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FOUO No. 710



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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OAU STATES URGED TO DEFINE POSITION ON CHADIAN-LIBYAN MERGER

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 pp 115-117

[Editorial]

[Text] As soon as it became known, the commitment by Chad and Libya to "work toward achieving complete unity between the two countries" caused a wave of reactions within Chad itself, in Africa, in France, and in the Western chanceries. Despite the ambiguity surrounding its signing--for example, the presence in Tripoli on 6 January of the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] foreign minister of Chad, Mr Acyl Ahmat, known for his pro-Libyan sympathies, was only revealed several days later--the document, which seems to be essentially a statement of intent, obliges the governments concerned to define their position with respect to Libya's expansionist policy.

In Chad, Colonel Kamougue seems not to have been involved in the Tripoli negotiations conducted by the delegation headed by Goukouni Oueddei. Once again on the eve of the negotiations Col Kamougue underlined the necessity of "rebuilding the Chadian nation" and of reconstructing a national army based on the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) which he commands. His first reaction to the announcement of an accord which entrusted Libyan soldiers with the responsibility for maintaining order was to deem it "an impossible marriage," adding that it was not possible "to sell away the sovereignty of Chad."

Both the Chadian press agency and the office of the president in Chad minimized the scope of the Tripoli agreement. According to the former, Mr Goukouni Oueddei "made no formal commitment to the Libyan side," while the latter said that "there is no merger, much less an annexation of Chad by Libya. There is the intention of alliance which it is up to the Government of Chad to confirm or nullify." The signatory of the Tripoli document, Mr Goukouni Oueddei, has made no official statement. He seems, since his return to N'djamena, to have devoted considerable time to explaining his position to his partners in the GUNT.

Keen Concern...

The mere possibility of a merger between Chad and Libya has aroused the most keen concern among the states bordering Chad. As the crossroads where the white Africa of the north and the black Africa south of the Sahara meet, virtually the entire continent is concerned by the maintenance of or the threat to equilibrium resulting from colonization which was ratified by the Organization of African Unity, whose golden rule remains the inviolability of borders.

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The proposed merger program cannot in fact be considered to be a free association between two states retaining full sovereignty, since Libyan troops are still present in Chad. In Africa it has been seen as expansionism by Libya, abusing the superiority it enjoys by virtue of its army, its modern military equipment, and its oil revenues. Ridiculed in Uganda, where the freedom of the survivors of its expeditionary corps had to be bought through ransom, and in the BET [Borkou-Ennedi Tibesti], where Libyan detachments were wiped out by Goukouni's troops, the Libyan army, reorganized and supported by East European advisers and technicians, appears today, after the conquest of N'djamena, as a formidable war machine in the service of Col al-Qadhafi.

Even progressive Ethiopia has condemned the Libyan plan by reaffirming its support for the "principles of territorial integrity, nonintervention, and respect for the independence of states." It was Egypt, the object of an explicit warning--as was Sudan--in the Tripoli accord, which reacted most vigorously to Libyan intentions. But condemnation is almost universal throughout West Africa.

...And Some Uncertainty

The acting president of the OAU, Mr Siaka Stevens, called together in Lome some 15 heads of state, including those who make up the organization's ad hoc committee on Chad, starting on 12 January. But it was decided that it was an informal meeting for an exchange of views and not, contrary to the wish expressed by certain heads of state, an official meeting of the OAU, which would have given more impact and authority to the decisions or recommendations of the conference. The active presence in Lome of the Libyan foreign minister, Mr 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, who left in a huff to protest against the presence of Egypt, and the obvious haste with which the meeting was convoked, which may have offended some sensibilities, threw into relief a certain hesitation about the position to adopt toward Libya.

Some states have already broken diplomatic relations with Tripoli. This is the case with Senegal, Ghana, the Gambia, Egypt, and since 13 January, Niger. Others, such as Nigeria, have shown their teeth without going so far as a rupture. At the most recent Lagos conference, 7 of the 13 participating states (Sudan, Senegal, Togo, Guinea, Cameroon, Niger, Central African Republic) refused to sign the final communique because it did not explicitly call for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. The final communique was accepted only by Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, Benin, and, naturally, by Libya and by Chad itself.

The first Lagos accord, which was endorsed by the OAU and accepted by the 11 Chadian factions, prohibited, in effect, the presence on Chadian territory of troops belonging to a neighboring state, demanded the departure of French troops, and envisaged the presence in the field of an inter-African armed force supplied by Congo, Benin, and Guinea. The accord also stipulated that the transition government, the presidency of which had been entrusted to Goukouni Oueddei, was to get a mandate to prepare general elections to permit Chadians to decide on their institutions. Did Mr Goukouni Oueddei from that moment have the power to commit the future of the Chadian people without having consulted them? On the other hand, of all the commitments made, only one of them has been honored: France has withdrawn its troops.

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The African states tirelessly and with good reason demand the right to resolve their differences among themselves, and exclusively among themselves. But with rare exceptions up to now they have shown themselves powerless to act or effectively oppose a policy of force in violation of commitments made. Now that Libya, as Col al-Qadhafi has never hidden, is embarking on the realization of its plan to create a vast Sahelian entity, the same states which before were demanding the removal of French troops have come around now to asking for guarantees regarding their threatened security, calling on France and even the United States, where the representatives of the Carter administration as well as the future secretary of state, General Haig, have declared themselves concerned by the situation in Chad.

France's Attitude

The first sign of resistance to Libyan ambitions came from Paris, where the government seems to have been surprised both by the rapidity of the Libyan victory in N'djamena and by the proposed merger between the two countries. Bouar garrison, in Central Africa, near the Chadian border, has been reinforced, as will those of the other French bases in the states linked to France by defense agreements. The French minister of foreign affairs, Mr Jean Francois-Poncet, said in Abidjan, where he was making an official visit, that France will respond "with determination and without hesitation" to the requests of the African countries if the latter feel their security threatened as soon as they appeal for solidarity.

This firmness expressed officially in the 8 January communique of the French Government puts an end to a period during which French policy showed itself to be uncertain to the point that it was even possible to entertain the hypothesis of a tacit accord between Paris and Tripoli, giving Libya a free hand in Chad. The diabolical cunning of Col al-Qadhafi in choosing the very moment of the proposed merger agreement to announce the granting of prospecting rights on Libyan territory to Elf Aquitaine placed the French Government in an awkward position, and it is difficult to believe that it was unaware of the negotiations the French company had been conducting for a whole year. Anxious to defend itself against the accusation of giving too large a place in its policy to considerations that could be called "mercantile," the French Government stated that it would oppose any move by Elf to commit exploration funds in the new territories.

At the same time, France sent a military expedition to Sudan and decided to impose an entry visa requirement on Chadian citizens, an obligation to which previously only Libyan citizens had been subjected.

The hardening of the French position, in contrast to its past weakness which had caused it to agree to the return of the French ambassador in dangerous conditions after the sacking of the French Embassy in Tripoli last February, seems to have set off intense Libyan diplomatic activity. The Libyan minister of foreign affairs, Mr al-Turayki, went to Lome. Major Jallud, the diplomatic troubleshooter, on 12 January made an open visit to Algiers, where he was received by President Chadli Bendjedid. Algeria, linked to Libya by the 1975 treaty of alliance and a party to the Lagos accords, is showing a certain anxiety in face of the Libyan initiatives, but does not seem to want to endanger Arab solidarity within the "Solidarity Front."

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What can France--criticized today for having withdrawn its troops from Chad and after having taken military measures intended to reassure both its friends in Africa and its partners in the West, particularly the United States, where doubts were expressed about its capacity to defend the position of the free world on the black continent and to oppose attempts at destabilization remote-controlled from the Soviet Union--do now?

Having assured the states that would refuse to yield to intimidation that it would support them, it can only leave to the Africans the responsibility to resolve among themselves a problem which concerns them the most. This is also the position of Great Britain, whose foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, invokes the jurisdiction of the OAU.

France cannot substitute itself for the people of Chad. But without shirking its responsibilities, it should insure that they have the opportunity to freely choose their own destiny. It would, moreover, find itself in an impossible dilemma if a portion of the Chadian people, refusing to become Libyan, were to call on it to guarantee the exercise of their free choice. Neither can France substitute itself for the African states directly concerned. The primary responsibility for clearly defining the position which they intend to adopt with regard to the attempted Libyan merger rests with them and with the organization which represents them. France could do no more, if it were asked to do so, than provide the means, including the military means, for implementing a decision that was incontestably the will of the OAU.

When an internationally recognized legal authority has been reestablished in Chad, France should--if Chad desires it--continue the economic and cultural cooperation which it endeavors, within the limits of its resources, to maintain or improve with the African states, including those which never in their history were under its authority and those which have adopted an ideology contrary to its own. Meanwhile, from a humanitarian standpoint it should do everything in its power to help the Chadian people restore normal conditions where they have been destroyed or damaged.

Finally, Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was right in pointing out recently that instability was the daughter of misery and that helping the Africans to surmount political problems also involved providing them with the conditions indispensable for the security of their economies and thus guaranteeing a fair and stable remuneration for their agricultural and mineral products. Some Western states, concerned by Africa's political instability, seem to be unaware of this basic truth. France should work tirelessly to make them aware of it.

In any case, the worst policy would be for it to dissociate itself from Chad by deluding itself with the hope that the Libyan will be satisfied with the extent of his conquest.

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UNCERTAINTY REGARDING FUTURE LIBYAN ROLE IN CHAD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 pp 17, 18

[Text] As Merlin used to say, he who wishes to deceive another often winds up deceiving himself.

One might meditate on these words by la Fontaine following the publication of the Libyan-Chadian agreement of 6 January (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 January 1981, p 117), and after the declaration by the chiefs of state who met at Lome on 14 January.

There were two surprises right away: Although Libyan intervention in Chad--military but also administrative--was quite well known, nobody expected Colonel Qadhafi so rapidly to take the initiative in announcing a blueprint for "complete unity" between Libya and Chad.

Likewise, the debates that took place at Ndjamena within the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), following the return from Libya of President Goukouni Oueddei, reveal the full difficulty of this undertaking. Colonel Kamougue, vice president of the government and spokesman of a South which has no intention of being reduced to total dependence in a Muslim Chadian state, oriented toward the North, in particular demanded that his authority be spelled out in writing and protested that he had not been consulted prior to the signing of the accord on 6 January.

The second surprise took place at Lome, when, on 14 January, 11 chiefs of state (Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sierra-Leone, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and Congo) and the representatives of the governments of Niger and Egypt (the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, Mr Triki, had left the conference) dared declare, without the slightest hesitation, that "the merger accord between the Arab Libyan Jamahiriya and the Transitional National Union Government of Chad violates the spirit and the letter of the Lagos accord" and denounced it.

This declaration moved Nigeria closer to a group of countries considered "moderate" within the OAU, countries which semiofficially protested against the Libyan move and were worried about its consequences. This was a sufficiently important event to persuade President Goukouni and Vice President Kamougue to meet with the Nigerian

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chief of state, Mr Shehu Shagari, in Lagos, on 16 January. It was probably in the course of this visit that the Nigerian officials, according to the TIMES of London, learned that the president of the GUNT was in fear of his life even while he agreed to sign the 6 January accord. This confidential news item, which remains to be confirmed, would be another manifestation of the reluctance of the GUNT to accept the views of Colonel Qadhafi. But one must not exaggerate this reticence. The government in Ndjamena, which owes its victory to Libya, can still detect some advantages in the alliance with Tripoli: it has just asked for Libyan financial aid to pay its civil service personnel who, as we know, for the most part withdrew to the South ever since 1979.

The game in Chad is far from over. The Lome declaration certainly is a victory of the "moderates" in the OAU. France, which has just beefed up its military presence in Central Africa and which is ready to help its friends in danger, has every reason to be happy over these developments. But the participants in the Lome meeting are not the spokesmen of a majority current in the OAU; that organization was not officially consulted on the Chad issue. It would be unwise to anticipate the results of such a debate.

Nor must we imagine that Libya--in turn bogged down in the internal problems of Chad--could not overcome the diplomatic setback at Lome.

The Libyan reaction to the 14 January declaration is skillful: a diplomatic offensive in Africa and concessions to save the essence. While Libyan emissaries--Messrs Triki and al-'Ubaydi, went to Angola and Rwanda, the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau in Tripoli responded to the Lome communique on 15 January.

According to the JANA Agency, the Bureau "was happy with all of the paragraphs in the text of that communique, except for paragraph 2 (equivalent to paragraphs 2-5 included in the AFP [French Press Agency] version) which constitutes unjustifiable interference in the affairs of Chad." And Tripoli developed the following argument:

"The withdrawal of the Libyan forces from Chad as a matter of fact can be demanded only by the party that has already demanded the intervention of these forces. The Libyan forces intervened in Chad in accordance with a treaty and a request from the president of the Chadian people who has every legitimate authority because he is the founder of FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front], the man who directed the liberation struggle for 20 years, the man who pushed armed combat all the way to the Chadian capital and overthrew the puppet government of Malloum. Thus, Goukouni Oueddei has every legitimate authority which enables him to ask for and keep the Libyan forces there. He is the only one who could ask for their withdrawal. Libya will respond only to the request of Goukouni Oueddei and will withdraw its forces when he asks. (...because he is) the depository of revolutionary and legal legitimacy and they in turn enable him to demand the withdrawal of the Libyan forces."

On the other hand, "the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau stresses the fact that political unity between the two countries cannot be accomplished without consulting the Chadian people through a referendum on that subject and that the content of the communique issued after the meeting of the African presidents at Lome regarding the union of the two countries is illegal.

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"In taking up this subject, the African presidents were misled by words; the OAU Charter calls for the unity of countries of the continent and stresses the fact that unity among the African countries must be an objective that must be attained. Under these conditions, how can the African presidents allow themselves to defend a cause while opposing the text of the OAU Charter and its objectives."

It is extremely difficult for the GUNT to keep its distance from the Libyan government under such circumstances. The communique published on 15 January at Ndjamea by ATP (Chadian Press Agency) also stresses the fact that the Libyan-Chadian merger "can only be the result of the freely expressed will of both peoples involved" and the government here reaffirms "its devotion to the clauses of the Lagos accord which expressly exclude the maintenance of foreign bases on Chadian national territory," while once again thanking Libya for having "enabled it to put an end to the rebellion"; but one cannot really see where this sort of thing might lead, except for the prospects of "normal relations with countries that entered into co-operation agreements, particularly France." Is this the beginning of resistance in Chad? It is too early to interpret correctly the information on the fighting among the Libyans and the Chadians near Biltine and Arrada.

Besides, Colonel Qadhafi in response to the dispatch of fresh French troops to the RCA [Central African Republic], in turn announced on 14 January a "strengthening of Libyan forces in Chad." The airport at Ndjamea, still denied to the Chadians, is still in the hands of Tripoli. How, under these conditions, could one implement paragraph 7 of the Lome declaration on the dispatch of an inter-African force "over the entire extent of Chadian national territory?" At this point the diplomatic victory at Lome runs the risk of having no future for the "moderates" and their Western allies, in the absence of a more general and more concrete response to the ambitions of Tripoli which--and that is the least we can say--are encouraged by the Soviet bloc.

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PHOTOGRAPHER DESCRIBES 'LIBERATION' OF NDJAMENA BY LIBYA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5-18 Jan 81 pp 45-48

[Article by Tanguy Loyzance: "Myths and Realities"]

[Text] During the recent months of the long war in Chad, no foreign newsman was there to cover it. Observers were in the Cameroonian settlement of Kousseri on the opposite bank of the river, and when they occasionally left their base, it was to go to the districts occupied by Hissein Habre's FAN [Northern Armed Forces]. As a result, on the basis of half-truths and half-lies, a whole arsenal of propaganda against GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] and at the same time against Libya, obviously the main target of this offensive, was fabricated. A photographer -- and neutral observer -- has just spent several months in Chad, where he witnessed the 'liberation' of Ndjamen, of which he brings us his account. Scandalized by the way in which the war in Ndjamen between the united forces of GUNT and Hissein Habre's troops has been reported abroad, he describes what he saw and heard.

Sunday, 14 December 1980: After a brief resistance, the Northern Armed Forces of Hissein Habre had to abandon the Camp of the 13 (formerly Camp Koufra), which has always been a kind of symbol. Consequently, when the president of GUNT, Goukouni Oueddei, and Colonel Kamougue made their way in, they did not doubt for an instant that the end of the war was near.

Indeed, at 1000 hours the following day, when I arrived at the Chagoua Bridge at the southern end of Ndjamen, after crossing the entire capital accompanied by the former mayor of the city, Mahamat Djerma, there were no more traces of the FAN as such. Nor was there any question of running up the colored banners (which once distinguished the supporters of each faction) for those who would come to pray with the president at the mosque spared by the guns, finally silent. People met and embraced one another warmly, sometimes after 8 months of separation. A large part of the city has been destroyed, and the burned trees, the ripped off roofs, as in the case of the cathedral, and the walls pockmarked by thousands of impacts bear witness to the bitterness of the fighting. At the Place de l'Independence, the body of a soldier, his clothing torn and trousers red with blood, is still stretched out on the ground one of the last to fall. Nearly 9,000 others like him fought the war for peace. At Kousseri, on the Cameroonian shore of the Ubangi-

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Shari, a crowd of special envoys "observed," in a very strange manner, it would appear, and spread throughout the world the wildest information on the military positions of both sides, President Goukouni's so-called "move" far from Ndjamenas, the arrival of squadrons of bombers or the massive flight of the entire population as tracer bullets rained down. If one were to believe them, Ndjamenas was another Kabul, crisscrossed by some 50 tanks.

I just spent several months in Chad. Many times I visited the battlefields as a photographer. I spent 6 months at Farcha, where I experienced the anguish of the people when the shells sometimes fell on the land concessions. I learned to cease speaking the names of soldiers, some of whom were my friends and who we knew would never return. I was sometimes afraid, like everyone else, and I saw terrible sights I shall never forget. But it was a different war, not the one I saw taking place in Chad, that was reported on Paris and on Radio-France Internationale, usually on the basis of trumped-up or imaginary sources but, alas, repeated en masse by all the different media.

Among the events that marked these recent months until the general attack of 8 December, I noted one important date, that of 6 October, when the fighting reached an extreme pitch, leaving nearly 700 dead in 2 days. On the evening of 5 October, Hisssein Habre had distributed money to his soldiers and urged them to take the old French military base, the objective which, in his mind, constituted the last chance to win. The plan put into effect consisted of infiltrating enemy ranks, the gendarmerie and the military base. In this way, on the morning of the 6th, Habre's troops attacked, surprising everyone. The fighting that followed was of unaccustomed violence. The counterattack (which I personally witnessed), led by President Goukouni and Acyl Ahmat (minister of foreign affairs and leader of the Common Action Front, the FAC), was rapid and decisive. Stalin's organs, operated by members of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR, grouping the FAC and the 1st Army), provided the united forces of GUNT with such firepower that all the positions, with the exception of part of the gendarmerie, were rapidly retaken. None of the infiltrated FAN soldiers would be able to regain his base. Night fell on a spectacle of horror. The entire zone of the gendarmerie and the base was strewn with bodies. That day enabled GUNT -- which had superior firepower (Stalin's organs and BRDM's [expansion unknown]) -- to realize that with a single command, it was possible to invest the FAN positions in a rather short span of time. The great strength of the Northern Armed Forces in fact resided in the fact that they obviously had a single staff, which permitted great speed of attack without any possibility of escape. On the other side, the united factions of GUNT each had their own autonomous military leadership. Everything changed at the end of November when Colonel Kamougue was given the task, following a Cabinet meeting, of officering the different factions of GUNT. For that purpose, the Chadian Armed Forces, which up to that time had waited beyond the Chagoua Bridge, were taken to Ndjamenas by helicopter and based at the gendarmerie. Several times during the transfer I heard the sound of the helicopters, some of which were piloted by three of my Chadian friends who had studied in France and Italy. However, it was at that time that the "observers" based in Kousseri would see the American CH 47's piloted by Libyans. Soon Radio-France Internationale, then French television, followed by all the Western media, announced a "Libyan invasion." It was as if Qadhdhafi himself were getting ready to enter Ndjamenas at the head of his troops. A veritable international propaganda campaign began using the excuse of the aid, very real but limited in nature -- it

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is mainly technical and sanitary -- lent by Tripoli to warn against the danger of Chad's occupation by Libya's "Islamic army." Nor are certain African chiefs of state removed from the effort. It will be noted that most of them have had their differences with Libyan leaders and furthermore, nearly all of them are the most loyal spokesmen for the moods and designs of the Elysee Palace, as if Chad had truly become the alibi.

In September, the foreign affairs minister of GUNT, Acyl Ahmat, summed things up very well: "The people who are attacking us today think that they can solve any problems they might have with Libya in this way. They would do better to settle them directly with Tripoli," he said.

Unequaled Violence

But what was happening in the field? The week of 8 to 14 December saw the resistance of Hissein Habre's forces fritter away. The attack, waged on all fronts, was of unprecedented violence. The weapons were sophisticated. The time of the underground and MAS 36's is over. The Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), the members of the People's Armed Forces (FAP) and those of the Democratic Council of the Revolution and the Western Action Front (FAO) had Kalashnikovs and Belgies and knew how to use Stalin's organs and the BRDM's as well, while some groups have Chadian personnel able to use the 106 and 120 canons. At a press conference in November, President Goukouni Oueddei, questioned about the source of GUNT's weapons, responded as follows: "You know that we do not manufacture weapons in Chad, but the list of friendly countries that support and aid us would be too long to read."

In Douala recently, one minister belonging to the Chadian government coalition to whom I put the inevitable question about the presence of a Libyan army in Chad answered in the following terms: "The newspapers have spoken of 5,000, even 20,000 Libyans on Chadian soil. How can you think for a second, if you know the slightest bit about Chad, that its people, who have been fighting and suffering for 15 years, would be willing to accept any army of occupation?"

End of an Era

And everyone knows: The Chadian people chose long ago to live free and fight any form of exploitation and foreign tutelage. All the wars that have followed the manifesto issued by Ibrahim Abatcha, founder of the FROLINAT, show that it is not possible to envisage any accepted meddling in Chadian affairs of state. Acyl Ahmat, who is always presented as the most pro-Libyan member of GUNT, told me in September: "Colonel Qadhdhafi aids and supports the Chadian revolution, but it is totally out of the question for anyone to dictate our policy. Those Chadians who now label us as Libyan pawns forget too easily that at one time or another, they also played the Libyan card and used it. But they now want to look like intransigent nationalists." He continued: "We will always need France, to which we are linked by history. But there is no question of remaining under the tutelage of the former colonial power, just as there can be no question of bringing in another force to replace France. The language used concerning us, which is too reminiscent of the language of ruler-to-ruled, must change."

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Over and over in Ndjamena, when with members of GUNT I heard the following comment concerning relations with France: "Tombalbaye and his time are indeed dead, even if France has difficulty admitting it. We shall never again accept any form of colonization, whether economic or military, or even if it is expressed in the form of one-way cooperation."

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ANGOLA

PARTIAL DATA ON CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81 p 98

[Article: "The 12 new members of the Central Committee"]

[Text] "As we published on page 42 of our last number, the long-awaited official biographies of the 12 new elected members of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party have been published in Luanda. They emphasize the peasant or working-class origin of most of them.

"The addition of working-class and peasant blood should mark the beginning of a more dynamic phase in the life of the party," President Jose Eduardo dos Santos had declared several days before the opening of the first extraordinary congress of the MPLA on last 17 December. It is emphasized that four of the new members are peasants or workers, one is director of an agricultural unit and most of the others have responsible positions in the party. Three are deputies, two of them in the provincial assemblies and one in the National People's Assembly.

Two-thirds of these members participated in the national liberation struggle against the Portuguese. Most of them come from the provinces of Bengo and Kwanza North. Only one woman was elected to the Central Committee. The ages of the new members run from 32 to 66 years.

It is known that 8 seats on the Central Committee remain vacant, as the members of the Congress did not succeed in coming to an agreement on the assignment of all 20 places. Furthermore, the 7 supplementary members of the Central Committee have been made regular members by decision of the Congress.

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CAMEROON

BRIEFS

GAS LIQUEFACTION PLANT--It is rumored that after the discovery of a gas deposit in the Kribi region, the Total Company, in association with other oil companies and at the request of the Cameroon Government, is studying the building of a gas liquefaction plant. Its present cost is estimated at more than 700 billion CFA francs, including all labor up and downstream of the plant. (See MTM 18 July p 1802 and 7 November p 2968). The construction of this plant, not far from the small fishing village of Ebodje, could begin in 1983 but, the size of the job would not allow its completion before 1986 or 1987. This construction is linked to that of infrastructures, specially the Edea-Kribi-Campo road (a bridge is under construction on the Lobe, on Kribi's southern exit) and the Rocher-du-Loup port, a rocky small island off Ebodje. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3410] 9626

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

UNCA ESTABLISHED--A new political party, the National Central African Union [UNCA] has just been created in Bangui by Mr Michel Adama-Tamboux, former President of the Central African National Assembly and former Ambassador. The founding chairman of UNCA, Mr Adama-Tamboux, 52 years of age, was President of the National Assembly from 1960 to 1965. He was also Ambassador of the Central African Republic to the United Nations in New York (1970-1974), then ambassador to Egypt (1974-1979). According to him, this new party desires to develop a spirit of national unity and solidarity at the cost of ethnic and regional solidarity. UNCA will encourage both private initiative and foreign investments in conformity with the legislation in effect. Finally, for Mr Adama-Tamboux, it is indispensable to take into consideration the progressive aspirations of the Central Africans in the framework of democracy. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan p 86] 12,116

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CHAD

PROSPECTS SAID TO BE BLEAKER THAN ANY TIME SINCE INDEPENDENCE

London AFRICA in English Feb 81 pp 45, 47-48, 57

[Article by John Howe]

[Text]

In a manoeuvre reminiscent of its abortive unions with several neighbouring states, Libya last month announced yet another intended merger with trouble-torn Chad. Apart from its wider political implications, many African states see the move as the beginnings of even more dangerous Libyan military adventures in the region.

ALL doubts as to the extent of Libya's military involvement in Chad disappeared at the beginning of December when Libyan tanks and troops in Libyan uniform launched a major attack on the positions of Hissene Habre's Northern Armed Forces (FAN) in and around Ndjamen. Preceded by artillery fire which caused civilian casualties in the popular quarters in which the FAN were implanted, the first tank attacks were repulsed fairly easily. There was a short pause before renewed heavy attacks during the second week of December started an exodus of some 10,000 refugees who crossed the river to the Cameroon.

At the same time, it was reported that the FAN rear base at Abeche, in the east close to the Sudan border, had been surrounded and the town of Ati, mid-point on the road between Abeche and the capital, had been captured by troops of the Government coalition.

Since the fighting between former Defence Minister Habre and provisional President Goukouni Oueddei broke out last March, this road, which continues across the frontier to Sudan,

had been kept open. Cut off from their source of supplies, the FAN troops in Ndjamen ran out of food as artillery bombardment intensified. In the end, Libya's firepower proved too much for Hissene Habre, and he ordered his men to withdraw from the capital on the evening of 14 December.

Habre himself fled to the Cameroon, where President Ahidjo persuaded him to sign the ceasefire initialled by Goukouni at the end of November. His troops withdrew in good order, some across the river to the Cameroon where they were disarmed by the authorities, others heading for eastern Chad. At the same time the FAN garrison in Abeche broke through the encirclement and withdrew to the mountains around Biltine, taking its equipment.

Habre signed the Lome ceasefire agreement on 16 December. But in a series of remarks and interviews reported over the next fortnight he indicated that he intended to 'continue the struggle' and lead 'resistance to the Libyan invasion'. Under the new circumstances the FAN would abandon classic war tactics and develop a guerilla struggle. Contrary to reports, the

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former Defence Minister said, his forces did not suffer heavy casualties in Ndjama and are 'almost intact'.

Hissene Habre's present whereabouts are unknown and Cameroon issued an official statement on 1 January saying that he had not asked for political asylum and that 'if he does, it will not be granted'.

Nigeria hosted yet another peace conference on 23 December, attended by Chad's neighbours. Goukouni and the Libyans announced in advance that they saw no sense in a conference involving Hissene Habre, whose troops had been 'annihilated', and which proposed to discuss Libyan involvement in Chad. The conference took place behind closed doors and produced a bland communique couched in general terms which did not name Libya. Despite the mounting anxiety among the leaders of Chad's neighbours, discretion prevailed in the hope that the situation could be 'de-fused' without creating rifts in the OAU.

All this tact became redundant when, on 6 January, Libya and Chad announced that they were going to work towards 'complete unity between the two countries, a unity of the masses in which the power, the wealth and the arms will be in the hands of the people and its instruments, the congresses and people's committees'.

The announcement came at the end of a four-day visit to Tripoli by Goukouni, who said that French troops would never again be authorised to enter Chad. The communique also mentioned the 'reconstruction' of the Chad army by Libya and the opening of the frontier between the two countries.

The announcement was the sixth of its kind to come out of Tripoli. Like the five earlier romances (with Egypt, Sudan, and Syria and Tunisia) the new one appeared to be a source of embarrassment and anxiety everywhere except in Tripoli, and not least in Ndjama. Colonel Kamougue, Vice-President to Goukouni in the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) described the 'union' immediately as 'an impossible marriage'.

Within days, sources close to Goukouni were pointing out that what had been announced was only a project, and the details remain to be worked out. Abba Siddick, Higher Education Minister in the GUNT and leader of 'Original Frolinat' (lately resident in Algiers) also came out strongly against the project.

So did all of Chad's neighbours, the OAU, France and the United States. Only the Soviet Union among the foreign powers, and Benin and Congo in Africa, have supported the project. In those African countries most closely concerned, opposition was unanimous.

The change was most noticeable in the case of Nigeria and that of Niger, both of which until the announcement had tried to be tactful and 'live with' the Libyan presence in Chad in the hope that Libya could be persuaded tactfully to withdraw. On 5 January, even before the announcement had been made public, Nigeria gave members of the Libyan 'People's Bureau' in Lagos, which had just abandoned its claim to be an Embassy, 48 hours to get out of the country. (See Page 45).

Niger followed suit on 13 January, at the same time denouncing Libyan interference in its own internal affairs. Apart from border problems and violations of airspace, Niger is thought to be particularly annoyed by Colonel Gaddafi's recent remarks about the Tuaregs, including the allegation that these oppressed 'Arabs' and 'Libyans' were being kept in 'extermination camps' in Niger and Mali. In Nigeria's case, it is now rumoured that the Foreign Minister's complaints about Libyan purchase of supplies in Maiduguri (see AFRICA No. 113) followed violations of Nigerian airspace and unauthorised landings. The reinforcement of Nigeria's north-eastern air defences suggests there may be some truth in the rumours. There have also been allegations (so far unsupported) of a Libyan connection in the tragic Kano rioting.

Summit

Meeting from 12 to 14 January, a restricted OAU summit comprising the eight members of the 17th Summit

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Bureau of the OAU and the members of the OAU ad hoc committee on Chad, 12 Heads of State in all, also attended by President Houphouët-Boigny and observers from various countries including Egypt, met in Lomé (Togo) to discuss events in Chad.

The communique issued on 14 January condemned the project of fusion, urged a return to the terms of the Lagos accords, called upon Libya to withdraw its troops, and decided to send OAU observers and an OAU peacekeeping force from Benin, Congo, Guinea and Togo to supervise security in Chad and organize elections. The UN is to be asked for help.

Various Heads of State not immediately concerned by events in Chad — Gabon's President Bongo, King Hassan, President Houphouët-Boigny, former President Senghor and President Moi — have made stiff comments on 'Libyan subversion' and from these quarters, and Washington, there has been a tendency to see a Soviet shadow behind Libya. Both among these, and among francophone African countries with real interests at stake, there has been a certain sourness about recent French actions.

It will be recalled that not long ago Libya and France appeared to have reached some sort of agreement over Chad, and the announcement of the project of fusion interrupted the signing of five new oil concessions by Libya and Elf-Aquitain. This produced a row in France between the Government and Elf, which nevertheless a week later announced a new programme of heavy oil investment in Nigeria.

France's reply to its critics was that it remains ready to help its allies. But Chad had asked it to withdraw its troops, it had done so, and nobody had invited them back. It offered to increase its military aid to countries bordering Chad and within days had reinforced its garrisons in the CAR and sent a contingent of military experts to Niger. Troops, aviation and armour are also stationed in Gabon, Senegal, Ivory Coast and elsewhere.

On 14 January, however, an 'informed source' in Paris indicated that France would intervene militarily 'if Libya pushes its pawns too far' and 'on condition that the country concerned asks it to'. Apart from existing defence agreements with the CAR, Niger and Cameroon, France is cooperating (by means of a mission) with Sudan which it says is 'vulnerable' to Libyan action. Libya's response to these moves was to announce that it was strengthening its military presence in Chad to counter an alleged threat of invasion 'from France and Sudan', and to launch a 'diplomatic offensive' in defence of the project of fusion and its presence in Chad.

Excitement

There was a tendency among some observers to forget Chad itself amid all this excitement. The cessation of eight months of fighting must have provided some relief to Ndjama's remaining inhabitants. It was clear however that few members of the government coalition, even among Goukouni's own men who not long ago fought sharp battles with Libyan troops in northern Chad, regard the Libyan presence as an unmixed blessing. Libyan arms, money and supplies are an irresistible lure in a country ruined and ravaged by war. But Chad's very real rivalries and jealousies were apparent even in sharing out the Libyan largesse.

It seems likely that the project of fusion between Libya and Chad will finish Goukouni as a national leader, however long he remains President. By the same token, sympathy for Hissene Habre is said to have increased among Chadians, especially as most of the civilian casualties in Ndjama were produced by GUNT and Libyan, rather than FAN, artillery fire. Habre has tried to reassure the country's southern populations by dropping his earlier references to Islamic 'revolution'. He retains an effective armed force and is 'open to all possibilities' of outside support. The ingredients for another civil war therefore are all in place.

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In this context, the OAU will have to move fast, and will need a lot of luck, if it is to pacify Chad on the basis of the Lagos accords. Even this very remote possibility presupposes a swift Libyan climb-down, which in mid-January still looked very unlikely. Some substitute would have to be found for the resources now being poured in by Libya, and which used to come from France. There is no sign of what this substitute might be. Meanwhile prospects for Chad look bleaker than at any time since independence, and there is a very real danger of international conflict around its borders. ■

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COMORO ISLANDS

RESURFACING OF OPPOSITION DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Jan 81 p 49

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "The Reawakening of the 'Soilihists'"]

[Text] Several arguments are in confrontation within an opposition that feels strong enough to show itself in broad daylight.

A shameful masquerade, a pitiful production, reprehensible haste; what else can you call the process that has allowed the "special court" instituted for the occasion by President Ahmed Abdallah, to sentence, hurriedly and almost clandestinely, the principal friends of the former chief of state, Ali Soilih, who has been held in Moroni prison since the coup d'etat of Bob Denard in May 1978?

The proceedings were opened on 9 December after a secret "hearing," with the lawyers retained by the families being unable to become familiar with the dossier, meet with the accused or evaluate the sentences incurred. On 13 December Michel Zavrian, also representing Mourad Oussedik, came into a catastrophe in Moroni; his efforts to approach the prisoners, meet with judicial authorities or penetrate the hearing room were vain. And on 18 December it was announced that Mohamed Hamada and two former superior officers had been sentenced to life imprisonment for their attitude in the affair of the village of Iconi (where 10 persons were killed on 18 March 1978). Eleven other co-defendants were sentenced to 6 months to 20 years in prison.

Thus the worst has been avoided, at least for this proceeding: the death sentence. Undoubtedly the regime of Ahmed Abdallah was afraid to displease its principal protector--France--, which already has enough to do these days with the repercussions of the escapades and crimes of Bokassa, the former emperor of Central Africa. But this judgment is evidence that the friends of Abdallah are afraid and are trying to avert, with spectacular gestures of this kind, the reawakening of an opposition that feels its hour is drawing near.

We have described the shock produced within the Comoros' traditional political class by the resignation of Ambassador Said Ali Kemal* and his decision to form a national public safety committee in exile; the "treason" of a man who had played Abdallah's game for two years while occupying a key post in Paris--is not most of archipelago policy decided, as in the time of colonization, from the French capital?--disturbed the avenues of power, in the government as in the National Assembly. It is true that Kemal is the son of the late Prince Said Ibrahim, one of the few Comorian statesmen
*See AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 229: "Ubu in the Perfume Archipelago."

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whom Ali Soilih had been close to before he himself came to power; this counts, in a small country where the political life is very personalized, not to say "familial."

The Fear of Abdallah

But although the initiative of this personality contributed to smashing the regime from inside, it does not make for unanimity with the Comorian opposition, at home as abroad. Thus, the foreign branch of the Union of Comorians (UNIKOM) believes that Kemal's past hardly speaks in his favor; having lived for the most part in the West, he does not know the Comorian people and above all appears to be tempted to use as a springboard or allowance the situation given to him by his familial ancestry. In addition, his position in Ali Soilih's regime never was clear; and hardly anything happened, in any way, that might have been favorable to him, whatever he says today. Finally, among Abdallah's principal agents for two years, he did not dissociate himself from him until his own interests were found to be contradiction with those of the regime.

Some opponents who are claiming a pure "Soilihism" are afraid, therefore, that one day Kemal may be the instrument of a new "Central African comedy," the Elysee being on the lookout--this is no secret to anyone--for a "Dacko" replacement for the Comorians. They are opposing "the little people who are fighting and suffering" against a privileged person in exile who "jumps on the bandwagon," represents no one but himself and is in danger of dragging the Comoros into a new adventure.

But at a time when the political prisoners of Moroni, like a number of clandestine opponents, are experiencing the thunderbolts of repression, it is a time for the patriotic mobilization for unity, the defense of human rights, and against the division of the archipelago by France. This is chiefly the meaning of the solidarity actions organized in this month of January in Paris, in liaison with the French Communist and Socialist Parties, the N'Krumah Committee and the French Association for Friendship and Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa.

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CONGO

CHIEF OF STATE MAKES PROGRESS REPORT ON 1980 ECONOMIC POLICY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81 pp 87, 88

[Article: "Economic policy and the public sector in 1980"]

[Text] In the very long presidential message to the nation given at Brazzaville on 31 December as part of the celebration of the 11th anniversary of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party] and of the "42nd anniversary of its founder" (President Ngouabi, assassinated in 1977), Col Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese chief of state, specifically presented the balance of the economic policy for the year 1980 and more precisely the balance of the complementary program which concerned the public sector.

He recalled that in February 1979 the third extraordinary congress of the PCT had recommended that a plan of economic and social development be drawn up for 1982-1986 and "while waiting for such a plan to be put into effect," a program for 1980 and another one for 1981 also be prepared.

According to the president, the total cost of the complementary 1980 program in its definitive version, "in other words, taking into account the adjustments made at the time of approving the total budget," amounted to 89.7 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs identified according to their sources as follows: the state, 33.1 billion CFA francs; income of the enterprises themselves (auto-financing) 7 billion; local banks: 3.6 billion; foreign contributions, 45.5 billion. He noted that anticipated foreign financing had been realized to the extent of nearly 40 percent.

Setbacks in 1980 Program

The Chief of State also reviewed the projects anticipated in the 1980 program which it has been impossible to complete.

"Thus, in the domain of the rural economy, the production of tobacco on the level of the Congolese Tobacco Office and the production of mangos by the Loudima fruit station, of manioc and wet rice by the Mantoumba farm of beef cattle and swine by the N'Gamaba and Kombe farms are not reaching the lower goals.

"The installation of a forestry management unit in the Sangha has been impossible to accomplish.

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"On the level of the Department of Mines and Energy, the SOCOREM [expansion unknown] program is experiencing severe difficulties and the development of the Yanga-Koubanza mine has been delayed. The works of the Moukondo power station have been compromised for this year. The Impfondo well could not be completed. The construction of the working-class city in Bouenza has been delayed. The works to pipe water to Gamboma, Boundji and Madingo-Kayes have suffered delay.

"On the level of industry and tourism, the Pointe-Noire Motel could not be completed as anticipated in the complementary program. The production of olive and other fruit oil and of oil cake has not achieved the goals desired on the HUTILKA [expansion unknown] level.

"Just like the production of meal by the cattle-feed mill at Nkayi, cement by CIDOLOU [Domanide de Loutete Cement Plant], imprinted textiles and dyed textiles by SOTEXCO [expansion unknown].

"As far as the Department of Transports is concerned, the installation of a water distribution network in the port of Pointe-Noire, the acquisition of tanker barges for navigable routes, a tugboat for the Port of Brazzaville, replacement parts for river transports, the works on the Impfondo Airport, the repair of the Brazzaville runway, the lighting of the Pointe-Noire runway and the construction of a maintenance workshop for Lina-Congo [Congo National Airlines] are either delayed or compromised.

"In the domain of public works and construction, the works on the land-registry building at Nkayi, the acquisition of the civil engineering material for the RNTP [Congolese National Administration of Transports and Public Works] have suffered a delay.

"As for the Department of Posts, Telecommunications and Information, it can be noted by the extension of the overhead and underground networks in Brazzaville, Loubomo and Pointe-Noire, the construction of a commutation road at Pointe-Noire and the installation of a network of teleprinters for the ACI [CONGOLESE INFORMATION AGENCY] have also suffered delay.

"In the Department of Commerce, the construction of the OFNACOM [National Marketing Office] depots at Oyo and at Mossaka, the construction of the ONLP [expansion unknown] store at Impfondo and the management and equipping of a supermarket at Mpila are progressing at an unsatisfactory rate.

"On the level of the Ministry of the Interior, the construction of the Enyelle PCA [Administrative Control Post], of the regional directorates of state security at Sibiti and at Kinkala, of the public security post of Talangai and the remodeling of the Owando waterworks have been impossible to fully complete in 1980. The situation is the same with regard to the construction of the buildings for the regional labor inspection at Ouesso and Makoua as far as the Labor Ministry is concerned.

"On the sociocultural level, certain lacks have also been observed. This is the case with the Gamboma Secondary School and of the University Pavilion in the domain of national education; of the Loubomo Hospital and the medical centers at Divenie and Loutete, the management of the infants' care center and public nursery at

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Makelekele, the management of the social center at Owando, the construction of the social center at Impfondo and of the medical center at Madingou for the Health Department."

A chief of state then reviewed the "very real progress" realized in 1980:

"In the domain of rural economy, the production of palm oil by the RNTP [expansion unknown] has been accomplished in suitable quantities at Etoumbi and Kounda in comparison with the anticipated goals in spite of considerable difficulties. The production of wet rice and of corn by the agricultural and stock-raising company has achieved the anticipated figures. This is also true of the production of coffee and to a certain degree of cacao even if the results do not exceed those of the preceding years.

"The production of meat by the Luila ranch corresponds overall to the anticipated production. The production of meat-type chickens by SONAVI [expansion unknown] is satisfactory on the whole.

"The areas cultivated on the level of certain units correspond to the anticipated figures and at times exceed them. This is the case on the level of the former SOCOTON [expansion unknown] for corn and wet rice, the manioc farm at Makoua for the cultivated areas of manioc, on the level of the Matsoumba farm for corn and wet rice. In relation to credits, the production of wood both in logs and sawn lumber is on the whole satisfactory, on the level of SNEB [expansion unknown] and of SONITRAB [expansion unknown] in spite of many difficulties.

"Overall forest production is experiencing a positive evolution. The works of planting pines and eucalyptus are progressing normally and in a satisfactory way on the level of the UAB [expansion unknown].

"The construction works on the Owando and Loubomo mixed farms are progressing normally on the whole in spite of a few bottlenecks. The performance of the OCB [Congolese Wood Office] is improving. As of 30 November 1980 the OCB bought 275,971 cubic meters of logs from the woodcutters and it exported 270,000 cubic meters of logs, while in 1978 the amount exported was 182,666 cubic meters. The cash flow of the OCB on 30 November 1980 was 8.36 billion CFA francs or 176 percent of the 1978 cash flow.

"As for the Department of Mines and Energy the works of constructing electrical stations at Talangai, Kitsoundi, Mfilou and Dongou are being carried out normally. The acquisition of transport and distribution material by Hydro-Congo has been accomplished. The repair of the refinery is progressing satisfactorily. The construction of the station on the high-tension line for Loudima-Pointe-Noire is being carried out suitably while at the beginning nothing more than a study was anticipated. The strengthening of the means of production of energy in some secondary centers has been accomplished: in Owando, Makoua, Ouesso. The same is true of the extension of the water-supply network to Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. The equipment for the drilling at Pointe-Noire has been acquired.

"The works for the construction of the water works at N'Kayi and of the water treatment plant as well as the installation of the primary network have been carried out on the whole.

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"As far as industry is concerned, the production on the level of SUCO [expansion unknown] can be considered as relatively satisfactory taking into account the anticipations as well as the production by SOTEXCO [expansion unknown] as far as bleached textiles are concerned. The works of installation at UTS [expansion unknown] are being carried out in a satisfactory way.

"In the transport sector, the works of dredging the channel and the basin in the port of Pointe-Noire have been correctly carried out as well as various works in the port. The works of realigning the railroad are being conducted normally. The anticipated works in the ports of Mossaka and Ouesso have been accomplished in a suitable way. The rebuilding of the Pointe-Noire airport has been completed and the works on the Owando airport are being carried out at a satisfactory rate.

"On the level of the Ministry of Public Works and Construction the 384 housing units anticipated on the level of SOPROGI-SONACO [National Construction Company] have been completed. It is proper to point out that in one year, the number of housing units constructed approaches the number constructed since independence. The road-maintenance program is fairly well kept up on the whole. The works of asphaltting the Etsouali-Obouya road are being carried out normally and according to the prior planning.

"On the level of the Commerce Ministry: the management and the equipping of the OFNACOM [National Marketing Office] entrepots in Brazzaville and Loubomo have been accomplished. The works of installing the refrigeration entrepots at Pointe-Noire, Owando and Brazzaville are going forward at an acceptable rate. As for OFNACOM, for a long time considered as chronically ill, we are witnessing at this moment a vigorous recovery. The cash flow in 1979 was 4.45 billion. On 30 November 1980 the cash flow had risen to 6 billion. The gross income in 1979 was 115 million. On 30 November 1980 it was 453 million.

"On the level of the Interior Ministry: the construction of the PCA [Administrative Control Post] at Louingui and Mourgoundou has been carried out in a fairly suitable way as well as the works of construction of the criminology laboratory, the repair of city routes on Terenkyo number 17. The works of electrification in Brazzaville, the centenary bridge and the negotiations for acquiring collective transport vehicles for the city of Brazzaville are being carried out as anticipated.

"[....] On the level of the Ministry of National Education a certain number of projects that were held back, like the remodeling of dormitories or the completion of certain labors, equipping laboratories, opening three regional secondary schools (Ouesso, Kinkala, Mouyondzi) etc., have been carried out in a relatively satisfactory way. The productive work at the school has experienced a particular development thanks to the effective and creative application of the word of order "one school, one field," which deserves a very special mention here. On the levels of culture, arts and sports and scientific research, the essential part of the projects held back has been carried out in a normal way. [....] On the level of health: the projects concerning the struggle against such scourges as trypanosomiasis, the great epidemics (onchocercosis, tuberculosis, leprosy...), the completion of the Ntam dispensary, the repairing of the A.Cisse Hospital, etc., have been carried out satisfactorily [...]."

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Solidarity Fund

Finally, the Chief of State spoke of the balance of the National Solidarity Fund, instituted in 1978. He distinguished the 1978-1979 period and the year 1979.

In 1978-1979, according to President Sassou Nguesso, the resources of the funds were divided as follows (in millions of CFA francs):

Ministry of Rural Economy: the Pointe-Noire bird-raising complex, 628.14; the Owando mixed farm, 595.92; the Loubomo pig farm, 449.19; the bovine experimental center, 300; the cattle-feed factory, 40; the Cuban bird-raising project, 282.82; the Makoua manioc farm, 82.2; the Mbe manioc farm, 84.3; the Mantsoumba manioc farm, 231.76; specific actions in the present environment, 259.

Ministry of Public Works and Construction: Construction of housing by SONACO-SOPROGI: 1.2 billion CFA francs. The council of ministers has added to these activities the purchase of medicines amounting to 342.54 million CFA francs. The total for the 1978-1979 projects financed by the fund came to 4.49 billion CFA francs.

In 1978-1979, the National Solidarity Fund (raised by wage deductions) brought in 5.61 billion CFA francs. Some 800 million CFA francs from the 1.12 billion CFA franc surplus were used for the aforementioned housing program, as complementary financing.

The 322.2 million CFA balance has not yet been appropriated for a specific goal by the government.

"As for the National Solidarity Fund for the year 1980, receipts in hand as of 13 December 1980 are calculated at 2.77 billion francs showing a surplus of 222.7 million francs with respect to anticipations. Let us recall that the National Solidarity Fund in 1980 was one of the lines which permitted the complementary program to be carried out," the President declared after emphasizing elsewhere that the framework of a series of measures in the direction of "a progressive improvement in the conditions of existence of the masses," the fund had been suppressed during that year. He noted that the state had also reestablished "advances with a financial effect" and had recruited "more than 4000 young people" and that it would recruit others "as the overall situation will permit."

1981 Perspectives

Touching on the perspectives of the government's economic policy, the Congolese chief of state declared:

"The recovery of the state sector is an absolutely indispensable operation and an important factor in future plans. The recovery of this sector must begin in 1981.

"In fact it would be absolutely useless to create other enterprises if those that exist do not work and constitute a more and more unsupportable load for the Congolese people. On the basis of the directives given by the political leadership, a national conference of state enterprises, meeting in three phases during several months (in 1980) made an exhaustive diagnosis of the present situation of

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the state sector and drew up a recovery plan for each state enterprise. The conference of the state enterprises permitted, in addition to drawing up recovery plans, the adoption of a charter of the enterprises which "defines the general principles which should henceforth regulate the life of the state enterprises for their recovery and profitability." We think thus to consolidate one of the fundamental bases for constructing an independent national economy, in other words, the state economic sector, and avoid the infernal cycle of creating and curing whose final term alone will cost us 400 billion CFA francs for the next 6 years.

"The construction of infrastructures for the purpose of opening up a country is an essential goal in a country where the industrial investment effort has been very small. The construction of roads, bridges, maritime and river ports, railroads, airports, adequate telecommunication, infrastructures such as radio beams, terrestrial stations and the strengthening of national radio broadcasting, play an essential and decisive role in the economic integration of our country, the formation of a veritable national market belonging to the Congolese nation. It constitutes at the same time one of the major objectives of future plans and the condition of its success. However, the infrastructures cost a lot of money. Adding then to the 1981 program constitutes a manifest indication of a will and of a tendency which must turn out to be irreversible.

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LIBERIA

BRIEFS

PREPARATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION--Master Sergeant Samuel K Doe, the chairman of the National Redemption Council, announced on 24 December in his Christmas message to the nation, the forthcoming appointment of a committee which will be charged with writing a new democratic constitution. "We seized power to restore a political and social system based on democratic principles," he declared, as he reaffirmed "the promise of the soldiers to return to their barracks." The Liberian President additionally specified that in his November speech (MTM for 21 November, p 3100) he had in no way imposed a total freeze on employment. "The government has not prevented private enterprise from giving jobs to the people," he declared. "I would be happy for them to help the revolution to provide more jobs. They must not use government measures as a pretext to stop hiring." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81, p 82] 12,116

ROK TRADE AGREEMENT--Maj Joseph N Douglas, the Liberian Minister of Industry and Transport, signed a trade agreement between his country and South Korea on 22 December at Seoul. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81, p 82] 12,116

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MOZAMBIQUE

ANALYSIS OF 1981 CENTRAL PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Jan 81 p 98

[Article: "The People's Assembly defines economic and social goals for 1981"]

[Excerpts] The seventh session of the People's Assembly of Mozambique, which has just been held at Maputo, completed its labors on Christmas Eve and President Samora Machel summed up its accomplishments at the closing session.

The deputies studied and approved the 1981 central state plan and the 1981 budget.

The 1981 central state plan should be "the first assured step of the decade of victory over underdevelopment," Samora Machel declared. He aims to correct the sometimes insufficient results which have been obtained in previous years and which are resumed in the following table (indexed on the base of 100 in 1978):

	1978	1979	1980 Goal	1980 Realized	1980 Goal Percent Realized
Agriculture	100%	93%	135%	114%	84%
Stock-Raising	100%	128%	150%	164%	114%
Industry	100%	99%	130%	114%	71%
Construction	100%	93%	130%	130%	100%
Provisioning	100%	93%	110%	98%	89%

It is obvious from this table that in 1980 the goal of the plan was exceeded in the stock-raising sector and achieved in the construction sector. In the other sectors the percentage of realization was lower than the goals, for diverse reasons: lack of means or of raw materials, malfunctioning of transport, drought, insufficient manpower, etc.

The central state plan for 1981 aims at two principal sectors: that of strategic products for export (cashew nuts, sugar, cotton, prawns, lumber, tea, coal, cement, tantalite, bagasse, molasses, citrus fruit, sisal, textiles) and that of strategic products for the provisioning of the people (corn and wheat flour, rice, potatoes, fish, edible oils, meat, milk, soap, textiles, matches, electric batteries, salt).

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All structures and sectors directly or indirectly involved in production, in marketing, in distributing and in transporting those products should take all necessary measures to realize the planned goals, which are fixed thus with relation to the 1980 estimated production: agricultural production, 132 percent; industrial production, 136 percent; transport, 142 percent.

As far as strategic products for export are concerned, the objective aimed at is to export the maximum and always to exceed the planned levels. For the strategic products for supplying the people, it is a question of reducing the level of imports by increasing national production.

The 1981 central state plan, in its synthesis, makes a special reference to liquid fuels. Taking into account the increase in prices of imported crude oil and the fact that a part of production is destined for export, it has been judged necessary to adopt some concrete measures aiming at the reduction of the domestic consumption of fuels: those measures will be taken on the level of each province.

It is to be noted to complete this chapter that the goals fixed for the 1981 central state plan have taken the form of a law to clearly mark their obligatory character and to make of them "a platform for the takeoff of the Mozambican economy."

We have few details available concerning the general state budget for 1981, presented as the financial component of the central state plan and the guarantee of the mobilization of financial resources for executing the plan approved at 16 million meticals, the principal part of the income still derived from taxes, in spite of the profound transformations already carried out in the economic structures of Mozambique.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

ITALIAN AIRPLANE PURCHASE NEGOTIATIONS--Negotiations are now going on between AERITALIA and the Government of Nigeria for the purchase by the latter of six twin-turbined G-222's to equip its air force. [Text] [Paris LE MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUE in French Feb 81 p 9]

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RWANDA

REPORT ON COUNTRY'S ECONOMY FOR 1979-1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3360

[Text] Rwandan Republic Planning Ministry recently published its reports on the economic and cyclical country's outlook at the end of December 1979. This report was completed with the 1980 forecast figures.

Compared to 1977 and 1978 which registered a sustained increase, 1979 was marked by the closing of the border with Uganda, which brought with it a lack of supplies and a ceasing of transport for the first 5 months of 1979.

The consequences were felt until the end of December with a decline of activities in the industrial sector, delays in the completion of development projects, inflation on the order of 20 percent, a sharp increase of private and State financial charges and a disorganization of trading circuits.

Extraordinary emergency aid supplied by international organizations and industrialized countries is computed at 844 million FRw (1 FRw= FF 0.045) during the last months part of it as gifts in kind. With the grant of an aid of 57.000 tons of food products donated by the international community, the food situation of the country was clearly improved during the first months of 1980.

Purchases of marketable coffee totalled 30.540 tons in 1979 compared to 23,665 tons in 1978, therefore exceeding the goals assigned by Plan II. The coffee's inferior quality, unchanged since 1974 has somewhat improved. The Coffee Bureau exports measured over 40,625 tons of which 10.175 tons in view of the previous program and which, with the price increase produced a return of 12.8 billion FRw compared to 4.5 billion FRw in 1978. Forecasts for 1980 are in the order of 24.000 tons and should obtain 7.3 billion FRw in export revenue.

In 1979 the production of tea mills totaled 5.800 tons of processed tea, compared to 5,300 tons in 1978. Four new processing facilities should start now up to the end of 1981. Financing is being assured by foreign bidding (EDF [European Development Fund], Kuwait, West Germany and FAC [Communal Agricultural Farm]). Export forecasts for 1980 bring over 6,100 tons and should obtain 1.2 billion FRw in revenue.

Far behind Plan II's forecasts is the pyrethrum yield which did not reach more than 795 tons in dried flowers in 1979, providing 37.4 tons of raw extract at 32 percent. Also, falling short of the Plan's goal is the production of quinquina bark which did not exceed 544 tons in 1979.

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The production of sugar, which began to yield in 1976 exceeded the Plan's II goals, producing 2,350 tons of refined sugar in 1979. For the current year the tonnage should go slightly over this figure.

Purchases of electricity in Zaire caused an expenditure of 86 million FRw in 1979. They should exceed 100 million in 1980.

In 1979 mining production, underwritten by the Rwandan Mining Company shows a setback, with 1,910 tons of cassiterite, 47 tons of colombo tantalite, 782 tons of wolfram, 86 tons of beryl and 15 kg of gold. This production represented an overall value of 1.8 billion FRw (compared to 2.1 billion in 1978).

The modern small industry, whose annual growth rate assigned by Plan II is 7.1 percent, becomes an important investment effort. But, private investments decreased to a large extent. The public program concerns the country's equipment for tea mills, refining of pyrethrum extract, a facility for banana fermentation for the production of "beer" and banana juice whose production is running against a lot of difficulties and the tin foundry which should be operational by mid 1981. The pig iron foundry project was the object of a new study for the storing of raw materials (imported scrap iron).

Manufacturing output was seriously affected by the crisis. In addition, the companies suffer from a lack of technical personnel and an insufficiency of operating capital. However, the production of soap should mark an increase in 1981.

Cement, imported in its entirety from Uganda and Kenya, has been in short supply for 5 months and construction activity decreased sharply.

In other respects 1979 was a difficult year for the hotel industry. The opening of new hotels made the employment coefficient drop to 15 percent for the whole country and to 21 percent for Kigali.

Because of the coffee export and marketing campaign peak output, the trade balance for 1979 was positive by 3.6 billion FRw, compared to a deficit of 3.1 billion FRw in 1978. Import forecasts climbed to 21.7 billion FRw for 1980, shipment and insurance included, compared to 11.6 billion in exports of which: Coffee, 7.3 billion; tea, 1.2 billion; mining products, 2.3 billion.

Due to the closing of borders for 4 months, there were less import regulations than in 1978 and, with the contribution of foreign bids, the general balance of payments for 1979 exceeded 7.1 billion FRw, the particular balance of goods and services intervening with a positive sum of 1.1 billion.

The regular budget for the 1979 fiscal year was austere, revenue and expenditures balanced at 9.2 billion FRw. Therefore, the sharp rise of coffee market price produced a revenue surplus of 2.7 billion. The regular budget for the 1980 fiscal year remained balanced at 11.2 billion (more than 22 percent over the preceding year). Concerning the development budget, its capital is being increased from 1.6 billion in 1979 to 2.2 billion in 1980, with 1.2 billion in national loans.

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At the end of December 1979, the national public debt is fixed at 3.5 billion FRw. This represents 4 percent of the gross national product and its office absorbed 9 percent of the regular budget. At the same time the rate of foreign public debt represented the exchange value of 10.7 billion FRw, sum total less than the year's exports and corresponding to 12 percent of the gross national product. During the year, the Federal Republic of Germany annulled the debt incurred with them (1.5 billion). In 1979 the foreign debt office absorbed 3 percent of the regular budget; this percentage will rise to 5 percent in 1980, taking into consideration the drawing made on the margin yet available at the end of 1979 (9 billion).

With 89 billion FRw, the gross national product for the year of 1979 results in an increase, at current prices, of 16.5 percent over 1978. The forecasts for 1980 bring over 103.3 billion, i.e., a progression of 16 percent. The GNP is entered at 15,890 FRw in 1978, per capita or \$171. Its level will let this figure remain stable in 1979.

The increase of prices was brisk in 1979. From over 7 percent to over 23 percent on products of great consumption. Imported inflation is expected to exceed 14 percent in 1980.

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SENEGAL

PRESIDENT SAID TO HAVE BEGUN HIS RULE WELL

London AFRICA in French Feb 81 pp 25-26

[Article by Kin-Kiey Mulumba]

[Text]

BBREAKING with one-party rule, establishing a moderate multi-party system, running in Presidential elections against an opposition candidate with authorised access to the mass media, ... Leopold Sedar Senghor was recently already looking like a different statesman on the African political scene where the retention of power at all costs is the rule rather than the exception.

In deciding to resign his post as Head of State last December when nothing apparently forced him to do so — no major health worries or threatened impeachment — the Senegalese leader is conforming to his own concept of power and is strengthening the characteristics of an image which can be understood better with these words spoken the day after the announcement of his departure: 'In politics, you should know when to go!'

Paradoxically, Senghor's exit raises more problems than it solves. Under an amendment to Article 35 of the Senegalese Constitution, on the death or resignation of the President or when the Supreme Court rules to impeach him, it is the Prime Minister who takes over the duties of the Head of State until the Presidential mandate expires. he names a New Prime Minister and forms a new Government.

This amendment explains the succession on 1 January of Prime Minister Abdou Diouf to the Presidency without the elections until 1983 when the five-year term to which President Senghor was elected runs out.

However, this amendment was passed in April 1976 by President Senghor who had just celebrated his 70th birthday, and came at a time when the parliament — composed solely of Socialist Party (PS) members — gained a certain reputation for passing several laws restricting civil liberties. It has as a result always been contested by the Senegalese opposition, legal or clandestine, which demands its out and out annulment.

In the eyes of the opposition, when the Presidency fell vacant, there should have been a new democratic choice. In other words, it is demanding that on the death or resignation of the President fresh elections should be held. With the departure of President Senghor, the opposition seems determined more than ever to raise the issue with obvious implications on the legitimacy of the men delegated to take over power and the retention of the amendment.

But does the opposition have enough muscle to topple President

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Diouf in an election? The Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), led by Dakar lawyer Abdoulaye Wade, constitutes the main opposition group, and the only opposition party represented in the parliament. But it only has 16 members in Parliament compared with the ruling party's 84.

In addition, the PDS's image is somewhat tarnished in opposition circles; it has been reproached for flirting with Senghor's people. Like most members of his party, Wade defected from the PS. He left the party only after a petty ideological struggle which did not go his way. The alternative political programme proposed by the PDS, according to its critics, differs very little from the programme of the ruling party. It has also been said that some wind was taken out of the PDS's sails when a large number of reforms that it had envisaged were implemented by the PS in its attempt to defuse the crisis which was shaking the country.

The threat

The real threat to the regime of President Diouf, it would appear, comes less from the opposition, united or not, than from the PS itself, more particularly from the so-called

'barons' who — during the 10 years that Diouf was Prime Minister — dampened their ambition because of President Senghor's charisma. They have built themselves political strongholds which Diouf — although Prime Minister — had not succeeded in forming, even in his own region of Louga.

In his farewell address to the nation, Senghor told the country that the new President was more vigorous than some thought him to be and that he would not hesitate to provide proof of this. These words must have sounded like a free advertisement. Certainly, President Diouf will keep the 'Senghor hat', at least he has said he will. He has vowed to continue with the same vigour the recovery plan, and, without doubt, with the co-operation of France which at the same time as the new President was taking office, announced that it would give Senegal — through the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economic (CCE) — an 'exceptional' loan of FF120 million so that it could face up to the difficult economic situation. On the political front, the new President is said to be thinking of widening the democratic spectrum in Senegal. In fact, President Diouf seems rather to have begun his rule well. But will he keep up the momentum? ■

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SENEGAL

RADICALIZATION OF SENEGALESE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERFANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 134

[Article: "Toward a Radicalization of the Senegalese Democratic Party"]

[Text] The Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) has held its national convention in Dakar on 5-6 January; according to party reports, there were 1,600 delegates representing the 32 department and city federations, plus representatives of organizations integrated into or affiliated to the PDS.

On this occasion, Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, general secretary of the PDS, presented to the delegates an introductory report entitled: "The PDS in the Face of the Crisis." The main conclusions of this second national convention show a determination to "radicalize the party."

According to the resolution, this radicalization of the opposition offered by the PDS (a party with liberal leanings) to the government and to the Socialist Party (now in power) shall express itself through a strengthening of party organization, discipline, and mobilization. It shall not involve the resignation of the PDS deputies at the National Assembly where this party is the only political opposition group represented (it holds 16 seats out of 100), although such a resignation had been contemplated. However, the convention reserves its right to have recourse to "any extreme solution" should the government attack PDS leaders.

The convention recommends that PDS leaders accept to discuss the modification of the present voting system and prepare themselves for a "possible confrontation" with the Socialist Party should the latter "persist in its attitude." It also advocates an intensification of their efforts to have all political parties recognized, and to achieve the coordination of the opposition parties "committed to change."

With respect to Mr Abdou Diouf's accession to power, the convention has condemned Article 35 of the Senegalese Constitution which has made it possible and it considers that "the present power is illegitimate." Therefore, the delegates are demanding that free and democratic elections be organized immediately.

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As they see it, however, elections must be preceded by a revision of the voting code such that magistrates would become involved in the supervision of the polls. The PDS demands that the truthfulness of the polls be guaranteed by "the police force's effectively supervising the polls instead of being placed at the disposal of the polling station chairmen who use them to trample the rights of the opposition."

Accordingly to the general secretary of the PDS, "the division of the opposition has made Senghor's strength." He stated that the opposition had decided to unite against the Socialist Party. Maitre Wade indicated that "the PDS, with its 700,000 active members, will support unity for the installation of a government of the people."

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SENEGAL

TRUDEN PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO COUNTRY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 pp 134, 135

[Article: "Canadian Prime Minister's Visit"]

[Text] Mr Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, made an official visit to Senegal on 11-13 January. Mr Trudeau was received twice by Mr Abdou Diouf; this was the first official visit of an important foreign personality to Mr Diouf, who became president of the Republic on 1 January. Mr Trudeau also had a meeting with Mr Habib Thiam, Senegal's new prime minister.

Dakar is the second stop in a trip aimed at resuming the North-South dialogue; Mr Trudeau had cancelled his official visits to Austria and Algeria when he found himself held up by avalanches in an Austrian ski resort.

Dakar, in a way, is the counterpart of Mr Trudeau's stop in Nigeria: one of the two countries speaks French, the other English; one is essentially an agricultural country and it has suffered a lot from the drought and from the energy crisis, whereas the other has large oil resources available for its development. However, politically speaking, as is stressed in Ottawa, the personality of the former president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, his international role among French-speaking countries, and his influence in Africa, have made Senegal a privileged partner in discussions with Canada.

The two countries, which agree on subjects such as the North-South dialogue or maritime law, have frequent consultations, especially at the United Nations. These close relations have been translated into facts during President Senghor's six visits to Canada.

Although trade relations between the two countries remain modest, Canada still ranks second as Senegal's partner with respect to cooperation (agriculture, health, fisheries, energy) after France, and about equal with the Federal Republic of Germany.

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SENEGAL

CENTRAL FUND GRANTS OVER 4 BILLION CFA FRANCS IN LOANS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 135

[Article: "Reafforestation and Cement Plant; Cooperation: Three Loans From the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation Totalling 4,705 Billion CFA Francs"]

[Text] The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation has just granted Senegal three loans for a total of 4,705 billion CFA francs. The first one is a loan for 30 years, with reimbursement deferred for 10 years, and a low rate of interest: 1.5 percent per year during the deferment period, 2 percent later on. Its amount is 705 million CFA francs and it is intended to finance part of a reafforestation program. This program will cover 2,000 hectares of industrial eucalyptus plantations, 3,000 hectares of rural plantations, and the development of 10,000 hectares of natural forest.

The remaining four billion CFA francs have been granted to SOCOCIM Industries [West African Cement Company] to finance part of the expansion of its cement plant. Two billions are loaned at market conditions; the remaining two at an annual interest rate of seven percent. Both loans are for 15 years, including 5 years' deferment of the reimbursement.

With this loan, SOCOCIM will be able to undertake its expansion program aimed at increasing its annual production capacity from 360,000 to 825,000 tons. Its present production is hardly sufficient to cover the needs of the country, and there have been sporadic shortages.

This expansion program has been judged preferable, for the time being, to the construction of a second, larger cement plant which would produce much more than the market requires, and at a cost higher than SOCOCIM's.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

STIRN'S VISIT--Mr Olivier STirn, secretary of state in charge of Foreign Affairs, will visit Senegal on 16-17 January; this visit falls within the scope of his new position with Mr Robert Galley, French minister for Defense and Cooperation. During his visit to Dakar, Mr Stirn will meet the president of the Republic, Mr Abdou Diouf; he will also have discussions with the prime minister, Mr Habib Thiam, and with leading members of the new Senegalese government. These discussions will bear on bilateral relations, more particularly on the future of the cooperation between the two countries and on the present situation in Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 134] 9294

INCREASED GASOLINE PRICES--On 11 January, the prices for regular and premium gasoline in Senegal were raised by 25 CFA francs. According to an official press release, this new increase, which raises the price of premium gasoline from 170 to 195 CFA francs, and that of regular gasoline from 160 to 175 CFA francs, is the result of the price increase decided by OPEC, of the increase in the exchange rate of the dollar, and of the creation of a 15 percent tax on the importation of oil products into Senegal. At the same time, the prices for the Diesel oil used in fishing boats and outboard motors have been decreased. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 135] 9294

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SEYCHELLES

SOLIDARITY CONGRESS REVIEWED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Jan 81 pp 48-49

[Article by Erhaf Seiler: "The Solidarity Congress"]

[Text] The Second National Congress of the Seychellois People's Progressive Front (SPPF) was held last 10 and 11 December in Victoria, and was attended by over 100 delegates from all over the country. Special schedules--from 1600 until late at night--had been chosen so as not to disturb the country's economic activities.

As President Albert Rene emphasized when he opened the sessions, those attending the congress, who throughout the year were tuned in to the people's needs, had as their essential task the defining of the broad directions of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country. Putting the results into operation will then be the province of the Central Executive Committee, whose duty it will be to outline work directives in the various fields for the ministerial departments concerned.

"To discuss truly serious problems and take really important decisions," such was the watchword put forth by President Albert Rene at the opening session. The discussions were also dominated by the concern aroused by the excessive militarization of the Indian Ocean, and the congress was a demonstration of international solidarity with all of the liberation movements and progressive countries of the world. Those were two of the main themes of the congress. Several resolutions were adopted with respect to them. One of them recalls the SPPF's proposals to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone, and reaffirms the determination of the Seychelles to carry on the struggle for the demilitarization of that region, by dismantling foreign military bases and the departure of the forces of foreign powers.

At the same time the congress condemned the military escalation in the region, which is being carried out under the fallacious pretexts of ensuring the protection of the oil route or dealing with recent events in the Gulf. In this connection, the resolution deplors the attitude of certain states bordering the Indian Ocean, which have agreed to grant facilities to the foreign powers or to have military bases installed in their territories, these measures contributing to the intensification of the militarization of the region. In conclusion, the congress reiterated the SPPF's appeal in favor of the dismantling of the Diego Garcia base and the return of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

With regard to the general policy resolution, it reaffirms the militant solidarity and the support of the Seychelles for the African liberation movements, especially

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the SWAPO in Namibia, the ANC in South Africa, the Polisario Front and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Finally, the congress, which adopted a modification of the party statutes, reaffirmed its full and complete confidence in President France Albert Rene as president of the SPPF and chief of state; it also proclaimed once again its devotion to the socialist principles contained in the party's program and its determination to carry on the revolution of 5 June 1977.

[Sidebar]

An Avant-garde Party

Founded in 1964, the Seychelles Peoples United Party (SPUP), shortly after the revolution of 5 June 1977, became the SPPF. This transformation marked a deepening of the party's political role, more precisely the passage to a higher level, from the struggle of a mass party for independence to that of an avant-garde party responsible at one and the same time for setting the broad directions of the country and watching over the setting up of the program of action evolving from it.

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TANZANIA

DECLINE IN FOOD PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 148

[Article: "Considerable Decline in Food Production"]

[Text] The Tanzanian National Milling Corporation (NMC) which has a monopoly on the purchase of the farmers' food production, has just announced that its 1980 purchases totalled only 294,300 tons, compared with 345,000 tons in 1979. This represents a drop of over 40 percent in the marketed food production of Tanzania last year.

According to the general manager of the company, Mr C. Y. Mpupua--as quoted by the Tanzanian press agency SHIHATA--this decline is mainly due to poor weather conditions.

Most purchases were made around Arusha (48,657 tons), Dodoma (39,173 tons), Rukwa (21,777 tons), Iringa (19,104 tons), Mbeya (16,389 tons), and Ruvuma (14,546 tons).

The 1980 figures for each crop are given below, the figures for 1979 are between parentheses: corn, 94,575 tons (139,425 tons); paddy, 4,606 tons (25,171 tons); rice, 7,472 tons (9,122 tons); wheat, 25,964 tons (24,544 tons); manioc, 39,341 tons (3,910 tons); millet, 318 tons (1,268 tons); sorgho, 17,928 tons (23,709 tons); small millet, 1,324 tons (14,009 tons); beans, 12,291 tons (26,076 tons); peas, 18,578 tons (27,392 tons).

It should be noted that corn was purchased primarily in the areas around Dodoma, Iringa, Arusha, Rukwa and Songea. As for rice, it comes from the Mbarali farm, near Mbeya.

In 1981, the NMC expects to purchase from the farmers 226,000 tons of food products, including 100,000 tons of corn. This is a forecast which has been adjusted to take into account the poor results of 1980; forecast purchases for the past season were 400,000 tons.

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TANZANIA

SISAL INDUSTRY'S DECENTRALIZATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 148

[Article: "Decentralization of Sisal Industry"]

[Text] In accordance with decisions made in August 1979 by the sole party, the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), the Tanzanian sisal industry has just become decentralized.

Five independent companies have been created by the Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA) formerly the sole organization in charge of the sisal industry in the country.

Under the new system, which came into effect last 1 January, TSA retains only three functions: defining a general sisal policy; passing on to the other companies any information concerning sisal; marketing the production.

The five companies are as follows:

- Muheza Sisal Company which has its headquarters at the Kibaranga farm, in the Korogwe district; its manager is Mr Peter Feer.
- Ngombezi Sisal Company, also in the Korogwe district; its manager is Mr N. M. Nnko.
- Mombo Sisal Company, in the same district; it is managed by Mr A.M. Lukwaro.
- Morogoro Sisal Company, managed by Mr G.O. Seng'Enge.
- Kimamba Sisal Company, in the same area (Morogoro); it is managed by Mr S.A. Shoo.

As a result of the creation of these companies, TSA has had its staff reduced by 250 to 150 people. There have been no lay-offs, though, just a transfer of administrative personnel to the newly created companies.

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

WATER, ELECTRIC POWER OFFICIALS--The Tanzanian government has just appointed a team of three, headed by the former head secretary at the Ministry of Development in the capital, Mr G. B. Minja, to supervise the construction of the water and electricity supply systems in Dodoma, the future capital of the country, in the center of continental Tanzania. The city, which now has some 75,000 inhabitants, is not yet adequately supplied with water and electricity. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 148] 9294

INCREASED TRAFFIC IN TANGA--According to officials of the Tanga port, in North Tanzania, traffic there has increased in 1980: 345,360 tons against 304,385 the year before. The goods were distributed as follows in 1980: 143,174 tons leaving the port, and 202,186 tons entering the port; this does not include the 80,000 tons handled at the wharf of the Tanzanian Fertilizer Company. Last year has seen a decrease in the amount of goods leaving (191,731 tons in 1979) and a marked increase in the amount entering the port (112,654 tons in 1979). It should be remembered that the port is used by Uganda as a way of access to the sea and that exportations also include some of Tanzania's agricultural production (sisal and coffee). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 148] 9294

INCREASED ELECTRIC POWER SALES--According to its 1979 annual report, the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (Tanesco) had increased its sales of electricity in Tanzania by 10 percent in 1979; its earnings amounted to 301.9 million shillings, compared with 274 million in 1978. Industrial activity is the main cause for this increase (+13.6 percent in electricity purchased). Tanesco's net profits amounted to 1.7 million shillings in 1979. The number of its customers increased from 105,117 to 116,574. The production of electricity was 753.71 million of kWh compared with 682.72 million in 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 p 148] 9294

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