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JPRS L/9349 15 October 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 40/80)



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15 October 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 40/80)

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CITIZENS SURVEYED ON CIVIC ATTITUDES, INVOLVEMENT

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Sep 80 pp 106-117

[Article: "Peace, Order, Cleanliness"]

[Text] Under Helmut Schmidt's government the FRG has progressed like an efficient industrial enterprise. Citizens' attitudes have not kept up with the progress. Peace is considered the first civic duty.

The Germans are proud of the political system of their state, which in their opinion is democratic, efficient and liberal. But that is more or less the extent of their interest in politics. The large majority votes and is silent—that is the result of the 1980 CAPITAL survey, which was conducted by the Mannheim political science professor Dr Rudolf Wildenmann. What is the political perception of the average citizen according to this representative opinion poll? He sees himself, whatever he means by it, in the center. He does not want to be on the "left" or on the "right." Accordingly, his political attitude is leaning toward forced restraint.

After all, he does not lean toward extreme views. Signing a petition, perhaps even joining a peaceful demonstration, is the highest expression of his feelings. Wildcat strikes, occupying houses, clashes with police-all these things he rejects as violent means of pursuing political trends. He has little sympathy for the small group of those who take part in these things.

So much for his relationship to unconventional attitudes. And his conventional attitude: He reads the political part of the newspaper and perhaps he attends an election rally. But that is all.

This average citizen expects three things from the state: --peace and quiet for his personal environment;

- --order in society:
- -- cleanliness in the state.

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In this country, citizenship is still interpreted as being obedient to those in government. From this point of view, public order is more important than civil rights, laws must be observed even if one thinks that they are unjust. The interest of the whole nation is the foremost guideline for political actions, demands on the government by special interest groups are detrimental.

For the German, the Basic Law is the best democratic order imaginable. He accepts Parliament as a controlling authority. In case the parliamentary control should fail, he ascribes the function of an emergency brake to the Federal Constitutional Court. There are few doubts about the correctness of its decisions. On the other hand, appreciation for the government opposition is rather limited: The opposition, according to the FRG citizen, should not criticize the government but support its work. Nevertheless, he does not want greater personal influence on government decisions either.

He strongly disagrees with the statements made by politicians on decisive current questions. For instance, he supports nuclear energy, he believes that the terrorist laws have not restricted civil rights. And again: Maintaining peace and order is the most important thing; it is more important than fighting inflation or protecting the freedom of speech.

The Political System: Comfort

According to the ways of thinking among leftwing Social Democrats, the FRG is a capitalist class state. The criticism of leftwing liberals is: The FRG is an authoritarian legalistic state. If that were so, the citizen would have to regard the political system with reservation and be at odds with the state of democracy.

Less than 5 percent of the Germans are indicating aversions of this kind. In other words: The population is satisfied with the democratic system as it was constructed in 1949 by the fathers of the constitution, 26 percent are even very satisfied. From the outward appearance, this opinion also signifies political timeliness. Germans see the economy in rosy colors. In spite of 800,000 unemployed people, the labor market is considered to be in good shape. The German mark enjoys strong purchasing power. Compared to foreign countries, the inflation rate is sensationally low. Strikes? In this country they are a rarity. Political violence? Restrained, so it seems. In the FRG there is peace, order and contentment.

It is equated with a productive system, as produced by its institutions and the appreciable manner in which it benefits the individual. As was already demonstrated by the 1978 CAPITAL survey—topic: The New Nationalism of the Germans—the pride in this functioning system is distinct. Since then it has become even more pronounced.

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In other words, comfort wherever one looks. The state system provides a feeling of wellbeing. Nevertheless, self-contentment is not identical with democratic self-understanding. The majority is inactive when it comes to events; and it sounds almost like an apology when --64 percent say that they have no influence on politics; --70 percent state that their influence is limited to ballots; --72 percent indicate that politics is too complicated; --68 percent feel that politicians do not pay attention to "little people."

Incidentally: A relatively large minority, however, is of the opinion that it does have an influence on politics. This minority is also indicating involvement in parties, in labor unions, in citizens initiatives. It is also the reason why the interest in politics has generally grown during the last decade. Nevertheless, among the majority it is still considerably underdeveloped. To put it into words: As long as "those up there" are taking care of things, we will be more or less satisfied. To formulate it cynically: Stockholders trust the board of directors as long as the enterprise is flourishing; they go to the general meeting not to debate or to oppose but to reelect the administration.

In the same manner, 60 percent of the citizens are giving evidence of their confidence in the current government. Helmut Schmidt will take care of it: He is looked upon as the chancellor who can manage the economic future and handle crises. All that matters is order, all that matters is peace, even in foreign policy. Crises in the world, for instance, Afghanistan or Iran, are seen as a threat—to their own wellbeing. Because the more there is to lose, the more the possible loss is felt. And in the meantime, FRG citizens have a lot to lose—the pride in what they have is proof. Consequently, it is no surprise that during the 1980 election year questions concerning foreign policy are rated according to the following point of view: How do we get through this crisis unnarmed? It is so pervasive that even the danger of inflation, for many decades a topic among Germans, is now considered less important.

The conspicuous contentment cannot cover up the fact that there is a general lack of understanding for the system. The democracy is in good shape as long as the economy moves ahead: It must be a disturbing idea to think what might happen if the development moves in a different direction. At any rate, to date the safety valve has functioned: Governments that did not come up to expectations were voted out of office. Such a desire is currently not noticeable. Konrad Adenauer's classical slogan is timely: No experiments.

1

Loyalty to System

Question: Are you satisfied with the political system and the state of democracy in the FRG?

1980	<u>1979</u>	1978	<u>1977</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u> 1972</u>
Very satisf	ied				
26.0	21.0	19.5	17.6	19.2	20.6
Satisfied					
69.2	71.7	72.2	72.8	70.7	72.6
Dissatisfie	.d				
4.8	7.3	8.3	9.6	10.1	6.8

Data given in percentages. Standard values.

Political Self-Assessment: Center Field

The citizen is satisfied with the democratic system, which in his opinion is liberal, almost too liberal, and efficient economically. Accordingly, he also shows no inclination toward political radicalism. He represents, whatever he means by it, the center. He does not want to be on the "left" or the "right"—according to the slogans that have come into use, symbolizing political stands and which are used by politicians of all colors to battle one another.

In the analysis, what is "left" and what is "right"? It is a measure of self-assessments, which represent a mixture of emotions and ideas reminiscent of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer: First of all, everybody is what he thinks he is. And then: What others think of him. Whoever is asked about his political stand, indicates the intention of what one should be and the idea of what one is: In the FRG upper-middle class with slight variations.

An equally large number of voters, 36 percent, consider themselves "left of center" or "right of center." They are flanked by two wings, 10 percent who profess to be "leftists" and 18 percent who profess to be "rightists." The right wing is traditionally stronger. Altogether, this self-assessment has shown a slight but clearly visible shift to the right.

Among party supporters, the differences are more striking. Eleven percent of Union voters classify themselves as "left of center," 51 percent as "right of center" and 35 percent as "on the right." According to these

attitudes, the Union seems to be in the minority as far as the center is concerned, because almost all of the supporters of the coalition parties—the SPD and the FDP—consider themselves as belonging "left" as well as "right" of center. Extreme self—assessments among these people play an insignificant role.

Consequently, the Bundestag election is a battle for the center. If one wants to win elections, it is not enough to seek support among fringe groups if one fails to hold on to the center.

Using this spectrum for placing the candidates for the chancellorship, Helmut Schmidt and Franz Josef Strauss—as persons who are what others think they are: Then it becomes evident that Schmidt is placed in the "center" and Strauss on the "right." FDP voters are much farther removed from the Union candidate than many SPD voters are. The election statement which makes mention of a coalition with Strauss is therefore beyond any reality. The punishment would be a considerable loss of voters.

The figures on the right and on the left indicate that the polarization among party supporters is more or less marginal. Purely on a theoretical basis, a distinct "rightwing party" might count on a voter potential of 20 percent and a distinct "leftwing party" on a voter potential of 10 percent. There have already been frequent speculations about theories of this kind: Might a split of the Union into a "rightwing" CSU and a "right of center" oriented CDU increase the chance of an election victory? In view of the political stand of the population, these are risky speculations. As long as the SPD is not drifting to the left, such a split could take away votes from the center of the Union and add them to the present coalition. And in addition: It would destroy the unity of the Union and, along with it, split up the party system which has proven itself as a fundamental accomplishment of the democratic system in Germany.

The FDP, still undecided, cannot enter into a coalition with Strauss and also not with the Union as long as its position is leaning to the "right." If the Union would present itself as a more moderate center party in the future, there might be a possibility, as happened in 1974 under Helmut Kohl, of achieving a majority; at least, the liberals would consider it "acceptable for a coalition."

Such a change in attitude would certainly be necessary in the interest of democracy. There is very little appreciation among the people for an opposition that operates by ultimatum, whoever may be doing it. It is seen as a lot of "noise," and the voters have become indifferent to it: Criticism, even justified criticism, is not taken seriously.

Consequently, the government has not been locked in by the opposition, no more than by the coalition parties.

This factor and the self-satisfaction of the citizen represent a dangerous situation. A constitutional consensus exists, but it is only a form of conformity and conservatism: a "state conservatism" in a new form. It looks as if the 19th century is catching up with us and a government led by Social Democrats.

Choice of Position

Question: Political positions are labeled as progressive or conservative, as left or right. Where would you place yourself?

<u>Left</u>	Left of center	Right of Center	Right
All voters			
9.6	36.5	36.3	17.6
SPD voters			
15.4	52.9	25.2	6.5
Union voters			
1.3	11.1	51.7	35.9
FDP voters			
2.5	58.4	35.0	4.1
Voters of ot	her parties		
40.0	47.2	12.8	0.0

Data given in percentages.

Basic Democratic Positions: Loyalty to State

The contrast is glaring: Under the Schmidt government the FRG developed like a well-managed industrial plant; economically it is more efficient than ever. Citizenship has not made as much progress. In this country it is essentially still understood as being obedient. The attitude toward the "board of directors" is almost noncritical.

Actually, it should hardly be expected and yet it is so: The population's faith in the government is stronger today than it was at the time of Konrad Adenauer. To be sure, Parliament is fully recognized as the controlling authority. But criticism is not part of this ideal picture: The opposition should not "complain," but it should support the government. From this viewpoint, public order is more important than civil rights, compliance is the first duty of the citizen.

Such an opinion implies that laws must be kept even when they are thought to be unjust. Such an opinion reflects the view that demands on the government by special interest groups damage the public welfare.

Basic positions of this kind are equally dominant among supporters of both candidates for the chancellorship and produce the same reactions: Whoever complains, falls into disfavor. No wonder that such a noncritical attitude among the rather critical young generation of voters is interpreted as "threatening."

The democratic understanding, based on the constitution, shows clear contours. Accordingly, the opposition is the possible government of tomorrow, minorities must be respected and protected, conflicts are to be settled openly, freedom of speech must prevail. According to the verdict by voters, that is the way it has to be. Naturally, the constitution is the best conceivable order. But within the framework of the constitution, everything has to be "orderly," please: If there have to be discussions, there should be as few as possible, and above all no "agruments."

Considering this faith in the government, the reputation which is enjoyed by the Constitutional Court is almost conclusive. The highest court is seen as the protector of the constitution, an attitude which is almost indisputable. In spite of criticism of individual verdicts—most of the time it is voiced only by those who are affected anyway—its decisions are sacrosanct. This competency does not only apply to legal questions; increasingly and without hesitation, judges are permitted to make important political decisions as well.

As far as the relationship between the government and the Constitutional Court is concerned, the following applies: It is hoped that nothing will happen; but if the government makes a mistake, it is up to the judges to keep it in line. The question remains, who is going to control the "controllers" in Karlsruhe? The answer is given by the question itself: The population is satisfied with a symbolic confidence in the highest German court, which is entrusted with more and more important political decisions.

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Constraint by System						
Question: Do you agree with these	All vo	ters	Schm suppor		Stra suppor	
opinions?	Yes	<u>No</u>	Yes	<u>No</u>	Yes	<u>No</u>
Our Bundestag is doing everything to control the government effectively.	85	15	88	12	84	16
Task of the oppo- sition is not to criticize the gov- ernment but to support it.	70	30	71	29	67	33
Our constitution is still the best conceivable order.	96	4	97	3	95	5
One should comply with the laws even when one feels that they are unjust.	87	13	87	13	90	10
If Bonn acts against the Constitution, the Constitutional Court will prevent it.	85	15	85	15	87	13
The interests of the entire people should always take precedence over individual special interests.	93	7	93	7	92	8
Demands by special interest groups dam-age the general wel-fare.	67	33	67	33	68	32
If public order is endangered, the citizen loses his right to strikes and demonstrations.	73	27	69	31	78	22

Data are given in percentages.

On Political Attitudes: Forced Restraint

What is the state of the political consciousness in the FRG? It can be measured by questioning the citizen about his attitude toward conventional conduct, for instance, attendance of election rallies, and unconventional conduct, for instance, participation in wildcat strikes.

The results are as follows: Conventional conduct is well distributed, unconventional conduct is almost nonexistent. In Germany, democratic attitudes represent forced restraint.

When it comes to attitudes, five real types can be distinguished; they were first modeled by Prof Edward Muller, Tucson, and Prof Dr Max Kasse, Mannheim. The profiles of these prototypes are very different from one another, and the size of the groups representing each type has remained relatively constant for a long time.

More than one-fourth of the voters are "inactive." They are farthest removed from all politics, conventional as well as unconventional. They are only minimally informed. If they decide to do something "political," at best it is signing a petition, most of the time only when it is in their own interest. Nevertheless, they carry political weight, because during elections they bring in the bulk of the votes, benefiting the Union more than the coalition.

Approximately 5 percent of the population, partly from the circle of the "protesters" and partly from the circle of the "activists," are willing to engage in violent actions for the sake of politics: Measured by events in foreign countries, it is an insignificant minority.

"Conformists," 21 percent of all the voters, show a lively interest in politics. They are well-informed, are active in a conventional manner but inactive in unconventional ways; they go as far as signing petitions.

"Reformers," 21 percent of all voters, are different: Like "conformists" they are interested but they go a step further; on occasion they are willing to demonstrate peacefully.

The "protesters," 17 percent of all voters, are a peculiar category. They dislike spending the time necessary for arriving at a factually oriented decision. They are saving the effort and prefer to demonstrate right away. It appears that they are more comfortable in "crowds" than during critical discussions: This behavior type is frequently represented in citizens initiatives.

This attitude definitely contradicts the image of the ideal citizen. To be sure, protesters do not want to do without active participation in politics, but they prefer to act rather than being confused through information.

Finally: The "activists," approximately 15 percent of the voters. Altogether, they are very well informed and ready for action. They have the most highly developed political consciousness, and they are the member reserves for the parties.

Question: How do you inform yourself politically and in what political actions would you participate?

Sie teilnehmen?	Inaktive 6)		a) Lese Zeitung:	1		-	e) unterschreibe Petitionen.			26%	
Verhaltensweisen. 1) Frage: Wie informieren Sie sich politisch, und an welchen politischen Aktionen würden Sie teilnehmen?	Konformisten 5)	Constitution of the consti	a) Lese Zeitung;	diskutiere mit b) Freunden;	c) besuche Wahlveranstaltungen;	unterstütze Politiker:d	e) unterschreibe Petitionen.	1	ı	21%	
Verhaltensweisen. $^{ m 1)}$ ch, und an welchen politische	Reformisten 4)		a) Lese Zeitung;		c) besuche Wahiveranstaltungen;	unterstütze Politiker;	e) unterschreibe Petitionen;	f) demonstriere.	١	21%	
formieren Sie sich politis	Protestierer 3)		a) Lese Zeitung:	-	1	(p -	e) unterschreibe Petitionen;	f) demonstriere;	g) beteilige mich an politischen Streiks.	17%	nformation und Aktion.
Frage: Wie inf	Aktivisten 2)		a) Lese Zeitung;	b) diskutiere mit Freunden;	c) besuche Wahlveranstaltungen;	d) unterstütze Politiker:	e) unterschreibe Petitionen;	f) demonstriere;	B) beteilige mich an politischen Streiks.	15%	7 Typologie nach Aktivität bei Information und Aktion.

Key:

- Conformists
- 6. Inactivists f. Demonstrate
 7. Typology according to activity g. Take part in political strikes with regard to information and action.
- 1. Types of conduct
 2. Activists
 3. Protesters
 4. Reformers
 5. Conformiate
 6. Support politicians
 6. Sign petitions
 7. Sign petitions

 - e. Sign petitions

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On Basic Political Question: Stand

What politicians say and what voters think are two different things, particularly with regard to those basic questions that affect the citizen directly. He is not able to perceive doubt and skepticism when his own personal environment is concerned—it is almost already a security complex.

The most important thing to the citizen is the maintenance of peace and order in the country. It has a much higher priority than, for instance, the fight against inflation or the protection of freedom of speech. Accordingly, a clear majority is of the opinion that the terrorist laws do not at all restrict civil rights too much; only 10 percent feel that they are a threat to the constitutional state.

At first glance it seems frightening that 50 percent of the voters want the death penalty for terrorists. When looking at it more closely, it becomes apparent that there has been some "progress": 10 years ago, as many as 2/3 of the population were still in favor of the comeback of the guillotine.

In keeping with the thought of security is also the fact that the Federal Government ought to play a larger role in managing the economy. Almost 60 percent of the voters are in favor of it—but only for the benefit of the individual and not in the sense of nationalization. Just as much, nuclear energy is seen as security—providing for the future in energy policies. Only 5 percent of the population are opponents of nuclear energy.

The state may interfere in the personal environment of the citizen wherever it is to his advantage but not where his privacy is to be preserved. A clear majority, more than 80 percent, is in favor of letting women make their own decisions concerning an abortion. In this question, differences in party policies became apparent. A rejection of this opinion can be found more frequently among Union supporters than among supporters of the coalition parties. Nevertheless, only one-fifth of all Union voters is registering an opposing viewpoint in this matter. It is an indication that there is a strong desire for self-determination in the private domain. In this area the following opinion is prevelant: Freedom of movement, whatever its interpretation, is more important than anything.

Opinions of this kind are more than simple ritual answers to certain problem areas. Naturally, it is the reaction to values which touch the central interests in life or even reach into the depth of the soul. But the priority that is accorded to these problems rounds out the picture of orientation and attitude of the 1980 voters: They produce, they consume, they go on vacation, on the whole they are satisfied and—leave politics to the parties and the government. Whenever "politics" is

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protecting and preserving the everyday life, as it happens to be at any given time, it is welcome; beyond that it enjoys only moderate interest.

Certainly not a "state of night-watchmen" but also not a vital democracy. Nevertheless—this is also a privilige of the FRG constitutional order. In contrast to other places, there is no obligation to participate in politics. The citizen has the freedom to remain aloof.

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Concept of Order

Question: Do you agree these opinions?	with	Agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Disagree Disagree
Development of nu- clear energy should	Schmidt supporters	41	38	16	5
be continued to guarantee our future energy supply.	Strauss supporters	59	30	8	3
The government should	Schmidt supporters	17	41	32	10
play a larger role in managing the economy.	Strauss supporters	20	32	29	19
Women should be able to make their own	Schmidt supporters	58	26	10	6
decisions on an abortion.	Strauss supporters	40	23	17	20
Because of terrorists, civil rights in Ger-	Schmidt supporters	10	28	38	24
many have been re- stricted too much.	Strauss supporters	, 11	25	32	32
Question: In your oping how urgent are these properties.	nion,	lst choic	2nd e choic	3rd e choice	4th choice
Maintenance of	Schmidt supporters	s 42	24	15	19
peace and order in this country.	Strauss supporter	s 57	25	10	8
	Schmidt supporter	s 28	3 32	27	13
The fight against rising prices.	Strauss supporter			24	11
5 A.L.	Schmidt supporter	s 20	20	29	31
Protection of the right to free speech.	Strauss supporter		7 20	33	40
More influence by	Schmidt supporter	s 10	24	29	37
citizens on govern- ment decisions.	Strauss supporter	s	7 19	33	41

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Data given in percentages.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

AGING POPULATION, LOW BIRTHRATE SEEN AS REQUIRING SERIOUS STUDY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22 Aug 80 p 21

[Article by Guy Durand, economics professor: "Population: the Blind Left"]

[Text] For the fifth consecutive year, the population growth has not reached generation-replacement levels. But this issue has still not become the topic of a major national debate. It only crops up in discussions on abortion. A problem and a tradition lie behind this lack of interest. The problem is related to the fact that population trends are imperceptible changes which are most often noticed only when the situation has passed beyond the point of recovery. The tradition involved, a tradition of the left, is even more serious: the progressives are not interested in demography. So they abandon the subject to people for whom it is only a pretext for speeches on power or for moralizing sermons. It is essential that the left include the following facts in its thinking.

The French population has not reached replacement levels since 1974. To replace itself 100 women would have to give birth to 210 children. This figure, larger than 200 (two parents, two children), is based on the percentage of boys and girls born (105 boys to 100 girls), and on the rates of female mortality from birth to menopause. Even if female mortality were eliminated, it would still take 205 children born to 100 women for the generations to be replaced. Now, 100 women give birth to only 183 children. In these conditions, the decline in population and the pronounced aging of the population will be the determinants of our future. This long-term trend has escaped the attention of most of our contemporaries, because it is masked by two deceptive appearances.

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- 1. The increase in the total number of the population by 0.3 percent in 1975. With 1.8 child produced per woman, this slow growth would continue until about the year 2000, because of the mechanical inertia of the population and because the large numbers of women born after the war would be in their fertile years. Starting by the year 2000, though, we would find a slow decline, with the present population level being reached by about 2030. But within this population, the proportion of people over 65 would be 19.5 percent, instead of 14 percent, as it is today. The slight present population growth, an apparent sign of good health, has caused some confusion between the overall increase in the number of French people and the replacement of generations. Our population is like a lump of coal which is being consumed from within: while for the time being it keeps its volume intact, it will begin to crumble all at once.
- 2. A slight youthful trend in the composition of the population since the smaller generations born between 1915 and 1919 are now reaching retirement age. This younger trend is a very temporary phenomenon. The number of births in 1979 (750,000) is slightly higher than the number of births in 1978 (736,000) and in 1977 (745,000), but these are only very relative fluctuations, without any significance. In reality, France is now moving into a situation with low birthrates and an aging population. Announcing an improvement in this situation is quite foolish, given the low levels to which we have fallen: the lowest in the history of the French population in peacetime.

We are now going through the euphoric phase of the lowered birthrate. The annual savings in the budget [because of the low birthrate] are estimated at 6 billion francs (according to J.-C. Chesnais of the INED [National Institute of Demographic Studies?]). These savings come from the decrease in allotments paid for births, from the reduced family allotments because large families with three or more children have almost disappeared, not to mention the schools that don't have to be built, etc. The money thus being saved is not being used to prepare for our future lean years, though; it is being wasted, burned up in the gasoline tanks of our cars. So the future is being deliberately sacrificed to the present. This is a classic attitude, but a very serious one. Our future is now being written, year by year, in our birth records. Many reforms will be hindered or made impossible because of the lack of children. Children are now treated as undesirable and considered to be recruits for the future

ranks of the unemployed, while in reality, they will be the producers of our wealth tomorrow.

This situation leads to two particularly painful consequences. In the first place, the problem of being able to pay retirement pensions, for while wealth is distributed between social classes, it also has a dimension in time; it is distributed between generations, which are paired together. In a more general way, all of our social systems (social security, unemployment insurance) are based on ties between generations. In the second place, as there are fewer and fewer of us, we will also be older and very poorly distributed throughout our national territory. Entire regions, which were once inhabited, will be left like ghost towns. Not to mention the social frustrations involved, these ghost towns will demand huge financial burdens to maintain structures which are now too costly, but which are essential for those still left in the area.

Politically, it is the right in power which will have benefited from the good times of the lowered birth rate, and when the left is in power--it will have to get there one day--its planned reforms will be blocked by today's lack of concern and lack of courage. Our present good times will turn out to be very expensive.

Based on these facts, reactions may naturally differ. It is paradoxical but true that while almost everyone agrees about the objective of maintaining a generation-replacement level, no one will openly dare to admit a pro-natalist position. This timidity has caused serious harm. The conservatives advance moralistic explanations for the decline in the birthrate, but propose strictly financial solutions. And inversely, the left advances material problems but proposes very vague solutions of the "change in society" type.

The opposition between pro-natalists and anti-natalists should not be viewed in strictly black and white terms. About 200,000 third children are born, and it would take 60,000 to 70,000 more children to replace our generations. So, to remedy this, those families who decide not to have a third child because there are too many problems in their way could be given special aid to meet this minimum level. One way might be to take advantage of the job crisis to lengthen parental leaves at the time of the birth of a third child.

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In our frantic race to "change life," wouldn't it be wise not to forget life itself? If the avant-garde will not look to the future, who will? Let's study this issue seriously, and remember that, unlike a man, a population can grow younger, if we really and truly want that to happen.

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FRANCE

COUNTRY SECTION

PROPHYLAXIS AGAINST VIRAL HEPATITIS DESCRIBED

Paris MEDECINE ET ARMEES in French Aug-Sep 80 pp 495-502

[Article by: J. Demarchi, M.D., inspector, technical inspector of medical services, hygiene and epidemiology; C.Laverdant, M.D., chief of services, instructor at Val-de-Grace; J. Dutertre, chief of staff, chief of the epidemiology section, central administration of the Army Health Service; J. Hainaut, chief of staff, biologist to the hospitals, chief of the immunology-hemostasis service, Army Blood Transfusion Center: "Prophylaxis Against Type A Viral Hepatitis by Means of Polyvalent Immunoglobulins: Results Obtained in the Armies"]

[Text] We present here the results of a joint project that could not have been accomplished without the participation of a large part of the Army Health Service—in the administrative and supply branches as well as in the structures of the Service included in the units in France or in the field.

The use of immunoglobulins in prophylaxis of type A viral hepatitis dates from 1945, when Neefe and Stokes (8) reported on their effectiveness, and found it compatible with the development--under cover of the immunoglobulins--of an active immunization. Since then many studies have confirmed this point of view.

But an attempt at gamma globulin prophylaxis carried out in 1957 in 128,000 soldiers called up to serve in Algeria ended in failure. According to Hamon, Darbon and Colobert (5-2), who reported on its results, protection was manifested only during the first three months following the injection; past that period of time the number of clinical hepatitis cases was revealed to be higher, compressed by a cumulative effect, though it was slowed in relation to the usual peak of the seasonal prevalence curb.

A second trial, undertaken in Chad in 1970-1971 with 365 randomly distributed subjects showed the effectiveness of specific prevention during the first three months, whereas beyond that time morbidity was the same in the

Key words: A viral hepatitis; polyvalent gamma globulins; globulin prophylaxis; controlled trial.

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"prophylactized" groups and the control groups.

In the meantime, however, our American army colleagues in 1967 and 1969 conducted a trial with 107,803 soldiers stationed in Korea, and concluded that the administration of 5 milliliters of standard 16.5-per-100 gamma globulin contributed a passive protection for approximately six months, reducing by nearly 50 per 100 the morbidity from viral hepatitis in the total number treated in relation to the group receiving a placebo only (1).

The occurrence of many cases of type A viral hepatitis among French troops engaged in actions abroad in 1978 encouraged us to repeat similar attempts to achieve passive prophylaxis. Two trials were undertaken, under different conditions corresponding to operational imperatives, one in Lebanon with the relief contingent of troops put at the disposal of the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the other in Chad.

1. Lebanon

It was in March 1978 that the French government decided to put at the disposal of the UN a detachment of approximately 1,300 men to participate in operations to control the cease-fire that had taken place between the belligerents in Lebanon.

Viral hepatitis is not rare in that country, where during the winter of 1939-1940 Gaguiere (4) had described an epidemic affecting 54 French solders in a camp occupied by 1,200 men.

In the detachment that arrived on 23 March 1978, cases of A viral hepatitis appeared, beginning the 15th week of their stay, in a sporadic fashion that became epidemic after the 19th week, the number of cases reaching 10 to 12 per week. Among these personnel cases were observed until the 35th week after the beginning of the operation, that is to say, for the last cases, after their return to France (figure 1). A total of 99 cases being established in this population of 1,282 men, morbidity was 77 in 1,000, a significant value if one compares it to the highest prevalence observed up to that point, which concerned American troops in the Pacific in 1945: 45.9 in 1,000.

The entire first detachment was relieved in late September 1978. The employment conditions of the units providing the relief having to be almost identical, we proposed that before exposing the men who made up the units to such a risk, they receive a passive prophylaxis by immunoglobulins, following a "double blind" comparative method likely to answer that first question: Does standard gamma globulin prepared by the Army Blood Transfusion Center protect against the appearance of type A viral hepatitis?

A. Equipment and Methods

The list of names of the 1,273 personnel of various units designated to participate in the relief was established and the names distributed at random into three groups, A, B and C, using a randomized numbers table

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(Table I). The Chi-square: 1,202 for 10 degrees of freedom, shows that the homogeneity of the randomization was irreproachable.




Figure No 1.

Key:

- 1. Viral hepatitis in Lebanon
- 2. Weekly distribution of cases 9. November
- 3. First detachment
- 4. 23 March 78
- 5. July
- August 6.
- September

8. October

10. Controls: 215 subjects

11. Week

Simultaneously, in a laboratory safe from any indiscretion, the Army Blood Transfusion Center was preparing solutions of various globulins in flasks labeled A, B or C. These solutions were blindly subjected to titrations of anti HAV [type A viral hepatitis] specific antibodies by a radio-immunologic method (Havab-Abbott) carried out by another laboratory.

Solution A contains 165 mg per milliliter of polyvalent immunoglobulin prepared by the CTSA [Army Blood Transfusion Center]. The titers of anti HAV antibodies (expressed in dilution) of the samples drawn vary between 512 and 2,048, or a geometric mean of 1,024 (m = 6.93; s + 0.49).

Solution B contains 165 mg per milliliter of standard gamma globulin prepared by the Lille Transfusion Center. The anti HAV titers vary between 256 and 1,024: geometric mean of 512 (m = 6.24; s = 0.49).

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TABLE I

Units	Total			
0.1250	A	В	С	
No 1	311	308	124	743
No 2	34	35	13	82
No 3	53	56	22	131
No 4	50	56	25	131
No 5	49	50	21	120
Miscel- laneous	29	27	10	66
Total	526	532	215	1,273

Solution C contains no globulin and is without biologic activity.

The difference in the titers of lots A and B is not significant (t = 2.24 for 8 ddl [degrees of freedom]).

Before his departure each subject received an intramuscular injection of the solution corresponding to the group assigned to him. Departures were spread between 22 September and 24 October 1978. In the third month of the tour (from 22 December 1978 to 24 January 1979), each received a new injection of 5 milliliters of solution from the same lot that had been administered to him on his departure from France. The return home of this second detachment was carried out echelon by echelon between 23 March and the end of April 1979, and the personnel concerned were followed medically after their return to France as well as during their stay in Lebanon.

B. Results

Sixteen cases of type A viral hepatitis appeared in this second detachment.

No cases were observed among the subjects having received the globulin from lot A.

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One case was confirmed (in the sixth week of the stay) in a subject having received solution B.

Fifteen cases were recorded among personnel having received injections from lot C. These cases appeared between the sixth and 18th week of their stay (figure 1).

TABLE II

		A + B	С	Total
g: 1	Yes	1	15	16
Sick	No	1057	200	1257
Total		1058	215	1273

C. Discussion

We have seen that the average titers of solutions A and B were not significantly different from each other. Groups A and B, whose total numbers are practically equal and in which only a single case is observed, can therefore be combined in a single group, group A + B, which we will compare with group C, considered a "control" group.

All other conditions--individual sensitivity, individual or collective hygiene, exposure to the risk of infection, age, fatigue, etc.-being evenly distributed because of the random division of the individuals between these groups, only one difference (systematically introduced) between these subjects remains: injection of polyvalent immunoglobulin in the subjects in group A + B.

The smallest group includes the most subjects who are sick. The Fisher test shows that the distribution observed can only be attributed to chance once in 50,000,000,000 times (p = 2×10^{-11}), which attests to the reality of the prophylactic action of the immunoglobulin.

In group C the incidence of viral hepatitis is 15/215 = 0.0698, or approximately 7 in 100, comparable to that which crippled the whole first detachment (a non-significant difference, with chi-square + 0.145).

In the A + B group this incidence is below 1 in 1,000 (0.0009). Comparison can be made by the ratio 0.0698/0.009 = 73.88, that is to say the administration of immunoglobulin diminishes the incidence of epidemic hepatitis in the proportion of 74 to 1.

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Comparison by difference:

0.0698 --- 0.0009 = 0.0689

shows that of the 1,058 subjects having received the A or B globulin, $1,057 \times 0.0689 = 73$ cases of hepatitis have been prevented, which would have had to occur if they had received an injection of the placebo solution only.

Thus, one may answer the question posed affirmatively and conclude that under the described conditions the administration of polyvalent immunoglobulin, titrated in anti HAV specific antibodies, exercised a protective action against the clinical appearance of cases of hepatitis in the exposed subjects.

II. Chad

Unlike the controlled trial we have just described, the preventive action conducted with our troops in Chad represents merely an "observation situation."

Beginning in February 1978 France installed active troops in that country amounting to approximately 2,000 men.

A number of cases of type A viral hepatitis were manifested among these troops also, who were installed in a hyper-endemic region, as attested to by observations made on the Chadian national army in which cases appeared throughout the year, without a seasonal character.

No overall relief of the units engaged in that operation could be envisaged, which ruled out recourse to the methodology employed with regard to the troops sent to Lebanon.

On the other hand, while studies on the immunoglobulin prepared by the CTSA had just recently shown us their anti HAV antibody content, psychological reasons prompted us to undertake a preventive action with these globulins in these personnel. In fact we then posed as a basic hypothesis that a potential preventive action of the administration of polyvalent immunoglobulin was linked to the presence in this globulin of anti HAV antibodies.

For this reason we were proposing to undertake such an action by studying the immunologic status of the population submitted to this prophylaxis against hepatitis viruses and by following the incidental distribution of the personnel into three groups: those who had received no prophylactic injection before or during their stay in Chad (the control group); those who would receive the injection even though their stay in the endemic territory had already covered a more or less long period of time; lastly, those who would receive the injection before their embarkation or on the day of their arrival in Chad, thus before exposure to the risk of contamination.

A mobile team was sent there to draw a venous sample from all the soldiers participating in the operation for study of the serum antibodies, and then to administer an intramuscular injection of 5 milliliters of 165 mg/milliliter standard gamma globulin from the CTSA.

Beginning on the same date, all personnel assigned in France to go and take part in this operation submitted to having blood drawn and received an identical injection, and all subjects returning home at the end of their stay were compelled to submit to the drawing of blood.

The mobile team's intervention began on 21 October 1978. As it was the hope that the administration of globulin to subjects either in incubation or exposed to the risk in those active centers where 321 cases had been recorded (figure 2), would eventually mitigate the incidence of clinical cases, the mission was compared to a pumping action flooding the periphery of the fire, to limit its expansion.




Figure No 2.

Key:

- 1. Viral Hepatitis in Chad
- 2. Beginning of operation
- 3. Beginning of injections
- 4. April
- 5. May
- 6. June

- 8. August
- 9. February
- 10. March
- 11. Weekly Distribution of Cases

Between 21 October and 5 November 1,945 persons underwent withdrawal of blood on the premises and received an injection of globulin. Afterwards, despite the difficulties inherent in the mobility of the personnel, the drawing of blood and giving of injections was continued, first under the health service of the local detachment and later, after 20 December 1978, under the health service of the troop units stationed in France from which personnel were sent to take part in this operation.

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A. Results

The hepatitis cases grouped by ten-day periods according to the date they appeared clinically, are represented in figure 3.

Indicated in white are the cases occurring in non-"prophylactized" subjects; in hatching, cases observed in subjects having received the polyvalent globulin injection in the course of their stay in the endemic territory; in dots, those who had been protected before their departure.




Figure No 3.

Key:

- 1. Hepatitis epidemic in troops in Chad: chronological distribution of cases observed
- 2. A case without seroprophylaxis
- 3. A case with seroprophylaxis on location
- 4. A case with seroprophylaxis before exposure
- 5. May

10. March

6. June

11. April

7. July

12. Prophylaxis of troops previously

8. August

exposed

- 9. February
- 13. Prophylaxis before exposure

1. Cases without seroprophylaxis

If we consider the period between debarkation in the endemic zone and the date of the appearance of hepatitis in 268 patients having received no prophylactic injection, we find that the first cases appear at the end of one month of the stay and that their number

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increases in such a way that the mode is toward the third month.

CASES OF HEPATITIS
PERIOD BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND CLINICAL ONSET

CAS D'HEPATITE ISANS PROPHYLAXIE, DELAI ENTRE

EXPOSITION ET DEBUT CLINIQUE




Figure No 4

Key:

1. Cases

2. Days after arrival in Chad

The graph in figure 4 representing this phenomenon is adaptable to a Laplacian distribution with the mean 81.59 and the standard deviation 23.69. The mean of 81 days includes the incubation period and the no doubt variable period between exposure to contamination and its realization, and this phenomenon is characteristic of an endemo-epidemic epidemiologic mode.

Chad is known to be a territory hyper-endemic for hepatitis where, in 1976 for example, 11,506 cases were confirmed among the civilian population (4,000,000 inhabitants).

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In the first units engaged in the operation, from the beginning of March to 1 September 1978, 133 cases were observed among 1,852 men, which is a morbidity of 72 in 1,000. After that it is impossible to calculate morbidity, replenishment of troops having been accomplished in small fractions.

Circulation of the virus was very active, as demonstrated at the Research Center of the Army Health Service by means of electronic immuno-microscopy in 7 cells out of 30 collected on location from subjects in good health (3).

2. Cases having received immunoglobulin before departure

In 2,360 subjects filed and followed having received the gamma globulin prophylaxis before any exposure to the risk involved in their stay in the endemic zone, a single case was observed, which corroborates our findings in Lebanon.

3. Cases with prophylaxis on location.

If gamma globulin protects when administered before a massive contact with the virus, one might wonder about their effect when used even in the heart of an endemo-epidemic center.

HEPATITIS CASES (WITH PROPHYLAXIS PERFORMED ON LOCATION)
PERIOD BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND CLINICAL ONSET

CAS D'HEPATITE (AVEC PROPHYLAXIE
MISE EN ŒUVRE SUR
PLACE)

EXPOSITION ET DEBUT CLINIQUE




Figure No 5

Figure nº 5.

Key:

1. Cases

2. Days after arrival in Chad

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In the 2,350 subjects concerned in the operation carried out on location, 67 cases of hepatitis were observed afterwards. But here the distribution of these cases in terms of the date of arrival in the territory takes on a quite different aspect from that which we pointed out for the cases without seroprophylaxis: the curve is asymmetrical to the right, adaptable to a diminution curve which is called negative exponential (with -0.021 days the coefficient of determination is 0.894). Such a diminution could represent the fact that after the globulin is administered—on location or among the new arrivals—the subjects likely to present a clinical episode constitute a stock that is no longer being renewed.

It should be noted that between June and November 1979 seven new cases were observed, although the practice of injecting gamma globulin before departure had been maintained. Investigation showed, in fact, that 5 of the 7 subjects, although they had properly received a globulin injection before or during their first stay in Chad, had been exempted from it before their second departure, because the instructions had been poorly interpreted. We will return to these cases later.

B. Clinical aspects

Thus, in 3,710 subjects who submitted to prophylaxis, there were 68 cases of viral hepatitis before the end of October 1978 and April 1979, for a morbidity of 14 in 1,000, clearly below that recorded during the six months before.

It still must be considered that at least 14 of them are carriers of one or more virus B markers. Among these cases 8 are probably cases recently infected with virus B, which is not rare in Chad (6), since they were carrying HBs antigen and HBc antibodies (7 cases) or only anti HBc (1 case). If we add that no marker makes it possible to reveal the existence of non-A--non-B virus, we can acknowledge that the figure of 60 cases of type A hepatitis is a maximum, which lowers the morbidity to 13 in 1,000.

All of those affected except one had already been in Chad from 2 to 22 weeks at the time of the immunoglobulin injection, and it can be admitted that the globulin was administered to them too late to exercise any protective power.

Finally, then, only one failure should be recorded: it involves the single man who, having received an injection of globulin before his departure from France, nevertheless presented with a hepatitis in the ninth week of his stay in Chad.

One might also wonder if, in subjects having received immunoglobulin and nevertheless presenting with a clinical hepatitis, the hepatitis is changed, alleviated or exacerbated?

Adopting the progressive classification of viral hepatites outlined by one of us (7), the following comparative table may be established.

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TABLE III

	General Case	Prophylac	tized Patients
	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Simple progression	66	55	80
Di- or polyphasic progression	33	11	17
Chronic progression	< 1	1	-
Serious, fatal form	< 0.2	1	-

C. Immunologic aspects

1. Carrying anti-HAV antibodies

It is commonly acknowledged that type A virus confers solid immunity after first contact. Therefore one may be surprised to find among the 68 patients studied, 27 subjects who had since early in 1978 been staying in either Djibouti or Lebanon, or even in Chad in April, May, June or July; these are hyperendemic zones where it appears to have been difficult to escape contact with this virus.

On the other hand, of 1,912 blood samples taken in France before seroprophylaxis among our young soldiers between the ages of 18 and 25, only 294 were revealed to be without anti-HAV antibodies, or a proportion $p = 0.154 (\pm 0.016)$ (14 to 17 in 100), which conversely gives a proportion of carriers of 83 to 86 in 100.

Under these conditions, how can it be explained that such a well-"protected" population can still give rise to contamination?

In fact, carrying anti-HAV does not seem to protect from a clinical attack. Of 56 serums drawn before the departure for Chad from subjects who would present with hepatitis later on, 37 contained anti-HAV antibodies, or a proportion $p=0.66\ (\pm\ 0.12)$, or 54 to 78 in 100. A quantitative study of the carrying levels is in progress.

In the current state of our knowledge, three hypotheses may be mentioned:

either that the anti-HAV antibodies are not in themselves the sole support of immunity;

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or that the virus is not unique in its antigenic qualities;

or that external conditions (massive contamination, fatigue, various stresses, parasitoses, etc.) break down the specific virus A-immunizing potential. It would still be necessary to explain why 19 subjects who in July were living right in the endemo-spidemic center and then sent home without having presented with hepatitis, contract the disease in November, after their return to Chad, when material living conditions have been improved.

2. Passive-active immunization

We sought to find out whether injection of gamma globulin enables acquisition of anti-HAV antibodies when there is repeated contact with the virus.

Of 208 subjects who were without anti-HAV antibodies at the time the first samples were drawn, 120 had such antibodies on their return to Chad four to five months later (p = 0.577 ± 0.069). One might think that after four or five months the organism would contain no more than a tiny quantity of the antibodies injected with the gamma globulin. Therefore, those specific antibodies that turned up after the tour of duty probably come from an active immunization process, but this process concerns only half of the subjects (between 51 and 65 in 100).

On the other hand, our of 33 of our patients who were the subject of a detailed serologic study, six were not carriers of anti-HAV at the clinical onset of their illness. But in two cases the immunoglobulin injection went back 15 days and in two cases 30 days. For the other two the injection dated respectively from six to nine weeks. So what had become of the antibodies injected into the first four, if their half-life is acknowledged to be from 20 to 28 days? It should also be noted that in two of these six patients the search for anti-HAV always remained negative.

It is in this context that the seven patients observed in July and November of 1979 must be considered. Two presented with type B hepatitis. The other five completed a second tour and had received globulin 280 to 330 days before their clinical attacks. It might be surprising that they had remained sensitive despite a stay of at least four months in a very infected milieu. Therefore it seems that even in the case of a repeated exposure to the virus, active production of antibodies does not necessarily take over from passive immunization.

Conclusion

In the theoretical domain the present work reveals that many questions remain to be resolved as to the pathology of type A hepatitis, particularly in the matter of the immunologic phenomena associated with this disease. and this is the object of the research still being carried by the Army Heal. Service.

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The controlled trial carried out on troops sent to Lebanon contributes the certainty that an injection of 5 milliliters of polyvalent gamma globulin rich in anti-HAV antibodies, such as those prepared by the Army Blood Transfusion Center, protects against the appearance of type A viral hepatitis.

Observation of the gamma globulin prophylaxis operation applied to troops in service in Chad does not contradict this finding, but it demonstrates that the injections of gamma globulin must be administered /before departure/ [in italics] for a hyperendemic territory if they are to manifest their full protective effectiveness.

The authors are especially grateful to chief physicians Aubry, Castera, Cavalia, Dupeyron, Gautier, Juglard, Laure, Lozac'Hmeur, Nourrit, Prevot, Salini, Sellier; principal physicians Grimaux, Hotellier, De Ressequier; doctors Becker, Colleau, Gril, Huet, Humbert, Marsan, Martet, Rio, Thomas.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ETA (P-M) TERRORIST ARESENAL INCLUDES FRENCH WEAPONS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Jul 80 p 17

[For related articles please see JPRS 76570, 7 October 1980, No. 1635 of this series pp 117-134]

[Text] Half a dozen aluminum kitchen pots, a couple of pressure cookers, 20 kilograms of "gum-2," several quartz watches and a dozen French- and American-made electric batteries were the arsenal used by the ETA (p-m) [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] to keep thousands of Spanish and foreign tourists in suspense for the past 15 days.

The bombs manufactured from these materials, according to the police, never contained more than 1.5 or 2 kilograms of "gum-2," "although the effect they had on the tourist population was worse than a volcano." The cooking utensils--metal pots and pressure cookers--were used by the terrorists, according to the same sources, to protect the bombs against weather.

Obviously the pressure cookers and pots must not have been hermetically sealed, or the FPA members may not have secured them properly. The explosive artifact placed by the ETA on the Mijas golf course, for example, did not explode because the battery got wet due to the storm which occurred some 15 days before the bomb was to go off.

A week earlier, the ETA bombs in Alicante and Javea went off an hour and a half after they should have according to the ETA (p-m) communiques. The police attributed this to the fact that the batteries must have been almost dead and the watches were beginning to run slow.

It is therefore believed at the Ministry of Interior that the explosive artifacts must have been placed at least 2 months before the ETA (p-m) announced its bomb campaign against the tourists.

The terrorist command which carried out the operation, the same sources say, is headed by Jose Aulestia Urrutia, who was the planner of the campaign of attacks on the Costa del Sol, Castellon and Alicante last year.

It is no accident, therefore, that the campaign against the tourist trade began exactly a year, but for 1 day, from the previous one, while the

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ETA (p-m) planned both last year and this to kidnap a UCD [Democratic Center Union] deputy--Gabriel Cisneros, last year, and Eulogio Gomez Franqueira, a month ago--in order to negotiate amnesty with the government from a position of strength.

"The terrorist command," the police have stated, "not only planned both terrorist campaigns from the South of France, but also made use of French subjects to place the artifacts. The bombs," these same sources say, "were also fabricated in France, since neither the batteries nor the watches are for sale on the Spanish market."

Under these circumstances, according to sources close to the Spanish government, there can be no doubt that there is at least tacit complicity with the terrorists on the part of the French government, given the freedom allowed the ETA movement in the Basque-French territory, where they plan attacks, train commando units, recruit activists and collect "revolutionary taxes." "Now then," a spokesman for the Ministry of Interior told CAMBIO 16, "while we have the hell of bombs on our beaches here, it is not illogical to presume that the terrorists are 'on vacation' at some point on the French coast."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

ENERGY PLAN EXAMINED AFTER 1ST YEAR, SOME SHORTCOMINGS SEEN

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 Aug 80 pp 28, 29

[Article: "Getting Away From Oil"]

[Text] One year ago, amid high-powered arguments, Congress approved the National Energy Plan (PEN). No less than 640 days had passed since the Moncloa Agreements had pinpointed the need for an energy policy, and it was more than 5 years since most of the western countries had realized the seriousness of the energy crisis and had begun to take drastic measures. The infant PEN was a long time being born. And in its first year of life the work has been piling up. "There is no other area of the administration where so many steps have been taken in one year. It is clear that the PEN is a top priority program," Luis Magana, commissioner of energy, has said to CAMBIO 16. And he added, by way of balance: "We are satisfied, although that does not mean that we are not having any problems in implementing the development of the PEN. Perhaps we could have saved a month or two in what we have done, but there are many complicating factors."

The left does not take such an optimistic view. "The government's PEN has made it clear that something which is very sickly from birth is incapable of dealing with the problems which should have been solved. If the energy situation was bad before, it is just as bad today," Javier Solana, the "energy man" of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] stated to CAMBIO 16. For Eugenio Triana of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] lack of foresight and inertia have dominated the government's actions on the PEN this year.

Regaining its health, the government's energy team has produced a report in which it outlines the completion of the measures taken by the PEN this year. There is still a long road ahead to travel before reaching the end in 1987, and before achieving the main objective of consuming 24 million less tons of oil, half of what is being consumed today. "To go from oil amounting to 68 percent of consumption in 1979 to 48.9 percent of consumption in 1985 is the overall objective which sums up all the others," says Magana.

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To achieve this, 1.6 trillion pesetas are going to be invested through 1983, at an average rate of 400 billion a year. This will mean keeping or creating some 125,000 jobs, especially in the areas of capital goods, construction, assembly and engineering, which should come out of their deep recession thanks to the PEN.

The nuclear field is where the Energy Plan has advanced most rapidly. Construction of two new nuclear plants was authorized in August 1979: Trillo (a 1,032 Mw unit) and Valdecaballeros (two 975 Mw units). Forty billion pesetas have already been invested there, and 1,000 persons have been employed at each location. It is predicted that in September the government will grant final authorization for Trillo II (where nothing has yet been invested), and later in November or December for Vandellos II (where investments of 25 billion pesetas have already been made).

"We do not know why they are authorizing these two new plants, since in order to justify them they will have to explain what increase in consumption is expected over the initial PEN. It does not appear from the data we have that they are going to be needed," Javier Solana said to this magazine.

"In the field of nuclear energy, elementary measures for safer technology have not been taken," states Triana. On this subject, the Commissariat of Energy has put a committee of experts in charge of issuing a report on the different types of nuclear technologies, so as to standardize the type of plant which is being built in Spain. The idea is to set up a "systems company"—as in France or Germany—which would unify technology and even be able to look for new markets (basically in Latin America.) "The Administration should decide on this point within a year," says Luis Magana.

The most striking item this year in the PEN is undoubtedly the accelerated plan for construction of coal-powered stations: There are seven plants (four using national coal and three using imported coal) planned for the end of 1984. This involves an investment of 146 billion pesetas, and will mean a saving of 6.4 million tons of oil each year. The decision on two new 550 Mw coal plants is expected to be made at the end of autumn. This involves a second group on the Almeria coast, and a plant in Ametlla (Taragona).

"The only significant positive element, the most effective one in the PEN, has been these coal power plants, which are compensating for the delay in other fields," says Eugenio Triana. For socialist Javier Solana, there is the continuing problem of the future of CARBOEX, a public company which will have to guarantee the supply of 70 percent of the imported coal. "There is a very great possibility that CARBOEX may invest in all the most expensive infrastructures and ports and later the private companies will benefit from this."

Another objective of the PEN, according to Magana, is to "do away with" the use of fuel oil (petroleum) in the generation of electricity within 4 years. Seven plants would be reconverted to coal, and another 20 (old ones, located in the centers of cities) would be left for 'reserves' to regulate the supply."

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Another method of getting away from oil is the plan for the reconversion of the cement industry, which has promised this year that 70 percent of the fuel oil it consumes will be replaced by coal within 2 years. To do this, investments of 20 billion pesetas are needed, of which 70 percent will be provided by official loans.

Through 1982 the Industrial Credit Bank will have a line of credit (6.12 billion pesetas in 1980) to finance the "stocks" of coal for steam power plants, while at the same time it will subsidize the transportation of coal from the coalfields.

In the area of hydroelectric power, a study on the exploitation of small waterfalls has reached an advanced stage. Some 800 "little waterfalls" would be able to produce up to 2,000 Mw in hydroelectric power (like the two nuclear groups, 8 percent of the energy which is consumed today) within 8 years if 200 billion pesetas are invested. The idea is to set up a Promotion Society for this type of waterfall power, with the participation of the companies for Regional Development (SODIS), provincial councils, savings banks, municipalities, companies and interested private persons.

"Nothing is being done to improve hydroelectric exploitation," Eugenio Triana criticizes. "And nothing is being done to establish pumping stations, which make optimum use of the main plants. If it had not rained so much this year, there would have been serious problems of supply."

On the subject of electricity, a bill is pending in Congress which would institute a compensation mechanism for the installation of electric power plants (as long as they do not use fuel oil or natural gas). It is estimated that if the bill is approved in September it could involve an amount of 20 billion pesetas in 1980, which will funadmentally benefit the provinces where the nuclear and coal plants are going to be installed. (The provincial councils or the autonomous bodies will collect the millions.)

As for natural gas, the PEN is hoping to complete the infrastructure work. A month ago the gas pipeline reached Castellon, in August it will reach Vitoria, and by the end of the year it is hoped that gas will arrive in Valencia and Zaragoza. Drilling continues in Jaca, and the minister of industry and energy has just stated that with the Serralbo deposits, consumption of gas in Spain, which today accounts for 3 percent of the total, can be doubled. For Eugenio Triana of the PCE, the "uncertain future of our foreign supplies, because of incompetent foreign policy," is a serious problem.

In addition to getting away from imported oil as much as possible and looking for crude oil in our own subsoil—Magana believes that 2.5 million tons could be produced in the near future—the energy authorities are trying to work on refining so as to be able to convert fuel oil into lighter products (Program FCC). To do this, 160 billion pesetas will be invested in seven "cracking" plants, which could mean a savings of 3.5 million tons of oil by 1984.

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"In the field of energy conservation, which represents a great source of energy, there are not enough actions and incentives," comments Eugenio Triana. The socialists agree. "We are one of the few countries of the OECD where dependence on oil has grown by a point and a half. Almost nothing has been done to conserve energy," says Javier Solana. However, the energy authorities state that they can point to the bill for energy conservation—which is now in Congress—and to the 10 billion which the Industrial Credit Bank has available this year for credits to companies which invest in conservation and self-generation of energy.

From Solar to Waste Power

When it looks at the new sources of energy, the left is unanimously critical. "Practically nothing has been done," says Solana (PSOE); "accomplishments in solar energy have been very scattered," notes Triana (PCE). In the first year of the PEN, construction of one solar energy plant has begun in Almeria (1 Mw), pilot projects with solar cells have been carried out (the latter at the Zarzuela palace) and the INISOLAR public company has been set up. In addition, work is going on in research into energy projects using wind, geothermal and tidal power (the latter with the English and Japanese in a 12-million-peseta project) as well as using material (a plant is being constructed near Madred--with 180 million invested--and another two are planned in Castellon and Alcazar de San Juan.) "All these are timid attempts; an overall plan is needed," states Javier

Summing up all this complex framework of actions in the field of energy in the course of one year, Luis Magana thinks that, on balance, it has been very positive. "A plan has been put forward, and very clear guidelines have been established. From now on it is more a problem of pace than of definition." However, the Left continues to think that "the PEN has not accomplished anything different from what had been done in the past."


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(1) Las inversiones en energía (2) (En millones de pesetas constantes, del 31-XII-79)									
(3) Destino	1980	1981	1982	1983	1980-83				
Carbón (4)	13.694	21.192	23.636	27.600	86.122				
Petróleo (.5.)	57.130	86.122	111.771	102.167	357.180				
Gases(6)	24.990	23.647	21.378	22.203	92.218				
Centrales: (7) Hidráulicas (8) De carbón (9) Puel-oil (10) Nucleares (11) Transporte, transformación y distribución (12) Otras inversiones (13) Electricidad (14)	27.772 3.516 97.431	16.464 55.244 1.733 97.265 61.959 11.076 243.741	16.237 76.948 1.384 73.582 65.936 13.336 247.423	14.802 77.616 1.342 93.622 66.259 15.595 272.236	63.011 237.580 7.975 361.900 256.829 45.007 974.302				
Ciclo del combustible nu- ciear(15)	5.386	3.632	3.317	2.820	15.155				
Conservación, investiga- ción y desarrollo de la energía(16.)	16.932	27.172	72.024	37.467	113.595				
TOTAL (17.)	329.084	405.306	439.549	464.483	1.638.572				

Key:

- 1. Investments in Energy
- 2. In billions of constant pesetas, as of 31 December 1979
- 3. Use
- 4. Coal
- 5. 0il
- 6. Gases
- 7. Plants 8. Water Power
 9. Coal
 10. Fuel Oil

- 11. Nuclear
- 12. Transportation, Processing and Distribution
- 13. Other Investments
- 14. Electricity
- 15. Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- 16. Conservation, research and development 17. Total



Key:

- 1. Less Oil, More Coal and Nuclear Power
- 2. Percentage of each in Spanish energy sources
- 3. Oil
- 4. Extremely dry year
- 5. Coal
- 6. Waterpower
- 7. Natural Gas
- 8. New Energy Sources
- 9. PEN Estimate

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