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14 November 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 46/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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CONTENTS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

Briefs		
Preelection Defense Request		1

SPAIN

Strategic Importance of Gibraltar to NATO 'Iberlant' Defense (Jorge Calvar Gross; DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 80)		2
Effect of NATO Admission on CSCE, U.S. Defense Relationship (DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 80)		9

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Neo-Nazi Terrorist Groups Interact With Arab Counterparts (Kathleen Evin; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 13-19 Oct 80)		12
New Book Traces International Arms Transfer Law (Romain Yakemtchouk; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Sep 80)		15

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Youth Surveyed on Political, Social Attitudes (Karen Andressen; STERN, 25 Sep 80)		17
--	--	----

FRANCE

PCF Changes Policy: Domination of Left Main Goal (Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 20-26 Oct 80).....		23
PCF Maneuvers Cost PSF, PCF Seats in National Assembly (Michel Chamard; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 6 Oct 80).....		26

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Defense Policy Update Reviewed in Extract (DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 80)	29
Draft 1981 Civil Aviation Budget Presented (AIR & COSMOS, 27 Sep 80)	36
CNES 1981 Subsidy Increased Considerably (AIR & COSMOS, 27 Sep 80)	39

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral Finds Soviet Naval Strength Exaggerated (David Watts; THE TIMES, 21 Oct 80)	40
Financial Paper Reports on New Torpedo Test Vehicle (David Fishlock; FINANCIAL TIMES, 6 Oct 80)	42

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PREELECTION DEFENSE REQUEST--Valery Giscard d'Estaing has asked that the technical drawings of the mobile missile that is to replace the Mirage IV after 1992, and the specifications for the new strategic submarines, be presented to him in January [1981]. Planned for mid-November, the defense council meeting has been put off [until January] so as to enable the new minister of defense, Joel Le Theule, to familiarize himself with the files involved. The president wants all these questions to be studied prior to the election. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Oct 80 p 25]

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF GIBRALTAR TO NATO 'IBERLANT' DEFENSE

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 80 pp 26-32

[Article by Jorge Calvar Gross, lieutenant commander in the Spanish Navy]

[Text] Even though we realize that history is subjective, we must acknowledge that the "maritime theater of the Strait of Gibraltar" has always been of enormous strategic interest. In England's longstanding battle against the Spanish Empire, its most important victories were not, as we might believe, against the "Great Armada" of Philip II in the English Channel, or at Trafalgar against Napoleon and his subordinate ally Charles IV, but rather the conquest of Jamaica, located at the very center of Spain's maritime trade in the Caribbean, and the occupation of the Rock of Gibraltar. With these two strategically decisive points of support in the hands of the adversary, the Spanish Empire was headed for disaster.

The Royal Navy's real domination of the world's seas could be said to have begun with the occupation of Gibraltar.

The Strait

The Iberian Peninsula is located at the juncture of two axes:

--A north-south axis that makes it either a natural bridge between Europe and Africa or a physical barrier between the two continents, depending on Spain's posture;

--An east-west axis that places it astride the unavoidable strait between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The two axes cross at the strait, which for this reason takes on an importance perhaps unequalled by any other region in the world.

In its east-west projection, the strait's importance stems from the fact that a powerful nation could, from its banks, control shipping. The ability to do this would depend on the location of its facilities, its weaponry and its instruments of detection.

A major percentage of the world's shipping (an average of 180 vessels a day, equivalent to 2 million tons) passes through the strait, and 95 percent of this shipping is among Western bloc nations.

The strait has its own personality, importance and significance. Its strategic importance makes Spanish naval action in it indispensable. The strait is a passage for the rest of the world; for Spain it is a permanent feature. This means that Spain must control it, though territorial possession should be the aim, because this could make the country a first-rate power, as history has confirmed.

Every naval operation requires a specific amount of maneuvering room, and since the strait covers a geographically tiny area, its theater must be viewed in a larger dimension from a standpoint of strategy and tactics: from the meridian of San Vicente in the west to the meridian of Cape La Nao in the east. Perhaps a better description would be the zone inside the lines joining Cape San Vicente and Cape Cantin in the west and Cape La Nao and Cape Tenes in the east, a stretch of some 500 miles.

Even though the great influence that the land has on the sea is indisputable given the shape of this zone, strategy in the strait must be primarily naval, for those two reasons:

--The main reason is that its function is based on sea-borne trade;

--The second is that submarines are the main threat to this trade, whether in a time of crisis or during a nuclear holocaust itself.

Gibraltar

Gibraltar is a problem fraught with strategic significance, to the extreme that today as yesterday, this is the main reason why it is still a colony, in spite of the UN resolutions and Spain's legitimate claim to it.

The Gibraltar naval base, with its arsenal, airport and centralized position on the strait, retains enough military importance in the theater in which it is nestled for Great Britain to refuse to let go of this bargaining chip in the European power struggle.

Although The Rock, in England's hands, contributes to the security of NATO's southern flank, we must acknowledge that since it lacks space and its own resources, it loses much of its value today as a means of controlling and dominating the strait against the main threat posed by submarines.

Given the modern features of these vessels (there are more nuclear submarines than conventional ones), monitoring their passage through the strait requires devices installed in deep water, which can be done only off the eastern and western access coasts.

At present, modern nuclear submarines can pass completely submerged through the Strait of Gibraltar, thus diminishing the dangers stemming from adverse countercurrents; inertial navigation precludes errors in this situation. Underway passage is still dangerous for conventional submarines because the limited capacity of their batteries imposes serious restrictions if they are subjected beforehand to heavy harassment.

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Spain does not suffer from the aforementioned limitations in the bid to make the strait impenetrable, to keep the threat stationary in a time of crisis and to nullify it later. The southern coast of the peninsula and the excellent complement of Alboran, Ceuta and Melilla, bolstered by the outposts of the Balearic and Canary Islands, offer clear strategic sufficiency.

A Spanish Gibraltar would obviously boost Western defense capabilities, because its degree of effectiveness could be complemented by placing other military facilities and submarine detection systems, as branches of the base, all along the northern coast of the strait.

The very structure of NATO, with the creation of "Iberlant," whose command and general headquarters are in Lisbon, is an acknowledgement that the strategic control of the Atlantic begins in the western Mediterranean and vice-versa. The fact that NATO does not refer expressly to Gibraltar as an alliance command base or assign control of the strait to a specific naval authority, does not mean that it does not attach the highest importance to the strait and, of course, to The Rock.

The raison d'etre of NATO as a collective security organization countering a common threat is the establishment of a solid defense network, in which Spain theoretically has a place. The ideal development for the defense of Iberlant would be to have bases in the Portugal-Spain-Morocco-Atlantic islands zone. Strategically speaking and in the theater that we are dealing with, defense means utilizing accesses to the strait for one's own purposes and preventing them from being used by the enemy in wartime. To this end, we must be in a position to monitor the entire zone in the event of a crisis.

If Spain were to exercise actual control over the strait, and bearing in mind that the scope of our territory would provide wider and better coverage than from Gibraltar alone, which is in a choked off central position dominated by its location at Spain's periphery, why would NATO be interested in owning the Gibraltar base under these conditions? In any event, it would be interested in having the cooperation of the country in a position to control the strait or to take charge of it at a given moment.

Threat and Current Tensions

In order to define a strategy we must first specify the threat, inasmuch as no strategy is possible if there is no potential enemy. How could we justify a defensive strategy such as NATO's if we did not spell out against whom we have to defend ourselves?

The British geopolitical scientist MacKinder emphasized that the universal threat would come from the land power that could control the Heartland (the continent of Eurasia from Germany to central Siberia), because from there it could endeavor to dominate the World Island (the continents of Eurasia and Africa) and then go about conquering the rest of the world.

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The Soviet Union is obviously striving to extend and consolidate its influence around the World Island. Its enveloping movements along all of the coasts of Africa and the growth of its naval might, with a presence in all oceans and seas and even in maritime zones that it had not previously frequented, represent a potential threat and bespeak an expansionist policy that could give rise to incidents and confrontations in crisis situations.

Given the face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, the problem of its security seems not so much military as political, although it is currently one of the world's tense regions, especially from a military standpoint. Spain's very security obliges it to play an active role in this theater, a role in which it must neither avoid risks nor fail to make use of advantages. We live in an age in which strict independence is practically nonexistent. Nonalignment has no real meaning, and it normally camouflages de facto dependence. The strategical problems that Spain has to face revolve around its geographical location on the continent of Europe, because Spain is part of Europe and the West.

The presence of France, the coverage that the area of common Spain-U.S. interest provides for the entire theater, and the flanking presence of Italy as a NATO member guarantee Spain relative security, even though institutionally speaking there is no unified politico-strategic system, inasmuch as France is not a full-fledged military participant in the Atlantic Alliance, and Spain is not a member. The United States rounds out the imperfect arrangement by linking up the defensive systems of Spain and NATO.

Aside from the repercussions that future alignment in bilateral pacts, alliances or treaties could bring, there are a number of strategic reasons why Spain will find it very difficult to remain outside a confrontation of interests that in one way or another will affect its security and sovereignty.

Spain's Involvement

We must recognize that the Mediterranean is no longer the European "Mare Nostrum," since by their skillful strategy the Soviets have been able to take advantage of every opportunity to bring several southern Mediterranean coastal nations into their sphere of influence.

It is hard to imagine today that certain north African countries could serve as a springboard for recovering Europe, as in the last world war. It seems more likely that many of these countries, which still bear ill will against their former mother countries, would like to see Europe subjugated. An oil embargo and granting the USSR the air and naval bases that Europe has been losing along the southern Mediterranean coast could be strong bargaining chips.

But we must view this basin, together with the Strait of Gibraltar theater, in another dimension, from the viewpoint of a totally new crisis, the crisis in northern Africa, which is basically characterized by competition between Algeria and Morocco for supremacy in the zone. Spain is already involved in

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this crisis, in the form of diplomatic efforts and because of Algeria's encouragement of a separatist movement on Spanish soil, the Canary Islands.

The situation in the Canaries Archipelago has not escaped the sharp eye of the Soviet Union, which is pursuing its objectives in the Sahara and would no doubt be pleased if Spain left the Canaries Archipelago, so that it could try to install a regime favorable to its interests and thus eliminate the bothersome geopolitical barrier that the islands pose for the Sahara.

Spain is involved in the crisis, not so much as a passive party to the tension between Algeria and Morocco but rather as a function of its own territorial presence and interests in the area, stemming from its sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla and the series of rocky hills in northern Morocco.

Pursuing its policy of an indirect approach, Soviet strategy aims at closing the ring around Europe by surrounding the strait on the southwest. In accordance with its modus operandi, some time ago it sent its vanguard, its fishing fleet, into the Saharan Bank, followed by ocean research vessels.

Now that Spain has left the Sahara, the USSR seems to be supporting the Polisario Front through Algeria, with an eye towards securing an independent Sahara, which, given the scant resources and level of native population there, would transform this desert region into a state at the mercy of its interests.

Moscow's flirtings with and assistance to Morocco in connection with the outfitting of the ports of Nador and Alhucemas do not seem to have yielded it any appreciable advantages.

The Stumbling Block of Gibraltar

There are often cracks in the Western bloc's defense against the Soviet threat, due to the contradiction between the attempt to have military solidarity and the permitted divergencies in foreign policy prompted by differing or opposing national interests.

One of the problems to be debated is the future of the Rock of Gibraltar. It is vital to NATO today to have the rock in strong friendly hands to guarantee its security.

The British presence in Gibraltar obviously detracts from the importance of Spain's geostrategic location as a military bargaining chip in the Atlantic Alliance. By turning Gibraltar into a NATO base, Great Britain has bolstered the alliance and gained preeminence in it, at the cost of Spanish territory.

Furthermore, England will continue to have a presence in the Mediterranean as long as its flag still flies over The Rock, which could be of importance to NATO from a naval standpoint.

For all of these reasons we can assert that Gibraltar helps Britain to enhance its might and to achieve its political objectives.

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If Spain were to become a full-fledged member of the Atlantic Alliance, with which it has only indirect ties through the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the United States, there would be no reason at all to preserve Gibraltar's colonial status.

The passage of time has bolstered Britain's conviction that The Rock is its permanent property. Spain's course of action, based mainly on negotiation, claiming its rights and citing the clauses of the Treaty of Utrecht, has no direct bearing on England's reason for keeping The Rock under its control: to maintain its supremacy in the strategic zone around the strait.

Since Spain is not a member of NATO, we cannot give serious thought to a Spanish Gibraltar, with or without its own home rule, but with a naval base under British command in support of its naval policy and strategy and for joint use by NATO.

Thus, Gibraltar, a longstanding stumbling block in relations between Spain and Britain, is also a factor in Spain's policy toward joining NATO.

One thing is clear: without a prior return of Gibraltar, Spain's membership in NATO would be tantamount to participating in an alliance that retains part of Spanish territory for itself, which would implicitly entail an acceptance of this situation.

Final Considerations

I would stress the following points in this article:

Spain's Geostrategy

The Spanish peninsula forms a geographical barrier off northwest Africa that is enhanced by the Balearic and Canaries archipelagos. Because of their strategic location off Morocco and the Sahara, the Canaries are more than just a mere outpost.

The western Mediterranean represents a component or extension of the strategic Atlantic theater to Spain.

Spain's dominant position by the Strait of Gibraltar is a tangible reality.

The raison d'etre of Spain's military and naval strategy is the presence and importance of the strait.

Gibraltar

Diplomatic negotiations and even recourse to international courts have so far not succeeded in establishing a common basis for dialog with England. As long as Gibraltar has the full operational capability of exercising unlimited control over the strait, it will retain sufficient strategic importance.

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In order to negotiate with the hope of positive results, Spain must act in the knowledge that Great Britain is unquestionably unwilling to renounce, diminish or negotiate away the influence that it exerts in an area of both acknowledged world strategic importance and of essential importance for its own national objectives.

The key to Spain's participation in the Western bloc is to be found in the interplay of politicostrategic approaches. In order to take the initiative in international relations, strategy must be the cause and policy the consequence. In order to parry a foreign initiative, strategy must be subordinated to politics. Spain must bolster the strait region militarily. This will require a reordering of priorities in the defense budget, but it obviously satisfies a far-reaching need for Spain's sovereignty and the integrity of its territory.

Only when Spain has sufficient naval power to replace Great Britain in the strait theater and only when the British presence in Gibraltar is no longer regarded as indispensable, will we be able to give serious thought to a policy change on the part of the United States and the other members of NATO that is favorable to Spain, because as Professor Olesa from the Naval War School quite rightly says: "Location is inert. It becomes important only when it is utilized by man and furnished with appropriate materials. It makes no sense to strengthen our control over the sea by taking possession of an unavoidable strait if we lack the means needed to assert our will in it."

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN

EFFECT OF NATO ADMISSION ON CSCE, U.S. DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 1980 pp 90-92

[Text] Within the polemic discussion arising from the publication by DEFENSA of its survey concerning whether Spain should enter NATO or not, high points in which were the statements by Defense Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcelino Oreja, the president of the Congress of Deputies, Landelino Lavilla, and other leading individuals, some of them foreigners, two articles published in the Madrid daily EL PAIS by authorized party members, one representing the government and the other the main opposition party--Javier Ruperez and Enrique Mugica Herzog, respectively--should be stressed.

Javier Ruperez, who is a Democratic Center Union (UCD) deputy for Cuenca and UCD secretary for foreign relations, wrote among other things:

"Between pure and simple fallacy and more or less objective conventional wisdom, groups with a special interest or which are merely naive have tried to cloud the calm needed for discussion with the black ink of simplistic charges.

"Setting the fallacy aside, the conventional wisdom says that Spain's entry into NATO would seriously alter the delicate balance we enjoy today. Let us not deceive ourselves nor let ourselves be deceived: all the geographic territory covered by Spanish sovereignty is accepted by all parties as a geographic area defined as potentially friendly or possibly inimical, in a definition which in cause and effect still fails to take the full participation of the Spanish people and their representative organs into account.

"A dispassionate examination of the real and psychological data which make up the status quo today shows with blinding clarity that there would be no upset in the balance if Spain decided to assume, as an active agent, the right of participation which falls to it in a system of responsibilities in which we are serving today as a mere passive object.

"For conventional wisdom also sees as axiomatic, and this is more serious, the risk of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in the event that Spain enters NATO. It is obvious that what happens in Yugoslavia, and I personally want and hope for it to be nothing other than what is freely wanted and accepted by the Yugoslav people themselves, will certainly occur without our decisions or our future being able to affect it.

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"There is no lack of those who assert a claim which threatens to become conventional wisdom, to the effect that the European security and cooperation conference scheduled to be held in Madrid would be seriously compromised in its development and its results by a Spanish decision to join NATO. It would be well to remember here that the text of the Final Helsinki Act itself recognizes 'the right to participate or not in alliance treaties,' that in agreeing that Madrid would be the site of the conference, neither did the participants impose nor of course did the government accept any kind of conditions as to the goals and purposes of our foreign policy; that the success or failure of the conference can never mean the success or failure of the host country, but rather of the 25 participating states; and finally, that the events which might stand in the way of the success of the conference occurred in dramatic fashion very far from our frontiers and in a way completely alien and radically opposed to our will, our convictions, our interests, and the interests of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] itself.

"To claim that our defensive needs in cooperation with the West are sufficiently covered by our bilateral relations with the United States means forgetting in an almost reprehensible fashion all the objections many of us have made against some treaties which, invalidated by the times in which they were concluded, require profound review within the context of equal rights and responsibilities which has not existed since 1953, and which would be difficult to achieve outside the multilateral context which the Atlantic alliance offers."

At the opposite extreme, Enrique Mugica, political relations secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), a PSOE deputy for Guipuzcoa and vice president of the defense commission of the Congress of Deputies, said:

"In our opposition to NATO, we cannot be accused of unacceptable motivations. Spain is not tied to any Third World movement, increasingly divided, since it is a part of Western Europe by conviction and will, to an institutional environment which has to be maintained, because only through it can liberty preside over the unmistakable path of justice. Any exterior aggression against this area would come up against our opposition, because we defend ourselves in defending it. But this means above all preventing the conditions for possible aggression, which involves sustaining the status quo which itself, within its framework, does not prevent the balance of forces from tipping one way at one moment and being re-established the next, which would be problematical if a country such as ours, of confirmed economic value and military potential, were to enter NATO. Imagine the levels tension would reach! The Soviet response with a view to distorting the direction of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era or any other, connected with what is happening in Africa and the Middle East, would pose an imminent threat to peace.

"But the status quo would not be destroyed however if the treaty with the United States were renegotiated on an equalitarian basis, if agreements and cooperation were arranged with European countries, if an international role were undertaken with a free hand, all of this to the benefit of our interests and the strengthening of our armed forces, which we want to be powerful in order to carry out their constitutional duties, ready to defend the free institutions in which European peoples recognize their identity, and ennobled so that on missions of peace, the Spanish flag--integrated in the United Nations--can guarantee security in any part of the world.

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"What is needed is sufficient imagination to plan for autonomy of decision in defense, without detriment to the necessary coordination.

"Does membership in NATO encourage entry into the EEC? One would have to ask Portugal, which has belonged to the alliance since its founding, but which shares the present dilemma with us.

"Are we assured recovery of Gibraltar? It would be illusory to ask the question of the British, just as we are certain they would not contribute to the defense of Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands either because they are outside their range of interest. However, there is a question which should be of concern. Why is it that a majority of the officers in our armed forces were not in favor of the alliance when polled by the periodical DEFENSA? And there is a certainty which confirms our position: in the FGR, where communism has not succeeded in winning even 1 percent of the votes, only 20 percent of those questioned in a survey made by the Social Studies Institute of that nation's army expressed full confidence in NATO.

"Should its fervent supporters reflect a bit further?"

- EL PAIS itself, in an editorial in which it focused on the subject of whether or not Spain should join NATO within the framework of American-Spanish relations, wrote a few days later:

"The prospects in our relations with the United States have not changed only because of the advent of democracy in Spain, but because of the birth of this 'Euronutralism' detected by Brzezinski, and to some extent materialized in the incipient and indicative Paris-Bonn axis. Just as the very concept of the Common Market, the dream of a united Europe, is now in a phase of necessary redefinition, the concept of Atlantic loyalty, of the political and military solidarity of the West contrived during the first cold war is now being reworked.

"Our government, moreover, although it has to draft a plan of national defense, in which the weak points are the Canary Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Baleares Islands and Ceuta and Melilla. The renewal of the treaties of friendship and cooperation with the United States cannot fail to take into account the definite support of Hassan II by Washington and its abstention on the Gibraltar question. Finally, a new plan for an understanding between the United States and Spain cannot continue to be based on some reciprocal exchanges of military bases and certain credit and surplus war materiel. The trade aspects, our chronic trade deficit with the United States, the maintenance of our diplomatic independence with the Latin American countries, the support they need in terms of technology and research and even the functioning in Spain of the United States secret services, very active when it comes to revealing Soviet agents, real or imagined, but nonexistent when it comes to the prevention and destruction of the terrorism from which we suffer, must be taken into account."

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11

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NEO-NAZI TERRORIST GROUPS INTERACT WITH ARAB COUNTERPARTS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-19 Oct 80 p 50

[Article by Kathleen Evin: "The Cypriot Connection"]

[Text] Ties between French neo-nazis and Arab terrorist organizations have existed for a long time.

The entrance on the scene of a mysterious Cypriot motorcyclist [motarde] in the Rue Copernic affair seems to have been enough for certain persons, with obvious relief, to separate the extreme right from possible responsibility for the act of violence, as Cyprus is reputed to be the base of Arab terrorism against the West. That is not telling the whole story by a long shot. As a matter of fact, an advanced love affair has existed for a long time between a number of French groups of the extreme right and Arab terrorist organizations.

The summer of 1976: Lebanon, torn by a civil war which is as murderous as it is incoherent, is agonizing. Among the dead and the combatants of the two sides there are a few foreigners, mercenaries or ideologues who have come here to pursue, by other means and under other skies, a battle which they judge to be too stifled in their own countries. In the ranks of Camille Chamoun's Christian militia there is a handful of Frenchmen. They are all acquainted with one another: former legionnaires cast off by the OAS [Secret Army Organization], young "hardliners" from the Nationalist Revolutionary Groups (GNR) of Francois Duprat, who have come here to put their theories to the test of fire, extremists of the New Forces Party (PFN) for whom the mere emotions of electoral "wall postering" were not enough. Most of them, before rallying to Lebanon, passed through Cyprus, a privileged place between the East and West, which the secret services, arms traffickers and extremists of all kinds have chosen to carry out their complementary activities. In the following September, moreover, three men--who were less adroit or more annoying than the others--were arrested in Cyprus for arms trafficking: Yves Van Ghele and his two friends are members of the PFN. And Christian Bonnet knows very well that two members of the French police took advantage of their vacations to put their ideas at the end of a rifle on the side of Beirut through the same connection.

Within the PFN, which was established after the May 1974 presidential election by old hands of New Order--thanks to the subsidies which they received entirely officially for having "materially" assured the proper conduct of the Valery Giscard d'Estaing campaign--all are no longer satisfied, in fact, with a "trend

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toward a middle class outlook" and with a "legalism" which are not even bringing the expected political and electoral rewards. The most extreme, powerless individuals do not wish to witness the rise of a left which is consolidating its breakthrough during the elections. They found an ideologue in the person of Francois Duprat, founder of the GNR who, particularly in "Review of the History of Fascism" calls for the implementation of a "strategy a la Chile," designed to switch the country from the side of the "parties of order." Three objectives are then offered: the establishing of a structure of "activists," the training of a "combat group" and the setting up of a "war chest," all of which is in anticipation of the day in the near future when the "nationalists" will have to take action.

For a "Strategy of Tension"

A program carried out on the whole. From 1976 to 1978, the police experienced a recrudescence of activity within the extreme right: international contacts increased, arms and explosives circulated and, above all, money collected. In the principal foul crimes of that period (the kidnapping of Louis Hazan, the Dassault-de Vathaire affair, the "break-in" at the Nice General Company...), the extreme right was physically present. However, on every occasion the possible political implications of these incidents reportedly were denied by the government. Why?

The year 1978 marked a watershed in this strategy: on 18 March, Francois Duprat died in an explosion of his boobytrapped automobile. This was a job done by professionals the perpetrators of which, for the friends of the victim and the police alike, should rather be sought within the extreme right itself. Having been made orphans, those of the GNR approached a small group established in 1966 which in the interim had fallen into a quasi comatose state, the Federation for National and European Action (FANE), headed by Marc Fredriksen. It was Michel Faci, who had been questioned by the police and arrested several times for theft, carrying and possessing weapons, who brought the survivors of "Duprat's group" to the FANE. As Fredriksen's right hand man, he has since been his principal driving force. In a report issued in July 1980, the RG [expansion unknown] stated, "Since that time (1978), which marks an important stage in its existence, the movement was particularly active, both in our territory and abroad." Since then, the police know that within the FANE activists are advocating movement to "direct action." While waiting until the time is ripe, they "will content themselves" with assaults and small acts of violence of a racist kind.

And then in January 1980, at the initiative of the FANE, the "first fascist congress" was held in Paris which assembled 60 French and foreign militants. In February, there was a meeting in Frankfurt. In March, in Anvers and Brighton; in May, in Munich. It seems that at each meeting of European neo-nazis the question of "direct action" was brought up by certain persons. Within the FANE, a "hard-line" group thus declared itself ready "to objectify in broad daylight its aspirations by a public action." NOTRE EUROPE, the movement's publication, repeated these discussions. In the April issue, Michel Leloup--alias Michel Faci--makes a plea for movement to a "strategy of tension." And he explains why the time seems to him well chosen: "The economic crisis is driving away from the movement a large number of voters who are seeking a new political path-way and will have to choose between bolshevism and fascism."

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Has this hardlining by some of the FANE militants been approved by all its leaders? Questioned by LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS the day after the assassinations on rue Copernic, Fredriksen, the poor man's fuhrer of the FANE, answered without hesitation: "The act could have been committed by former members of the FANE traumatized by the ban which has been placed on the organization." As early as 1977, in a book devoted to "The Extreme Right in France," Bernard Brigouleix said, "The originality of the FANE is to push hostility for Israel to the point of providing support of Palestinian movements of the extreme left." The Cypriot connection has not finished delivering up its secrets.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NEW BOOK TRACES INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFER LAW

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French Sep 80 p 762

[Review of the book "Les Transferts Internationaux d'Armes de Guerre" by Romain Yakemtchouk, Pedone, Paris, 1980, 452 pages]

[Text] International arms transfers are at the heart of the sovereignty of states. The latter make use of such transfers as an instrument for the realization of their concepts of the defense and production of national interests. Never in the history of international law has a global system for control of these arms transfers been envisaged. The promotion of such a system would be an attempt to deprive the states of this instrument which has become essential to them. All the more so because it largely goes beyond the problem of the regulation of interstate military balances.

Arms transfers are a source of political and/or economic profits and a means of domination from several standpoints, a source of authority (internal) and power (international). In the face of such stakes, the law remains powerless. Romain Yakemtchouk demonstrates this very well in his work, in any event in the first part (the first eight chapters). So far as we know, this is the first time that a historical reconstruction has been made of the efforts at international regulation of international arms transfers. The author has succeeded, and his exposition is scrupulously accurate.

Even if, in the course of the centuries, it has been possible to conceive coherent control systems, the history of these efforts is that of a series of setbacks. It is only when, in certain respects, arms transfers made difficult the exercise of sovereignty by certain states that such sovereign states were able to come to grips with the problem. The most serious proposals for regulation, moreover, concerned private merchants who precisely during that period wished to dictate their laws to the states. Because the SDN [League of Nations] failed in this attempt to stabilize relations between states, it failed in its efforts in the sector of arms trade regulation. It is the states themselves which to strengthen their sovereignties between the two arms systematically accentuated their control over arms production and export. At the international level, the problem of arms transfers was from then on linked with the pious wishes for general and complete disarmament process.

Beginning with chapter 11, Romain Yakemtchouk's book suddenly changes its focus. After an anecdotal chapter on arms sales to the Middle East and a schematic table of the world military market the author begins an analysis, which on the whole is excellent, of certain legal questions posed by arms transfers: respect for destination, the international transit of arms. The chapter on embargo could have been

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the occasion for again analyzing the constraints and limits of the international disarmament law in the face of the reality of international relations: in this regard, the problem of arms transfers is excellent terrain for research and analysis.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

YOUTH SURVEYED ON POLITICAL, SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Hamburg STERN in German 25 Sep 80 pp 80-86

[Report by Karen Andressen: "First Vote for Disco"]

[Text] The young generation is the subject of more puzzling, philosophizing and writing than any other generation. And however the elders judged the next generation thus far, they were in agreement about one thing: Young people never lived up to the expectations of them.

If the postwar generation was considered too pragmatic and skeptical, those in their teens and twenties during the 1960's had to put up with the reproach of being too rebellious and radical. The years of revolt against the "stuffiness" at the universities and a social system felt to be hidebound are now long past.

A new generation has grown up, less ready for discussions and demonstrations than the preceding one. And again the adults are not happy: The phrases about the conformist generation, about spineless youth are circulating again. Politicians--like SPD chairman Willy Brandt recently--are complaining that many young people are "keeping aloof from what we have created."

Their concern is well-founded. According to a poll conducted by STERN* 1 in 5 of those 18 to 20 years old would prefer to "drop out" and live "simply and naturally." 39 percent of this age group (31 percent of the young men and 48 percent of the young women) have little or no interest in politics.

"In fact there are only three topics that young people today are really interested in," says 19-year old Marcus Conrad, a waiter: "Music, motorcycles and how far you've gone with your girlfriend." The STERN investigation confirms the estimate of this young man from Munich. In response to the question about their principal interest, 7 out of 10 named music. Sports, going out, traveling and their own moped occupy a higher position than politics.

*The Institute for Youth Research in Munich polled 507 representative first-time voters between the ages of 18 and 20 in July 1980 for STERN. Many of the questions were asked in 1975.

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1. Interests Here are various areas of interest, please tell me which ones you take part in frequently?

	18 to 20 year olds					
	Total		Male		Female	
	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
Music	69.2	65.0	66.0	63.5	72.6	66.6
Sports	53.8	42.5	61.0	56.9	46.4	28.0
Going Out	44.2	47.7	39.0	45.6	49.6	49.9
Reading	41.8	42.4	29.7	29.0	54.4	55.9
Cars, Motorcycles, Mopeds	39.6	35.7	56.8	50.1	21.8	21.4
Travel	39.4	32.9	32.8	24.3	46.4	41.5
Job	31.8	38.9	35.9	37.2	27.4	40.5
Politics	26.6	21.5	29.7	25.9	23.4	17.2
Fashion, Beauty	23.1	27.4	6.6	3.9	40.3	51.0

All figures are in percentages. Those questioned were able to name more than one interest, so the responses total over 100 percent.

The withdrawal into a private realm, the flight into the flicker of the disco or drug-inspired dreams began in the mid-1970's. While only 7 percent had stated their lack of interest in politics in 1968, in 1975 it was 11 percent who had little, and almost 36 percent who had no interest in political questions--as much as 8 percent more than today.

The politicians are principally at fault themselves for the lack of interest that they criticize with furrowed brows, in the opinion of the first-time voters. "Politicians only make an effort when an election is coming up," says 19-year-old Stefan Hantel, a student at the Agricultural School in Euskirchen. Thomas Heisener, 18 years old, has a similarly skeptical view. Thomas is unemployed and wants "to vote only for a party that promises to do something about youth unemployment." The young Hamburger does not believe that anything will really happen then, "because they make a lot of promises, and usually something quite different is the result. But at least I can try, it can't hurt."

Many of the 3.6 million first-time voters feel like Thomas. Those questioned have more than enough worries: 43 percent of the 18- to 20-year olds think their chances for employment are particularly bad. Almost one in five is afraid of being unemployed sometime in the future. Twenty percent are worried about a new war, 19 percent think it is better not to have children. Not many have any hope of effecting a new, in their sense better, government policy with their ballot: More than one-third of the young voters accuse the parties of having the "wrong goals," and of ignoring the interests of large groups of the populace. Forty-six percent complain that the parties are too much alike. On 5 October only just 60 percent of this age group intends "quite definitely" to go to vote, but 11 percent will "probably not."

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How little the parties have understood the young voters' annoyance with politics is revealed in their mostly helpless reactions: The CDU stifles critical questions nationwide with disco noise in their music tent "Meeting Point '80." What is supposed to be adapting to the Zeitgeist is a declaration of bankruptcy. Agriculture student Stefan Hantel says critically: There is nothing, apart from a disco or discussion evening now and again." The mood is reminiscent of the malaise of youth in the mid-1960's. At that time as well many young people saw no choice between the parties after the Social Democrats and the Christian parties formed the Grand Coalition in 1966. Youth took to the streets with their protest.

Meantime, the "extraparliamentary opposition," with which Apo hoped to change the world, is finding fewer and fewer followers. Confidence in the effect of citizens' action groups, demonstrations and collecting signatures has declined noticeably since 1975.

2. Actions What would you do to defend democracy?

	18-to 20 year olds		Male		Female	
	Total					
	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
Participate in collecting signatures	49.1	53.0	48.6	50.4	49.5	56.0
Participate in demonstrations	45.4	47.4	47.1	52.7	43.5	42.5
Enroll in a democratic party	30.4	34.9	35.1	39.6	25.4	30.1
Hunger strike	5.5	2.9	4.6	4.2	6.5	1.5
Use force against objects	4.3	3.9	6.6	4.6	2.0	3.1
Use force against people	2.8	6.4	4.2	10.8	1.2	1.9
None of the above	7.3	6.6	10.4	6.5	4.0	6.2

Those interviewed could choose more than one answer

About one-third of those questioned today think that nonviolent demonstrations achieve nothing. Almost all, however, reject acts of violence. The alternatives for young people are not banners and noisy protest--for many it is increasing resignation. The "not me" mentality of the 1950's is slowly returning.

No one should be surprised by that, except those who believe that surveillance activity in defense of the constitution and decrees against radicals go unnoticed by the very younger generation which--unlike generations before it--must worry about not finding a teaching position or employment.

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The disrespectful political phrases of the Apo years have been replaced among young people in 1980 by the motto: "Dear Lord, make me handicapped, so that I can get a civil service job"--even among those who do not want to enter government service, who line up for one of the--rare--teaching positions. Social scientists discovered that every second young person prefers not to say what he thinks in school or at his job, because he is afraid it may be detrimental.

"It is not young people who have withdrawn from their social obligations, but society--represented by its institutions--has less and less to offer to young people," writes Hendrik Bussiek in his "Report on The Situation of Youth."

The FRG does not come off too badly in the estimation of 18- to 20-year olds. Sixty percent attest that it comes close to the ideal form of democracy. Sixty-nine percent (10 percent more than in 1975) think this democracy is "very stable." And this, although today fewer young people than in 1975 believe personal freedom to be guaranteed. Five years ago more than 80 percent had said they felt totally free or free in at least most areas. Today 74 percent say the same. Against that, 22 percent, almost 7 percent more young people than in 1975, think they are free in only a few areas.

3. Freedom The freedom of every person is guaranteed in the statute. What is your impression of freedom in the FRG? Do you think you are:

	18- to 20 year olds		Male		Female	
	Total		1980	1975	1980	1975
	1980	1975				
Completely free	13.6	12.9	11.6	14.3	15.7	11.6
Free in most areas	60.6	67.7	67.2	66.6	53.6	68.9
Free in only a few areas	21.9	15.3	18.1	14.2	25.8	16.4
Free in very few areas	4.1	2.0	3.5	2.4	4.8	1.6
Not free at all	-	1.6	-	2.1	-	1.2

All figures given in percentages

The positive overall judgment of the FRG is certainly linked to the realization that this state is still the better of all comparable worlds. Where attractive alternatives are lacking, people prefer to stick with the conservative motto "no experiments."

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It is a conservatism that is more sympathetic to a Helmut Schmidt than a Franz Josef Strauss. Particularly in foreign policy, which has increased in importance for many young people since the Afghanistan crisis, the chancellor can hope for high approval among the new generation of voters.

4. Responsibilities To which area of politics should the Federal Government currently pay particular attention?

	18- to 20-year olds		Male		Female	
	Total					
	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
Environmental protection	25.0	17.7	23.9	21.0	26.2	14.5
Economic policy	24.7	52.0	29.0	50.7	20.2	53.3
Foreign policy	20.3	5.7	21.6	4.8	19.0	6.5
Social policy	15.6	14.9	13.5	15.0	17.7	14.9
Education	10.5	15.9	8.9	16.3	12.1	15.4
Foreign Aid	8.7	5.1	7.7	4.3	9.7	5.9
Defense policy	8.5	2.3	10.4	3.6	6.5	0.9
Justice	4.5	6.2	4.2	5.5	4.8	6.9
Transportation	1.8	1.3	2.3	1.5	1.2	1.1
Urban Development	1.8	1.9	0.8	1.6	2.8	2.1

Those questioned could name several areas. The responses total over 100 percent as a result.

In response to the question, how the FRG should act in the current world situation, 73 percent gave the answer: "It is important for the FRG to maintain relations with the United States and yet not allow contacts with the East to be broken off." Only 17 percent thought that the FRG, in concert with the United States, should adopt a "clear and hard line" towards the Eastern bloc countries. Barely 10 percent want better relationships with Eastern bloc states even if this harms relations with the United States. In domestic policy most young people lean more towards the coalition than towards the opposition. Compared with 1975, fewer young people want a "strong state" that deals harshly with terrorist and motor cycle groups. Instead of 52 percent, only 41 percent today demand "stricter measures" against terrorist groups. The others oppose them because they are worried about freedom laws in the republic.

Authoritarian and radical right-wing tendencies have decreased in comparison with 1975. At that time 22 percent of the young people questioned were in favor of the reintroduction of the death penalty. Today it is only 19 percent. On the subject of National Socialism, 3 percent say that it had many good aspects. In 1975, 11

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percent had chosen this response. Still, it would be hasty to maintain that youth is not vulnerable to slogans from the far right. Precisely because more and more young people want nothing to do with politics, the danger remains that 18-year-old Evelyn Eckl, a trainee tax advisor, will be proven correct. She says: "The enthusiasm of young people for politics is only aroused when there is a genuine crisis, with famine, cold and all that goes with it." The young person from Munich does not want that, because then "a strong man" would have "great opportunities among young people."

5. National Socialism How do you judge today the period from 1933-1945--the time of National Socialism? Here are three statements--which corresponds most closely with your opinion?

	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975
The period of National Socialism should be condemned absolutely	59.6	43.2	59.5	42.0	59.7	44.5
The period of National Socialism should be condemned as a whole, but there were some good things	36.1	46.1	35.1	43.1	37.1	49.1
The period of National Socialism is seen completely wrongly today, it had many good aspects	3.2	10.5	4.6	13.9	1.6	7.0

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF CHANGES POLICY: DOMINATION OF LEFT MAIN GOAL

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 20-26 Oct 30 p 60

[Article by Thierry Pfister: "'Georges' New Message"]

[Text] Marchais' candidacy is proving to be a radical change in the PCF's strategy.

The Communist Party has really changed its strategy. At the time of its 21st Congress in October 1974, shortly after the presidential election, people were afraid of that. Three years later the break in the alliance with the PS [Socialist Party] in 1977 confirmed it. However, at the time, to question a change in the PCF's strategy was, according to Georges Marchais and his friends, to turn to anticommunism. Therefore this was not only to understand nothing about its policy, but it was also to be racist, since it has been well known since the 7 October demonstration in Paris that, according to the PCF, "anticommunism is racism." In which Georges Marchais is aligned with Menahem Begin, for whom "anti-Zionism" is also racism. Such abuses of vocabulary definitely do not stop the larger world.

But today is it official. The Communist Party has changed its strategy: Charles Fiterman explained it to the national conference which met in Nanterre on Saturday 11 and Sunday 12 October to make official Georges Marchais' candidacy for president of the Republic. The secretary general repeated it the next day on Antenna 2, during the "Cards on the Table" broadcast. "Since the break in the Union of the Left by the Socialist Party, we have had to put our heads to work," he noted. "We have had to ask ourselves questions." The fruit of these reflections led the PCF leadership to reevaluate, not only the policy it has conducted for ten years, but also what were the unitary experiences in 1936 at the time of the Popular Front, and then in the Liberation.

The Politburo's Dream

The conclusion is clear: all those experiences were negative, for the Socialists are always betrayed. Consequently the PCF must absolutely see to it that it again becomes the primary force on the left, it must stand head and shoulders above any potential coalition. Today this is its absolute priority. But since, despite all its speeches on "struggles" and "grassroots unity," the Communist Party has gradually been dragged down into French standards, it is only really operating--like the other

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political organizations--at the pace of the elections and measures its own strengthening only in electoral results. Hence its decision to run a candidate for the presidential election. Hence its decision, too, not to withdraw any more in the second round in favor of the representative of the left who has arrived in the lead, because of an intangible rule.

His objective no longer being to come into power, which to him means "republican discipline." His objective being to take over control of the left again, he must on the other hand use all means possible to limit the socialist influence and take away from the rival any prospect of electoral victory. Already, before the 1978 legislative elections, the PCF had carried out this blackmail by withdrawal. "The notion of 'republican discipline,'" Rene Andrieu wrote in February 1978, is to relegate to the History Museum between the spinning wheel, the oil lamp and missed opportunities." Marchais is beginning again today, but by avowing more clearly that he will never allow the election of a president of the Socialist Republic. Which does not mean that he will not withdraw. After considering the results of the first round, if as in 1978 the left does not appear to be in a position to obtain a majority, he will undoubtedly mingle his votes with those of the PS. In the opposite case, he will do anything to prevent what is in his eyes the worst possible eventuality: to contribute to bringing to power a PS over which he no longer has any hold.

All the more so because the Communist Party very much expects a new electoral failure on the part of the left in 1981. It expects a debate to open then between socialists which could culminate in exploding the PS, one faction deciding to try the experiment of participating in the government, another maintaining a PS diminished and very "unitary," the rest scattering more or less into the wilderness. Well, a small PS with a strong Marxist structure is one of the dreams of the PCF. This would be an ideal satellite as far as it is concerned. And the customary terrain of social democracy having been deserted, the communists would soon try to occupy it, even if it meant recognizing the language of the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties. One silly detail, however. Until 1973 the PCF dominated the left electorally but was nevertheless never able to assure its victory. What is more, its very influence practically forbade a success for the left.

How can this new PCF strategy be stopped? This is the question being asked of themselves by all communists who for two years now have unsuccessfully opposed their party's reorientation. Jean Kehayan, the author of the "Street of the Red Proletariat," is proposing a concrete measure. In a new work, "Piotr's Stool," to be brought soon by Seuil, he affirms: "Our last resort, to disavow a policy going against reason, will be not to vote communist."

A watchword that may be heard. For Georges Marchais' candidacy has aroused no real enthusiasm in his party. What is more, the frenzied campaign to promote his book, "The Hope for the Present," the return of an excessive personalization--"Georges' book," from which every communist speaker now feels obliged to quote an excerpt--cause a certain irritation. Robert Ballanger himself, the perpetual president of the communist group in the National Assembly despite the politburo, could not help, in an interview with LE MONDE, allowing a certain reserve to be penetrated.

The "Downhill Slide" of an Elleinstein

It is not only the problem of the presidency of the National Assembly group that is being raised for the PCF leadership. It is a new "communist people" that

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Georges Marchais would have to mobilize on the occasion of his electoral campaign. Most of his adherents from the "Common Program" period do not understand where they are being led and they are going away or dragging their feet. The cells hardly meet any more and the party is spiritless. From place to place, discreetly, the local cadres are also beginning to be relieved; yesterday's disappointed unitarians are being replaced by new recruits who joined on the basis of the current line. In this work of normalization, the PCF sometimes finds unexpected or involuntary allies. Thus, Jean-Marie Domenach who, in LE MATIN, is offended to read in the press columns of protesting communists signing themselves "PCF militants." By what right! If they are not in agreement, let them leave their organization! He too, like Georges Marchais, wants to see only a single head and conceives of political debate only if the balances remain chiefly unchanged. An involuntary ally, Jean Elleinstein, who compromised all his authority in the eyes of militant communists by agreeing to act as support for Louis Pauwels in LE FIGARO MAGAZINE, thus putting himself in the position of receiving lessons from a Raymond Aron. By doing so he dealt a blow to all the protesting communists whom the PCF leadership quickly classed with the party's former star historian. It is easy to predict for all these "dissidents" an identical "downhill slide."

If the party's new strategy involves a renewal of the grassroots and the local staffs it symbolizes at the same time the revenge of Roland Leroy. Removed from the secretariat at the 23rd congress, the editor of L'HUMANITE scored a triumph at the national conference. It is true he had taken special care with his appearance, his entrance and his performance. Everyone, at the podium and in the room, got the message: he must always be reckoned with.

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FRANCE

PCF MANEUVERS COST PSF, PCF SEATS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 6 Oct 80 pp 29-30

[Article by Michel Chamard: "Marchais' Orders"]

[Text] The PCF has tripped the PSF in the Senatorial elections. A prelude to the Presidential election.

"Everything is happening today as if the PCF were less concerned to win seats than to deny them to the Socialist party, as if its objective were to prevent the Left from winning."

Jean Poperon, deputy from the Rhone and member of the PSF national secretariat, did not mince words in commenting, in LE MATIN DE PARIS, on the Communists' attitude at the time of the Senatorial elections. His anger was provoked by the semi-defeat of his party due to the PCF's refusal to withdraw in several departments.

Mitterrand's followers expected to gain 15 to 20 seats for the Left, of which almost all would go to the PSF. The latter won 12 but lost 3, while the MRG [United Left] lost 1.

A few days before the vote, the Communists had called for the drawing up of common slates in several departments. Faced with a Socialist refusal, they had threatened to act in consequence.

All was decided on 28 September, the day of the elections, between the two ballots.

At noon, at the end of the first ballot, the Socialists had every reason to be satisfied. A number of their candidates were in a fair way to election that afternoon. To satisfy the Communists, whose votes were needed to win, the Socialists proposed a common slate in the Côtes-du-Nord and Allier.

At 2:30, a few minutes before the start of the second ballot, the answer arrived from PCF headquarters: no common slate in the Côtes-du-Nord; no-

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retention of Communist candidates in that department, as in six others, against Socialists who had beaten them in the first round. It was a rout.

In the Correze, leader Marcel Champeix of the Socialist group in the Senate was defeated by Dr Henri Belcourt, the substitute for Jacques Chirac. In the Cotes-du-Nord, whose three seats the PSF expected to win, two were kept by the majority. In the Doubs, Edgar Faure, though numerically beaten according to the morning's figures, prevailed thanks to the retention of Communist candidates, as did one of his running mates. The first-round Socialist winner, Senator Robert Schwint, only saved his seat by a one-vote margin over the third majority candidate.

"The Communists caused the defeat of a CGT worker by the politician Edgar Faure, and let in a manager from Peugeot!," exclaimed Poperon indignantly.

Yet the Communist maneuver was only partially successful: in the Dordogne, Creuse, and Hérault the PSF won all seats.

In departments where Communists withdrew, elector defections harmful to the PSF were noted. Even in the Allier, where a common slate was drawn up between the two ballots, the bad Communist repercussions on the Socialist candidate allowed CDS [Social Democratic Center] first-round winners to save their seats.

To Poperon's charges of "treason," PCF spokesman Juquin replied by denouncing the "spoilers."

"Giscard could send a congratulatory telegram to the Mitterrand-Poperon tandem--it would be deserved," said Marchais 29 September.

The PCF secretary general brought up a PSF directive ordering its successful candidates to reduce Communist representation to a minimum in the designation of electors on 7 September. The PCF would thus have been deprived of eight seats. Marchais explained:

"The PSF decided that there would be no new Communist senators. A number of our electors said 'That's enough!'"

The Socialists have reckoned up their score. They would have gained five additional seats if the PCF had respected "republican discipline." By accepting the common slates proposed for the second round, the Communists would have gained two seats, instead of having to be content with the reelection of their single first-round winner.

Of the 12 seats gained by the PSF, none is owed to Communist support: 3 were won in the first round, 4 in departments where elections were by proportional representation, and 5 despite the retention of Communist candidates.

The majority can rightfully take satisfaction in that un hoped for support: it retains its position in the Senate, and Alain Poher, candidate to succeed

himself as president of the upper chamber, was to be reelected by a comfortable margin Thursday afternoon. The RPR [Rally for the Republic] won six seats; the UDF [expansion unknown] remained constant; and the losses by the PR and CDS were offset by gains for the Valois radicals and various moderates.

The majority, by and large, was victorious when it was united in presenting lists with an official stamp. Isolated candidates, even when well entrenched locally, were often forsaken by their electorate. This happened to Francois Le Douarec, RPR deputy from Rennes and president of the local council, who saw rise up against him a minister from his own party, Yvon Bourges. And that happened also to several CNI [extension unknown] first-round winners.

The Giscardians intend to make full use of that argument during the next few months. Roger Chinaud, chairman of the UDF parliamentary group, kicked off this campaign, which is meant to intimidate the elected followers of Chirac. Following a parliamentary meeting of his group on 1 October, he declared:

"The RPR won only on its ministers' coattails and on unified slates. I have urged my friends to recall this to their colleagues in their departments."

A test will make it possible to ascertain whether Chinaud's warning has been effective, and whether the Communists are persisting in their wish to trip the PSF. Before year's end, eight partial legislative elections are to take place: six to provide replacements for deputies elected to the Senate (two Socialists, three Giscardians, and one RPR), including one in the Aveyron to replace Robert Fabre, appointed as mediator, and one in the Cantal following the resignation of Augustin Chevvet, RPR deputy from Aurillac, who was disappointed by his defeat in the Senatorial elections.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DEFENSE POLICY UPDATE REVIEWED IN EXTRACT

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug-Sep 80 pp 20-24

[Extract from the Report on the Military Equipment and Expenditures Program for the 1977-1982 Period, as approved by the French Parliament; since its passage, several modifications have been made that do not substantially alter the contents of the report]

[Text] The world context of France's security policy is marked by a number of basic facts: first, that in relations between the East and West, the search for detente has replaced the cold war; second, the growing importance of Third World nations in international relations; and finally, the first signs of Europe's economic and political organization, in the western region of our continent.

The search for detente stems from a dual conviction that France was one of the first to express: first, that in the era of nuclear weapons, a military conflict could result only in mass suicide and in the destruction of civilization; and second, that despite philosophical, political, economic or social differences, the normalization of relations among nations, the reduction of areas of tension and an increase in all kinds of exchanges are beneficial to mankind because they offer greater opportunities for peace.

As the president of the republic said at Helsinki:

"History teaches us that maintaining equilibrium is an essential condition for promoting detente and peace, because it is the only thing that can create the climate needed for security."

Equilibrium and detente are like the two sides of a single coin. A threat to one is unavoidably a threat to the other.

Thus, at the same time that France strives to promote detente, it also intends to develop its defense efforts and will remain on the alert to preserve the effectiveness of its Armed Forces.

The nations of the Third World have become an essential present-day factor, due to the importance that they have acquired on the world scene.

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The mere fact that there are so many of them (which means that there are more and more economic, political and decisionmaking centers in a world becoming more complicated and, in certain aspects, less stable) makes nuclear proliferation, in particular, a possibility that cannot be overlooked.

Furthermore, we can no longer ignore these nations, because of the wealth that some of them have built up with their shares of the world's energy and raw materials resources and on account of the influence that they can now exert on regional and international levels.

Finally, these nations are faced with tremendous problems that to many of them are additional factors of internal instability and external vulnerability. These problems include low-level economic development, inadequate food and energy supplies and technological dependence.

The developments in the Third World have a bearing on France's security in more than one aspect. Our nation, which is now one of the world's leading trade powers, must pay special attention to the conditions governing the normal cost and importation of overseas supplies, because to a large extent our economic well-being depends on them. Any conflict that breaks out in the Third World, even if triggered locally, could result in the intervention of the big powers and thus, by escalation, jeopardize world peace.

From a wider perspective, tranquility in the world will depend to a very great extent on the balance between the developing and the most highly developed nations.

In light of these factors, France has decided to make maximum use of its international position, which in many aspects is unique, and to pursue a policy of deterrence, dialog and cooperation. It wants to help Third World nations with which it has close historical and geographical ties, to bolster their independence and guarantee their development.

In order for this policy to work, France must have the wherewithal to confront the wideranging insecurity of a much more complex world that is still far from achieving balance, a world in which direct or indirect threats could appear at any moment on unexpected horizons.

Goals of Security Policy

In today's world, if France evaded its obligation to protect its own security, it would be tantamount to neglect and resignation. The fact is that for a free people security goes hand in hand with the protection of that fundamental freedom, which is essential because it represents a bulwark for everything else. It is on the basis of this concept that France justifies the main options of its defense policy and determines the objectives of its Armed Forces.

A nation cannot be certain of its security unless it possesses the collective will to continue controlling its destiny, in other words, assessing the situation of its own initiative and deciding independently which actions it ought to take. This desire for independence rules out any sort of systematic

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alignment with the diplomatic postures of other nations, and this becomes even more imperative when the nation has to decide the methods and the precise timing for the potential use of its Armed Forces in the event of a crisis or conflict.

In order to assert this will in the real world, each citizen must realize that he belongs to a single community and grasp the need to preserve its identity, safeguard its heritage and assure its future. This will must be reflected in each citizen's support of and rapid participation in the common effort.

Today as yesterday, France's security and independence require the safeguarding of the nation's territory and inhabitants against any risk of direct aggression or any threat to their lives and liberty.

The integrity of the national territory is a necessary condition for security. However, this alone is not enough. Due to the increasingly close correlation between peace and the prosperity of nations in today's world, security cannot be divorced from the international context. Security could be menaced to varying degrees by tensions that could affect vast areas of the world, both on land and at sea. Above all, however, it depends directly on the balance in Europe. It would be wishful thinking to hope that France could retain little more than a feeble sovereignty if its neighbors were occupied by a hostile power or put under its control. Therefore, the security of Western Europe as a whole is essential to France.

Main Policy Options

On account of the conditions that are vital for security, France has had to make a number of main policy decisions.

First, it must have purely national nuclear weapons. The sacrifices that the country has accepted in obtaining and then updating them reflect its determination to guarantee its defense, while at the same time making a specific contribution to an overall bolstering of deterrence. These efforts will continue with the intensity needed to keep pace with technological developments.

France joined the Atlantic Pact from its outset and is still a powerful member of the alliance. The fact is that under the current circumstances, only the alliance can offset the enormous military potential of the Warsaw Pact nations and guarantee a balance of power in Europe. While continuing to accept a wide range of obligations to the Atlantic Pact, France decided to withdraw from the alliance's military organization. France came to believe that if it remained in the organization, it could compromise, from a military materiel standpoint, its freedom to assess and make decisions regarding the timing, speed and methods for utilizing its forces in the event of a crisis or conflict. Although it was justified from this standpoint, France's withdrawal did not mean that it refused to cooperate closely with its allies; it meant only that it refused to accept any sort of automatic or spontaneous approach that could impair its control of its own defense policy.

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The conditions for France's security did not stem solely from its main defense policy options. They were also based on spelling out the basic functions of its Armed Forces:

--To protect the nation against any threat of invasion or any act of aggression and to guarantee the freedom of the French people under all circumstances.

--To have the capability of participating, without compromising national independence, in the defense of Europe, even its northern and southern accesses. This potential involvement reflects the solidarity or, rather, the solidarity of intent that links France to its European partners and helps to deter aggression in this region.

--To contribute to the security of those countries outside Europe with which France has ties pursuant to agreements or on account of economic or cultural solidarity.

--On the high seas, to safeguard its interests and to contribute to the security of shipping, which is indispensable for an uninterrupted flow of supplies.

The Role of the Armed Forces

France's military strategy is based on the deterrence and combat capabilities of its nuclear and conventional forces, which complement each other. These forces assure national independence, preserve territorial integrity and help to maintain equilibrium in Europe. They must also play a role in those regions in which France's interests could be directly or indirectly challenged.

Military forces perform their function first by virtue of their existence, then through their deployment and, finally, by their utilization when necessary.

Their existence is concrete and lasting proof of national will and one of the methods of influencing the international scene. Their use, whether by putting them on alert, bolstering or deploying them, lends a special significance to diplomatic action. Employing them in combat means that the decision has been made not to allow ourselves to be dominated by the enemy. This function and the specialized nature of the Armed Forces, which are in charge of safeguarding the nation's potential by serving the nation alone, justify the special regulations governing them, as well as the unique place that they occupy in the national community.

Nuclear and Conventional Forces

France decided to acquire nuclear weapons as far back as 1956. Today, it possesses a wide variety of them. Because of the unique nature of these weapons, the chief of state alone makes the decision whether to use them. In accordance with the circumstances, they could be used either to destroy vital objectives, to paralyze combat units and their supplies or support, or to destroy certain installations outside the combat zone.

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More than any other weapon, strategic nuclear arms are a greater danger to a potential aggressor than the benefits that such an aggressor could obtain by taking action. The deterrent force of these weapons lies in their psychological and technical credibility. The psychology is based on a nation's determination. This means that the threat of their use should be reserved for the defense of the country's most vital interests. Unfamiliarity with the nature, location and scope of these interests is a deterrent factor. Technical credibility does not require nuclear parity, but it does demand that in the face of increasingly sophisticated detection, attack and defense devices, we maintain a high technological level to preserve our survival and weapons penetration capabilities.

A tactical nuclear arsenal also comprises a variety of weapons. Its size and power, together with a diversification of delivery devices, provides a wide range of possible uses, depending on the circumstances. Complemented by conventional forces, its presence enhances its deterrent value and combat capabilities. The use of tactical nuclear weapons against an aggressor that might have made an error in judgment would support the threat of strategic nuclear weapons.

Due to their diversity and flexibility, conventional forces are suited to a wide range of crisis situations in our times. Thus, the function of these forces is multifaceted, but their basic mission is to preserve the nation's territorial integrity.

In the event of a crisis in Europe or in the continent's peripheral regions, deployment of these forces would enable the government to demonstrate its determination to intervene. Their use in combat, whether independently or in conjunction with the forces of other nations, especially within the structure of the Atlantic Alliance, would demonstrate to an adversary that France is determined to employ every means at its disposal to turn back aggression. Our naval forces, if necessary in conjunction with those of other nations, would contribute to the security of maritime supply lines.

The security of departments and territories overseas must be guaranteed by the continued presence of French forces and their capacity for intervention. Moreover, French forces must be able to undertake several kinds of external actions, for example, to move into other countries at the request of international organizations or of the countries themselves or to furnish military or technical assistance to threatened nations.

Because of the capabilities expected of them and the kinds of operations they are supposed to undertake, the Armed Forces must possess special characteristics. In order for them to act without delay, they must be deployed in the proper places and have a high degree of mobility. Although the entire system of conventional forces cannot possibly depend on a mobilization, because of the quick reaction time required, reserves will still play an essential role in any major crisis, especially in the defense of the nation's territory and as support forces.

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Finally, France must always have large enough Armed Forces. The draft plays a vital role in this regard. On account of their large numbers or perhaps even more so because of their quality, draftees contribute to the readiness and effectiveness of all forces. They are an example of the entire French people's involvement in the defense of their nation, as well as an illustration of the ongoing interrelationship between the nation and the Armed Forces that safeguard it.

The Armed Forces

From 1962 to 1975, the army was transformed from a 600,000-man force involved mainly in overseas operations into a 330,000-man force that was better prepared for a modern conflict in Europe. This transformation included a detailed reorganization and modernization of administrative procedures, as well as exceptional gains in tanks, helicopters, antitank missiles and communications.

At present, the army is composed of four branches: the Maneuvers Force, designed and trained to fight in a nuclear environment; the Intervention Force, consisting of a paratroopers division and a Marine brigade; the Internal Defense Forces, under the commanders of military regions, and finally, some 10,000 men stationed overseas.

This setup currently makes it difficult for the army to meet its troop and officer requirements. Furthermore, the structural and geographic distribution of the forces makes it impossible to adapt them to the variety of existing situations and to use their materiel as well as it could be, to judge by the missions that they would have to perform at present. This is the reason why the army, which will also have to cut its general expenditures, began a structural overhaul in late 1975.

The 68,300-man navy has not expanded since 1960. It comprises one of the basic components of our nuclear forces, the Oceanic Strategy Force, which has maintained a continuous, uninterrupted presence on the high seas since the first "Le Redoutable" patrol in 1971. This force complements conventional surface, submarine and airborne forces.

The conventional forces are well distributed. They are basically located in two naval complexes, one in western France and the other in southeastern France. These forces are stationed in Brest, Lorient, Lann-Bihoué and Lann-divisiau on the Atlantic and Toulon, Nîmes and Hyères on the Mediterranean. Although they have just a few support bases outside of France, there are forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans receiving mobile logistic backing from specialized vessels.

Most of the units are outfitted with modern equipment and weapons, in particular for aircraft and submarine monitoring, computerized analysis and tactical data and, most recently, surface-to-surface missiles.

Because of the successive delays in passing the laws of the last three programs, there has not been enough shipbuilding to satisfactorily overhaul the conventional fleet.

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Naval aviation comprises two branches: maritime reconnaissance aircraft and aircraft operating off carriers. The maritime reconnaissance units are Neptunes and Atlantics; the fleet of planes based on aircraft carriers consists of attack, reconnaissance and naval surveillance planes, in addition to anti-submarine helicopters and general use tactical helicopters. The third program law authorized the construction of the Super Etendard and of WG13 helicopters for service on new frigates and corvettes, replacing the Alouette III anti-submarine warfare helicopters.

With its personnel cut to some 106,000 men, the Air Force supplies two elements of the strategic forces: a fleet of 450 combat planes both for the tactical air force and air defense and 150 transport aircraft. We also have the fleet of training planes and helicopters. Since 1964 the Air Force has been modifying the structures and organization of its commands so that they could adapt to the country's total defense strategy and satisfy the conditions for deploying modern weaponry systems. In other words, we have many commands specialized in the deployment and use of forces, major regional commands for logistic and support functions and units at Air Force bases.

Air Force tactical equipment is being updated, as Jaguars are gradually replacing older aircraft. The Air Force has acquired Mirage V's that were initially built for export but has so far ordered fewer Jaguars than anticipated. These planes have generally provided a high level of performance. At present, however, since electronic countermeasures and anti-aircraft defenses (missiles and guns) play a predominant role, special efforts are needed to update countermeasures equipment and high-accuracy weaponry for air-to-surface attacks.

Radar coverage of the nation's territory has been completed, but only at maximum and intermediate altitudes. We must enhance our ability to intercept extremely fast hostile targets, especially at low altitudes. The new fighter that the Air Force plans to acquire could meet this need.

Our short-range air defense will be gradually guaranteed with Crotale missiles. Within the same context, air bases will be camouflaged and protection bolstered.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DRAFT 1981 CIVIL AVIATION BUDGET PRESENTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 27 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] As he did last year for the first time, the Minister of Transportation has this year presented for 1981 an overall draft budget in a form consistent with the objectives and organization of the Ministry.

Specific credits for civil aviation are found on the one hand in the "Civil Aviation" section, and, on the other hand, in the "Meterology" section, finally in the catch-all section relative to research.

General Lines of the Draft Budget

The total of ordinary expenditures (Titles III and IV) and the payment credits of Titles V and VI total 3,956 million francs [MF], compared with 3,630 MF for 1980. The draft budget for 1981 therefore shows a 10 percent increase over the budget adopted for 1980.

The total of ordinary expenditures (Titles III and IV) and payment credits for Titles V and VI for the civil aviation section alone are 3,247 MF compared with 3,037 MF for 1980, or an 8 percent increase. The breakdown of this total by division is as follows: air transport, 300 MF; civil aeronautical construction, 1,337 MF; air navigation (flight traffic), 863 MF; air bases and air navigation (approach and landing), 289 MF; aeronautical training plus general aviation plus technical supervision, 139 MF; joint departments of the general administration, 323 MF.

The 8 percent increase mentioned above is in reality a much greater increase. For the guidelines given by the Prime Minister during the first rough drafts of a budget still a little 'hazy' were, for their part, extremely detailed: a 20 percent abatement compared with 1980 of all equipment expenditures and the maintenance of operation expenses at their 1980 level. A certain number of divisions must therefore have been upheld as high priority for the increase in the budget planned for 1981 to be so considerable.

Two large divisions stand out: air navigation (both personnel and equipment); aeronautical construction.

High Priority Given Air Navigation

For Air Navigation, the total amount of program authorizations rose from 139 to 191MF (in-flight control plus approach and landing), or an increase of nearly 40 percent, with two main operations; nearly 41 MF for continuing construction and berthing work

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on the regional center at Reims and 18 MF for the development of the Cautra IV potential. It will be noted that the total cost of the Reims project (excluding Cautra IV) has been estimated at 206 MF (in 1980 francs) and that there presently remain about 40 MF to be financed. The appropriations for the other regional air navigation centers in the draft budget for 1981 will be financed at a little more than 41 MF.

Still for air navigation, but this time regarding job creation (title III), the 1981 budget as presently projected must be qualified as very satisfactory, if one considers that for the overall State budget in 1981, the total number of new jobs to be created is not to exceed 1,800 (it was some 10,000 for 1980).

Of the 100 new jobs created, 90 are in air navigation, according to the following breakdown: 7 engineers, 39 controller officers, 22 electricians, 22 technicians.

For the operating expenses of its departments (Title III), air navigation is supposed to have available in 1981 a total amount of credits 29.6 percent higher than that of the present year.

Civil Construction Division Favored

The second large division granted high priority is Aeronautical Construction. The total amount of program authorizations is 1,337 MF (an increase of 9.3 percent); in payment credits, 1,331 MF (up 11 percent). The following table gives the breakdown by program (figures in million of francs):

Table AP = Program Authorization
CP = Payment Credits

	AP	CP
Airbus	605	590
Concord (service and development support)	125	153
CFM-56	452	428
On board Equipment	40	40
New planes: TA-9 and TA-11 versions of Airbus (TA=Twin Aisle); SA plane (SA= Single Aisle) with 130 to 160 seats and two CFM-56	25	25
Basic advanced planes study (including the AS-35 project)	13	13
Squirrel biturbine helicopter	17	17
Exploratory development (HT turbines, composite wings, critical wing)	25	30
Miscellaneous investments and tests in State establishments	23	25
Preliminary studies of a new helicopter engine	8	5
Light aviation	4	5
Total	1,337	1,331

Airport Platforms

In program authorizations, the draft-budget for 1981 provides 87 MF of which:

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--52 MF for infrastructure equipment of nationally important airfields; in this sum there figures a credit of 42 MF for Nice Cote d'Azur but this is a conservatory budgetary entry since the minister will only make his decision, after having seen a report which is to be submitted to him at the end of the year, on whether or not the enlargement works will be continued. The other budget entries concern among others Toulouse-Blagnac (2.26 MF), Marseilles-Marignane (470,000 Fr), Bordeaux (400,000 Fr), Strasburg (400,000 Fr), Lille (1.2 MF);

--17 MF for infrastructure equipment of nationally important overseas airfields;

--11 MF for infrastructure equipment of regionally important airfields (3 MF for the north region; 2.4 MF for the southwest and 5.4 MF for the southwest).

The Big Loser: SFACT

Since the Department of Aeronautical Training and Technical Control [SFACT] did not have the benefit of any measure envisaging a high priority action, its equipment credits were reduced 20 percent. With respect to its operating credits, this will not make it possible for it to meet additional expenditures resulting from the very considerable rise in the price of fuel. Reductions in the centers' activities are to be expected in the medium term, to the extent that other savings already decided upon should prove insufficient.

Public Interventions

Under title IV, a credit of 6.1 MF has been inscribed for "financial participation to reinforce international air service of the Strasburg airport." On the other hand, it is noted that the total amount of the subsidy to the Air Transport Institute was not renewed. For the exploitation of the Mercury and in pursuance of the protocol concluded between the State and Air Inter, this company will receive 25.8 MF. Air France, for the exploitation of its "supersonic network," will receive 272.3 MF from the Transportation Ministry.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CNES 1981 SUBSIDY INCREASED CONSIDERABLY

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 27 Sep 80 p 12

[Text] The draft appropriations bill for 1981 concerning the Ministry of Industry reveals that ministerial subsidies to the CNES for the coming year will amount, in program authorizations, to 1,407.08 million francs [MF] in 1981 compared with 1,157.86 MF in 1980, and, in payment credits, to 1,564.48 MF in 1981 instead of 1,370.18 MF this year. These credits represent the major portion of the CNES budget but not the totality; credits from other ministries will in fact be paid into the CNES budget for launchers and satellites.

The program authorizations of the Ministry of Industry for the CNES in 1981 (1,407.08 MF) are broken down as follows: 515.2 MF for multilateral cooperation (telecommunications satellites, Spacelab, Ariane), 268.8 MF for multilateral cooperation in scientific satellites (Exosat, SLED, Hippacros, ISPM) and the general budget; 110.0 MF for Franco-German bilateral cooperation (exploitation of the Symphonies and development of direct TV satellites) and Franco-American cooperation (Argos, Sargos); 77.4 MF for Franco-Russian bilateral cooperation (Venera 84, Arcad 3), Franco-American bilateral cooperation (ISPM, GRO), and Franco-European bilateral cooperation (Spacelab, ISPM); 256.1 MF for the national program (Spot satellite and high thrust HM 60 cryogenic engine); 31.9 MF for balloon experiments; 4.2 MF for infrastructure works at the CST; 31.85 MF for the renovation of stations network and data processing center; 46.0 MF for program support; 65.63 MF for study contracts with foreign laboratories for the exploitation of the tracking network and participation in the Arianespace company for the construction of Ariane.

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UNITED KINGDOM

ADMIRAL FINDS SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH EXAGGERATED

LD211239 London THE TIMES in English 21 Oct 80 p 5

[Dispatch by David Watts: "British Admiral Cuts the Russians Down to Size"]

[Text] Singapore, 20 Oct--Rear-Admiral Conrad Jenkin is not intimidated by what he has seen of the Soviet Navy lately and he believes the West is in danger of exaggerating the Russian threat.

Before setting sail today in his task group flagship, the guided missile destroyer Antrim, for the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, the British admiral told THE TIMES that the Russians are not "twenty feet high" military giants and the West is consistently underestimating its comparative strength.

Though details of the Antrim's schedule are not public, it is due to join the guided missile destroyer Coventry and the frigate Alacrity in the Gulf vicinity, ready to assist any ships affected by the Iran-Iraq war. Its original schedule called for several good will visits along the way.

The Alacrity and the Coventry, with an attendant supply-vessel, were detached from Admiral Jenkin's task group and sent ahead to the Gulf after the war broke out. The task group is in the return half of a deployment that has taken it to Shanghai and Tokyo.

During the deployment Admiral Jenkin's vessels have had extensive contacts and exercises with foreign navies. Although he has no illusions about the power of Britain's naval adversaries, Admiral Jenkin believes that the constant stress on Soviet military strength may have a negative effect.

He believes that if Soviet power is constantly magnified, the public will react against defence spending as a waste of money because a military contest will be lost before it starts.

"I believe that for very understandable reasons, we sometimes exaggerate the threat though it is absolutely imperative that we keep dipping into our pockets to keep our defences up."

Looking as bright and ebullient as his freshly painted ships, the admiral outlined why Soviet naval power holds no terrors for him and why he had been impressed by the Japanese naval self-defence forces and by the turn-out of the Chinese navy in Shanghai.

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On route to Shanghai the task group came alongside the 32,000-ton Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk, which has attracted huge publicity as one of the manifestations of Russian naval power.

Admiral Jenkin was not particularly impressed. "The Minsk looks a powerful ship, but she doesn't frighten me too much. There are equipment and tactical facets of her which must give her captain considerable headaches."

There was apparently no sign on deck of the Yak 36 vertical take-off aircraft--the Soviet answer to the Harrier. According to another officer on the Antrim, a British Lynx antisubmarine helicopter launched to look over the vessel "ran rings" round her outdated Soviet equivalent.

Despite being the first Royal Navy vessels to visit China for 30 years, there seems to have been no sense of history when the task group docked at Shanghai, complete with Irish Piper--the first time the white ensign has been seen in China since the Amethyst incident.

Chinese naval vessels held little surprise for the Royal Navy. The ships and crew are uniformly well turned out and the welcome exhausting.

The ability of the Japanese to integrate their operations immediately and completely with the Royal Navy, while operating in another language, seems to have most impressed the task group. Perhaps it gave rise to Admiral Jenkin's summary of the deployment thus far: "We should be careful not to think that we have nothing to learn from other navies."

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UNITED KINGDOM

FINANCIAL PAPER REPORTS ON NEW TORPEDO TEST VEHICLE

LDO71251 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 6

[Report by David Fishlock: "String Ray Gets an Underwater 'Taxi'"]

[Text] A torpedo-like test vehicle controlled by computer has been developed by the Ministry of Defence to explore new ideas in anti-submarine weapons and warfare. The all-purpose test vehicle, called TVX, is being prepared for its first sea trials later this year.

TVX will be used to test parts of the controversial string ray lightweight torpedo, the "smart" anti-submarine weapon the navy and air force plan to put into service in their frigates, nimrods and antisubmarine helicopters. It will also be used to test future developments for heavyweight torpedoes of the kind carried by submarines, including a new model the Defence Ministry is exploring.

TVX is the brainchild of the weapons laboratory of the Admiralty underwater weapons establishment at Portland near Weymouth. It has been developed over the last four years at a cost of "a few million pounds," says Miss Betty Killick, in charge of the laboratory. The scientists have acquired the meccano-like hardware for three TVXs but plan to assemble only one at a time. Sperry Gyroscope has been the prime contractor.

TVX is a "taxi," the size and shape of a heavyweight torpedo. It is 0.53 metres in diameter, five metres long, and weighs 1,150 kilogrammes. Instead of a payload it has a large luggage compartment in the nose for experimental payloads of almost any aspect of torpedo research--homing, fushing, attitude sending systems, for example. It can also test new propulsion systems for torpedoes, by replacing the appropriate part of the basic TVX assembly.

The need for TVX reflects a growing awareness of the Russian submarine threat, as their submarines--once noisy and relatively easily detected--become much faster yet quieter and altogether greatly improved in performance, the Portland scientists say. Their taxi is designed for speeds at least half as fast again as the fastest craft a torpedo is expected to pursue. Its speed can be varied between about 28 and 60 knots through remote control of its gas turbine engine and jet-pump propulsion system.

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A scientist drives TVX from a computer console aboard the launch vessel. TVX's own onboard computer controls its speed, attitude and safety factors. It has its own three-dimensional tracking system and can carry data recorders, although normally it will be transmitting data continuously through its guide wire for realtime analysis back aboard the mother vessel.

The taxi is highly manoeuvrable, and can be controlled very accurately, claims Portland. It boasts rates of turn up to 40 degrees per second and pitch angles of -28 degrees. Its range of 7.3 kilometres is limited either by fuel supplies or by the guide wire running out. It is positively buoyant by 40 kilogrammes, and floats horizontally to assist recovery. It operates at depths from 3 to 300 metres--the limit available on torpedo ranges open to TVX.

Following "dry runs" in test calls at Portland, where its propulsion system was proven, TVX has been tried out at the British Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (BUTEC), the Ministry of Defence's new torpedo testing range on the inner sound of Raasay, between the Scottish mainland and Skye. Should TVX fail to surface, BUTEC is equipped with a curious boat called "cutlet": a self-propelled "bedstead," also developed at Portland, which locates and recovers test torpedoes from the seabed for another go. The subterranean range, measuring ten by four kilometres, is wired for sound so that the whole exercise can be watched on sonar display screens from the shore.

Normally TVX is deployed from a vessel. Under its own power it swims out of the open lattice launch cradle (shown in the photograph) at a depth of three metres. After a test run TVX should surface under its own buoyancy and be located with the aid of dead reckoning via its own control computer. It also has a "beeper" locator on board. The crew of a Gemini dinghy then attach a tow line and take it back to its mother vessel.

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