economic development of the Latin American countries in the postwar years ("the achievement of the age of majority") or as the manifestation of traditional nationalism in these countries and the long-standing mistrust of their "rich and powerful northern neighbor," caused by the "previous interventionist policy of the USA in relation to Latin America," as a reaction to mistaken, inflexible policies of past U.S. governments, or as a mutual "misunderstanding" which has taken root, etc. <sup>2</sup>

At the same time a number of U.S. government figures and historians attempt to minimize in general the significance of Latin America in the political life of the present-day world and to downplay the role of the diplomacy of the Latin American countries in international relations.<sup>3</sup>

The facts, however, say the opposite: the role of the Latin American countries in world economics and politics is already significant now; it is invariably growing and will continue to grow in the future. This is recognized by government officials and representatives of big business in the West. For example, according to Paul Martin, Canada's former secretary of state, the main argument that convinces him that "Canada must develop closer relations with Latin America is the prospect for the development of this continent; before the end of this century Latin America will become one of the most influential regions of the world."<sup>4</sup> The president of Italy, Giuseppe Saragat, went even further in his evaluation of the prospects for the development of Latin America. Upon returning from a trip to South America in 1965, he stated that "the future not only of Europe but of the whole world" depends on its development.<sup>5</sup> George Bolton, board chairman of the Bank of London and South America, wrote with regard to the Latin

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American countries that "by the end of the century this comparatively little-known group of countries, which does not now receive the necessary attention, will acquire political weight and economic might which Europe will envy."<sup>6</sup>

The great and ever growing significance of Latin America is also recognized by the USA. In 1971, Orville Freeman, who was then the U.S. secretary of agriculture, noted, for example, that Latin America, with a population expected to reach 600 million and gross annual production expected to reach \$300 billion by the end of the century "is too big a market to ignore."<sup>7</sup>

A committee composed of prominent representatives of U.S. business and scientific circles and headed by Saul Linowitz, former U.S. representative to the OAS, studies the status of relations between the USA and Latin America and periodically publishes the results of their investigations; in its December 1976 report, the committee came to the following conclusions about the role of Latin America in the contemporary world: "With time the significance of the Latin American countries will inevitably increase. A number of of the leading Latin American countries which are among the most powerful and successful countries of the Third World will exert a significant influence on the development of the international economic order... The Latin American countries will be able to influence to a large degree the state of international trade; they will play a central role in the solution of the food problem on a worldwide scale..."<sup>8</sup>

These conclusions arise directly from the experience of American monopoly capital. It is well known that the United States accounts for about 40 percent of the trade by the Latin American countries and this trade brings the United States from \$500 to \$900 million in income per year. Direct private American capital investment in the Latin American countries reached \$15 billion in 1970, amounted to 60 percent of all foreign capital investment in this region and brought in net income of \$1.5 billion per year.<sup>9</sup> In subsequent years this interest has increased even more. In 1973 private American capital investment reached \$16.4 billion, while in 1975 it amounted to \$22.2 billion. The U.S. monopolies appropriate one-fifth of the gross national product of this region and one-third of its income from export. The total amount of resources which they pump out of Latin America greatly exceeds the influx of new investments.<sup>10</sup> It is extremely revealing that Latin America remains a very important source of income for the American monopolies; they obtain here 45 percent of their profits from overseas activities.<sup>11</sup>

The significance of Latin America as the main source of many raw material and agricultural products for the USA has grown with the current raw material crisis. The Latin American countries account for the following percentages of total American imports of specific items: 99 percent of the tin concentrate, 96 percent of the bauxite, 34 percent of crude petroleum and more than 80 percent of petroleum products, 71 percent of the beryllium; 47 percent of the copper, 37 percent of the antimony, 35 percent of the zinc, 35 percent of the iron ore, 33 percent of lead and manganese, 17 percent of the mercury, 14 percent of tungsten, as well as 100 percent of the bananas, 68 percent of the coffee and 57 percent of the sugar, etc.<sup>12</sup>

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Thus, the significant role of the Latin American countries in the world economy and politics is not a cause for doubt. However, the U.S. press periodically contains materials which assert that Latin America is supposedly not of substantial significance in the world economy and world politics, as a result of which the interests of American diplomacy in this region are limited. The position of Nixon, who carried out the so-called policy of benign neglect, is cited as an example of the secondary role which Latin America supposedly plays in U.S. policy.

It is perfectly obvious that claims of this kind, like U.S. government policy itself at certain periods, has been designed primarily to mask the true interests of the USA in Latin America, to cover up the actual goals of American diplomatic activity in this region and its scale, to draw away, if only for a little while, the attention of the Latin American and world community. And, clearly, it is no accident that American politicians, scholars and journalists have been persistent in their efforts to disseminate various versions of the idea about the "limited interests" of American diplomacy in the Latin American countries at precisely the time when American state organs and private corporations had begun to develop furiously their activities to organize a conspiracy against Popular Unity in Chile and to "destabilize" the situations in other Latin American countries which had begun to implement a policy independent of the USA.

The situation in Latin America, the foreign policy of the countries in this region, and especially the new tendencies in their diplomacy attract as well the concentrated attention of the leading capitalist countries of Western Europe and Japan; they view the Latin American countries as markets and capital investment spheres important for themselves, and they attribute great significance to the strengthening of their political influence in these countries, which leads to the exacerbation of imperialist conflicts in Latin America. The USA and the other imperialist powers attempt to actively drive a wedge into the tense struggle which is being carried out between the progressive and reactionary forces in many Latin American countries on the issue of the direction which their diplomatic activities should take. As a result, the situation in these countries is becoming more acute and complex, and it is essential to take this into account when studying the characteristics of diplomacy of the individual Latin American countries and groups of countries on this continent.

Although all the states of this region should be included in the category of developing countries which follow the capitalist path (socialist Cuba is naturally an exception<sup>13</sup>), their domestic and foreign policy and, correspondingly, their diplomatic activities are extremely varied, inasmuch as they depend on the forces which are

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in power and which support them at a given moment in each country. The spectrum of political forces which participate in the management of the Latin American countries is extremely broad. It includes the large landowners, whose interests have been intertwined for a long time with the interests of the imperialist monopolies, foreign and domestic banks; the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the upper and middle national bourgeoisie; the numerous strata of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie; military circles, one part of which is closely linked to the oligarchy and imperialism or the national bourgeoisie and another party, which is patriotically inclined, which represents mainly the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and, to a certain degree, the interests of the broad popular masses.

The reactionary oligarchical regimes in the countries of this region conduct an anti-popular, pro-American diplomatic course; the patriotic governments adhere to an independent anti-imperialist line. There are elements of both courses in the diplomacy of the remaining countries.

Other factors also play a large role in the formation of the diplomatic course followed by the Latin American countries. A politically mature working class, led by experienced communist parties, is a powerful political force in these countries, a force which exerts a significant influence on all their activities, including diplomatic activities. The peasant movement, which has an anti-oligarchical and anti-imperialist trend has also acquired a large scale. More or less consistent actions in defense of economic and political independence are undertaken by radical urban strata of the petty bourgeoisie, and by certain circles of the reformist and nationalistically inclined bourgeoisie.

Under the pressure of the progressive forces, and in view of the exacerbation of the objective conflicts between the policy of imperialism and the state interests of any given country, even some of the reactionary Latin American regimes have been forced at times to take an independent position on foreign policy issues, a position which differs from the position of the imperialistic powers.

The revolution in Cuba continues to exert a great influence on all progressive changes in Latin America; the revolution has become an irreversible social factor of Latin American reality.

However, it should be taken into account that the duplicity of the national bourgeoisie, the interference of the imperialist powers in the international affairs of the Latin American countries, the private military coups and the general instability of the internal political situation lead to the frequently observed inconsistency and vacillation in the diplomacy of the governments which adhere to a progressive orientation.

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Nonetheless, the main factor, which in the end determines the international activities of the countries of the continent in general, lies in the irreconcilable and the ever worsening conflicts between their national interests and the interests of imperialism, and this inevitably leads to the growth of tendencies toward independence in their diplomacy. Despite the furious opposition of imperialism and its allies in Latin America, these tendencies are gathering strength as the Latin American countries become more and more convinced that independent diplomacy serves to protect their national interests.

Speaking at the 33d session of the UN General Assembly, A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, evaluated the role and position of the Latin America countries in international life, saying: "Let us turn to one more continent--Latin America. Its role in world affairs is growing--and this is especially noteworthy--the Latin American countries are attempting to an ever greater degree to speak with an independent voice. Correspondingly, there are expanding opportunities for cooperation with these countries and the states of other parts of the world. This is a positive and important factor in international life."<sup>14</sup>

The process by which the new tendencies in the diplomacy of the Latin American countries are strengthened was unleashed against a background of historically conditioned features of the diplomacy of the Latin American countries, features which have left their own noticeable imprint on this process. For this reason the analysis which this work provides of the development of these tendencies is preceded by an examination of the specific features common to Latin American diplomacy as well as of the features characteristic of the diplomacy of individual countries in this region because it is impossible without consideration of these features to correctly understand either present-day Latin American diplomacy or the new tendencies which are now developing in the diplomacy of many Latin American countries, increasing their role and that of the continent in general in all international life.

#### Conclusion

From what has been said above, it is possible to conclude that with the relaxation of international tension, which has become possible thanks to the consistent, peace-loving policy of the USSR, the strengthening of the national-liberation movement in Latin America and the coming to power in a number of Latin American countries of governments which adhere to an anti-imperialist course have resulted in progressive changes noted in Latin American diplomacy and caused a crisis of imperialist "bloc diplomacy," which was first asserted in the post-war years in Latin America.

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And despite the fact that a large number of countries on this continent are still dependent on the USA, and although extremely reactionary pro-imperialist regimes continue to exist in Latin America, progressive features characteristic of the diplomacy of a majority of the developing countries of other regions of the world are coming through more and more clearly in the diplomatic activities of many Latin American countries. This process, which reflects the objective demands of the national development of the Latin American countries, the increased influence of the anti-imperialist forces in these countries and the realities of present-day international life, will undoubtedly be developed, although with the difficulties and complications which are inevitable under the circumstances of Latin America.

The growth of the tendencies toward independence in the diplomacy of the Western hemisphere countries is reflected more and more strongly in the situation in the OAS and throughout the entire inter-American system, and it is accompanied by an increased level of participation by the Latin American countries in the world arena. In a report to the 25th CPSU Congress, L.I. Brezhnev talked with exhaustive clarity about the USSR's relation to this process: "We support the aspiration of these countries for the consolidation of their political and economic independence, and we welcome their increased role in international life."<sup>15</sup>

These words reflect the firm confidence of the Soviet Union that in a situation of detente the future of inter-American relations will be found in a new, independent foreign policy and diplomacy founded on principles of peaceful coexistence and that the countries of Latin America, which have embarked on a path of anti-imperialist struggle, will have every opportunity to persistently and consistently carry out this line, to develop comprehensive cooperation with the socialist alliance and with the progressive anti-imperialist regimes of other continents, to apply forever these principles to the practice of inter-American relations and to make impossible a return to pro-imperialist "bloc diplomacy," which is alien to their interests.

## FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 21.
2. See, for example, "Statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, before the House International Relations Committee on Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, June 17, 1976," Department of State press release, June 17, 1976, No 306; G. Peterson, "Latin America. Benign Neglect is Not Enough," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1973, pp 598-607; Col. Blasier, "The Hovering Giant. U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America." Pittsburgh, 1976, pp 249-258.



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3. See, for example, D. Bronheim. "Relations Between the United States and Latin America," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, July 1970, p 505; WASHINGTON POST, September 9, 1971.
4. Citation according to EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Ottawa, July 1967, p 266.
5. Citation according to CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan, September 15, 1965, p 1.
6. Citation according to THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 1969, p 82.
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8. "The United States and Latin America: Next Steps." A Second Report by the Commission on United States--Latin American Relations. December 20, 1976," New York, 1976, p 3.
9. W. Rogers. "Foreign Investment in Latin America: Past Policies and Future Trends," JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Virginia, No 2, 1970; U.S. Department of Commerce. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, October 1970, p 31; Ibid., October 1971, p 28; P. Roper. "Investment in Latin America," L., 1970, pp 7-8; COMMERCE TODAY, New York, March 8, 1971, p 35.
10. KOMMUNIST, No 12, 1978, p 109.
11. "Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico. Structural Sources of Economic and Noneconomic Power," Washington, 1975, p 11.
12. LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT, L., January 24, 1975, p 15; THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, May 3, 1976, p 587; THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS Gainesville, February, 1976, p 7.
13. The diplomacy of socialist Cuba is not considered in the present work.
14. Citation according to PRAVDA, September 27, 1978.
15. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress, p 21.

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NATIONAL

HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON SOVIET NATIONALITY RELATIONS

Moscow OSNOVNYYE NAPRAVLENIYA IZUCHENIYA NATSIONAL'NYKH OTNOSHENIY V SSSR  
(Main Directions in the Study of Nationality Relations in the USSR) in Russian 1979 signed to press 20 Sep 79 p 4, 5-8, 319

[Summary, foreword and table of contents from book edited by M. I. Kulichenko, Izdatel'stvo Nauka]

[Text] This work gives a generalized characterization of the basic stages and directions taken in the study of nationality relations in the Soviet Union. Special attention is devoted to the treatments of the historical problems of a new historical entity--the concept of the Soviet people; it deals with the historiography of economic, governmental-legal, linguistic and a number of other aspects of nationality relations. An integrated historiographic analysis of the main accomplishments of Soviet science with respect to individual aspects of nationality relations makes it possible to focus the attention of scholars on urgent questions still unresolved in the area of nationality problems.

Foreword

The new Constitution of the USSR--the Basic Law of the Soviet land--establishes in legislation the foremost achievement of mankind in social progress in our time--the construction in the USSR of a mature socialist society. Playing an enormous role in socialism's attainment of this eminence has been the most fundamental progress which has been achieved in the development of and in the mutual relations between the nations and peoples inhabiting our country. The essential nature of this progress consists in the following: on the basis of Marxist-Leninist science, the Soviet Union has resolved the nationality problem for the first time in history under the leadership of the Communist Party created by the great Lenin; there has been produced an unprecedented general flowering, impossible under capitalism, of all our nations and peoples, whose contribution to the treasure house of world civilization continues to grow; fundamental changes have occurred in the mutual relations between the peoples and the great process of drawing them

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together is under way; proletarian socialist internationalism has become the norm governing the consciousness and activities of working people of all the nationalities; a new historical community of human beings--the Soviet people--has emerged on the basis of a continuous strengthening of the ties between the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and national intelligentsia and of the friendship and international unity of all nations and peoples.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU set Soviet science the tasks of continuously generalizing the historical experience our party and people have accumulated in the building of socialism and communism and of thoroughly analyzing the laws governing the development of Soviet society, particularly the processes and trends associated with the strengthening of a mature socialism and its gradual development into communism.<sup>1</sup> Soviet scholars, declared Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in a speech during ceremonies marking the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, "are called upon to help the party find the best possible solutions to such historical problems as the progressive elimination of class distinctions and the establishment in our society of complete social uniformity, further evolution of the party's Leninist nationality policy and the strengthening of the unity of the entire Soviet people."<sup>2</sup>

The application of historiographic analysis to the effort of organizing and thoroughly mastering the fund of knowledge already amassed concerning previous stages in the development of Soviet society, including knowledge of scholarly achievements in the study of problems associated with national development and nationality relations is one of the most important means of accomplishing the tasks ahead of Soviet historical science. Such analysis makes it possible to summarize what has been done, to identify "bottlenecks" and problems still unresolved in our researches, to direct the efforts of our specialists toward further study of those aspects of the problem most urgently requiring attention, to establish the need for new studies on the part of scholars of various specialties and, to a certain extent, even to coordinate their joint efforts in the study of the national and international processes associated with the development of Soviet society.

It should be pointed out that Soviet historiography, the science of historical science, has made a considerable stride forward in its development over recent decades. Of special value have been early advances in the treatment of general problems in the theory, methodology and historiography of the Soviet Union and of world history in general.<sup>3</sup> Considerable experience has also been accumulated in the study of individual problems in the historiography on Soviet society.<sup>4</sup> It must be said, however, that historiographic analysis of specialists' treatment of the experience accumulated in implementing the Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the resolution of the nationality problem, the flowering and the bringing together of the nations and of the development of the friendship

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of the peoples and the strengthening of the international unity of the Soviet people as a new historical community of human beings still fails to measure up to the increased demands placed upon the development of Soviet historical science and for enlarging its role in insuring the progress of Soviet society.

Guided by the fact that historiographic mastery of the scientific advances which have been made in this area, as well as further methodological treatment of the problems involved, can make a great contribution to more thorough research on the national and international processes under way within the Soviet Union as well as throughout the world, the Scientific Council on Nationality Problems of the Social Sciences Section of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is undertaking the publication of a series of monographs dealing with the general problem of "Nationality Relations in the Present Epoch."

The first volume offered for the readers' attention contains scholarly papers discussed during meetings of the Council on Nationality Problems in connection with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the birth of the multinational Soviet state. It has been proposed in coming volumes to publish other monographs in this series dealing with nationality problems in foreign countries, nationality problems in the union republics, with problems of national culture and with other aspects of nationality relations of timely interest.

The following authors contributed to the monograph: Academician Yu. V. Bromley - Foreword; Main Phases and Directions in the Study of Nationality Relations in the USSR; M. I. Kulichenko - Treatment of the Problem of the New Historical Community in Soviet Historiography; E. A. Bagramov - Nationality Relations and International Education (Problems in Methodology and Historiography); E. V. Tadevosyan - Problems in the Soviet Historiography of National-State Building in the USSR; M. N. Rosenko - Problems in the Economic Development of Socialist Nations; M. N. Guboglo - Historiographic Problems of Bilingualism; Yu. D. Desheriyev - Study of Sociolinguistic Problems Associated with the Development of Nationality Relations (Some Problems in Methodology and Historiography); L. N. Terent'yeva and M. Ya. Ustinova - International Marriages and Their Role in Ethnic Processes in the USSR (An Outline of the Historiography); L. M. Drobizheva - Specific Sociological Study of Nations and Nationality Relations; I. S. Gurchich - Some Problems in the Historiography of the National Development of the Peoples of the Far North in the Soviet Period; V. P. Sherstobitov - Main Directions in Research on Nationality Relations by Scholars of the Soviet Republics.

FOOTNOTES

1. XXV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenogr. otchet [Stenographic Record of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, vol 1, p 98.

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2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1976, vol 5, p 367.
3. See: "Metodologicheskkiye i istoriograficheskkiye voprosy istoricheskoy nauki" [Methodological and Historiographical Problems in Historical Science], Tomsk, 1963-1972, Nos 1-8; M. V. Nechkina, "The History of History: (Some Methodological Problems in the History of Historical Science) in the book "Istoriya i istoriki" [History and Historians], Moscow, 1965; V. V. Ivanov, "Sootnosheniye istorii i sovremennosti kak metodologicheskaya problema" [The Relationship Between History and the Present as a Problem in Methodology], Moscow, 1973; A. A. Karalyuk, "Nekotoryye voprosy metodologii istoriograficheskogo issledovaniya istorii KPSS" [Some Problems in the Methodology of Historiographic Research on the History of the CPSU], Moscow, 1973; "Problemy istorii i metodologii nauchnogo poznaniya" [Problems in History and in the Methodology of Scientific Knowledge], Moscow, 1974; "Razvitiye sovetskoy istoricheskoy nauki, 1970-1974" [The Development of Soviet Historical Science, 1970-1974], Moscow, 1974; A. A. D'yakov, "Metodologiya istorii v proshlom i nastoyashchem" [Historical Methodology Past and Present], Moscow, 1974; N. N. Maslov and Z. V. Stepanov, "Ocherki istochnikovedeniya i istoriografii istorii KPSS" [Essays on Source Study and the Historiography of the History of the CPSU], Leningrad, 1974; "Problemy obshchestvennoy mysli i istoriografii" [Problems in Social Thought and Historiography], Moscow, 1976 among other works.
4. See: "Voprosy istoriografii rabochego klassa SSSR" [Problems in the Historiography of the Working Class of the USSR], Moscow, 1970; L. M. Zak, V. S. Lel'chuk and V. I. Pogudin, "Stroitel'stvo sotsializma v SSSR: Istoriograficheskii ocherk" [Building Socialism in the USSR: An Historiographic Essay], Moscow, 1971; "V. I. Lenin i resheniye agrarnokrest'yanskogo voprosa v SSSR" [V. I. Lenin and the Resolution of the Agrarian-Peasant Question in the USSR], Moscow, 1971; V. P. Danilov, "Problemy v istorii Sovetskogo selskogo khozyaystva, 1946-1970: An Outline of the Historiography" in the book "Razvitiye sel'skogo khozyaystva SSSR v poslevoyennyye gody (1946-1970 gg.)" [Postwar Agricultural Development in the USSR, 1946-1970], Moscow, 1972; I. Ye. Vorozheykin, "Ocherk istoriografii rabochego klassa SSSR" [An Outline of the Historiography of the Working Class of the USSR], Moscow, 1975; V. S. Lel'chuk, "Sotsialisticheskaya industrializatsiya SSSR i ee osvescheniye v sovetskoy istoriografii" [Socialist Industrialization in the USSR and its Treatment in Soviet Historiography], Moscow, 1976; V. I. Kas'yanenko, "Razvitnyy Socialism: Istoriografiya i metodologiya problemy" [Developed Socialism: The Historiography and the Methodology of the Problem], Moscow, 1976 among other works.

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SOVIET BALTIC REPUBLICS-PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Tallinn PROBLEMY SOTSIAL'NOY STRUKTURY RESPUBLIK SOVETSKOY PRIBALTIKI in Russian 1978 signed to press 23 Oct 78 pp 5-6, 247

[Introduction and table of contents from a book edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences R. N. Pullat]

[Text] The rise of Soviet historical studies under conditions of socialist development is characterized by an increasing interest in the problems of the social structure of Soviet society, as has already been reflected in many general works. One of the most important problems placed before Soviet socialologists by the 25th CPSU Congress is the study of problems relating to the period of socialist development and, in particular, the change in the social structure.\*

In this regard, the present collection of articles, "Problems of the Social Structure of the Soviet Baltic Republics," acquires a special urgency. It illuminates the colossal changes that occurred in the social structure of the peoples of the three Baltic republics and the formation and development of the Soviet working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelligentsia.

In analyzing the formation of the social structure of a developing socialist society, one should note that this process occurred much faster in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia than in the republics where Soviet power was established much earlier. The reason is that the Baltic Soviet republics, in carrying out

\*L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom (Lenin's Course), Vol. 5, p. 531.

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a socialist revolution and in constructing socialism and communism, have relied and still rely on the rich experience already acquired by the other fraternal republics of the USSR, which have constantly provided all-encompassing and disinterested help and support.

In Article 70 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics it is written: "The USSR embodies the state unity of the Soviet people and unites all nations and peoples in the goal of the joint construction of communism."\*

Summing up the historical path followed by our country, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The chief goal that animated our people for the forty or so years since the previous Soviet Constitution went into effect is the construction of a developed socialist society and the formation of the first government in the world composed of all the people."\*\*

The disinterested mutual help of the peoples of our country and the mutual enrichment of their spiritual life, which are based on the high Leninist principles of internationalism, provide a solid foundation for the blossoming of all the fraternal republics of the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by the material in the present collection, which reflects the great transformations occurring during the years of Soviet power in the Soviet Baltic republics, thanks to the fraternal solidarity, cooperation, and mutual help of all the peoples of our multinational Motherland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and due to the formation of a new international society, the Soviet people.

The scientific value of this collection results from the fact that it is the joint work of historians and sociologists. Combining historical and sociological materials allows us to uncover new aspects of the internal development of a mature socialist society, and it aids the study of the laws governing the transition from socialism to communism. In the comparative historical sense, the authors' collective illuminates a number of important problems of the formation of the social structure in the Soviet Baltic republics.

\*Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, 1977, p. 26.

\*\*L. I. Brezhnev. "Historical boundary on the path to communism," PROBL. MIRA SOTS., No. 12, 3-10, 1977.

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The present collection of articles is the first of three, coordinated, scientific studies planned by the Academies of Sciences of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR on the problem: "Laws Governing the Construction of Socialism and Communism in the Soviet Baltic Republics as Part of the USSR." The main responsibility for the present collection rests with the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR and, in particular, the section on the history of the socialist period at this institute.

The collection is divided into four parts: the first contains articles on the social structure as a whole; the second covers the development of the Soviet working class in the Baltic republics; the third considers the formation and structure of the kolkhoz peasantry; the fourth discusses the emergence of a socialist intelligentsia and the problems related to its development.

The articles in the collection cover the following basic topics: the leading role of the CPSU in the formation of the social structure of the Soviet Baltic republics during the period of socialist development, the post-war development of the working class, and the development of the kolkhoz peasantry in the republics and the intelligentsia.

The collection reflects the trends in research that have appeared and developed in the republics and gives some results regarding the main questions concerning the social structure of a socialist society.

The collection illuminates important aspects of the development of the social structure in the Soviet Baltic republics as a whole and its individual elements during socialist and communist construction.

The published research provides new material to expose the groundlessness of bourgeois-nationionistic conceptions of the West German "Ostforschung" and reactionary emigrants regarding the "exceptional" nature of the Baltic peoples and their "apartness" from the Russian and other peoples in the USSR.

Director of the Institute of  
History of the USSR of the  
Academy of Sciences, USSR  
Academician A. L. Narochitskiy

Secretary of the CC of  
the Estonian CP  
V. I. Vyalyas

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SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL REPORTED

Kiev RADYANS'KE LITERATUROZNAVSTVO in Ukrainian No 7, Jul 80  
pp 92-93

Excerpts An extended conference of the office of scientific council was held on the problem of "Normal development of world literature in the present-day period", at which time the following issues were discussed: "Preparing personnel with better qualifications in literary studies in the Ukrainian SSR" and "On coordinating literary research in the Ukrainian SSR: some results of the five-year plan and goals for 1981-1985". In addition to office members, representatives from Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Donetsk and Odessa universities and a number of pedagogical institutes also attended the conference.

S. A. Kryzhanivskyy read a "Memorandum on preparing better qualified literary studies personnel in the Ukrainian SSR" put together by members of the commission of the scientific problem council. He stressed that the most urgent problem now is the issue of systematic preparation of experts in literary studies in all disciplines, beginning with theory of literature through bibliography and scientific information.

Starting out with a number of facts which testify to an inadequate number of literary experts with higher qualifications, especially in higher educational establishments, the scientific problem council stresses the need to provide more intensive preparation of literary studies experts through post-graduate studies and also current improvement through a system of seminars, schools, probationary periods, etc. It recommends more active work with youth, its direction towards a creative utilization of acquired knowledge, an encouragement of those pedagogues who care about raising a scholarly new generation.

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The scientific problem council, as stated in the "Memorandum..." calls to mind also the need for moral and material stimulation of literary research with the thought that the university lecturer should be just as interested in scholarly research as in pedagogical work. Those who are interested in this work and who provide concrete results in monographs, collections and in periodicals should be rewarded in prestige; more effort should be directed to textbook, manual, and seminar preparation including the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences system, which would aid in revising according to contemporary scholarship lectures in literature presented in higher educational institutions and secondary schools. In the council members' opinion the scholarly prognosis for literary research should be systematized, for periodicals -- a systematic generalization of the accomplished, a determination of directions for the most promising and urgent, dictated by the interests of communist education of the Soviet individual, the builder of a new society.

The following spoke out on issues raised in the "Memorandum": D.V. Zaton's'kyy, M.S. Hrytsay, Z.S. Holubyeva, N.Ye. Krutikova, V.O. Vlasenko, A.V. Kulynych, H.D. Verves, V.L. Mykytas' and H.A. Vyazovs'kyy. Members of the office of scientific problem council and higher institution lecturers unanimously recognized the importance and timeliness of the personnel issue. They supported the basic principles of the "Memorandum" and also provided a series of propositions directed at improvements in the preparation of better qualified personnel in literary studies.

The head of the scientific problem council, the director of the Institute of Literature imeni T.H. Shevchenko of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, I.O. Dzeverin summarized the discussion and suggested discussing the "Memorandum" about preparing personnel with higher qualifications in literary studies in the Ukrainian SSR" in university departments in order to obtain additional suggestions and factual material.

A report on "The coordination of literary studies research in the Ukrainian SSR: some results of the five-year plan and goals for 1981-1985" was given by the scientific secretary of the scientific council H.M. Syvokin'. He noted that the development of Ukrainian Soviet literary studies has markedly intensified in recent times and this places additional tasks before the scientific problem council. It should more actively coordinate the efforts of literary experts, directing

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them to the solution of the most important, truly fundamental problems, to provide for all branches of scholarly research work, an all-around development of Marxist-Leninist teaching about literature.

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DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN UKRAINIAN LITERARY STUDIES

Kiev RADYANS'KA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 26 Jul 80 p 3

Article by Ya. Hoyan: "The Fighter's Position; An Open Party Meeting of Kiev Writers"

Text Almost five decades have passed since that November day when PRAVDA printed in Ukrainian Pavlo Tychyna's poem "Partiya Vede" "The Party Leads". This work rang out to the whole world from the pages of the great paper founded by Lenin as a credo of the poet, the bard of a new age, as the voice of all the artistic intelligentsia of the young Land of Soviets, as a ballad of the people. The powerful cry "The Party Leads" born in a poet's heart was taken up in the early 1930ties in the melodious poetic verse as a passion of the "bolshhevik era", as a flag, as the truth of our life, the unity of people and party. This cry is always with us, the people carry it as sacred through history, because the people know: Victory lies with the party!

The open meeting of the communist writers of Kiev, the largest party organization of creative intelligentsia in the republic, was conducted in a spirit of unity with party and people, a spirit of responsibility to the profession of master of words in Soviet literature and party principles. Capital writers discussed their tasks which came about as a result of the June (1980) CC CPSU Plenum and the goals expressed in the speech by L. I. Brezhnev; they talked movingly about the significant, world-important event, the 26st party congress. To come to the party congress with a personal gift of labor, strictly evaluating the achieved, exposing in spoken and written word the real life and problems of the times, to live as a political fighter -- this was the main thought of the speech by party committee secretary Borys Oliynyk and other writers.

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The party organization of Kiev writers accomplished much in the period after the 25th CPSU Congress. In the last two years the republic's writers held 45,000 conferences, speeches and discussions on the decisions of the party congress. Last year, in Kiev only there were more than 100 conferences devoted to the books by L.I. Brezhnev "Mala Zemlya" /Small World/, "Vidrodzhennya" /Rebirth/, and "Tsilyna" /Virgin Soil/. A series of important literary evenings were organized honoring the 325th anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia, Lenin's anniversary and the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory. Forms and methods of patronage, the creative contacts with workers in towns and villages are being improved.

Meeting participants Konstyantyn Kudiyevs'kyi, Petro Perebyynis, Lyubomyr Dmyterko, Volodymyr Kolomiyets', Borys Rohoza and Viktor Blyznets' noted also that internal party work yields interesting experience and this experience should be improved and extended. It is the preparation of young, talented, ideologically mature writers for party membership, their creative reports in party committee meetings and party organization workshops, and also the activation of party group work and an improvement of the creative atmosphere in the editorial offices of LITERATURNA UKRAYINA and the publishing house "Radyans'kyi Pys'mennyk", joint meetings with party organizations of other creative collectives in town.

Along with this, the communists persistently asked questions about an increased party committee control of the activities of party organizations, about adherence to statute requirements and the fulfillment of party directives by communists, and the work of problem-theoretical seminars and political instruction of party members where there are quite a few shortcomings. Party work is creative work, yet formalism survives in some party organizations. In particular, after serious party committee criticism, the party organization of the publishing house "Radyans'kyi Pys'mennyk" (comrade P.D. Morhayenko, secretary) is reorganizing its activities rather slowly. There are shortcomings in the work of the initial party organizations of the periodical RADUHA (secretary comrade O.P. Rohotchenko) and of playwrights (comrade H.D. Plotkin, secretary). Of course, a clearly organized control of their decision fulfillment would help the party committee determine these shortcomings early and question the guilty. Both the speech and other talks stressed the need to strengthen the party influence on the level of literary criticism.

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Kiev's masters of the word speaking openly about work achievements and shortcomings, thought about the future, about their place in the national preparations in honor of the party congress.

Our hearts are attuned to the events in the world, said Leonid Novychenko in his speech; American imperialism is straining international relations, it is playing with the fate of mankind. We strongly approve the external party and government politics which are constructive and peaceful. We must actively look for our place in line, hardening our political diligence and spiritual mobilization in order to say our true word in literature and publicism. We need a political novel, a political play and a political poem. Poetry is the fortress of the national soul, it along with all literature must become a powerful weapon of the people against the instigators of war.

Ukraine's writers along with all the people are preparing a worthy greeting for the 26st party congress. Their creativity, and work with people is filled with the poetic cry: "The Party Leads" which was heard recently at the communist meeting.

The secretary of the Kiev city committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, T.V. Hlavak, appeared before and participated in the meeting work.

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EMIGRE JOURNAL ON RESULTS OF SURVEYS ON RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES IN LENINGRAD

Frankfurt POSEV in Russian Jun 80 p 13

[Article by O.V., Leningrad, 1980: "Nonbelief Loses Support in the Country"]

[Text] We publish below secret data from two sociological surveys conducted among a special category of people--nonbelievers. Nevertheless, the results of these surveys provide us for the first time with concrete figures confirming the growth of belief in the country, since changes among nonbelievers are only a reflection of more active spiritual processes among the believing portion of the population of the USSR.

The CPSU leadership is extremely disturbed over the rise of religion in our country. Sociologists consequently were assigned the task of determining the sources of religiosity and the reasons for its indestructibility.

For this end, there was conducted in 1971, and duplicated in 1979, a survey of several thousand workers in Leningrad for the purpose of studying the state and dynamics of the attitude of workers toward religion. Only those were surveyed who considered themselves nonbelievers. They comprise the great majority of the working class, but far from all of this majority are convinced atheists. "Superficially nonbelieving people" frequently come to religion.

Some of the concrete data obtained in the process of investigation are interesting. Thus, it was revealed that the level of information of nonbelievers concerning religion is very low. Only 3.5 percent consider themselves competent in religious questions. Fifty-six percent honestly admitted that if they had to talk with believers on religion they would not know what to talk about.

In the proposed survey of nonbelievers, a question was included among others on the role of the Church in social life. Various points of view were provided as choices. In 1971 Marxist positions were shared by 27 percent of those surveyed, while in 1979 the figure was 10 percent. People with vulgar

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antireligious views ("all popes are frauds" and the like) in 1971 constituted 17 percent and in 1979--4 percent. The reduction of this contingent is connected with old men, who had been educated by the League of Militant Atheists in the 1920s-1930s, going on pension. In 1971, religion was assessed positively by 11 percent and in 1979 by 19 percent. Persons asserting that they had not thought about these questions and in this way were kept out of the selection, in 1971 comprised 34 percent and in 1979--49 percent. Similar answers were given to a comparable survey on the role of religion in the field of culture.

One of the questions for nonbelievers proposed that they explain the reasons for their nonbelief. Thirty-nine percent of those questioned in 1971 and 20 percent of those in 1979 explained it on the basis of Marxist philosophy. In 1971, eleven percent and in 1979 twenty-nine percent could not provide an explanation. The rest either gave very naive explanations or refrained from answering.

On the basis of all the answers to the questions of the survey, the sociologists divided nonbelievers into several groups. Nonbelievers with a "scientific outlook," that is, actual atheists, in 1971 comprised 30.3 percent and in 1979--29.6 percent. Nonbelievers with vulgar atheistic views in 1971 numbered 19.4 percent and in 1979--10.1 percent. "Stereotype" nonbelievers numbered 37 percent in 1971 and 43 percent in 1979.

In addition to those who considered themselves nonbelievers, the survey also revealed those who found it difficult in determining to which category they belonged--to believers or to nonbelievers. Such numbered 7.4 percent among those questioned in 1971 and 8.8 percent in 1979.

A comparable investigation, but on a smaller scale, was conducted among the Leningrad intelligentsia; the results were similar.

Since 1963, Leningrad sociologists have been studying baptisms. In 1964, 26 percent of all newborn infants were baptized; by 1971 this figure had fallen to 19.2 percent, but in 1979 it again reached the 1964 level. Curiously, 3.1 percent of baptized children are children of families of CPSU members.

Despite the intensive atheistic treatment, rank-and-file people regard religion with respect. Thirty percent of people with higher education condemn baptism and only 6 percent with primary education do so. Among non-party people, 13 percent condemn baptism, CPSU members--34 percent (this means that 66 percent of the communists do not disparage the religious Sacraments. If only Lenin knew...).

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Investigations of rites also showed that Easter is celebrated by 38 percent of Leningraders and Whitsun--33 percent.

The data obtained by the sociologists illustrated the process of the de-ideologization of Soviet society. The consciousness of the ordinary man is being freed of Marxist-Leninist encrustations. What then is filling the vacuum thus formed?

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REGIONAL

REVIEW OF NEW NOVEL BY OLES' HONCHAR

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pp 18-30

Review by M. K. Nayenko: "The Star of Memory and Human Solidarity"

Excerpts It seemed that at the end of 1970's and beginning 1980's researchers into Oles' Honchar's creativity would still be deliberating his recently published six-volume edition, but within half a year the author presented the readers with a new novel "Tvoya Zorya" ("Your Star") (VITCHYZNA, 1980, No 1-2), and thus we must re-examine our ideas about Honchar. The publication of a new work by Oles' Honchar is quite a normal occurrence because the artist has now attained the next phase on his artistic path and "Tvoya Zorya" is the result. The novel testifies to further artistic creativity acceleration of the "Praporonostsi" ("Flag Bearers") author, a period of his starry flowering and intensive artistic honey yield.

During one meeting with readers, testifies Dmytro Pavlychko, Oles' Honchar shared with them his dream to write a novel "about air or about water, about something most indispensable to man." We think that "Tvoya Zorya" is one of the author's novels about what is indispensable to man, that is about air. To create an image of it the author made his characters move rapidly about our planet, penetrating deeply into the mystery of flowering and the breathing of primordial nature, into the mystery of human life and the life of honeybees. As a result, this air appeared in the novel not only with its "natural" qualities (clean, gentle, limpid, softly moving, glassy or the opposite -- heavy, dirty, poisonous) but also in a broader, poetically generalized meaning, as spiritual air needed by man not only for breathing but for inspiration, for a bright flowering of his life star high in the heavens of the present age. In this second meaning the air combines also

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with a spirit of the native land with its morning dew and nightingale songs, the grandeur of helpful work, human memory, Leninist life-giving ideas which complete the manifold beauty of man's spirituality. This beauty, which the novel's main characters breathed, absorbed and absorb contrasts continuously in the work with all that disfigured it in the past and even stains it sometimes today. The author took the next important step in depicting an individual of our times, the crown of nature with a poetic-philosophical consideration of such eternal categories as the sacred love of fatherland, international solidarity, a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the world now and in the future.

Thus the subject matter of "Tvoya Zorya" has a universal, one could even say planetary character. Events in which the main characters take part occur in different parts of our planet. But, and this is essential, the root system of the novel's leading ideas gets its life-giving fluids and ozone air still only from one, clearly defined in a local sense, point. As in many of his other works, Oles' Honchar remained faithful to the endless Ukrainian steppe in this book also. Encompassing in thoughts and actions humanity's most urgent living problems, the main characters of "Tvoya Zorya" are spiritually powerful primarily through their blood ties with the small village Ternivshchyna (its prototype would probably be found somewhere in the southern Poltava region or in the Kherson-Nikolaev area), and through it with our whole fatherland. In this way the ideas of patriotism and international solidarity are confirmed in the novel as organically indivisible, monolithic, as a banner of our age.

The main character in the novel, Kyrylo Zabolotnyy, is a diplomat by profession and, quite naturally, all events in the story are related to Soviet diplomatic life abroad. Based on this it might be tempting to discuss the novel along with other works dealing with the "diplomatic" theme, of which there appeared about five in Ukrainian literature alone in the last few years. Discussing prose achievements in 1979 H. Syvokin' stated: The time has, of course, come to write a special critical study about the Ukrainian "diplomatic" novels, but he also expressed a fear that it might become strictly interpretational and illustrative. <sup>2</sup> Actually, not all those novels with diplomat heroes can be squeezed in within the framework of a "diplomatic" theme. Oles' Honchar's "Tvoya Zorya" is a good example. This novel "fits" neither into a "diplomatic" framework nor into any other framework; it contains numerous profound ideas which by their content are equally interesting and important for all people. This content is founded on a base out of which only the most fundamental

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things in human life evolve, on a base of spirituality and morality in the broadest meaning of these words.

Zabolotnyy, the main character of "Tvoya Zorya", became spiritually rich and morally pure thanks to an organic unity with his native nation, because all his life he breathed the ozone air of communist ideas. His life was full of the same joys and fears within which our fatherland developed and grew stronger in the post-October days.

It is characteristic that not only the main character thinks this way in the novel. Zabolotnyy's "partner" is his contemporary and childhood companion, an ecologist by profession, in whose name the story is told, but most importantly, Zabolotnyy's living ideals appear to be very acceptable to a representative of the contemporary young generation, the student Lida Dudarevych. When during a trip into the distant city to see a recently discovered painting masterpiece "Madonna Under the Apple Tree" (in a review of the novel the reviewer Strel'byts'kyy groundlessly establishes the novel's place of action <sup>2</sup>) Zabolotnyy asked if their Ternivshchyna childhood could have a special meaning for her, the girl's reply was not only affirmative, but also enthusiastic. "I learned so much about people and other things..." she replies; later her mother describes the girl's feelings after "the trip to the Madonna": "You know she is simply enraptured... She got up early, not tired at all, no touchiness, joyful, gentle... She said she visited a place where the world seems different, the people seem kinder, no one is in a hurry... It seemed to me, she said, that I can hear invisible choirs singing 'Ave Maria' above me and bells ringing in heaven joyfully the whole day and around me orchards in bloom and the sun... Then I went to the steppe, the blue rains bathed me... So enchanted was the child..."

The development of this idea in the imagery fabric of "Tvoya Zorya" could be discussed in the process of examining any of the novel's episodes. Oles' Honchar shows that the "Madonna Under the Apple Tree" is created by life itself from life itself; she captivated and united in their aspirations not only Nad'ka's fellow countrymen, but also people who live very far from Ternivshchyna. Exhibited in one of the museums of a western country, the Madonna (although according to Zabolotnyy it may not have been the same Madonna but one very much like her) immediately became a sensation ("Slavic Madonna, a masterpiece by an unknown artist, thus wrote the press") and when some maniac tore through the painting with a knife, all museum workers ("Oh, Madonna! We fell in love with her") unanimously went on strike. Jointly they expressed

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their protest both against inadequate wages, against rising prices and against the violence of gangsters in the country.

In depicting the strike itself the very important ideological direction of "Tvoya Zorya" is evident in the cause of international solidarity on the part of Zabolotnyy and his fellow-travelers with the strikers, and also the theme of the common fates of men in our planet which evolves closely tied to the image of Nad'ka-Madonna. Among the strikers, we read in the novel, Zabolotnyy noticed a swarthy mulatto woman who seemed to resemble Vynnykivna very much. "In what way? Because she was dark-skinned this mulatto beauty or perhaps because holding her infant close to her breast she smiles to us from behind the columns just as friendly as the other did standing under the apple tree when we came to drink at the well?" There is no direct answer to this question in the novel, but the reader understands that their likeness is in the most essential: Vynnykivna and the mulatto beauty both personify the spirit of motherhood as the fundamental principle of human existence.

All these images which contrast in the novel with images of Zabolotnyy's childhood and generally with the life of people in the socialist world enabled Lida to understand the content of our spiritual values even better, to honestly declare that stories from the long ago gone by, but very much alive in the memory of Zabolotnyy, life in Ternivshchyna have a special meaning not only for him alone but also for her, a representative of today's younger generation.

This story is noteworthy also because it is directly concerned with one more problem which is dealt with in the novel -- the problem of war and peace. Actually this problem is found in the very first pages of the book and is also tied to the fate of Zabolotnyy. As a fighter plane pilot, he spent almost the whole past war with the fascists in the air. His character formed itself in battle, in battle he learned to appreciate the greatest value in life -- human solidarity, considering his present work as a diplomat also as a struggle for solidarity among people, for peace, a struggle to prevent war.

The idea of everyone's responsibility for all and everything acquired in "Tvoya Zorya" an even more distinct determination in the course of disclosing those associative ties found in the images of Roman from the steppe and the old negro Frank. Like the enchanter Roman Vynnyk, Frank's occupation is also peaceful bee keeping, which seemingly has no relation to the living climate on the planet nor to problems of individual responsibility for all and everything. But that is only a first impression.

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The artist did think about man, his responsibility for all and everything when he poetized Roman's and Frank's work in the melodious apiaries, when together with his heroes he considered the mysterious life of the tireless, harmonious workers -- honeybees. There is truly something to think about. Here, for example, is an image in which the bee "Moans from delight and happiness, forgetting itself in work, creating honey from nothing". In another place we learn that bees feed each other when one becomes ill. Still another tells that in Brazil "hybrids" of aggressive bees have been bred which are dangerous even for people, or about the fact that even elephants cannot stand jet noise and here Frank's bees learned to gather honey right at the airport... Each of these images is filled with thoughts about man, how he must toil, take care of one another and what conclusions should be drawn from the fact that today there is still so much aggressiveness in the world, so many harmful things for human life.

One thinks most about all this reading the novel's last chapter in which actual bee interference in human life is presented when a swarm of bees settled on a traffic light on a highway and forced all traffic to a stop before it. This episode sounded in the novel as a caution, as a peculiar warning delivered to man by nature herself. The bees, states Zabolotny excitedly, by their behavior said to humanity: "Stay in place, all of you mister-twisters... Take a breath, look up at the sky, at the bright sun! Think about essential, fundamental things! That is something to do! No, they are truly unique creatures, they must be from somewhere, we don't know them yet!..."

However, this episode "does not remain suspended" in the novel as a mere warning: an optimistic perspective is projected in it at the same time because the paralyzed highway traffic eventually moves. But an interesting detail, the traffic problem is not resolved by representatives of the official service who were ready to "put into action hoses and wash the swarm away", but by Frank who is called out especially for this job. With his bare hands (as was done in similar instances by Roman from the steppe) he removes the bee family from the traffic signal and the stream of cars gradually disappears. Thus, the future fate of mankind depends first of all on the actions of man himself: it is in the hands of workers like Frank or his distant colleague from the steppe Ternivshchyna Roman...

The final chord of the lesson given to the people by the bees on the highway sounded truly optimistic. How then should

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the last lines of the novel be received in which we learn that this optimism apparently did not apply to Zabolotnyy himself? As far as he was concerned, the bee swarm did not simply warn him of danger, but prophesied it in the real sense of the word. Is there no contradiction here? Did not the author perhaps violate the laws of logic uniting, it would seem, the incompatible -- an optimistic perspective for the life of humanity and the tragic death of one of its representatives?

One cannot reply to these questions affirmatively. The novel's artistic philosophy remains in complete conformity with the philosophy of life. Telling about the death of Zabolotnyy the author only confirmed the known formula that dialectic incompatibility lies at the base of reality development. Even more: the mysteriousness of the death of the novel's main character confirms once more that our world is full of unsolved mysteries, and the greatest of them is man himself. Therefore, the author goes considerably further than "artistic illustration" of generally known philosophical concepts: in his novel, in addition to other things, there sounded also a troubled, trembling, multi-voiced question WHY? "Tvoya Zorya" is perceived not only as a novel-reflection, novel-reminiscence, novel-confession, but also as a novel-question.

Let us review the whole work once more. Its artistic fabric is similar to a wheat field over which during sunny-windy weather tight waves of ripe spikes ripple over and over towards the horizon. These waves are the novel's endless "whys". Why are things seen in childhood remembered throughout a lifetime? Why does one specific person or event stay in one's memory? Why is the air of home or native land so sweet? Why is fate so bitter to people like Roman or Nad'ka? Why is Lida embarrassed listening to stories of injustice done to Roman's family? Why do the bees behave so mysteriously? Why is it that victims of Hiroshima are "honored" in the same hotel as new dictators from the jungles? Why, finally, don't "first-rate careerists" perish for whom conscience is only an abstraction, instead of such personalities as Zabolotnyy, a tireless seeker of the truth (the character of a wild ox), a spiritual Atlas, "a human torpedo", the creator of the energy of good, with a youthful, falcon's gaze? These "whys" could go on indefinitely, states Zabolotnyy at one time. The novel answers only some of them but forces one to think about all of them. It does not calm, does not rock the reader to sleep, but lifts him up, fills his soul and heart with this ozone air of which the novel speaks from the first to the last page.

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"Tvoya Zorya" only just began shining in our literature, it took its first step on the road to the reader. There is no doubt that this road will be just as happy as in "Praporonostsi", "Tronka", "Tsyklon" or other works by the writer. Because this novel is not an ordinary occurrence in the socialist realism literature, and among Oles' Honchar's novels it is completely organic, essential and innovative from many viewpoints. The essence of the innovation will be perceived by literary critics in time, but some aspects may be discussed even today.

Thanks to these and other innovative characteristics "Tvoya Zorya" quite normally possess the leading place among those Soviet literature works which "Inspire contemporaries and leave to posterity memories of the heart and soul of our generation, about our time, its troubles and achievements".<sup>6</sup>

Oles' Honchar's creativity is a brilliant example of how generously the wealth of our native language may be utilized, how it may be polished artistically in order to be returned to the people again. He knows how to find the right companionship for each word so that it may shine with a new brightness and how to use a new word so that it may easily become part of the language resources.

Critics talked about the evolution of Oles' Honchar's style for the first time back in the 1950's. In reviews of novels "Zemlya Hude" /The Earth Resounds/, "Tavriya" and "Perekop" /Cross-Ditch/ we can read that the poetical quality, excitement so peculiar to "Praporonostsi" now give way to "ordinary" realistic writing, in which the lyric-romantic origin (as the foundation of poetical qualities) is expressed only in the form of insignificant drops. A little later conclusions were made that the author would inevitably reach the path of "pure" narrative realism. However, this "prognosis" did not materialize. But the author's style did not remain unchanging, it developed continually. The artist's poetic thinking acquired a deeper meaning: from the externally effective poetic qualities the author directed himself towards internal poetry which has become organic to his realistic prose. "Speaking of poetic qualities, wrote Oles' Honchar himself, we mean first of all its high emotional load, a deep philosophical thought... Poetical qualities should be evident in the design, the approach to the theme, and all of life's material that the author places at the foundation of his work."<sup>8</sup>

Thus the poetical qualities of a work are already in its design, in the approach to the theme. The novel "Tvoya Zorya"

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was also created in a spirit of poetical realism. It is poetical both in style, in artistic measures, but most importantly, in design and its realization. In this lies the similarity of this novel to all previous works by the author, but at the same time also a difference. Here the poetic symbolism as further developed by the author carries within itself a much more powerful charge of artistic generalizations.

Two years ago Yehor Isayev wrote in a letter to Oles' Honchar: "As I know you, you are very people-oriented, a conscientious mouzhik, an artist in each nerve and each word rootlet. In this lies the secret of your youth, this same secret which beginning with "Znamenostsi" <sup>/"Praporonostsi"/</sup> may be widely discovered in millions and millions of your wonderful in beauty and strength of influence books." <sup>9</sup> These words by the 1980 Lenin Prize winner may be repeated today in relation to Oles' Honchar's new work. "Tvoya Zorya" is a novel in each "word rootlet", a young novel, powerful in its influence and filled with the magic of this wonderful beauty of loyalty which the writer poetizes inspiringly beginning with the imperishable "Praporonostsi". It will become, of course, an additional link in the complex system of Oles' Honchar's novels which are a very singular artistic model of life in our restless and majestic age.

## FOOTNOTES

1. D. Pavlychko. The Gift of Light and Purity. Ukrainian Language and Literature in School, 1978, No 4, p 24.
2. See "Literaturna Ukrayina", 1980, Feb 12.
3. See M. Strel'byts'kyi, The Light of a Good Star. "Literaturna Ukrayina", 1980, Mar 20.
6. Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress. Politvydav Ukrayiny, 1976, p 90.
8. O. Honchar. Works in six volumes. Dnipro, 1979, 527 pp.
9. From the writer's personal papers.

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