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JPRS L/9288

5 September 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 33/80)

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ARAB NATIONALISM SAID NOT TO BE ANTI-ISLAM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 28 Jun - 4 Jul 80 pp 36-39

[Article: "Arabism, Islam and Racism"]

[Text] "You are the best nation that has been brought forth." So the holy Koran addressed the Arab nation when it gave them the mission to spread Islam throughout the earth.

So that the Arabs would have no arrogance, pride or boastfulness about their race, the holy Arab prophet told them, "The Arab can excel over the non-Arab only by being more devout."

However, Islam, which emerged among the Arab tribes and brought them out of their ignorance, grew and was in fact strengthened by the Arabs' faith that they were one nation. This belief unconsciously spread widely, although it was greatly intermixed with religion, since Islam and Arabism cannot be separated.

The Arab connection revealed itself in literature and poetry, as well as in government. The Umayyad state was strictly Arab, in heart and soul, and in form and substance. When the helm of the 'Abbasid state was taken over by non-Arabs, the state fragmented and collapsed and the brilliance of Arab civilization withered with its gradual decline. Islam was frozen into a mold.

The Arabs experienced successive centuries of decay under the shadow of those who assumed power. The Ottoman Caliphate, which ruled for 5 centuries in the name of religion, was the blackest period of decadence, and, perhaps, was historically responsible for the backwardness which befel them. In the meantime, Europe passed them, using what it inherited from the Arabs as a foundation for its modern civilization and brilliant science. When things turned toward getting the Arabs and the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire moving again, the Arab nation awoke from its stupor, stirred up by Arab nationalism and its emotional appeal to its intellectual elite and officers.

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The Arabs were not diverted from their determination to get rid of the Ottoman hell by Jamal Pasha's hanging of the vanguard of this elite and the cream of its youth on gallows in Beirut and Damascus in 1915 and 1916. The nationalist struggle was crowned with success when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918. The Arabs' pullout from the Empire was sufficient to eliminate its Islamic character. Thus, Mustafa Kamal, the builder of modern Turkey, was forced to bring down the religious caliphate once and for all. Under the banner of pure Arabism, the Arab East, including Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Palestine, fought against recalcitrant forms of colonialism-- French, British and Zionist.

As the 30's ended, Arab nationalism began to shed its emotional garb in order to base its appeal on scientific and humanitarian foundations. First there was the Ba'th movement and then Nasirism, both accompanied by dozens of different by-product factions.

However, from the very start, the scientific nationalist appeal was aware of the role of religion, and gave it a secure place in its ideology. It was recognized, and firmly believed, that the heavenly messages which descended on Arab land were an essential part of the spirit, mentality and heritage of this nation, and consequently, were an inseparable part of its present and its future and of its nationalist pride and faith.

It is self-evident that the Arab appeal is directed toward a high and noble goal, the achievement of Arab unity. It is also self-evident that all hostile forces, whether local, regional or international, are directed at defeating this effort by striking at the nationalist forces. First, the union between Egypt and Syria was aborted. Then, the plan for a tri-partite union among Egypt, Syria and Iraq was frustrated. This was followed by the decisive blow dealt to the nationalist forces through the June [1967] defeat.

This, however, does not absolve the nationalist forces of their responsibility for shortcomings, atrophy and retrogression suffered by the nationalist movement. The internecine fighting and competition of these forces, their avoidance of a democratic approach at times, and the infiltration of paralysis and denominational, tribal and opportunistic factions into their ranks, has all led to the formation of a negative aspect of the nationalist movement. The impact of this has brought trouble, confusion and disappointment into the daily life of the Arab masses.

Attacks are made on Arabism by leftists cloaked in slogans by "progressivism" and "internationalism," using the argument that Arab nationalism has turned into a reactionary or chauvinist appeal. This left wing feigns to overlook the fact that scientific socialism cannot come into existence within partial or fragmented entities that have not yet achieved their national unity. This left wing keeps in mind that it is not in the interest of "internationalism," as it advances to encircle the warm Arab waters in the Mediterranean and the Gulf, that the Arab region should have a single

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nation with a single political entity and a single decision-making process. Such a single nation would quickly take its place among nations as a great unity, profoundly proud of its particular character, its independence and its regional international and humanitarian role.

Arabism today is also attacked by rightists on the grounds that Arab nationalism has turned its back upon Islam, and that talk about the unity of the Arab homeland is in conflict with talk about the "international character" of Islam.

Worse still, those who were first to undermine the Islamic edifice of the Arabs [the Persians] are today accusing Arabism of "heresy" and shedding the blood of its advocates. They are now "exporting" Islam to the Arab world under various and contradictory leadership elements which have been able to shake off the heavy burden of the Shah from their shoulders, but which have been unable to shake off the sores of rigidity, ethnic separatism and hidden hatred of everything Arab.

It is also unfortunate that the Arabs these days are producing individuals who deny the purity of origin of their nation and its right to be a nation. They disparage its past and its great men. However, there is some consolation in the fact that these voices emerge in dissonant tones from the rabble, and express little calm, logical scientific thinking.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI does not figure that its role lies in reaffirming the Arabism and unity of the Arabs, something which is self-evident. We are not trying to be involved in trivial, rabble-rousing dialogues as are displayed on the pages of some newspapers and magazines. Rather, we are today addressing ourselves to Arab public opinion with two questions:

Is Arab nationalism anti-Islamic?

Is Arab nationalism a racist appeal?

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has chosen to have these questions answered scientifically and objectively by three well-known thinkers in the Arab East. This does not imply that its pages are not open to any thinker, writer, politician or intellectual, wherever they may be on the political map, to have his say scientifically and objectively, whether positive or negative, about what is the best these days for the Arabs and Islam.

This newspaper finally puts to the Arab conscience a question that may need no answer. It is, "Is it not strange that Western secularism, the Zionist appeal and Persian ethnic separatism should coincide in denying that the Arabs are worthy of being one nation?"

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1. Is Arab nationalism anti-Islamic?

a. Manah al-Sulh is a political thinker, well known as an Arab nationalist. He is descended from an old Lebanese family known for political work and its Arab orientation. His thoughts and writings are very influential among the younger generations in the Arab world. Al-Sulh's answer to this question is as follows:

When 'Abd-al-Nasir emerged as a representative of the liberal Arab nationalist outreach, individuals in Iran, Turkey and the Arab world itself arose to open tedious and hostile political fronts against him in the name of Islam.

The fact is that it was they who created the fairy tale that there is a contradiction between Arab nationalism and Islam. Who can believe that the Turkish regime that inherited power from Mustafa Kamal and inherited his secular teachings is closer to Islam than 'Abd-al-Nasir?

From the first day he attained power, 'Abd-al-Nasir defined that what was important for Islam was important for him, and that the Islamic framework came immediately after the Arab framework, as far as his activity was concerned.

In fact, who can believe that the Shah, the advocate of Aryarism and the views of the Sassanids, was more genuinely Islamic than 'Abd-al-Nasir? However, 'Adnan Menderes, the Shah of Iran and some Arab rulers took on the guise of teachers of Islam for one thing only, to strike a blow at the Arab liberation movement. In reality, this movement was the cornerstone of the renaissance of the Arabs and of the Islamic and eastern countries in general. In fact, not one Arab school of thought held a view toward Islam similar to that authorized by Mustafa Kamal in Turkey and the Shah in Iran.

The conservative school which governs most of the Arab countries talks of Islam as the foundation for governing.

The Ba'thist school of thought also talks of Islam, and refuses to adopt the Western view which espouses a complete separation of religion from the state and sanctions secularism as the foundation for governing.

So there is nothing in the Arab schools of thought about government, whether old or new schools, which has any negative aspect in its view of the relationship between Arabism and Islam. What then is the source of this accusation against the Arabs who have a deep relationship, as a people, with Islam?

The charge of damaging Islam must first and last be made against anyone who refrains from pursuing the Arab and liberationist renaissance. This lagging back, wherever it occurs, is a sign that a deep desire for Islam is

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lacking. In the countries where there is progress, liberation, a pan-Arab creed, and a regard for Islam as the spirit of Arab civilization, Islam is very healthy indeed.

b. Muta' Safadi is a political thinker of Syrian origin. He belonged to the Ba'th Party in his early youth, fought in its ranks and was one of its prominent advocates among students and young people. He converted to Nasirism in the 60's. His works and books on Arab nationalist thinking are quite worthwhile. Safadi's answer to this question is as follows:

No one can break up the historic and continued intermeshing between the Arabs and Islam. How could the idea of Arab nationalism be opposed to or conflict with the Islamic doctrine, when affiliation with a nation has never been a barrier to affiliation with a religion?

This applies to all contemporary nations which have not been prevented from having their own religions by the fact that they were French or German or Indian or even Soviet. This applies to the Arabs and Islam in particular. Because the Arab nation was the home of the Islamic message and has preached it and has fought to spread and develop it, it has retained this distinguished status which has, in fact, been a bridge between its periods of underdevelopment.

There is a succession of examples from history to prove that whenever the Arabs lay down their mission, Islam as well loses its cultural vitality and its independence is lost or subdued by the big political powers in the various Islamic countries.

Conversely, all the political victories achieved by the Arabs in their fight for the independence of their countries and for the rights of colonized and oppressed peoples, have had a major effect in reviving modern Islam. The battles of Arab nationalism for more than a quarter of a century cannot be isolated from the revolution now invading the neighboring Islamic countries, revealing nationalist awakening under the guise of diverse religious ideologies.

The fact is that the rupture between nationalist affiliation and religious affiliation arises only when religion is transformed into ideologies. These result in a series of sectarian and doctrinal schisms which conflict with the thrust of the awakening which seeks effective unification of the energies of society and its various segments in the battle for total liberation from cultural backwardness and political and economic subjugation.

We ought not to be surprised to see today that the appeals to religious ideologies are accompanied by sectarian, racial and regional winds blowing from the Mediterranean coast to our Asian heartland in the east and to the Kabylie mountains in Algeria to the west.

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The initial experiences of Arab nationalism have proven that it is an appeal for liberation and unification in the real world. We should not forget that along with this appeal, national independence has been achieved for more than 20 countries, and that, under the slogans of this appeal, Muslim and Christian Arabs of every denomination have fought as have the Arabs, Berbers and Kurds.

The progress of national independence has been obstructed by a number of political regimes and prevented from developing into total pan-Arab independence, because a new and previously unexperienced split has crept into the fabric of the nation. Some time will have to pass before a new vital struggle capable of overcoming this situation will develop.

Restraining Arab nations' sm at this level of national independence and freezing it on the geo-political-economic man, by a number of regimes and international influences lurking behind them, is a symptom of a major threat facing both the Arabs and Islam. Maintaining this status quo is only a short breathing spell after which hostile forces will launch a chain of events completely counter to the previous wave of liberation and unification.

It will be a series of domestic fragmentation stimulated separately in each country through its own type of inherited elements of discord. Today, we face internal fragmentation and collapse on every level, making a reality of the slogan of the Zionization of Arab society and its conversion into minority societies, all at each other's throats. What is happening today under the umbrella of the Iranian "Islamic" revolution is an advance sample of simultaneous racial, denominational and regional polarizations.

Many voices of international public opinion nominate our Arab and Islamic area for a new epoch of denominational wars similar to Europe's Hundred Year War during the Middle Ages, but this will not happen, unless we ourselves place ideologies, sectarian differences above the fateful drive to promote and develop unification.

If the sectarian termite can eat into the fabric of society of a small country, think how effective it can be when its artificial forces are released against whole ethnic groups. When that happens, we will be facing not just sectarian wars; rather, ethnic separatist wars will arise with them. The strategy of Kissinger, Brzezinski and Hertzfel will have triumphed.

c. Shaykh 'Abdullah al-'Alayli is a well-versed religious teacher, immersed in linguistics and familiar with various cultural currents. He is descended from a well-known Lebanese family. Al-'Alayli's answer to this question is as follows:

Islam, as an international appeal, is not in itself a substitute for nationalisms; rather, its adherents are expected to stave off the injustices

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of aggressors and invaders. When nationalism is defense against injustices, it is an inseparable part of religion.

2. Is Arab nationalism a racist appeal?

a. Manah al-Sulh: The left and the right come together in accusing the idea of modern Arab nationalism of racism. The nationalists have fought a bitter struggle in ideas and in actions to forge the Arab nationalist course in the face of various skeptics. The Arab nationalist idea has continued to impose its accepted facts and premises and its avant-garde horizons on all ideological currents in the Arab homeland, whether leftwing or conservative.

There is not one adhering to the ideological currents in the Arab countries bold enough at present to slap nationalism as an idea; in fact, everyone races to take a firm stance of faith toward it and to adopt it as a basis for thought and action.

However, there is still a gulf between practice and application. There is more devotion in words than in action. There are many factions in the Arab homeland which do not espouse the nationalist idea although they are no so bold as to openly profess their rejection of this idea. Some Islamists in politics are still trying to put Islam in the place of Arab nationalism and some regional leftists are trying to attribute racism to the Arab nationalist idea.

However, nowhere in the Arab homeland have things gone so far as to charge Arab nationalism with being synonymous with Zionism, as was the case with some Iranian leaders. These made statements to some Lebanese reporters equating Arab nationalism with Zionism, a sort of one-upmanship which does not indicate true or enthusiastic hostility to Israel.

If it is conceivable to charge any nationalist idea in the world with racism, the idea of Arab nationalism is the last that could be accused of racism. Arab nationalism, with its cultural and humanitarian roots and its historic values embodies one of the most complete forms of social, political and cultural unification the world has ever known.

Everyone who has lived on Arab land,; in fact, everyone who has lived in Asia and Africa close to the Arabs, feels that Arab nationalism represents him to a large extent and that he is not a stranger to the concerns, aspirations and radiance of Arab nationalism. Anyone exposed to the East or to Islam will of necessity have a love for Arabism and the Arabs. If any person from the East or any Muslim does not feel this love, it means that he is lacking in Islam and in character. Any true belief in Arabism is accompanied by a love for Islam and an openness toward the East; any shortcoming in the latter means a shortcoming in the former.

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The finest example of the degree of love of Islam and the East in the heart of any Arab nationalist was that address given by the martyr, 'Abd-al-Ghani al-'Arisi (a Lebanese who was executed by the Ottoman murderer, Jamal Pasha), at the first Arab conference in Paris in 1913. He opened the address with a brilliant exposition of the essence of Arab nationalism and then moved on to a discussion of the relationship of the Arabs and the Turks under the shadow of the Ottoman state. He said:

"The Arabs and Turks together founded this Ottoman state on the premise of partnership in the holy war against the Crusader invaders. We, the Arabs, gave the Caliphate to the Turks because of this holy partnership in war and in defense of the East and Islam. We did not feel that the Turks were conquerors and that we were countries conquered at the point of a Turkish sword. We were, therefore, satisfied to establish this relationship. When we felt that some Turks wanted to deal with us as a victor who had taken our land at swordpoint, we had no choice but to stand up against them, whatever the price."

'Abd-al-Ghani al-'Arisi and his brothers rose against Turkish rule, and tried to liquidate the Ottoman state. However, their Arab nationalist thinking was so accepting of the East and of Islam that it went so far as to be content with a status of equal partnership within the Ottoman state.

How can modern Arab nationalism--this product of the womb of the Ottoman state--be accused of racism?

Certainly, Arab nationalism did not come into existence originally to solve the problem of the minorities in the Arab East, but the enthusiasm of the minorities for it was, at the time, something very natural. It was the nature of Arab nationalism to constitute a vehicle [for the improvement of] their circumstances.

It is, however, unfortunate that some of these minorities did not retain their old enthusiasm for the idea of Arab nationalism. That has hurt the Arab nation as well as them. The refusal of some minorities to adhere to Arab nationalism and to carry its torch was a factor which reinforced in others the propensity toward sectarianism. This happened in Lebanon, for example, when some Maronites turned their backs on the Arab nationalist principle. Thus, they created a sectarian propensity which insisted on following the logic of numbers and statistics in acquiring shares of the land. In other words, these insisted on treating the Maronites as a denomination, just as any denomination, to be given a share according to its numbers.

Had it not been for the Maronite renunciation of the Arab nationalist line, which had been followed by persons such as al-Rihani, Jibran Khalil Jibran, Najib al-'Azuri and Bishara al-Khuri, we would not have seen other sects proceed to look at the issues from a narrow denominational point of view.

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Arabism involves a great love of Islam. Anyone whose Arabism does not give him this love lacks a fundamental element of his ability to give himself to his homeland.

Enough said about the minorities within the Arab homeland. As for the Muslims outside the Arab countries, it can also be said that Islam has a great deal of love for Arabism. Anyone whose Islam has not given him love for the Arabs lacks ability to give himself to his own homeland.

b. Muta' Safadi: If we aspire to scientific precision in defining concepts, we must first ask what is meant by the concept of racism. This term has been bandied about to describe a type of concept and practice, particularly among some European peoples, to be more precise, some political regimes and their associated positions in international relations.

So, where does Arab nationalism stand with regard to these racial theories which have always accompanied the evolution of Western civilization and which can be regarded as its distinguishing feature in various periods of history?

During its modern revival, Arab nationalism acquired its intellectual and practical values from the struggle for survival which the various regions of the Arab nation waged, particularly during the period of Western colonialism, from the stage of direct occupation up to the stage of contemporary imperialism. It was a struggle which was directed toward liberating the Arab homeland from the foreign aggressor and from the domination of its exploitative and perverted cultural systems. This combative nationalism did not give rise to any principles of discrimination, except on the basis of who sided with imperialism and who fell victim of imperialist oppression.

Accordingly, Arab nationalism was described as having a humanitarian outlook, because, in its struggle and its progress, it served only the cause of the liberation of all oppressed peoples. Any fairminded historian will acknowledge that the struggle of Arab nationalism since the middle of this century has, to a great extent, helped to reaffirm the liberation of dozens of peoples and nations. It also helped to establish the so-called third world and its just issues.

There is nothing in the concept or practices of Arab nationalism which can in any way imply any connection with practicing or teaching racism. Just the reverse is true, since the struggle of nationalities characterized the struggle of the peoples of the third world and gave them the quality of popular nationalism.

On the other hand, the racism of the modern industrial societies is no longer content with the well known concepts of race, religion or culture. It is today a racism of technological superiority running the gamut from the machinery of war to consumer appliances and automated systems of analysis, thinking and information.

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Also, the experience of contemporary history show that certain peoples and denominations have changed from being oppressed to practicing persecution when given the chance to do so, thereby becoming racist.

There is no better example of this than Zionism which reversed the suffering of the Jews under Nazism to persecution of the Arabs of Palestine. Zionism claims a right to a homeland it doesn't own, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Finally, I fear what we all fear, that some factions of the Iranian revolution will again pick up the slogans of the Shah which made themselves a model of imperial racism. They would look for some religious justifications to export Islam, for example, to the very nation and homeland which witnessed the birth of Islam and carried its message to the whole world.

The popular nationalisms which have led the struggle of the third world since World War II, and which were pioneered by the experiment of Arab nationalism, accomplished effective responses to various forms of old racism. These include European colonialism as well as the new economic imperialism or ideological imperialism, both of which are going through a period of eclipse and retreat today.

The only thing left is for the disease of racism to be caught by new nationalisms emerging from the depths of the third world and claiming for themselves artificial factors of superiority. Their history should induce them to cooperate and integrate with predecessor popular revolutions, be they Western or adjacent movements.

c. 'Abdullah al-'Alayayli: It is absolutely ridiculous to say that nationalism is stained by racism. We are not referring only to Arab nationalism; no nationalism carries the stain of racism. Although nationalism is linked with a nation or people, the intent is not "race."

Nationalism, in fact, can be called a physical, moral and economic compound. Nationalism involves a physical element--land and beings, and a moral element, that is, a heritage and the enjoyment of specific religious, literary and cultural characteristics.

Arab nationalism is totally removed from the idea of race. Science a long time ago invalidated the idea of race; both anthropology (the science of man) and ethnology (the science of types of peoples) have totally invalidated the claim that there is an absolutely pure race as follows: Every nation or group on historical record has become a blend. In other words, their blood has been mingled with various bloods. Science has condemned racism, and it is completely ridiculous to talk about the idea of race. How could racism have been made an integral part of nationalism?

Even were we to suppose that there exists a pure being, we would not find him, even among the Eskimo tribes or among the aborigines.

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To refute racism, science has made this sweeping statement: Every group that has appeared in history has been a compound. Thus, the hypothesis of race now has no connection in any shape or form with nationalism.

Nationalism can, in fact, be defined in two words which must be easily and gently superimposed: nationalism and patriotism. In superimposing them, we find them completely compatible. In doing so, we define the nationalist concept, which has been advocated by the Arabs and others. In other words, rather than speak of social nationalism, we should speak of patriotic nationalism. So there is no basis for race or blood; rather, there are human beings on earth with their own special qualities.

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IRAN

TEHRAN LABYRINTH EXPLORED FOR COUP POSSIBILITIES

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Aug 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Jean Cau: "Tehran, Beirut, Paris: Bloody Channel"]

[Text] In Iran, who arms the killer sent abroad? Who wanted to assassinate Mr Bahktiar, and to whom would the crime profit? To ask these questions is like trying to disentangle a huge ball of woolen skein turning up there, in Iran, and a bit of thread--a bloody thread--appearing in France last week. In fact, it is certain that when a state is shaken by frictions and is ruled only by jolts of violence, the men in the saddle are apprehensive about losing the reins of power fall back on the olden recipe: terror. At home, they terrorize and execute; abroad, they assassinate.

At home, for 2 months, the Iranian revolution has become more radical, swinging into the worst: a religious fundamentalism more and more blindly prone to excesses. Who rules? No one. But, since it is precisely there where the Iranian form of government lies, who then terrorizes? The fundamentalistic mullahs, whose leader is Ayatollah Beheshti, a terrible melange of black-frocked Robespierre and bearded Savonarole. However, following the elections which were tampered with, the fundamentalist party now holds the majority of seats in Parliament. Through the hostages it can call its own "plays," against a President Bani-Sadr who is more and more a puppet chief of government. Thanks to the mullahs the party enjoys a propaganda network (agitprop) in the country, and plenty of money coming from mosque funds. It also makes the most of information gathered by SAVAMA, the political police which has replaced the shah's SAVAK, whose numerous agents have resumed work by simply "turning their coats." Finally, not only does it tolerate but it also subsidizes the Hezbollahi (party of God!) in which a few idealists are submerged by a swarm of former marginal elements, and recently released common law prisoners and criminals. Real terror, these Hezbollahi! They kill, hit, nurture violent demonstrations and flog for the least thing. (They may be compared with the militia in 1944, in which very honest boys were mixed with unscrupulous scoundrels and foul Gestapo-like agents. And in Tehran it is God who has to shoulder all the blame, just as did the struggle against Bolshevism in 1944 in Paris.)

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The Pazdarans (Pasdarans) (guardians of the revolution), a mass movement composed mostly of illiterate youths, are equally violent; nevertheless, they take orders from Ayatollah Khomeyni, or rather make use of his name. Islamic "students" also had their hour of glory when they seized the hostages, now they live, so to speak, on that capital. It is considerable. Consequently, when that jumble pours into the streets how can one know who exactly confiscates properties? Who, arm in hand, breaks into apartments to loot? Who deals in precious objects, Korans, manuscripts and stolen jewels? Is it in the name of Islam or by unrestrained liking for pillage that precious stones and diamonds inlaid in the Great Mogol's famous throne were pried loose from their fittings with blade tips? Is it in the name of Islam that a veritable cyclone pulls down historical monuments in Kerman City, liming frescoes everywhere and trampling miniatures under foot? Before Mao, nothing, said the Red Guards. Before the Prophet, nothing, say Islamic fanatics in whose footsteps rascals follow, picking up booties and establishing a reign of boundless corruption.

#### They Execute, Control and Muzzle

Such is the internal situation in Iran, being aggravated further by troubles or revolts in the provinces. This caused the religious party to flee forward, thinking that by terror it is possible for them to fight on all fronts. They execute "coup plotting" brass hats by firing squads, hold Bani-Sadr by the nose and muzzle allies of yesterday such as the mudjahidin (combatants of the people), a movement composed of "progressist" religious and intellectuals listed now, as under the shah, as "Islamic Marxists," or the fedaye'en (Marxist-Leninist leftwingers) 250 of whom are in prison and the rest in semi-clandestinity, although these 2 movements have not publicly opposed the mullahs, and have pretended only to a critical attitude. They relegate Admiral Madani, prestigious military leader, to the sidelines. At the same time, they do not forget to sing the praises of Islamic purity, to brandish interdicts and to encourage more and more denunciations. They flog people for a cigarette, or for a glass of alcohol; they impose the chador on women and prohibit their driving a car. Spying thrives on at all levels. As for him, Ayatollah Khalkhali has recently switched to hunting dope traffickers. Crafty, that Khalkhali! He knows that dope in Iran is an appalling scourge; but while the ayatollah does not clobber hundreds of thousands of consumers he hangs traffickers by the neck until dead. This ferocious rigor is not, to be true, without earning him a kind of redoubtable popularity, thanks to which the implacable justice meted out by him to generals, sent in droves before firing squads, to civilians convicted for close or loose collaboration with the former regime, and to real or imaginary plotters, appeared to be served by nothing but revolutionary virtue.

In brief, such is Iran, a hodge podge in which everything is moving: politico-religious intolerance, gangsterism with alibis, and terroristic

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puritanism. Khomeyni remains the key. His death would entail chaos and civil war. The Muslim patriarch does not rule but continues to reign. He is nothing politically, but is all-powerful through symbolic radiance. We, Westerners, must understand the strength of Iranian religious feeling. It pervades, horizontally, all strata of society. General or paysan, subtle intellectual or consummate illiterate, bourgeois or oil worker, all of them share a same current of faith--which was synonym of deliverance when it toppled the shah--and Khomeyni is the incarnation and symbol of that faith. "He has no power, according to Western standards," an Iranian who arrived last week from Tehran told me, "but he is the only man capable of throwing 5 million of persons into the streets." "Still today?" "Always today! He is the imam. He is untouchable. I understand that you do not understand that paradox of a Khomeyni who is all-powerful but does not rule. Seen from Paris, New York or London, this is an imperceptible effect...but that is the way it is."

Only the Army Can Put an End to Dictatorship

Now, another topic: exterior opposition.

Three heads: General Oveissi, not long ago nicknamed "the butcher of Tehran," because he had rigorously repressed the riots preceding the downfall of the shah, who still has real prestige within the army. Dismissing the popular uprising theory, he thinks that only the army can put an end to the mullah dictatorship. He lives in Paris but "travels a lot" (United States, Iraq, etc.). Second head, Nazih, former oil chief. Nationalist. Third head, finally, Shahpur Bakhtiar, very close to Nazih, resolute opponent of the imperial dictatorship even though he had accepted, in order to save Iran from chaos and prevent the religious from conquering power, to be the last prime minister of a shah at bay. With his firmness, lucidity, courage and political consistency, Bakhtiar has up to now been the veritable "pivot" to this day of the opposition in exile. In Iran, over the past few months his star has singularly risen among the entire enlightened section of the population. With the common people, this is another question; but, given the mullah's reliance on the primary fanaticism of the illiterates, it suffices to liquidate that fanaticism at the top to see that only the enlightened section of the population is capable of putting Iran back on the right track. The mullahs know that. Nor do they ignore that Bakhtiar's popularity has considerably increased since the former prime minister began his daily talks on Radio-Baghdad, and that his voice has crossed borders. Radio talks and transistors were the supreme weapons which De Gaulle knew how to use. Bakhtiar recalled that lesson a few weeks ago, so it is possible that the decision to assassinate him has been taken to prevent him from reaping the benefits of that campaign. Decision taken by whom? It is hard to answer, since all enemies of the anti-mullah opposition have interest in liquidating Bakhtiar. Including--and this is not without complicating things--those who, albeit not being dependable allies of the religious party in power, would be displeased with its eventual replacement

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by a firm democracy but showing Western coloration. For instance, the Tudeh communist party, a Soviet surrogate weaving its plots in the background. Evidently, this is only an example. There are many who do not want the mullahs, but who want Bakhtiar even less, whose accession to power would be regarded with favor in the West. Consequently, from the Khomeyni extreme to the other extreme, the Tudeh, encompassing mullahs, guardians of the revolution, and thugs of the present regime, all the shades in the spectrum had a common No 1 enemy: Shahpur Bakhtiar.

Who has attempted to kill him (and has missed him at the cost of two innocent deaths)? The police have detained five killers. Certainties: they arrived aboard different flights. The commando chief, Amiz Naccash (Amis Naccache), checked in at the Grand Hotel near the Opera, the others at the hotel Gerson, on Sorbonne street, and at an apartment rented, by pure coincidence, on Toullier street (100 m from the hotel Gerson) renowned for the massacre of policemen in which the very famous Carlos took part. Naccash has admitted to working for the Palestinian al-Fatah since a decade.

#### Two Enormous Grains of Salt in Cogwheel

The expedition germinated in the brains of the terrible Ayatollah Khalkhali, who has charged Amal Organization, a leftwing Lebanese movement composed of pro-PLO Shi'ites, with carrying it to completion. That movement has called on a specialized service--Aman 17--which, within Al Fatah, performs that kind of "coups." The chief of Aman 17, Abu Hassan Salameh, was killed in Beirut by the Israelis a few months ago, and was replaced forthwith by two new "bosses": Ayil Hamid and Colonel Abu Musa. It should be added that all Palestinian special services work in close collaboration with their Syrian counterparts led by Col Ali Doba, who supplies them with passports and weapons tranquilly dispatched through diplomatic pouch, or via Marseilles. Training takes place in a military camp south of Beirut. It is in that camp that the Paris-bound commando underwent training and set details for the first part of the terroristic operation. Naccash, who speaks French very well, would pass off for a journalist. Three terrorists would enter the building, gun down Bakhtiar, then leave the building, to be covered by two cronies who would neutralize the policemen guarding the entrance. Two enormous grains of sand had slipped into the machine: Bakhtiar has not been killed; the two accomplices slated for the cover job fled, so that their three colleagues were left petrified in the face of a young probationary policeman, who held them at a safe distance permitting the police to nab them gently. This unpreparation for the "coup" is not the least of the surprises of French policemen. An explanation: the five men have confused Paris with Beirut where they are like fish in water; away from home they were very improperly prepared for the new "environment," and thus were as flabbergasted as a band of thugs accustomed to attacking a rural credit union in France now switching to a New York bank. Only two, for instance, Naccash and Falaheddin El Kara, speak French. The other three, not a word!

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Another astonishment: the five men, now behind bars, have come clean and told the whole story without any difficulty at all.

Impression of police: they are religious fanatics ("Our cause is sacred" ... "We are ready to sacrifice ourselves in the name of Allah," etc.), but their other structures are equal to a goose egg. At the limit, they are more inclined to die than to kill, to be martyrs rather than soldiers. Religious passion devours them, and now, arrested, they proclaim it without realizing that they have "broken down."

Thus, it is in that Palestinian stew and on religiously motivated terrorists that the Iranians, through Ayatollah Khalkhali (who, occasionally, sends dope peddlers to hang) have called. Besides, the Iranians are not short of arguments with which to talk PLO leaders into underwriting the operation.

PLO Leaders, These Very Dear "Brethren"

In fact, Khomeyni's Iran welcomes PLO members as very dear "brethren," has not hesitated to offer them the premises of the former Israeli embassy, willingly supplies PLO troops with weapons (and, according to Israeli special services, would have recently put at their disposal U.S.-made Red Eye missiles capable of shooting down civilian planes), and kicks back to the PLO \$1 to \$2 per barrel of oil sold to the West. In any case, the operation constitutes a harsh blow for 'Arafat, so much anxious during the past few months to cultivate his credibility with the West. Either he is forced to admit that he does not have his troops in hand, and that the Palestinian resistance is only a puzzle in which a piece may go mad; or--but this is what he will recognize still less--he was aware that a commando was going to assassinate Bakhtiar, and that he had approved of the operation. Its failure is grave in all respects. On the plane of "prestige," because the operation--let's say it again--was conducted in an extraordinarily clumsy way. Thus, for instance, Bakhtiar used to take a daily walk, lasting at least an hour, in the Boulogne wood. Evidently, he was tailed by guardian angels, but it would have been easy to kill him with a telescope-equipped rifle, to jump into a car and to disappear in the traffic flow toward the Etoile. Instead, the murders grope for the "right" door, miss it, kill a lady and a policeman, finally riddle the right door with bullets before scrambling downstairs only to be collared by the young probationary policeman. This is a stupid job. Aggravated by two crimes. On the political plane, this is an enormous bloomer. In fact, France is one of the least stingy countries when it comes to granting asylum, and certainly it is not Ayatollah Khomeyni who could attest to the contrary. Protected by the shield on which the words "right of sanctuary" were engraved, terrorists and agitators from all places and from all colors abound in our country where they are welcomed without excessive worries, apparently in the name of our "traditions." (In short, France would be the Netherlands of the 17th Century, except that

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Descartes while enjoying our neighbors' hospitality, did not handle plastic bombs and Kalachnikov submachine guns...). German terrorists, Italian Red Brigades, ETA Basque killers, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, Palestinian agents and others, all that world living on our soil plots and agitates, hatches schemes and organizes--and kills if the occasion presents itself--in relative tranquillity. While criminality is one of our major problems, considerable police forces are deflected away from the fight against it to hunt down terrorists or to protect their eventual victims. So, for instance, the anti-crime squad has arrested since this past January, 50 terrorists of all nationalities (considerable balance-sheet, but leading to the thought that for 50 men arrested there are certainly hundreds still at large...), and our inspectors are wondering whether they are there to repress gangsterism or to dam up excesses of the blind tolerances of our first-rate "right of sanctuary," in the name of which we have released Abu Daou, organizer of the Munich killing, extradited the murderers at the Iraqi embassy, let Carlos slip away, and set free (according to Israeli reports) Ibrahim Elbaz, redoubtable terrorist apprehended in May 1979 in Roissy with a suitcase full of terrifying toys, etc. Finally, that is the way it is. Nevertheless, the Bakhtiar affair lays bare the risks of the "right of sanctuary." There are flaws.

Moreover, recent declarations of our government and of its president of the republic have, nevertheless, expressed some understanding about the Palestinian cause, thus irritating the Israelis. Finally, our ties with Tehran were far from being broken up.

#### We Demand of You a Small Service

Well, at one blow thunder fell on that edifice, threatening to undermine it. Must one think then that the Bakhtiar danger is so great that the Iranians were compelled to harshly ask the Palestinians to carry out, in specialists, which they are reputed to be, an attempt upon the life of the former prime minister? A give-and-take bargaining session would have taken place. "If you still want to enjoy our protection and our support, if you want to draw on our finances, we demand of you a small service." "Which one?" "Help us to get rid of Bakhtiar!" Perhaps the Palestinians scratched their heads a little, then with the knife of blackmail on the throat, they accepted, thinking with much frivolity that the gods would be their accomplices, and that the French police would be inferior to anything. Things did not happen as expected. Scamped operation, scamped slaughter, and perhaps scamped arrest (because without the sang froid of the young policeman the chaps would have disappeared); but, at all events, enormous flop on the finishing line. Bakhtiar is more alive than ever, and now in the eyes of his partisans he has become a half-martyr; the Palestinians, even if 'Arafat makes himself hoarse with bawling that he has nothing to do with the affair, are compromised and, dropping their masks, they show once again the repulsive face of terrorism; the French

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government is ill at ease seeing its pro-Palestinian policy stained with blood; Tehran vociferates against France. Much ruin for a vain result.

A second thing is certain: purges, shootings, hangings, appeals to murder and to denunciations prove that the Tehran power is seriously tottering since it endlessly continues to rule by the gallows or firing squads, and seeks survival and salvation in terror. Another thing is no less certain: Bakhtiar symbolized an insupportable recourse and an unbearable danger and must be liquidated. Failure. Bakhtiar, missed by the killers, is from now on a still greater danger and a stronger recourse.

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IRAN

UK JOURNALIST URGES WEST TO HEED IRANIAN EXILE GROUPS

LD081315 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 8 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Simon Henderson: "Why the West Must Take Iran Exile Groups More Seriously"]

[Text] We will use terror, we will use assassination and we will use bombings"--the words were spoken last weekend by an Iranian emigre in Paris as he discussed future tactics against Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime in Iran.

Six months ago such words would have been greeted with derision. Iranian exiles were seen as being the new white Russians, endlessly talking about the good old days or what might have happened if Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the interim prime minister who asked the shah to leave the country, had been more successful.

But there are now good reasons why the exiles, disunited as they are, should be taken more seriously. Two of the leaders, Dr Bakhtiar and General Gholam Ali Oveysi, have the nuclei of private armies based in Iraq where the regime of Saddam Husayn regards the Ayatollah Khomeyni as a danger to the stability of the region and a threat to Iraqi influence. Also the Iranian royal family, despite the death of the shah, is still acting as a focus of both money and political clout among the estimated 1 million exiles scattered through Europe and the United States.

The situation presents a dilemma for the nations of the West who play host to the exiles but who also need to safeguard their subjects and remaining commercial interests in Iran itself.

But, perhaps more important, is the choice they face in deciding how far they should go in supporting the Iranian exiles against the religious regime in Tehran whose policies have proved so inimical to the interests of the West.

However much Washington, London and Paris may wish to be rid of the troublesome priest in Iran, they may regard a prolonged period of instability in the gulf as the greater of two evils.



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The dangers of disrupting world oil supplies and encouraging further Soviet expansionism in the event of civil strife in Iran must remain an important consideration.

Even so, it is clear that, even with the hostages still in the hands of the Islamic militants, Washington is already involved.

Reports from Iran play down the exiles' significance. The royal family is still generally despised. General Oveysi is still remembered as the "butcher of Tehran" for the way he handled anti-Shah demonstrations; and Dr Bakhtiar is considered one of the world's biggest losers with nothing to show on his record except fence-sitting or failure.

But they still worry the revolutionary authorities. This week, President Bani-sadr accused France of allowing Iranians to be trained in sabotage in the country. A coup attempt was made last month--for which 50 soldiers have so far been shot--in the name of Dr Bakhtiar. Relations between Tehran and Baghdad are very tense with frequent reports of cross-border shooting.

Part of the revolutionary regime has already started fighting back. Dr Bakhtiar narrowly escaped assassination in Paris last month and one of his leading supporters in Washington was killed four days later.

Although Dr Bakhtiar receives most of the publicity he is probably not the force that Tehran has most to reckon with. In an interview in his bullet-scarred Paris apartment last weekend he appeared absurdly principled for a politician. "Success or failure is not important," he said. "It is more important for me to be in conformity with my conscience."

Rather more credible, and certainly more sinister, is Gen Oveysi's organization. Unlike Dr Bakhtiar, he does not give interviews and his aides, while friendly and obviously bright, are tight lipped when it comes to talking about tactics.

There are indications of the size of the backing he is receiving, and it is substantial. Like Dr Bakhtiar, he has a radio station in Iraq, where his military wing is probably very much bigger than the former prime minister's. It numbers more than 1,000 well-trained former officers and NCO's from the shah's army, and insiders say it is likely to grow to more than 20,000. Given the large number of desertions in the Iranian Armed Forces at the time of the revolution 18 months ago, this could easily be true.

With the death of the shah, 20-year-old Crown Prince Reza is pretender to the peacock throne. Last week, the Empress Farah published what she claimed was the shah's last will and testament.

It was a tape recording in her voice rather than his but called on the people to obey the crown prince.

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Despite the disunity, it is not hard to imagine circumstances by which the emigres might work more together. Dr Bakhtiar says that, if returned to power, he would work from the 1906 Constitution, which accepts the monarchy. General Oveysi was a loyal soldier to the shah, although his aides say he is now a republican. Monarchists in London still regard it as possible to work with him.

So far, it is only Iraq which is providing open support to the emigres. Egypt is probably giving more than hospitality. Of the Western nations, only the U.S. is known to be keeping lines open to both Dr Bakhtiar and General Oveysi, but it is also running an anti-Khomeyni clandestine radio out of Cairo and admitted to a force of Iranian "friendlylies" at the time of the abortive hostage rescue mission.

Of the European countries, Britain appears to be keeping well clear of political contact with the exiles. However, the conspiratorial Iranian revolutionary mind probably would not accept this, remembering British assistance to the U.S. in 1953 at the time of the overthrow of Dr Mosaddeq, the nationalist prime minister, and the return of the shah to his throne.

France, it seems, is trying to repeat the diplomatic success it achieved for a short while when Ayatollah Khomeyni himself was in exile outside Paris. Although France perhaps is not offering direct support, it is easy to know what precisely is going on with Dr Bakhtiar and General Oveysi living in Paris.

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LEBANON

FUTURE COURSE OF STRUGGLE IN SOUTH EXPLORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 20, 21

/Article: "Lebanon before the Unknown"/

/Text/ Has the deterioration of the political, military and security situation opened Lebanon up to grave possibilities once again? Has the danger stage reached its full extent? What will follow? An Israeli invasion and occupation? International trusteeship? A Palestinian Lebanese clash? Settlement or partition?

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's bureau sends this report on the situation and anticipated probabilities, relying on information available to it from official Lebanese and Palestinian sources and sources in the Maronite "Lebanese Front."

The Israeli operations in the military context, regardless of what they led to along the Lebanese coast and in the Palestinian population centers, stirred up basic questions for which the leaders of the resistance could not formulate clear answers, which has caused them to open to all possibilities without exception.

These questions are:

Since Israel began its military operations with an official declaration that it was determined to continue them, is what has occurred the maximum it is aiming for?

If what it is doing is only diversion or attrition operation, what is the ultimate goal? Where will the main Israeli blow be--in the south or in Beirut?

What character will this strike assume--a lightning operation or an occupation operation, as happened in spring 1978 when Israel entered the south up to the al-Litani?

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The leaders of the Palestinian resistance in Beirut are acting as if the possibilities contained in the questions are real. In their behavior, they give the impression that they are not just calculating probable military operations but are also calculating the repercussions and effects they could have on the resistance in its Lebanese environment and in the context of its Arab and international activity.

In the meetings the Palestinian resistance held this week, the command studied the various military reports and information drawn from all Arab and international sources and found that the likelihood that Israel would carry out a broad military operation in Lebanon had recently become stronger, especially after the failure which afflicted the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks on west bank autonomy, the great uprising in the west bank itself, and the disappearance of imminent solutions.

#### The Palestinians Anticipate an Attack

Palestinian sources state that Abu Iyad's reference to probable Israeli military operations against resistance commanders in Beirut is not the only likelihood the Palestinian leaders have dealt with. The most conspicuous thing they have dealt with is the war of attrition Israel started against the Palestinians in Lebanon and various areas, without exception, and the probability that this attrition will escalate to the level of a continuous daily war or a war of occupation in the area where the Palestinians exist, in the al-Zahrani region.

Palestinian sources believe that the Israeli military "diversion" of Palestinian forces along the Lebanese coast is a practical attempt to sense out the best areas for mounting an armored brigade invasion along the Lebanese coast and that an invasion of this sort will not be aimed at carrying out lightning military operations against the Palestinian resistance but at remaining in these areas, which lie outside the international emergency forces' zone of operations, under the guise of putting a limit to "constant Palestinian terrorist operations," as Menachem Begin and Ezer Weizmann described them in their latest statements.

The climate the resistance commanders fear is what the Lebanese government is making calculations for, and whose results and consequences it is anxious over, not just on the military level on Lebanese soil but also as regards the new political factors which these kinds of grave possibilities could produce.

This situation was laid on the table for discussion at the meetings which the president and the premier held and which were tended by the minister of foreign affairs toward the end. Likewise, this situation was the focus of discussion between Premier al-Huss and Abu al-Walid and Abu Jihad of the resistance's military command.

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Government sources state that the military leaders of the resistance do not share some Palestinian leaders' fear that Israeli operations will be of this magnitude, because that could lead to extreme losses for the Israeli invaders and because the international climate is not favorable for this kind of operation in the current circumstance.

However, the resistance's military commanders have not ruled out the fact that Israeli operations could assume a large magnitude in the coming period, in order to create a state of internal disruption in Lebanon and create pretexts for a clash between Lebanese and Palestinians.

These people consider that the resistance's military requirements may cause its presence in some areas to make Lebanese citizens feel pressure, and that because of the extensive area of Israeli operations its broad military deployment could lead to further pressure on Lebanese citizens.

What Does the Government Want from the Palestinians?

These Palestinian fears have prompted the Lebanese government to state that the resistance leaders must take initiatives to remedy such possibilities before they get out of hand, especially since the fact that Israel is maintaining the power to stir up such problems will cause any attempts in other contexts to be fruitless.

Although Premier Salim al-Huss did not mention to the resistance commanders what he meant by Palestinian initiatives on the practical level, what he meant was that the resistance should acquire an understanding of the dangers looming over it and of attempts to fabricate a clash between it and its Lebanese environment.

al-Huss considers that there are measures which the resistance could have taken previously to set Lebanese citizens at ease in the south which were not taken. They still could be taken, if the resistance actually wanted to frustrate those perpetrating the clashes and dissension.

Premier al-Huss' sources point out that Lebanese political bodies have been carrying out a mobilization operation for some time to create the climate for a clash with the resistance and that the talk which has been raised recently on settlement and resettlement is aimed at alleviating the severity of the tension and creating justifications for such a clash.

al-Huss' sources point to the attacks the "Lebanese Front" has started in this regard; these have been transformed into the demand for "a change in the Palestinian revolution," as the Phalange Party recently said. These sources say that this kind of tendency reflects a serious new development in the delicate circumstances through which the Middle East crisis is passing.

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#### Escalation of the "Lebanese Front" Attack

The fact is that the Phalange Party expects that its attack on the Palestinian resistance will assume new dimensions after the meeting the Political Committee of the Lebanese Front will hold on 28 May to study a report on "settlement" and ways of confronting it in Lebanon.

Phalange circles consider that the "Lebanese Front's" conception of the Palestinian problem resembles Syria's and that Syria has stated that it does not have any ready-made solutions for such an issue. It has also stressed that this issue must be remedied carefully through the resistance so that the situation will not blow up in a way which cannot be contained in the future.

Phalange circles consider that the Syrians have joined with them in stating that a Palestinian state on the west bank is not possible because of Israeli intransigence, that the Palestinians are staying in Lebanon until circumstances change, and that they, that is, the circumstances, do not seem likely to change in the foreseeable future.

Perhaps this is what has caused the Phalange to assume escalation of the military confrontation with the Palestinians, and perhaps this is what caused a Phalange military source to say "A broad Israeli operation against the Palestinians could be the entree for a Lebanese-Palestinian confrontation in the future."

In its campaign, the "Lebanese Front" talks about the need "to have the Palestinian resistance respond to the security requirements of the Lebanese nation." In this campaign, it goes beyond the measures and procedures which would achieve coordination to ward the danger away from Lebanon, its villages and its citizens, which the Lebanese government had previously discussed with the resistance leaders, and propounds "the need for the Palestinian revolution to change so that it will not exert coercion against a nation which has no alternative for itself or for others when it could exercise coercion against a revolution which has more than one alternative."

This statement opened a big wound in the Palestinian side. One leader of the Palestinian resistance even said "This kind of talk faces us with the option of throwing down arms and stopping the struggle against Israel or clashing with the Lebanese Front, and we have no option here except to continue the struggle."

Palestinian sources believe that the Maronite "Lebanese Front" is playing a dangerous game and is responding positively to Israeli tactics. To talk about "compelling the Palestinian resistance to draw back from its historic error and other errors," as was stated in the Phalange Party report, is

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not to attempt to ward off the dangers of settlement but to move toward sanctifying settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

#### Disarmament Means Settlement

These sources say that ending the Palestinian struggle will mean once again turning the Palestinians into tent dwellers who are not capable of changing their status and consequently changing the intention of Israel and the United States of America to keep them where they are. This is settlement.

Apart from the potential political effects of any broad Israeli aggression against Lebanon, and its relations with the Palestinian resistance, such aggressions on the ground could assume a military character which would make it necessary to act to bring about an Israeli withdrawal rapidly through the United Nations forces which could arrive in other areas north of the al-Litani River if the international Security Council found that that was the only solution for Israeli withdrawal from any new areas it might occupy.

Western diplomatic sources comment on the likelihood that Israel will carry out an occupation invasion operation by saying that this kind of operation would result in the emplacement of Palestinian tents in Sur for the first time under the protection of international forces if these forces were assigned to operate north of the al-Litani, and that that could lead to a sort of international trusteeship over the Palestinians in this area.

These Western diplomatic sources consider that Israel might exploit the United States' preoccupation with the presidential elections to launch a strike which could help Begin consolidate his chances of acquiring new popular support.

In the midst of these circumstances of utmost complexity, Israel and its allies on the border strip are continuing military operations against the heavily populated southern towns and the Lebanese coast from Sur to Beirut.

All the detachments of the resistance have been placed in a state of maximum alert, and all detachments of the National Movement have been alerted to provide support against the Israeli operations. It has reached the point where a foreign correspondent has described the state as "one of actual war."

Will what is going on be the prelude to a great explosion or will the explosion be a war not between Israel and the resistance but between the Palestinian resistance and the forces which make up its natural environment in Lebanon?

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Premier al-Huss says that the resistance must understand the conditions of Lebanon because, like a fish, it can live only in its environment and must keep this environment from turning into a climate mobilized against it.

President Ilyas Sarkis described what has been going on as the most serious thing Lebanon has witnessed since 1975. The main problem is that it is not known whether this trend is toward a solution or toward the end of a dead end, and it is not known whether or not the solution will be at Lebanon's expense. The main problem is that Lebanon is not taking serious action to ascertain that.

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LEBANON

LEFTIST, PALESTINIAN LEADERS CONDEMN SETTLEMENT

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 22, 23

/Article: "Settlement--Once Again"/

/Text/ Why is the ballad of the Palestinians' settlement being repeated? Three senior officials in the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian resistance express their view on the boisterous media campaign which the "Lebanese Front" is launching over the settlement issue.

The subject of settlement has once again assumed the central place in official and popular Lebanese concerns, to the point where some parties, through their statements and media, have started acting as if settlement was a fait accompli.

The Palestinian resistance and the National Movement, the two main parties concerned with this issue on the Lebanese stage, assert "Settlement is an old American-Zionist plot" which could be realized, if the Camp David line triumphs, although those who are afraid of settlement now are the ones who support Camp David.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI brought three questions on this issue to three leaders of the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, In'am Ra'd, vice president of the Political Council of the National Movement, the lawyer 'Isam Nu'man, member of the Executive Committee of the National Movement, and Majid Abu Sharar, secretary of the Revolutionary Council of the FATH movement.

The questions are:

1. Why have some parties resumed raising the issue of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon? Are there indications and justifications to call for this fear?
2. Do you believe that it is possible to realize the settlement plan in southern Lebanon?

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3. What are possible means for confronting and thwarting this scheme?

In'am Ra'd: Those Who Are Betting on Camp David Are Betting on Settlement.

I would like to restrict the answer to a startling fact, which is that our brothers al-Qawasimah and Milhim, the mayors of Hebron and Halhul, and the imam of Hebron, banished by order of the occupation authorities, have set out from Beirut to the bridge dividing the occupied territories from Jordan in an attempt to return after spending a few days in exile, thus uniting the will of the occupation.

Fears of settlement arise among those who are betting that Camp David will be consummated in the context of an Israeli-American peace and that its foremost result will be the settlement of the Palestinians outside Palestine, who will therefore be outside Lebanon also. The slogan of settlement has been and is being raised by the people who are betting on Camp David--both those who are proceeding in its cavalcade and those who despair of any alternate approach.

In either case these people talk of settlement as if it were a Palestinian or Arab plot, and not what it is, an Israeli-American plot. Resistance to and perseverance before Camp David is the only way to eliminate the settlement plan, which is the other face of Camp David.

Fabricating the settlement issue by some agencies of the authorities to justify the army's entry into specific areas, as if deploying it would result in preventing this process, is an exaggeration which goes beyond the facts. The issue of deployment of the army has been subjected to a domestic Lebanese struggle over the Army Organization Law which has no relation to the Palestinian resistance. It is an issue on which the viewpoint of the Lebanese prime minister coincides with that of the majority of the Lebanese, foremost among them the Lebanese National Movement.

In another area, the army was deployed in some areas of the secessionist ghetto but still was not able to prevent armed dominance by secessionist militia, their dominance over the installations and harbors of the state, including the port of Beirut, or their tribal wars.

Moreover the Palestinian resistance, in areas where it is present, is not a settlement authority but a revolutionary authority directed toward Palestine; relations between the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian resistance are established on this national basis.

'Isam Nu'man: They Are Trying To Glorify the Occupation

1. The hidden objectives in raising the issue of settlement are clear:

To cover up the fact of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the continued exacerbated aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian

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people by raising the controversy over the settlement issue, which is extremely sensitive to the people of the south, among whom and next to whom Palestinians live.

Ignoring the perpetrator as far as the party really responsible for settlement goes, because the "Camp David" agreements have assured that the Palestinians who are not residents of the bank or Gaza will be prevented from returning to the autonomous statelet once it is established. This means that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will be compelled to stay where they are now, that is, in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries.

Therefore, the function of those raising the settlement issue--some of them, at least--is to glorify the simple fact that Israel expelled the Palestinians from their homes in 1948 and 1967, that the parties to Camp David have sanctified keeping them where they are by leading public opinion to believe that settlement is occurring perforce because there is no solution to the Palestinian cause at the present time, and that the Palestinians are compelled to stay where they are and perhaps fortify themselves in their positions to repel the almost daily Zionist aggressions.

The "Lebanese Front" is trying to allude to the danger of settlement in order to put pressure on the central authorities (President Sarkis) and defraud Lebanese national forces in order to retain the privileges and interests which the present format of the Lebanese regime guarantees them, including the composition of the army, in any anticipated settlement.

2. The settlement plan can be realized in southern Lebanon and also in all adjacent Arab countries. The matter depends on the Arabs' ability to repel Israel and thwart its plans. However, if the Arabs are unsuccessful in the fifth confrontation with Israel, the enemy will be able not just to carry out the settlement plan but will also actually proceed to cut relations with the surrounding Arab countries in order to establish worthless little statelets in which political boundaries will coincide with religious boundaries.

3. The means of confrontation in the Lebanese context may be summarized as follows:

Resisting the Israeli occupation and settlement plans by supporting the Palestinian revolution aimed at the total liberation of Palestinian soil and passing through the tentative solution of establishing an independent state which is not mortgaged to the Zionist imperialist enemy.

Dealing with transgressions caused by some Palestinian resistance organizations with decisiveness and determination in the context of the united Lebanese-Palestinian struggle against the enemy and the agreements in force, with the intention of attaining the highest degree of effectiveness in confronting the enemy.

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Translating the principles of national reconciliation contained in President Sarkis' message into an action plan aimed at completing the construction of the Lebanese army on a basis of national balance and confrontation with the Zionist enemy, and establishing the legitimate authority of the state over all Lebanese territory by eliminating factional statelets and pockets of mercenaries and smugglers.

Majid Abu Sharar: The Conspiracy is Zionist-American

1. Settling Palestinians outside their country is to be considered one of the objectives which America is trying and has tried to achieve for many long years. The first time America set out the settlement issue was in 1954 when it proposed settling the Palestinians outside their country--at that time specifying the Sinai area for settling refugees from the Gaza Strip. This led to a popular uprising against settlement in the Gaza Strip which went on 4 days. At that time the demonstrators raised a slogan which I still remember, which is "No settlement or housing, American agents!"

This is the Palestinian position. At the time the Palestinians paid the price of seven martyrs and dozens of wounded people who fell during the uprising for it. It still is the current Palestinian position and will always remain so. If the Palestinians want to settle down where they live--in other words, if the Palestinians choose the settlement road instead of the road of revolution and the gun--they will be met with acceptance and welcome from many Arab regimes, including the regime in Lebanon, and they will not be exposed to the slaughter and tragedies they were exposed to after choosing the road of revolution. Therefore I say that the people who are afraid of the issue of settling the Palestinians in Lebanon now are in fact among the most intensely enthusiastic about settling the Palestinians.

But what Palestinians do they want? They want the Palestinians working in factories, workshops and feudal manors at the cheapest prices and wages. They want the Palestinians who have been stripped of their identity and will.

Therefore I ask those who are afraid of the settlement of Palestinians about the tens of thousands of Palestinians to whom they gave Lebanese citizenship when their interests coincided with those of these Palestinians. Even those Palestinians who at that time faced two choices--the choice between continuing a life at the mercy of the agencies of the authorities and Lebanese citizenship--chose citizenship. When we presented them with the correct choice, which was that of revolution, we found that most of them enlisted in the activities and ranks of the revolution. This shows that the Palestinians are the main real opponents of the settlement of Palestinians outside their own country.

In another area, all those who slavishly rush after a solution to the Palestinian issue come up against the continuing problem of Palestinian

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refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and other Arab countries. When these people feel that they are incapable of creating conditions which can enable the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland because of the blatant failure to realize that the party which possesses the solution--I mean America--has always been the most persistent enemy of the return of the Palestinians to their homeland, you find them resorting to the solution which in their opinion is the easiest, that is, to settle the Palestinians in the Arab countries in order to realize two goals at the same time--first to consecrate Israel's survival as a base protecting American imperialist interests in the region and second the assimilation and elimination of the Palestinian national personality, the uplifter and mover of the Arab struggle for the liberation and unification of the Arab nation for dozens of years, that is, substituting combative people with deep bonds to their territory, their Arabhood and their national causes for Jews coming from all corners of the world to protect American interests and consequently to protect the survival of America's agents in the form of the Arab reactionaries who tyrannize their people and pave the way in full for the plunder of the nation's resources and its continued bondage in the chains of backwardness and impotence.

2. As for the issue of settlement in southern Lebanon, that is relevant, but, if the enemies of the Palestinian people can snatch the rifle from the hands of the revolution and defuse it and sanctify the Camp David agreements, then the solution will be to settle the Palestinians in southern Lebanon through planning and with encouragement from those now afraid of settlement, such as the Lebanese Front and the Americans, and the reactionaries behind them. This means a solution at the expense of the Palestinian people and their cause and at the expense of the people of the Lebanese south who have been oppressed and neglected by the Lebanese authorities throughout the life of the Lebanese nation. For the Lebanese Front and its aides to cry over the south is a fraud which will not deceive the simplest persevering citizen of the south.

In any event, while people are scheming to settle us in southern Lebanon, we are scheming to make southern Lebanon the gateway to the nation and the liberation of the Arab nation from those who enslave it and plunder its resources.

3. The basic means for thwarting the settlement conspiracy is further adherence to the revolution and its fighting gun, because the gateway to settlement lies in stripping the revolutionary Palestinian of his rifle--and woe to him who believes that that is possible. Our people have borne arms and will cast them down only after the liberation of their homeland, at which time southern Lebanon will be the neighbor of northern Palestine, among the most beloved pieces of Arab territory to every Palestinian who has known how the southerners suffered from oppression, humiliation, and neglect before the Palestinian revolution, how they are suffering now from

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Zionist-secessionist aggressions against their towns, villages and fields, and how high the price is which they are paying to preserve their national identity and continue persevering in the trench of the revolution.

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LEBANON

MOST ARAB STATES CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 P 49

/Article: "Beirut: Except for Libya and Algeria, the Arabs Are Paying Their Shares of the Program To Rebuild Lebanon"/

/Text/ Iraq was the first to carry out its Tunis summit commitment to aid Lebanon. Recently it paid the second instalment of its share of the first year's assessment, which totals \$400 million out of a total of \$2 billion.

The premier, Dr Salim al-Huss, told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that his government received a money order for \$20 million, the second instalment of Iraq's share. Thus it has received from the Iraqi government a total of less than \$40 million out of \$58.64 million, Iraq's share for the first year of the aid program.

The third instalment, totalling about \$19 million, is expected to be paid at a later time this year.

It is worth pointing out that the proportion of Iraq's share to the total Arab aid the Tunis summit had approved for Lebanon is 14.66 percent, equal to \$293.2 million, distributed over 5 years, at the rate of \$58.64 million per year.

After the annual budget of Saudi Arabia was put into effect last month, Lebanon waited for the bureaucratic procedures to be completed for implementation of the instructions of Prince Fahd, the crown prince and deputy prime minister, on payment of Saudi Arabia's share for the first year, which totals more than \$114 million.

The Saudi share is the greatest Arab share, as its proportion comes to 28.58 percent of the total aid of \$2 billion and equals \$571.6 million.

After that comes Kuwait, with 15.71 percent, equal to \$314.2 million or \$62.84 million per year. The Lebanese government has been informed that

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it intends to transfer \$25 million during the first year, with the proviso that it will pay the rest soon.

The emirates' share comes to 11.63 percent, or the equivalent of \$232.6 million, broken down over 5 years at a rate of \$46.52 million per year. The Lebanese government has received notification that the value of the first instalment will be handed over in full.

According to information at the disposal of the Lebanese government, Qatar will soon pay its share for the first year, which totals \$26.38 million, as its share is 6.57 percent, equal to \$131.4 million.

There remain two countries which seem unprepared to pay; these are Algeria, whose share totals 7.14 percent or \$142.8 million, to be paid at a rate of \$28.56 per year (it declined to pay because of the financial straits it is suffering from), and Libya, whose share totals 15.71 percent, the equivalent of \$314.2 million, broken down over 5 years at a rate of \$62.84 million per year.

From this it may be deduced that Lebanon may not obtain the entire first year's assessment of Arab aid which the Tunis summit approved, which is \$400 million out of a total of \$2 billion. The total contribution by countries giving their agreement totals about \$309, leaving \$91 million, the shares of Libya and Algeria.

Here it is worth wondering: if this is the total of the Arab aid, what will the volume of expenditures for rebuilding Lebanon be for the first year?

The fact is that the Lebanese government is hesitant about the Arab aid figure. The Development and Reconstruction Council, chaired by Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, has set forth a 12-month redevelopment plan which includes the implementation of projects which cost 2,961,000,000 pounds or more than \$800 million. This means that the government will finance half the expenditures for these projects with domestic and foreign loans, including the \$150-million loan the Development and Reconstruction Council obtained from the group of foreign banks in 1978, of which it has not yet spent one piaster.

The state's entry into the financing process is tantamount to an official confirmation of the Lebanese people's desire to rebuild their country, even in the light of unstable security conditions, without relying on Arab aid funds alone to do so.

This step is to be considered a factor in encouraging the Arab countries to provide what they committed themselves to at the Tunis summit.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

OPPOSITION LEADERS INTERVIEWED ABOUT OPPOSITION MOVEMENT

Opposition Formulates National Charter

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 p 32

[Text] 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the new Yemeni president has recently spoken more than once to explain the objectives and the reasons for the new change in South Yemen. The most important feature of this change was the ouster of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from the presidency of the state and from the party's general secretariat. But what does the opposition think of these changes and of the Marxist regime as a whole? This is the question that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been trying to answer through the interviews it conducted with the leaders of the broad coalition which included almost all the political organizations and movements in the country. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will review and present the most important items of the draft National Charter which has been attained recently during the meetings of opposition leaders.

The first coalition of forces opposed to the ruling Marxist regime in South Yemen was formed last April in Baghdad.

The National Coalition of Patriotic Forces in South Yemen included the following organizations:

- \* The United National Front, chaired by Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi who was chosen secretary general for the coalition.
- \* The National Unity Front, chaired by Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham who was chosen to be deputy secretary general for the coalition.
- \* The Liberation Front and the Arab South League Party, chaired by Mr Muhammad 'Ali al-Jafari who died suddenly while he was in Baghdad. This organization is currently chaired by Mr Shaykhan al-Habashi.
- \* The 26 June Organization--this is the organization of the late Salim Rabi' 'Ali.
- \* The Popular Organization, chaired by Mr 'Ali ibn Hadi.

The coalition also included a number of independent civilian and military figures that is not inconsiderable.

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#### Principles of the Charter

The coalition was able to attain a draft national action charter which it regarded as a comprehensive theoretical guide for national action. The coalition defined its programs with the following objectives:

1. Establishing a united, progressive, democratic, national government.
2. Eliminating fanaticism, sectarianism and partisanship which constitute an obstacle to the culturally pure and sound unity, development and progress of Yemen.
3. Eliminating the atheistic movement and preserving our spiritual and cultural heritage.
4. Pursuing a national economic policy that has national prospects and dimensions for the purpose of building a free national economy that is based on the principles of modern knowledge as well as those of scientific planning which has been thought over and programmed.
5. Encouraging national capital within the limits of the public interest.
6. Organizing the economic sectors according to a specific time plan.
7. Establishing a public sector in addition to the private sector and drawing up a purposeful economic policy that would achieve balance between the public and the private sectors; this balance is to be consistent with the public interest of all citizens.
8. Ensuring the freedom of opinion and of faith for all the people; ensuring the freedom of all branches of political and cultural action; and ensuring the freedom to establish professional organizations and cooperative, cultural and charitable societies.
9. Building and developing the national army on modern principles.
10. Making diligent efforts to achieve the unity of Yemeni soil and working for the establishment of the real unity of the people on the basis of sound democratic, popular principles after a popular referendum is held under a neutral and a joint Yemeni government to provide a free, democratic climate in both parts of Yemen.

The National Action Charter determined the principles of the domestic policy by endorsing justice and equality among citizens; by eliminating privileges, discrimination, oppression and arbitrariness; by affirming the principle of a democratic government and the principle of democracy for everyone; and by encouraging the establishment of popular organizations and professional, farmers' and women's unions.

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The charter also affirmed the importance of guaranteeing individual and public liberties, including the right to publish newspapers and magazines, and of setting democratic freedoms loose in the broadest sense.

On the economic scene the coalition committed itself to supporting public order; limiting ownership in basic industries and in the vital facilities of those industries; encouraging the private sector to participate in development projects; remedying the dangers of migration and unemployment; offering guarantees to Arab capitalists; and issuing a law to regulate agricultural ownership.

On the national and international scene the coalition committed itself to affirming the notion of pan-Arab unity, fighting separatist and anti-Arab tendencies; respecting all the Arab regimes that did not renounce basic Arab principles and questions; and pursuing a non-alignment policy.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met and talked with a number of coalition leaders. Today, it relates the opinion of Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi, the secretary general of the coalition, and of Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, the deputy secretary general. In the next issue we will publish the opinion of Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahyub, member of the command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party in Yemen.

#### Subordination to Soviets Rejected

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 33-34

[Text] 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi was accused of being a reactionary and an agent for colonialism. People forgot that he had resigned as prime minister of the Federation of South Arabia to join the national rank. They also forgot that he has paid a high price for that. Agents of colonialism killed his sister and three of his sons in one day. Just as Makkawi led the struggle of his people one day against British colonialism, he is saying today that he is determined to lead the struggle of this nation against the Marxist regime in South Yemen and against the subordination of this regime to the Soviet Union.

The name of 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi is not strange to Arab politics. He is a well-known leader from South Yemen. He surprised the British when he submitted his resignation as prime minister of the Federation of South Arabia in 1965 to join the national rank that was struggling for independence. He became the leader of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. This front included broad national movements and led the struggle against colonialism.

'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi paid a high price for his struggle. The agents of colonialism blew up his house in Aden on 27 February in 1967. Three of his sons were killed: Jalal (23 years old); 'Adil (20 years); and Samir (9 years). His sister was also killed. When all of Aden came out for

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the funeral of Makkawi's sons, the British fired [their] guns at the mourners, but the people insisted on sharing their leader's loss despite the gunfire of colonialism.

To spite the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir whose forces were still in North Yemen at the time, the British Labor government placed the National Front, which was then led by Mr Qahtan al-Sha'bi, in charge of South Yemen. The National Front was the principal front opposing the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen which was supported and subsidized by President 'Abd-al-Nasir.

Makkawi left the homeland, moving about in the Arab world and practicing his opposition to the current regime in his country as a member of the United National Front. This front has been expanded recently at the Baghdad Conference which included various opposition movements.

'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi has a dignified appearance and a strong stature; he is well-educated, well informed and quick-witted. Here he is talking to the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Baghdad.

[Question] What do you think about the recent change in the top positions of government in Aden?

[Answer] I think these changes were changes in people only and were not changes in the state's policy, especially since Nasir Muhammad did declare after assuming power recently that his affiliation with the Soviets would not be shaken and that he would continue this policy of Soviet dependency.

But what concerns us above all else is getting rid of this foreign influence which is threatening our independence as Arabs, as progressive people and as nationalists.

Therefore, if 'Ali Nasir wants to come back to the Arab fold, he has to rid himself first of the foreign interventions and the foreign influence in his country.

This is a fundamental condition required by all the forces of the Yemeni opposition whose groups are working in the National Coalition of Nationalist Forces.

The second thing that we want is to put democracy in action and to achieve national unity. When, for example, Sultan Ahmad 'Umar, the chairman of what is called the National Front, and his group insist on putting democracy in action in North Yemen and on having all the popular forces take part in a national government there, it would stand to reason also that those communists who are controlling the lives of our people in South Yemen apply [that principle] too before the unity of Yemeni soil can be completed.

Let me say again and emphasize that what happened in Aden was a play in which a few faces who were not in favor were rejected and other faces who

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were more flexible returned to the stage. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is the Soviets' man, and so is 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il. The only difference between them is that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is more flexible than 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, and his flexibility may be a factor that will help in obtaining some financial aid for the purpose of overcoming the economic crisis that is choking them off now.

This is naturally a Soviet tactic. Instead of "wasting" 'Abd-al-Fattah, the Soviets brought a more flexible person in to overcome this crisis. After this crisis is overcome, 'Abd-al-Fattah will return to take over the following stage. The Soviets know that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is more acceptable to the people of South Yemen than 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad Will Be Destroyed

[Question] Do you think that the new president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad will succeed in shouldering the responsibility of [this] stage?

[Answer] 'Ali Nasir is now shouldering a major responsibility in the state and in the party. I fear that he may be destroyed if he cannot overcome the destructive economic crisis or if he cannot perform his role well in the Soviet drama.

[Question] Can what happened in Afghanistan be repeated in South Yemen with regard to armed intervention and with regard to replacing Zayd with 'Amr [i.e., one man with another]?

[Answer] What I am afraid of and what I did not want to declare is that the Afghanistan experience may be repeated in Aden. This is because this has always been the Soviets' custom.

I am absolutely certain that, when they dispensed with 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il in this manner, they would not at all hesitate to dispense with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in another short period of time. They would replace him with a person who would be more acceptable to the people, who would do better service and be more loyal to the Soviets--one who would be more successful in carrying out the duties of [this] stage.

This does not mean that 'Ali Nasir is less loyal to the Soviets than 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, but it does mean that he is the man of the hour. 'Abd-al-Fattah alienated many Arab countries that have an unadulterated, pan-Arab and nationalist outlook. He became more of a Soviet than the Soviets themselves. But 'Ali Nasir, as I said is more flexible than 'Abd-al-Fattah is in dealing with the Arab countries.

I also do not find it unlikely that 'Abd-al-Fattah's role in this drama will come at the end of the performance, after 'Ali Nasir fails [in his mission], having been fettered with all these enormous responsibilities.

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The Soviets are concerned above all else with their own interests. If their interests are not served through 'Abd-al-Fattah, 'Ali Nasir or 'Ali 'Antar, they can easily appoint any replacement who will be more willing to carry out their demands and serve their interests.

[Question] Does what happened in Aden mean that the military faction has won a victory over the party faction?

[Answer] The army is loyal to 'Ali Nasir and to 'Ali 'Antar. 'Abd-al-Fattah has lost the army and the militia, especially after the militia was incorporated in the regular army.

[Question] It is being said that Mr al-Qamati and four of his strong aides have been physically liquidated. It is well known that he was a militia leader and the right hand man of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.

[Answer] I believe that the army now is in the hands of 'Ali Nasir and 'Ali 'Antar and their group. Even the party is now in their hands, now that 'Abd-al-Fattah is out of the picture. Many of 'Abd-al-Fattah's aides and supporters have been removed from all important positions. It is for this reason that the change came about quietly and without visible battles as was the case in the battle with Salim Rabi' 'Ali.

No Unity with a Marxist Regime

[Question] Can unity be achieved between the two [sections of] Yemen after the change that took place in Aden?

[Answer] I do not believe that these steps have any serious implications. There can be no unity between a Marxist regime and a conservative regime. I believe there is Yemeni unity now because the two peoples are united, but Yemeni unity cannot come about unless a patriotic national regime is established in South Yemen. Unity under the present regime will be frail and would soon collapse.

[Question] What about the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Aden?

[Answer] Saudi Arabia has been working for the supreme pan-Arab interests; it has always extended a helping hand to Yemen. If there should be a rapprochement between it and the regime in Aden, Saudi Arabia would consider the people before the regime. I do not believe that the atheistic, communist regime of Aden can agree with a regime which holds our most sacred Islamic relics.

But we must first be certain of the good intentions of the Aden regime and of its sincere inclination in favor of Arabs. When it rids itself of foreign subordination, it can then return to the Arab fold.

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[Question] How can a sound, healthy relationship be established between Yemen and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] We are not in any case opposed to cordial, normal relations with the Soviets. What we do oppose is that this superpower gain absolute control over our country. The relationship today between Aden and Moscow is one of subordination. There is not an ounce of independence in this relationship, and this is what we oppose.

Hence we do not believe that the Aden regime is serious at all in establishing good relations with Saudi Arabia. It is rather an opportunist relationship from which the Aden regime is seeking a solution to its economic crises.

So far 'Ali Nasir has not shown any sincere inclination [towards the Arabs] to make us believe that he has returned to the Arab fold. We believe that he will not be able now to declare any sincere inclinations towards the Arab nation.

We Will Take Serious Action

[Question] What are the goals of the National Coalition of Patriotic Forces in Yemen which was recently established in Baghdad? How much influence does it have on the domestic Yemeni scene, and how much influence does it have abroad on the two Yemens?

[Answer] We thank God that we were able to bring together in one melting pot all the forces that oppose the Shu'ubi [anti-Arab dominance] regime in Aden, which is hostile to our nation. All the organizations inside and outside the Yemeni scene met in Baghdad to confront the common enemy in their country as a single force.

We thank God that we agreed on everything. We agreed on a national action program; on the broad lines of a general policy; and on serious, fruitful action inside the area. We are still at the beginning of the course. I am confident that the beginning bodes well [for us] because we have placed ourselves on the correct course.

The purpose of the coalition then is, first, to bring about the downfall of the regime in South Yemen because it is an unnatural regime that does not serve the interests of our people; and second, to establish a nationalist democratic, patriotic government of unity in South Yemen.

The action that we will take is political, media-oriented, organizational and military. When we say military action, we mean guerilla and organized military action. We will have a fruitful and a serious beginning that will surprise many people.

The coalition includes all the national parties, chief among which are the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the Yemeni Unity Front, the United National

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Front, the 26 June Front and the Popular Resistance. I am very optimistic, more than any time in the past, that success will be our ally because we will undertake actions that are very effective in the near future.

[Question] How do you view relations between the coalition and the Arab countries neighboring South Yemen?

[Answer] They are very good relations, supporting our positions with North Yemen, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries. They are all with us body and soul because we are a nationalist, patriotic group working to expel the foreign influence that is threatening our nation and because, as I said, we belong to our Arab nation before belonging to any other agency.

[Question] But is this coalition a periodic one or is it a long-term coalition?

[Answer] Our alliance is a long-term strategic alliance. It is not just a temporary alliance to overthrow the regime. Our alliance seeks liberation and the establishment of a socialist Arab coalition because we believe that the regime in Aden is colonialist. We came out from under British colonialism and entered into Soviet colonialism.

#### Persecutions in Exile Deplored

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 30 May-6 Jun 80 pp 34-35

[Text] Muhammad 'Ali Haytham is one of the leaders of South Yemen living in exile who is probably the most knowledgeable person about the personalities and the trends of the ruling regime in South Yemen. He is also the one who is most subject to persecution and harassment by the regime. Today, Haytham is the deputy secretary general of the opposition coalition which has recently been formed. Here he registers his observations and his impressions of his experience with the regime of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il and his hopes for the future.

Muhammad 'Ali Haytham is one of the founders of the National Front in Aden. When the faction of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was overthrown in 1969 by President Qahtan al-Sha'bi and his command of the front, Muhammad 'Ali Haytham was selected to be one of a five-man team that constituted the presidential council. He was then charged with forming a government, but he was relieved of his position in 1972, and Isma'il banished him to the Soviet Union. However, he escaped to Cairo where he formed an opposition organization called the National Unity Front.

'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was aware of the danger Muhammad 'Ali Haytham posed to his regime. He therefore pursued him relentlessly. There were three attempts to assassinate him in exile. He was seriously hurt all three times: in his face, in his neck and in his chest, but he survived miraculously.

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Muhammad 'Ali Haytham is described as having inclinations towards Arab unity. He is characterized by his political moderation and his flexibility. It is being said that he is popular in Yemen.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI had this interview with Muhammad 'Ali Haytham in which he talked about his experience and his suffering and about the future of the current regime in South Yemen.

[Question] You know the makeup of the current regime in Aden better than anyone else. How do you interpret what happened, and who are the new officials?

[Answer] I would like to emphasize on the basis of my knowledge of the ruling group that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was forced to resign and that he did not resign voluntarily because he has been the primary figure in the regime since the changes that took place on 20 June 1969.

I do not think that 'Abd-al-Fattah gave himself up that easily. He has always aspired to the role of the hero, and numerous circumstances had been prepared for him [to play that role].

Because we know many of the brothers who joined the current setup of the regime, we know that their inclinations were nationalistic. But with the change that occurred in the ideology of the regime and of the party, and as a Marxist-Leninist course was adopted, those inclinations vanished.

We hope they will disavow their new persuasions, their mistakes and their oppressive and terrorist practices against the helpless citizen of Yemen. We hope they will not introduce our people into the struggle of the international game against the interests of the Arab nation.

At this present stage we may not hope for much from them, but we are hoping for another and a more far-reaching change in the future.

Half of Our People Are Homeless

[Question] Do you believe that unity is possible between the two parts of Yemen under present circumstances?

[Answer] When Aden became independent, we were hoping that an additional flag would not be flown [in the capital]. We were rather hoping that San'a' would seize us and unite both parts of Yemen; we were hoping that unity would be [established] under one flag. But this unfortunately did not happen.

The present call for unity between the two regimes is based on the fact that the Aden regime, with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, would take over the other part of Yemen and impose its ideological control throughout the territory of Yemen.

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We consider the regime of Aden to be an implanted regime because it did not come [to power] through the will of the people, nor does it realize the ambitions of the Arab citizen. We are part of a large nation, and this nation has major interests. The Arab nation must fight for its national, its humanitarian and its democratic unity, and it must fight for a just social system.

The population of South Yemen when [it gained] independence was 1.5 million. Today, the population in South Yemen is much less than a million because hundreds of thousands of citizens have been made homeless. They live in tin huts in the desert of al-Rub' al-Khali and in Sha'ab in North Yemen. They wander in the streets and alleys of the cities of North Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Gulf, of Egypt, Sudan and Iraq.

This is the biggest indication that it is an implanted regime which practices terrorist oppression against the masses who do not believe in what the regime believes.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the situation in Aden? Who won and who lost there?

[Answer] The fact is that the makeup of the socialist party now, and ever since the National Front was changed and turned into a party, is an extension of the organization of the National Front with all its evils, its negative factors and its contradictions, whether they be tribal, sectarian fanaticism or a separatist spirit.

The present Yemeni Socialist Party represents the same former makeup, and the struggle that can be found now is not the struggle of ideological movements, but it is rather the tribal mentality that is in control.

It is evident from the new makeup of the Aden regime that military men played a major role in that change, and they settled the situation to their advantage. We are encouraged by this because the military men have begun to take action.

[Question] What then in your opinion is the future of the regime?

[Answer] No regime can be overthrown quickly. Today, we are resisting a regime that senses a major point of weakness: that it is an implanted regime.

This feeling is growing within the regime, and in spite of its terrorist practices, we can say that any serious opposition and resistance can achieve major results.

We are in the process of achieving this now that the Yemeni opposition has consolidated itself. We will take effective opposition action, and we have the enormous manpower that can achieve the most difficult of missions.

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The question of ease or difficulty goes back to our ability to take action. I believe we are capable of taking major action and of ridding the Arab nation from this cancer which has been implanted in it.

Aden Is a Soviet Colony

[Question] What interest do the Soviets have in supporting a regime that is as isolated from the people as you describe?

[Answer] As a superpower the Soviet Union strives to have stable interests. It is not interested in who achieves these goals for it. What is important to the Soviet Union is that these goals are achieved by any person.

During the war of liberation against British colonialism the Soviet Union used to refuse to give us any aid. It would not even give us any weapons.

But after independence the frenzy began, and the Soviet Union began to mobilize people and to strive to achieve its interests. It was gradually able to implant this regime in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula.

Ever since the early seventies the Soviet Union has obtained terms that it would never have dreamed of at all.

The airports at Aden are always open for Soviet flights. Suffice it [to know] that last year the Soviet Union trained a division in its entirety with full military equipment to conduct rapid transport [operations] from the Soviet Union to Aden and vice versa so as to test its capability for rapid transport.

If the Soviet Union were to pay billions of dollars, it would not be able to obtain such facilities free of charge.

All the ports of South Yemen are also open to the Soviet navy. Soviet ships and submarines that malfunction at sea had to be returned to Lenin-grad for maintenance, but now all maintenance is carried out in the ports of Aden, and this saves millions of dollars and large quantities of fuel.

Fishing vessels, which are espionage vessels, and all commercial and military ships sail into Aden without contacting authorities in Aden.

All the crews of military and commercial ships in Aden have also been given facilities for storing all kinds of weapons to suppress all liberation movements in the Horn of Africa and in the Arab homeland.

Aden has become a Soviet colony or a new Soviet republic to be added to the Soviet republics.

[Question] Do you believe that the political future of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il has come to an end?

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[Answer] The recent changes in Yemen have become clear because the people who are in power have a bloodthirsty nature.

They know the danger 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il poses to them if he remains alive, and fearing a repeat of the Afghanistan experience, they will not allow 'Abd-al-Fattah to live.

If their assassination squad is traveling in foreign countries looking for opposition members, is it reasonable [to expect them] to leave 'Abd-al-Fattah alive so he would return [to power] and liquidate them?

[Question] What about the rapprochement between the regime of South Yemen and Saudi Arabia? What do you think about it?

[Answer] Aden's leanings towards Saudi Arabia are taking place with instructions from the Soviet Union, in view of the fact that the Aden regime is an implanted regime which receives directions from whoever implanted it.

[Question] You are now an active member in organizing the opposition and in organizing the National Coalition of Yemeni Patriotic Forces. What are your hopes and your expectations?

[Answer] The coalition is a positive step taken on the correct road of confronting the client regime in Aden. All the groups of the Yemeni opposition have been aspiring to form such a coalition. We are hoping that this coalition would have been established a long time before this so it would have been more effective. We would have at least taken some strides on the arduous journey of a 1,000 miles.

The National Coalition is introducing a new method; this is a practical method to bring the client regime of Aden to its knees.

Our objectives are clear: to establish in our country a nationalist regime, whose thoughts are of unity--a regime that is humanitarian in its practices and strong in its aspirations.

We hope to establish a regime that would raise the standard [of living] of the Yemeni people and achieve the unity of Yemen. This will only come about by overthrowing this regime and destroying all its political, constitutional and other institutions. I can say that the coalition can achieve that.

[Question] Do you believe that the coalition is a front with an interim, tactical objective, or do you believe that it has objectives that go beyond those of changing the regime?

[Answer] The alliance of these opposition parties in the coalition is a long-term strategic alliance and not a temporary tactical alliance that will come to an end when the objective of the stage is realized, and that is the overthrow of the regime in Aden.

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The regime in Aden has already begun to fear the newly created coalition. It is trying to encircle it by making offers for talks, but we are rejecting [such talks], and we will only be satisfied with the overthrow of the regime.

Change of Regime Analyzed

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 32-33

[Text] In the previous issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi and Muhammad 'Ali Haytham spoke about the view which the opposition in South Yemen has of the events and developments that have happened and are happening there. The two men stated their opinion of the policy and the directions which the ruling Marxist party in Aden was taking.

Today, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI continues its review of the positions of the opposition groups. It is publishing an interview with 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahyub, member of the command of the Ba'th Party in Yemen. Mr Mahyub expresses his opinion about the situation in South Yemen and the change which culminated with President 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il abandoning his post in the party and in the government. President 'Ali Nasir replaced him. Mahyub also states his opinion of the establishment of a coalition for the opposition and the drawing up of a charter for it.

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Yemen played a prominent role in the national struggle movement against British colonialism in South Yemen and against the regime of the Imam in North Yemen.

After independence the party found itself with other national groups in the position of opposing the policy of the National Front and then that of the ruling socialist party. It was this policy that involved this dear part of the Arab homeland in international struggles and tied it to the wheel of a specific international camp as well as to a lack of earnestness in achieving Yemeni unity.

Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahyub member of the command of the Ba'th party in Yemen spoke to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI about the opinion and the directions the party was taking vis-a-vis the recent events in South Yemen and in the aftermath of the formation of the National Coalition of Patriotic Forces there. Excerpts from the interview that took place between him and our correspondent in Baghdad follow:

[Question] Can the change that occurred recently in Aden be considered something advantageous to Arab independence from international camps?

[Answer] The events that culminated in Aden with the removal of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il were the result of cumulative events and struggles inside the ruling socialist party. They go back to July 1978 when the various parties cooperated to overthrow Salim Rabi' 'Ali and to kill him.

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The struggles continued to take various forms afterwards. These struggles were manifested by shakeups within the leadership and the staff of the socialist party. The situation was the same internally where conditions were deteriorating daily and the repressive notion as a method of dealing with various national opinions and trends in South Yemen was prevailing. On the Arab scene these struggles were manifested by the Aden-Soviet treaty which established South Yemen as a base for foreign forces; and they were also manifested in the agreement that Aden had with Mengistu, Ethiopia's strong man. According to this agreement Aden was turned into a manpower center for shoring up the Ethiopian regime against the aspirations and the will of our Arab people in Eritrea.

Everything that has occurred and everything that materialized was a foregone conclusion and was to be expected. These events were postponed 2 months since the situation was supposed to have exploded last February.

The simplest indication of this vicious repressive campaign against the fighters of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, whose numbers in the prisons of Aden have reached 400 prisoners, is the fact that 18 of them were to be tried in secret trials that began early in January 1980.

All this was a clear indication that the parties to the government had reached a dead end. Consequently, one party had to settle the situation against the other party.

Awaiting the Course of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad

[Question] What are your expectations of the new political leadership there under the leadership of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad?

[Answer] 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il immersed himself in hard-line positions and in the practice of terrorism. At the same time we find that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has given himself a distinctive style that became known for its moderation on the domestic scene and on the Arab scene.

If 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il represents the hard-line stage on all levels, we are awaiting what the course of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad will produce.

We think that matters are not to be judged by intentions, but rather by practical concrete positions. There are several questions in front of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad today: there is the question of democracy; the question of the detained Ba'th party members; there is the question of thousands of prisoners; of deteriorating conditions; the question of Yemeni unity; and [the question of] freedom to travel and to assemble.

Our evaluation of the new conditions is based on settling these questions so that the method of treatment may become a practical test of the new policy of Aden.

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On the Arab scene, bringing Yemen out of a cycle of haphazard conduct, and hard-line and overbearing positions in many instances--such as making relations between Aden and Baghdad more critical--does in our opinion constitute an actual test of the new trends.

On the international scene we are awaiting [a shift in] direction towards the independence and sovereignty of South Yemen and towards the removal of foreign bases and the preservation of Yemeni dignity.

We are naturally against international imperialism, and chiefly that of the United States of America. But this does not at all mean falling into the snares and the plans of other forces regardless of their identity.

Inasmuch as the head of the current regime adopts a democratic, Arab and independent course, such a course will be met by understanding from the other parties and a realization of the true intentions, the moderation and the openness of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

Will a New Karmal Appear?

[Question] These are your hopes as a patriotic Arab for South Yemen and for the political leadership there. But do you believe that the Soviet Union can easily give up its position of influence there?

[Answer] The distinguished location of South Yemen constitutes a basic link in Soviet strategy in the Arab region, and especially in the area adjacent to the oil wells and to the approaches to the Red Sea and to East Africa.

Therefore, regardless of the changes that are made in people and in tools, after having shaped this area into a military and a manpower center, the Soviet Union cannot, practically speaking, but hold on tight to this area and strengthen its presence in it because it constitutes the spearhead in its policies and in its strategies. Hence, it would not be unlikely for the Soviet Union to bring a new Karmal to Aden.

[Question] A new Karmal just like what happened in Afghanistan. But do you believe that former President 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il gave up easily and that he will not return again?

[Answer] It is not possible for 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il to give up power as long as there is a breath of life in his body. As a result, using the logic of the repeated physical liquidations that we have experienced, he may try to return through the physical liquidation of his opponents. It is inevitable that he will kill or be killed.

[Question] Do you think that the regime in South Yemen is serious about achieving unity between the two sections of Yemen?

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[Answer] Yemeni unity is a deep-seated faith in the heart of every Yemeni. The history of the Arab people in Yemen has always been tied to a struggle for unity.

But when colonialism was thrown out of Aden in 1967, the National Front, which came to power at the time, strengthened the partition and established a state instead of fusing the two parts of Yemen into a single Yemeni state. The same course was followed by the Socialist Party which is now in power. The slogans that it is proclaiming now are no more than hot air for political consumption only.

They do not want unity unless it is under the leadership of the socialist party. This was affirmed by their resolutions and by their secret conferences. That is, they are working for the overthrow of the San'a' regime by implanting their agents there. Thus, the leadership of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was not serious about achieving unity.

Today, if the regime in Aden were to abandon the irresponsible programs of 'Abd-al-Fattah and his gangs in North Yemen; and if it were to make a diligent and a sincere effort for the establishment of unity, it would thus be offering preliminary indications that it was serious about achieving unity. We'll have to wait and see!

And here I want to affirm that unity can only be established on the shoulders of genuine advocates of unity and through the free exercise of the popular will, without maneuvers, political extortion and toying with the emotions of the public.

[Question] What is your view as a Ba'th Party leader of the opposition front that has recently been formed under the name the National Coalition of Patriotic Forces in South Yemen?

[Answer] I want to explain first that the national opposition to the separatist regime in Aden consists basically of those forces that were engaged in a political and a military struggle against British colonialism. This opposition with its various political affiliations has expressed its rejection of the Aden regime in various positions and methods. However, the predominant characteristic of this opposition is its diversity and its fragmentation.

Recently we have sensed that there was a serious inclination in the forces of this opposition to unify its ranks and its word and to amass its capabilities so it can move from the stage of waiting to that of confronting the separatist regime in Aden, adopting thereby all the forms and methods of struggle.

In the context of this inclination, the various groups of the opposition invited each other and met in Baghdad. These groups are: the United National Front, chaired by Mr 'Abd-al-Qawi Makkawi; the Yemeni Unity Front,

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chaired by Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haytham; the Liberation Front; the League Party, chaired by the late Muhammad 'Ali al-Jafari and Shaykhan al-Habashi; the 26 July Organization, the forces of the late Salim Rabi' 'Ali; the Popular Organization, chaired by 'Ali ibn Hadi; and a number of independent national political personalities and various military trends.

This meeting is considered an important step on the course of the national struggle in South Yemen. It was the first time for the national forces to meet to confront the communist regime in Aden. The results that have been achieved bode well and indicate that there is a possibility that matters may assume a better shape and that greater action [may be taken].

The fact that various parties were able to unify themselves, after forgetting their differences and the negative occurrences of the past, in a framework that regulates their actions, which are represented in establishing the national coalition and its national charter, will have major effects when this is translated into practical terms.

We bless this step that has been taken by parties to the national opposition, and we affirm our interest in achieving positive results that would enable them to rectify conditions and establish truth.

We hope that the national conference that is to be held soon in Baghdad will place these forces on the correct course. We are looking forward to a democratic national regime that will provide all liberties, end the unusual situations and achieve for the people their sovereignty, their independence and their national unity.

Let me affirm again that the position of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party on the National Coalition of the Opposition and its new directions comes in the context of its clear and firm position on the prevailing conditions in Aden. Therefore, it looks with considerable satisfaction upon what the national opposition has been able to achieve to unify its ranks.

Having looked into the National Charter that was issued by the coalition and having sensed the earnestness and the interest of the various parties to continue the struggle the Ba'th party blesses, supports and strengthens all these steps.

We are with them with our hearts and with all the power we have. Today, they represent an important vanguard in the Yemeni national struggle. We hope that their actions will be crowned with success so that Aden will be Arab again.

[Question] The Ba'th Party is an effective force on the Yemeni scene. Can you give us a general picture about its political activities there?

[Answer] Ever since its early beginnings, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party in Yemen has played an important role in establishing labor unions and

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hence, the leadership of the labor conference, which bore a large burden in the struggle against British colonialism.

The infrastructures of the party joined the combat groups, and chief among them were the vanguards of the Popular Liberation War. The party made tremendous and large sacrifices, and its choice leaders, staff members and fighters died fighting for the principles and for achieving the objectives of the party and of the revolution.

After independence the members of the Ba'th Party continued their struggle to lay the foundations of democracy, to achieve Yemeni unity and to improve living conditions. They paid much for that. But they were not scared by acts of repression and terror, and they were not dissuaded by harassment and physical liquidations. They remained loyal to their principles and to the will of the people. They made tremendous sacrifices. The destiny of scores of them is still unknown. Not a day goes by when the prison cells of Aden are not opened to receive many of them.

Last June more than 400 members of the Ba'th party were arrested and subjected to various kinds of torture. Then they were put on trial. Unfair sentences were issued against a number of them, but 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il did not enjoy his oppression. He fell [from power] 2 weeks after those sentences were issued.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

ECONOMIC PROGRESS MARKED BY FORMATION OF CENTRAL BANK

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 May 80 pp 48-49

[Article: "Central Bank Will Help the UAE Avert Economic and Banking Upsets"]

[Text] The UAE is moving toward regulating and controlling its banking activity through the establishment of a central bank to take on the job of steering the UAE's financial policy. This will prevent the kind of banking and economic upsets that have occurred in the past few years due to the lack of so important a financial institution.

The UAE has recently entered a process of placing money, investment and banking policy under the direct supervision of a central bank. The basic articles and functions of this bank have been established on the basis of the experiences of the developed states in this field of activity with the aim of profiting completely from the errors and mistakes made in the past.

The UAE banking sector consists of 54 banks with a total of 420 branches. The goal of placing these institutions under the control of the central bank is to steer them toward participation in development projects. Another goal is to regulate and develop banking activity and place it on established principles which will protect it from any upsets.

The new banking measures including the following:

- Issuing new paper and metal currencies to replace the currency now in circulation beginning in 1981.
- Regulation of the positions of the banks so that the commercial banks will have a minimum of 20 million dirhams in completely paid-up capital.
- A requirement that all licensed banks will be listed on registers maintained by the central bank, which will establish the conditions and measures required for listing on these registers.
- No commercial bank will be permitted to open a new branch, change the location of a branch, or close a branch without obtaining prior approval from the board of directors of the central bank.
- A commercial bank can be deleted from the register and required to cease its activities under the following conditions: if the bank itself requests

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that this action be taken; if the bank fails to begin its operations within a period exceeding 1 year; if the bank declares bankruptcy or merges with another bank; if the solvency of the bank is threatened; or if the bank commits a serious infraction of the laws, regulations, rules, decisions and directives which govern its activity in accordance with the organizational provisions of the central bank. In addition, commercial banks are prohibited from conducting nonbanking activities.

This fundamental step in the banking sector possesses great importance in the UAE because it is the outcome of studies which covered a long period of time and dealt with the appropriate methods and means to put the country on the road to investment and sound economic development and eliminate the mysterious jumps which propel the country into inflation.

#### Importance of the Central Bank's Activity

The establishment of the central bank in the UAE was accompanied by a series of financial legislation approved by the Supreme State Council and the National Assembly as a part of the general budget plan approved last April.

Intensive deliberations have recently been held among senior officials for the purpose of selecting the members of the bank's board of directors. These members have been chosen from among experts who have proven their qualifications in the planning and development field, so that the board will be able to put the bank law into effect. This law actually consists of three parts: the law establishing the central bank, the law defining the central banking system, and the law governing banking functions. All of these are contained in 130 integrated articles which provide the bank with powers that will bring about complete coordination in monetary and financial policies.

The plan drawn up for the central bank provides for the establishment of the largest possible reserve of foreign currency. This will be accomplished by transferring the state's foreign currency revenues to the central bank to ensure the continued adequacy of the legal currency backing to meet the country's foreign currency requirements necessary for importation and exportation and to balance the country's international payments [accounts] with other states.

In addition, the bank will be assured of a large degree of monetary liquidity since UAE President Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan and his vice president have decided that Abu Dhabi and Dubai will contribute half their oil revenues, or approximately 30 billion dirhams, to the federal budget, and these funds will be placed on deposit in the central bank as the state banking institution.

Thus, the recommendations passed by the Federal National Assembly along with the general budget at the beginning of last month are viewed as the final link in a series of measures which are being prepared and implemented in order to rectify and regulate the financial situation.

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Observations of the National Assembly

After comprehensive discussions of the budget, the Federal National Council adopted seven recommendations pertaining to regulation of the financial situation.

Some of these recommendations expressed the National Assembly's great appreciation for the patriotic step undertaken by Abu Dhabi and Dubai in which they agreed to allocate half of their oil revenues to cover general budgetary expenditures. In view of this step, the assembly felt that the channeling of the emirates' revenues into the state treasury will help support the UAE and strengthen its progress toward growth and advancement.

The recommendations also state the following: "The assembly has observed that the budget has not been drawn up on the basis of a comprehensive plan for economic and social development. Therefore, it recommends that both short-range and long-range comprehensive development plans be drawn up along with an annual program for the implementation of each plan. The assembly further recommends that industry form the basic element for the creation of a strong economic base. Thus, the assembly hopes to see the formulation of a plan to open the way to industrialization in cooperation with the other Gulf states on the basis of integration rather than competition."

The Federal National Assembly expressed its view that raising the standard of living of limited-income persons should not be accomplished by providing aid and charity. It stated that the honorable solution to this problem lies in the creation of suitable job opportunities for these citizens. Therefore, the assembly recommended that a plan be drawn up to ensure that new work opportunities are opened for national labor and that these workers are trained to perform appropriate jobs.

During the comprehensive debate which took place, UAE finance and industry minister Hamdan ibn Rashid acknowledged the difficulties arising from inflation. He said: "The UAE is a state which is completely dependent on importation, and the existing industrial sector is inadequate. The government is working to remedy these deficiencies, increase social assistance, and support the prices of all foodstuffs and daily necessities based on a study which is currently under discussion. Another study has been conducted which establishes the percentage of new positions, stipulates a 50 percent increase in the budget of the armed forces and security forces, and calls for improvement of conditions in the cities and assistance for the municipalities."

With regard to Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's agreement to contribute 50 percent of their oil revenues to the general budget, the minister said: "The total amount has varied between 28 and 30 billion dirhams, which represents the actual federal revenues. However, these figures are just estimates of the income that is expected to come in."

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Picture of the New Financial Situation

Dr 'Abd-al-Malik al-Hamar, general director of the UAE Currency Fund, gave AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI a comprehensive picture of the state's new financial situation.

He said that the board of directors of the state's central bank will draw up all the details of the financial policy and supervise its application based on its delegated powers. The general director added: "The fact is that since mid-1977, we have suspended the licensing procedures for establishing new banks in the state. The currency board has announced on more than one occasion that all new license applications must wait for the formulation of the new policy currently entrusted to the central bank. Even though some exceptions have been made, these have not included foreign banks, but have been limited to national banks. Of course, this includes both banks and branches."

The general director of the currency board also said: "The number of branches of foreign banks in the UAE will be reconsidered and only national or Gulf banks will be permitted to establish new branches. These banks must be built around specialization in banking activities which serve and advance all fields of development and construction. Examples of such banks include the real estate bank and the industrial bank, the latter of which will be allowed to be established in order to organize and develop industries, because for the coming decade the country needs an industrial institution concerned with the development, improvement and organization of industry. This is perhaps what is suggested by greater attention to the encouragement of industry in the interior."

The general director added: "Every central bank law stipulates that clear and detailed principles be drawn up for the monetary policy. Naturally, these involve some measures which require a sufficient amount of time. However, there are several measures in the text of the law which together constitute monetary policy. These can include, among other things, guidelines for developmental policy. All these matters are decided by the bank's board of directors, as I said previously."

He also talked about the problem of economic stagnation. He said: "The problem of relative stagnation, or what some experts call financial and monetary confusion, have been a basic problem domestically. As is generally known, this problem developed from the failure of the previous currency board to adhere to the provisions and laws and to federal law no 2 of 1973. Every central monetary institution has a law, and the law establishes the framework in which action must be taken.

"The mistake which was made was that the currency board participated in commercial activities outside the scope of its authority, and this led to confusion. It also got involved in some unsecured foreign obligations and expansion of activities, and this led to the complications which confronted the country.

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"What the present administration of the currency fund has done is to work toward reapplying the exact provisions concerning its operation and powers as laid down in the aforementioned federal law. This law includes many sound guidelines which, had they been correctly applied from the beginning, would have prevented us from getting into the circumstances we got into.

"Of course, we cannot forget the foreign developments and influences in the economic and financial sphere which intensified the difficulties which persisted until 1977. At that time, the state hired a number of experts and implemented some basic financial measures which forced the banks to set aside a large financial reserve as local currency deposits and to regulate investment and interest rates, along with other measures and controls. These actions created a basic starting point and a financial system which restored the banks to a proper state of organization.

"From that time, the situation began to improve based on the policy which was put into effect under the supervision of the currency fund. The improvement was reinforced by the fact that the state took advantage of the world recession. It heeded the importance of regulation and concentration and maintained moderation in its spending. This led to a relative reduction of public spending and caused state spending to be confined to essential requirements without any waste. This in turn checked the difficulties.

"This combined with control over the activities and investments of the banks by the monetary board helped limit the scale of the recession. Thus, the inflation rate dropped from 35 percent to between 15 and 20 percent, noting that the natural rate of growth and spending usually varies between 7 and 8 percent. The rate of spending in some states does not exceed 2 percent."

Dr 'Abdallah al-Hamar continued: "It has been agreed that the oil revenues which are to be deposited in the central bank by Abu Dhabi and Dubai will be spent first and foremost on the federal budget of the state as approved by the Federal National Assembly, which amounts to approximately 16 billion dirhams. Part of the revenues over and above this amount for the current year, for instance, will be allocated to back the currency, and an additional amount will be allocated for foreign investments. However, after all possible attention and concentration are directed toward encouraging investments inside the country, we have federal projects whose expenses are covered out of government funds and these have first priority of implementation."

Reviewing the problem of steering Arab investments, Dr al-Hamar said: "We hope that additional investment in the various fields will be channeled into the Gulf and Arab states, because domestic investment provides a guaranteed future return which is much more significant than that of investment made abroad. The many crises, including the political and monetary crises, have taught us lessons which we hope will benefit us in the phases of coordination which must be developed among us in all fields. We do not forget the factor of security and stability which provides a complete

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safeguard for the development plan. For no matter how big the financial return from a project may be, the failure to provide security decreases its importance and lessens its benefits.

In this connection, he emphasized the importance of coordination: "This makes it clear that the establishment of effective coordination among the Gulf states is very important. We hope that there will be greater diversification in the area of foreign investment, and that this investment will be channeled toward the developing areas in the world. There are areas in various parts of the world which are abundantly open to such economic activities. Coordination now exists among the monetary authorities in the Gulf area through meetings in which Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman all take part. The purpose of these meetings is to study monetary policies and their impact on investment projects in the Gulf. These meetings have continued since the beginning of 1978. A certain amount of agreement has taken shape through a statistical publication which is distributed and through continuous consultations."

Dr al-Hamar qualified this by saying: "However, we must formulate an integrated plan for the future so that this cooperation can take on a fundamental and fruitful character. For without the formulation of an economic plan translated into a monetary and financial plan, it will be impossible to achieve our aspirations in this area.

"The financial and economic regulation movement appears to be strong, since the laws which have been passed are being applied and proposals for new and integrative legislation are being put forward. Examples of such legislation include a bill concerning the movement of capital, an investments bill, a bill pertaining to the prosecution of individuals who write checks without sufficient funds, an amendment to the law governing foreign agencies, and other bills which will help achieve integration in a sound economic structure for the state."

The workshop of regulation and development is still just beginning its work and momentum, and it is at the start of its commitment to achieve the requirements of a strongly established economic structure.

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WESTERN SAHARA

OAU SUMMIT CONSIDERED 'DECISIVE ADVANCE' IN SAHARAN CAUSE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 21 Jul - 3 Aug 80 p 54, 55

Article by Fode Amadou: "A Success for Saharans"

Excerpt Despite all Maneuvers, the 17th Summit Confirmed the Growing Isolation of Morocco

Meeting in Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, from 1 to 5 July, the 17th OAU summit was dominated, as were preceding ones, by the western Sahara question. And it marked a decisive advance for the cause of the Saharan people. In fact it was during this summit that Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Mali and Chad made public their decision to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). Consequently, OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo was led to point out in plenary session that 26 of the organization's 50 member states--that is, the majority--have recognized the SDAR. Under the OAU charter the SDAR should thus by right become the 51st OAU member. This was to be emphasized, following the summit, by Mohamed Abdelaziz, president of the SDAR Command Council and secretary general of POLISARIO.

However, with the support of a number of so-called "moderate" states--but whose "moderation" is a one-way street--Moroccan premier Maati Bouabid did his utmost to hide that fundamental result in a maze of procedural maneuvers, while once again brandishing the threat of his withdrawal and of the OAU's breakup. Such blackmail, though particularly sensitive in its effect on an organization concerned above all with preserving its still fragile unity, did not this time yield the results awaited. Indeed, the summit refused to decide the prior issue raised by the Moroccan delegation, and which, under the pretext of denying to the SDAR the character of a sovereign and independent state, in fact tended to replace a simple majority--sufficient for the admission of a new state--by a two-thirds majority, as required for fundamental political questions.

True, admission of the SDAR as the 51st member state was not solemnly proclaimed. But juridically, as soon as a state has given notice of candidacy and the latter has received the assent of the majority (or 26) of the members, membership follows automatically after a simple administrative proce-

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cedure. The fact that this interpretation is opposed by Morocco and a few of its supporters, who act as if nothing had happened at Freetown, cannot for long deceive.

What has emerged with evident clearness is the ever growing isolation of the Moroccan kingdom, and the ever broader and clearer condemnation of an expansionist policy which tramples underfoot the inalienable right of a people to its existence, sovereignty, and independence, while at the same time constituting a challenge to Africa, whose leaders have ceaselessly recommended a peaceable solution of the Saharan conflict. In this regard, the speeches by Presidents Samora Machel and Didier Ratsirika, Premier Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe--whose appearance at the rostrum was one of the high points of this summit--and Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Benyahia, were particularly firm and convincing.

Pressure was so strong that, after President Senghor's motion to convene an extraordinary summit was submerged by indifference, the Moroccan delegation had to make a show of endorsing the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, which were solemnly confirmed by the summit. That committee, whose mandate was renewed for 3 months, and which will henceforth meet under the chairmanship of President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, not only "earnestly requested of Morocco the immediate withdrawal of all its troops and officials from the region of the western Sahara evacuated by Mauritania," but insisted on the need for a general cease-fire to permit the Saharan people freely to determine its own future. By discreetly taking note of "Morocco's determination to enter into discussions with all interested parties and participate fully in the work of the ad hoc committee"--which Rabat has up till now boycotted--the summit has backed Hassan II to the wall.

The future will soon tell whether Morocco will finally abandon its vain dreams of hegemony, and truly wishes to attain a just and lasting peace, or if on the contrary its retreat is but purely tactical.

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