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Translation

WAR AND THE ARMY

A Philosophical and Sociological Study

Ed. by

D.A. Volkogonov, A.S. Milovidov and S.A. Tyushkevich



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WAR AND THE ARMY
A PHILOSOPHICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

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ANNOTATION

This work examines the pressing problems associated with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Writing this book, the collective tried to make broad use of the rich theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, and decisions and documents of the CPSU and the entire world communist movement; it tried to reflect our party's tremendous experience in leading military development and armed protection of the socialist fatherland, and to account for the advances of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army enjoyed in recent times. Antiscientific bourgeois conceptions and the viewpoints of rightist and "leftist" revisionists are exposed.

The book is intended for a broad range of readers interested in the problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. It is recommended as a handbook for officer Marxist-Leninist training, and for cadets and students of military educational institutions.

INTRODUCTION

History is irresistibly traveling the road of the world's revolutionary transformation, initiated by Great October. The international positions of socialism are growing stronger and expanding with every year. The successes of the national liberation movement are increasing. Laborers are intensifying their class struggle against the yoke of the monopolies, and against the orders of exploitation. The revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is acquiring increasingly greater scope. The ideas of Great October are capturing the minds of millions upon millions of new people on our planet. "No event in world history," said CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his report to a joint ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Great October, "has ever had deeper, farther-reaching consequences to mankind than the Great October Socialist Revolution. The flashes from the October thunderstorm lit the way to the future for peoples of many countries. History marched forward in giant strides."*

* PRAVDA, 3 November 1977.

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The most important prerequisite of mankind's progress is peace. Nations always dreamed of a sound, just peace, a peace without social and national oppression, but throughout the centuries and millenia one war after another broke out on earth--the social forces opposing the aggressive policy of the classes of exploitation were too weak and disorganized. In our times the peace movement has acquired a dependable support--the power, unity, and activity of world socialism, its growing union with all progressive and peace-loving forces.

Faithful to the principle of socialist internationalism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to provide the conditions for peaceful development in our country and in other countries of the socialist fraternity, as well as for peace and security of all nations. The main result of its foreign policy, noted the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, is that "The international position of the Soviet Union is stronger than ever before. This is the fourth decade we are living in peace. The positions of socialism have grown stronger. Detente has become a dominant trend."*

At the same time the congress emphasized the need for high alertness, and the importance of energetic actions and unity of all forces of peace and good will. The enemies of detente and disarmament have many resources at their disposal. Attempting to adapt themselves to new international conditions, these reactionary forces are displaying aggressiveness, they are experimenting with various tactics, and they are attacking the peace effort from different directions. We cannot forget for even a single day that although the possibilities for aggressive actions by imperialism have now been significantly reduced, its nature has not changed. The issue of war and peace remains the main issue of modern times.

In this situation of conflict between opposing social systems, in the international arena the solution to the problem of war and peace is being sought in all spheres of public life and activity--in economics, politics, ideology, and culture. Experiencing shocks and failures in domestic and foreign policy, and bridled by the powerful revolutionary forces of modern times, imperialism now rests special hope on ideological sabotage, and it is mobilizing more and more sources and resources for ideological disorientation of the masses.

The sole correct solution to the problem of war and peace is provided by Marxism-Leninism. Deeply revealing the laws governing society's development and exposing the reactionary social essence and scientific groundlessness of various sorts of bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints on war and peace, it is a dependable foundation for developing the correct strategy and tactics of the struggle for peace, prevention of war, and international security.

Marxism-Leninism also provides the sole correct solution to problems of war and the army inseparably associated with a more-general issue--the issue of war and peace. The system of viewpoints on these problems makes up the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, the premises of which are supported by the fundamental conclusions of dialectical and historical materialism, political economics, and scientific communism.

*"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 34.

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The teaching on war and the army is an organic part of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on society. Utilizing the categories and concepts of dialectical and historical materialism, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army analyzes the most general, fundamental problems of the essence of war as a social phenomenon, the origin and class nature of war and the army, the relationship between war and politics, the mutual ties existing between economic, scientific, sociopolitical, and moral-political factors in war, the social nature and types of wars, the role of the popular masses and the individual in war, the role of ideology in war, and others. Being the most general and profound, the premises of historical materialism perform an integrating function within the entire structure of sociopolitical knowledge on war and the army, permitting us to interpret it in a dialectical mutual relationship with different elements of this structure's foundation and superstructure.

In addition the teaching on war and the army utilizes the categories and concepts of political economics, scientific communism, and other sciences. With their assistance, we analyze the economic roots of war and the army, the role of the economic factor in war, the relationship between war and the society's economic life, and the economic foundations of a state's military power. In addition the teaching on war and the army examines, from a sociopolitical aspect, the relationship between war and revolution, armed defense of the socialist fatherland, the essence and laws of development of the army, the particular features of scientific control in military affairs, and so on. Naturally these problems are not independent of one another. In their sum total and in their dialectical mutual relationship, they represent a single, integral Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army bears a creative nature. It is constantly developing, and being filled with new content. Basing themselves on the ideological-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal communist and workers parties are consistently and persistently enriching this teaching with new premises and conclusions, in accordance with changes in the conditions and balance of forces in different stages of human society's development, and in accordance with the objective trends of history.

One of the most important prerequisites for scientific leadership of the troops and for improvement of the style of work of our military personnel is deep mastery of the entire sum of knowledge contained in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and development of the ability to competently use this knowledge in practice. This task has acquired special urgency in the present stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, swift development of military science, deepening differentiation, and concurrent integration of military knowledge.

Preparing this book, the author collective tried to make the broadest possible use of the rich ideological-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and the decisions and documents of the CPSU and the entire world communist movement, to reflect more fully our party's tremendous experience in leading Soviet military development and armed protection of the socialist fatherland, and to account for the advances the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has enjoyed in recent times.

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The structure of the work reflects the Marxist-Leninist approach to integrated analysis of the problems of war and the army.

The book contains three parts.

The first analyzes the fundamental issues in the teaching on war, and it explains the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of war, and its roots, essence, and place in history.

The second part of the book reveals the mutual ties and interactions of material and spiritual forces in war, and describes the military power of the state, the fundamental laws determining the course and outcome of a war, and the mechanism of their action and utilization by social forces.

The third part of the book examines the origin, essence, and laws of development of the army, its place and role in social life and in the fate of war and peace, and the nature of modern armies and military alliances. The concluding chapter illuminates the methodological functions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

A significant part of the book is devoted to a criticism of antiscientific bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints on the causes, nature, and social consequences of war, and on the social nature and purpose of the army.

The author collective expresses the hope that this work, which has the purpose of systematizing the basic provisions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, will provide assistance to our military personnel in their effort to raise the level of their theoretical training and in their practical activities aimed at constantly reinforcing combat readiness, as required of the Soviet Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress, and expressed by the new USSR Constitution.

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PART ONE

WAR AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

CHAPTER I

ARISAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST TEACHING ON WAR AND THE ARMY

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the result of many centuries of the development of society's thinking, and it is its greatest achievement in the investigation of military phenomena. Having made a real revolution in the viewpoints on society, Marxism was the first doctrine to encourage scientific study of war and the army, from the positions of the proletariat.

Citing the history of philosophy and social science, V. I. Lenin noted that Marxism arose not as an offshoot of the trunk of world civilization's development, but as a direct continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economics, and socialism.¹ Naturally, Lenin's conclusion also extends to formation of the Marxist teaching on war and the army. This teaching did not arise in a vacuum; it was the continuation and a further, qualitatively higher development of the achievements of pre-Marxist military-theoretical thought, critically reexamined from the standpoint of working class interests.

1. The Problems of War and the Army in Pre-Marxist Philosophy and Sociology

The birth of viewpoints on war and the army is associated with formation and development of a class-based slave-owning society, and its ideology. Being one of the aspects of ideology, from the moment of its arisal military-theoretical thought began expressing the viewpoints of the dominant class on war and the army, and the functional nature of a class society. Slave-owning society, which was typified by the cruelest sort of exploitation and by numerous wars, also generated certain ideas about war and its instruments.

One of the first attempts at a theoretical generalization of the issues of war was the "Manu-smrti" (an ancient Indian collection of laws reflecting Brahman dogma and ideology; 6th century B.C.). Later such attempts were undertaken in the 5th century B.C. in Ancient Greece and Ancient China. The attention of the thinkers was attracted mainly by the roots of wars, by their origin. Representing the class interests of the slave-owners, for whom war was a means for reinforcing their dominance, they

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explained war as supposedly a natural phenomenon. The ancient Greek philosopher-idealist Plato (427-347 B.C.) asserted that wars are a natural and permanent state of mankind, since they provide slaves, without which society could not exist. Sharing this viewpoint, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) viewed the art of warfare as the art of acquiring slaves.

Ideologists representing the progressive faction of the ruling class--slave-owning democratic materialists such as Democritus (460-370 B.C.), Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), and Titus Lucretius Carus (99-55 B.C.)--felt that wars came into being with formation of society. As long as people remained wild, Titus Lucretius Carus wrote as an example, there had been no wars, and thousands of people were not called to arms.

Because the dominant form of ideology in the era of feudalism was religion, war was interpreted from the standpoint of religious philosophy. One of the "Fathers of the Church", A. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), represented the life of society in the form of a struggle between two opposing kingdoms--"profane" and "divine", and he structured his conception of war accordingly. He recognized war to be a necessary evil, without which the "blessings of the Christian world and justice" could not exist. In the same period, however, the ideas that the causes of war are not in Heaven but on Earth, that they lie in the mercenary goals of feudal lords and princes of the Church, were also stated as a protest against feudal wars, and in opposition to state doctrine protecting the interests of the feudal lords. Thus in his book "Defender of the Peace", the Italian philosopher Marsilius of Padua (1280-1343) named the exorbitant claims of the Roman bishops as one of the main causes breaking the peace and generating war.

The ideas and problems suggested in Antiquity enjoyed further development and substantiation in recent history. In the period of early bourgeois society, the interpretation of war as an earthly social phenomenon enjoyed much greater acceptance than under feudalism. The English materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), as an example, found man's nature to contain "the three basic causes of war: first, rivalry; second, mistrust; third, passion for glory."² "The first cause," wrote Hobbes, "compels people to attack one another for the purposes of personal gain, the second for the purposes of personal security, and the third out of considerations of honor. People motivated by the first cause use force to make themselves the masters of other people, their wives, children, and chattels; people motivated by the second cause use force for the purposes of self-defense; the third category of people resorts to force in response to trifles such as a wrong word or a smile, and in response to disagreements of opinion and other manifestations of disrespect...."³ Hobbes suggested that wars were also associated with a lack of room on earth due to the growing numbers of people. As we can see, given the limitations of the naturalistic approach, in opposition to religious dogma Hobbes reduced the origin of wars to earthly causes.

The German idealistic philosopher G. Leibniz (1646-1716) felt war to be inevitable. In his words the roots of war lie in the insurmountable hostility of people; monarchs toy with the fate of peace as if they were playing cards; to them, peace treaties were nothing more than temporary truces, and perpetual peace was possible only in the grave.

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The ideologists of the French bourgeois revolution made a noticeable contribution to our understanding of the causes of wars. Among the most important causes of war, J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778) indicated the inequality of property in society, man's yearning for private ownership.⁴ But he believed the latter to be derived from "the nature of man", and therefore he was unable to reveal the material sources of war. Nor were the French materialists of the 18th century able to see the true causes of wars, inasmuch as they remained idealists in their interpretation of social life. In their conceptions, wars were associated with various ideological, mental, and other factors. Thus P. H. Holbach (1723-1789) wrote that an excess of sarcasm in the bile of a fanatic, blood running hot in the heart of a conqueror, indigestion in a monarch, and the capriciousness of a woman are sufficient causes of war.⁵

The theoretical activities of utopian socialists and Russian revolutionary democrats occupy a special place in formation of our viewpoints on war and its roots. Expressing predominantly the interests of the oppressed masses, these intellectuals managed to arrive at deeper conjectures on the origin and essence of war. Long before Rousseau, T. Campanella (1568-1639) suggested that private ownership elicits wars. G. Winstanley (1609-1652), the leader of the English Diggers, discussed the causes of war lying in private ownership.⁶ The French utopian J. Melier (1664-1729) attempted to substantiate the thesis that distribution of wealth based on private ownership engenders feelings of hatred and envy among people, who in turn cause mutinies and wars. All of these ideas were developed by Saint-Simon (1760-1825), R. Owen (1771-1858), and C. Fourier (1772-1837). They argued that private ownership is a constant cause of wars, leading to rivalry not only among people but also among states and alliances of countries, and drawing them into wars.

Expressing the interests of the peasant masses, Russian revolutionary democrats arrived at a scientific interpretation of wars and their sources. N. G. Chernyshevskiy (1828-1889) viewed war as a social phenomenon inherent to particular historical conditions, to a particular civil structure of society.⁷ War, he wrote, is generated by a society in which oppressors dominate and the common people are enslaved, and as long as such a society exists, its development would proceed through conflict, through wars.

Democratic sociopolitical thought also attempted to explain another important problem--the relationship between war and politics. This problem was stated in primitive form as long ago as in the "Manu-smrti". Canakya, a prominent progressive intellectual of Ancient India, suggested in his work "Arthasastra" (4th century B.C.) that war is not an end in itself, that it serves politics.⁸ Aristotle felt war to be a part of the art of politics.

This problem was developed in recent history by the works of the prominent German philosopher G. Hegel (1770-1831). He approached war as an implement of politics. "Troops were used," Hegel wrote "to achieve the special objectives of politics...."⁹

Hegel's dialectics had an influence on the military-theoretical viewpoints of K. Clausewitz (1780-1831) one of the prominent military ideologists of the bourgeoisie. He was able to sense the mutual relationship existing between war and policy. Clausewitz noted that war cannot be understood apart from politics, since war is a part of a whole, and that whole is policy. He wrote: "War is...a continuation

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of state policy by other means.... War is not only a political act but also a real instrument of policy, a continuation of political relations, their exercise by other means. That within it which remains unique has to do only with the uniqueness of its means."¹⁰

However, Clausewitz was unable to reveal the deep objective mutual relationship existing between war and policy, since in view of his idealism and class limitations he could not understand the essence and nature of policy. He based himself on the idea that policy, being the "wisdom of the state embodied,"¹¹ represents the interests of society as a whole¹²--that is he felt policy to be above the classes. War, according to Clausewitz is a continuation only of foreign policy, which in his interpretation is essentially subjective. Clausewitz could not see the material, economic foundations of state policy.

Democratic intellectuals also tried to explain the nature of wars in accordance with their understanding of the origins of wars and their relationship to policy. Plato, the ideologist of the slave-owners, attempted to justify the legality of wars which pursued the goals of enslaving other peoples ("barbarians") and suppressing slave uprisings. In the well-ordered state he describes, honors are paid to those who distinguish themselves in "the greatest form of war"--foreign war.¹³ Aristotle forwarded the concept of a just war. But his, and Plato's, was not yet a moral assessment, being only a legal one, inasmuch as the criterion of justice used by Aristotle was the interests of the slave-owning state, as reflected in its laws.

Augustine attempted to provide religious grounds for his moral assessment of war. Since war is the product of divine predetermination, he asserted, then the justice of a war waged in the name of faith, in the name of Christianity, emanates from God. This conception was developed by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). He felt that a war would be just if it is engendered by "legal causes" sanctioned by the Church, if it is waged by a "legal power", and if it pursues "legal goals". In the conditions of feudal separatism, where "might made right" and where every feudal lord engaged in warfare, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, a proponent of centralized state rule, satisfied the interests of absolutism (secular and clerical) in preservation of peace within the country, which was constantly being broken by the feudal lords. However, this teaching justifies predatory wars and crusades initiated at the will of monarchs and the Church.

Bourgeois ideologists had their own interpretation of the nature of wars. They declared feudal wars and armed uprisings of oppressed masses to be illegal, recognizing only bourgeois wars to be legal. This was the position taken, in particular, by Hegel, who justified the reactionary demands of the German bourgeoisie for Germany to conquer and enslave other countries, defended its predatory wars, and rejected wars of liberation by the popular masses. Hegel's reactionary ideas were precisely the ones used subsequently by the Nazis in their ideological "substantiation" of their piratic policy.

Concurrently, certain pre-Marxist philosophers and sociologists suggested more-rational ideas. Thus the French materialist Holbach justified war only in one case: if it were waged for defensive purposes. "War," he wrote, "is just and unavoidable only in the event that it is waged in order to repel an attack by an unjust predator, to restrain the violence of a rabid nation...."¹⁴ The German

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philosopher I. Kant (1724-1804) felt that it was natural for an alliance of states to be created to repel another state forwarding unjustifiable claims.¹⁵

The most progressive ideas to explain the nature of wars were suggested by utopian socialists. Saint-Simon hypothesized that it would be possible for a defensive war to transform into a predatory war under the influence of certain factors. G. Babeuf (1760-1797) presumed that the goals of a war make it legal or illegal; war pursued for mercenary goals was illegal.

N. G. Chernyshevskiy made a significant step forward in resolving the issue as to the nature of wars. The prominent Russian revolutionary democrat noted that wars are not unique. In this connection he criticized the passivists, who condemned all wars. Chernyshevskiy supported force directed against evil. He distinguished ruinous, harmful, devastating wars from useful, beneficial wars; useful wars were only those which were waged to repel an enemy, "to defend or recapture national independence," while harmful wars were ones fought in the interest of the exploiters. Chernyshevskiy appealed for a struggle against harmful wars and support for useful ones.

The social consequences of wars were also examined by pre-Marxist philosophy and sociology. The class goals of the exploiters affected the interpretation as a rule. Expressing the viewpoints of the slave-owning aristocracy of Ancient Greece, Plato and Heraclitus the Ephesian (circa 544-circa 483 B.C.), for example, saw wars to have only positive consequences for the state. Heraclitus promoted war as something good because, he wrote, the stronger and braver survive in war. "War," read the writings of Heraclitus, "is the father of all, and the ruler of all; it made some gods, and others men; it made some slaves, and others free."¹⁶ The ideologists of slave-owning democracy--Democritus and others--pointed out the negative results of wars. Canakya said that war is accompanied by a loss of wealth and the fall of morality.

Many intellectuals of recent history tried to represent the wars of the bourgeoisie as something necessary and beneficial to the country. The English materialistic philosopher F. Bacon (1561-1526) condemned feudal wars but tried to justify Great Britain's colonial expansion. He was one of the first ideological defenders of the colonial wars of the bourgeoisie. A nation, Bacon declared, cannot develop its wealth in any way other than at the expense of another nation.

In order to justify wars and their consequences, Hegel suggested the thesis that war is a moral necessity. "...the great significance of war," he wrote, "is that owing to it...the moral health of the people is preserved... In the same way that the stirring of winds keeps a lake from decaying, which would be the unavoidable consequence of a prolonged still, so it is that war keeps nations from decaying, which would be the unavoidable consequence of a lengthy and, all the more so, a permanent peace."¹⁷ Nations emerge from war spiritually strengthened, Hegel concluded, achieving internal peace.

In addition some bourgeois intellectuals defended the notion that wars and their consequences were ruinous to the state and its subjects. Thus Hobbes condemned wars as bearing misfortune and disaster for people, since in a state of war there is no place for labor, agriculture, crafts, or sea trade, there being only perpetual

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fear and the constant danger of violent death.¹⁸ But if war happens, "every individual is obligated in view of the law of nature to protect, by protecting with all of his strength, that power which affords him protection in peacetime."¹⁹ Following Hobbes, Leibniz noted that war devastates a country, inasmuch as it is difficult to preserve that which is won through war, and even a victorious war does tremendous harm to the trade of the victors.

Developing these premises, French materialists called wars the vestiges of the "barbarian era". They sharply condemned conquest and violence, they defended the principle of the equality of nations, and they opposed feudal wars, believing them to be disastrous to the people. War, wrote D. Diderot (1713-1784), suppresses the voice of nature, justice, and humanitarianism, it generates piracy and crime, and it distorts the morality of entire nations.

Russian revolutionary democrats revealed the negative consequences of wars. War, felt A. I. Gertsen (1812-1870) "is a misfortune, an evil necessity."²⁰ N. G. Chernyshevskiy argued that the results of wars waged by the exploiters are negative in all respects. The preparations themselves for war enrich the propertied classes and devastate the country. War disturbs finances and all administration, placing a heavy burden upon the common people. The deprivations of the people grow to enormous proportions during wars. War annihilates masses of people, and it tears them away from peaceful labor even more. The moral consequences of such wars are especially dangerous to society. These wars kill the people's love for labor, and produce tyrants and predators.

Condemning wars and their consequences, almost all pre-Marxist intellectuals tried to indicate the road to peace. Representatives of utopian socialism, for example, believed that wars could be avoided if people would live a communal life, and if all of their property were to become common to all. Then, noted Campanella, there would be no wars, and people would beat their sabers into plowshares. Winstanley concluded that peace would set in and wars would disappear with elimination of private ownership. T. More (1438-1535) wrote that in a society in which private ownership does not exist, wars would not exist either; in such a society, in order not to reveal an inability to make war to foreign enemies, the citizens must constantly exercise themselves in the military sciences.

Utopian socialists tied peace in with the activities of an enlightened ruler who might eliminate private ownership and thus insure the unity and equality of nations. Though in naive form, we can discern here the idea of doing away with wars by making a transition to a different kind of society, to socialism. This made the utopians different from those who felt it possible to put an end to wars in bourgeois society.

Bourgeois theorists took a different approach to the problems of peace. As an example Hobbes believed the roots of peace to lie in the people's fear of war, of the disastrous consequences it bears. The ideologists of imperialism now make rather broad use of this Hobbesian thesis to justify the arms race, as if it is necessary to create "a balance of terror" as the foundation of peace. Condemning wars in general, Hobbes also condemned civil wars, associating them with the fall of a state. He believed that opposition between secular and clerical power to be the cause of these wars.²¹

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Believing the causes of wars to lie in chance phenomena, the French materialists were unable to understand the ways to peace, and they placed their hopes on achieving it through "the wise administration of an enlightened ruler."

The German philosopher Kant surmised the existence of an objective law leading to affirmation of permanent peace, one of the inevitability of creating, on a foundation of peace, a union of nations serving peace. To Kant, however, peace was only a moral ideal, and not a practical objective.

The Russian revolutionary democrats came right to the threshold of a scientific conception of the ways of achieving peace. In order to do away with war, N. G. Chernyshevskiy believed, we must do away with the social structure generating wars; wars would disappear only when the common people assume power. In his opinion there is only one means for eliminating wars: the overthrow of a reactionary regime, a popular revolution.

Pre-Marxist intellectuals also posed the problem of the army. Viewing it in their majority from the standpoint of the ruling classes, they were nevertheless able to correctly discern certain aspects of the army of the exploiters as an instrument for reinforcing their supremacy. It was stated as long ago as in the "Manu-smrti" that the army controls subjects, that it suppresses uprisings by lower castes. Aristotle pointed out that a state cannot exist without troops.

Bourgeois theorists criticized the feudal army and tried to substantiate the idea of a national army, one supposedly called upon to stand guard over the interests of all society, in contrast to the purpose of the feudal army. Giving substance to this premise, Hegel wrote that the army, being an instrument of policy in the hands of the state, protects national interests.

An attempt to portray the army as being a national force, one independent of classes, was typical of all philosophers and sociologists expressing the goals of the classes of exploitation. The ideologists of the oppressed masses, meanwhile--the utopian socialists and the revolutionary democrats--arrived at the threshold of clarifying the class nature of armies. Utopians correctly caught the essence of the armies of exploitation, labeling them social parasites, and noted that this minority of armed slaves was intended to restrain the majority of unarmed slaves.

Rejecting the false assertions of bourgeois theorists that the army of exploitation was supposedly national in nature, N. G. Chernyshevskiy demonstrated that it served the interests of the exploiters and their government as a means for suppressing the common people in their state and in other countries, and as a means of warfare with the goal of enslaving and plundering neighboring nations. In this case he sharply condemned the use of armies against nations, and he used the term vileness when describing the desire of the ruling classes to keep other nations dependent for their mercenary interests.²² Exposing the true nature of the reactionary theories on the perpetuity of armies, N. G. Chernyshevskiy wrote that armies came into being and underwent development under certain social conditions, ones in which the dominance of exploiters was established. When common people come into power in most countries, the need for a permanent army would wither away.

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The intellectuals of the pre-Marxist period tried to resolve the question as to the conditions of victory in war, and as to the sources of an army's strength. The "Manu-smrti", the writings of Sun-tzu, and other theorists of Antiquity offered suggestions concerning the significance of moral forces in war, which they defined as a unification of a ruler and his people, concerning the influence of the geographic environment, and concerning the role of troop training and supply. However, the military leader, who was said to hold the fate of war in his hands, was given the main role. These problems enjoyed further development in bourgeois military and philosophical conceptions. New questions of other kinds were posed as well. As an example Bacon suggested an interesting idea about the relationship between military affairs and science. He wrote that the printing press, gunpowder, and the compass "altered the countenance and state of the entire world, first in the art of writing, second in the art of war, and third in the art of navigation."²³ Hegel suggested ideas about the role of the moral spirit of the people and the army, and the military leader and common soldier in war, and about the dependence of the military organization on the internal structure of the state.

Russian revolutionary democrats hold views on the sources of a state's military power that are very interesting. Analyzing the history of wars and contemporary military affairs, Chernyshevskiy concluded that for war to be successful, there must be developed industry and transportation, and this would be impossible without eliminating serfdom. Chernyshevskiy attached important significance to the morale of the troops in war. He criticized foreign and Russian theorists who examined the morale of the troops apart from the nature of war and the goals of the dueling sides.

Chernyshevskiy noted two conditions for moral supremacy over the enemy: 1) recognition, by the people and the army, of war goals useful to the people; 2) the confidence of the people and the army in their strength and in victory over the enemy. These conditions arise only in the event that the war is in fact waged in the interests of the people. The miraculous energy of Garibaldi's volunteers, Chernyshevskiy wrote, was an expression of the popular forces of Italy.²⁴ He demonstrated with many facts that the strength of an army lies, in the end, in its ties with the people, in the people's support of the army. This strengthens the morale of the army. The morale of the troops is the main prerequisite of their strength.²⁵ Arms, training level, and discipline are important to an army's strength. Discipline is the foundation of all in a good army. Without it, the army is a mob, unsuited for war. Chernyshevskiy opposed the discipline of the rod, and mechanical drill. An army trained in this fashion "would always fall to an enemy whose soldiers are not dead machines but live beings."²⁶ Chernyshevskiy attached great significance to nurturing patriotism, love for the fatherland and the people, awareness of civic duty, and a sense of personal worth in soldiers of the army of a democratic state.

As we can see, justification of wars as a means of social development was typical of most pre-Marxist intellectuals expressing the interests of the ruling classes. They suggested a number of ideas which sometimes correctly captured the essence of certain aspects of war and the army. However, these ideas were nothing more than conjectures that were not supported by detailed scientific evidence. War and the army were made dependent on the will of a great personality as a rule, and they were felt to be permanent attributes of society. It is in this that the class

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limitations of the authors of these ideas and their idealistic and metaphysical understanding of social phenomena manifested themselves. At the same time the materialists, especially those who defended the interests of the oppressed classes, viewed war and the army not as perpetual phenomena but rather ones associated with the arising of an unjust society. They condemned the wars of the exploiters. But these were only isolated theses which did not enjoy scientific substantiation. In view of their theoretical and methodological weakness, as well as their social limitations, pre-Marxist materialists could not create a consistent teaching on war and the army. This task was completed by the founders of Marxism.

2. The Revolution Made by Marx and Engels in Viewpoints on War and the Army

In new historic conditions, when the proletariat entered the arena of the class struggle, Marx and Engels developed a social teaching for this most-progressive class. Extending materialism into the realm of social phenomena, they caused a revolution in views on society. In V. I. Lenin's words, by doing so they indicated "the path toward scientific study of history as the sole natural path, in all of its tremendous diversity and contradiction."²⁷ Marx and Engels surmounted the limitations and other shortcomings of previous sociology, and together with this, the existing interpretations of war and the army. They also caused a revolution in this sphere of human cognition. Critically reexamining the military-theoretical legacy of the past, Marx and Engels generalized the tremendous amount of military historical material from the standpoint of the working class, and they created a teaching on war and the army based on proletarian philosophy. All of this predetermined the start of a qualitatively new, higher stage in the development of the teaching on war and the army. Problems posed by former intellectuals were deeply developed at a truly scientific level, and new important problems associated with war and the army were posed and solved.

The founders of Marxism deserve great credit for the fact that they were the first in history to scientifically explain the origin and sources of war. Marx and Engels thoroughly substantiated the dependence of wars on social and historical factors, and they demonstrated the causes of their arising, which came into being with the appearance of private ownership, with division of society into antagonistic classes, and with formation of the state. War arises as a natural phenomenon of a society of exploitation. It becomes an inseparable property of social relations based on a system of social and national oppression. The role of war in the functions of exploiting states grows as their sociopolitical organization becomes more complex, as antagonistic contradictions grow more acute, and as the results of material production are used more and more extensively in the interests of militance.

Exposing the idealistic "theory of violence", according to which social inequality is elicited "simply" by violence imposed by some people upon others, Engels demonstrated that inequality and classes were not brought into being by wars, that on the contrary it was class inequality that caused the arising of war as a social phenomenon. The founders of Marxism criticized various antiscientific theories explaining the origin of wars on the basis of biological, psychological, geographic, and other factors of similar nature. They revealed their scientific groundlessness and their social purpose--that of covering over the true causes of wars, which were contained within the very nature of antagonistic society.

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After answering the question as to the causes of wars, Marx and Engels were able to provide a scientific explanation of the relationship between war and state policy: being a product of class-antagonistic society, wars arise and proceed in behalf of the political interests of certain classes. In war, one of the extreme forms of violence--armed violence--is used for political purposes. "...an act of violence..." Engels stressed, "is a political act."²⁸

The leaders of the international proletariat did not restrict themselves to revealing the ties between war and policy. They revealed the roots of war policy in the economy of the society of exploitation, and they demonstrated that no matter what the motives of war, its roots lie in economics. "...violence is only a means," wrote Engels, "and the end is something altogether different--economic gain."²⁷

Marx and Engels also deeply and thoroughly analyzed the nature of wars contemporary to them, and they laid the basis for a concretely historical interpretation of wars. They closely tied their dialectical-materialistic analysis of wars in with the general objective of the liberation movement of oppressed masses, and mainly with the struggle of the working class, and they determined, from the standpoint of its interests, their relationship to concrete wars of their era. Their works drew the distinct outlines of the teaching on different forms and types of wars, and laid the foundation of a scientific classification of wars.

Marx and Engels divided wars into defensive and offensive depending on their sociopolitical content. Defensive wars, they said, were ones fought by nations and states with the goal of protecting themselves against foreign invaders, and revolutionary wars fought by oppressed classes rising against social oppression. Marx and Engels categorized aggressive, predatory, and reactionary wars fought by exploiter classes and states as offensive wars. In this case Marx cautioned that it was wrong to confuse defensive wars with defensive military operations.³⁰ "Defensive war..." he said, "by no means excludes offensive operations dictated 'by the course of military events'."³¹ Marxist classicists felt defensive wars fought by oppressed classes against the oppressors, and popular wars of national liberation, to be legal and historically justified. Concurrently they sharply condemned, as illegal and unjust, the predatory and dynastic wars of the exploiters.

Basing themselves on an analysis of the sociopolitical nature of wars, Marx and Engels examined the role and place of armed violence in historical progress from a concrete historical aspect. They made a tremendous step forward in the study of this problem, raising its development to a qualitatively new level.

The issue as to the conditions for excluding wars from the life of mankind and consolidating peace enjoyed development and full scientific substantiation in the works of Marx and Engels. Regarding war to be an invariable satellite of a society of exploitation, the proletarian intellectual geniuses proved that only the victory of the most progressive structure--the communist order--would put an end to class antagonisms and insure the triumph of peace. Thus they dealt an annihilatory blow against antiscientific bourgeois theories which, justifying the aggressive, predatory wars of the exploiters, declared them to be a permanent phenomenon, and asserted that they were supposedly inherent to the nature of human society and that they were the principal motive force of its development. The founders of Marxism were the first to scientifically determine the historical bounds of the existence

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of wars. The union of the workers of all countries, wrote Marx, will, in the end, eradicate all wars and lead to peace among nations, since in opposition to the old society, the new society will have peace as its international principle, and each nation will have one and the same master--labor.³²

Marx and Engels were the first to pose and solve the problem as to the relationship between war and revolution, demonstrating that this relationship is complex and contradictory, and that revolution does not necessarily occur through war. They also outlined another aspect of this highly important problem, tying in the possibility for consolidating peace with revolution. The leaders of the world proletariat believed socialist revolution to be a means for avoiding war. Thus, noting the growth of militance in the late 19th century, Engels wrote that had a revolution occurred in Russia at that time, it would have saved Europe from the calamity of universal war, and laid the basis for a world social revolution.

History also credits Marx and Engels with scientific development of the question as to the origin, class essence, and functions of the army as an armed organization of the state intended for warfare. They deeply analyzed the antipopular, reactionary nature of the armies of exploitation, which serve as an instrument of suppression of the oppressed classes of their states, and enslavement of the peoples of other countries, they substantiated the idea that the bourgeois state machine, and the bourgeois army, would disintegrate in the course of a socialist revolution, and they demonstrated the need for replacing the old, disintegrated army by a new armed organization capable of protecting the revolutionary achievements of the laborers. The founders of Marxism defined the nature, the most important principles, and a number of the significant traits of the proletarian army.

Marx and Engels made a significant contribution to analysis of war and the army with their work on the prerequisites of victory in war and on the sources of an army's strength. Basing himself on a materialistic conception of history, Marx concluded that "the fate of war...rests upon material factors."³³ After this, Engels revealed the dependence of armed violence on material resources. He emphasized that "the victory of violence is founded upon weapons production, and in turn, weapons production is founded upon production in general, and consequently...on the material resources at the disposal of violence."³⁴ Without these resources, violence would generally "cease to be a force."

The Marxist classicists were the first to scientifically resolve the issue as to the role of the popular masses and military leaders in war. They noted that the success of combat is directly dependent on the morale of the army and people, since "battles will be won by people, and not by muskets..."³⁵ In the course of war, the moral element transforms into a material force. An army fighting for just goals is characterized by higher ideals, resolve, and unity. Defending the true fatherland, a citizen of communist society would fight with inspiration, with fortitude, with courage.³⁶ In addition to this, Marx and Engels turned their attention to the fact that the material and spiritual forces of an army create only the possibility of victory. Its transformation into reality would depend on both the conscious activity of the masses and the ability of the organizers and leaders to correctly understand the course of events in war, and direct the actions of the masses accordingly.

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Marx and Engels made an important contribution to the theory of war and the army by revealing the laws governing development of military affairs. They substantiated the dependence of the methods and forms of warfare on the level of development of productive forces and on the nature of production relations. Engels emphasized that "new productive forces would be the prerequisite of each new improvement in the system of waging war."³⁷ He pointed out that fundamental changes occur in military affairs as a result of social revolution. New social relations generate a new system of waging war.

The founders of Marxism demonstrated the revolutionizing influence major technical discoveries and inventions have on military affairs. As productive forces develop, military technology and weapons improve constantly, at an ever-increasing rate and scale. Appearance of new weapons leads to fundamental changes in the strategy of warfare and the organization of the troops. "With invention of a new instrument of war...", Marx wrote, "the entire internal organization of the army inevitably changed, the relationship on the basis of which individuals form an army and are able to operate as an army transformed, and the relationship of different armies to one another also changed."³⁸ Engels noted that "technological advances, as soon as they became applicable and did in fact find application in military affairs, elicited changes and even revolutions in the means of warfare--almost violently, often even in opposition to the will of the military command..."³⁹ This dependence stems from the fact that improvements in arms have their own source of development--internal contradictions. The most important of them is competition between offensive and defensive weapons--the saber and the shield, the lance and the suit of armor, the artillery projectile and armor plating. Such competition promotes invention of increasingly more effective offensive weapons, in response to which more-dependable means of protection are created. Engels saw in this competition a manifestation of the intrinsic law of dialectical motion.

The appearance of a new weapon creates the technical possibility for a turn in military affairs. After the availability of a new weapon in the troops reaches a certain point, fundamental changes also occur in the very foundation of military affairs. Only the mass use of new, improved weapons, and mass qualitative changes in the personnel, can lead to a revolution in the means of warfare, to a revolution in military affairs. Discussing such transformations in the second half of the 19th century, Engels wrote that "conscription of all persons fit for military service into the army, which was now millions of soldiers strong, and use of fire weapons, artillery projectiles, and explosives of unprecedented power created a complete revolution in all military affairs, immediately putting an...end to the period of Napoleonic warfare..."⁴⁰ When military affairs assume a new qualitative state, they acquire a new quantitative character. This law reveals itself as a constant increase in the quantity of army personnel and arms, an increase in the proportion of equipment in the troops, and growth in the scope of engagements and wars in general.

The revolutionary intellectual geniuses were the first to conclude that new social relations create not only a new system of warfare but also a new military science. "...the military science created by the revolution and Napoleon," Engels emphasized, "was the inevitable result of the new relations generated by the revolution."⁴¹ He suggested the idea that liberation of the proletariat would also express itself in a special way in military affairs, leading to creation of a unique, new military method.

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Marx and Engels also deserve tremendous credit for developing a number of fundamental provisions of the strategy and tactics of the working class in an armed uprising, which they validly interpreted as an art. In his article "Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany" Engels pointed out that an uprising is an art, in precisely the same way as is war. It follows certain rules, neglect of which harbors fatal consequences.

Thus, interpreting social developments from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, Marx and Engels critically assimilated, qualitatively reworked, and developed the achievements of prior philosophical, political, and economic thought, including investigations of war and armies. Surmounting the limitations of the latter, they revealed the deep economic roots and the class-political nature of war and armies, demonstrating their historical bounds. Thus they caused a revolution in the teaching on war and the army, and they created the foundation for the military program and the military science of the proletariat.

3. The Leninist Stage in Development of the Teaching on War and the Army

V. I. Lenin was the brilliant successor of the affairs and teachings of Marx and Engels. "An entire revolutionary era in the life of mankind is associated with the name and activities of Lenin. Lenin gave answers to the most pressing questions posed by the course of historical development, he comprehensively developed the theory of socialist revolution and development of communist society, he armed the Russian and the whole international revolutionary movement with scientifically grounded strategy and tactics, and he led the struggle of the working class for implementation of the ideals of socialism."⁴²

Lenin's activities associated with developing the teaching on war and the army were also multifaceted and exceptionally productive. He laid the basis for a new, Leninist stage in improvement of this system of knowledge, one which was the immediate continuation and a further development of the viewpoints of Marx and Engels on the issues of war and the army in new historical conditions: in an era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, in an era of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism, of colonialism's fall and the victory of national liberation movements. Under these conditions, there arose an objective need for scientifically analyzing development of class and national collisions, antagonisms, and conflicts in order to permit a correct understanding of the essence of all of the basic types of wars, and determination of the relationship of the proletariat to them. The new factors affecting the social and military-technical nature of war had to be interpreted from Marxist positions, the working class had to be given the theoretical weapons it needed in its struggle against imperialist, predatory wars, and the way to pull down the military organization of imperialism in the course of socialist revolution and to organize armed defense of socialism had to be shown. This task of historic proportions was completed by V. I. Lenin. He defended and developed the Marxist teaching on war and the army, and he exposed its falsifications by opportunists.

The important contributions Lenin and his associates made to the Marxist teaching on war and the army consisted of their analysis of the essence of war and its

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class nature. Relying on the premises of Marx and Engels and generalizing the historical experience of wars in the new conditions, Lenin explained the essence and class nature of war from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.

Lenin did a tremendous service by enriching the Marxist classification of wars with his hypotheses on the types of wars typical of the imperialist era. Considering the trends of economic, political, and scientific-technical development, Lenin pointed out the most important features of modern wars. This permitted him to deepen, and make more concrete, the premises of the founders of Marxism on the role of the popular masses in war, and to demonstrate the possibility the laborers had for preventing imperialist wars and the reality of transforming an imperialist war into a civil war. In this way, Lenin also made a significant contribution to analysis of the relationship between war and revolution.

Lenin's thorough study of sociopolitical development of capitalist countries in the imperialist era and his generalization of the revolutionary experience of the working class in the new historical conditions permitted him to enrich Marxist ideas on the role of armed violence in the class struggle of the proletariat. Even before the revolution Lenin clearly defined the fundamental principles of development of the working class's military organization. Lenin's analysis of problems in military theory armed the proletariat with a military program in the time of its preparation for and performance of the socialist revolution. Lenin's work on these issues significantly supplemented and deepened the Marxist teaching on war and the army.

The Great October Socialist Revolution was a turning point of world history. It initiated the era of universal revolutionary renewal of the world, the era of transition of capitalism to socialism. Socialist transformations in our country laid the basis for revolutionary change of the entire planet's social countenance.

With the victory of Great October, Lenin and the Communist Party found themselves facing, for the first time, the full measure of the responsibility for generalizing the world-historic experience of the socialist revolution, including the military experience of the proletariat within it, and of revealing the laws and motive forces governing development of socialist society and the military organization of the working class, and its utilization in the defense of the achievements of socialism. Marxists interpreted the problems of military theory from the aspect of the most typical traits of the new historical era.

Socialist society came into being in a country encircled by a hostile capitalist world. Lenin warned that this encirclement, by exerting military, political, economic, and ideological pressure, was not about to halt its attempts at restoring capitalism or at least retarding the growth of our social economy, formation of a new way of life, and development of socialist consciousness.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, military problems acquired vital significance to the state of socialism. "In our times...", Lenin said in October 1918, "the issue of war, of strengthening the army has priority."⁴³ The main efforts of the military theoretical activities of the Marxists were directed at resolving this issue. During this period the Marxist teaching on war

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and the army served as the immediate scientific foundation for formation of Soviet military doctrine; it provided effective assistance in organization of an army of a new type.

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party decisively fought against bourgeois and opportunist distortions of the problems of war. There was great significance in the fact that V. I. Lenin and the party armed our military personnel with the principles of scientific criticism of militant ideology, with an irreconcilable and uncompromising resolve to fight for preservation of the purity of the Marxist teaching on war and the army, and with the understanding that ideological defeat of the enemy is just as important as his military annihilation.

Posing and resolving the issues of war and the army in the new historical situation, Lenin suggested and substantiated the idea of peaceful coexistence among states with different social structures. His great contribution to Marxism was creation of an integral teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland. Lenin enriched the teaching on war and the army with an analysis of the essence and laws of the armed defense of socialism. He clearly demonstrated that protection of the socialist fatherland is one of the most important laws of development and consolidation of the new society, and an international responsibility of international proletariat.

Lenin was the founder of Soviet military science. Owing to Lenin and his associates, the military science of the working class developed from its first days on the sound theoretical and methodological foundation of Marxism. Relying upon the premises of Marx and Engels, Lenin exerted the full power inherent to him to place a scientific foundation beneath the question as to the mutual relationship existing between Marxist philosophy and military science. His premise that without dialectical materialism as a method of scientific cognition, scientists would be hopeless in their philosophical conclusions and generalizations⁴⁴ has great methodological significance to military science as well. Lenin was a master of dialectical analysis of the problems of war, armies, and military affairs. He served as an example of application of dialectical materialism to the problems of military theory, and of practical achievement of a union between Marxist philosophy and military science.

Decisions of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] Congress had special significance to assertion of Lenin's principles for creating the army of the socialist state. The party program adopted by the congress defined the road of socialism's development and determined military policy. The congress based its resolution on the military issue on the main principle of our army's development and activities--the Communist Party's leadership of all of the state's armed forces. The congress pointed out the need for strictly complying with the class principle in the army's development, for intensifying formation of the officer corps out of the proletariat and semiproletariat, for elevating the role of commissars and the entire party-political machinery, for improving political work in the troops, and for implementing other important measures aimed at strengthening the Red Army's battleworthiness. The tremendous significance of clear centralized control and high military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces was emphasized.

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After the foreign interventionists were expelled and the civil war came to an end, Lenin and the Communist Party raised development of the Marxist teaching on war and the army to an even higher level. All possibilities were employed in order to broadly develop military-theoretical research based on the military experience of the revolutionary masses. Marxists concentrated significant efforts on conceptualizing the experience of World War I and the Civil War, and they determined the course of development of the Soviet Armed Forces with a consideration for this experience. Such was the will of the times. "We have seen the end of one stage of war," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "and we must prepare ourselves for the second; but we do not know when it will come, and we must do what needs to be done so that when it does come, we could stay on top of it."⁴⁵

The acquired experience was to go a long way in guiding the party in its subsequent work. At the same time Lenin's ideas on military issues had to be generalized, and used as a sound theoretical and methodological foundation for development of the socialist state's military science and formation of Soviet military doctrine fully satisfying internal and external conditions.

In the 1920's-1930's the Communist Party posed and promptly solved the problem of the union between Marxism and military science. It actively fought against anti-Marxist conceptions in military theory and against the mistaken and hostile viewpoints of "leftist" communists and Trotskyites on the issues of military construction under socialism. The party did a great service by thoroughly analyzing the tasks arising in the course of improvement of military affairs, deeply analyzing the nature of wars, and revealing the fundamental laws governing development of the country's military power, with a consideration for new elements appearing within it and for the features of a future war.

The question as to the unique features of a possible war occupied a central place in analysis of the problems of war. It had great theoretical and practical significance because the success of strengthening the state's defenses and gaining a clear understanding of the nature and objectives of military development depended in many ways on achieving correct, scientific viewpoints on future warfare. A large group of outstanding military leaders and theorists of the Lenin school participated actively and productively in this highly important research-- M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I. S. Unshlikht, Ya. M. Zhigur, A. K. Toporkov, S. M. Belitskiy, and others. They thoroughly analyzed changes in warfare elicited by its sociopolitical nature, growth in army strength, and the increase in the equipment available to armies. It was concluded that engagements of unprecedented scale would be typical of possible war. Hundreds of millions of persons would be drawn into the savage struggle--on land, at sea, and in the air, over tremendous territory. In such a war, the sharp boundary between the front and the rear would disappear. The outcome of the war would be defined not only by decisive victories at the front but also by the productive power, organization, and steadfastness of the rear.

It was in this connection that the relationships between war and armed conflict were illuminated. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. V. Golubev, K. I. Bocharov, and others wrote that war is not limited to just military operations alone, that it is also waged in the economic, diplomatic, and ideological spheres. New forms of conflict

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in the future war were examined: mass attacks by aviation, airborne assaults in the deep rear, actions by the submarine fleet, economic blockade, agitation and propaganda among enemy troops and population, and so on.

The problems of the army enjoyed further development, especially the socialist army. They were illuminated in documents of the Comintern, in decisions of our party, and in the works of B. K. Blyukher, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuybyshev, I. V. Stalin, M. V. Frunze, and others. The basic trends of military development were thoroughly studied.

Realizing the decisive significance of man in war and the swiftness with which science and technology were progressing, M. V. Frunze, V. K. Blyukher, and others raised the issue of increasing the role of science in the army's consolidation, in personnel training, and mainly in the training of command personnel. Daily attention was devoted to the task of troop political indoctrination. S. M. Kirov, M. V. Frunze, A. S. Bubnov, S. I. Gusev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and others developed Lenin's premise that the Red Army was strong due to its political awareness, and because each of our soldiers knew who and what he was serving. The power of the Red Army rested upon the selfless devotion of the personnel to the Soviet motherland and the Communist Party, on the inviolable principle of proletarian internationalism, and on a burning hatred of the enemies of socialism.

Careful analysis of the pressing problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army in the period between the wars went a long way to promote creation of the military-theoretical prerequisites of the Soviet Armed Forces' victory over the fascist aggressors in the Great Patriotic War.

In the harsh years of war, owing to the theoretical and organizational activity of the Communist Party our commanders, all armed forces personnel, and all Soviet people were armed with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army as a daily guide in their struggle against fascism. In turn, the practical efforts of Soviet troop commanders, the combat experience of the army and navy, and the heroic labor of workers in the rear nurtured the party's theoretical activities, and enriched them.

In those hard times the party systematically generalized the experience of the war and helped military personnel assimilate it in the interests of developing military science and organizing the swiftest possible defeat of the aggressor. The situation demanded that we concentrate our attention on analyzing the social essence and unique features of the war, on publicizing Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning protection of the socialist fatherland, on mobilizing all of the strength of the people to repel the enemy, and on unmasking the piratic nature of fascist actions in the war. The party did everything to insure that the Soviet people would clearly understand the goals of the struggle, that they would maintain an unshakeable faith in their strength and in their victory, and that they would selflessly fight at the front and work in the rear.

The just, progressive goals of liberation and the popular nature of the war fought by the Soviet Union were deeply revealed. Analysis of the sources of victory and the foundations of the state's military power assumed a prominent place, as did examination of the economic, moral-political, and especially the military factors

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of the victory. Much attention was turned in the study of the army to the mission of liberation of our armed forces.

Following the world-historic victory of the Soviet people and other freedom-loving peoples over fascism in World War II, Marxist-Leninist thought found itself faced by the tasks of critically studying and assimilating the experience of the past war, and theoretically generalizing all of the innovations that had arisen during it. This task was completed with a consideration for the achievements in economics, science, and technology, the constant changes occurring in the balance of economic, political, and military forces of the two social systems in the world arena, and improvements in troop armament and organization.

The conclusions and premises forwarded by Communist Party congresses on the problems of war and peace, military development, protection of the achievements of socialism, and development of communism were a tremendous contribution to development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The congress documents examined the unique features of the country's military power at the present stage, and they substantiated the importance of considering the combined military power of systems of states--coalitions. The documents placed special emphasis on the growing role of science and technology in the state's military power and in the fighting power of the armed forces. The successes of socialist production and of Soviet science and technology, noted the 22d CPSU Congress, permitted us to enact a true revolution in military affairs.

Problems associated with the army, its functions, and the laws of its development, and the tasks of the party associated with affording leadership to all Soviet military development occupied an important place in the proceedings of the CPSU congresses. The CPSU Program adopted by the 22d CPSU Congress stated: "The CPSU views defense of the socialist fatherland and reinforcement of the USSR's defenses and the power of the Soviet Armed Forces as the sacred duty of the party and all Soviet people, as the most important function of the socialist state. The Soviet Union feels it to be its international responsibility to insure, together with other socialist countries, dependable protection and security for the entire socialist camp."⁴⁶

The conclusions of the 25th CPSU Congress were a new and significant landmark in development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Defining the new, grand prospects of peaceful construction, the congress based itself on Lenin's premise that development of communism and the country's security were inseparable. It pointed out the constantly increasing significance of scientific research on the fundamental problems of the clash of forces in war and peace, and it devoted a great deal of attention to this problem's examination. The congress described the forces blocking the path of the policy of war and insuring peace on earth. Countries of the socialist fraternity make up the foundation of these forces.

The 25th CPSU Congress determined the specific causes of military danger in the present era, causes contained within the imperialist camp, and it revealed the most important manifestations of the aggressiveness of reactionary forces. Forces of this sort in the USA and other imperialist states had no wish to halt the arms race, divorce themselves from cold war psychology, or successively implement a policy of mutually advantageous cooperation and noninterference in the internal

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affairs of other countries. Military actions against nations fighting for their liberty and independence continued.

The Soviet Union, the congress emphasized, will conduct its foreign policy, one enjoying the respect and support of the multimillion popular masses in all the world, with doubled energy. It will neutralize the forces of war and aggression, promote consolidation of universal peace, and insure the rights of nations to liberty, independence, and social progress.

Basing itself on an analysis of the alignment of the forces of peace and war, the congress pointed out that as long as a danger of war exists, and as long as militant circles pursue the arms race and the NATO bloc continues to function, the need for strengthening the country's defense capabilities, improving the armed forces, and strengthening the military-political alliance of the members of the Warsaw Pact would persist. Our country has supported and will continue to support nations fighting for their liberty.

The proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress revealed the fundamental contradiction existing between bourgeois and socialist armies, they demonstrated the progressive nature and purpose of the army of the socialist state, and they theoretically substantiated its historic mission in foreign policy and its role in the internal life of the countries of socialism.

The congress deeply analyzed the relationship between detente and the class struggle. Detente has to do with international relations. It means that disputes and conflicts between countries must not be resolved by war, by the application of force or the threat of force. Detente does not supplant, and it does not change the laws of the class struggle. No one can hope that in the conditions of detente, communists would make peace with capitalist exploitation, or that monopolists would come over to the revolution.

The fundamental principles of party and state policy in the area of the socialist fatherland's defense enjoyed legal documentation in the new USSR Constitution. It emphasizes that defense of the socialist fatherland is one of the most important functions of the state, and that it is a matter of all the people. The duty of the armed forces to the people is clearly spelled out: dependably defend the socialist fatherland, and maintain constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor. Consequently the responsibility for maintaining constant combat readiness of the troops and naval forces is now a constitutional provision.

The analysis of the most important problems of modern international life, made in the documents of the postwar international conferences of representatives of communist and workers parties, has great significance to further development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. These documents describe the alignment of political forces in the world arena, and they formulate the tasks in the struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism, and against the aggressive actions of imperialism.

The decisions and documents of the CPSU, of the communist parties of other socialist countries, and of the international conferences of representatives of communist and

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workers parties feed new ideas and premises into the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and guide and accelerate its development. The quality and quantity of works on philosophical, sociological, sociopolitical, and economic problems of war and armies are growing. They are typified by a wide grasp of the important problems, and by effective analysis of the arising questions.

New integrated studies based on the systems analysis approach became a significant feature in the postwar development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. They analyzed the problems of war and the army on the basis of a unified philosophical and sociopolitical approach. This approach reveals itself, for example, in the collective works "Marksizm-leninizm o voyne i armii" [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army] (published in five editions), "Metodologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" [The Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice] (two editions), and others.

Another important feature is the significant expansion of the subject matter dealt with, the addition of new problems of war and the army, elicited by profound changes in the sociopolitical and military-technical areas. Priority attention is devoted to the study of the revolution in military affairs: its causes, essence, unique features, and sociopolitical consequences.

Publication of a number of works on the history of the past war has great significance to development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. This is especially true of the continuing publication of the twelve-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945]. It provides a thorough scientific analysis of the events of the prewar and war years.

In the period under examination a new feature took shape in the development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army--analysis of the teaching's history itself. This was promoted in many ways by publication of a number of party documents, as well as books devoted to the 150th anniversaries of the birthdays of Marx and Engels, and the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. This research direction is typified not only by profound generalization and multifaceted analysis of the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, but also by utilization of this rich material to solve the problems of modern military development. Mention should be made of collective works such as "Filosofskoye naslediyе V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoy voyny" [The Philosophical Legacy of V. I. Lenin and the Problems of Modern War], "Karl Marks i voyennaya istoriya" [Karl Marx and Military History], "Fridrikh Engel's i voyennaya istoriya" [Friedrich Engels and Military History], "V. I. Lenin i voyennaya istoriya" [V. I. Lenin and Military History], "Problemy voyny i mira" [Problems of War and Peace], and others.

Marxist-Leninist military-theoretical thought also concentrates on development of the methodological foundations and problems of military science under socialism. Study of the processes and phenomena of presently developing military affairs and the phenomena of war occupies an important place in this regard. This is primarily an analysis of modern warfare in all of its complexity and contradictions from the standpoint of dialectical materialism. Problems associated with the essence, nature, and types of wars in the modern era, the consequences and historical role of wars, the relationship between war and state policy in the nuclear age, the relationship

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between war and revolution, the mutual ties existing between military science and military doctrine, the essence of scientific control of troop activities, and other methodological problems of military theory and practice enjoyed especially deep illumination in recent years. Scientific criticism of bourgeois conceptions of war and armies has become broader. Further development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army in the postwar era served as a highly important prerequisite for development of the fundamental premises of Soviet military science. Questions concerning the forms and methods of military activities and the relationship among different resources of armed conflict were answered on the basis of an analysis of the unique features of modern wars and the fundamental changes occurring in military affairs. The dominant significance of nuclear missiles was pointed out, and at the same time the necessity for correctly accounting for the role of conventional weapons, for avoiding the extremes when assessing both new and existing forms of armament, and for being ready to perform missions with both conventional and nuclear resources was stated. These conclusions promoted successful solution of other complex problems of military science, which arose in connection with the revolution in military affairs.

Thus the Leninist stage in the development of the teaching on war and the army is typified by further development of the entire complex of its problems, and enrichment of this teaching with new premises and conclusions, as stated in the works of V. I. Lenin, his associates and scientists, in the documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties, and in the works of Marxist-Leninist scholars.

The Leninist stage in development of the teaching on war and the army embraces the same historical period that Leninism as a whole does. And this is natural. Development of Marxism is a single process of theoretical reflection of economic, political, and scientific life in close interaction with the requirements of the class struggle of the proletariat against imperialism. Therefore the issues of war and the army and of protecting the socialist fatherland undergo development within the framework of the same revolutionary teaching as well.

Development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is distinguished by a creative, international nature, by a broad research front, and by an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. It is proceeding in organic interaction with the practice of socialist military development and armed defense of the revolutionary achievements of the laborers against imperialist aggression. An inseparable tie between the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and practice has great significance to constant growth in its effectiveness. The following premise stated by the 25th CPSU Congress pertains equally to it and to all other social sciences: "The tasks facing our social science could be completed only on the condition of its most intimate association with life. Scholastic theorizing can only hinder our movement forward. Only an association with practice can raise the effectiveness of science, and today this is one of the central problems."⁴⁷ It is in daily reliance upon practice, in an inseparable association with it that we can find a guarantee for constant growth of the effectiveness of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and of its influence upon reinforcement of the defense capabilities of the Soviet state and the entire fraternity of socialist countries.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 23, p 40.
2. Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh" [Selected Works in Two Volumes], Vol 2, Moscow, 1964, p 151.
3. Ibid., p 152.
4. See "Antologiya mirovoy filosofii v chetyrekh tomakh" [Anthology of World Philosophy in Four Volumes], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, pp 565-567.
5. See Gol'bakh, Pol' Anri, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh" [Selected Works in Two Volumes], Vol 1, Moscow, 1963, p 260.
6. See Uinstenli, Dzherard, "Izbrannyye pamflety" [Selected Pamphlets], Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p 203.
7. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 4, Moscow, 1948, p 489.
8. See Neru, Dzhavakharlal, "Otkrytiye Indii" [The Discovery of India], Moscow, 1955, p 126.
9. Gegel', G., "Soch." [Works], Vol 8, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, p 291.
10. Klauzevits, "O Voynе" [On War], Vol 1, Moscow, 1941, p 43.
11. Ibid., p 45.
12. See Ibid., Vol 2, p 336.
13. See "Tvoreniya Platona" [The Works of Plato], Vol 13, "Laws", Petrograd, 1923, pp 23-24.
14. Gol'bakh, Pol' Anri, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh," Vol 2, p 459.
15. See "Traktaty o vechnom mire" [Treatises on Permanent Peace], Moscow, 1963, p 189.
16. "Materialisty Drevney Gretsii" [The Materialist of Ancient Greece], Moscow, 1955, p 46.
17. Gegel', G., "Soch.," Vol 7, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p 344.
18. See Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh," Vol 2, pp 152-153.
19. Ibid., p 668.

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20. "'Kolokol'. Gazeta A. I. Gertsena i N. P. Ogareva. Vypusk 9. 1866-1867" ["KOLOKOL". A Newspaper Published by A. I. Gertsen and N. P. Ogarev. No. 9, 1866-1867], Moscow, 1964, p 1742.
21. See Gobbs, Tomas, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh," Vol 2, pp 341-342.
22. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, Moscow, 1949, p 105.
23. Bekon, F., "Novyy Organon" [Novum Organum], Moscow, 1938, p 100.
24. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, p 326.
25. See Chernyshevskiy, N. G., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 6, p 494.
26. Ibid., p 316.
27. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 58.
28. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, p 162.
29. Ibid., p 164.
30. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 33, pp 36-37.
31. Marks, K. and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 17, p 275.
32. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 17, p 5.
33. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 13, p 287.
34. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 170.
35. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 15, p 225.
36. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 2, p 539.
37. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 7, p 510.
38. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 6, pp 441-442.
39. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 176.
40. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 22, p 537.
41. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 7, p 510.
42. "K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [The 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Abstracts of Reports of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1970, p 3.

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43. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 125.
44. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 45, p 31.
45. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 42, pp 143-144.
46. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1976, pp 110-111.
47. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 73.

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CHAPTER II
ORIGIN AND SOCIAL ESSENCE OF WARS

Climbing the endless ladder of social progress, mankind has dragged behind it a lengthy train of wars and conflicts over the millenia. The insatiable Grim Reaper of war gathered an abundant harvest for many centuries. The principal instrument of international disputes and of national and racial discord was the force of arms. Scholars believe that in the last five and a half thousand years there had been more than 14,000 wars on earth, which took the lives of more than 4 billion persons-- as many as there are now in the present population of the planet. The 20th century was not an exception in this regard. Two world wars unleashed by imperialism in just its first half took more than 50 million human lives and annihilated colossal quantities of material and cultural valuables. After 1945, new wars and military conflicts arose more than 100 times in the world.

Nor has the danger that imperialism might unleash new wars, including a world war, disappeared today. Therefore Marxist-Leninist analysis of war and of its origin and essence has extremely important significance.

1. Origin of Wars and the Causes of Their Arisal

Wars, teaches Marxism-Leninism, are a historical phenomenon. Throughout the lengthy existence of primitive society, people did not know wars as a sociopolitical phenomenon. Contrary to this, however, bourgeois sociologists and historians assert that war has existed since the dawn of man, that it is a permanent phenomenon. As we can see, that there are two fundamentally contradictory viewpoints on the origin of wars is obvious. This can be explained by the fact that the approach taken by different researchers to the study of war depends entirely upon their class-based attitude--their philosophy and the methods they use. Only a materialistic interpretation of history faithfully reveals the genesis and social essence of all social phenomena associated with war. Marxism-Leninism has demonstrated that the history of human society is a socially dependent process depending to a significant extent on the level and nature of development of the society's material foundation--its means of production. It is namely upon the means of production that the relations among people, the social ties, and the contradictions and conflicts arising in society depend.

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Primitive society, which existed for hundreds of thousands of years, was the very first stage of social progress. It was distinguished by an extremely low level of productive forces, and an exceptional dependence of man upon nature. But social relations which separated man from the natural environment forever evolved at this first stage of history. This was not a society of domination by some and subordination by others; primitive collectivism and equality were the society's dominant features. The tribal structure, in which the relations of primitive society attained their greatest maturity, promoted maximum unification of the efforts of all members of the tribe in their struggle against natural elements, and for survival and existence.

Consequently the main source of the primitive social structure's progress was a struggle between natural and sociohistoric factors, man's struggle with surrounding nature. The contradictions and conflicts arising between tribes were secondary, they were not paramount. The primitive means of production was based on common needs and interests. The social organization of this classless society, which was typified by a low level of economic development, required close unity and cooperation within the tribe and family. The natural environment--the cradle and source of the people's existence--was to them a hostile demoniacal force which could be fought only if the people were closely unified. Without such unity, people simply could not have survived.

Armed conflicts between tribes did not have a social nature; they were only skirmishes fought in an effort to acquire the best hunting grounds, pastures, and shelters. They were also fought as vendettas. The founders of Marxism sometimes referred to such armed collisions as "ancient wars".¹ The element of armed violence--a permanent attribute of all wars--was present in such tribal battles, but the only goal pursued by this violence was immediate satisfaction of the economic needs of primitive people. Therefore Marx felt that "ancient wars" were one of the forms of primitive labor. Armed conflicts in pre-class society remotely recalled wars as we define them today only in form, inasmuch as the sociopolitical sources of their arising and conduct did not exist at that time, and there were no special implements of war. Absence of classes and private ownership in primitive society deprived "ancient wars" of their main stimulus--they were not fought in order to enslave and exploit the conquered. This was economically unsuitable owing to the extremely low level of development of productive forces. Captured members of other tribes were eaten, and sometimes they were killed or accepted into the winning tribe.

Consequently the armed collisions of primitive peoples were a continuation and a part of their common struggle to create the conditions permitting their existence. Immediate economic necessity was at their basis. Except for blood feuds, they were to a significant extent chance encounters, and they were not unavoidable. All of this confirms that war had not been with us forever, and that mankind went through a very long period of history without the sociopolitical phenomenon of war.

Investigating the origin of wars, it is important to understand the conditions of their arising and existence; in the modern era, it is also important to understand how to prevent and exclude them from the life of society.

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The conditions of arisal of war are also the prerequisites of the actual birth, manifestation, and realization of social conflict. They are the prologue of war. We know that at a certain stage of history, the possibility for accumulating surplus production arose as a result of a certain amount of growth in labor productivity. It became the economic source of social violence and inequality. Private ownership, classes, and states arose. Exploiters could no longer survive without wars as a means for enslaving other peoples and reinforcing their domination within their own country. This historic period of transition caught primitive society in the stage of its disintegration and at the time of arisal of the slave-owning socioeconomic formation. Armed aggression, which, as Engels noted, existed previously "only as a means of revenge against aggression or as a means for expanding territory when it was no longer large enough, was now resorted to only for the sake of plunder, becoming a permanent craft."²

After antagonistic classes formed, the class struggle became the source of society's progress, though the initial contradiction (between the social organism and the natural environment) can never be fully erased. Striving to acquire boundless wealth, the classes of exploitation "legalized" the "craft" of war as one of the means for achieving this goal. Organized armed violence became a permanent element of their policy.

Thus with the appearance of antagonistic class society, its permanent satellite--wars--naturally arose. All wars without exception were the result of the action of profound socioeconomic processes within this society. In other words the source of wars and their genesis are embodied within the structure of exploitation itself, being based on private ownership of the means of production, and on oppression of the laborers. But the economic goals of the classes of exploitation are reached through the implementation of a certain state policy. In this sense policy is a "generalization" of economics. "Politics," wrote Lenin, "is a concentrated expression of economics...."³ Lenin's statement is the key to analyzing and understanding wars as a sociopolitical phenomenon brought into being by the very nature of a society of exploitation. His premise permits us to understand the initial--economic--foundation of war, which can be differentiated in terms of concrete causes of each war viewed individually.

We can distinguish several levels of historical causality of wars.⁴ First there is the level of root causes. The overall, root cause of every war reflects the innermost production relations of a society of exploitation, and the sociopolitical phenomena these relations generate, taking the form of armed violence of some classes (states) against others. War is an expression of ultimate aggravation of political conflicts, and it is simultaneously a specific means of their manifestation and resolution.⁵

In other words the contradictions of antagonistic society create the permanent base of various sociopolitical conflicts (including those taking the form of war) between classes and states.

The next level of causality consists of specific, special causes. They express the dialectical relationship between the given antagonistic means of production and the concrete historical conditions, and the social situation under which a certain form of social antagonism arises and develops. The sociohistoric situation in which the general cause of war manifests itself may retard or accelerate its action.

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The general, root cause of wars is ever-present today, inasmuch as it still persists within the capitalist structure; however, wars are not fatalistically unavoidable. It is only when the cause leads to a certain crisis situation that it serves as a trigger, irreversibly igniting the flame of war. But when the action of concrete factors that keep the cause of war from manifesting itself is intensified (when the balance of forces shifts away from the potential imperialist aggressor, when the social movement to prevent war grows, when antimilitant movements become unified, and so on), the possibility for preventing war grows.

Within the bounds of historical necessity, as defined by the root causes, events are unrepeatable and unique in their manifestations. A concrete situation expressing a particular acuity and maturity of the root causes of war can lead directly to war, or it may provide a possibility for avoiding war. This depends on the nature and orientation of the efforts of the masses, classes, and parties, through the activities of which social necessity is realized. It may even be said that the specific, special causes of war are a unique manifestation of the root cause within a particular social situation, in particular historic conditions.

And, finally, we can distinguish another level of causality of wars reflecting unique, particular causes. These are associated with individual factors behind manifestation of the root cause of war in a particular historic situation. A unique, particular cause is not the dominant cause of war, but in each case it imparts a special hue to this process, in a sense supplementing it, giving the root cause concrete form. The actions of personalities, social groups, special circumstances, and random factors can retard or hasten, and weaken or intensify the influence of the general, root cause. The general cause manifests itself precisely through a set of social acts, through the social will of individuals possessing different political qualities. A unique, particular cause mainly reveals the dialectics of necessity and chance in cause-and-effect relationships, and it serves as the means by which the general and special causes of war become more concrete.

Both the general, root causes and the specific and particular causes of wars operate not on their own, not in isolation, but together, in their unity. Their relationship and their manifestation in each separate war are unrepeatable and unique. But uniqueness does not preclude the fact that no matter what the circumstances, the root causes, the basic causes always remain the decisive, dominant causes. The conditions and causes eliciting a social crisis taking the form of a war do not disappear completely; instead, they appear to undergo modification, and they become included within the process of war, representing important elements of its content.

And so, wars arise owing to the action of cause-and-effect relationships existing as a complex structure, owing to the dialectics between the general, special, and unique causes, with the general, root causes playing the main role. In this case causality expresses itself differently in different concrete historic conditions. The chain of phenomena leading to war may not only follow a stable trend; they may also deviate from it (we may witness acceleration or deceleration of the process of a war's arising, or even its prevention), depending on the concrete situations and the concrete actions of personalities and social groups. To put it another way, the general cause realizes itself in different ways while preserving its main, fundamental orientation.

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Examination and consideration of the different levels of causality permits us to gain a deeper understanding of the concrete causes of wars in the present era, and the ways and means of blocking their manifestations; it also permits us to persuasively reveal the true face of fatalistic and subjectivistic viewpoints on war.

The events of our days confirm with new force the validity of Marxist-Leninist analysis of both the causes of wars and the means of their prevention. In the face of the constantly growing power of world socialism and the tremendous international authority of the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and other states of the socialist fraternity, the ruling circles of a number of capitalist countries have been forced to take certain steps in the direction of realism, toward recognizing the immutable fact that the sole sensible alternative to a war of devastation is peaceful coexistence of states having different socioeconomic structures. In essence the favorable shifts presently occurring in international relations reflect a factor of paramount significance: change in the balance of world forces in favor of socialism, the bankruptcy of the imperialist "position of strength" policy, and the groundlessness of bourgeois doctrines of dictatorship, pressure, and threat against states of the socialist fraternity.

Now that the balance of forces has changed in favor of socialism, imperialism's possibilities for using war as political means for attaining its reactionary goals has decreased. Under these conditions, peaceful coexistence--the foundation of peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism, a specific form of the class struggle between them--is at the same time one of the means for restricting and blocking the general, root cause of wars, a cause built into the structure of exploitation.

While the general positions of imperialism have weakened, this does not mean that its aggressiveness has decreased. Evidence of this can be found in imperialism's aggression against Vietnam and the Arab countries, the invasion of Guinea and Angola by neocolonists, the subversive activities against progressive regimes in Latin America, and numerous other facts. As a socioeconomic structure, imperialism continues to be the general, root cause of all wars of the modern era. The tendency toward international detente has not changed and could not change the internal social structure of modern bourgeois society or the reactionary essence of the imperialist state, together with the greed, aggressiveness, and antihumanitarianism inherent to it.

The aggressiveness of imperialism persists owing to the action of a group of factors.

First, the end result of the historic duel between the two socioeconomic systems is becoming ever-clearer. The complete triumph of socialism in the whole world is inevitable. However, attempting to postpone its fate in the arena of history, imperialism continues to place its hopes on military violence. Given the present level of development of weapons and military equipment, the special danger this course has to peace and the security of nations is clear.

Second, the general crisis of capitalism, which continues to deepen, is revealing irresolvable internal conflicts in the capitalist system. New centers and

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junctions of imperialist rivalry are forming. Growth in unemployment, financial and monetary upheavals, stiffening of market competition among imperialist predators, stagnation and decline of industrial production, and many other manifestations of the general crisis of capitalism clearly demonstrate the scandalous contradiction with the entire course of social progress into which the capitalist system has placed itself.

Attempting to find a solution to its critical situation, imperialism is placing great hopes on intensifying the society's militancy, and on pursuing the arms race. Just in 1975 alone the total military expenditures of the NATO countries increased by 10 percent over the previous year's level, exceeding \$149 billion. The military budget of the USA has attained especially large proportions. In the 1977 fiscal year it was \$113 billion, increasing by more than \$39 billion in just 2 years. The USA's decision in 1977 to initiate production of cruise missiles and allocate assets for a neutron bomb marked the beginning of a new spiral in the arms race. The allocations were a record for peacetime military expenditures. Growth in militarism increases the potential threat of a military explosion and creates crisis situations in international relations. However, the following paradox is becoming more and more evident: The military potentials of the aggressive imperialist blocs are growing, but their ability to impose their will upon other states is relentlessly decreasing. This situation is the consequence of objective changes in the balance of forces in the favor of socialism.

Third, imperialism has not been able to accept the fact that its colonial system crashed in the postwar era. Attempting to retain its influence in vast areas economically and strategically important to it, and trying to strangle the growing national liberation movement, it is resorting to the methods of neocolonialism, it is evoking armed conflicts in the Third World, and it is supporting the forces of extreme reaction.

Imperialism is adapting extremely aggressively to the new situation in the world. In military terms this means that imperialism is finding it increasingly more difficult to lay all of its immediate hopes only on a world nuclear war against the socialist fraternity. It is becoming more and more obvious that this would mean the liquidation of the entire capitalist system as well. Therefore, while not abandoning preparations for a world nuclear missile war, imperialism is placing special hopes on unleashing local wars, thus attempting to retard the world revolutionary process, and achieve its predatory goals in parts.

Thus imperialism bears the burden of numerous social ills, including the constant threat of war. And while it has no grounds for counting on victory in war, it is capable of beginning it. This obliges us to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Soviet state, and the combat readiness of the army and navy in every possible way.

2. The Social Essence of Wars

Having arisen as a social phenomenon, war has attracted the attention of intellectuals and military leaders as an extremely complex object of cognition since ancient times. But it was only the classicists of Marxism-Leninism who were able

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to provide, on the basis of a materialistic understanding of history, a truly scientific explanation of the essence of wars. V. I. Lenin made an especially great contribution to solving this problem. In a number of his works, mainly the article "The Fall of the Second International" (1915) and his lecture "War and Revolution" (1917), V. I. Lenin worked out the methodology of analyzing the social essence of war. Lenin's fundamental methodological requirement to understanding war can be stated as the need for maintaining a consistent class-political approach to it as a concrete historic phenomenon. "How do we arrive at the 'true essence' of war, how do we determine it?" Lenin asked, and he replied: "War is the continuation of state policy. We must study state policy as it existed before war, the policy which led to and heralded war."⁶

The essence of war cannot be determined apart from an analysis of the entire set of socioeconomic and political relations within a state or system of states leading to war. Describing the essence of World War I, Lenin said: "...we must inspect the entire policy of the whole system of European states, in their economic and political mutual relationship, if we are to understand the way this system led directly and unavoidably to this war."⁷ Criticizing the leaders of the Second International for substituting dialectics by sophistry in their explanation of the essence of war, V. I. Lenin wrote that war is a continuation of state policy by other, violent means. He emphasized in this case that "this was precisely the point of view held by Marx and Engels, who interpreted every war as a continuation of the policy of certain interested powers--and of different classes within them--at the given time."⁸

This extremely profound thought expresses the most important thing in the Marxist definition of the essence of war. It differs fundamentally from the interpretation given to this issue by bourgeois theorists, Clausewitz in particular.

V. I. Lenin referred to Clausewitz many times, praising him as a military philosopher of his era. But this does not at all mean that Lenin's and Clausewitz' viewpoints on war are identical, as bourgeois ideologists assert. Quite the contrary. While Clausewitz explained state policy idealistically as some sort of abstract phenomenon independent of classes, and believed that war is a continuation of foreign policy alone, V. I. Lenin approached state policy from class positions. He viewed foreign and domestic policy in their dialectical unity, placing priority on domestic policy, since it expresses the fundamental interests of classes the most fully and deeply, and since it is responsible for many processes occurring in society. This is precisely why, Lenin concluded, "that war is a reflection of the internal policy followed by the given country prior to a war."⁹

Domestic policy directly represents and defends the fundamental economic and social interests of the dominant classes, and therefore it has a tremendous influence on the nature and content of foreign policy, though in a number of cases (for example at the eve of or in the course of a war) foreign policy may play the dominant role in relation to domestic policy. In this case both domestic and foreign policy, according to Lenin, are not simply an expression of the interests of the dominant classes and governments, but they also express the "relationship between classes..."¹⁰ And so the assertions of bourgeois theorists that Lenin and Clausewitz adhere to the same viewpoint on the essence of war are entirely groundless, being nothing more than bare ideological speculation.

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It follows from Lenin's methodological premises that the structure of the essence of war consists of two main elements: 1) a particular policy and 2) its continuation in specific form--in the form of armed violence.

War is a political phenomenon, and therefore it possesses all of the functional characteristics of state policy. In this sense, as V. I. Lenin said, "war is policy throughout, a continuation of the pursuit, by these classes, of the same goals by other means."¹¹ In essence this statement contains the fundamental methodological principle of analysis of war: assessment of all phenomena associated with preparation for war, and the process itself and consequences of war, through the political prism of class interests. Were we to neglect the requirements of this principle, all discussions of war would be nothing more than an idle philological exchange."¹²

Basing ourselves on this, we can deduce a number of mutual dependencies in the relationship between war and policy. Let us note first of all that policy determines the orientation and nature of preparations made by a class, a state, or a coalition for a concrete war. It also defines the criteria of preparedness for war, designates the goals, and controls the initiation and, to a certain extent, the course of a war. While the policy of socialist states, which defends the fundamental interests of the laboring masses in the struggle against the aggressor, is based on the principles of social justice, international assistance to class brothers, and faithfulness to treaty obligations, the policy of imperialist states pursuing reactionary goals rests on demagoguery and treachery. Memory of the fruitless efforts of American reactionary circles to break the will for victory of the Vietnamese people is still fresh in all; the inhumane adventures of imperialism in Algeria, Korea, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Angola, and other countries have not been forgotten. And in each of these and in a multiplicity of other militant actions, imperialism has hypocritically declared a "struggle for freedom", "fulfillment of obligations", and so on.

Politics influences the course of war by setting and elaborating on strategic goals. Through strategy, it influences the concrete forms and methods of armed conflict, subordinating them to an overall military-political plan. It is only through political means that the action of all factors deciding the course and outcome of a war can be coordinated. The close unity existing between political and military activity in a war also expresses itself in the fact that the foreign political leadership of a country during a war usually defines supreme military leadership as well.

State policy also capitalizes upon the results of past wars, promoting new goals and tasks for the class and society on the basis of the real social consequences of war.

We naturally need to see the reverse relationship as well: the dependence of state policy on war, especially if military activities proceed contrary to the plan. In this case state policy must be restructured, the goals must be changed, and new tasks must be posed. Thus when it unleashed World War II, fascist Germany intended to conquer first Europe and then the whole world. However, after a number of major defeats on the Soviet-German front, the Nazi leadership was forced to consider something entirely different--the rescue of the Nazi regime, and so it attempted to make a separate peace with the Western powers for this purpose. In the end, the

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inconsistency between the posed goals and the availability of the means of their achievement, and inconsistency resulting from the adventurism of fascist policy, led to fascism's total downfall.

The reverse influence of war on state policy makes itself known through different channels, but the main one is represented by the results of combat activities, by the victories or defeats of troops on the battlefields. In this case the particular influence war has on policy stems from deep-lying factors: the viability of the concrete social structure, the social relations existing in the country, and the political content of the given war.

Military successes on the fronts of armed conflict may reinforce the political slogans, appeals, and political programs of the ruling classes in the minds of the people. In regard to capitalist states, however, even military successes are unable to completely camouflage the harmfulness and the reactionary goals of their wars, which are fought for the purposes of invasion, plunder, and suppression of revolutionary masses.

War has an especially direct influence upon the policy of classes and states suffering military failures. Many centuries of history have demonstrated that when exploiting states are defeated, all of their internal weaknesses and failures are revealed. The military failures of capitalist countries are promoted by the awakening of significant strata of the population from a chauvinistic trance into which they might have fallen as a result of militant propaganda. Class antagonisms become more obvious, and the laborers begin to realize more clearly that it is the policy of the monopolistic bourgeoisie that is leading the country to disaster, devastation, and deprivations. Defeats at the front also elicit further aggravation of national and racial contradictions in the antagonistic society.

In wars imposed upon socialism by imperialism, on its road to victory the socialist state encountered many difficulties of military and economic nature. But in the end it did surmount them. We can cite, for example, the experience of the Soviet people's Great Patriotic War against fascist invaders. In an improbably complex situation our society maximally mobilized its material and spiritual possibilities and turned the course of the struggle in its favor. The tremendous advantages of socialism over capitalism, which were realized owing to the colossal organizational activity and ideological indoctrination by the Communist Party and the heroic efforts of all Soviet people, welded together into a monolith by a unity of viewpoints, will, and actions, played a decisive role in this.

Consequently politics is the principal component of the structure of the essence of war viewed as a sociohistoric phenomenon. At the same time war is not simply or solely politics. Another component of war is armed violence. War is the continuation of state policy by a special means inherent to it alone--armed violence, which is the main resource and the specific characteristic of war.

The fact that armed violence is dominant in war does not by any means signify that war can be reduced to just military actions alone--battles, encounters, and engagements. Even in the very heat of military actions, state policy promotes attainment of the posed goals not only with the help of armed violence but also other means: conduct of an economic struggle, activation of diplomatic activities, and

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intensification of ideological and psychological influence upon the enemy. State policy is precisely what determines the nature of all measures having military significance. Only it is in a position to organize and direct the struggle against the enemy, utilizing all of its forms in the interests of achieving victory in war.

It would be correct to say that armed conflict is the main form of struggle in war. Without it, war would not be war. Thus certain expressions we hear today--economic, ideological, psychological, and commercial war--are rather arbitrary, and should not be taken literally; they emphasize, first of all, the resources of compulsion and influence used in the duel--economic, ideological, psychological, and so on. But these resources can also be used without war.

Any war is always an armed social conflict. But not every armed conflict can be called a war. Here again the problem lies with more than just the scale of the military duel. War possesses a number of characteristics which are not always inherent to armed conflicts.

First, war leads to a qualitative change in the state of the society. This transformation occurs mainly within all of the elements of the superstructure, within the political organization of the society. Many state institutions begin to perform new specific functions. The role of the political and legal superstructure grows even more. The ideological resources of the state are channeled almost entirely into supporting the political goals of the war; the entire spiritual atmosphere of the society changes rapidly, and the population's way of life acquires unique traits. The economy is placed on a war footing. Centralization of state power is increased, and all material and spiritual resources of the society are concentrated on supporting the war. In an armed conflict, on the other hand, the political goals are more-limited than in a war, and they do not require fundamental alteration of the entire state mechanism, and the society as a whole need not shift into the special state elicited by war.¹³

Second, while every war is generated mainly by the general, root causes stemming from the economic structure of a society of exploitation--this is even true today, special and particular causes expressing unique features in the interaction of a concrete historic situation and the existing means of production may assume priority in an armed conflict. And inasmuch as special and particular causes are organically associated with the general, root causes, armed conflicts may be precursors of a war--not only local but also world war. We know of cases in the past where imperialist circles have organized armed conflicts many times so as to create an excuse for war.

As we can see, armed conflict does not possess all of the characteristics that make war a special state of society. However, by its social essence it is also a consequence of a certain state policy; it is the latter's expression by violent means in a concrete area, and it pursues concrete political goals, though more limited in scope than those of war.

It should be noted that the problem of armed conflicts is now becoming an object of persistent study by bourgeois theorists. Attempts are also being made to create some sort of "special science" of conflicts which, in the opinion of Western ideologists, should have the purpose of studying the "technique" of conflict, the

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"mechanism" of its manifestation and resolution. Indicative in this respect is the collection "Control and Resolution of Conflicts" published in Stuttgart. The authors of this collection examine military conflicts apart from a particular sociopolitical context, reducing their examination to the development of various logical speculative schemes that stray quite far away from the essence of the problem. Their attempt to build abstract models of conflicts based on game theory, apart from real analysis of sociopolitical situations, essentially does nothing more than lead them away from a real resolution of the issue.

Thus the social essence of war is expressed in the classical Leninist premise that war is a continuation of state policy by different, violent means. This premise is implied by the materialistic, class interpretation of state policy and armed violence in their dialectical mutual relationship and mutual dependence. It teaches us to see, in the essence of war, not simply the "sum" of state policy and armed violence, but the deep dialectical unity of these elements in the process of realization of certain class interests.

The definition of the social essence of war given in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is general in nature; it applies to all types of wars. As far as the essence of each war taken separately is concerned, it naturally manifests itself uniquely each time, in accordance with the nature of the politics, the means of armed violence, and the historical conditions. This essence assumes concrete form in application to each type and form of war, and each individual war. This concrete nature manifests itself in the political content of the war. By reviewing the political content of a war, we are able to see its role in social development and give it a general sociopolitical description. This political content differs in different historical eras. Thus in the 19th century many wars had a national bourgeois liberation movement as their content. With the end of the 19th century, wars began to arise between capitalist states with the goal of reapportioning colonies, of reapportioning the world. Wars having defense of socialism as their political content arose for the first time in the 20th century. It follows from this that analysis of the essence of a concrete war presupposes clarification mainly of its political content--its goals, its nature, the social forces involved, and so on.

The Marxist-Leninist definition of the essence of war is also fully applicable to a world nuclear missile war, which imperialist reaction has still not discounted as a possibility in its plans. In recent years some bourgeois authors have stated the opinion several times that were a global military collision involving nuclear missiles to occur between the two systems, this war would be devoid of any sort of political essence. The arguments they suggest in favor of this premise are as follows: No political goals can be achieved through nuclear war, since all it can do is annihilate civilization; such a war would be not a continuation of state policy but "a continuation of insanity". "It is impossible in modern times to realize political solutions by nuclear means," declared, for example, the French general A. Beaufre.¹⁴

What can we say in this regard?

The authors of the statements cited above confuse two factors: the unsuitability of using nuclear weapons to achieve political goals, and the real essence of a nuclear missile war.

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The fact that some authors have been led to believe that a nuclear missile war could have no political essence can be explained to a significant extent by the new properties of such a war, generated by human imagination. Were we to look at the causes, nature, scope, and consequences of war as a whole from the standpoint of basic methodological premises, we cannot but see that state policy is responsible for the most significant traits of a world nuclear missile war as well, deeply influencing both the probability of its arisal and its prevention. The aggressive policy of militant forces can lead to a nuclear missile war; the peace-loving policy of socialist countries as well as actions by all other forces fighting for peace are capable of preventing this war. In the case of its arisal, a nuclear missile war would be the most "political" of all wars known to history. This conclusion is based on Lenin's thought expressed in his remarks on the book "On War" by Clausewitz: "The more political it is, the more 'warlike' war begins to seem..."¹⁵ Were a nuclear missile war to occur, it would preserve within its origins the general social essence of war: continuation of state policy by other, violent means, continuation of a policy of aggression by imperialism on one hand, and continuation of a policy of defense by socialism on the other hand.

All policy of the socialist state is aimed at eliminating war from the life of society. On the very second day after the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin's famous Peace Decree was adopted, declaring to all mankind that from that day forward this country was to be one of the laborers, one which would do everything to affirm peace on earth, and which would promote in every way the fall of the imperialist war machine. V. I. Lenin described the October Revolution itself as "the first victory in the effort to annihilate wars..."¹⁶ Socialism is pursuing this great effort with faith and justice. The world policy of the Soviet state and other countries of the socialist fraternity is based not on competing ideas and tactical considerations, as is often declared by bourgeois ideologists, but rather on the limitless possibilities of socialism, certain of the final triumph of its ideals even without the need for resorting to war, in the conditions of peaceful competition between the two systems. And if in opposition to the will of the peoples the fire of a world nuclear missile war does flare up, its root cause would be the capitalist system, imperialist policy.

It is entirely obvious that it is extremely difficult today for imperialism to continue its policy by the "nuclear" avenue, since imperialism's socioeconomic base and its possibilities are growing constantly smaller while the forces of socialism, which reject war as a means of resolving international disputes, are swiftly increasing. The fact that a nuclear missile war has not started on our planet is mainly owing to the existence of the Soviet Union and the community of socialist states--a powerful force capable of restraining the aggressor.

While the general social essence of war would remain the same, some new factors may arise in a possible nuclear missile war. They would express themselves in the nature of continuation of policy by violent means: first, in having a tremendous influence upon the future of not only individual countries and coalitions, but all mankind as well; second, in broad reflection, in the essence of the war, of the greatest technological achievements of recent decades in military affairs and in exercise of armed violence by fundamentally new technical resources. These resources would add many new things to the content of the armed conflict itself, and they would

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have an influence on all factors defining the course and outcome of the war, but at the same time they would not change its general social essence as a continuation of policy by violent means.

Consequently throughout its existence, war has always been, is, and will be a continuation of policy by violent means. The genetic stability of the essence of war lies in the invariably dominant role of policy in relation to armed violence.

Marxist-Leninist analysis of the origin, causes, and essence of wars is not only one of the most important methodological principles of investigation of the nature of past and present wars and armed conflicts, but it is also an effective means of fighting against bourgeois and opportunist falsifiers of these issues.

3. A Criticism of Bourgeois and Opportunist Conceptions of the Origin, Causes, and Essence of Wars

Examining the origin, causes, and essence of wars above, we saw that in the area of military theory, as well as in other spheres of ideology, a savage, irreconcilable struggle is going on. This problem is the battlefield of two viewpoints, opposite in their class content, on the causes and essence of wars: on one hand the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, and on the other hand the bourgeois viewpoint, with which various opportunist points of view align themselves to one extent or another. The methodological and philosophical premises on the essence of modern wars and on the causes of their arising, presented in concentrated form in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, are the object of special attacks by Western ideologists and their opportunist allies. The capitalist countries publish large numbers of articles and books and conduct numerous studies, conferences, and symposiums with this purpose.

What are the roots of such high attention of bourgeois ideology to the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army? They can be described as follows.

We know that the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate philosophical and methodological foundation of Soviet military theory and practice. Guiding military development, the Communist Party bases itself on the conclusions of Marxism-Leninism on the essence, causes, nature, and consequences of modern wars. Bourgeois ideologists would wish to distort these fundamental conclusions of Marxism-Leninism, and to cast a shadow upon the concrete content of the CPSU's military policy, upon the orientation of Soviet military development, and upon its philosophical and methodological foundation.

The growing aggressiveness of the ideological attacks by our class enemies upon the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is also a product of their attempts to theoretically "justify" the militant, aggressive course of monopolistic reaction. Bourgeois conceptions of war, which falsify the true causes of modern wars, and which justify militarization of imperialist states, play the role of a unique sort of theoretical "lightning rod", having the purpose of directing social awareness onto to a false path. This is why Lenin's words are so important today: "We must explain to the people the real situation, the great secrecy surrounding the birth of war.... It may be that the sophisms in which the bourgeois press engages may in fact be the main resource for drawing the masses into war..."¹⁷

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Within the variegated mosaic of viewpoints of modern bourgeois ideologists on the origin and causes of wars, we can distinguish three main groups.

The first group consists of conceptions having to do with the sociopolitical determinism of wars. They essentially explain the origin and causes of war by differences in the sociopolitical doctrines operating in society. The articles and books of theorists adhering to this group contain many discussions of the role of politics, ideology, and social institutions in the arising of crises leading to war. The reading of such publications by a person unexperienced in the nuances of bourgeois political demagoguery may create the impression that these theories are scientifically based. But deeper familiarization with them makes it clear that there is only an appearance of a scientific approach to this extremely important problem.

Not one work by bourgeois authors on the causes of wars recognizes the dominant objective premise that the socioeconomic structure of the society of exploitation is the deepest, general, and most permanent cause of all wars and conflicts, both in the past and today.

The rather influential sociological school of "political realism" existing in the USA (H. Morgenthau, A. Schlesinger, W. Whitworth) spreads the assertion that the struggle for power, for hegemony by all available means is supposedly the basis of social development--both in the framework of individual states and on an international scale. And, using the terms of the proponents of this school, inasmuch as "the communist hegemony is absolutely unacceptable", then a military duel between the two systems supposedly becomes an unavoidable reality.¹⁸ Even peaceful coexistence is viewed by them as a means of military conflict. Thus the authors of the collection "Arms and Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age", published in the USA, feel that "peaceful coexistence is nothing more than another conception of the struggle for domination and supremacy in the world."¹⁹

Our viewpoints on peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures are fundamentally opposite to these reactionary views. "Peaceful coexistence," reads the CPSU Program, "presupposes: rejection of war as a means for resolving disputes between states, and insistence upon the resolution by negotiation; equal rights, mutual understanding, and trust between states, and consideration of each other's interests; noninterference in internal affairs, and recognition of each nation's right to independently resolve all of the country's own issues; strict respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit."²⁰ Such relations between socialist and capitalist states are an objective prerequisite of human society's development. The policy of peaceful coexistence is opposed by reactionary imperialist circles, which are incredibly persisting with military adventures and with the arms race, and which have pursued, and still try to pursue, a foreign policy "from a position of strength".

Having tremendous experience in social demagoguery and utilizing an entire system of ideological myths and propaganda slogans, Western theorists are trying to inject, into the consciousness of the bourgeois masses, the false tenet that the main cause of wars in the modern era is the "Soviet threat", the existence of socialism, of its supposed policy "of achieving domination over the world."

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Manipulating certain passages and premises taken out of context from the works of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism, bourgeois ideologists are attempting to transform the very fact of our scientifically justified, optimistic certainty in the final triumph of the ideals of socialism and communism throughout the entire planet into an expression "of the expansionistic orientation of world communism". By juggling anticommunist arguments, for example, the American sociologist W. Whitworth hopes to lead the reader to the hypocritical conclusion that "the USA has been forced to create a military machine, armed forces, and foreign bases, and pursue a 'policy of deterrence' and engage in military activities only in order to contain the expansionism of world communism."²¹

All military-theoretical conceptions of modern militarism are based on this false premise. The myth of a "Soviet threat", of the "threat of communism" fabricated in the West serves as a screen covering the aggressive actions of imperialism. It is being used actively by the enemies of international detente.

We cannot but see that in a number of cases such tactics could produce temporary ideological results advantageous to imperialism, and inject false ideas into the minds of some strata of bourgeois society, deformed by Western propaganda. As the French sociologist C. Moisy writes in the book "America Under Arms", "the Pentagon has been able to draw the United States into military conflicts in the past and in the present (be it the war in Korea or Indochina) owing to the fact that the average American still believes the USA's mission of protecting all Western democracy against world communism."²²

Reality itself refutes this myth. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity are directing their efforts not at "expansion", as the enemies of socialism falsely assert, but at the "peace offensive", at deepening detente, at further improvement of the living conditions of different nations. This humanitarian course was clearly re-embodied in decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and in documents of the fraternal parties of other socialist states. Unmasking the designs of our enemies, whose main motive is to spread the assertion of the so-called "military threat", Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "In fact, of course, there is no Soviet threat in either the West or the East. All of this is a monstrous lie--from the beginning to the end. The Soviet Union has no intention of attacking anyone. The Soviet Union does not need war. The Soviet Union is not enlarging its military budget, and it is not reducing but steadfastly increasing its allocations to raise the welfare of the people. Our country is consistently and unwaveringly struggling for peace, and it is constantly suggesting concrete proposals aimed at arms reduction and at disarmament."²³

Expressing the class interests of the bourgeoisie, the representatives of the conceptions of sociopolitical determinism of wars declare in their theoretical developments that the source of war can also be found in the struggle of the working class of capitalist states for their social liberation, and in activation of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries.

The scientific groundlessness and social reactionism of such assertions cannot be doubted. The oppressed classes and peoples have the historic right to fight against their exploiters. They select the forms of this struggle depending on the historic conditions--both peaceful and nonpeaceful forms. Thus Marxists are

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not against any and all wars in general, they are only against unjust, predatory, imperialist wars. Peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures does not mean "prohibition" of revolutionary and civil wars fought by laborers for their social liberation, or national liberation wars fought by people against imperialist oppressors. What brings misfortune to people is not these just socio-political acts, but the policy of imperialism, aimed at strangling the just desires for liberty and forcing the masses to take up arms.

The conceptions of sociopolitical determinism tie the causes of war in with only the phenomena of the superstructure, completely ignoring their fundamental economic grounds. And if such fundamental grounds are ever brought up, this is only done with the purpose of portraying war and the arms race as one of the means for "curing" the bourgeois economy of its numerous shocks. In reality, however, the arms race leads not to economic flourishing but rather to a constantly deepening crisis in social relations, and meaningless waste of more and more material resources. V. I. Lenin aptly referred to the "scientific" arguments of bourgeois theorists trying to justify these outlays as the vulgar nonsense of a militant.²⁴

The second group of bourgeois theories on the origin and causes of wars includes the conceptions of natural determinism. This group contains the viewpoints of a neo-Freudian, psychological interpretation, biological conceptions (social Darwinism, racism, neo-Malthuseanism), and so on.

The proponents of the theory of psychological causality of wars view the mind not as a continuous process of reflection of the objective world but rather as something primordial, unchanging, self-contained, and permanent. The English bourgeois sociologist G. Blainey asserts that the principal mechanism that supposedly determines whether we are in a state of war or peace is the so-called "primordial psychological cycle of the world, following which, any society would sooner or later acquire the propensity to go to war."²⁵ Usually the proponents of this theory place dominance on subconscious, irrational factors, pathological drives, and "permanent instincts". In their opinion, presence of "primordial aggressive drives" within man's spiritual structure creates a permanent foundation for his warlike nature, for his propensity for violence. As an example the American sociologist (A. Meyerlo) writes in the book "That Difficult Peace" that "in each of us there dwells a primeval instinct of aggressiveness, and man's desire for devastation, for war, and for conflicts is ingrained in his mind...."²⁶

Such viewpoints are based on the neo-Freudian suggestion that collisions between people are supposedly unavoidable and permanent, something stemming from their "inborn aggressiveness". This subconscious drive, neo-Freudians say, is what elicits social crises in society, and the fall of ideals, hopes, and prospects. As a result we see amplification of the traits of egoism, individualism, and aggressiveness--that is, all that prods people to violence, including armed violence; leaders in executive positions and possessing such traits determine whether or not there will be war.²⁷ The psychological basis of military conflicts, the adherents of this conception believe, is ineradicable.

Different modifications of social Darwinism, racism, and neo-Malthuseanism explain the causes of war as the incompatibility of races, as overpopulation of certain regions of the world, and as the "demographic explosion". This is yet

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another expression of the deep crisis of bourgeois military theoretical thought, of its powerless social reactionism, of a philosophical and methodological inability to provide a scientific idea of the real social processes and the roots of war.

In essence the proponents of explaining wars by natural causes mechanically apply the laws of development of the animal world to human society, they ignore the class and socioeconomic causes of wars, and thus they attempt to whitewash the monopolistic bourgeoisie, the principal perpetrator of modern wars.

The representatives of biosocial conceptions of war have become noticeably more active in recent years, speculating on some facts concerning overpopulation of certain regions of the planet and on high population growth in developing countries. They attempt to persuade public opinion that these phenomena are supposedly aggravating the struggle for existence, making war a blessing, a means for achieving the needed decrease in population. The causes of conflicts and wars, consequently, are moved from the social sphere to the realm of natural conditions.

The third group of viewpoints on the origin and causes of wars include the conceptions of bourgeois military sociology centering on so-called technical determinism. Their essence lies in the assertion that the danger of wars in the modern era stems not from the capitalist means of production and not from the social failures of bourgeois society, but from the depths of scientific-technical progress. These ideas are not new. The roots of such viewpoints extend back to the middle of the last century, when they were expressed in concentrated form by the bourgeois economist and sociologist T. Veblen. According to him, science and technology fully predetermine all processes of social life, they serve as the cause of growth in production, culture, and the needs of people, and they are the source of all social antagonisms. According to an updated version of these viewpoints, in the interaction of two factors--cultural and material--the latter supposedly is far ahead of the culture factor in its development, and it is gradually acquiring its own independent logic of development, one that is out of the control of man's power and his political institutions.²⁸

The authors of the book "Breakthrough to Peace", published in the USA, go even further. They say that "the scientific-technical determinant of life is gradually making the latest weapons more and more automated, and thus they are going farther and farther out of our control. It could be said that arms will become higher beings, that they will be typified by ultimate manifestations of decisiveness and courage; we will tend to trust them more than ourselves."²⁹ The bearers of such views state that nuclear weapons and automated armament systems, which are supposedly irreversibly slipping away from human control, are transforming into a "demoniacal force" and becoming an independent monstrous factor that objectively threatens the future of mankind.

Divorcing the achievements of science and technology from concrete policy, or identifying social progress with scientific-technical progress, bourgeois ideologists usually reach anticommunist conclusions in their reasoning. The most reactionary followers advise no restraint in the choice of the resources for fighting against revolutionary forces. Thus the notorious American atomic scientist E. Teller prophesies: "Use of any weapon, of any resources in the struggle against world communism is justified by the very essence of our technological age."³⁰

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As with other antiscientific viewpoints on the sources of wars, technical determinism has deep social and gnoseological roots in bourgeois society itself. We know that transformation of the products of labor into commodities and their alienation from the producers under capitalism leads to the erroneous idea that things control society. Being itself a commodity, technology acquires certain mystical traits in the awareness of some people, and assumes the characteristics of a fetish. Here lie the grounds for the gnoseological possibility for Western sociology to shift, from imperialism to scientific-technical progress, the blame for many antagonistic phenomena and social diseases inherent to bourgeois society.

The following are typical of all such conceptions that provide a distorted explanation of the origin and causes of wars: in social respects--distinctly pronounced anticommunism, and in the theoretical aspect--idealism and metaphysics, which are hidden in fashionable pseudoscientific clothing.

Basing itself on the interests of the ruling classes of capitalist society, bourgeois military sociology also prejudiciously explains the essence of war. While recognizing the relationship existing between war and state policy in their majority, as a rule Western theorists interpret the essence of a concrete policy (both bourgeois and socialist) with a bias, in a way advantageous to themselves, divorcing it from its economic basis and treating domestic and foreign policy as opposite entities.

Other viewpoints on the essence of modern war are also widespread in bourgeois military sociological literature. Some Western authors, as was noted earlier, feel that the essence of a possible nuclear world war is devoid of political content, inasmuch as such a war would lead to universal disaster; the senselessness of such a war is said to be proof of this in itself. It would not be difficult to deduce from such conclusions, in particular, extinction of the hope, harbored by certain aggressive circles of imperialism, of achieving their global political goals by force of arms. This trend could have arisen only in an atmosphere of continuing reinforcement of the positions of socialism, and the influence of its broad "peace offensive", which has the purpose of affirming more and more strongly, in international relations, the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with opposing socioeconomic systems.

Some bourgeois ideologists who preach the notion of renouncing war stand on the positions of passivism, and directly or indirectly they condemn the actions of militant circles making preparations for a new war. This is a manifestation of the positive element of passivist conceptions.

Attacking the Marxist theoretical definition of the essence of war as a continuation of policy by violent means, bourgeois theorists are trying to carry this problem to another plane--the plane of a nuclear missile war's suitability or unsuitability, asserting in this case that Marxist-Leninist theory supposedly treats such war as inevitable. This is a gross falsification. Marxism-Leninism has never thought of war as a means for resolving international disputes, and it never will. This premise is written into the CPSU Program.³¹ It also clearly states our attitude toward world thermonuclear war: "The efforts of the people must be concentrated on promptly neutralizing the imperialists, and depriving them of their possibility for placing their death-dealing weapons into motion. The

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most important thing is to prevent thermonuclear war, to keep it from starting."³² The CPSU Program, the USSR Constitution, party congress decisions, and other party documents clearly express the humanitarian principles of Soviet peace-loving foreign policy.

Analyzing the essence of local wars, modern bourgeois ideologists try to diminish the role of armed violence in them. Western literature usually defines local wars basically as ones involving small areas and being characterized by "limited" use of men and equipment, "political limitation" of violence, and so on. As an example in his book "Limited War" R. Osgood asserts that violence is an insignificant element of local war, that everything supposedly depends on policy alone. Definitions of the essence of local wars place their emphasis on the need for a "pacification policy", for fulfillment of "accepted political obligations" to other countries, achievement of a "political resolution", and so on. Falsely representing imperialist policy as having a peaceful orientation, bourgeois ideologists try to reduce the essence of imperialist local wars mainly to political actions, to political support of what are said to be forced military measures, and so on.

However, as with attempts at removing the entire political foundation from war, these attempts at reducing war down to policy predominantly (after first distorting its content) are unable to conceal the aggressive essence of imperialism generating war, including local wars, which may become the detonator of world war under certain conditions. And Lenin's assessment of the "minor" wars of the imperialists as a continuation of their policy of seizure and slaughter of entire nationalities, and of unprecedented atrocities fully retains its significance today. Mankind is aware of numerous facts and documents that have shed light on the true political goals of imperialism in the wars of recent decades--in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam, the Near East, and other regions of the planet.

Various opportunist conceptions also express viewpoints objectively in common with bourgeois theories. When defining the causes and essence of modern wars, opportunists on the right typically understate the military danger of imperialism and overstate the possibilities of moral resources for restraining the threat of a new world war. Opportunists or ideologists on the right usually see the source of modern wars mainly in the contradictions of the era--in the contradictions between socialism and imperialism. This is fundamentally incorrect. Wars are elicited not by the contradiction itself between two opposing socioeconomic systems--wars had been fought even prior to this, when this contradiction was still nonexistent. Wars are generated, as was demonstrated above, by one of the two sides between which this contradiction exists--the imperialist side.

Modern "leftist" opportunism, especially Maoism, cloaks itself with revolutionary phrases, and in the area of military theory it specializes in distortion of the causes, essence, and role of wars in the life of society, declaring them to be inevitable.

Opportunism in theory and political attitude inevitably leads to opportunism in practice, to betrayal of the fundamental interests of the laborers. This is why the task of unmasking both the bourgeois theories of war and the opportunist interpretations of this phenomenon is especially important today. What is important in the struggle against our ideological enemies is not just defending but also developing the premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

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Grounded criticism of bourgeois and opportunist viewpoints permits us to reinforce, in the consciousness of the people, scientific, class-based ideas on the causes, essence, nature, and consequences of modern wars. Assimilation of Marxist-Leninist premises and conclusions on the essence and causes of wars plays a tremendous philosophical and methodological role, since it provides a possibility for each person to clearly determine his true class position in assessing concrete wars and his own practical relationship to them.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 21, p 108.
2. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, p 164.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 42, p 278.
4. Various aspects of the origin and essence of wars were studied in the works of a number of Soviet authors: T. R. Kondratkov, S. I. Krupnov, V. I. Morozov, Ye. I. Rybkin, G. A. Fedorov, and others.
5. Naturally, not every war resolves existing contradictions to the end. Resolution of some conflicts often leads to aggravation or arisal of others. Only just wars create a possibility for effectively resolving contradictions by eliminating class oppression, national enslavement, the consequences of aggression, and so on.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 82.
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 80.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 224.
9. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 319.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 43, p 72.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 281.
12. Ibid., p 82.
13. For greater detail on qualitative changes in the state of society during a war, see pp 59-64 of this book.
14. Beaufre, A., "Strategie pour demain.," Paris, 1974, p 19.
15. "Leninskiy sbornik XII" [Lenin Anthology XII], p 397.
16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 149.
17. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 45, pp 318, 319.

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18. Whitworth, W., "Naive Question About War and Peace," New York, 1972, pp 77-78.
19. "Arms and Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age," New York, 1975, p 237.
20. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 59.
21. Whitworth, W., "Naive Question About War and Peace," p 41.
22. Moisy, C., "L'Amerique sous les Armes," Paris, 1973, p 185.
23. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 22.
24. See "Lenin Anthology XXVII," p 17.
25. Blainey, G., "The Causes of War," London, 1973, p 87.
26. "That Difficult Peace," New York, 1970, p 180.
27. Etrioni, A., "The Hard Way to the Peace. N. Strategy," New York, 1970, pp 77-79.
28. Dessauer, "Streit um die Technik," Frankfurt am Main, 1970, p 16.
29. "Breakthrough to Peace," New York, 1969, p 167.
30. Teller, E., "Alternatives for Security," New York, 1968, p 61.
31. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," p 59.
32. Ibid., p 57.
33. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 86.

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CHAPTER III

WAR AND OTHERS FORMS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

All war is a continuation of state policy by the resources of armed violence. These resources are used to achieve certain goals of classes and states. But far from all armed violence can be defined as war--it may also be employed on a unilateral basis, while war presupposes mutual use of armed violence by opposing sides.

Armed violence, being the most acute form of social violence, is generated by social antagonisms existing in structures of exploitation, and it is one of their attributes. Only the emergence of socialism in the world arena and continual growth in its political and economic power made it possible, for the first time in history, to realistically consider the notion of excluding the use of violence, including armed violence, in relations between states.

At the same time the world still contains influential imperialist forces that are doing everything they can to spoil the process of detente, place resources of armed violence of ever-greater destructive power into motion, employ atomic and other military blackmail and, finally, under certain conditions initiate a new world war in order to further their criminal designs. Careful analysis of the historical forms of armed violence can help to reveal the true nature of the plans of aggressive imperialist circles, and to mobilize the popular masses in the struggle for a secure peace and the security of nations.

1. The Role and Place of Armed Violence in Social Violence

The classicists of Marxism-Leninism fully substantiated the origin, essence, and role of social violence in history. Social violence arose in the heart of a society based on private ownership, on man's exploitation by man. It is a system of economic, political (including military), and ideological measures of compulsion imposed by some classes and states in relation to others. Armed violence is a manifestation of social violence in which armed resources play the main role in the effort to reach particular goals.

After its arisal, the exploiting minority found a need for using force to keep the exploited masses subservient, and to multiply its wealth and privileges through seizure of new territories and enslavement of other nations. In response to the violence of the exploiters, the oppressed classes rose up in arms for their liberation, and they opposed the enemy with the resources of revolutionary violence.

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Since power depends on economic and other social factors, violence is subservient to these factors, serving the economic and political interests of classes and states. "...violence..." wrote Engels in his criticism of (Dyuring) formaking the role of violence in history absolute, "is predicated upon economics, which provides the resources for creating and preserving the instruments of violence."¹

Violence is organically not inherent to socialism, since socialist society is based on public ownership, which exclude exploitation and suppression of one individual by another. Within a socialist state, relationships of friendship and mutual assistance dominate between people, while foreign policy is aimed at consolidating peace, friendship, and cooperation with other nations. But inasmuch as all of the existence of exploiting states is inseparably associated with their use of violence, Marxists cannot renounce the use of violent means by the laboring masses as a retaliatory, forced measure in the struggle against the exploiters and their system of oppression and violence. V. I. Lenin taught that "Without revolutionary violence aimed at the immediate enemies of the workers and peasants, we cannot break the resistance of these exploiters."²

Consequently violence has played either a reactionary role in history if its purpose was to defend outdated social orders, or a progressive role, if it served as an instrument used by progressive forces in the struggle against these orders.

Today there are two types of social violence that are diametrically opposed in terms of their class content, social orientation, and role in history: 1) the reactionary violence of exploiter classes and states, used to preserve and consolidate a system of exploitation of one individual by another, to multiply one's wealth and privileges, and to combat the forces of democracy and socialism, and 2) the revolutionary violence of progressive classes and states, which serves as a means for restraining violent exploiters, and as an instrument with which to overthrow exploiting classes, defend the achievements of socialism, and eliminate the colonial yoke.

V. I. Lenin wrote: "...socialism generally opposes violence against people. However, with the exception of Christian anarchists and the followers of Tolstoy, no one has ever concluded from this that socialism is against revolutionary violence. Consequently referring to "violence" in general, without analyzing the conditions making reactionary violence different from revolutionary violence, means siding with the petty bourgeoisie who have renounced revolution, or it means simply deceiving oneself and others by sophistry."³

It is precisely the class content of revolutionary, progressive violence, viewed in inseparable unity with its social orientation and historical role, that imparts to it a retaliatory, forced form of opposition against the violent attempts of reactionary classes to perpetuate the system of exploitation and retard the objective, progressive course of history.

Thus the main criteria used to determine the form of social violence, including armed violence are: the class content of social violence, the historical dependence and orientation of its action, and the way the resources of social violence are used.

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As we can see from the above, social violence is a broader concept than armed violence. Social violence manifests itself in different forms--economic, political, legal, and military. In a certain sense it is only to reactionary violence that we can apply the concept of ideological violence, in which the mass media ideologically brainwash the broad masses in the interests of the classes of exploitation.

Consequently violence cannot be interpreted simplistically; it cannot be reduced to armed violence, to physical action. Such a simplified view is typical of some petty bourgeois ideologists and "leftist" revisionists siding with them on this issue, mainly the Maoists, who are attempting to picture the revolutionary struggle of the laborers only as a series of armed uprisings, and who refer to armed seizure of power as the highest form of the class struggle.

In opposition to these assertions, Marxism-Leninism views not war but the political struggle, of which war is a possible but not a mandatory component, as the highest form of the class struggle. The concept "highest form of the class struggle" can be applied to a socialist revolution, which may be brought about by both peaceful and nonpeaceful resources. The classicists of Marxism-Leninism said many times that the working class and the laborers would prefer to come to power by the peaceful means--that is, by the least painful route. However, trying to retard the revolutionary process, the classes of exploitation as a rule place weapons in motion, and thus they force the oppressed to resort to military resources of conflict.

Hence we can see that armed violence is not the highest form of the class struggle, but the most decisive form of social violence. The type of social violence to which armed violence is related has a dominant influence on the nature and methods of armed violence.

The armed violence of revolutionary classes, and progressive violence in general, is typified not only by progressive goals but also by the maximally humanitarian nature of the resources by which these goals are achieved. When revolutionary classes fight a war that may be referred to as a reaction, they relate humanely to the peaceful population, to the defeated enemy, and to prisoners and casualties. Here lies one of the important sources of the power of revolutionary, progressive armies. The progressive goals of war, when viewed in unity with the humanitarian methods of the conduct of war, promote development of high moral-political and combat qualities in soldiers.

And on the other hand, the reactionary goals of unjust wars fought by classes of exploitation make extremely cruel methods of armed violence necessary. We are well aware of the mass slaughter of Communards in France in 1871, the merciless terror of the external and internal enemies of Soviet power in the period of foreign military intervention and civil war in Russia, the "scorched earth" policy followed by the Nazis in World War II, and the outrages of the American aggressors in Vietnam. According to official Pentagon figures, in 1966-1972 American aviation dropped more than 7 million tons of bombs on the countries of Indochina--3.5 times more than was dropped by it on the fronts of World War II.⁴ As of the beginning of 1971 almost 1.5 million Vietnamese had been poisoned, and many died

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as a result of the use of chemical weapons by American interventionists. A tremendous number of atrocities were committed by other imperialist armies. Punitive operations, the slaughter of peaceful residents, destruction of crops, forests, and so on--all of these methods of armed violence, ones which are angrily condemned by progressive civilization, have become a permanent fixture of the arsenal of imperialism. Unjust wars, and barbarian methods used in them, have a disintegrating action upon the personality and transform the imperialist army into a band of murderers, marauders, and rapists.

2. The Forms of Reactionary Armed Violence

Armed violence by reactionary classes possesses traits brought about by the place of these classes in history and by the concrete forms and technical resources of violence.

The historical trend in the evolution of capitalist society has been such that as it turned from its ascending to its descending line of development, as the prerequisites for arisal of the new society matured and manifested themselves, and especially as the general crisis of capitalism began, bourgeois society became increasingly more militant, and the bourgeoisie resorted with increasing frequency to armed violence in the name of preserving and consolidating its domination. This trend achieved its apogee under imperialism. Imperialism elevated armed violence to the rank of its highest policy, making it the main resource of systematic alteration of the world, and of the struggle against socialism and the international workers and national liberation movements. "...politically," Lenin wrote, "imperialism is in general a tendency toward violence and toward reaction."⁵

Imperialism's reactionary nature and its tendency to resort to violence constantly manifest themselves today. Utilizing all resources, including armed violence, slander, befuddlement of the public, economic blockade, organization of starvation and devastation, bribery, and so on, imperialism is trying to halt the objective process of the world revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, which makes up the principal content of the modern era.

The armed violence of imperialism, which permeates all of its domestic and foreign policy, should be defined as the use, by monopolist bourgeoisie, of its military organization with the purpose of achieving reactionary economic and political goals, both in war and apart from it. The monopolist bourgeoisie maintains large armies, police, a political apparatus, intelligence organs, and special armed detachments for this purpose.

As an example according to data of the London Institute of Strategic Research, as of 1977 the U.S. Armed Forces had a strength of 2.1 million men. In all, 5 million persons were employed by various militarized organizations of the USA.⁶ Despite the fact that a significant amount of time had already passed since the end of the war in Vietnam, the numbers of American troops abroad was 500,000 men in this same period. The American armed forces have 340 major bases and over 2,000 other military facilities at their disposal in 30 states.⁷ The United States has military treaties and agreements with 40 countries, and it provides military aid to 50 states.⁸

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As of the beginning of 1977 the combined armed forces of NATO contained about 70 divisions, 10,000 medium and heavy tanks, 3,000 warplanes, and more than 7,000 units of nuclear ammunition. The total strength of the armed forces of all NATO countries was about 5 million men.⁹

All of these resources of imperialist armed violence are not only a potential threat to peace. They are systematically used in the interests of major capital.

One of the typical forms of armed violence resorted to by monopolist bourgeoisie within its own country is the performance of police functions (dispersal of demonstrations, laborer meetings, and so on) by police formations, by troops, and especially by units specially trained for this purpose. In periods when the revolutionary uprisings of the people acquire special danger to the power of capital, imperialists quickly increase their use of armed violence against the laborers, not hesitating to use even the cruelest measures.

Counterrevolutionary uprisings and military coups are a widespread form of armed violence by reactionary classes. As a result, governments following a democratic course are overthrown and reactionary governments come into power. Indicative in this aspect are the coups in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). Espionage and subversive activities by major imperialist powers play a great role in the implementation of reactionary conspiracies. As an example the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA participated in the overthrow of the governments of Mosaddeq in Iran (1953), Arbenz in Guatemala (1954), and so on. Just in the last 10 or so years reactionary military coups were conducted with the participation of the CIA in Ghana (1966), Mali (1968), and Chile.

The forms of imperialism's armed violence in the international arena have become more diverse and monstrous. The first half of the 20th century was marked by two world wars, started by the leading imperialist powers with the hope of satisfying their aggressive appetites. The armed violence of imperialism in these wars, especially in World War II, acquired an all-encompassing nature, drawing hundreds of millions of people into its reach. It attained its highest point when in 1941 fascism unleashed a war historically unprecedented in terms of its cruelty and scale against the world's first socialist state. The Soviet Union suffered the main blow of the most reactionary forces of imperialism. Owing mainly to the heroic struggle of our people, mankind was rescued from the threat of fascist enslavement.

World wars are a product of imperialism. The resources of armed violence are utilized in them to their fullest degree. Monopolist reaction used the most destructive weapons in these wars. While war gases were placed into common usage in World War I, "mushroom" clouds raised by the explosions of atom bombs dropped by American aviation on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served as the finale to World War II.

Imperialism's preparation for a new world war against the countries of the socialist fraternity directly and indirectly express the tendency for manifestation of the reactionary class essence of armed violence by monopolist bourgeoisie in its most inhumane forms. However, now that the balance of social forces in the international

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arena has tilted in favor of socialism, it is becoming increasingly more risky and dangerous for imperialism to unleash a world war. Therefore militants are devoting increasingly greater attention to other forms of armed violence which they believe to be more flexible and less dangerous to imperialism's existence: local wars, demonstrations of power, and military blackmail. Thus, as is obviously implied by figures published by the Brookings Institution, since 1945 the USA resorted to the use of armed forces to support its foreign policy actions in 215 cases.¹⁰ Armed violence was used against peoples rising for their liberation by the armies of England, France, and other imperialist states in the last few decades.

Armed violence, which has penetrated deeply into the day-to-day policy of imperialism, is a means of both direct aggression and political and psychological pressure in international affairs. Imperialist states undertake special actions having the purpose of exerting political and psychological pressure on the policies of certain countries and on the class forces within them. Such actions include military maneuvers, transfers of ground troops, fleets, and aviation to the borders of the state selected as an object of terror, placement of troops located at bases near the given country in combat readiness, flights to its borders by warplanes, and so on.

Thus the U.S. Navy participated many times in demonstrations of power along the coast of Southeast Asia and Africa, and in the Mediterranean Sea. In October 1962 the government of the United States placed its armed forces, to include the 6th and 7th fleets and several thousand warplanes, on combat alert, and concentrated about 250,000 enlisted men and officers and over 200 ships for an attack on Cuba. A naval blockade of Cuba was organized. The republic was threatened openly by invasion. "...we made plans for 2,000 sorties," wrote R. Kennedy, "and the landing of marine infantry and paratrooper assault parties; several carriers, two heavy cruisers, 25 destroyers, and a significant number of auxiliary ships were concentrated in the vicinity of Cuba.... The American Armed Forces were brought to full combat readiness throughout the world."¹¹ The world was placed at the brink of war, and it was only the decisive and, at the same time, flexible foreign policy of the Soviet Union in Cuba that permitted the Cuban people to defend their revolutionary achievements, and maintain the peace.

In December 1971, when the Indo-Pakistani conflict began, the U.S. government sent a naval squadron to the shores of the Indian peninsula in order to exert pressure upon progressive circles in India and Bangladesh which had demonstrated their opposition against military violence by the reactionary circles of Pakistan in power at that time. However, the firm position of the Soviet Union and other socialist states, which supported the just struggle of the peoples of India and Bangladesh, averted armed intervention by imperialism in the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

Major imperialist states are resorting more and more frequently to another form of armed violence--use of mercenaries and of the armies of their "junior partners" to fight against developing countries assuming a progressive path. Typical in this regard were actions by bands of mercenaries hired by Western monopolies in the Congo and other African countries during the time of achievement of their national independence, participation of units and subunits of the armed forces of Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in the dirty war in Indochina, participation of troops of the South African Republic in the intervention against Angola, and Israeli aggression against Arab peoples.

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International imperialism not only inspired Israeli invaders and supplied their military machine with weapons and modern combat equipment, but also supported them in critical moments by concentrating their troops near the Arab states. It is known that at the time of a new outbreak of Israel's war against the Arab peoples in October 1973, the USA immediately provided broad military assistance to Israel, placed its troops in combat readiness, and sent its fleet into the area of the Near East conflict.

And so, imperialism has been using armed violence in the modern era mainly to fight against socialism and the international workers and national liberation movements, to preserve obsolete social orders, and to retard the pace of social progress. It has also been used several times in internal skirmishes of the reactionary forces themselves, but it has mainly been directed against the principal revolutionary forces of modern times. The logic of historical development demands that the violence of the reactionaries be opposed by the power of socialism, the international working class, and all other progressive forces having the objective right and responsibility to employ all forms and methods of the struggle in behalf of the defense of social progress, and that particular forms and methods be competently utilized in accordance with the concrete situation.

3. The Forms of Revolutionary Armed Violence Used by Laborers

Various military organizations of the progressive classes and states serve as the instruments of revolutionary armed violence. Each social organization arises and functions in a concrete situation. It may include an entire army, a workers militia, partisan formations, or an armed nation.

Armed violence of the proletariat came into being and underwent development in the course of its resistance to the regular troops of the reactionary classes. Such was the case, for example, in the days of the Paris Commune, when reactions of the armed public against the regular army played a tremendous role. "Had the Paris Commune not relied upon the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie," Engels emphasized, "it could hardly have held on for more than a day."¹²

The armed uprising was historically the first form of armed violence by laborers. The classicists of Marxism-Leninism viewed it as one of the possible forms of revolutionary transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the proletariat. Marx and Engels taught that we should view the uprising as an art, that we should master its laws, and that we should act sensibly, boldly, and decisively. "...the armed uprising," wrote Lenin, "is a special form of political struggle following special laws...."¹³

The party of the Bolsheviks made broad use of the experience of the Paris Commune and the December (1905) armed uprising in Moscow in its preparation for the armed overthrow of the Provisionary Government in October 1917. This path was the sole possible one in the situation that had evolved.

After February 1917 the Communist Party maintained a course of peaceful development of the revolution. However, it was forced to call the proletariat out for an armed uprising in the face of the unceasing attempts of the counterrevolution to

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destroy the revolutionary organizations of the laborers, peasants, and soldiers, and to crush the struggle of the laborers by armed resources. Under these concrete situations the armed uprising of the proletariat in Russia in October 1917 became an objective necessity. By implementing this uprising, the Communist Party insured a swift and least painful transfer of power into the hands of the working class, and decisive defeat of the counterrevolution. Detachments of the Red Guard--the prototype of the future Red Army, an army of a fundamentally new type--made up the main fighting force of the uprising.

The revolutionary movement of the 20th century reveals to us that the armed uprising remains an important resource of conflict within the arsenal of the revolution, one used in a particular situation precluding the possibility of peaceful development of the revolution. It is capable of achieving decisive goals.

As an example the armed uprising of the Vietnamese people against the Japanese invaders in 1945, which occurred under the influence of the Soviet Armed Forces' liberation mission in the Far East, initiated their 30-years' heroic struggle for the liberty of their motherland against Japanese, French, and American invaders. This struggle culminated with the total victory of the Vietnamese people. The armed uprising of Cuban revolutionaries headed by Comrade Fidel Castro marked the beginning of civil war in Cuba, which ended with the persuasive victory of progressive forces.

Demonstrations by revolutionarily predisposed units and subunits of the Portuguese army, supported by the masses, led to the overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal (1974).

The experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the subsequent struggle against interventionists and White Guards demonstrated that the Red Guard detachments were not enough to oppose the hordes of the international and internal counterrevolution. Creation of the regular Red Army became a new stage in organization of revolutionary armed violence, satisfying the tasks of protecting the revolutionary achievements of laborers against imperialist aggression. This was an objective necessity following from the laws of social development and the unique features of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism.

The combat actions of the army of a new type are the most decisive form of revolutionary armed violence. The Soviet state used this army in response to imperialist aggression. Defending the highest ideals and the most progressive social structure, the Soviet Armed Forces displayed exceptional decisiveness, and the yearning and ability to achieve total victory in all of its struggle against the aggressors. The following facts support this more than persuasively. Our army annihilated the overwhelming majority of the Axis forces on the Soviet-German front--607 enemy divisions. For comparison we can note that Anglo-American troops in West Europe, North Africa, and Italy destroyed only 176 enemy divisions. The German losses on the Soviet-German front were 10 million killed, wounded, and captured--more than 70 percent of fascist Germany's total manpower losses in World War II. The fascist invaders lost three-fourths of their aviation, the bulk of their tanks and artillery, and more than 1,600 warships and transport vessels on the Soviet-German front. In the Far East, the Soviet Armed Forces destroyed the Kwantung Army, a Japanese troop grouping of impressive strength.

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Another form of the just armed struggle of the popular masses which had arisen in the distant past is broadly employed in the defense of socialism as a supplement to the combat activities of a regular army--the partisan movement. The methods of the partisan struggle are extremely diverse: raids, ambushes, diversionary movements, joint combat activities together with regular army units, and defense of liberated regions.

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet partisans and underground fighters operated in the enemy rear during the Great Patriotic War. They provided active assistance to the Red Army. The whole people's support made the partisan movement very powerful. The population of areas temporarily occupied by the Germans replenished the partisan detachments and supplied food and clothing to them. By their decisive actions the partisans contained a significant quantity of enemy troops on the Soviet-German front, doing tangible harm to them.

The partisan movement also developed successfully during World War II in Yugoslavia, Poland, France, Greece, Italy, Indochina, China, Burma, and other countries.

Following World War II the partisan methods of the struggle for the motherland's liberty were employed by patriots of Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, Campuchia, Angola, Guinea, Mozambique, and other countries.

Reactionary classes cannot but see the fighting effectiveness of partisan methods, and they are trying to incorporate them into their own fighting forces. At the end of World War II the Germans are known to have attempted to create peoples' militia detachments, which adolescents, men exempt from the army due to age or illness, and women were forcibly compelled to join. However, because of the swift victorious advance of the Red Army, breakdown of the fascist Reich, and absence of serious support from the German population, these detachments did not have any sort of significant influence on the course of combat activities at the front.

The Pentagon devotes significant attention to preparing diversionary detachments that could utilize, at the needed moment, the methods of the partisan struggle in the rear of regular enemy troops. But even these efforts could not produce the desired results. By its class nature and possibilities the partisan movement is fundamentally different from various bandit and diversionary groups created by reactionary circles. Partisans fighting for progressive ideals rely on the whole people's assistance. The bandit and diversionary groups of the reactionary classes operate as an antipopular force, and they do not enjoy the support of the laboring masses.

Imperialism is constantly trying to conduct its policy "from a position of strength". It creates centers of military danger, and it concentrates its shock military groupings in the most diverse regions of the globe. Under these conditions the Soviet Armed Forces are called upon to display high alertness, and to dependably protect the peace and security of nations. The Strategic Missile Forces and the National Air Defense Forces are serving combat duty, ready to make an immediate retaliatory strike against an aggressor. In the period when imperialism sharply aggravated the international situation and raised tension to the extreme limits in the Caribbean in 1962, the Soviet government took additional steps to raise the combat readiness of the armed forces.

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Thus concern for maintaining high combat readiness of the socialist army is subordinated to the goals and tasks of the peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist state, and it reflects the objective necessity for protecting it against the intrigues of the imperialist aggressors.

4. Society in a State of War

With the beginning of a war, armed conflict becomes the principal means of achieving political goals, and a factor causing changes in the social life in the interests of achieving a military victory over the enemy. Wars from different periods of history can serve as an example.

The main goal of the wars of slave-owning states was the capture of slaves. Only their regular replenishment could support the functions of the slave-owning structure. Wars influenced the state of society, and the position of different social strata. They devastated the plebians, tearing them away from their productive labor, but they enriched the patricians. During wars, the population was reduced, entire cities perished, and vast regions were devastated. Thus Carthage was wiped from the face of the earth. The Tatar and Mongol invaders ravaged significant areas of Ancient Russ. Through wars, conquerors often made profound changes in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical life of other countries. It was in this way that feudalism of more-finished form than that seen, for example, in France, where it evolved naturally, was introduced into England.¹⁴

The relationship between military activities and the economic, political, and ideological changes occurring in warring states grew stronger in the feudal era. In some countries wars accelerated transformation of free peasants into serfs. "Under Karl the Great," wrote Marks, "French peasants were also devastated by war, such that they had nothing left to do but transform from debtors into serfs."¹⁵ A significant part of the wealth of warring states was often annihilated on the battlefields and excluded from economic turnover. Significant transformations occurred in society and in the structure of industrial production. As an example during the crusades the Italian cities of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa essentially became the "commissaries" of the warring armies.

But not all wars fought in the feudal era caused great transformations in social life. They were often limited to just troop activities alone. Such wars did not lead directly to abrupt turns in the economic, political, and ideological spheres of society. As a result the illusion of full consistency, of the identity of the concepts of war and armed struggle sometimes came into being; this illusion was also promoted by the fact that each time, war begins only with the initiation of combat activities, with the beginning of an armed struggle.

However, as social life and its economic and social organization grew more complex and as the scale of wars broadened, the warring countries underwent increasingly deeper reorganization into a war economy. The wars of the imperialist period demonstrated that most of them were associated with tremendous stress upon all of the material and spiritual strengths of the people, and with significant changes in all social life of the dueling states.

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This revealed itself especially clearly in the two world wars of the 20th century, in a series of civil wars (in Russia, Spain, and China), and in a number of other military collisions. All other forms of activity engaged in by social forces were subordinated to the armed struggle. War made a unique impression on the entire life of nations. Discussing the experience of Soviet military development during the years of foreign intervention and civil war, Lenin emphasized that this experience "cannot be interpreted as an isolated experience. War includes within itself all forms, all areas of development."¹⁶

M. N. Tukhachevskiy deeply studied the influence of war on the life of society on the basis of Lenin's ideas. He wrote: "While feudal wars and all subsequent wars prior to the great French Revolution had the outward appearance of being separate from the life of the entire country, with further development of capitalism, war and social life intertwined more and more closely. While the tactics of a theater of war involved the maneuvering of manpower on the fronts of a war, the conduct of war by industrial countries today entails the maneuvering of the country's manpower and economic resources."¹⁷

Tukhachevskiy noted the great practical harm caused by defining war narrowly as only the actions of armed forces. In his opinion the general staffs of all warring imperialist powers prior to 1914 did not think deeply enough about preparing not only the armies but also their entire states, especially their economies, for a protracted and burdensome war. As a consequence significant difficulties arose at the beginning of World War I in switching the economy to a war footing, this process requiring a long period of time.¹⁸

The experience of history teaches us that when we reduce the concept of war to the armed struggle of troops, we understate the decisive role played by the popular masses, diminish the significance of political leadership in war, and prevent a correct understanding of the role of the unity of the front and rear. Such mistakes would be especially dangerous in a modern war, which would have a universal nature and impose extremely high requirements on development of the military. Dependable support of the motherland's armed protection presupposes complete and all-out use of the country's economic, political, scientific, moral, and specifically military potentials.

Of course, the degree to which a country's social life changes in different wars is far from the same. When a large state fights a war against a small one, the socioeconomic lives of the two undergo different degrees of alteration. Nevertheless, in any case war is a qualitatively new state of the society in comparison with peacetime. With the beginning of a war, one type of relations maintained within the limits of the rules of peacetime law are substituted by another type, in which the economic, political, and ideological forms of struggle are inseparably associated with the armed struggle, and support it. Classes waging the war try to subordinate the entire life of the country and all functions of the state to the objective of defeating the enemy through the resources of armed violence. These trends manifest themselves in every state, but the possibilities and laws of their manifestation and of a country's transformation into a single military camp differ in relation to capitalist and socialist states.

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In a case where imperialist aggression is imposed on a socialist state, owing to the latter's socioeconomic nature and the moral-political unity of the society, the socialist state is capable of mobilizing all of its resources for the struggle against the enemy in a short time. These advantages were demonstrated fully during the Great Patriotic War. The Leninist Communist Party--the leading and guiding force of Soviet society--was the inspiration and the organizer of the selfless struggle of all the people of our great socialist motherland against the fascist aggressors. In response to its call, all Soviet people rose to the defense of the fatherland as one man. Devoting all one's powers to the cause of victory became the inviolable law of the life of each Soviet patriot.

Organizing the repulsion of fascist Germany's treacherous attack, the party energetically initiated the state's economic alteration. The country's military economy grew and developed quickly. While in 1940 only 15 percent of the national income was being spent on defense needs, in 1942 these outlays grew to 55 percent. The bulk of industrial production--68 percent--was carried out in support of the front.¹⁹

The war also demanded serious changes in the state's domestic political life, which had to be subordinated to the objective of the enemy's military defeat. The new conditions unavoidably elicited extraordinary forms of party leadership of the country's entire life. By decision of the party's Central Committee Politburo, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed, and all of the power of the country was concentrated in its hands. Local extraordinary organs--city defense committees--were created at cities on the front. The institution of party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks) was expanded at the most important enterprises, as was the institution of sector secretaries in local party organs. Political sections were formed at motor-tractor stations and sovkhozes. "Implementation of extraordinary forms of party leadership of the national economy permitted the party to switch it to a war footing in a short time."²⁰

With the beginning of the war, rigid centralization was established in the work of state and social organizations, elections to the soviets of labor deputies were temporarily postponed, martial law was instituted in a number of oblasts, and some other measures were implemented.

The party's entire ideological activity was subordinated to the goal of victory. Political ideals, legal rules, morale, literature, and art were all aimed at mobilizing the popular masses for the defeat of the fascist invaders. Simultaneously with traditional methods, specific methods were also employed in the ideological struggle against the aggressor, especially on territory temporarily occupied by the enemy as well as among the troops and population of the enemy.

The activities of the party and state in the economic and ideological spheres were intimately intertwined with the struggle on the diplomatic front, which also experienced profound changes in its content and methods. The diplomatic efforts of the Soviet Union were channeled into creating and strengthening the anti-Nazi alliance, at opening up a second front as quickly as possible, and at achieving international isolation of Nazi Germany.

Under the guidance of the Communist Party our country won a victory of worldwide historic proportions. The Soviet people were the chief creator of this victory.

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Unified about the Communist Party, they committed an act of heroism having no equals in history.

It stands to reason that bourgeois society, the entire life of which is permeated by the uncompromising class struggle, does not have such possibilities for becoming a unified, monolithic force. This is why imperialist ruling circles preparing for and conducting a war make broad use of measures to brainwash their armies and the public, and why they deprive laborers of their elementary rights. All changes inevitably occurring in bourgeois society during such a period bear the impression of a structure of exploitation, and they have an antipopular orientation. We know for example that during World War II a system of forced labor, comparable only with a similar system of slave-owning times and permitting monopolies to enrich themselves to an unprecedented degree, was created in fascist Germany to support the standing army. The number of foreign citizens forcibly conveyed into Germany to work at its enterprises exceeded 7 million persons in 1944. The social system of the Western states in the anti-Nazi alliance also made it possible to shift the entire burden of the war onto the shoulders of the laborers and insure high profits for the monopolies.

Summarizing the above, we can isolate the following most typical traits of modern war as a special state of society, and demonstrate its differences from a state of peace.

First, military resources acquire the main role in implementation of state policy, which has an effect on all social relations within a country and on its mutual relations with other states. The society's economic, political, diplomatic, and ideological activities are subordinated to the interests of the armed struggle. Modern world war necessarily presupposes maximum exertion of all of the powers of the state, and a stubborn armed struggle by the army and other combat formations gaining their direct support from the country's economic, diplomatic, and ideological efforts.

The ratio of different forms of struggle and their influence upon the course and outcome of a war have a complex dialectical nature. Wars of different types and scales can have different effects upon a given form of struggle, which as a supplement to combat activities of the troops can acquire special significance in the attainment of victory. Demanding a concrete historical analysis of every situation that evolves, V. I. Lenin wrote that "different forms of struggle assume priority, becoming the main forms of struggle depending on variations in the political, national cultural, personal, and other conditions, and in turn, the secondary, incidental forms of struggle undergo modification in this connection."²¹

The course and results of armed struggle and of the actions of troops, while remaining constantly dependent on economics, diplomacy, and ideology, are themselves capable of influencing the potentials and prospects of these other forms. Let us look at the facts. The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, which immeasurably raised the authority of the USSR, promoted achievement of our foreign policy's important goals. Thus the victory of the Soviet troops at Moscow had a decisive influence, unifying the forces of the antifascist alliance. It had a sobering action upon the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey which, after the beginning of fascist Germany's aggression, were simply waiting for an appropriate

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moment to attack the USSR. As a result of the defeat of fascist troops at Stalingrad, disorder in the ranks of the fascist bloc grew intense. As in 1941, the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey were forced to restrain themselves from entering the war against the Soviet Union. The defeat of the Germans at Kursk and other victories enjoyed by the Soviet troops in 1943 initiated the disintegration of the fascist bloc. Germany's isolation in the international arena deepened. It was clear to the entire world that the USSR was capable of defeating Nazi Germany and its satellites and liberating Europe on its own. In this situation the governments of England and the USA could no longer drag their heels in opening a second front in Europe. In June 1944 Anglo-American troops landed in France. But even after this, the Soviet-German front continued to be the decisive one. In response to the annihilatory blows of the Soviet Armed Forces in the concluding period of the war, the fascist bloc fell apart forever. The victory of the Soviet people inspired the peoples of many countries to fight actively against the invaders. In the course of the war against a common enemy the Soviet Union acquired new allies. International relations of a new, socialist type began to evolve with a large number of them. The circle of countries with which the USSR established diplomatic relations widened, their number increasing from 25 at the eve of the war to 49 at its end.

No matter what achievements there might be in the economic, diplomatic, and ideological areas, they cannot decide the fate of a war on their own. Their role is necessarily mediated by the armed struggle of regular troops, national resistance, and partisan detachments. In the end, the advantages achieved in economics, science, diplomacy, and ideology manifest themselves in the course of armed struggle through the quality and quantity of the troops and the artfulness of their actions.

It is entirely obvious that the enemy's military resistance is broken mainly through military resources. Inasmuch as military violence is the principal resource of war, the next world war, were imperialism able to unleash it, would first of all be typified by a decisive armed collision of unprecedented cruelty between opposing class forces--socialism and capitalism. The outcome of the war will be determined primarily on the battlefields, by people having perfect mastery over modern combat equipment and possessing a high moral spirit.

Second, war as a special state of society presupposes shifting the economy to a war footing. The importance of war industry increases. Structural changes occur in the sectors of the national economy, resulting in their preponderate production of war products. The nonproductive outlays of material resources and their irreversible loss rise dramatically. While during World War I material valuables worth \$338 billion were annihilated, in World War II these losses increased by almost 12 times to exceed \$4 trillion.²²

The standard of living of the laboring masses declines significantly in war. As a rule, food and industrial goods are rationed. The birth rate drops, and migration of the population increases.

Third, war elicits profound changes in the political superstructure. The role of the army among all of the instruments of policy grows sharply. The country assumes a wartime position partially or completely. In the interests of the war,

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structural transformations are made in state organs and state power is centralized further. New goals are set for the resources of ideological influence.

There is great methodological significance to defining war as a special state of society, since this permits us to scientifically study the basic ways to continually reinforce the defense capabilities of the Soviet state and all countries of the socialist fraternity. When we define war in this way, the conclusion we necessarily reach is that we must thoroughly prepare socialist society to repel possible aggression by imperialism. Such preparation presupposes, in addition to increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces, constant concern for economic, moral-political, ideological, and diplomatic support to the defense capabilities of the socialist fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [works], Vol 20, p 171.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 117.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 296.
4. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1973, p 3.
5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 27, p 388.
6. "The Military Balance 1976/77," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, December 1976, p 45.
7. AIR FORCE TIMES, 3 January 1977.
8. See "SShA: vneshnepoliticheskiy mekhanizm. Organizatsiya, funktsii, upravleniye" [The USA: Its Foreign Policy Mechanism. Organization, Functions, Control], Moscow, 1972, p 134.
9. "The Military Balance 1976/1977," AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, December 1976, p 55.
10. PRAVDA, 13 February 1977.
11. Cited in the book: "Armii stran NATO" [The Armies of the NATO Countries], Moscow 1974, p 34.
12. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 18, p 305.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 34, p 382.
14. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 46, Part I, p 479.
15. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 25, Part II, p 148.
16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 76.

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17. Tukhachevskiy, M. N., "The Issue of Modern Strategy," in "Voyna i voyennoye iskusstvo v svete istoricheskogo materializma" [War and the Art of War in Light of Historical Materialism], Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p 115.
18. See Ibid., p 115-116.
19. See "Sovetskaya ekonomika v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Economy in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Moscow, 1970, p 32.
20. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, 1970, p 167.
21. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 14, p 2.
22. See PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 7, 1969, p 30.

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CHAPTER IV

TYPES AND SOCIAL NATURE OF MODERN WARS

Wars influence all spheres of social life and affect the fundamental interests of all classes and social groups, and therefore they evoke a certain attitude toward themselves in these classes and groups. The popular masses may support a certain war, and thus promote its victorious conclusion, or they may remain passive to its goals, and even actively oppose it. This is precisely why social assessment of wars and the orientation of the popular masses relative to the nature of wars have always been in the center of attention of political and military leaders and ideologists of the most different persuasions.

This problem is acquiring even greater acuity today in connection with the fact that the world's largest armies are now supplied with nuclear missiles. Decisively unmasking the attempt to falsify the nature of wars by militant ideologists, Marxists-Leninists counter their attempts by their own conclusions based on a scientific classification of wars. A scientific definition of wars permits the Marxist-Leninist parties to develop a proper strategy and tactics for resolving the main issue of modern times--the problem of war and peace.

1. The Methodology of Classifying Wars

A scientific methodology for classifying wars was fully developed by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin made an especially great contribution to this problem. It enjoyed further development in the program documents of the CPSU and the entire international communist movement. Questions pertaining to scientific classification of wars have been deeply illuminated in the theoretical works of the contemporary Marxist scholars.

War is a multifaceted phenomenon having certain traits and characteristics. Among them there are significant and insignificant ones, and principal and secondary ones. The more thoroughly a war is analyzed and the more fundamentally its significant facets are revealed, the fuller would be the assessment of a war. The scientific classification of wars is structured precisely on the basis of a determination of the most important aspects of war.

The most significant criteria used in classifying wars can be combined into three groups: 1) sociohistoric, 2) quantitative, and 3) military-technical. The first

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group of criteria affords a possibility for assessing wars as sociopolitical phenomena, for revealing their place within the framework of the historical era and their influence on social progress. The second group of criteria permits us to determine the scale of a concrete war in time and in space, and to establish the number and groupings of its participants. Using the third group of criteria we can reveal the nature of the armed struggle and the technical resources employed in it. This is especially important today, when revolutionary changes in the equipment of many armies are occurring under the influence of scientific-technical progress.

All of these groups of criteria are closely interrelated. The technical resources of conflict, for example, depend on the extent to which the state's economy is developed, on its economic structure, while the latter, as we know, is the foundation of the political organization and its goals.

The classicists of Marxism-Leninism used all three groups of classification criteria in their assessment of concrete wars, but they placed priority on the sociohistorical criteria, since only they provide a possibility for clarifying why a given war is waged, and the policy of which class it is a continuation.

One of the most important sociohistoric criteria for classifying wars is the relationship of a war to the era. "We cannot understand a given war," V. I. Lenin taught, "without understanding the era."¹ This criterion derives from the methodological principle of examining all social phenomena on a concrete historic basis. "The war must be placed within that historic situation in which it proceeds, and only then can we determine our relationship to it."² We can use this criterion to scientifically establish the periods of history into which wars fall--wars of the slave-owning era, of feudalism, of capitalism, and wars of the modern era.

Inasmuch as each historic era undergoes certain stages in its development, the most diverse types of wars can be found within the limits of a single era. "An era is called an era," wrote Lenin, "because it encompasses the sum total of diverse phenomena and wars, both typical and atypical, both large and small, and typical of both advanced and lagging countries."³ Thus subdivision of wars into different types, which permits us to view a war as a single two-sided process, is a concrete expression of the first classification criterion.

Lenin attached great significance to classifying wars in relation to types. In August 1915 he wrote the following to A. M. Kollontay: "I believe it theoretically wrong and practically harmful not to distinguish between types of wars."⁴ Many of Lenin's works contain statements having methodological significance to understanding this category. The premises he formulated in his letter to I. F. Armand on 19 January 1917 and in his lecture "War and Revolution" (May 1917) play an especially important role. In his works, Lenin uses the system of economic and political relations between states and classes involved in a given war as the basis for subdividing wars into different types.⁵

The category "type of war" combines a certain group of wars having similar characteristics that are the product of unique features of a concrete historic system of economic and political relations between states and classes and the contradictions between them they generate, as well as of the ways and means used to resolve these contradictions.

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Inasmuch as the word "war" in the concept "type of war" presupposes an integrated, two-sided process, the name of the type of war indicates both warring sides associated by a concrete system of economic and political mutual relations (for example a war between imperialist states).

However the goals of the two opposing sides may differ significantly from one another depending on which class or state the war is being fought for. Therefore it becomes necessary to define the class and political orientation of the war fought by each of the warring sides.

Marxists distinguish another classification criterion based on the class and political orientation of wars--the social nature of the war. This criterion distinguishes between two kinds of wars: just on one side and unjust on the other, or unjust on both sides. The concept "kind of war" combines just or unjust wars differing in terms of their concrete political content. In this connection the kinds of wars are subdivided into forms of wars, which imply concrete just or unjust wars of a certain historic era. We will see this more graphically somewhat later, in our examination of the structural nature of wars of the modern era.⁶

The brilliant leaders of the proletariat also use quantitative criteria to classify wars. Thus they distinguish between local and world wars with a consideration for the range of the goals and the number of participants of a war, and the space over which military activities were carried on.⁷ This subdivision has great theoretical and practical significance. The consequences of a war and its influence upon the state of mankind depend significantly on how local or global it becomes. Under modern conditions, due to closer mutual relationships between states, even local wars affect the interests of nations on all continents, and harbor the possibility of mushrooming into world wars.

In terms of the number of participants in a war and the groupings they assume, we subdivide wars into those fought by two states and by several states, and coalition wars. A tendency toward waging coalition wars can be observed in the modern era. Of course these coalitions may not always be obvious, but for practical purposes a duel between even individual countries may be "supported" by coalitions of countries behind them. This can be explained by the ever-increasing polarization of forces in the international arena.

Also included among the quantitative criteria is the duration of wars. In this aspect we distinguish between swift and protracted wars. Many wars of the modern era lasted for many years, even though their initiators counted on achieving their designs in short time. As an example the hope of the Nazi clique to win the war with the USSR with lightning speed was foiled by the Soviet people. The war dragged on for almost 4 years, and ended with the total defeat of the fascist aggressors. The attempt of American imperialism to conduct a new variant of the blitzkrieg in Vietnam also failed. The heroic Vietnamese people selflessly fought for their liberty for many years with the support of peoples of the socialist countries, and they won their struggle against the giant of the capitalist world and its Saigon puppets.

The military-technical criteria for classifying wars are placed in an independent group. The most important among them is the nature of the military equipment and weapons employed.

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Inasmuch as the arisal of new types of weapons causes fundamental changes in the methods of military activities, when we describe a war it is very important to consider the achievements of military-technical progress. It should be kept in mind in this case, however, that a new weapon does not displace former resources of armed conflict immediately and completely. This can be explained by the fact that, first, neither warring side wants to risk immediate rejection of tested weapon models, and second, new weapons are never available in sufficient quantity to instantaneously occupy a monopolistic position in the arsenal of technical combat resources. Moreover it takes a significant amount of time to master a new weapon.

The military-technical criteria for classifying wars (or, more precisely, their individual stages) also include the means of combat activities. In different stages, the same war may be dynamic and fluid, or it may be distinguished by a certain degree of stasis. The categories "mobile warfare" and "static warfare" are broadly employed in the history and theory of the art of war.

All of the classification criteria named above are essentially objective, reflecting certain facets of war. Were we to fail to consider any one of these facets, our assessment of a war would be incomplete. Modern bourgeois politicians and military officials, meanwhile, make ready use of the quantitative and military-technical criteria while attempting to ignore the sociohistoric criteria of their classification. As an example according to the classification presently used in the USA, there are four variants of modern wars: strategic nuclear war (implying a war between coalitions of imperialist and socialist states); nuclear war in a theater of war (one in which tactical nuclear weapons are employed) leading to limited goals; conventional war in a theater of war (using only conventional weapons); conventional war in a theater of military activities or in a limited region of a theater of war. As we can see, this classification is based mainly on the quantitative and military-technical characteristics of wars. When forced to comment on such a classification, bourgeois officials do everything they can to distort such issues as the essence of the war, its social nature, and the political contradictions being resolved by resources of armed violence. And this is no accident. Objective analysis of these problems would inevitably lead to the conclusion that imperialism is a constant source of military danger to all mankind.

Problems associated with defining the types and social nature of modern wars have acquired the greatest acuity in the ideological struggle centered on military issues in the international arena. This can be explained by the fact that the contradictions between scientific, Marxist-Leninist analysis of wars and the anti-scientific conceptions expressing the viewpoints of bourgeois ideologists and rightist and "leftist" revisionists reveals itself most obviously in the fundamentally different relationship maintained toward the different types and socio-political nature of wars.

2. Types of Modern Wars

A scientific approach to defining the types of wars presupposes examination of the basic types of antagonistic economic and political relations of the era, and the contradictions inherent to them.

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The modern era is typified by the following basic types of antagonistic economic and political relations: 1) between socialist and capitalist sociopolitical systems (states); 2) between the working class and all laborers of antagonistic states on one hand, and the dominant classes, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie, and the forces of extreme reaction of these states on the other; 3) between nations fighting for their national liberation or assuming a path of sovereign development, and imperialist states pursuing a colonial or neocolonial policy; 4) between capitalist states.

Antagonistic economic and political relations of the modern era contain within themselves the possibility of war, but it should be considered in this case that on their own, they do not transform a possibility of war into a reality. Such transformation occurs owing to the aggressive course of imperialism and the actions of those reactionary forces which see military violence as the best means for resolving existing contradictions. As far as socialist countries as well as other revolutionary forces of modern times are concerned, they pursue a course aimed not at starting but, on the contrary, at preventing war. To them, resorting to military means is a forced, retaliatory measure in opposition to the violence of reactionary states and classes.

As history attests, the type of war fought between states (coalitions) representing opposing social systems--capitalist and socialist--is associated with the first type of economic and political relations and with the social contradictions of the modern era stemming from them. Wars of this type included the war between the capitalist interventionists and the Soviet Union (1918-1920), the war between fascist Germany and its allies on one hand and the USSR on the other (1941-1945), and the war between the American aggressors and the Vietnamese people.

Relations between the working class of a given state and all laborers of antagonistic states on one hand and the dominant classes, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the forces of extreme reaction, on the other occupy a special place in the system of economic and political relations of the modern era. Civil war corresponds to these relations. The warring sides may be represented by the following depending on the maturity of the society's social structure: in capitalist states--the working class and its allies on one pole and the bourgeoisie, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie, on the other; in developing countries--a bloc of progressive forces against the society's reactionary forces. Despite certain differences in these wars (in the social composition of the warring sides, their goals, and so on), they make up one type of wars--civil wars, resulting from social antagonisms within the society of exploitation. Examples of civil wars fought in the modern era include the civil war in Russia (1918-1920), the civil war in Greece (1946-1949), and civil wars in a number of other countries.

The type of war fought between nations striving for national liberation or assuming a path of sovereign development on one hand and imperialist states pursuing a colonial or neocolonial policy on the other is associated with the next type of economic and political relations of the modern era.

Antagonistic contradictions existing between peoples striving for their independence on one hand and their imperialist oppressors on the other are resolved today

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in two ways: Either the imperialists are forced to "voluntarily" leave their colonies and resort to veiled means of exploiting these countries in view of the hopelessness of presently employed methods of colonial oppression, or they attempt to openly hinder historic development, going as far as military violence, in which case the peoples of dependent countries are left with no other choice than to fight for their independence with arms. In just the 1960's-1970's the peoples of more than 30 countries of Asia and Africa were forced to take up arms to achieve or defend national independence.

Another type of war possible in the modern era is war between capitalist states. For example despite the attempts by anti-Soviet forces to immediately direct the aggression of fascism toward the USSR, World War II had its beginning inside the capitalist camp. The military conflict between the capitalist states lasted for 6 years with varying degrees of intensity. In this case after Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, a certain group of capitalist countries--the USA, England, and others--was compelled to establish an alliance with the socialist country in order to win its war against the second grouping of capitalist states opposing it.

We cannot exclude the possibility of wars between capitalist states in the future, though obviously because of the deepening general crisis of capitalism, for the sake of its class interests the monopolistic bourgeoisie is striving to somehow dull the sharpness of the contradictions existing within the capitalist system. Its policy in the world arena is being defined to an ever-greater degree by the class goals of the common struggle mainly against the socialist fraternity.

Certain armed collisions occur between developing states, but obviously they cannot be treated as an independent type of war. The fact is that some of these countries maintain a socialist orientation while others follow a capitalist path. Therefore the relations between these groups of states reflect the typical antagonistic relations of the era already discussed above. Countries with a socialist orientation try to resolve their disputes by peaceful means. Falling under the increasing influence of the imperialist powers, states following the capitalist path lay their hopes on force in a number of cases.

Armed collisions between developing countries are not in keeping with the interests of their peoples, hindering the growth of their economies and their national consolidation. Such states face a multiplicity of domestic problems, successful solution of which cannot be promoted in any way by war. Armed collisions between them are a manifestation of the pernicious influence of the legacy of imperialism and the acute economic, political, religious, ethnic, and other problems left to the young countries, they are the consequence of the criminal policy of imperialist reaction attempting to capitalize upon these conflicts for its own mercenary interests, and they are the result of the short-sighted actions of some political leaders of the developing states.

Such are the types of wars in the modern era. It should be kept in mind that the type of concrete war does not always manifest itself in pure form. Some wars are an alloy of different types. Let us look at World War II as an example. It possessed both the characteristics of a war between two groupings of imperialist countries, and those of a coalition war fought between imperialist states headed

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by Nazi Germany on one hand and a socialist country--the USSR--on the other. It is entirely obvious that a complex phenomenon such as World War II cannot be interpreted within the limits of a single type of war, since this would be a simplification of the problem.

The social interests of the bourgeoisie encouraged its theorists to create their own classification of wars, one that is far from scientific and far from objective in relation to both modern and past eras.

Highly indicative in this regard is the two-volume work by the American sociologist and lawyer Q. Wright "A Study of War", which was republished several times. The author bases himself on an abstract metaphysical definition of the essence of war, identifying it with any conflict occurring not only in human society but also in the animal world. Wright's approach to war is typically nonhistoric, biological, and psychological. It is on this antiscientific basis that he structures his classification, distinguishing four types of past and modern wars. The first type, the American theorist declares, includes "wars between animals". These are "wars" based on the use of violence by one species of animals against another or against members of the same group. Study of "war" between animals, in Wright's words, "contributes much to our understanding of wars between people." The second type includes "wars between primitive peoples." They were supposedly "the most important factor of cultural development," they cultivated courage and obedience, and strong groups that were able to occupy significant territory were created with their assistance. The third type consists of "historic wars" of the past between civilized peoples having a written language. Wright believes the causes of these wars to be a custom of cruelty and aggressiveness, a warlike morality, and political despotism. Finally, the fourth type includes wars fought by highly developed nations using modern equipment and weapons.⁸

Such a classification of wars rests on a false interpretation of the socio-historic process, including that of war. The author glosses over the qualitative difference between conflicts in the animal world and in human society, between classless and class societies, and between armed collisions of primitive society and the wars of class-antagonist formations. He does this in order to perpetuate war, to expand the historic bounds of its existence indefinitely, and to represent it as an ineradicable, fatalistic phenomenon. The class purpose of this apologetic classification of wars cannot evoke any doubt.

An arbitrary approach to classification of wars is also typical of other bourgeois sociologists and military officials. They distinguish "religious", "national", "philosophical", and other wars as special types. As an example the West German general W. Baudissin, who had occupied important posts in NATO, defines the following types of war: religious wars of the 16th century; "abstract" wars of the 17th and 18th centuries; national wars of the 19th century; "philosophical" wars of the 20th century (following the Great October Socialist Revolution). This classification is also groundless, lacking objectivity, inasmuch as it is created without a consideration for the fundamental socioeconomic and class-political characteristics of wars. It has no scientific value, and its purpose is to deceive the popular masses.

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The attention of bourgeois ideologists to classifying so-called "minor" wars increased noticeably in recent decades. A confirmation of this can be found in a book written by the West German philosopher and historian W. Hahlweg, "Typology of Modern Minor Wars". It presents two types of such wars, the main ones in the author's opinion: "Eastern" and "Western". "Politics dominates in the Eastern type of minor wars," writes Hahlweg, while on the contrary "military strategic interests are paramount" in "Western wars".⁹ As we can see, Hahlweg divorces military strategy from politics, placing one in opposition to the other, which is clearly contradictory to a scientific approach to the analysis of wars.

Thus the classification of wars publicized in modern Western literature is anti-scientific. Its principal fault, a product mainly of the class interests of the bourgeoisie, is distortion of the essence of the modern era, and failure to analyze the structure of economic and political relations and the ensuing contradictions between classes, states, and sociopolitical systems. Attempting to conceal the fact that imperialism is the source of modern wars, bourgeois authors refrain from objective analysis of the sociopolitical content of wars, and in their classifications of wars they place priority on biological, religious, and national, as well as quantitative and military-technical criteria.

3. The Social Nature of Modern Wars

In order to deeply understand the social nature of modern wars, we need to once again turn to some general methodological premises briefly discussed above in our examination of the sociohistoric criteria of a scientific classification of wars.

The category "type of war", which defines war as a struggle between two hostile sides observed in their unity, reveals the nature of the antagonistic contradictions existing between the sides, ones elicited by economic and political relations. However, this category does not reflect, with maximum clarity, exactly which of the dueling sides represents social progress, or the political goals each of the sides pursues. It is not enough to assert the existence of a contradiction. We must, Marx thought, clarify "which specific position each of ...the two elements occupy within the contradiction."¹⁰ This goal is served by the concept "social nature of war". "Revealing the nature of a war," said Lenin, "is a necessary prerequisite to the Marxist seeking to define his relationship to it."¹¹

What does Marxism-Leninism define as the social nature of a war?

The category "social nature of a war" is kindred to the concept "social content of a war". Explaining the social content of World War I, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Capture of land and enslavement of foreign nations, devastation of the competing nation, the plunder of its riches, distraction of the attention of the laboring masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, England, and other countries, isolation and nationalistic stupefaction of the laborers, and eradication of their advance guard for the purposes of weakening the revolutionary movement of the proletariat--such is the sole true content, significance, and meaning of modern war."¹²

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The political content of war includes within itself both relatively stable and dynamically varying components. The social-class orientation of a war, which is labeled the social nature of a war, is a relatively stable element. Concrete political goals of military actions occurring at strategic and tactical scale are a more-dynamic element of the political content of war. Lenin cautioned against confusing the social nature of a war with its strategic and tactical content. He taught that when we define the social nature of a war, its true significance must be sought not in the position occupied by the enemy's troops, but rather in the nature of the policy of which the given war is a continuation. This premise does not mean that Lenin contrasts the elements of the same political content against one another; he is simply stating that they must not be identified with each other. The category "social nature of a war" expresses the social-class orientation of the war--that is, the consistency or inconsistency, with social progress, of the main political goals (and their realization) of each of the warring sides, and an assessment of the war as being just or unjust.

Considering that the relationship of the popular masses to the objective content of the social nature of a war expresses itself mainly in the assessment of this war as a just or unjust one, reactionary state officials intending to unleash a knowingly unjust war resort to cynical deceit of the laborers. In his time, the Prussian King Friedrich II uttered a phrase which has become notoriously famous. "If a foreign province is to your liking and your power is great enough," he declared, "seize it immediately. As soon as you do so, you'll always find a sufficient number of lawyers who will prove that you did have every right to the occupied territory..."¹⁴ Even the Nazi clique, with its openly inhumane plans for conquering the entire world and enslaving some and physically liquidating other peoples, tried to impart a "just" appearance to its vandalism. It attempted to "justify" the aggressive actions of German imperialism by a supposed shortage of "living space" for the "Arian race", its "superiority" over other "deficient" peoples, and other delirious assertions.

An evaluation of the objective content of the social nature of the war--be it just or unjust--contains within itself the following facets: political, legal, moral, esthetic and, in relation to nations consisting mostly of believers, religious. Such an evaluation is made, first of all, by the dominant class, which utilizes powerful mass media to support it. But secondly, the popular masses themselves also make their own assessment of the war.

The political evaluation of the social nature of a war is the dominant one. The reason for this lies in the fact that war is permeated throughout by politics, that the political content of a war is its principal content in general, and that political evaluations reflect the fundamental interests of entire classes and the millions of common people.

Closely associated to a political evaluation of the social nature of a war is a legal evaluation based on the rules of international law. Principles condemning the methods of armed aggression were documented in international law prior to the start of World War II. These principles were developed after World War II. Thus the sentence handed down by the International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg trials to the principal German military criminals (1946) emphasized quite categorically: "...initiation of an aggressive war is not simply an international

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crime--it is the gravest international crime differing from other military crimes only in that it contains within itself, in concentrated form, the evil which is contained in all other crimes."¹⁵

A resolution of the 29th Session of the UN General Assembly (1974) containing a definition of aggression was a major achievement of peace-loving forces. This document states: "Aggression is the use of armed forces by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, or in some other fashion incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, as set forth in this definition."¹⁶ This definition provides the legal basis for evaluating aggressive wars as unjust.

Documents such as the treaty between the USSR and the USA to prevent nuclear war (August 1973) and the agreement adopted in August 1975 by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe also have important significance. The participants of this conference pledged to refrain from using force or the threat of force in their mutual relations. All of this creates the international legal grounds for condemning aggressive war and for preventing it.

Evaluation of a war as just or unjust also has a moral aspect, represented by the condemnation or approval of the war by the people and by the public opinion of the countries. A moral evaluation of the social nature of the war is extremely effective. "A conviction in the justness of a war, recognition of the necessity for sacrificing one's life for the good of one's brothers," Lenin pointed out, "uplifts the spirit of the soldiers and compels them to endure unprecedented hardships."¹⁷

Some facets of the social nature of a just war--its goals as well as the bravery and heroism displayed on the battlefield--are given an esthetic evaluation with terms such as noble, beautiful, and so on.

Thus an evaluation of the social nature of a war as just or unjust is a generalizing evaluation, one which synthesizes the political, legal, moral, and esthetic evaluations into a single unit. The most important evaluation to be given is the political one.

An evaluation of the social nature of a war can be true, mistaken, or false. A true evaluation of the social nature of a war is possible only from the positions of progressive classes. Such classes are represented today mainly by the working class--the most consistent revolutionary class, armed with a truly scientific theory of social development.

Such are the general methodological premises at the basis of a scientific classification of wars in relation to their social nature. They permit the conclusion that within the framework of the types of modern wars examined above, the following basic forms of just wars exist: 1) wars in defense of the socialist fatherland and countries of the socialist fraternity; 2) wars of the oppressed classes and of all progressive forces against the classes of exploitation; 3) wars of national liberation. In accordance with this, the basic forms of unjust wars are: 1) wars fought by imperialist states against socialist countries; 2) wars fought by exploiting classes against exploited classes within the framework of a civil war; 3) colonial or neocolonial wars.

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The social nature of a concrete war, as well as its essence, does not always remain constant. The nature of a war may undergo transformation in connection with possible changes, in the course of a war, in the political goals and ratio of forces of the warring sides, and development of new resources and means of the struggle. This can be distinctly seen from the example of World War II. It began between two groupings of imperialist states as a mutually unjust war, though from the very beginning it did exhibit certain popular, national-liberation tendencies. Thus the Polish people, who became the sacrifice to fascist aggression, fought a just struggle of national liberation against the German oppressors from the very first days of the war; moreover they fought it in contradiction to the state policy of the reactionary Polish government that was in power at that time and which fled the country in cowardice. However, the heroic struggle of the Polish people could not make fundamental changes in the general direction of the struggle between the imperialist groupings, or transform its principal trend.

Being at first unjust in relation to both imperialist groupings, later the Second World War gradually began to transform into a just war of liberation on the part of forces fighting against the fascist bloc, mainly under the influence of the growing struggle of liberation waged by people in states occupied by the Germans.

Entry of the Soviet Union into World War II, which was evoked by Nazi Germany's attack on it, was the principal factor of this progressive process. Its entry into the war was the last step in formation of the social nature of World War II, transforming it from a mutually unjust, predatory war into a just, antifascist war of liberation fought by all forces opposing fascism. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people was the keystone of World War II. It decided not only the fate of the world's first socialist state but also the future of all world civilization, progress, and democracy.

As far as the bloc of fascist states headed by Germany and Japan is concerned, the war on its part remained unjust and predatory from beginning to end.

Consequently the social nature of a war is a complex, changing phenomenon, the content of which cannot be reduced to just a political or a moral evaluation. It is an integrated class-political and moral-legal evaluation, one which broadens the limits of the definition of a war's essence and the forms of its manifestation. It reflects real processes occurring in a war, and its sociopolitical orientation.

An examination of the social nature of a war would be incomplete, were we not to touch upon its relationship to the resources used in the armed struggle.

Guiding itself by humanitarian ideals, the Soviet state consistently opposes the use of resources causing mass annihilation of people, including nuclear weapons, which in view of their poor selectivity are capable of doing colossal harm not only to the warring armies but also to the peaceful population. But inasmuch as the threat of nuclear war still exists, and inasmuch as the world still contains aggressive forces hoping to achieve their reactionary goals with the help of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and its armed forces are left with no choice other than to remain in constant readiness to decisively repel an aggressor with all forms of modern weapons available to it, including nuclear. When viewed in

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this way, such use of nuclear weapons is legal. Use of a nuclear weapon as retaliation to its use by an aggressor does not cancel out the just nature of the war fought by the state opposing the aggressor.

In this connection we cannot agree with the position taken by some foreign theorists who view a war in which nuclear weapons are used as unjust on both sides. This assertion reflects confusion of two different, though mutually related problems, namely: the tremendous destructive consequences of nuclear war, and the social nature of a nuclear war. As far as the first problem is concerned, Marxists-Leninists have only one response: Nuclear war would be ruinous to many peoples and states, and therefore everything must be done to prevent it. But it is one thing not to want nuclear war, and something else to act if such a war comes into being. Therefore we should emphasize once again that were the aggressors to impose nuclear war upon the socialist countries, the peoples and armies of states in the socialist fraternity will do everything to defeat the invaders and forever eradicate the source of military danger. A war fought in defense of socialism will have a just nature, and for the people of the socialist countries this evaluation will be a powerful supplementary weapon.

Marxists-Leninists also decisively oppose relativistic interpretations of the concept of just wars by bourgeois ideologists. The essence of such conceptions is that an evaluation of a war as a just one supposedly does not contain an element of truth, since both warring sides try to represent any war they are waging as just. The question as to which war is just, declared the American military writer S. Possony, is resolved in the end "by the tribunal of arms".¹⁸ According to the logic of this militant, military force is what dominates in society, and not justice. Another American theorist, P. Ramsey, emphasizes the relativism of a moral-legal evaluation of a war in precisely the same way in his book "The Just War". In his words the concepts "justice", "good", and "benefactor" are extremely relative when applied to a weapon system and to warfare.¹⁹

In fact, however, as was demonstrated above, the social nature of a war may be determined with scientific precision. For this purpose we need to establish the true political goals pursued in the war by each of the dueling sides.

Marxists-Leninists also fight uncompromisingly against obvious falsifications made in relation to just wars, especially revolutionary wars. A book by the American theorist J. Collins, "Grand Strategy", as an example, contains the slanderous assertion that "a revolutionary war is inherently amoral.... The end justifies all means in the course of such a war."²⁰ At the same time the works of such "theorists" falsely claim that any war waged by the USA and other NATO states is a just war. Such declarations cannot be viewed as anything other than obvious deception of the masses--a tactic that has become an inseparable attribute of the state policy of monopolistic capital.

Only Marxism-Leninism can insure a correct, scientific interpretation of the types and social nature of wars. The Marxist-Leninist classification of wars, which persuasively refutes the antiscientific, bourgeois-idealistic classification of wars, serves the purpose of indoctrinating Soviet soldiers, improving their knowledge of military theory, raising their conviction and revolutionary alertness, and insuring continuous reinforcement of the combat readiness of our armed forces.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 49, p 287.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 27.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, pp 86-87.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 49, p 118.
5. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 80; Vol 49, pp 369-370.
6. See pp 73-77 of this publication.
7. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 36, p 531.
8. Wright, Q., "Die Geschichte des Krieges," in "Friedensforschung," Koln-Berlin, 1970, pp 29, 43.
9. Hahlweg, W., "Typologie des modernen Kleinkrieges," Wiesbaden, 1967, pp 52-53.
10. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 2, p 38.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 27.
12. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 15.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 262.
14. Cited in Osipov, K., "Suvorov" [Suvorov], Moscow, 1941, p 25.
15. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess" [The Nuremberg Trials], Vol 7, Moscow, 1961, p 327.
16. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 3, 1975, p 154.
17. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, p 121.
18. Possony, S., "Zur Bewaltigung der Kriegsschuldfrage," Koln and Opladen, 1968, pp 38, 45.
19. Ramsey, P., "The Just War," New York, 1968, pp 5, 55.
20. Collins, J. M., "Grand Strategy," Annapolis, 1973, p 310.

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CHAPTER V

THE NATURE AND BASIC TRAITS OF WARS IN DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND

Wars fought in defense of the socialist fatherland make up a special form of wars of the modern era. They differ significantly from other forms of wars in terms of their goals and nature, the methods of their conduct, the relationship of the popular masses to them, and historic significance. Our understanding of the nature and unique features of this form of wars is based on Marxist-Leninist ideas concerning defense of the achievements of the socialist revolution. It also stems from the experience of wars the socialist states have had to fight against imperialist aggressors.

1. The Nature of Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland

The social nature of wars fought in defense of the socialist fatherland is defined by the laws of the class struggle. These wars represent a retaliatory measure by socialist states, undertaken to repel imperialist aggressors. They are a continuation of the politics of revolution, the politics of defending the achievements of socialism against transgressions by imperialism. Attempts by international imperialist reaction and, in a particular stage of socialist society's development, by internal counterrevolution to liquidate the achievements of the socialist revolution by all resources available at their disposal on one hand, and protection of these achievements by the victorious proletariat and its allies on the other hand is an expression of an acute class struggle.

Deprived of power and its economic and social privileges by the victory of the socialist revolution, a country's bourgeoisie violently tries to recapture its "paradise lost" and restore capitalist orders. It employs conspiracies and sabotage against the working and peasant state, it speculates on its difficulties, it engages in false counterrevolutionary propaganda with the goal of deceiving the masses, and it resorts to civil war with the support and direct participation of world imperialist reaction. Imperialist states do not limit themselves to financial, material-technical, political, and ideological support to counterrevolution; they also organize direct military attacks upon a country that had undergone a socialist revolution.

In accordance with his new theory on socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin concluded that socialism could be victorious initially in a single country taken alone, or in

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several countries, pointing out that this victory should evoke "not only friction but also a direct desire of the bourgeoisie of other countries to defeat the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In these cases the war would be legal and just on our side. This would be a war for socialism, for liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie."¹

Imperialist reaction undertakes aggression against workers and peasant states not only soon after a socialist revolution, but also later, after socialism is firmly consolidated.

Developing a new society under the constant threat of imperialist aggression, the working class and its Communist Party are compelled to concern themselves daily with the state's defense capabilities. Protection of revolutionary achievements from the aggressive transgressions of imperialist reaction is one of the main laws inherent to all countries assuming the path of socialism.

The main goal sought by imperialism when it unleashes war against socialist states is the overthrow of the new social structure and restoration of the power of capitalists and landowners. Concurrently it tries to deprive the people of socialist countries of their national and state independence, plunder their national wealth, subdivide their territory, transform a significant part of the latter into colonial possessions or the "spheres of influence" of imperialist states, make the population of socialist countries its slaves, and exterminate the disobedient ones.

Imperialist aggressors also tie their designs for destroying or at least weakening socialist states in with their reactionary goal in relation to the laborers of their own country, as well as in relation to nations that had liberated themselves from the colonial yoke of imperialism, or ones still wearing it. Writing its aggressive plans against the advance guard of the revolutionary forces of modern times--the fraternity of socialist states, imperialist reaction hopes to make its main thrust against the entire world revolutionary movement.

The threat of imperialism's aggressiveness to all mankind and the interest of all laborers in preserving the peace and the achievements of socialism are a sound objective foundation for unifying all anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces with the goal of fighting imperialist aggression.

The social nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland is directly determined by their fully just and noble goals, ones which are in keeping with the nature of socialism and which follow from the peace-loving policy of the socialist state, a policy of defending the achievements of socialism.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity utilize all peaceful ways and means of defending socialism--a peace-loving foreign policy, and development of economic, scientific-technical, and cultural ties with nonsocialist states. They constantly display peaceful initiative and submit constructive proposals aimed at consolidating peace among nations and at preventing world war and the local wars of imperialism.

All of this proves over and over again that the causes of wars between socialist and imperialist countries lie not within the socialist system but rather in the

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aggressive essence of imperialism, and that socialist states are forced to wage a patriotic war to repel military attacks by imperialism and by other reactionary forces. These are the roots of the fully just and noble goals pursued by laborers in a war in defense of the socialist fatherland. These goals are as follows: first, defending history's most progressive and just social structure--socialism, and its great achievements in the country, and providing all possible assistance to other states of the socialist fraternity in their struggle against aggressors; second, defending the liberty and independence of socialist nations, their territory, their culture, and existence itself; third, helping our allies--the working class, the laboring masses of the capitalist states, the colonial peoples and dependent countries, and young national states--in their struggle of liberation against the imperialist yoke and foreign enslavement.

These just goals correspond to the objective laws of historic development. They are not only diametrically opposed to the reactionary and predatory goals of the counter-revolutionary wars of imperialist states against socialist countries, and the goals of all predatory wars fought by exploiters, but they also differ significantly from the goals of other just wars of the past and present.

They differ mainly in the fact that socialist states defend a progressive, just structure that reflects the fundamental interests of not only all members of socialist society and all of its classes and social groups, but also of all progressive mankind, since the socialist fatherland is a dependable bulwark of the international working class and all laborers, as well as oppressed peoples in their revolutionary struggle of liberation against imperialism and for national independence, peace, democracy, and socialism. The just wars of nonsocialist states also pursue progressive and sometimes even revolutionary goals (this can be seen in the wars of national liberation fought by countries oppressed by imperialism), but in these wars the interests of all society agree only temporarily, and to just a relative extent. Laborers fight to cast off the foreign yoke and achieve real liberty for their motherland. Propertied classes rising against the dominance of foreign monopolies try to capitalize on the struggle of the masses with the purposes of establishing and consolidating their own domination within the country.

Wars in defense of the socialist fatherland also differ from other just wars in that socialist states defend the liberty and independence of socialist nations, unified by common social, moral, and political values. On the other hand capitalist states (or developing countries in which the bourgeoisie is in power) fighting just wars defend the liberty of the evolved bourgeois nation, or they fight for conditions permitting consolidation of separated elements of the population into a single nation. There is not and cannot be class unity in a bourgeois nation. "Landowners and hired workers making up a negligible number of wealthy individuals, and tens of millions of poor people and laborers--these are truly 'two nations'...."2 wrote V. I. Lenin on bourgeois society. Occupying a position of dominance in a capitalist state, the bourgeoisie tries to subordinate the interests of the nation to its own egoistic class goals, and when the laboring masses prohibit this by their class revolutionary struggle, it renounces the national interests and makes deals with exploiters in other states, sometimes with yesterday's oppressors. Betrayal of national interests by the classes of exploitation is one of the indications of their antipopular social essence. Lenin believed this to be a law of the class interests and class policy of the bourgeoisie.

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Thus wars in defense of the socialist fatherland are the most legal, fully just, and progressive wars. Such were, for example, the war fought by the young Soviet republic against foreign interventionists and internal counterrevolution, and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against the fascist invaders. The war of the Vietnamese people against American aggressors also had a legal, just, and progressive nature.

The social nature and essence of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland reveal themselves most graphically in the basic traits of such wars.

2. The Basic Traits of Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland

One of the basic traits of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland is their consistently revolutionary nature. It manifests itself in the class content, the basic political goals and military objectives, the strategy of the struggle, the historic results, and the consequences of these wars.

By their class content, wars in defense of socialist states against imperialist aggressors are a continuation, in the international arena, of the class struggle of the proletariat and its allies, in new conditions and forms, against the world imperialist bourgeoisie and all reactionary forces of the old society. This premise is in fully correspondence with Lenin's conclusion that the war of the Soviet state against foreign interventionists bore the nature of an international civil war.³ It is also in keeping with the assessment made by a combined plenum of the party Central Committee and Central Control Committee in 1927 of the nature of the new war for which imperialism was preparing itself: "...the preparations being made for war against the USSR are nothing more than a duplication, on a broader basis, of the class struggle between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the victorious proletariat. This is precisely how the class essence of this war will be defined."⁴

Consequently wars between socialist and imperialist states, which express the goals and interests of opposing classes, combine within themselves the traits of both international and civil wars. They are typified by an uncompromising struggle, inasmuch as they resolve the fate of a particular sociopolitical structure. This is how wars of this type differ from wars between exploiting states of the same kinds, which do not lead to the annihilation of the sociopolitical structure existing in one of the warring countries (coalitions).

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union is an example of a supreme revolutionary element in a war fought in defense of the socialist fatherland, in a situation where the exploiters in a country are eliminated as a class and where the people rise as a single monolithic force. By its social content, it was a decisive revolutionary struggle of all of our people, faithful to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, against the most reactionary forces of world imperialism, and it united within itself the traits of international civil war in defense of the achievements of socialism, and a war of national liberation in defense of the liberty and independence of socialist nations. It decided the fate of the Soviet socialist state, and the future of world civilization, progress, and democracy. Our victory, emphasizes the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", "persuasively demonstrated the viability and

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invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It was a triumph of the new social and state structure born of October, of a socialist economy, of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, of the moral-political unity of Soviet society, and of the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR."⁵

The revolutionary nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland also expresses itself in the fact that their victorious outcome weakens the positions of international imperialism, and under certain conditions victory can cause the downfall of reactionary regimes in the aggressive states, promote the victory of democratic and socialist forces in these states, encourage new countries to leave the world capitalist system, and provide tremendous assistance to the struggle of national liberation of peoples oppressed by imperialism.

In the hard times of foreign intervention and civil war, V. I. Lenin said: "Today, fighting for the socialist structure in Russia, we are fighting for socialism in all the world."⁶ Dealing annihilatory blows on troops of the interventionists and on the White Guard counterrevolution, the workers and peasants of the young Soviet state had a revolutionizing influence upon the laborers of capitalist countries and colonial peoples, they weakened the war machine of the imperialists, and thus they helped the laborers of the world in their struggle against the oppressors.

The USSR honorably fulfilled its mission of liberation in World War II. Its victory of world historic proportions over the fascist invaders had the most profound influence upon the entire course of world development. The peoples of a number of European and Asian countries to whom the Soviet Union had provided decisive assistance were now able to build a new, socialist life. Favorable conditions were created for further development of the workers movement in capitalist states, and for growth and consolidation of communist and workers parties, which are the most active warriors of the proletariat and all laborers. The prerequisites of even broader development of the struggle by colonial and dependent peoples against imperialist oppressors and for the liberation of their countries from the foreign yoke arose.

In the final stage of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years the Soviet Union was able to avert armed intervention by imperialists in a large number of countries, and to prevent export of counterrevolution to them.

The revolutionary nature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland also manifests itself in the revolutionary method of their conduct. The essence of this method is as follows:

Communist Party leadership over everything having to do with armed defense of the socialist fatherland, and unification of the efforts of all people and of all state and social organizations for the struggle against the enemy; reliance of the Communist Party and the government of the socialist state upon the high political awareness and patriotic inspiration of the laborers, and upon their revolutionary and military creativity;

definition and attainment of decisive political and military goals in the war, a firm and unshakeable line of total defeat of the enemy, and the consequent highly aggressive, offensive nature of combat activities of the socialist army, and

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selflessness and mass heroism of its soldiers; organization of a multifaceted struggle, including an armed, whole peoples struggle, on territory temporarily occupied by enemy troops, and coordination of the actions of troop formations on the front and partisan formations in the enemy rear;

close military cooperation and mutual assistance among socialist states, and combat cooperation among their armies, relying upon all-out economic and political cooperation among socialist countries;

fraternal assistance to other nations rising in a just struggle against foreign invaders;

creation and broad utilization of the latest resources and methods of military activities, and attentive study and creative utilization of world military experience, to include the achievements of the enemy in military affairs;

a humanitarian attitude toward prisoners of war and the population of countries prodded into a criminal war against socialist states by their rulers, and help to all progressive forces in these countries in their struggle against reactionary militant cliques.

One of the most important traits of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland is that they are truly popular from the very beginning of the existence of the socialist state, and after elimination of the classes of exploitation from the country, they become whole peoples wars. Owing to the fully just goals and objectives of these wars, ones which are fully in keeping with the interests of the laborers, the masses consciously participate in them, and actively support and implement the policy of the Communist Party and government, aimed at decisive defeat of the enemy.

Thus the first participants of the war against interventionists and White Guards in Russia were laborers and the most conscious impoverished peasants. Then, as the masses began to realize the just, progressive nature of the war being fought by the Soviet republic and the unjust, reactionary war of its enemies, increasingly broader segments of the lower and middle class rose in the defense of the young socialist state. "...we have created a conscious attitude toward the war and toward active assistance to it in an unprecedented mass of people," said Lenin. "For literally all to be sympathetic with the war, for all party and nonparty laborers and nonparty peasants (the bulk of the peasants are not party members) to understand the war, is something inherent only to Soviet rule, being a goal not even one-tenth reachable in any other political regime. This is basically why we were able to beat the strong enemy in the end."⁷

The Soviet people displayed unprecedented aggressiveness in the Great Patriotic War. From the very first day of the war our people rose as one man to defeat the fascist aggressors. Their conscious and active participation in defense of the Soviet motherland expressed itself in the unexcelled heroism of the Soviet soldiers on the front, in the selfless labor of laborers, kolkhoz farmers, and the intelligentsia in the rear, in the brave struggle of Soviet people on territory temporarily occupied by fascist aggressors, and in other forms.

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A significant trait of wars fought in the defense of the socialist fatherland is their deeply international nature. In these wars, national and international goals and objectives of the struggle of liberation of the working class and all laborers of our planet merge into one. Socialist states defending their revolutionary achievements consequently defend the achievements of the international proletariat, and they are a dependable support and inspiring example to the working class of all other countries in its struggle for democracy and socialism, while for peoples oppressed by imperialism they are an example to be followed in their struggle of national liberation. Socialist states also provide direct aid to peoples enslaved by foreign invaders. This aid is sincere, comprehensive, and disinterested. It does not pursue any goals other than liberating oppressed people and providing them the possibility to decide their own fate. In turn, the laborers of capitalist, dependent, and recently liberated countries provide support to the peoples of socialist states in the struggle against the aggressors.

In a certain situation capitalist states may also pursue just goals in a war against other capitalist countries; for example they may defend their national independence. Under pressure from the laborers, and sometimes in order to earn some political clout, these states sometimes provide aid to other peoples in their struggle against foreign oppressors, though only to an extent reflecting the interests of the dominant class of such states. In addition to just, openly declared goals, bourgeoisie leading a just war fought by a capitalist state also pursues covert predatory goals in relation to other peoples. Thus during World War II the USA, England, and other Western countries in the antifascist coalition fought together with the Soviet Union for just goals of liberation. But at the same time the reactionary forces of these countries also had secret predatory plans, including anti-Soviet plans, which had a significant influence on the way they satisfied their obligations as allies to the Soviet Union and nations enslaved by the fascist aggressors. This is expressed, for example, in the delay of a second front in Europe by certain circles of the USA and England. Our Western allies participating in the war against Japanese aggressors in Asia secretly supported reactionary pro-imperialist forces in Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, and other countries. After introducing their troops into these countries to liberate them from the Japanese invaders, the imperialist states unleashed colonial wars against the people.

The international nature of armed defense of the socialist fatherland enjoyed further deepening in connection with formation and consolidation of the fraternity of socialist countries. Owing to the continual growth of the economic and defensive power of the USSR and other socialist states, and of their influence upon world social development, the possibilities for jointly defending the socialist countries against the military threat of imperialism increased considerably, and the international positions of socialism became even stronger.

This noble goal is being effectively promoted by full cooperation among socialist states, to include military-political cooperation, which has the purpose of defending the revolutionary achievements of peoples in the fraternal countries. "Together with the flourishing of each socialist nation and reinforcement of the sovereignty of the socialist states," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "their

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mutual ties are becoming ever stronger, more and more common elements are arising in their politics, economies, and social life; and their levels of development are gradually becoming equal. This process of gradual convergence of socialist countries is manifesting itself quite definitely today as a law."⁸ This law also manifests itself clearly in the socialist states' joint defense of their revolutionary achievements.

The international tasks of states in the socialist fraternity are constantly expanding in connection with formation of many new independent national states, to which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are providing diverse, constantly increasing aid in their struggle against imperialism and for preservation and reinforcement of national independence and social progress. The role and responsibility of socialist states for preservation and consolidation of peace throughout the whole world are rising continuously.

The performance of the international mission of insuring the security of all peoples and consolidating universal peace by the Soviet Union, other countries of the socialist fraternity, and their armed forces is promoting further growth in sympathy throughout the world, and it is eliciting support for their peace-loving policy by all progressive mankind, which is helping to continually consolidate the international position of states in the socialist fraternity. Expansion of the diverse aid rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to their allies in the struggle against imperialist reaction and aggression on one hand and the growth in the activity of the broad popular masses throughout the world in the struggle for peace and in support of the socialist states on the other is a law of defense of the socialist fatherland.

Comprehensive cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance among countries of the socialist fraternity in their development of socialism and communism, to include military-political cooperation with the purposes of jointly defending the achievements of socialism and peace throughout the world, the friendship among the peoples, and the unity of communist and workers parties based on Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism are all a guarantee of continual reinforcement of the economic and defensive power of the fraternity of socialist states.

3. The Communist Party--the Organizer and Leader of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland

One of the most important laws of the defense of the socialist fatherland is that the Communist Party is the organizer and leader of all efforts to consolidate the defense capabilities of the socialist countries, and to insure its security, armed repulsion of imperialist aggressors, and decisive defeat of the enemy.

In distinction from the class-antagonistic society, socialist society comes into being and develops not spontaneously but in accordance with a plan, consciously, on the basis of the successive application of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. It is created by the broad popular masses, the activity of which grows constantly. "Socialism," emphasizes the CPSU Program, "is the living creativity of the laboring masses. Growth of the activity of the popular masses in construction of a new life is a law of the socialist era."⁹ Development of socialism and communism

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proceeds in a situation of an acute class struggle in the international arena (and within the country during the transitory period from capitalism to socialism). All of this makes it necessary for the Communist Party to provide daily leadership to all areas of the life and activities of socialist society, to include the defense of its revolutionary achievements. Armed with this Marxist-Leninist doctrine and a knowledge of social development and the ways of society's revolutionary transformation, and possessing tremendous practical experience in implementing scientific theory, the Communist Party is the foremost, most conscious, most organized, and most seasoned detachment of the working class and all laborers. It is precisely owing to this that it is capable of organizing and heading the grandiose effort to develop socialism and communism, and of directing the energy of millions of laborers toward creation of new forms of social life and toward defense of socialism's achievements.

"Socialist revolution," Lenin said, "brings out collective organizational talent, without which the multimillion army of the proletariat could not achieve victory."¹⁰ The Communist Party is such a collective organizer. It concentrates its main efforts on the general prospects of the society's development, on maintaining a correct political line, and on organizing the laborers to implement this line. In the area of the socialist fatherland's defense, the party's activity mainly involves developing a scientifically grounded military policy, and organizing the masses for its implementation.

The military policy of the Communist Party has a scientific nature because it is based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which reveals the laws of social development, the laws of the class struggle, and the laws of development of socialism and communism. Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland is the immediate methodological and theoretical foundation of the Communist Party's military policy, which is organically associated with all of its domestic policy--economic, social, national, technical, personnel, and cultural--and with foreign policy. This tie expresses itself in the basic directions assumed by the party's leadership of the entire effort of defending the socialist fatherland.

The most important direction in the Communist Party's activity in defense of the socialist fatherland is creation of regular armed forces of a new type, and constant concern for reinforcing their battleworthiness and combat readiness.

The USSR Armed Forces were created under the leadership of the CPSU and V. I. Lenin, and later on, in all stages of the Soviet state's development, the party maintained direct control over Soviet military development; it maintains such control today as well. The Communist Party's leadership of the armed forces, and growth in the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy make up the most important foundation of Soviet military development. The party bases its effort on the idea that continual reinforcement of the country's defense capabilities and improvement of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces were and continue to be an objective necessity, one of the decisive prerequisites for development of socialism and communism. This necessity is predetermined by the constant danger of military attack by imperialism, a danger brought on by its aggressive nature and state policy.

The CPSU's leadership of Soviet military development expresses itself in different forms. The party has developed scientific principles for Soviet military development,

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and it guides the activities of military and other state organs as well as those of public organizations implementing these principles. The military doctrine of the socialist state, which fully considers the political and military situation in the world, is developed under the leadership of the Communist Party. The CPSU guides all activities in the state aimed at training and placing regular officers, and it manages the ideological indoctrination of army and navy personnel. It leads the activities of public organizations (the Komsomol, DOSAAF, and others) and of educational institutions (grade schools, production-technical schools, tekhnikums, institutions of higher education) aimed at training preconscrip youth.

One of the most important directions in the Communist Party's organization of the socialist fatherland's defense is management of the activities of state, business, and public organizations and of all laborers aimed at creating and strengthening the economic, material, and technical foundations of the country's defense capabilities and the fighting power of its armed forces. Placing priority in its economic policy on constant improvement of the people's welfare, the party also foresees measures for reinforcing the state's defense capabilities and supporting the armed forces with materiel and equipment.

Thus following the civil war the party, basing itself on Lenin's conclusion that the Red Army must be strengthened in every possible way, planned a gigantic program to surmount the technical and economic backwardness of the country; formation of the economic foundation of the Soviet state's defensive power was an organic part of this program. The policy of socialist industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, and successful fulfillment of the prewar five-year plans insured creation of a powerful economic base for the state's defense capability.

The most important directions of the party's activities in defense of the socialist fatherland include constant concern for strengthening the sociopolitical prerequisites of the country's defense capabilities on the basis of a correct social and national policy, development of socialist democracy, and consolidation of the sociopolitical unity of socialist society, and of friendship among different peoples. The CPSU is engaged in purposeful ideological work, nurturing the Soviet people in the spirit of selfless devotion to communism, in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism, and in the spirit of a readiness to selflessly defend the achievements of socialism.

The foreign policy of the Communist Party plays a tremendous role in defense of the socialist fatherland; it is oriented at promoting favorable international conditions for development of socialism and communism, at strengthening the socialist fraternity, at unifying all anti-imperialist forces, at exposing the aggressive plans of imperialism, and at repelling its aggressive desires.

In wartime, the party mobilizes all forces and resources of the state for defeat of the enemy, transforming the country into a single military camp. It insures the unity of political and military leadership, provides leadership to the army and navy and to their military actions, and implements the strategic plans it develops.

Analyzing the causes of the young Soviet republic's victory over foreign interventionists and White Guards, Lenin found the Communist Party's leadership of the entire

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struggle against the numerous enemies to be one of the decisive sources of this victory. He said: "And it was only owing to the fact that the party was on guard, that the party was supremely disciplined, because the authority of the party united all departments and institutions, because dozens, hundreds, thousands, and, in the end, millions marched as one man in response to the words of the Central Committee, and only because unprecedented sacrifices were made, was the miracle that occurred made possible. It was only because of this, despite a second, third, and fourth campaign by imperialists of the Entente and imperialists of the whole world, that we found ourselves in a position to win."¹¹

War poses new, extremely complex tasks in all areas of the life of socialist society. Possibilities for victory over an imperialist aggressor, created in years of peace, cannot transform on their own, automatically, into reality. In order that these possibilities could be capitalized on fully, and in order that the enemy could be defeated, a colossal amount of organizational work is required.

Thus following the treacherous attack of fascist Germany upon the Soviet Union, our party developed a truly scientific, concrete program for defending the Soviet motherland on the basis of its creative application of Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, its deep analysis of the balance between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction in the international arena, and its thorough accounting of material and spiritual resources--both ours and the enemy's. Consistent implementation of this program led the Soviet state to its world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War.

During the war years the Communist Party began by reorganizing, for war, its own internal life and activities aimed at leading the society, and it directed the efforts of the state, social, and economic organs and organizations toward the same sort of alteration.

All fundamental issues associated with leading the country and managing the war were examined and resolved by the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat of the party Central Committee. Decisions of the party Central Committee were then implemented through the efforts of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Council of Peoples Commissars, the State Defense Committee, and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Military issues requiring swift resolution were discussed at general meetings of the Central Committee Politburo and the GKO [State Defense Committee], and the Central Committee Politburo and the Headquarters, while the most important issues were examined jointly by the Central Committee Politburo, the GKO, and the Headquarters.

The strictest possible centralization of leadership of intraparty life, combined with the use of forms of intraparty democracy suited to a war situation, competent application of leadership methods consistent with the concrete conditions of different periods of the war, effective leadership of state organs, especially the central organs of the military department, and effective leadership of social organizations all permitted the Communist Party to honorably perform its role as the leading, mobilizing, and guiding force of Soviet society. The flexibility of the party's organizational structure and of the party effort as a whole clearly manifested itself in the party's high efficiency and purposefulness, its strictest discipline, and its ability to quickly find the most effective ways to complete diverse tasks.

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One of the most important means the Communist Party had for exercising its leadership role in the armed defense of the socialist fatherland was concentration of its forces in the decisive areas of the struggle. During the Great Patriotic War more than 1.64 million communists, including tens of thousands of party, state, trade union, and Komsomol executives, were sent to the front by territorial party organizations. Communists marched in the advance guard of the whole people's struggle against the sworn enemies of the Soviet motherland, serving as an example of heroism and self-sacrifice. During the war about 2 million communists--more than half of the party's membership as of summer 1941--gave their lives in behalf of the liberty and independence of the socialist fatherland. Party members and candidates made up almost three-fourths of that glorious detachment of the motherland's defenders who earned the lofty Hero of the Soviet Union title.

The heroic activities of communists on the front and in the rear raised the influence and authority of the party among the broad laboring masses and strengthened the unity of the party and people. The ever-rising influx of new forces into the party ranks was one of the clear expressions of this. Moreover the largest influx into the party occurred in the party organizations of the operating army on the front, where each day one had to come face to face with mortal danger. In all during the Great Patriotic War, the army's and navy's party organizations accepted about 4 million persons into their ranks. Hundreds of thousands of privates, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, and officers, having submitted their application to the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of bolsheviks)] prior to battle, died the death of the brave and were never officially initiated into the party, their faithfulness to which they demonstrated by self-sacrifice. Despite the large losses of communists on the front, party membership in the armed forces did not drop; on the contrary it grew: While in 1941 there were 1.3 million communists in the army and navy, by the end of the war there were 3 million.¹² Growth in party membership during the war also occurred due to acceptance of the best representatives of the laborers, kolkhoz farmers, and the intelligentsia, heroically laboring in the rear.

As always, the Komsomol was a faithful assistant of the Communist Party. Prior to the Great Patriotic War there were 1.71 million Komsomol members in the army and navy. About another 2 million Komsomol members were called up into the armed forces during general mobilization at the beginning of the war. Over 700,000 Komsomol members were mobilized by special decrees of the Komsomol Central Committee and assigned to paratrooper units, shock ski battalions, Guards rocket units, and the navy. More than 300,000 Komsomol girls fought fearlessly at the front. During the war more than 5 million soldiers joined the Komsomol. Despite large losses on the battlefield and departure of members due to age, there were about 2.5 million Komsomol members in the armed forces by the end of the war.¹³ Komsomol members proved themselves to be a dependable support to commanders, political organs, and party organizations, and they fought in the front ranks of the soldiers as well. Among Heroes of the Soviet Union, 11 percent were Komsomol members. The Komsomol was awarded the Order of Lenin for its outstanding service to the motherland in the war years. Communists and Komsomol members made up almost half of all recipients of orders and medals during the war.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, military councils, and the political organs and party organizations of the troops and fleets played a great

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role in supporting the CPSU's military policy and its leadership of the armed forces. Together with commanders, they promoted fulfillment of the Communist Party's decisions in the army and navy, they supported personnel training, and they helped the command organize all of the combat activities of troops and naval forces in support of their missions.

Redistributing its executives, during the Great Patriotic War the party sent many members of the VKP(b) Central Committee and secretaries of union republic Communist Party central committees, and of kray, oblast, and rayon party committees, to responsible posts in the Main Political Directorate, in other political organs of the army and navy, and the military councils. This promoted a further rise in the authority and influence of the military councils, political organs, and party organizations of the armed forces.

All activities of the military councils and political organs were reorganized in accordance with the war conditions. The party broadened the functions of the political organs. While prior to the war they were only organs of political propaganda, now they were given the mission of promoting daily and comprehensive party influence upon the life and combat activities of the troops and carrying on agitation and propaganda work in conjunction with their organization activities aimed at strengthening the fighting power of the army and navy, improving discipline and the political-moral state of the personnel, and achieving closer unity of the personnel about the Communist Party and its Central Committee. The forms and methods employed by military councils in their leadership of combat operations, the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and material-technical support and supply of units, ships, and formations improved constantly. The military councils were given functions they did not have in peacetime: consolidating the immediate rear of the country in the name of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, and performing the functions of organs of government authority in areas declared to be under martial law. They maintained close ties with party formations on territories temporarily occupied by the enemy, they provided arms, combat equipment, and other resources to them, and they coordinated their efforts with the actions of the troops.

The Communist Party did a great deal of organizational work in mobilizing all of the society's resources to supply weapons, combat equipment, food, clothing, and the resources of agitation and mass cultural work to the front. The party reorganized the country's economy and the activities of state and social organizations, scientific institutions, and schools for war under the motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory!".

One of the decisive conditions of our victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War was the social policy of the Communist Party, directed at constantly strengthening the union of the working class and peasantry, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society, and the friendship among peoples of the USSR. The party developed, in all laborers and all of the country's peoples, a deep sense of devotion and faithfulness to the single Soviet motherland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it illuminated this feeling with the bright light of the ideals of communism, and it armed the Soviet people with a scientific understanding of their patriotic and international duty. Soviet patriotism, which organically

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included friendship among peoples and socialist internationalism in its content, manifested itself as a great active force, inspiring the popular masses to acts of heroism in behalf of the socialist fatherland.

An important area of the party's leadership of the Soviet people's struggle against fascist aggressors during the Great Patriotic War was its foreign policy. Owing to scientific, Marxist-Leninist analysis of the relationship between different social forces in the world arena, the party was able to plan a correct foreign policy course intended to unify the efforts of all countries threatened by fascist Germany, to win over previously neutral or even hostile bourgeois states, and to break up the fascist bloc. Consistently following this course, the Soviet Union managed to create an anti-Nazi coalition, and it promptly unmasked and paralyzed the actions of reactionary circles in the USA, Great Britain, and other states--our Western allies at that time, and fascist diplomacy intended to weaken and break apart the anti-Nazi coalition. At the same time the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and our diplomatic organs, gaining their support from the victories of the Soviet Army and Navy, applied tremendous pressure to shake the fascist bloc apart.

Our party broadened and strengthened its international ties with the Communist Parties of other countries, with the international working class, and with peoples oppressed by imperialism who rose in the struggle against the fascist invaders. A broadly organized resistance movement in the occupied countries played an important role in this struggle. Communist and workers parties marched in the advance guard of the struggle against this most dangerous enemy. Communists proved themselves to be true patriots and internationalists, consistently fighting for the liberty and independence of peoples.

The intense foreign policy activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government effectively promoted victory over the fascist states and creation of a post-war world which would satisfy the interests of the Soviet Union and all peoples fighting for peace and progress. These activities promoted unprecedented growth of the Soviet Union's authority and its influence on international problems in the postwar conditions.

Thus Communist Party leadership of a war in defense of the socialist fatherland is a principal source of victory. This objective law revealed itself to its full extent in the Great Patriotic War, which was one of the hardest trials ever experienced by our motherland. "The Leninist Communist Party--the leading and guiding force of our society," notes the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", "was the inspiration and organizer of the struggle of the Soviet people against fascist Germany. In exceptionally difficult conditions it was able to mobilize the Soviet people for a crusade against the fascist invaders, and despite temporary setbacks in the initial period of military actions, it managed to achieve a fundamental turning point in the course of the war and insure its victorious conclusion. The party did a truly titanic amount of work to reorganize the national economy for war. By their personal example, heroism, and bravery, communists raised the fighting spirit of the masses, led them on to acts of heroism, and inspired a firm confidence in total victory over the enemy. During the war the

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party's authority grew immeasurably, its ranks closed together even more tightly, and the unity of the party and people became stronger."¹⁴

The experience of the CPSU in leading the defense of the socialist fatherland in peace and war has international significance. It is being studied and utilized by fraternal communist and workers parties of countries in the socialist fraternity working to insure the peace and security of nations and dependable protection of socialist achievements. It is also being studied and utilized by communists and revolutionary democratic parties in developing and colonial countries leading the struggle of the popular masses against imperialism and its armed violence, and for national independence and sovereignty, for progressive development of their states.

This experience enjoyed further creative development during the postwar era in the theoretical and practical activities of the CPSU and fraternal parties in the socialist countries. Creatively applying and developing Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, and enriching the accumulated experience, they are thoroughly analyzing and accounting for the new conditions and trends of world social development, and the changes occurring in the balance of social forces in the international arena: the continual growth of the forces of socialism, which are defining the basic direction of modern world development, the tremendous growth of the revolutionary struggle of liberation of the working class and all laborers, deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system, disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism, and the movement of the proponents of peace against reactionary wars and military conflicts initiated and prepared for by the imperialists.

The CPSU and the fraternal communist parties account for the persisting danger of military attacks by imperialism upon socialist countries, its aggressive neocolonial policy aimed against the developing countries, and the desire of the imperialist and pro-imperialist bourgeoisie of a number of capitalist and developing states to transcend to overt military terrorist dictatorship, to a fascist regime within their own countries. Of important significance is the fact that the duel between the two opposing social systems--socialist and capitalist--the struggle of the forces of progress, peace, and socialism against the reactionary forces of imperialism and aggression is proceeding in an atmosphere of scientific-technical revolution, in a time when imperialist states are trying to use the tremendous achievements of science and psychology mainly to support the arms race and to create and accumulate weapons and combat equipment having enormous destructive force. Under these conditions the leadership role of the communist parties of the socialist countries in development of socialism and communism and in defense of the revolutionary achievements of the peoples has grown even more.

Following Lenin's commandment of implementing the largest possible quantity of decisions and measures "which would lead to peace, if not total elimination of the dangers of war",¹⁵ the CPSU is consistently following Lenin's foreign policy course. It is persistently implementing a principled foreign policy aimed at neutralizing the forces of aggression and war, consolidating universal peace, and insuring the security of the socialist states and the right of peoples for liberty, independence, and social progress.

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The CPSU devotes unweakening attention to developing the economic and material-technical foundations of the country's defense capabilities, and to strengthening the social, political, and ideological prerequisites of the socialist fatherland's reliable protection.

The sphere of economics and material production has been and continues to be a principal target of all of the party's activities. The economic strategy of the CPSU for the 10th Five-Year Plan and the long-range future has the goal of continually increasing the standard of living of the people on the basis of dynamic and proportionate development of social production, improvement of its effectiveness, acceleration of scientific-technical progress, growth in labor productivity, and all-out improvement of work quality in all segments of the national economy and in all spheres of social life. The central link of the Communist Party's economic policy is further growth of the country's economic potential in close association with growth in scientific-technical potential. This is in keeping with the main objective of the 10th Five-Year Plan and the long-range program, aimed at raising the material and cultural level of the people, at the same time it is promoting consolidation of the social prerequisites and the economic and material-technical base of the country's defensive power. As before, the tasks of strengthening the state's defense capabilities are carefully accounted for by the Communist Party in its development and implementation of economic, social, and personnel policy, and in other aspects of its activity.

The Communist Party devotes unweakening attention to constant growth of the combat readiness of the armed forces. The troops and naval forces are being outfitted with modern weapons and military equipment, their organizational structure is being improved, and the level of combat and operational training and of the ideological maturity of the personnel is constantly rising. "Soviet soldiers," writes CPSU Central Committee Politburo member USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "have a daily awareness of the wise leadership and guiding role of the CPSU in the armed forces, they treasure its attention and concern, and they respond to this with whole-hearted devotion to the party and people and with selfless military labor. We are extremely lucky that the armed forces are being led by such a tested strategist, organizer, and indoctrinator, as is the glorious Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee."¹⁶

The most important direction in the activity of the Communist Party aimed at organizing and leading the socialist fatherland's defense is its ideological work, which is directed at nurturing all of the people, and especially the growing generations, in the spirit of devotion to communism and love for one's socialist motherland and for other countries of the socialist fraternity, in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism. In this indoctrination effort, the CPSU attaches great significance to publicity on the heroic traditions of the Soviet people. The inviolable ideological and moral-political unity of Soviet society is the result of the Communist Party's tremendous ideological activity, of its organizational efforts to unite Soviet people of different nations and nationalities in the struggle to build socialism and communism and to defend the socialist fatherland.

The Soviet Armed Forces are honorably fulfilling their patriotic and international duty in a fraternal union with the armies of other socialist states.

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"Nor should anyone doubt," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "that our party will do everything to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union will continue to possess all they need to perform their responsible mission--standing guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and serving as the bulwark of universal peace."¹⁷

Thus growth in the Communist Party's role in strengthening the country's defense capabilities and in leading the whole effort of the socialist fatherland's defense is one of the most important laws of development of socialist society.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, p 133.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 11, p 282.
3. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, pp 113-114.
4. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums], 8th Edition, Vol 3, Moscow, 1970, p 465.
5. "Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Dokumenty i materialy" [The 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1975, p 4.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 68.
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 42, p 140.
8. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 6.
9. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 15.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 79.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 240.
12. See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History], Moscow, 1970, p 604.
13. See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya," p 605.
14. "Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Dokumenty i materialy," p 4-5.
15. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 45, p 241.

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16. KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1977, p 22.
17. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 83.

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CHAPTER VI

WAR AND REVOLUTION

The modern era of transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale has placed mankind face to face with a dramatic break from the old foundations of social life, and with great revolutionary development. In a time of swift development of the world revolutionary process, when socialism has firmly entrenched itself in the world and has become a powerful international force, in a situation of constant aggressiveness of imperialism and the greater possibilities for using the achievements of scientific-technical progress in war, the question as to the relationship between war and revolution has acquired special importance.

Marxism-Leninism provided a clear scientific definition of war and revolution as different social phenomena, and it revealed their dialectical mutual relationship.

1. War and Revolution as Social Phenomena of Different Nature

The ideologists of imperialism try to identify the concepts of war and revolution with each other. This is contrary to the facts of history and the conclusions of scientific theory. Marxism-Leninism persuasively substantiated the fact that although they are not isolated from one another, war and revolution are not only not identical in content, but they also do not exist in a unique, constant, and mandatory relationship between each other.

War and revolution have a common socioeconomic source. They are associated by their origin with private ownership, with relationships of domination and subservience, and with social antagonisms. Elicited by the conditions of a society of exploitation, war and revolution are the resources of a political struggle, a continuation of the policy of certain classes. Achievement of the goals of war and revolution presupposes the use of violence, though in different forms and to different degrees. Both war and social revolution are historically transitory phenomena of social life, inherent to a class-antagonistic society. At the same time, while they do bear some similarities as social phenomena, they are typified by a profound qualitative difference.

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Differences in the Causes of War and Revolution

A conflict between new productive forces and obsolete production relations that have become a hindrance to the former's development is the general economic basis of revolution. Under capitalism, this conflict expresses itself as sharp aggravation of the antagonistic contradiction between labor and capital. The entire course of this structure's economic development leads to the fall of capitalist domination. "Had it not been eroded and undermined by history," said Lenin, "no other force would have destroyed capitalism."¹

Socialist revolution is the result of both objective and subjective preconditions in a given country: material, depending on the maturity of capitalism; socio-political, defined by Lenin as a revolutionary situation; presence of a political revolutionary army--class forces quantitatively, organizationally, politically, and ideologically prepared for a successful assault on the foundations of capitalism.

Of course all collisions of history, Marx and Engels taught, are rooted in the contradiction between productive forces and in the form of communication²--that is, production relations. But war, which is contained within the very nature of a society of exploitation, is not necessarily always directly associated with a conflict between productive forces and production relations. Aggressive imperialist wars are the result of the action of the law of nonuniform economic and political development of capitalist countries, domination by monopolies, and the desire of imperialists to acquire maximum profit by any means. Revolution, meanwhile, is always directly associated with the action of the law of correspondence of production relations to the nature and level of development of productive forces.

The Specific Nature of the Opposing Forces in War and Revolution

In contrast to the situation with wars, which, with the exception of civil wars, represent a duel between states or coalitions of countries (not necessarily ones with different sociopolitical structures), revolution is a struggle between antagonistic classes within a state. Hence follows the special attention devoted to the inner source of revolution, to analyzing the preconditions existing within the given country, though of course war is also inseparably associated with the internal policies of the classes (states), and revolution is not isolated from the influence of external conditions.

In their time, Marx and Engels offered crushing criticism of Blancists and anarchists who asserted that an organized group of conspirators is supposedly enough to incite a revolution at any given time. Marxists-Leninists are opponents of the "export of revolution". Revolutions are not made by orders or conspiracies, nor can they be averted by them. At the time of the signing of the Brest peace, Lenin harshly labeled "left-wing communists" as adventurists and false revolutionaries, who encouraged "inciting" socialist revolution in West Europe, even at the price of the death of Soviet rule in Russia. War was to be the means by which such revolution was to be "incited". The conception of "revolutionary war" fought for the purposes of "inciting" a revolutionary process, declared by the Trotskyites, was referred to by Lenin as "a disease of revolutionary rhetoric."³ The conception of "inciting" revolution by arms is preached today by the ideologists of Maoism.

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When we analyze the social orientation of opposing forces in war and revolution, we should keep in mind that wars are fought by both reactionary and progressive forces. Revolutions are made only by progressive forces. Some just wars, primarily wars in defense of the socialist fatherland, are revolutionary in nature, inasmuch as they are aimed against reactionary forces of the old society and require the army and people to display high awareness, decisiveness of action, selflessness, and mass heroism.

The profound differences especially stand out when we compare revolution and an unjust international war.

Although they are waged by popular forces, unjust wars are prepared for in deep secrecy from the people, they begin and proceed under false slogans, and they pursue the mercenary goals of the classes of exploitation, goals hostile to the laborers.

In a revolution, progressive forces capable of handing down a death sentence to the obsolete structure rise. This manifests itself especially clearly in a socialist revolution, which expresses the interests of the people and gains its support from the political activity of the broad masses, mainly the working class, led by a Marxist-Leninist party.

The experience of the socialist revolution in Russia has unfading significance. Lenin had this to say about it: "We were a minority party in Russia, but most of the whole country's soviets of workers and peasants deputies were with us.... Almost half of the army, which contained at least 10 million men at that time, was with us."⁴ The bolsheviks united the entire revolutionary advance guard and the overwhelming majority of the country's laborers, and they led them to victory over Czarism and capitalism.

The task of unifying the masses is extremely important in modern capitalist society, now that it is possible to expand the social base of socialist revolution. The problem of winning over the majority of laborers and forming a broad front of anti-imperialist forces is one of the most important in the strategy and tactics of the communist and workers parties of the capitalist countries. The struggle of communist and workers parties for implementation of common democratic principles and for peace is helping to create a mass political army of socialist revolution. The general democratic struggle is not postponing socialist revolution; on the contrary it is bringing it nearer. The front of the anti-imperialist struggle is indivisible: Imperialism's defeat in one sector weakens its entire system. No matter what stages the revolutionary masses must go through, and no matter what interim programs and goals communists suggest in their effort to unify the laborers, they always remember that a battle for the overthrow of capitalism and for establishment of socialism lies ahead.

Democratic, national-liberation revolutions are associated with the victories of world socialism and the international working class. Such revolutions develop as an organic component of the single world revolutionary process. Each victory of the progressive forces, mainly the working class, brings us closer to the hour when all mankind will dismantle its social tracks and assume the track of communist society's development.

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Revolution and Unjust War Differ in Their Political Content and General Consequences

In contrast to unjust wars, revolutions pursue only just, progressive goals, which provided Marx the grounds for referring to them as the "locomotives of history".⁵ While imperialist war, for example, serves the reactionary goals of plundering the peoples of other countries, seizing territory, markets, and spheres of influence, and destroying revolutionary forces, socialist revolution embraces the entire set of progressive transformation--economic, political, and spiritual, leading to annihilation of social and national oppression, to complete elimination of capitalism and development of socialism, and consequently to elimination of the sources of all wars.

Being social phenomena of profoundly different content, unjust war and revolution lead to diametrically opposed social consequences. Unjust wars not only cause tremendous losses and suffering among the people, but they can also retard social progress. In opposition to them, revolution is creative at its very foundation; this is especially true of socialist revolution. Breaking down the old, obsolete system, it promotes a transition to new, more-progressive forms of social life. The best evidence of this can be found in the victory of Great October. The 10 days of October shook the world, and the subsequent decades of the revolution's development changed it. The ideas of October are embodied in the world-historic achievements of the Soviet Union and of all countries of the socialist fraternity, and in the successes of the world workers movement and the national liberation struggle of the people.

War and Revolution Are Specific in Terms of the Methods and Forms of Attainment of Political Goals

The principal characteristic of war from this aspect is the use of the resources of armed violence, mass armed conflict. Revolution, meanwhile, presupposes both non-peaceful and peaceful paths, tactics, and resources for achieving goals. Everything here depends on the general conditions of the era, on the concrete situation in the given state, on its national features, on the acuity of the class contradictions, on the relationship between class forces, on the degree of organization and political maturity of the working class and its allies, on the viability of the proletarian party, and on the amount of resistance offered by the bourgeoisie.

When revolution develops on a nonpeaceful path, armed violence takes the form of armed uprising, a partisan struggle, and civil war. In this case the civil war fought by the laboring masses is a form of revolutionary struggle, and it is consistent in its political orientation with that of the revolution. Having in mind such a war, Lenin wrote in 1905: "Revolution is war. It is the sole legal, rightful, just, truly grand war of all wars ever known to history."⁶ However, even revolutionary civil war is not identical to the nonpeaceful path of revolutionary development. Civil war may coincide with the beginning of an armed uprising, and it may develop following a revolution as well. The goals of revolution and revolutionary civil war are not fully consistent. Revolution breaks down the old structure and creates a new social structure. Revolutionary civil war provides an immediate solution only to the first problem--breaking down the old structure and suppressing counterrevolutionary forces.

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The main issue of social revolution is that of state power. Because dominant classes do not voluntarily abdicate, revolution is always a form of social violence. Communists openly declare that their goals may be attained only by overthrowing the capitalist structure. However, revolution is not necessarily associated with civil war, with the use of armed violence. Leading the masses to revolution, Marxists-Leninists never place priority on the military issues when the situation does not require such emphasis. Revolutionaries turn to armed violence only as a result of the objective development of events. Marx made an important statement in an appeal to all bourgeois governments, which was contained in his speech to the London Conference of the International Brotherhood of Workers on 21 September 1871: "...we know that you are an armed force aimed against the proletariat; we will act against you peacefully wherever we find this possible for us, and with weapons when this becomes necessary."⁷

Marxists have never asserted that power must be won by the same resources everywhere. They caution against stereotyping when determining the forms of transition to socialism, and against attempts at shifting the center of gravity from the content of the revolution concept to the forms of its manifestation. "Marx did not tie his hands--or those of future functionaries of the socialist revolution--in regard to the forms, tactics, and means of revolution," wrote Lenin, "knowing that a mass of new problems would arise, that the entire situation would change in the course of revolution, and that it would change frequently and intensively in the course of revolution."⁸

Without predetermining the means by which political power is to be won, and without making some one variant of socialist revolution absolute, Marxists believe it necessary for the proletariat to master all forms of the struggle without the slightest exception, to be ready to switch quickly from one form to another.

The founders of scientific communism emphasized many times that while remaining ready to use the entire arsenal of forms and resources of revolution, we must seek the least painful methods of action. Engels expressed the thought that it would be desirable to annihilate private ownership by peaceful means as long ago as in his "Principles of Communism".⁹ Marx is credited with the statement that "An uprising would be senseless where peaceful agitation could lead to the goal faster and more surely."¹⁰ Revolution occurring at the time of war is an especially hard way for a new social structure to come into being. This idea was reflected in the "Manifesto of the Communist International", adopted by the first congress of the Comintern (1919): "While they never artificially incite civil war, communist parties try to make it as short as possible when it arises out of ultimate necessity, to reduce the number of its sacrifices, and mainly to insure the victory of the proletariat."¹¹

Fabrications by bourgeois ideologists concerning the identity of war and revolution are refuted by the revolutionary process of the modern era itself. It shows us that a revolutionary situation does not necessarily have to transform into a revolution in the form of war.

Noteworthy, for example, is the experience of the 1919 Hungarian Revolution. The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie fell in response to the pressure of a powerful revolutionary peace offensive. Bela Kun, the leader of the Hungarian communists, strongly supported by the masses, became the head of state.

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The young Hungarian soviet republic did not exist for long. Encircled by enemies, it was strangled by a combined internal and external counterrevolution. Soviet Russia, which was exerting all of its efforts in its struggle against interventionists and White Guards, rendered all assistance it could in those difficult times to the Hungarian laborers, but of course, this help was not enough to permit the Hungarian revolution to restrain the onslaught of the sizable forces of reaction.

Different historic conditions evolved in the world in just a quarter of a century. The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II led to the fall of reactionary regimes in a number of European and Asiatic states, and created a favorable situation for the struggle of the laboring masses for socialism. These countries underwent a successful revolution; in this case the working class of peoples democratic states in Central and Southeast Europe for the most part insured a peaceful transition of the peoples democratic revolution into a socialist revolution under the guidance of Marxist-Leninist parties.

Thus civil war is also not a general trait of socialist revolution, or a mandatory form of political struggle among classes. Marxists associate the necessity of civil war--the most acute form of class struggle--only with certain historic conditions. Revolutionaries prefer peaceful resources for their struggle, and they are capable of acting in a legal and an illegal situation, and utilizing, depending on the situation, strikes, official government institutions, election campaigns, and meetings. But when exploiters resort to the bayonet, the revolutionary class chooses those resources of revolutionary violence which would permit it to surmount armed counterrevolutionary violence. It is prepared to perform a revolution by armed means, subordinating all methods and resources of the struggle to this strategic goal--revolutionary alteration of society.

Imperialism has unleashed many civil wars in the past. Its social nature and political designs unchanged, it is trying to implement its plans of exporting counterrevolution today as well. The exploiters have always united their forces and continue to do so in their struggle against the revolutionary movement of oppressed masses. The facts of history are eloquent testimony to this. The savage encounters between Sparta and the Athenians ceased whenever slave uprisings had to be strangled. In the era of Versailles, France entered a conspiracy with Bismark's Prussia with the intention of suppressing the Paris Commune. The troops of the largest capitalist states, which represented two hostile groupings in World War I, intervened together in Russia soon after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. This trend exists even today, but its conditions have changed. Relying upon its continually growing power, the socialist fraternity is restraining imperialism and limiting its possibilities for exporting counterrevolution.

The socialist fraternity is standing guard over the interests of developing the entire revolutionary movement. A revolution even in a small country--Cuba, a neighbor of the citadel of imperialism, the USA--was able to withstand the desperate attacks of the enemies of socialism owing to the fraternal assistance provided by the USSR and other socialist states. Imperialist plans for exporting counterrevolution to other countries were foiled as well.

The forms of struggle in national liberation revolutions must not be made absolute either. Such revolutions are typified by great complexity, since they occur in

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countries with a multifaceted economy, with a diverse social structure, and with complex mutual relations between classes. The revolutionary process may be typified here by different trends--bourgeois, revolutionary-democratic, and anticapitalist. This generates a wealth of specific transitory forms differing from the previously evolved, habitual forms.

Unique Laws Are Inherent to War and Revolution

Wars--their arisal and nature--naturally depend on the socioeconomic and political structure of states. Wars fought today are rooted in the very essence of imperialism; however, given the existing balance of forces in the world, this law may go unrealized. War is not at all necessary to a transition from capitalism to socialism, but socialist revolution is an invariable prerequisite of this historic jump, since there is no other way to resolve the growing contradictions between labor and capital. Given the great uniqueness of socialist revolutions occurring in different countries, in general they follow common laws which necessarily take their course. These include the laws of breakdown of the state machinery of exploiters; establishment of some form of dictatorship of the proletariat, and the working class's assumption of a leadership role in union with other strata of the laborers; elimination of the exploiters as a class; socialization of the means of production and assertion of socialist relations in all spheres of life in the city and countryside; communion of the broad laboring masses with cultural valuables; defense of the revolutionary achievements of the laborers.

Believing war between states to be "a natural condition of society", imperialist ideologists declare revolution to be "a historic anomaly", "a disease of the social organism". References are made to the "anachronism of revolution" in a situation where capitalist countries have supposedly assumed a path of "self-modification" of their economies, which would allegedly smooth out class contradictions. Trying to represent what they would want as something that already is, the theorists of the monopolist bourgeoisie assert that there are supposedly no grounds for a progressive world communist revolution.¹² Such statements are decisively refuted by the swiftly developing revolutionary process in the world, and the continual growth of the successes of the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism. And this is obvious to all who can view the facts soberly. Even bourgeois authors are sometimes forced to admit that today's attempts by imperialism to crush the revolutionary movement by the most modern resources--helicopters, napalm, war gases, electronic devices--are entirely comparable to the attempts of dominant classes in the time of Marx and Engels to disperse the revolutionary movement from the streets with the most up-to-date military equipment of that time. The repressive efforts of imperialism are making the revolutionary struggle even broader.

Consequently, being social phenomena, war and revolution are not necessarily in a cause-and-effect relationship.

2. The Mutual Influence of War and Revolution

Naturally, we cannot examine revolutionary processes in isolation, abstracting them from other social phenomena, including wars between states. The difference between an interstate war and revolution does not preclude dialectically flexible, mobile,

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multifaceted, and deeply contradictory mutual relationships between them. Wars have a certain influence on the development of the class struggle and on maturation of the revolutionary situation, while in turn, revolution may influence the course and results of a war.

Wars between states and coalitions, and especially world wars, influence social revolution in two ways. On one hand they may hasten the ripening of a revolutionary situation, while on the other hand they may retard and encumber attainment of a revolution's goals.

Let us examine the mutual influence between interstate war and socialist revolution.

An aggressive, unjust war fought between exploiting states sometimes acts as a unique catalyst of revolutionary processes. It causes dramatic aggravation of all of the socioeconomic contradictions of capitalism, and creates a situation promoting the highest possible mobility of political mutual relations between classes. Engels' prediction concerning the prospects of the proletarian revolution in the event of a world war were truly prophetic. "...this war," Engels wrote almost a quarter of a century prior to its arisal, "must either lead to the immediate victory of communism, or it must shake the old order of things so much and leave such a heap of ruins behind itself that existence of the old capitalist society would be even more impossible than before...."¹³ A devastating world war, Engels predicted, would shake the bourgeois states in their mundane state wisdom to such an extent that crowns would line the sidewalks by the dozens.

World War I did in fact evoke the most profound revolutionary mood in the masses, making it inevitable for them to overthrow the yoke of capital by revolutionary means, and pronounce final sentence upon the social institutions which had lost their viability. The events and results of World War II had a tremendous revolutionizing influence upon many countries, all the more so because not only aggressive, reactionary but also liberational, revolutionary forces participated in it.

War can hasten the ripening of objective and subjective preconditions of socialist revolution in view of the fact that, first, it unmaskes the true policy of the classes of exploitation, bares its antipopular nature, and promotes deepening of the crisis in leadership. The conflict becomes especially acute between the people and the government of a capitalist state when an unjust war fails to produce victory. In these conditions the government is unable to lead its country out of crisis, it bounces from one extreme to another, and it exhibits nervousness and confusion. The leaders lose their former capability for managing and controlling the country.

Second, during a war an imperialist government finds itself more dependent upon the people than in peacetime. Tremendous masses of laborers clothed in military uniform receive weapons which they could direct against their oppressors. Such was the case in Russia at the end of World War I, when owing to the mass agitation and organizational work of the bolsheviks in the army and navy, many soldiers and seamen rose against Czarism. The masses of soldiers and seamen in imperialist armed forces also acquired a revolutionary spirit as the officer caste schooled in a militarist spirit, begins to erode due to increasing war losses in these armies.

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War tears away the propagandist mask of peace from the aggressive policy of imperialism, and it constricts its possibilities for maneuvering. The contradiction between militant ideals and the experience of the masses becomes graphically evident as never before. In modern conditions the opposition laborers display toward the militant policy of imperialism is intensifying even more, inasmuch as the existence of the resources of war is a mortal danger to hundreds of millions of people.

Third, war aggravates social antagonisms, heaps new woes upon the laborers, and deepens the contrast between the continually growing greed and profits of the bourgeoisie and the declining standard of living of the people. As the war grows longer and becomes more acute, bourgeois governments are forced to stir up the masses; the latter, however, assume a road undesirable to the bourgeoisie under the influence of the growing social contradictions.

Even a local aggressive war fought by imperialist states has a tangible effect, aggravating the class contradictions within a country. Highly indicative in this regard are the internal political consequences of the USA in the war it fought in Vietnam. The aggressive nature of this war and the tremendous outlays on arms intensified the tendency in American society to oppose militant policy. In addition to other causes, the war deepened the crisis of the currency system, caused further inflation, and required the freezing or cutting of the real wages of the laborers. The tax burden increased. Even bourgeois press was forced to admit that the empire of the American dollar was bogged down in the swamps of Vietnam.

Militarization and the arms race in imperialist countries in peacetime is also promoting aggravation of social antagonisms. Inflation had elicited serious upheavals in the world capitalist economy. It had reached proportions never before encountered in peacetime, directly due to the constantly growing military expenditures in the West. Attempts by imperialist states to fight inflation and simultaneously increase military budgets is the same as pressing the accelerator of a car with one foot and the brake with the other, using the figurative expression of a reviewer of the American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Becoming more acute in the course of an unjust war, crisis phenomena make the historic process more dynamic, since ever-larger numbers of the populations of the Western countries are drawn into the turbulent whirlpool of social life. It becomes increasingly clearer that capitalism is an obstacle in the path of socioeconomic progress.

Fourth, war has an influence on the way class forces regroup in an exploiting state. It promotes changes in the country's sociopolitical situation which create an objective possibility for a decisive attack upon capitalism by the laborers. The political awareness of the masses broadens, and they unite about their revolutionary advance guard--the working class. Thus the political consciousness and organization of laborers of capitalist states grew noticeably during World War II. The sympathies of the working class, the peasantry, and progressive intelligentsia in many countries of the West turned to the side of truly patriotic Marxist-Leninist parties, which consistently and selflessly defended the interests of the peoples. This was clearly confirmed by the significant increase in their ranks. In comparison with 1939, as of 1 September 1945 the number of communist parties increased from 61 to 76, and their membership increased from 4 million to 20 million persons.¹⁴

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And on the other hand, the classes of exploitation discredited themselves even more in the eyes of the laborers. They were directly to blame for World War II. Many bourgeois officials in fascist-occupied countries who had assured the masses of their "patriotism" before the war and slandered the communists, proved themselves to be out-and-out traitors and servants of the Nazi invaders. Bourgeois politicians--conspirators in the Munich agreement--did a great deal to encourage Nazi Germany to attack the USSR, the bulwark of the whole world's revolutionary forces.

During the time of the USA's aggressive war in Vietnam a tendency for isolated protests of the masses to transform into purposeful movements revealed itself distinctly in imperialist states. The base of antimonopolist demonstrations widened. Dissatisfaction with the military-industrial complex even revealed itself among certain segments of the dominant class. Indicative in this regard is a statement by Professor K. Boulding, former president of the American Economic Association: "The U.S. Department of Defense is doing major harm to the economy of the United States: It is reducing domestic consumption...and channeling the resources of growth into the rat hole of competing weapon systems.... War industry is a cancerous tumor in the body of American society. It possesses its own model of growth. It is a system that is practically independent, and in fact it is objectively hostile to the welfare of the American people, even though it represents itself as their protector."¹⁵

The war in Vietnam was an accelerator but not the initial cause of the political crisis of imperialism. This crisis is based on the insoluble internal contradictions of capitalism, which cannot exist without oppression and exploitation, without expansion in the international arena. This heavy burden is constantly sensed by the laborers of imperialist states. More and more people in the world of capital are beginning to understand that the path of social progress can be shown not by bourgeois ideologists and not by various sorts of opportunists and revisionists, but by proponents of Marxist-Leninist teachings.

In a situation where the axis of political life is noticeably shifting leftward in a number of developed capitalist countries, despite active opposition by imperialist reaction, communists are enjoying growing possibilities for mobilizing the popular masses for an active struggle against military danger and for social progress.

Fifth, war promotes political awakening of not only the population of imperialist states but also the personnel of their armies.

Of course, military service in imperialist armed forces is viewed in the West, not without grounds, as the most favorable period for brainwashing. Through drill, bribery, and deceit, militants are trying to "reshape" the young in the army "mold", correct the results of the "harmful influence" exerted upon them by progressive organizations, and shut off the channels of influence of democratic society upon the military masses.

The army of an imperialist state continues to be an instrument of monopolist bourgeoisie, and the driving force of the reactionary machine's suppression of the laboring masses. However, the division of class forces is inevitably reflected in it as well. Conditions favoring defection of soldiers and seamen to the side

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of the revolution and development of the class struggle in the army and navy arose in Russia right during World War I. Engels' prediction of a day when soldiers under arms will refuse to kill their own brothers and fathers came true. Such preconditions will inevitably arise in a certain situation in modern imperialist armies as well. It is, after all, a fact that even in the armed forces of the citadel of capitalism--the USA, the social unreliability of servicemen is typically growing, as was especially manifested under the influence of the USA's reactionary war in Vietnam. In the words of the journal NEWSWEEK, this war became "poison in the veins of the American army."

Some military servicemen transferred from Vietnam to other regions of the globe, including West Europe, carried a spirit of mistrust and rebellion with them. Visiting the USA, in a number of cases they actively participated in antiwar campaigns. In spring 1971 Washington witnessed demonstrations by war veterans on the background of strikes by American laborers, a rise in the movement against racial oppression, and intensification of public protest against the dominance of the military-industrial complex. About one and a half thousand former privates, sergeants, and officers came to Washington from almost all states of the country, and set up camp at the very foot of Capitol Hill. Its stone steps were littered with orders and medals dropped by veterans--government awards for participation in the dirty war in Vietnam. The tumultuous speeches of the veterans were political in nature. Their slogans contained appeals for a struggle against the aggressive force of imperialism.

Accelerating political maturation and revolutionization of the masses in certain cases, an unjust war also creates tremendous difficulties in this respect. In a military situation a reactionary government imposes an even more rigid regime upon the country, strengthens its military and bureaucratic apparatus, offers free rein to unofficially supported reactionary organizations for terrorist actions against laborers and the liberation movement, and organizes reprisals against revolutionary and democratic forces.

Thus in one fell swoop World War I cancelled out all of the socioeconomic and political achievements of the European working class, achieved within the framework of a bourgeois democratic structure. Wartime punitive laws were enacted throughout, and the entire state apparatus of physical violence was put into action. In World War II, not only states of the fascist bloc but also the countries they occupied were contained by the bonds of military despotism.

In a state of war, imperialist rulers try to transform every factory, every institution and city, and the country as a whole into a barrack. Political repressions, military despotism, and application of cruel punitive measures make revolutionary activities difficult and encumber communication of the working class with the broad masses. Conditions favoring revival of opportunism arise in imperialist states in response to increased political reaction. Regular workers recruited into the army are replaced in production by petty bourgeois elements infected with opportunism, avoiding mobilization. Compromise parties and trade unions become active, making political deals with the bourgeoisie and speculating on the national chauvinistic feelings of ideologically immature people. Imperialist governments support them.

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A danger of another sort arises as well. In an atmosphere of dissatisfaction of the masses, growing protest against the yoke of militarism may create the appearance of a revolutionary mood taking the form of leftist adventurism.

All positive and negative aspects of the influence of war upon development of the revolutionary process in a concrete historic situation are strictly accounted for in the strategy and tactics of communist and workers parties.

Attempts by exploiting classes to distract, by unleashing an aggressive war, the attention of laborers from the internal political crisis, to separate and stupefy the masses with chauvinistic and nationalistic demagoguery, to exterminate the advance guard of the working class, and to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat could produce certain results for a little while, but in the end these attempts suffer failure. Efforts to contain revolutionary forces by the chains of war inevitably return like a boomerang to hurt the militants themselves. This is a specific manifestation of the general trend in development of class-antagonistic society--the law of inconsistency between the content of a goal and the practical results of activity. This inconsistency, which is less tangible in the immediate future, begins to have an ever-stronger effect with time. Exploiters invariably pay a high price for their antipopular political actions. Counting on the assistance of soldiers to suppress the revolutionary movement, imperialists themselves promote subversion of their own system of domination, contrary to their own plans.

As we can see, the influence of war upon development of the class struggle and upon ripening of the revolutionary situation can vary. It is also extremely important to keep in mind the reverse influence revolution has on war as a social phenomenon. The influence of a victorious socialist revolution is especially profound.

Great October plucked Russia out of the bloody abyss of World War I and initiated new international relations based on the principle of peaceful coexistence between states having different social structures. Peoples-democratic and, later, socialist revolutions in a number of countries of Europe and Asia in 1944-1945 promoted acceleration of World War II's conclusion. Formation and continual reinforcement of the fraternity of socialist states created a powerful obstacle to the aggressive policy of imperialism. Today, through the united efforts of the socialist fraternity and all other forces defending peace, we can prevent world war. A real possibility for excluding world war from the life of society long before socialism's total victory on earth will arise as a result of further growth of the forces of socialism and peace. The triumph of socialism on our entire planet will conclusively eliminate the social and national causes of all wars. "It is the historic mission of communism to do away with war and to confirm permanent peace on earth."¹⁶

With formation of the world socialist fraternity, socialism found itself in better conditions in which to dictate, to the world bourgeoisie, both the form of the struggle and the "battlefields" of peaceful coexistence between states having different social structures. War could do tremendous harm to the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the laboring masses, and to the effort to build socialism and communism.

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Back in the 1880's Engels approached, using Lenin's words, the prospects of a socialist revolution occurring simultaneously with a European war "with doubled caution". Believing fully in the victory of the socialist revolution, Engels at the same time cautioned that war would cause starvation, epidemics, and universal savagery.¹⁷

Modern war involving the use of the latest weapons would lead to even more-destructive consequences than any war of the past. We have no doubt that were they to initiate a new world war, the imperialist aggressors would themselves perish in its flames--the people would no longer tolerate a system which perpetually draws them into devastating wars. They would sweep imperialism away, and bury it forever. However, war would also annihilate a significant proportion of the productive forces, cause losses in the working class that would be difficult to replace, and retard the movement of the people toward communism, since it would take a long time to rehabilitate the economy, culture, and human resources. Communists are making the most serious political conclusions from this, since the end goal of socialist revolution is not simply to overthrow capitalism at any cost, but to build communism. Lenin's conclusions that "peace, no matter what its form, will provide an avenue for our influence that is a hundred times larger and wider"¹⁸, and that a policy of peace can "increase the propaganda power of our revolution by a hundred times"¹⁹ are especially important today.

Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence between states having different social structures is not an advertising gimmick: It is constantly being implemented by our party's realistic, scientifically grounded foreign policy course. It reflects the interests of the whole world's laborers and the interests of the entire world revolutionary process's development. This principle has transformed into a real force of international development.

Being a class policy in terms of its principles and goals, the policy of peaceful coexistence in no way signifies "freezing of the sociopolitical status quo"; nor is it in any way "an aid to capitalism", as left-wing revisionists assert. Answering these assertions, L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "...every revolution is mainly the natural result of the internal development of the given society. Even life itself refutes the fiction of 'freezing'. It would be sufficient to recall the great revolutionary transformations that have occurred in the world in the last few years."²⁰ Our party stands firmly on the positions of proletarian internationalism and solidarity in the struggle of peoples for their liberty and social progress, and against all forms of capitalist exploitation and colonial oppression.

A revolutionary path without wars is not reformism, it is not rejection of revolution, and it is not social partnership of the proletariat and bourgeoisie; instead, it is a fierce class struggle requiring flexibility, firmness, and decisiveness from Marxist-Leninist parties. It is not demobilization but mobilization of the masses, it is isolation of both right-wing opportunists and "left-wing" sectarians and dissenters. Peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems does not mean making the peaceful forms of socialist revolution absolute in a particular country, "it has nothing in common with the class world, and it casts not even the slightest doubt upon the sacred right of oppressed peoples to use all means in the name of their liberation, going as far as armed struggle."²¹

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In the conditions of peaceful coexistence, the major battles of the working class can lead to fundamental revolutionary social transformations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 32, p 99.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 3, p 74.
3. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, p 353.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 26.
5. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 7, p 86.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 9, p 212.
7. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 17, p 649.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 304.
9. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 4, p 331.
10. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 17, p 635.
11. "Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional v dokumentakh. 1919-1932" [The Communist International in Documents. 1919-1932], Moscow, 1933, p 59.
12. Tucker, P., "The Marxist Revolutionary Idea," New York, Norton, 1969, p 170.
13. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 22, pp 259-260.
14. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, p 660.
15. Cited in VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 4, 1971, p 21.
16. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 58.
17. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, p 361.
18. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 247.
19. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, p 191.
20. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 33.
21. "K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [The 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Report Abstracts of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 41.

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CHAPTER VII

WAR AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

The relationship between war and social progress has always occupied an important place in social theory and in the ideological struggle of different classes. It has become especially important today. Never before has the direction of human society's development and its historic future troubled people so deeply as today, in the atmosphere of an acute historic struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism, in the conditions of a most profound scientific-technical revolution. "The memory of the bitter lessons of the first and second world wars, and the awareness of the terrible consequences to which the use of nuclear weapons could lead," said L. I. Brezhnev at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, "commands the people of our planet to action so as to prevent a tragedy of unprecedented proportions in the history of mankind."¹

1. The Criteria of Social Progress. A Criticism of Antiscientific Viewpoints on the Role of War in Social Development

In the past, history marched forward through eras of an unusual abundance of wars. In the modern era world development is also accompanied by numerous wars and military conflicts. Thoughts about former days and our desire to understand the present and envision the future demand that we subject the problems of social progress--especially including its influence on various wars--to deep scientific analysis. The effect wars have on social development is quite obvious. However, the complexity and contradictory nature of this effect at the time of existence of antagonistic classes have produced the most diverse points of view in this regard.

Marxism-Leninism and its conclusions on the laws, sources, and motive forces of social development are the theoretical and methodological foundation of a scientific understanding of the relationship between war and social progress.

As a rule the ideologists of the classes of exploitation confuse and distort the mutual influence between war and social progress. It should be considered in this case that the relationship of one class or another to progress depends on the objective role which this class plays in the given stage of history. During the time of its ascending development, the exploiting class would only partially accept the idea of progress, though at least it did accept it. Later, however, in the descending phase of its existence, it typically rejected or made a distorted interpretation of the essence of social progress, since the idea of forward motion of

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society is fundamentally incompatible with the fundamental interests of historically obsolete social forces. This resulted in the arising of numerous conceptions interpreting social life as reverse motion from a "Golden Age" or as a chain of repeating social events following a circular course.

Social pessimism is especially typical of the modern ideologists of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The English historian A. Toynbee, for example, rejects the unity of world history and the progressive nature of its development.² At the same time Western ideologists naturally cannot ignore the universally obvious swift progress enjoyed by the fraternity of socialist states, or the progressive transformations occurring in many Third World countries. Therefore they do everything they can to distort the criteria, the motive forces, and the essence of social progress.

First of all the theorists of the classes of exploitation reject the objective nature and historic necessity of society's progressive motion. Interpreting history subjectively, bourgeois sociologists and politicians try to prove that capitalism is supposedly undergoing renewal and rejuvenation, and that possibilities for a new upswing have not been exhausted. They invent conceptions that forward these notions: "a state of universal prosperity", "capitalist revolution", "popular capitalism", and "postindustrial society". Incidentally, revisionists have also adopted these terms.

Western authors usually adopt some single factor as the criterion of social progress: the degree of development of reason, morality, science and technology, cultural development, growth in welfare, and so on.

One of the forms of distorted interpretation of the essence and motive forces of social progress is associated with an explanation of its mutual relationship with war. Among the numerous viewpoints on this issue, two extreme lines can be traced distinctly. One of them is represented by proponents of the "theory of violence" which glorifies war as supposedly the decisive cause of historic development, of progress in culture, science, and technology, and of improvements in social forms and relations, and of man himself. The other interprets all wars as an absolute evil, and a hindrance to social development.

Both of these lines have, at their gnoseological foundation, treatment of certain factors as absolute in the complex and contradictory influence of war upon different aspects of social life. In the social aspect, the first line expresses the interests of the warring militant forces of exploiting states, while the second as a rule expresses the viewpoints of "moderate", liberally predisposed circles of the society of exploitation.

Both of these lines appeared long ago, when wars appeared, and they have persisted in various manifestations until the present. There is no need for peering deep into history to demonstrate the traditional nature of both viewpoints. It would be sufficient to recall that the ideologists of the nascent bourgeoisie, especially enlightened philosophers of the early bourgeois revolutions, tried to raise their voices against war, and to condemn it as a barbarian vestige incompatible with human reason. But when the bourgeoisie transformed into ruling class, theories glorifying violence and war began to be disseminated actively.

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Militarism acquired distorted, but hardly less malicious, antihuman forms and manifestations in the ideology of modern imperialism. As an example it was quite recently in the West that notions of the acceptability and even usefulness of a nuclear missile world war were openly and broadly disseminated. The well-known American sociologist H. Kahn not only asserted that such a war is inevitable, but he also predicted formation, as a result of a third world war, of "an ordered and flexible international system" which could supposedly become a useful instrument for reinforcing peace on earth. What he had in mind here was that this "instrument of peace" would operate under the control of the USA, which, in his opinion, would win with an annihilatory nuclear blow.

Although many imperialist politicians and ideologists have been forced to recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures and recognize the need for preventing nuclear war in the face of the new balance of power in the world, the continuing growth of the political, economic, and defensive power of states in the socialist fraternity, the rise in the authority of their purposeful peace-loving foreign policy, and the successes of the international workers and national liberation movements, a militant ideology and policy and reliance upon military force in international relations continue to be typical of reactionary imperialist circles. Aggressive war is still an instrument of the foreign policy of imperialist states.

Conceptions justifying and even substantiating the need of wars to avert new socialist revolutions or to "hurl back" victorious socialist revolutions are still present in modern bourgeois ideology, pluralistic in its manifestations. Moreover certain political scientists, futurologists and other Western theorists continue to glorify nuclear war with the help of various contrivances.

From time to time officials in the capitalist camp pronounce militant declarations. Thus despite existence of a Soviet-American treaty to prevent the threat of nuclear war, at the eve of the concluding stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975) J. Schlesinger, then the secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense, declared the possibility of using nuclear weapons "for the purposes of defending West Europe", the possibility of "limited nuclear war" and, finally, that the USA was in a position to be the first to use nuclear weapons, including for the objective of "making selective strikes on the Soviet Union."³

It is not difficult to see, behind these and other similar notions that militarists are trying to justify war and the arms race, confuse the consciousness of the masses, and distract them from their struggle against the threat of a destructive nuclear war. These notions clearly reflect the interests of the most reactionary, adventuristic circles of monopolist bourgeoisie and the military-industrial complexes of the imperialist states. A decisive and successive struggle against various manifestations of modern militant ideology and policy continues to be an important task of all Marxists-Leninists, of all champions of peace, democracy, and socialism.

Abstract pacifist viewpoints representing all war as some sort of demoniacal force leading to "the end of civilization", "the death of world culture", and "degeneration of the human race" also have an antiscientific nature. Exploiters and militants find such notions useful as well, since they can weaken the will and resolve of the masses in their struggle against the armed violence of their oppressors. This makes

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it necessary to maintain a clear, strictly differentiated class approach to the various pacifist trends, to concretely analyze their content in the specific stage of history within a particular country, and to actively encourage all enemies of war to fight effectively for peace on earth.

Rejecting antiscientific conceptions, Marxism-Leninism reveals the objective criterion of social progress, and the real role played by wars in the fate of nations.

Social progress is a general sociological category reflecting and representing the ascending, forward motion of society as a whole and of its individual aspects, phenomena, and processes. The concept of progress is opposite in content and meaning to the concept of regression, meaning movement on a descending line, decline, and degradation.

Progress is a natural attribute of mankind's history. Society has traveled a long and hard road from the lowest forms of its existence to increasingly higher forms. This road could be fully understood only if it is approached dialectically, "with constant attention to the general interaction...of progressive changes and regressive changes."⁴

A natural historic process of supersession of different socioeconomic formations is the most important attribute of progress in society. Each of these formations, superseding one another throughout history, represented a new step in society's progressive development.

The most profound causes and motive forces of social progress, and its criteria are rooted in the conditions of the people's material life, in the means the society uses to produce material goods.

The problem of the criteria of social progress is a complex problem, and it cannot be boiled down to some single yardstick. But the productive forces of society have the leading role. Lenin called development of productive forces the highest criterion of social progress.⁵ That social formation which raises productive forces to a higher level and promotes higher labor productivity is more progressive. "Labor productivity is, in the last analysis, the most important to the victory of the new social structure. Capitalism achieved labor productivity never witnessed in land-owning society. Capitalism can be conclusively vanquished and will be conclusively vanquished because socialism is creating a new, much higher labor productivity."⁶

However, productive forces do not exist in and of themselves. They are inseparably associated with production relations, which define the social nature and orientation of development of productive forces. This is why together with productive forces we also include, in the system of criteria of social progress, the productive relations and the sociopolitical structure the latter bring into being, one offering the broadest room for the creativity of the revolutionary class, the bearer of social progress. In our days the main direction of mankind's social progress, the 25th CPSU Congress noted, is development of the socialist countries, growth of their power, and intensification of the beneficial influence of their international policy.⁷ Through their high ideals and enormous practical achievements

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in the name of the welfare of laboring people, the socialist states are having an increasingly deeper and stronger influence upon the entire course of world history.

A scientific solution to the problem concerning the criteria and principles of social progress permits us to correctly approach an assessment of the role and place of social progress in war. Being a continuation of the policy of particular classes and states through violent means, war organically includes itself within the development of antagonistic society, and it influences social progress and its pace and forms in an active and contradictory fashion. War expresses the contradiction between social progress and socioeconomic formations of exploitation, in which antagonism permeates throughout all relations and all aspects of their development. "Without antagonism, there can be no progress," wrote Marx in a discussion of a society of exploitation. "Such is the law that has been followed by civilization to the present day."⁸ Development at the expense of the popular masses, and at the price of their suffering--this has been the tragic nature of progress through the millenia of class-antagonistic society's existence. Using Engels' words, "history is perhaps the cruelest of all goddesses, driving her chariot of triumph over mountains of corpses not only in war but also at times of 'peaceful' economic development."⁹

The force and orientation of war's influence on social progress are not always the same: They depend on many social factors. Among these factors, the most important are the nature of the era, the economic and social structure of the warring states, the alignment of class forces within them and in the world arena, the socio-political content of the war, the weapons employed, the severity and duration of the war, its scale, and so on.

2. The Influence of Different Wars on the Nature and Pace of Social Development

The classicists of Marxism-Leninism examined the role of war in history from two basic aspects: the general sociological aspect--that is, in the sense of a broad assessment of the influence of war, as a social phenomenon, on all spheres of social life, and the concrete historic aspect--from the standpoint of revealing the influence of a particular war on social life.

When viewed from the general sociological aspect, the role of wars in history is very complex and contradictory, as was noted earlier. On one hand wars always bring disaster and suffering to people. They are accompanied by the annihilation of the society's productive forces, and mainly its principal productive forces--people, and considerable amounts of material valuables. War, Marx wrote, "is, in the purely economic respect, equivalent to a nation discarding some part of its capital into the sea..."¹⁰

The negative influence of war made itself strongly felt in the very early stages of social development, when "a single devastating war was enough to depopulate a country and annihilate its civilization for hundreds of years."¹¹ This trend grew constantly broader as the scale and severity of social conflicts increased and as the power of weapons grew. Wars brought devastation, starvation, and epidemics with them, they led to mass migrations of the people, and they disrupted the established way of life and the rhythm of population dynamics. It is impossible to precisely compute the human and material losses suffered by society throughout all history due to wars.

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On the other hand given all of the costs, destruction, and misery of wars, in a certain situation they may in some way accelerate the course of history. War often leads to the annihilation of the old and opens the way for the arisal, consolidation, and development of the new, the progressive. "In the same way that mummies disintegrate instantaneously when exposed to the atmosphere," Marx said in a descriptive comparison, "war hands down a death sentence to social institutions that are no longer viable."¹²

Understandably, these general premises on the contradictory influence of wars on social progress are not enough to fully answer the question as to their role in social development. For this purpose we would need to thoroughly analyze each separate war and give it a concrete historic assessment.

V. I. Lenin provided us with a deeply scientific, concretely historic approach to assessing the social role of different wars. In his work "Socialism and War" he wrote: "Socialists have always condemned wars among nations as barbarian and atrocious. But our relationship to war is fundamentally different from that of bourgeois pacifists (proponents and prophets of peace) and anarchists. We differ from the former in that we understand the inevitable tie between war and the struggle of classes within a country, in that we understand the impossibility of doing away with war without doing away with classes and creating socialism, and in that we fully recognize the lawfulness, progressiveness, and necessity of civil wars--that is, wars fought by an oppressed class against the oppressor, by slaves against slave-owners, by serfs against land-owners, by hired laborers against the bourgeoisie.... There have been many wars in history which, despite all of the horrors, atrocities, calamities, and torments invariably associated with all war, were progressive--that is, they benefited the development of mankind, helping to destroy especially harmful and reactionary institutions...."¹³

As we can see, the concepts of a war's progressiveness or reactionary nature (regressiveness) are socially conditional, reflecting the actual policy of each of the warring sides (classes, states), either aimed at promoting social progress (liberation of laborers from social and national oppression, defense of progressive achievements, and so on), or serving the interests of parasitic, dominating classes. "The method of Marx," wrote Lenin, "entails, first of all, consideration of the objective content of the historic process in a given concrete moment, in a given concrete situation, with the objective of, first of all, understanding the movement of the class serving as the mainspring of possible progress in this concrete situation."¹⁴ The true orientation of a policy may be determined with scientific accuracy. "...by what characteristics do we judge the real 'intentions and feelings' of real personalities?" Lenin asked, and he replied: "Understandably, there can only be one such characteristic: the actions of these personalities; and since we are discussing only the social 'intentions and feelings', then we should also add: the social actions of personalities--that is, the social facts."¹⁵

These social facts persuasively tell us that any war fought by the laboring masses in behalf of their liberation from social and national oppression, in defense of their revolutionary achievements, and against the aggression of reactionary classes and states is a just war, a war of liberation. And on the other hand, wars unleashed by imperialist reaction with the objective of suppressing revolutionary forces, enslaving other peoples, and seizing alien territories are unjust wars. A reactionary, predatory war cannot be just, and an unjust war hinders the progress of history. The most just wars of our time are wars in defense of the achievements of socialism.

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V. I. Lenin always associated the progressiveness of war with its justice, and vice versa. He said: "...wars can be just and unjust, progressive and reactionary, they can be fought by progressive classes and by backward classes, they can serve to reinforce class oppression and they can serve to overthrow it..."¹⁶ Lenin's premise, as stated above, is a profound sociological generalization of the history of wars. It is valid in relation to wars of all eras, irrespective of the nature of the weapons and equipment employed. Following this premise, Marxists-Leninists condemn predatory imperialist wars; they believe wars in the defense of socialist achievements against imperialist aggression, wars for national liberation, and wars fought by revolutionary classes to repel attempts by reactionary forces to retain or restore their domination by force of arms to be just wars, and they support them.

Whether a war is progressive and just, or reactionary and unjust is a function of history. Most typical of the era of capitalism before monopolies were, on one hand, bourgeois-progressive and national-liberation wars pursuing the goals of liberating nations from foreign oppression and forming national states and, on the other hand, the reactionary wars of feudal landowners for the preservation of obsolete absolutist monarchies and institutions hindering historic development. In this case the progressiveness of the bourgeoisie was historically limited even then, since under certain conditions bourgeois progressive wars transformed into reactionary wars, as had happened, for example, with the Napoleonic wars.

The historic orientation of bourgeois wars changed fundamentally under imperialism. Their goal became a struggle to reapportion the world, for world domination, and against the growing revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonies and dependent countries. The bourgeoisie transformed conclusively into a reactionary class.

The historically most progressive class that has consistently fought for social progress was and remains the working class, the proletariat. Its ideals are consistent with the objective laws of social development and with the fundamental interests of all laborers. This is why wars of the working class and its principal offspring--the world socialist system--have such a just and progressive nature.

The aggressive, unjust wars of imperialism assumed an especially barbarian character in the modern era. One such reactionary and devastating war was that of fascist Germany against the USSR, prepared by world imperialism with the goal of liquidating the world's first socialist state, enslaving the peoples of the Soviet Union, and hindering the victory of revolutionary forces in other countries. Suffering the brunt of the struggle against fascism, the USSR surmounted improbable difficulties. Many other states--members of the anti-Nazi coalition participating in the defeat of fascism during World War II--also suffered considerable adversities. The sinister consequences of the war can still be felt today in many countries.

Countless cases of imperialism's barbarianism fill the history of wars fought in the 1950's-1970's, and mainly the reactionary war of the USA in Vietnam. Imperialism will resort to all crimes in its attempt to preserve or restore its position in the most diverse regions of the world. Fighting against social progress, it tries to capitalize on the best scientific-technical achievements of modern times.

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A concentrated expression of this trend can be seen in the preparations for a nuclear missile war against the socialist countries, a war which imperialist reaction has still not dropped from its plans. Such a war, which would be reactionary on the part of imperialism, would become the greatest tragedy of all mankind--it would create the danger of the extermination of hundreds of millions of people and destruction of multitudes of centers of civilization and culture, and it would threaten the existence of entire peoples and states.

If contrary to common sense and the will of the people imperialist reaction does nevertheless unleash a world nuclear missile war, the peoples of the socialist fraternity and all progressive people on earth will fight in this war for the rescue of not only the achievements of socialism but also of all world civilization, and for the complete annihilation of imperialism--the source of wars and exploitation of peoples. The war would doubtlessly be just and progressive on their side, since under these conditions they would have no choice in the struggle for mankind's brilliant future except to decisively defeat the imperialist aggressors.

A nuclear war would slow down the procession of the people toward their bright future--communism, but it would not put a halt to it. The worldwide victory of communism is historically inevitable. "The monopolist bourgeoisie cannot deter the immutable course of historic development even with nuclear arms."¹⁷

Progressive wars are always a measure forced upon the laboring masses and classes, they are the response of the latter to the violence of reactionaries and exploiters. On its own, progress has no need of wars, since it is a natural process of supersession of the old by the new, and its roots lie in development of the means of production, in continual improvement of productive forces. But inasmuch as reaction resorts to war in order to defend historically obsolete social relations, the laborers' armed defense of their rights and achievements becomes a prerequisite of the forward movement of society. Wars fought by laborers have the objective of removing, from the road of social progress, the obstacles erected through the military violence of reactionaries.

Of course, progressive wars involve death and destruction as well. However, in the first place society makes these sacrifices in behalf of lofty, noble goals, and in the second place such wars are waged only when there is no other way forward, when the reactionary classes themselves go to war.

Understanding the severe consequences of a world nuclear war and its danger to the fate of peoples and countries, the Soviet Union and other socialist states consistently and steadfastly follow a policy of peace and security of nations. Actively fighting for relaxation of international tension, they concurrently maintain high alertness in relation to the aggressive intrigues of imperialist reaction. The political, economic, and defensive power of states in the socialist fraternity has been and continues to be the most important social factor in the struggle to avert a new world war.

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FOOTNOTES

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2. See "Istoricheskiy materializm i sotsial'naya filosofiya sovremennoy burzhuazii" [Historical Materialism and the Social Philosophy of the Modern Bourgeoisie], Moscow, 1960, p 174.
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5. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 16, p 220.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 21.
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8. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 4, p 96.
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11. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 28, p 211.
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14. Ibid., pp 139-140.
15. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 1, pp 423-424.
16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 337.
17. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 35.

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PART TWO

THE MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL FACTORS OF MODERN WAR

CHAPTER VIII

THE LAWS GOVERNING THE ARISING, COURSE, AND OUTCOME OF WARS

Rooted in the very nature of class-antagonistic formations, wars arise and develop in concrete conditions according to certain laws. However, this process is not automatic. Certain social systems prepare for it consciously and purposefully. The laws governing the arising, course, and outcome of any war reflect the activities of classes, parties, armies, and individual people aimed at achieving political goals dependent, in the end, on economic relations. These laws reflect the nature and the unique features of the warring sides, and the nature of the era in which the wars are fought.

The modern era, which is typified by fundamental social changes, an ongoing shift in the balance of power in favor of socialism and democracy, and a profound scientific-technical revolution, has imparted new traits to the laws of war, and modified the forms of their manifestation. Consideration of this is a necessary prerequisite of the socialist army's successful fulfillment of its patriotic and international duty.

1. The Essence and Features of the Laws of War

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army provides the sole correct interpretation of the laws of war. It is directly opposite to the viewpoints of the ideologists of imperialism, together with their idealistic philosophy and their social purpose of justifying the reactionary policy of monopolist bourgeoisie. Imperialist ideologists view war either as a chaotic set of random events for which no laws can be revealed, or as a phenomenon following biological, psychological, or other laws having no social essence. Evidence of this can be found in the anti-scientific assertions of many bourgeois sociologists and military historians and theorists on the origin, course, and outcome of World War II. What they essentially do is try to prove that the arising of World War II supposedly had no relationship with imperialism, with its economic conditions, policy, and ideology, and instead that the victory of the Soviet Union and other progressive forces over the fascist bloc was allegedly an accident.

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Analysis from the standpoint of dialectical imperialism would lead to the conclusion that no matter how diverse wars might be, no matter how complex and contradictory the armed struggle is, and no matter how variegated its other phenomena might be, war follows certain laws.¹ This was emphasized many times by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism.² It has been persuasively confirmed by history. Thus the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War was the result of the action of such laws. This victory was the necessary product of the superiority of the socialist social and state structure, the socialist economy, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of our society, Soviet patriotism, the friendship among the peoples of the USSR, the unity of the people about the Communist Party, the latter's wise leadership of the entire struggle against imperialist aggressors, and the immeasurable heroism and bravery of the Soviet people. The great victory over fascism was also insured owing to the superiority of Soviet military science and art of war.

The laws governing the arisal, course, and outcome of wars have traits common to all social laws, and at the same time they do have specific traits. They possess common traits because war is a state of society, and by its essence it is a continuation of the policy of classes and states. War does not interrupt politics; instead, it is their continuation, but in a different, altered, violent form. Use of the resources of armed conflict and placement of priority on such conflict alters the course of social processes, their pace, their nature, and so on. Owing to this the laws of war possess specific traits, ones inherent only to them.

The laws of war reveal themselves in the significant, necessary, and recurring ties and relationships between different sides and elements of war viewed as a process, ties and relationships determining the origin, function, development, and outcome of this process. They bear an objective nature in the sense that their action does not depend on the will and desires of people; wars always begin and proceed under certain circumstances. While these laws are objective, this does not mean that they are divorced from human activity. In war, as in the history of society in general, laws cannot manifest themselves in any way other than through the conscious activity of people. Engels turned his attention to this aspect of the problem. He wrote that "People endowed with consciousness, proceeding thoughtfully or under the influence of passion in the pursuit of particular goals, act in the history of society. Nothing is done here without conscious intent, without a desired goal."³ As a result of the collision of the numerous intentions and desires of people, an infinite number of intersecting forces, an infinite group of parallelograms of forces takes form, and from this intersection emerges one resultant. This resultant is a historic event.⁴

In application to the question at hand, this means that the practical purposefulness of the activities of popular masses, classes, parties, armies, and, of course, individuals in war create the conditions and forces through which the laws of war act. If we consider that war embraces all areas of a society's life--economic, political, ideological, and mainly military, then the laws of war associate the phenomena and processes of different spheres, ranging from material to ideological, and from physical to spiritual and psychological. It follows from this that not only material but also spiritual factors serve as the substrate for the action of the objective laws of war. Moreover inasmuch as the morale of the popular masses and the troops, and the will and knowledge of the people are factors of war and an

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important aspect of it, the objective laws may manifest themselves as relationships not only between the material factors of war but also between the spiritual forces acting within it, between material and spiritual forces both of the two warring sides and within each of them. Thus the subjective factor occupies a different place in different laws of war, playing a different role.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is also based on the premise that because the laws of war are associated with the practical activities of masses, classes, armies, and individuals, we can gain an understanding of these laws and reflect them in concepts.

Basing ourselves on Lenin's well known premise that "coming to understand a law is one of the steps of man's cognition of the unity and cohesiveness, the mutual dependence and integrity of the world process,"⁵ we can say that the scientific laws of war are a step in cognition of the objective ties inherent to war, a unique logical construct reflecting war. The deeper and fuller we understand and utilize the laws of wars, and the broader the knowledge of them is spread among the masses, the more effectively the socialist fatherland is defended. One premise stated by L. I. Brezhnev concerning economic laws pertains fully to the laws of war: "It would be wrong to think that only the great scientists and leaders need be concerned with economic laws. These laws, when they are understood correctly, dictate the logic of the behavior of not only an administrator, an engineer, a scientist, or a technician, but also every common laborer and kolkhoz farmer."⁶

The laws of war known to us are accounted for in the party's military policy; they are expressed in the military doctrine of the socialist state, they serve as the basis of military science, and they lie at the foundation of the principles of warfare and the activities of the command and all personnel of the socialist army. Without such a foundation, military labor would be reduced to simply hoping for a favorable meeting of circumstances, and reliance upon chance.

The ties and relationships existing between political classes and states and the resources of violence they use in war are recurring and stable in different historic periods of the evolution of antagonistic formations. The ties and relationships between productive forces and the military-technical aspect of war, and between production relations and the sociopolitical content of war are just as stable and recurring. In turn, stable ties and relationships depending on the degree of correspondence between production relations on one hand and the level of development and nature of productive forces on the other always evolve between the military-technical and sociopolitical aspects of war. Antagonistically contradictory forms of relationships between the sociopolitical and military-technical elements of war are inherent to a society of exploitation. These forms do not always stay the same. As a rule they reflect different degrees of incorrespondence between the war goals of an exploiting state and the interests of world social progress.

By establishing stable and recurring ties in war, we document its subordination to certain laws, which are then analyzed by science and reflected in its concepts. Science reveals the essence and the difference of the laws of war from other social laws. The unique features of the laws of war are embodied in the very uniqueness of war, which is a product of the use of violent resources in the interests of state policy. This unique feature can be seen mainly in the alteration experienced

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by the social life of the warring sides: An armed struggle assumes priority, and other forms of struggle, while they do not lose their independence, change their orientation--they now serve the armed struggle primarily. Therefore the laws of war represent an antagonistic process in which we see a competition between annihilation of the opponent's forces and preservation of one's own, a process that undergoes continual quantitative and qualitative change. And all of this happens in the effort of each of the dueling sides to achieve mutually exclusive political and military goals.

Consequently the laws of war express that sphere of social development in which violent interaction between warring classes, states, and coalitions occurs in behalf of their political and military goals. Specific forces, resources, and goals of the struggle make up, in their sum total, the unique features of the laws of war. One of them is the extreme mobility and variability of the elements, the motive forces of war viewed as a system. Being an open system, war, and mainly its specific manifestation as an armed struggle, is especially dependent upon a broad range of factors, both natural and social. A tremendous number of different circumstances constantly thrust themselves into the phenomena and processes of war; on becoming part of the content of war, they make their impression on it.

Thus given the unchanging nature of the war in Vietnam--a just, progressive war of liberation on the part of the Vietnamese people and a predatory, unjust, reactionary war on the part of American imperialism and internal reaction of South Vietnam--its course depended on, in addition to other conditions, the time of year and the locations of troops in the jungles and along river valleys; the influence of American aviation played its role--massive aerial bombardment of peaceful objectives in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and in liberated regions of South Vietnam, the "processing" of millions of hectares of agricultural land and forests with toxic chemicals, the use of napalm and electronic resources, and so on. However, despite all of this, imperialism suffered failure, and the Vietnamese people emerged victorious.

Under other spatial and temporal circumstances of the war in the Near East in October 1973, we also observed recurrence in the action of certain dependencies, such as: between the political goals of the war and the relationship of the popular masses and the world public to them; between the morale of the army and the effectiveness of its actions on the battlefield; between the quantity and quality of the troops on particular axes and in certain sectors of the front and the results of their actions, and so on. This means that essentially the same laws of war operate in different wars, but they manifest themselves differently in accordance with the concrete conditions, each time in another form.

The next unique feature of the laws of war is the extreme degree of contradiction in the mechanism of their action. World history cannot be interpreted in any way as something that "marches smoothly and punctually forward"⁷; zig-zags and even giant leaps backward may be possible in it. Zig-zags and backward leaps are encountered in war more than anywhere else. History has never known a more or less lengthy and intensive war in which one of the sides enjoyed nothing but victories, even when its advantage over the enemy was undebatable. This pertains primarily to all levels of armed struggle viewed as the principal element of war--the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

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In the course of armed struggle, various social institutions--the social and state structure and various institutions of the superstructure--are tested. By its specific nature, an armed struggle is directed at annihilating all of these institutions on the enemy's side and, on the other hand, at reaffirming one's own. In war, especially today, serious harm is done to material culture and to productive forces. People perish, cities, towns, factories, and plants are destroyed, and the environment is altered. In this sense war, more than any other social process, is typified by destructive tendencies that have an unfavorable influence upon historic development. But in addition, as was noted earlier, wars may benefit the development of mankind, if especially harmful and reactionary institutions and regimes are consequently annihilated.

Owing to the use of weapons and military equipment, the rate of change experienced by many social phenomena may be found to be higher in a time of war than in a peaceful situation. This imparts uniqueness to the combination of the motive forces of war. The more diverse they are, the more specifically the laws defining the course and outcome of a war manifest themselves.

In addition to clarifying the essence and unique features of the laws of war, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army reveals the forms of their manifestation.

Studying the laws of capitalist production, Marx noted that they represent trends which operate with iron necessity.⁸ Developing this idea, Engels demonstrated that although they are implemented with iron necessity as well, economic laws on their own "are not at all iron laws, being on the other hand very flexible...."⁹ As an example the price of each commodity is not directly equal to its value. Owing to fluctuations in demand, supply, and other factors, the prices of commodities fluctuate around their true value, and they usually do not coincide with it. The law of value "sets" the price of commodities only on the average, in general.

The situation with the laws of war is similar, though not identical. They cannot be categorized as dynamic laws expressing the nature of ordered processes--the dependence of some elements in such processes upon others is rigid. As an illustration we can cite the movement of the planets of the solar system, viewed as an independent entity. Nor can the laws of war be categorized as statistical laws expressing random, chaotic processes (for example the thermally-dependent movement of molecules associated with numerous chance occurrences--the laws of thermodynamics direct the movement of an aggregate of molecules, but not that of each of them taken separately).

Ordered and chaotic--these are two opposite types of processes, between which lies an entire range of intermediate states. Moreover chaotic processes are often self-ordering, and ordered processes can become chaotic.

War consists of ordered processes made up of numerous constant and variable elements (variables). The latter are not rigidly interdependent. A tremendous quantity of manpower and resources are used in war to achieve political and military goals. Events recur in war (though they do not recur simply), there are many different possibilities bearing differing probabilities, and a significant role is played by random events--recurring, statistical, individually unrepeatable, and so on. Thus the laws of war reflect its complex and contradictory nature, they show us that the development of war is a general result of many factors, and therefore these laws

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manifest themselves in terms of what we call statistical probability. They function as average, general laws, as trends. Manifesting themselves in this fashion, the laws of war define the orientation of the activities of people, they govern their actions, and they express the depth and scale of changes occurring in the course of a war.

2. A Classification of the Laws Governing the Arisal, Course, and Outcome of Wars

The Marxist-Leninist definition of production relations, which make up the foundation of a socioeconomic formation, is the methodological basis for concrete examination of the laws of war. Lenin emphasized that "every such system of production relations is, according to the theory of Marx, a special social organism with special laws of its origin, function, and transition into a higher form, of transformation into another social organism."¹⁰ What Lenin is referring to here is genetic laws, ones controlling the arisal of social systems, and the laws of their function and development.

Genetic laws express those objective relationships which lead to the birth of one phenomenon or process and change or elimination of another. As an example the arisal of a new system of social relations or of a new socioeconomic formation is associated with these laws. On the other hand the laws of function reflect the relative stability of this system and the laws of development reflect its variability, its transition from one state to another.

Such an approach is also applicable to analysis of war as a structural system in which we see the interaction of material and spiritual factors, and of objective, subjective, and other relationships. War follows the entire set of laws--genetic, structural-functional, and developmental, and it embodies the dialectics of their mutual relationships.

The action of genetic laws defines the arisal of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon, and it reflects society's transition from one state (peaceful) into another (warlike). By their nature, the laws governing the arisal of war are sociological and historic. They have their roots in the essence of antagonistic formations, and they exist as one aspect of the entire set of economic, sociopolitical, and ideological relations present in a society of exploitation. The laws governing the arisal of war are recurrent, stable, necessary, and significant relationships evolving in antagonistic socioeconomic formations. The same elements which we see in sociological concepts and categories--means of production, policy, classes, government, and so on--appear in their mechanism.

The laws of the arisal of war are a unique expression of the antagonistic contradiction seen in the process of history. They are a reflection of the action of forces interested in resolving social problems by force of arms.

As an example laws governing arisal of World War II are essentially the laws governing development of capitalism at its highest and last stage, at the stage of imperialism, in the conditions of an ever-deepening general crisis of capitalism. "World War II did not arise suddenly; it matured over the course of the two decades separating it from the end of World War I. The general crisis of capitalism deepened and all of the economic and social contradictions of capitalism grew in acuteness during these years."¹¹

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World War II was the natural product of keener capitalist competition in the international economic market, of the political contradictions between the principal imperialist states, of greater nonuniformity in their economic and political development, of the excessive acuity and intensity of the struggle between monopolies, of their merger with the state and subordination of the latter to their interests, and of growth in all forms of reaction in the capitalist world. The war reflected intensification of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and the desire of imperialism to suppress the revolutionary movement. It was needed by reactionary imperialist circles in their attempts to strangle the planet's first socialist country--the USSR, and in their desire to achieve world domination.

Wars, using Lenin's words, arise "out of the same soil of imperialist relations and the mutual relationships of a world economy and world policy."¹² This pertains to both world and local wars, and armed conflicts. Being a concentrated expression of economics, the policy of imperialism focuses within itself all of the causes and factors giving birth to war.¹³ However, the mechanism of action of these causes and factors, and consequently of the laws of war, varies. While having a common source lying within a structure of exploitation, concrete wars and military conflicts come into being not just any time but only in the presence of a certain alignment of class and political forces, in response to certain activities of these classes and political forces, and at a certain level of development of internal and international contradictions.

Today the acuity of antagonistic contradictions, the nonuniformity of economic and political development of imperialist states, and the desire of aggressive circles to eliminate socialism, to strangle the international workers movement and the struggle of national liberation of peoples make up the objective basis for the probability of a given war. Whether a war arises or it is prevented, however, depends on the nature and purposefulness of social forces interested in the given war on one hand, and on the opposition offered by forces fighting against this war on the other; it would also depend on a number of additional circumstances as well. If the contradictions become so acute that they must be resolved, the forms and methods of the resolution would depend on the equality achieved in the functions of political forces. The simultaneous influence of contradictions and of different political forces and social trends interested and not interested in war, which superimpose over one another, leads either to the start of war or to its prevention.

Inasmuch as ideological elements are contained within the mechanism of manifestation of these laws, intentional preparations for war have their roots in more than just material elements. Such preparations are associated with a number of sociopolitical, moral-psychological, and ideological factors, upon which they rely and which they utilize as the conditions of war. Conditions only make the action of causes possible. They create an alignment of forces that would be advantageous or disadvantageous to war, and a situation that is more convenient or less convenient to military action--that is, they predetermine the concrete form in which a war arises.

The operation of laws governing arising of wars is also associated with various sorts of random events which usually serve as the grounds for starting a war. Random events always have secondary significance, but their influence may change

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significantly. The actions of reactionary imperialist forces aimed at maintaining and aggravating tension in international relations make random events play a larger role in the arisal of war. We know that the cold war climate, the atmosphere of militant psychosis and the incitement of terror in the face of the "Red threat", fabricated by the proponents of a "preventive strike" against the socialist countries, broadened the stage for manifestation of random events capable of leading to world war. This danger was deepened by presence of nuclear missiles in the hands of aggressive circles. As the reserves of nuclear missiles rise, the probability of various chance events increases.

After evoking a concrete war to life, the laws governing arisal of war give way to laws which can be classified as structural-functional laws and as developmental laws. They define the course of the war as a particular social system.

The fact that war does not interrupt the previous policy of classes and states (coalitions), and that it is instead a continuation of this policy by different, violent means, signifies that all of the social laws do not stop operating in a war. This is primarily true of the most general sociological law: The means of material production predetermine the social, political, and spiritual processes occurring in general. Economic laws, the laws of the class struggle in antagonistic societies, and laws regulating the political and spiritual life of states and peoples continue to function. If socialist society is compelled to enter a war, its laws and its motive forces will continue to operate as well.

In addition, exercise of the policy of classes and states by violent means, and the consequent transition of society from a state of peace to a state of war, are associated with change in the ways all laws of social development manifest themselves, with change in the role each one of them plays, and with manifestation of new laws that operate only at times of war. Lenin emphasized that "class contradictions that tear the people apart will continuously exist and manifest themselves in wartime, in war, in the attributes of war."¹⁴ Other forms of social relations in warring states also continue to exist and begin to manifest themselves with warlike attributes. Consequently the laws of social life also continue to function with warlike attributes. The duel between the sides, the competition of their material and spiritual forces, makes an imprint on the way these laws manifest themselves.

Arisal of a new system of relations between states and peoples during war signifies the action of a certain system of laws differing from those of peacetime, ones which have come to be called the laws of the course and outcome of a war. The most important of these is the law of the dominant role of the political goals of war. "The nature of the political goal has the decisive influence upon the conduct of war..."¹⁵ wrote Lenin in his commentary on the book "On War" by Clausewitz. This law influences all aspects of war, since policy predetermines the nature of war, and its essence. The degree to which military violence is used, the scope and severity of the armed struggle, and the nature of the life of the states and the alliances of coalitions depend on political goals.

Policy determines: the order and power of strategic and operational thrusts at the enemy, and the steps to be taken in strengthening alliances within one's coalition; the general strategic plan of the war, having the objective of the fastest possible

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defeat of the enemy, or a protracted struggle leading to the enemy's exhaustion. After the strategic possibilities are considered, policy is structured depending on the rate and intensity required of military actions, and on the forces and resources that must be mobilized in order to achieve the objectives. In this case not only is policy based on the goals of the given war, but it also takes account of the objectives of postwar reconstruction, and it subordinates these objectives to the conduct of the war.

During a war, the opposing states act in accordance with their political goals. As an example the unjust, aggressive, reactionary policy of fascist Germany in World War II was predetermined by its adventuristic blitzkrieg strategy and barbarian tactics. On the other hand the just, revolutionary policy of the USSR was the product of the progressive, scientific nature of our military strategy and the decisive but concurrently humane actions of the army. This policy was what unified all of the forces of the Soviet people and mobilized them to repel the enemy.

The law named above is organically associated with the law of the defining role of the relationship between the material and spiritual forces of the warring sides. Quantitative and qualitative indicators of the relationship of these forces predetermine the possibilities of the sides for conducting the war and for winning it, the duration and costs of the war, the feasibility of the political and military goals, and so on. This law manifests itself in the fact that, first, the relationship between material and spiritual forces is the result of preceding development of the states and depends on the goals of this development, and second, it in turn draws the boundaries of the activities of the dueling classes, states, and coalitions, and the limits of their choice of goals and decisions. Reflecting the state of the economy and science, and the level of moral-political and ideological factors, this relationship of forces predetermines the basic direction in which the objective processes of war will unfold, their probable rate, the forms they take, and their results. The action of this law was confirmed by the victory of the USSR and other progressive forces over fascist Germany and militant Japan in World War II.

The law of the defining role of the political goals of war and the law of the defining role of the relationship between the forces of the warring sides influence the main characteristics of a war: its sociopolitical nature, and its dynamics (course and outcome). Because the action of each of these laws intertwines closely with the other (the political content of a war has an influence on its outcome and on the relationship of forces, while in turn, the latter influences the political content and goals of the war), both of these laws are essentially two facets of another, more-general law--the basic law of war. This is the law of the defining influence of the political content of a war and the relationships of the forces of the sides upon the nature, course, and outcome of the war.

And in fact, on their own the political goals (and, equally so, the relationship of forces) do not predestine the course and outcome of a war; they simply manifest themselves in the actions of the masses and troops and in military and political leadership. The laws of war and development of military affairs may be understood only if all of the factors listed here are accounted for. It stands to reason that the military and political goals and the relationship of forces are not independent in each concrete moment; instead, they are predetermined by concrete, objective causes: economic, moral, sociopolitical, scientific, and specifically military, as well as by the conditions (geographic, meteorological, and others) in which

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the war proceeds. The basic law allows us to reveal the general, highly complex trend of the war, to see its deep ties with the laws of the dueling social systems better, and to reveal more fully the significant premise that every concrete act of war (battle, engagement, operation, and so on) is characterized by its own political goals and its own relationship of forces. The basic law of war can be categorized simultaneously as a structural-functional and a developmental law.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching also concerns itself with more-concrete laws of the course and outcome of a war, implied by the basic law of war. They include, for example, the law of the dependence of war on the relationship of the economic forces of the warring states (coalitions). This law reveals to us that the possibilities of the dueling sides, the organization of the troops and the state as a whole, and that the methods of the war depend on economic preconditions, as do victory and defeat. The economic possibilities of warring states (coalitions) reflect themselves generally in the economic potential (factor), which is predetermined by the possibilities of material production, the economic system of the society, and its political structure. The capacity states (coalitions) have for satisfying the material demands of society and producing the required weapons depends on the level and nature of productive forces and on the degree to which they correspond with production relationships. This dependence expresses itself in the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment produced, which in turn determines the scale of the military actions, their nature, and the war strategy. This law revealed itself clearly in the first and second world wars, as well as in local wars of the modern era.

A qualitatively new relationship between economics and the course of military actions revealed itself in wars of the 20th century, especially the world wars. While in the wars of previous centuries the material needs of the armed forces were satisfied basically with previously accumulated weapons, military equipment, and other materiel, mobilization of all industry, transportation, agriculture, and all material resources was found to be necessary for victory over the enemy in the first and second world wars. The favorable outcome of war depended in many ways on how effectively the existing economic possibilities were utilized to initiate massive, continually growing arms production and to maintain military-technical superiority over the enemy.

Presence of nuclear missiles today significantly increases and complicates the dependence of victory and defeat on the relationship of economic forces. Were imperialism to unleash a nuclear missile war, it would require maximum exertion from the national economy, a high rate of development, high mobility, high viability, and sensible geographic distribution. The relationship between the material resources of war and human resources, the reserves of raw materials and energy, and so on will have tremendous significance. In turn, these relationships will depend on the nature of the social and political structure. The experience of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland, and mainly the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, demonstrated that the socialist means of production has enormous advantages over the capitalist means in providing the resources of conflict to a war.

Closely tied in with the law above is the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relationship of the scientific potentials of the warring sides. Scientific and technical achievements influence the military power of a

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state, the fighting power of its armed forces, and the fate of the war through the methods and forms of preparation and conduct of the armed conflict, and its support with new military equipment, weapons, and other materiel. Science, and primarily materialized science, influences the spiritual world of a war's participants. In the situation of the present scientific-technical revolution, in which science has been transformed into a direct productive force, into an important factor of social progress, and in which it is penetrating more and more deeply into all spheres of social life, maintaining superiority in scientific potential is acquiring extremely important significance to victory over the enemy.

Great is the role of the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relationship of social and moral-political forces and possibilities of the warring states (coalitions). It manifests itself in the influence the social and state structure of the warring sides, the social structure of the society, the relationship between class forces, and the nature of institutions of the superstructure has upon the course and outcome of the war. This dependence of war on social and moral-political forces and on the possibilities of the warring states (coalitions) was stated in general form by V. I. Lenin: "In all war, victory depends in the final analysis on the morale of the masses which shed their blood on the field of battle."¹⁶ In modern warfare, where states representing opposing social systems possess a large arsenal of powerful weapons, the role of social and moral-political factors in achieving victory over the enemy grows significantly.

The level and state of social possibilities and of the moral-political forces of the people and army are predetermined by the nature of economic relations, the social and state structure, the ideology dominating within the society, and the political goals of the war. The more fully these factors reflect the fundamental interests of the popular masses and the demands of social progress, the higher is the morale of the people in the army and the greater are the possibilities for victory in war. The ideological, moral-political, and psychological preparedness of the masses has a significant influence on moral-political forces. The superiority of the moral-political forces of the socialist countries is the product of the truly popular nature of their state government, their socioeconomic structure, their scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the consistent policy of the communist and workers parties. Socialist states fight only just wars of liberation, which multiplies their spiritual strengths.

The law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relationship of military forces (potentials) of the dueling sides operates on the basis of the laws indicated above, and in organic unity with them. The economic, moral-political, scientific, and specifically military possibilities of the warring states (coalitions) are focused in the relationship between their military forces. Victory and defeat in war, its course, and its final outcome are associated with the relationships between the fighting power of the armed forces and the possibilities of military mobilization of the opposing sides.

Thus all significant processes of war are governed by laws of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the political goals, the relationship of economic, scientific, social, moral-political, and specifically military forces and possibilities of the war's participants. Because different forms of struggle are employed in a war, and because each of them develops according to both general and intrinsic laws, the laws of armed struggle (military actions) play a special role.

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Discussing military actions, Engels emphasized that "After the order for military actions to begin is issued, military movements at sea and on land subordinate themselves no longer to the desires and plans of diplomats, but to their own laws, which cannot be violated without endangering the entire expedition."¹⁷ Marxist classicists devoted great attention to the laws of the armed uprising (the art of the offensive, creation of superiority of forces, operational leadership of an uprising, mastery of the technique of an uprising), which is a variant of armed struggle in general, and which at the same time subordinates itself to its own unique laws. These premises are still significant today. A conclusion formulated by Lenin in his description of the 1905-1907 revolution has fundamental significance to our understanding of these premises: "In order to assess the revolution in a truly Marxist way, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, we would need to assess it as a struggle between living social forces placed in particular objective conditions, acting in a particular way, and employing particular forms of struggle with greater or lesser success. To the Marxists, an evaluation of the technical aspect of the struggle, its technical issues, would be pertinent and, moreover, necessary following such analysis and, naturally, only on the basis of such an analysis."¹⁸

The laws of armed struggle predetermine the scope and nature of military actions, the forms and methods of their conduct, the basic direction of the armed struggle's development, and its results. These laws primarily include the law of the dependence of armed struggle on military goals, and the law of the dependence of armed struggle on the relationship of the fighting power of the troops of the dueling sides. In the final analysis, military goals derive from political goals. They are embodied in strategic and operational objectives, in the type of troop groupings employed, in the succession and directions of strikes on the enemy, in the interaction between arms and services, in the support given to the troops, and so on. The law of the dependence of armed struggle on the relationship of the fighting power of the troops expresses an objective trend in the struggle's development in favor of the side which is superior. However, this does not exclude the possibility that in certain cases the side with the lesser fighting power may win. An advantage in fighting power creates only a possibility for victory, which must still be realized. The main role is played in this by the artfulness of the commander, and by the conscious and competent activities of all personnel.

Another law of armed struggle is the dependence of the effectiveness of troop combat activity on the correspondence of the forces and resources and the methods of their application to the set goals (missions) and to the evolved situation. In modern wars, where swift and often sudden changes in the situation have become the rule, it is important to employ tactics which correspond to the fullest not only to the situation that has already evolved, but also to those goals and that situation which may be foreseen.

The influence of the goals and resources of armed struggle on its methods and on the results can be seen especially clearly today. Appearance of nuclear weapons and the latest military technology has naturally produced a change in the methods of military actions. Victory is directly dependent today on whether or not the army possesses a sufficient quantity of modern weapons, mainly nuclear missiles, and whether or not it possesses adequately trained commanders and common soldiers

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capable of assimilating and effectively using modern weapons, and competently finding and utilizing the suitable forms of military actions.

Armed struggle is also subordinated to the law of correspondence of military actions at different levels (correspondence of tactical to operational, operational to strategic, and strategic actions to the overall course of the war), and of mutual dependence of these actions. As the resources of armed struggle develop, changes also occur in the nature of mutual relationships existing between military actions at different levels. While in former times actions at the tactical and operational levels always set the stage for the strategic results, in modern war involving the use of nuclear missiles against the enemy's vitally important economic, political, and military objectives, strategic military actions acquire the decisive role in relation to the military actions of lower scale and to the war as a whole.

There is great significance to the law of the unity of troop military actions in time and in space in terms of achieving certain military-political goals. This law expresses the significant relationships arising in the pursuit of a common goal by different arms and services, during military actions on land, at sea, and in the air.

Another law of armed struggle is nonuniformity of the distribution of forces and resources in the troop combat formation (tactical order of battle). This law manifests itself practically as the principle of concentrating the main efforts of the troops in the decisive sector or on the decisive axis. Lenin turned his attention to this law. He wrote: "Having an overwhelming preponderance of forces at the decisive point in the decisive moment is a 'law' of military success which is also a law of political success..."¹⁹

Viewing the laws of war as a system, we should note that the areas of their action are not all the same. There are laws having the entire war as a social phenomenon as their sphere of action. Other laws manifest themselves only in armed struggle. This is a consequence of qualitative differences in the relationships inherent to each of the levels of the war process. However, all laws of war influence war not in isolation and not independently of one another, but as a certain combination, exhibiting certain mutual relationships.

The laws of war predetermine the outcome of a war by the simple fact that they govern the course of a war. This pertains chiefly to the most general laws, those operating within the sphere of action of armed forces, classes, and popular masses. In addition to these laws, laws expressing the historical inevitability of triumph of the new over the old manifest themselves and operate in war. Important among these is a law stating that from a historic perspective, victory belongs to that side which represents a new, more-progressive social and economic structure and which effectively utilizes the possibilities inherent to this structure. Marx pointed this out earlier in his analysis of war in the period of feudalism's supersession by capitalism, which was a more-progressive structure in comparison with the preceding socioeconomic formation. This premise, that the new will naturally be victorious over the old, is all the more valid in relation to wars fought in the defense of socialism, which has opened the road to liberty and happiness for all peoples, and promoted unprecedented all-out social progress.

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Examining the principles of the victory over Kolchak during the foreign military intervention and civil war in Russia, Lenin made the extremely important theoretical conclusion that "From a historic standpoint, that class which can lead the popular masses wins."²⁰ He emphasized that victory in war belongs to that side which enjoys the advantage in reserves, in the sources of power, and in the moral qualities of the masses. The action of this law was brilliantly confirmed by the world-historic victories of the Soviet people in fierce battles against enemies of the socialist fatherland.

3. The Dependence of the Laws of War on History

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, which recognizes that war is subordinated to specific laws, also accounts for the fact that these laws are historically dependent, that they experience changes as social life develops. In a concrete historic situation some laws leave the stage while others come into being; laws that had formerly dwelled in the shadows moved to the forefront, and vice versa. Together with change in the phenomena of war, the ways its laws manifest themselves change as well, these ways may not be the same for wars of different types and forms (for example in wars between imperialist states and in civil wars between the proletariat and bourgeoisie).

As an example the transition from feudalism to capitalism significantly "amended" the conditions for the arising and conduct of wars, and consequently the action of the laws of war. These changes were associated with formation of new economic and sociopolitical relations, and with creation of a new army and new technical resources for the conduct of military actions. Describing such processes in the time of the French bourgeois revolution, Lenin wrote: "In the same way that the people of the French Revolution exhibited a level of revolutionary energy which had not been seen for centuries, in the war of the late 18th century they displayed the same sort of tremendous revolutionary creativity, revamping the entire system of strategy, breaking with all of the old laws and customs of war, and creating, in place of the old troops, a new, revolutionary, peoples army and a new style of warfare."²¹

Later on, the way the system of the laws of war manifested itself changed in connection with capitalism's attainment of its last, imperialist stage, as a result of which the soil for arising of world wars was created. New important relationships began to operate between states contained within the same coalition, on the basis of world economic and political relations. These relationships became obvious as early as in World War I, but their intensity grew even greater and they acquired new traits in World War II. Moreover one of the coalitions of World War II--the anti-Nazi coalition--evolved out of states having opposing social systems, socialist and capitalist. The action of new motive forces and contradictions generated by the era, and consequently new laws made their influence fully known in the military duel between the coalitions.

New types and forms of war appeared in the modern era, and together with them new laws of war. These new laws displaced some which were not in keeping with the new conditions. Thus the system of laws of civil war applicable to the war between the proletariat and bourgeoisie in Russia could not remain at the same level as the system of laws applicable to, for example, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905,

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which was an unjust war on both sides. In contrast to the latter, an entirely different alignment of forces with special interests evolved in the civil war of 1918-1920: At one pole were the laboring masses headed by the working class, pursuing just, progressive goals, and the other pole was represented by the internal counterrevolution, actively supported by international imperialism. The goals of the young Soviet state's domestic and foreign enemies were unjust and reactionary. Intense military actions on the fronts were accompanied by the action of Red partisans in the rear of the White Guards and interventionists, and by sharp class skirmishes in the cities and towns. The troop strength of the warring sides changed quickly, and the relationship of forces was extremely dynamic.

"The goal of the civil war," noted V. I. Lenin in 1916, "is to take the banks, factories, plants, and so on, to annihilate every possibility of the bourgeoisie for resistance, to exterminate its troops. But this goal would be unattainable from a purely military, and economic, or a political point of view without concurrent introduction and spread of democracy through our troops and our 'rear' in the course of such a war."²² The leader of the Communist Party felt that for the proletariat to be victorious in the civil war, all democratic institutions and feelings would have to be used against the bourgeoisie. He emphasized that imperialist war "unites and 'molds' people into a coalition by means of coercion and financial dependence. We, in our civil war against the bourgeoisie, will unite and mold the people not by the force of the ruble, not by the force of the club, and not by coercion, but through voluntary consent, through the solidarity of the laborers against the exploiters."²³

The Communist Party competently directed the energy of the laborers toward the defeat of their enemies. It brought new motive forces into action and effectively utilized new laws of war.

Great October, which initiated a new era of history, also had an influence of unprecedented proportions upon the conditions of arising and conduct of wars. The birth and consolidation of socialism altered the relationship of forces in the international arena, raised the issue of a new type of relations between states, caused a fundamental change in the position of the classes, a change which defined the orientation of historic development, and altered the factors of warfare: a fundamentally new type of army was created, new relationships were formed between the front and the rear, and the people displayed powerful revolutionary creativity. A new revolutionary means of warfare was instituted in the war in defense of the socialist fatherland through the creativity of the people and their army. Typical traits of this new means of warfare include decisiveness of political and military goals, a firm line toward the total defeat of the enemy, highly aggressive actions, an offensive spirit, selflessness, and mass heroism of the socialist fatherland's defenders, monolithic unity of the army and people and of the people and party, and Communist Party leadership of the war.

The form in which the entire system of the laws of war manifested themselves became different as well. It would be sufficient to note that the ties existing between the front and rear in socialist and capitalist societies differ fundamentally, inasmuch as different social motive forces operate under socialism and capitalism. In a time of war, a socialist country transforms into a single military camp, welded together by the common goals of the whole people. Such unity is impossible in a bourgeois society, with its antagonistic contradictions.

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The relationship between the content of war, especially world war, and the basic traits of the era has deepened considerably, making the law of the growing role of the popular masses more intense in its action. In turn, the involvement of tremendous popular masses in war raises the role of the struggle between classes in capitalist states, of a closer combination of the national and international objectives of the proletariat, and of unification of the goals of national liberation with the social and class interests of the laborers. All of this has produced new factors in the action of the laws of war, which was demonstrated by the history of World War I, the civil war in Russia, and World War II.

Wars of the subsequent period were not an exception either. The war in Vietnam showed that nothing today can break the will of people fighting for their legal rights and enjoying support of countries of the socialist fraternity and all progressive mankind. The dependence of the laws of war on history was confirmed once again in the wars of the Near East. This can be seen mainly in the growing role of progressive forces, the nature of international relations, and the international climate witnessed at the end of local wars. The victory of one side and the defeat of another in a local war depend organically on the relationship each of these sides has to the corresponding international social forces, and on the general progress of resolving the issues of war and peace.

Formation and consolidation of the world socialist fraternity and continual change in the relationship of forces in the international arena in the favor of the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism are exerting a tremendous influence on the entire course of human society's development, including upon change in the conditions for the action of the laws governing arising of wars, world war primarily. This highly important factor restricts the possibilities of imperialism for implementing its reactionary policy by violent means even more. At the same time the dynamically changing relationship of forces in the world is also predestining change in the forms in which the laws of war manifest themselves.

The dependence of the laws of war on history expresses itself graphically in the change experienced by laws defining the methods and forms of armed struggle. This is understandable, since swift change in the material prerequisites of warfare and the significant changes occurring in the sociopolitical and ideological relationships between states and classes are having a direct influence on military equipment and weapons, and on the moral-combat qualities and strength of the troops. New methods and forms of armed struggle are not "a free creation of the mind". "...the influence of brilliant military leaders," Engels wrote, "is restricted in the best case to adapting the methods of warfare to new weapons and to new warriors."²⁴ In turn, new weapons and new warriors bring new methods of conducting military actions into being.

Swift development of the material conditions of warfare and improvement of military affairs are the product of swift growth of productive forces and scientific achievements. As a result we see the appearance of qualitatively new military technology and, together with it, new methods and forms of armed struggle.

Evidence of this can be found in World War II, during which the mass use of primarily tanks and aviation imparted tremendous scope, fluidity, and mobility to the armed struggle.

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The modern revolution in military affairs has had and continues to have a significant influence on the laws of war. Its principal influence is that of fundamentally and qualitatively changing the methods and forms of armed struggle and of war in general due to introduction of nuclear missiles and other modern military equipment. These methods and forms of struggle differ fundamentally from those existing previously, though many of the latter's characteristics and elements have been retained.

Change in the forms and methods of armed struggle depending on the level of military technology can be seen in any military action. The "mechanism" of this dependence can be described as follows: New military technology necessarily displaces old technology, but this does not occur right away, and for a certain time the old and the new coexist. At first the new technology is usually employed within the framework of the old methods of action, but on achieving a certain degree of perfection and on being stockpiled to a particular level, it begins to force a change in the methods of conflict. Old technology is not abandoned right away. It continues to have secondary functions for some time after, and its use is subordinated to the new methods of military action.

Such are the laws of the arising, course, and outcome of wars. They permit us to understand the extent to which the political and military goals forwarded by warring classes, states, and coalitions are consistent with their possibilities for conducting war and achieving victory, they permit us to see how wars are associated with the basic sociopolitical trends of historic progress, and they give us an indication of the decisive direction in the development of military affairs depending on the scientific-technical revolution, the general relationship between social forces, and other objective factors.

Change in the nature of socioeconomic and political contradictions, in the sources and conditions of war, and in the resources and methods of armed struggle inevitably elicits change in the objective laws of war. Careful consideration of these changes and deep analysis of the laws of war, the forms of their manifestation, and the principles of military development and art of war implied by them would be the most important prerequisites for successful fulfillment of the complex and important tasks of socialism's armed defense by Soviet military personnel.

FOOTNOTES

1. The categories "zakon" [law] and "zakonomernost'" [conformity with a law] are closely associated, and they have similar characteristics. The concept "zakonomernost'" is broader than the concept "zakon"; it expresses the general trend of a process, and the fact that a law lies at its basis. The category "zakon" is a concrete expression of a "zakonomernost'", and it is often used as a synonym of it. [To make things simple, I have chosen to translate both terms as "law"--*Translator*]
2. See for example Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 10, p 1; Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 34, pp 382-383.

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3. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, p 306.
4. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 37, p 395.
5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 29, p 135.
6. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 1, Moscow, 1970, p 383.
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 6.
8. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 23, p 6.
9. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 34, p 102.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 1, p 429.
11. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 1, Moscow, 1973, p viii.
12. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 27, p 418.
13. The causes of war were examined to greater detail in Chapter II.
14. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 41.
15. "Leninskiy sbornik XII" [Lenin Anthology XII], p 429.
16. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, p 121.
17. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 10, p 1.
18. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 17, p 43.
19. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 6.
20. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 351.
21. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, pp 79-80.
22. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 73.
23. Ibid., pp 73-74.
24. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 171.

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CHAPTER IX

A STATE'S MILITARY POWER, ITS MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL ELEMENTS

The course and outcome of a war are determined by the relationship between the forces of the warring sides. "Relationship of forces" is a general concept. It is given concrete expression mainly through the category "a state's (coalition's) military power". The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army analyzes the content of military power and its elements, and it reveals the ways the military power of a state forms in accordance with the basic trends of history, and development of the state itself and military affairs.

1. The Essence and Role of a State's Military Power

The concept "military power" is broadly employed in science. In bourgeois theory, this category has predominantly a military-technical nature, and in philosophical and methodological respects it is based on different types and degrees of idealism and metaphysics. Although many Western military theorists and sociologists include not only specifically military but also economic, political, and other factors in the concept of a state's military power, these factors are interpreted one-sidedly. Thus the explanation of military power is also generally incomplete and unscientific.

In opposition to bourgeois viewpoints, Marxist-Leninist science has developed a definition of military power based on dialectical materialism. It reflects a certain aspect of the social realities, and it is consistent with the laws of social development. According to this definition, military power is a phenomenon dependent, in the final analysis, on economic preconditions, while on the surface it is dependent upon social relations, state policy, and military strength itself.

Analyzing the nature of a state's military power, Engels turned special attention to the fact that in bourgeois society, the armed forces are in the hands of the exploiters, and not the proletariat.¹ The effectiveness with which military power is used was associated by Engels with the level of social development. He wrote that "The country enjoying the higher level of civilization receives the advantage in military respects...."²

V. I. Lenin also felt that the state at the higher level of social progress possesses objective advantages in the military area as well. On the eve of Great October, he wrote: "The defense capabilities and military power of a country with nationalized

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banks are greater than those of a country whose banks remain in private hands. The military power of a peasant country in which the land is in the hands of peasant committees is greater than that of a country of landlord property rights."³

Lenin assessed the military power of the newly-born socialist state in the difficult conditions of foreign military intervention and civil war with a consideration for the alignment of social forces and their activities, and new social relations determined (in the final analysis) by the level of development and nature of productive forces. He laid special emphasis on the dependence of military power on the activity of popular masses: "A country cannot be made defensible without exceptional heroism on the part of a people engaged in bold, decisively great economic transformations."⁴

Guiding itself by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the Communist Party developed the theory of military power and implemented it in the interests of dependably protecting the socialist fatherland against imperialist aggressors. In its creation and reinforcement of the military power of the Soviet state, the Communist Party accounted and continues to account for the nature of possible war and the military power of our allies and probable enemies.

Military power is commonly viewed in military science as the set of a society's real material and spiritual possibilities utilized by a class or the state with the purpose of waging war or completing other international and domestic tasks involving the use of armed force. Military power is embodied directly within the army of the state, within its capability for serving as an instrument of policy.

It is entirely obvious that the military power of different states may differ. This can be explained by the fact that one country may differ from another in its socio-economic and political structure, its material and spiritual potentials, the quantity and quality of its human resources, armament, and combat equipment, the size of its territory, and so on. Nor does the military power of the same state remain the same forever. Under different historic conditions it may either increase or decrease, and it may perform different functions depending on economic and socio-political changes occurring within the given country or in states opposing it. But despite all of this, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of military power are always socially dependent; military power has a social essence and role. While it is a variable, it does assume a sufficiently definite value at every concrete moment in time. Military power reveals itself the most fully in war. It is precisely at this time that the true magnitude and nature of military power reveal themselves, and that we begin to clearly see which of its elements are stable and which are unable to pass the test.

If we are to arrive at a scientific assessment of a state's (coalition's) military power, we would have to first of all reveal its class membership and the true purpose, function, and place it has within the system of social relations, as well as its dependence upon these relations.

Three types of a country's military power may be distinguished in accordance with the social nature of states of the modern world: 1) imperialist, 2) socialist, and 3) developing.

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The military power of imperialist states has a reactionary essence stemming from the social nature of imperialism. The basic traits of imperialism were described by V. I. Lenin. His evaluation also applies to the social essence of the military power of imperialist countries. Lenin wrote: "...imperialism..., due to its fundamental economic properties..., is distinguished by the least regard for peace and liberty, and by the greatest and universal development of militancy."⁵ Reaction in all respects is a political feature of imperialism, Lenin emphasized.⁶ Under imperialism, the capitalist state transforms into a committee controlling the affairs of the monopolist bourgeoisie, which has no wish to share political power with other classes. Concentrating economic domination and political power within its hands, it thus maintains a monopoly over the administration and military power of the country.

The following circumstances have a great influence upon the military power of imperialist states viewed as a factor of social life, and upon the nature and role of this power. First there is the deepening convergence of monopolies and the state administration, especially in the form of a military-industrial complex. Second there is the further increase in the reactionary nature of imperialism's foreign policy, which reflects a further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that the instability of capitalism is becoming increasingly more obvious.⁷ The crisis in capitalist economics has intimately intertwined with the political, moral, and spiritual crisis. All of today's realities confirm with new force that capitalism is a society without a future. Imperialism is trying to halt this universal crisis by reassuring its military-political blocs, intensifying the arms race, and activating reactionary policy. Activation of the forces of reaction and militarism is making growth of imperialism's military power especially dangerous. The facts show that the use to which imperialist states, especially the USA, have put their tremendous military power, both within their own countries and beyond, has a counterrevolutionary antihumanitarian nature.

Military power is used within imperialist states by the ruling classes to support and strengthen their domination, to crush the resistance of laborers struggling against exploitation and oppression, and to influence all strata of the population against the omnipotence of the monopolies.

The foreign policy role played by the military power of imperialist states has always expressed and continues to express their expansionist desires and their aggressive course in relation to other peoples and countries, mainly the socialist states. It is used mainly in the conduct of unjust, predatory wars. Thus in World War I the imperialist states used their enormous military power with the goal of reapportioning the already-divided world. Following the victory of the socialist revolution in our country, imperialism's military power acquired primarily an anti-Soviet orientation. During World War II the military power of states in the fascist bloc--the most aggressive striking force of imperialism offering the greatest danger to world civilization--was launched mainly against the Soviet Union, as well as against the common democratic achievements of other countries. Following World War II the military power of the imperialist states was aimed mainly against the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity, and against the international workers and national liberation movements.

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A typical trait revealing the social role of the military power of imperialist states in the present situation is unification of this power into a supernational entity. The power of different states had been combined in this way before, but never on such a scale and with such a social danger as today.

Unification of the military power of imperialist states is the product of their economic and political essence. It is simultaneously associated with the scientific-technical revolution and with the revolution in military affairs. In organizational terms, this unification expresses itself mainly as NATO and other aggressive imperialist military-political blocs. The combined military power of imperialist states is extremely great, and it is a great threat to peace and social progress.

The military power of imperialism is directly opposite in its nature and role to the military power of socialist states. In socialist countries, military power was transferred to the hands of the working class for the first time in mankind's history. As the socialist state underwent development, the degree of social control over this military power increased. Under developed socialism, military power is within the hands of all the people, with the working class playing the leading role.

Fundamental change in class control of a state's military power resulting from the victory of a socialist revolution predetermines a qualitative change in the role of this power--in socialist society it serves the progress of history.

From the standpoint of internal development of a socialist state, the latter's military power is used in the period of transition, in the period of dictatorship of the proletariat, to suppress the resistance of overthrown classes of exploitation attempting to take the power away from the laborers and restore a capitalist structure. Consequently the internal orientation of a socialist country's military power is a temporary phenomenon. After socialism is fully developed, only the external factor--imperialism and its aggressive policy--makes it necessary for the state's military power to continue to exist and function.

In light of the existing external conditions, the role of a socialist state's military power is to dependably protect the revolutionary achievements of the laborers and offer a decisive repulse to transgressions by imperialist aggressors. This is its principal and permanent mission, as substantiated by Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland. Even prior to the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin wrote that the victorious proletariat will have to be ready to wage a war in defense of the socialist fatherland, and that it will have to possess everything necessary for defense against the bourgeoisie of other countries.⁸

The military power of the socialist state, which was created by the Soviet people in the 1920's-1930's, found itself strong enough to perform its historic missions. It aided in the repulsion of fascist aggression, and in the defeat of the fascist bloc. Not only were the achievements of socialism preserved, but also the possibilities for socialism's development were broadened and the prerequisites for formation of a world socialist system were created. Today the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity possess forces and resources entirely sufficient to annihilate any aggressor who might dare transgress upon their revolutionary achievements.

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The military power of a socialist country is international in nature. This premise follows from the international essence of the socialist revolution, and from the unique features of the class struggle going on in the international arena.

The development of socialism and communism in individual countries is an international matter, as is its defense. If we are to strengthen our ties with international socialism, it is vitally important for us "to defend the socialist fatherland. He who scoffs defense of a country in which the proletariat has already won destroys his ties with international socialism."⁹ The experience of history shows us that the great military power of the socialist states is a dependable guarantee of the development of socialism in individual countries and in the entire socialist fraternity.

The military power of socialist states plays an important role in maintaining favorable international conditions for constantly enlarging the national liberation movement and insuring the progress of young developing states assuming a non-capitalist path of development.

The military power of the socialist states has the purpose of averting world war, preserving universal peace, and protecting world civilization. This is reflected by the new alignment of social forces in the international arena. The tremendous danger to the progress of history created by the military power of imperialism imposes special responsibility to mankind upon the socialist countries in their struggle for peace throughout the world. Being a resource of the policy of socialism's defense and of the policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures, the military power of the socialist states consequently guarantees protection of world civilization. L. I. Brezhnev said: "Our power is the bulwark of peace for all who fight against the threat of a new world war. Protecting socialism and peace, we protect the future of mankind."¹⁰

The great military power of the socialist countries, and mainly the Soviet Union, restrains the possibilities of imperialism for unleashing new aggressive local wars, and especially a world nuclear war. This is precisely why imperialism can no longer arbitrarily decide the fate of the world. The present level of the military power of states in the socialist fraternity, which is high enough to restrain any aggressor, forces the ruling circles of the imperialist countries to assess the world situation and the trends in international relations more realistically. In their policy, they are forced to reckon with the evolved balance of power in the world arena.

There is a significant amount of theoretical and practical interest in clarifying the essence and functions of the military power of developing states. The purposes served by the military power of these states can be conditionally subdivided into three groups depending on the level of sociopolitical development, the nature of the political regimes, and the domestic and foreign policies of these states.

The first group includes the military power of countries in which political rule is in the hands of revolutionary democrats closely associated with a growing working class and with the peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie. A number of these countries maintain a socialist orientation. Military power is used by them to defend their national independence against imperialist aggressors, and to insure society's progressive economic and sociopolitical development. Among such states we can name Algeria, Angola, Yemen, and others.

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The second group is made up of the military power of countries in which political power is concentrated in the hands of a national bourgeoisie generally occupying anticolonial positions. In these states the military power is intended, in terms of its external function, for defense of state independence. Within the country, however, it may be used for antipopular purposes, especially at times of aggravation of the class struggle between laborers and exploiters. This is typical of some states of South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The third group includes the military power of developing countries in which the political power is maintained by a bloc consisting of right-wing groupings of national bourgeoisie and land-owners which maintains close ties with international imperialism. The military power of these states is usually used as a means for implementing reactionary policy both within the country and outside it. We can cite as an example South Korea, which was a coparticipant in the aggression of imperialist states against the peoples of Indochina. This group of developing countries also includes a number of states in Latin America.

The military power of developing countries is an important social force. The balance of power on earth and the successes enjoyed by the champions of peace and security in all the world and of prevention of a new world war depend to a significant extent on the direction in which it develops and operates. Thus the broadly developing movement for nonannexation, in which many developing states are now participating, has already made a substantial contribution to social progress. It is directed against imperialism and aggression, against colonialism and neocolonialism, and it promotes further unification of forces fighting for peace, independence, liberty, and the progress of nations.

Thus the military power of modern states is, by its social essence, an instrument of the dominant class (of all the people in a state having a developed socialist structure), intended to achieve certain political goals.

2. The Structure of Military Power, and the Dialectics of Its Elements

By understanding the social nature and role of a state's (coalition's) military power from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, we are able to clarify the unique features of its structure as well. The structure of military power and the dialectics of its elements express general and specific features of the military activities of peoples, classes, and parties in concrete historic conditions. On the general side, we find that the actions of people, be they war preparations by aggressive forces or preparations by peace-loving states to repel an aggressor's attack, and actions occurring in the course of a war itself--always rest upon a material foundation, upon the means of production, which is the sum of productive forces and production relations.

But all practical activities of people have more than just a material side. They are permeated by the thoughts, feelings, and moods of the people--that is, by the spiritual factor, which in turn never remains in "pure form", instead manifesting itself in the concrete deeds of its bearers. Therefore we can validly refer to the spiritual factor as the motive force of the practical activities of people. The military history of peoples, classes, and states has demonstrated that the morale of the troops and of all the people goes a long way to predetermine victory or defeat in war.

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On the specific side of military power, we find that it reflects the class nature of the state and that it is utilized by the ruling class (classes) in the interests of achieving certain political goals. Military power without a class orientation cannot be created, and it cannot function.

In terms of its structure, military power is a system of economic, scientific, social, moral-political, and specifically military potentials or factors. In the interpretation used here, a potential expresses the quantitative and qualitative possibilities of the economy, science, sociopolitical and ideological relations and, of course, the armed forces of a state, which may be used in the conduct of war. Possibilities that are realized, that are placed into action, are usually referred to as a factor. The degree to which possibilities are realized in relation to concrete conditions naturally varies.

As with any system, military power is typified by an intrinsic organization, and interaction of its elements (potentials or factors). When viewed as a whole, it possesses new qualities which its parts do not.

The foundation of military power is represented by the economic potential (factor), which is a representation of the sum of productive forces and social relations--that is, the means of production. It predetermines the social and state structure of the country, the policy and ideology of its classes and parties, and operation of the entire society. Economic preconditions govern the relationship of forces existing between states (coalitions) in peacetime, and they impart a certain orientation to the use of military power. While the economy of imperialist states is oriented toward increasing military power to support a policy of aggression, the economy of socialist countries supports enlargement of military power to be used in behalf of development of socialism and communism, consolidation of peace, and restraint of the aggressor. It is the foundation of the state's defense capability. The economic potential (factor) creates the conditions for satisfying the material needs of the front and rear in times of war, and it has a decisive influence on the course and outcome of war.

Productive forces use the economic potential (factor) to form the military power of a state, mainly through the production of weapons, military equipment, food, and other materials necessary to warfare. In addition it determines, through production relations, the social and political possibilities of the society and its spiritual life, and thus it influences the scientific, social, moral-political, and military potentials (factors). In other words all of the components of military power are synthesized on the basis of the economic potential (factor) into a single whole; on its basis, military power undergoes enlargement or reduction.

The scientific potential (factor) is acquiring increasingly greater significance to military power today. Its place and role are associated with the essence and nature of science and with the achievements and consequences of the scientific-technical revolution. It would be sufficient to note the tremendous contribution made by science to the victory of the Soviet people over Nazi Germany, to the victory of reason, justice, and peace over the forces of barbarianism and aggression. Soviet science, which promoted creation of mighty modern weapons in response to the intrigues of the inciters of war, put an end to the nuclear monopoly of imperialism and made the defense of the Soviet Union inviolable.

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The scientific potential is realized through other potentials, and it is one of the motive forces of their development and interaction. It influences military power primarily through the economic and military-technical elements, through the military potential (weapons and military equipment, the organization of troops, and their command and control), and through the spiritual element of military power. The scientific potential is a necessary prerequisite of satisfying the army's contemporary requirements for military equipment. In accordance with their content, their class orientation, and their ideological basis, the sciences, and mainly the social sciences, actively participate in the formation of the social and moral-political potentials.

The social and moral-political potentials are extremely important elements of the military power of states (coalitions). They are closely associated, and at the same time they are independent.

The social potential expresses the class nature of military power, its strength, and its viability. It includes within itself the elements of the class structure and political organization of the society, and the relations existing within it between classes, social groups, nations, and nationalities, and between society, collectives, and the personality. Basing itself on an economic foundation, the social potential may be antagonistic and nonantagonistic. In an imperialist state it has an antagonistic essence, which predetermines the nature of military power as a whole, creates contradictions within it, and limits its application to a certain degree. The social potential of a socialist state, which is nonantagonistic in nature, is distinguished by special strength and viability.

As an element of military power, the moral-political potential represents the spiritual readiness of the people in the army to endure the trials of war, and to maintain their will for victory. It is a reflection of the political structure of the state, and of its consistency or inconsistency with the fundamental interests of the laborers. In wars fought between antagonistic classes, the moral-political potential of the warring sides is by nature diametrically opposed. Thus the role it plays differs as well. Being a relatively independent element of military power, the moral-political potential permeates through all of its other elements. It actively influences the life of the country, and it constantly affects military power through the economy, science, social relations, and the military potential, both directly and indirectly. The moral-political potential has a spiritual influence upon the effectiveness with which all elements of military power are used.

The specifically military potential (factor) has special significance in the system of a state's (coalition's) military power. Being a derivative of economic, scientific, social, and moral-political potentials, together with them it determines the military power of the country (coalition). The specifically military potential expresses the state's capability for maintaining and improving its armed forces, raising their fighting power, replenishing them with trained personnel, and supplying modern military equipment and all forms of materiel, in peacetime and all the more so in war.

Analyzing the place and role of the economic, scientific, social, moral-political, and specifically military potentials, it would not be difficult to note that military power represents the dialectical unity of the material and spiritual elements. While

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material elements have a direct physical and moral-psychological influence upon the enemy, the spiritual elements have mainly a moral-psychological influence. An army's fighting power is the principal indicator of the unity existing between material and spiritual forces making up military power.

The state and development of military power depend on the economic and sociopolitical structure of the state, the degree of development of productive forces, the orientation of state policy, the ideology dominating within the society, the prevalent ideas about the nature of a probable war (and, during its course, its real nature), the laws and unique features of the era, and so on. Being dependent on these factors, military power functions as a single whole. These factors also determine the mutual relationship existing between the material and spiritual elements of military power, their dialectics. The traits of these dialectics are as follows.

On one hand the economic and sociopolitical structure of an exploiting state, especially an imperialist one, promotes creation and implementation of tremendous military power in the interests of the ruling circles and their reactionary, aggressive policy. On the other hand interaction between the material and spiritual elements of their military power is antagonistically contradictory. This also pertains fully to the military power of an imperialist coalition. While the total military power of such a coalition is greater, there is an opposite tendency for this military power to weaken, in view of the antagonistic contradictions. The joint influence of these contradictions, and all the more so in the presence of an unfavorable balance of power, and in response to defeats and failures, objectively weakens the military power of the states and of the coalition as a whole, as was the case for example with the fascist bloc in World War II.

The socialist structure, which has indisputable advantages over the capitalist structure, contains within itself the possibilities for organic, strictly coordinated interaction between the material and spiritual elements of military power. This creates the objective conditions for keeping the state's defense capabilities reliable in peacetime and for swiftly mobilizing all of its resources to defeat imperialist aggressors in a time of war.

With its undisputable advantages over the capitalist structure, the socialist structure contains the possibilities for organic, precisely coordinated interaction between the material and spiritual elements of military power. This creates the objective prerequisites for keeping the state's defense capabilities dependable in peacetime and for quickly mobilizing all of its resources to defeat imperialist aggressors in a time of war.

A model of such mobilization can be found in our country's transformation into a single military camp during the civil and Great Patriotic wars, and in the high effectiveness of the socialist state's military power in the difficult conditions of war. This experience showed that implementation of the material and spiritual possibilities of victory is an extremely complex process, in which the decisive role belongs to the organizational and ideological work of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and the military leadership, and to the conscious activities of the multimillion popular masses. The Communist Party constantly infuses the idea of protecting the socialist fatherland into the minds of the Soviet people, and creates the prerequisites of maximum use of the socialist country's material and spiritual possibilities and its military power in the case of war for annihilatory destruction of imperialist aggressors.

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We have all of the conditions for completely realizing these possibilities within the framework of the coalition of socialist states as well. Absence of antagonistic contradictions and the continuous development of relationships of fraternal friendship and mutual assistance among the socialist countries, which are uniting their efforts to protect the progressive socioeconomic and political structure, objectively promote growth of their aggregate military power. Not only the combined material but also the ideological and moral-political strengths of such a union are great. An example of this is the military organization of the Warsaw Pact countries, which is not inferior to the military political blocs of imperialist states in material respects, and superior to them in the moral-political respect.

Interaction between the material and spiritual elements of a state's military power, and, consequently, the state itself as a whole depends significantly on the nature of the war it is waging or preparing itself for. A country waging a just war enjoys better conditions for maintaining military power at the required level than a state waging an unjust war. These conditions are created as a result of the active support of the war's political goals by all the people.

Naturally this does not mean that we have an automatic guarantee of unflagging military power in a just war. It all depends on the country's ability to realize its favorable possibilities and mobilize the masses for the enemy's decisive defeat.

Material potential is the source and the foundation of the spiritual forces of the people and army. But the spiritual components do not passively reflect the material elements; they do not mechanically derive from them. They always play an active role in the changes experienced by military power, in the effectiveness with which it is used, and in the means employed to increase or decrease material support. Moreover depending on the nature and type of war, the significance and relationship of the material and spiritual elements may change.

In mutually unjust wars, the spiritual components of the warring states do not differ fundamentally from each other. Therefore the course and the outcome of the war in such cases depends mainly on superiority in economics and in armed forces. A confirmation of this can be found, for example, in World War II.

In wars where one of the sides pursues just goals, the role of the spiritual elements of military power rises dramatically. The moral spirit of the people and army of the state fighting for a rightful cause is incomparably greater than that of the enemy. This makes it possible to utilize all of the country's other possibilities with much greater effectiveness. Such was the case in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. The significance of a high moral spirit also clearly revealed itself in the victory of the Vietnamese people, achieved in many years of fighting against American aggressors and their Saigon puppets.

It has been historically confirmed that spiritual forces having a progressive ideology and an advanced state of morality at their core have the advantage in growth of military power. In the modern era these spiritual forces include Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist morality, and the spiritual forces of people building socialism and communism. Lenin said the following at the Ninth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets: "From a material standpoint, we are immeasurably weak in relation to economics and military affairs, but morally--of course not from the standpoint of

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abstract morality but in terms of the relationship of the real forces possessed by all classes in all states--we are stronger than all. This has been tested in fact, it is proven not by words but by deeds, it has already been proven once, and perhaps if history will turn in a certain direction, it will be proven more than once."11 Since the time that these words were uttered our state has traveled a long road. Its economy has grown several times over. The Country of the Soviets has become strong not only morally but also materially. Welded into a single whole in the moral-political respects, and possessing a powerful economic base, Soviet society is also dependably supporting its defenses.

The modern era and its basic traits and laws significantly influence the formation and function of military power, and the dialectics of its material and spiritual elements.

First, this manifests itself in the change experienced in the military power of states having opposite social systems in relation to the basic trend of historical development--continual change in the relationship of social forces in the world arena in favor of peace, democracy, and socialism. Creation and reinforcement of the world socialist fraternity, the ever-increasing scope of the workers and communist movements in capitalist countries, disintegration of imperialism's colonial system, and growth of the national liberation struggle are changing the course of economic development and the alignment of sociopolitical forces in the world, and they are creating favorable conditions for the spread of Marxism-Leninism and for establishment of a just, democratic peace. All of this also influences the elements of military power, especially the economic and spiritual elements, and it promotes changes in the military power of the imperialist states and in the military power of the socialist countries, in accordance with their nature.

Second, development of the military power of states (coalitions) is to an enormous extent influenced by the modern scientific-technical revolution, which deeply affects all social relations and imposes new requirements on all social institutions. The scientific-technical revolution has accelerated growth of productive forces, it is having an influence on relations between peoples and between states, and it is causing significant changes in the labor and life of each individual. It invades all elements of military power, and it serves as an important factor of its formation and function--of course with a dependence on the sociopolitical nature of the given state. The scientific-technical revolution is having an effect on the nature of economic and moral potentials, it has increased the significance of the scientific potential, it is one of the sources of revolution in military affairs, and it has qualitatively transformed the military potential.

Third, the modern revolution in military affairs is significantly influencing the military power of the states. Having begun immediately after World War II, it produced a fundamental change mainly in the fighting power of the armies--in military equipment, in the cultural and technical level of the people, and in the methods and forms of armed struggle. The revolution in military affairs arose and is now continuing on two diametrically opposite sociopolitical and ideological foundations. This has made an impression on both the rate of transformations in military affairs and their form.

The revolution in military affairs has promoted an abrupt, hairpin switch to fundamentally new methods of achieving the main goals of war. It produced structural

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changes in military power: Nuclear missile weapons, automation, electronics, and other resources associated with the use of nuclear weapons are now the military-technical foundation of modern military power. It is entirely obvious that in the event of a nuclear war, there would be nothing to compensate for the absence of nuclear missiles.

The influence of the revolution in military affairs also manifests itself in the fact that nuclear missiles have enormously magnified man's strength. Tremendous growth in technical possibilities elicited an increase in the role of the individual's ideological and moral-psychological preparedness to act in a situation involving the use of modern weapons. The revolution in military affairs is intensifying the desire of states of like kind to unite their military power, and it is creating the conditions for deeper internationalization of military affairs in accordance with the sociopolitical nature, goals, and objectives of these states.

Fourth, change in military power is the product of the nature of a possible world war in both political and military-technical respects. On one hand the decisiveness of the political goals of opposing states with opposite sociopolitical systems will require tremendous material and spiritual efforts of them. On the other hand presence of powerful weapons now makes it possible to achieve objectives of a size which could not even be conceived in the past.

Such are the basic premises on the military power of states (coalitions). They show that military power is formed on the basis of laws governing all development of society, but also that this process is influenced by specific laws as well. The latter define the orientation taken by the formation and use of military power, and the dialectics of its material and spiritual elements. We will examine these elements, as independent potentials (factors).

FOOTNOTES

1. See Engel's, F., "Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Military Works], Moscow, 1956, p 613.
2. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 11, p 438.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 34, p 195.
4. Ibid., p 197.
5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 248.
6. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 27, p 408.
7. See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 28.
8. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, pp 133-135.
9. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 292.

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10. Brezhnev, L. I., "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i" [The Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1973, p 153.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 300.

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CHAPTER X

THE MATERIAL FACTOR AND ITS ROLE IN WAR

A country's (coalition's) economic possibilities make up the foundation of its military power. Economic possibilities also play the decisive role in the course and outcome of a war. The interaction between war on one hand and the economic conditions and the material factor on the other is dialectical in nature. The economy provides classes and states with the resources they need for achieving the political goals of a war, feeding it materially. But war does not remain passive. It itself constantly imposes high demands upon the economy in the interest of satisfying its own need for various materials.

Profound social changes occurring in the world and the modern scientific-technical revolution are making the mutual relationship between war and economics ever-closer and multifaceted.

1. The Economy and the Material Needs of War

The premise that a state's military power depends on the economy is one of the fundamental ones of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Marx and Engels devoted great attention to this problem. They use conclusions arrived at from an analysis of the mutual relationship between war and the economy to develop their materialistic interpretation of history and its central thesis--that the production relations of the society change in conformity with a law depending on the degree of development of the material resources of production and the productive forces.

Marx noted that war achieved its final forms sooner than peace, that economic relations such as hired labor, the use of machines, and so on developed in war and in armies prior to their arising in bourgeois society,¹ and that the relationship between productive forces and social relations are especially graphical in the army, in which machines are used for the first time on a large scale and division of labor within a single production sector is achieved for the first time.² Explaining the mutual relationship between war and the economy, Engels thoroughly criticized the theory prevalent at that time, according to which the course and outcome of wars were supposedly independent of economic development, being defined only by factors such as the morale of the army, the activities of the troop commanders, and so on. "...the entire organization of armies and the means of warfare and, concurrently, of victory and defeat used by them," Engels wrote, "are found to be dependent on material--that is, economic--conditions: on human resources and on weapons, and consequently on the quantity and quality of the population and technology."³

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Lenin is credited with creative development of Marx' and Engels' premise on the role of economics in war. The contribution made by Lenin to resolution of this problem is associated mainly with his analysis of the relationship between war and economics in the imperialist era. The extremely great scope of wars and participation of multimillion armies in them significantly broadened and deepened the mutual relationship between war and economics. "The relationship between a country's military organization and its entire economic and cultural structure has never been so intimate as it is today,"⁴ emphasized V. I. Lenin. Developing this idea, the great leader of the proletariat later wrote: "If war is to be waged as it should be, a firmly organized rear is needed. The best army, and people most devoted to the revolution would be immediately destroyed by the enemy if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food, and trained."⁵

The dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the material factor can be traced throughout the entire course of history. Even when military actions were conducted with silent weapons, their results depended in the final analysis on the level of production of these weapons--that is, on the economic conditions. This relationship became more tangible when fire weapons came to use and armed struggle acquired a different nature and scale. However, until the time of World War I the quantities of weapons and ammunition produced and accumulated in peacetime were enough as a rule to support military actions. The outcome of a war was often predetermined by a single general engagement. Such was the case, for example, in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. In it, consumption of ammunition and, all the more so, weapons was low: In 8 months the Germans fired an average of 40 rounds from each rifle, and 190 projectiles from each gun. The demand for ammunition increased noticeably in the Russo-Japanese war, in which the total number of artillery discharges was about a million (720 projectiles per gun). But even this consumption rate was adequately supported by peacetime reserves and the current production of existing munitions plants.

A different situation evolved in World War I. One engagement followed another. Ammunition consumption in these engagements was extremely great. The manpower losses were large as well. Just prior to 1914 the General Staff of the Russian Army predicted that it would need 1,000 projectiles per gun--a total of 7 million projectiles--in the forthcoming war. But the real needs of the combat situation made it necessary to produce more than 55 million units of artillery and mortar ammunition. Germany planned to produce 330,000 projectiles and 10,000 rifles a month, while in fact it required up to 12 million projectiles and 250,000 rifles. Naturally such a gross error could not but have an effect--it was one of the causes of the failure of the strategic war plan written by the German general staff. This plan was based on the notion of making a lightning strike on France with the hope of annihilating it before the Russian Army could mobilize and deploy. At the decisive moment, however, in the engagement on the River Marne in September 1914, the German command was unable to attain the success it needed. This happened mainly owing to a shortage of ammunition, as well as of rubber for motor transportation. Unprepared in peacetime, German industry was not in a position to satisfy the equipment demands of advancing German troops.

An even greater error was made by the military-political leadership of fascist Germany in its preparations for war against the Soviet Union. The Nazis made it

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their goal to destroy our army in a short time, using armament that had been produced earlier in Germany or which had been captured in the occupied countries of Europe. The Nazi clique felt that maximum deployment of war industry would not be needed during the war, and that fundamental changes would not occur in military technology. But when as a result of strikes by the Soviet Armed Forces the fascist blitzkreig plan suffered failure and it became necessary to produce the latest military equipment in ever-growing proportions, Germany found this task to be beyond its means.

The two world wars clearly demonstrated a qualitatively new mutual relationship between war and economics. It expressed itself mainly in the fact that economic support to a war based on the reserves of weapons and ammunition created in peacetime and on the current production of just war industry alone was entirely impossible. The reasons for this are as follows. First, the scale, intensity, and duration of military actions increased and continued to grow on an unprecedented scale, with the density of fire being significant, which led to swift annihilation or wear of military equipment. Second, the struggle for military-technical superiority and for replacement of obsolete military equipment by new, promising technology became keener. What Lenin said at the beginning of World War I has great methodological significance to understanding this trend: The German bourgeoisie organized "the offensive at a moment which it believed to be most convenient for utilizing its latest advances in military equipment, and before Russia could implement its so-called great military program."⁶

Success could be counted on in the first and second world wars only by a state having economic potential which was capable, in close interaction with other potentials, to materially support military actions in a complex situation. The relationship between war and economics was fundamentally new in that the course and outcome of military actions now depended significantly on the economic possibilities of the sides, on effective realization of these possibilities with the purposes of developing massive and continually growing production of weapons, and of achieving military-technical superiority over the enemy.

Following World War II, in a time of scientific-technical revolution, the relationship between the material factor and the military power of states (coalitions) became even more diverse and profound. The economic possibilities of warfare themselves broadened. As an example the USA needed relatively little time to create tremendous reserves of modern weapons. A tremendous proportion of the USA's productive forces and scientific and technical achievements are utilized and resources are redistributed among production centers for the benefit of militarism. It should be emphasized that a significant share of American military expenditures are channeled into development of offensive weapons systems--strategic bombers, atomic submarines, and missiles of various purposes, and into modernization of existing nuclear weapons. Military production and military consumption are the most important part of the economies of other imperialist countries as well. In them, as in the USA, the direct and indirect military expenditures are rising continually.

The material demands of modern warfare are increasing. This is confirmed mainly by the growth in the proportion of expenditures on military equipment out of the sum total of military allocations. Imperialist powers are allotting significant funds to outfit their armed forces with new models of weapons and military equipment. Moreover in recent years we have observed continuous growth in the proportion of

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these funds within the total budget of the military departments (in the FRG, for example, 27 percent in the 1973 fiscal year, 31.9 percent in 1974, and 32 percent in the 1975 fiscal year).⁷

The rate of obsolescence of weapons and military equipment is accelerating, and a need for renewing them in ever-shorter periods of time is arising. At the beginning of the century, development of a new model of a weapon and its adoption by an army was known to take 20-30 years, and sometimes more. Today this time period is lower by a factor of 2-3 in the largest states. In the course of the 1960's and up to the middle of the 1970's--in just 10-15 years--two or three generations of missiles superseded one another, a significant part of the fleet of warplanes, surface ships, and submarines was renewed, and the antiaircraft and radar armament systems and the control and communication resources were replaced several times. In view of this, the intensity of scientific research for military purposes is rising. Production of modern military equipment requires deep, multifaceted specialization of industry, and cooperation among numerous sectors and enterprises.

Qualitative changes have occurred in the structure of the material needs of war and in production to support them. Modern war requires a highly developed economy and a powerful industry capable of producing diverse military equipment on a large scale. The newest industrial sectors are playing the dominant role, while the old, traditional sectors are concerned mainly with manufacturing products of entirely different quality--high-alloy steel, heat-resistant, ultrapure metals, and so on. Industry must satisfy the demands of war for high-quality weapons and combat equipment--nuclear ammunition, various types of missiles, atomic submarines, missile aviation, and electronic equipment. The demand for qualified specialists who can develop, produce, and use the latest military equipment has risen more than ever before.

The conditions for mobilization and strategic deployment of troops have become dramatically more complex in modern warfare. Undertaking an attack, imperialist aggressors would try to make strikes of immeasurably greater strength and depth than ever before, using the latest military-technical resources. In such a situation, if a state opposing such invaders is to dependably repel the enemy and foil his insidious plans, it would be ideal for it to have a fully deployed army before war begins. But this involves great difficulties. Even for an economically extremely well developed country, maintaining armed forces in a fully mobilized state in peacetime is excessively burdensome. This could end not with greater military power, but with its weakening, with overstressing of the country. Thus precise determination of the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the peacetime army is a problem of tremendous complexity and importance. Its solution presupposes careful consideration of the possibilities of one's state and those of the probable enemy, and scientific prediction of the way military actions will develop in the event of imperialist aggression, of the missions which the troops and naval forces would face, and of the most effective means of their execution.

Qualitative changes occurring today in the means of economic support to war needs are associated with the fact that the economy itself has now become one of the most important objectives of possible strikes by the enemy. In view of certain features of modern production, including war production, a strike against just a single industrial unit could disrupt the function of the industrial system as a whole.

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Thus the need arises for implementing a complex of various measures to weaken the danger of the economy's failure, to raise its stability in the event of war. The way such measures are implemented depends on the social structure, economic policy, the military doctrines of the states, and other circumstances.

In a world war, were the imperialists to unleash it, reserves of the most important materials stockpiled in peacetime, well-organized and mobile military production, stable economic relations, and other factors will have tremendous significance. Special emphasis should be laid on the tremendous role that will be played by the possibilities of existing industry. This is associated primarily with the fact that when a modern war begins, it would be extremely difficult and, in a number of cases, simply impossible to do anything to increase the country's economic efforts with the purpose of supporting military actions.

2. The Economic Potential and Its Role in the Course and Outcome of a War

Analysis of the role of economics in the course and outcome of a war presupposes deep investigation of the economic potential, viewed as one of the categories of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. This category may be understood correctly only with a consideration for the entire diversity of social processes occurring in our era, as well as of the modern scientific-technical revolution, which made and continues to make profound changes in the means of warfare, in military theory, and in troop training and indoctrination.

Assessing the role of economics in war, it is important to deeply consider the relationship between the material preconditions and the sociopolitical, historic, geographic, and other features of the countries, and the content of the internal and foreign policies of the states. The economic potentials of countries having different social systems contain common technical factors, but at the same time they also contain fundamental differences stemming from opposite social relations and political lines.

The economic potential of a state can be defined as the maximum possibility of its national economy for supporting the material needs of the society's life and development, and for producing everything it needs for military goals. It is expressed in the level and volume of social production, in the rate and possibilities of its growth, in the nature of the economic structure of the country and the laws of its economic development, and in the degree to which these laws correspond to the progress of history. The economic potential depends on the level of development of productive forces in industry (mainly heavy industry) and agriculture, scientific-technical achievements, the transportation system, communications, population, the occupational, educational, and qualificational composition of the population, and the energy and raw material resources. The geographic distribution of productive forces and the status of the state's financial system have great significance as well.

In their unity and interaction, these elements make up just one side of the economic potential. Its other side is formed by the economic organization, by the material production relations which objectively exist and which develop as necessary in accordance with the level of development and nature of productive forces, and, in the final analysis, by the resources of labor. "The resources of labor," wrote Marx,

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"are not only a yardstick of the development of manpower, but they are also an indicator of the social relations in which labor goes on."⁸ The level of economic possibilities, their growth rate, and the effectiveness with which these possibilities are used also depend on the economic organization of the society and on its production relations.

V. I. Lenin taught that war is a test of all of the economic and organizational powers of each nation. In 1917, in his work "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", he wrote: "In modern war...economic organization has decisive significance."⁹

The socialist type of economic organization, which is based on public ownership and planned, proportionate development of production, is superior to the capitalist type in all respects. In the military respect the advantages of the socialist economic system express themselves as the possibility for faster alteration of the national economy for war, greater effectiveness of mobilization and sensible use of all forces and resources, extensive maneuvering of resources, and their maximum concentration for future objectives associated with economic support to military actions.

The advantages of the socialist type of economic organization of the society were persuasively demonstrated during World War II. Not a single state that was highly developed in technical respects was able to compare with the USSR in the completeness and sensibility of the use of economic and military-economic possibilities. Thus it only took a few months for our country to switch its economy to a war footing. On the other hand France, for example, was practically unable to alter its economy, and the USA and England took 1.5-2 years to do so.

By the moment of its treacherous attack on the USSR, together with its occupied and dependent countries fascist Germany had a 1.5-2-time superiority over our state in the production volume of the most important types of industrial products, and in 1942 it had about a 3-4-time superiority. The Soviet Union managed to maximally mobilize all of its possibilities, and it produced almost twice more military equipment than Germany during the war.

It is important to emphasize that the concept of economic potential is viewed today within the framework of both individual states and coalitions.

When countries integrate their economic efforts, their economic potential rises to a higher level. Considering this, the monopolist bourgeoisie is appealing broadly for economic integration. Following World War II the West created the European Economic Community ("The Common Market"), the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and a number of other international monopolistic state communities. Imperialist integration is founded on the common class goals of the monopolist bourgeoisie of different states, and on its attempt to strengthen the military-economic positions of imperialism in the struggle against socialist countries and the international workers and national liberation movements, and therefore it has a reactionary, antipopular nature.

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Military-economic integration is an inherent part of imperialism's economic integration. It also is directed against world social progress. Imperialists are trying to capitalize on military-economic integration to achieve more-effective use of their military production and of the results of the scientific-technical revolution with the purpose of preparing for aggressive wars. Concurrently with this, the imperialists have the objective of extracting additional profits for the monopolies of war industry.

Military-economic integration provides certain benefits to the imperialists. Expanding the possibilities for redistribution of military-economic resources, increasing the numbers of skilled personnel in military industrial monopolies, and stimulating exchange of patents, technical documents, and scientific research data, military-economic integration in imperialist states is permitting them to develop military production within certain limits, and achieve high results in economic preparation of the theaters of war. Economy of resources due to production of larger volumes of particular models of weapons and military equipment plays a noticeable role, being significantly more profitable than small-series production. Owing to this, additional resources are being extracted for further expansion of military production.

At the same time as with economic integration in general, extremely acute contradictions exist in imperialist military-economic integration. The unceasing competitive struggle between monopolies and between states within international imperialist communities is leading to serious difficulties in selection of common models of weapons and military equipment, distribution of orders for equipment, and so on. Every member of the imperialist coalition tries to resolve arising problems in a way to benefit mainly itself.

Socialist economic integration is fundamentally different. It serves the cause of consolidating the revolutionary achievements of the laborers and creating the most favorable internal and external economic conditions for development of socialism and communism in the fraternal countries. Socialist economic integration is based on the most progressive, the socialist means of production. Public ownership of the resources of production and socialist production relations create a solid foundation for unifying the socialist states, for international socialist division of labor, and for cooperation and specialization of production on a basis of full equality and mutual benefit. The program for further deepening and improvement of cooperation and development of socialist economic integration of the CEMA countries, adopted by the 25th Session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, emphasizes: Deepening and improvement of economic and scientific-technical cooperation and development of socialist economic integration of the CEMA countries make up a process, consciously and purposefully regulated by communists and workers parties and by the governments of the CEMA countries, of international socialist division of labor, of convergence of their economic levels, of formation of a modern, highly effective structure of national economies, of gradual convergence and equalization of the levels of their economic development, of formation of deep, stable ties in the principal sectors of the economy, science, and technology, of expansion and reinforcement of the international market of these countries, and of improvement of commodity and financial relations."¹⁰

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The advantages of economic cooperation among the socialist states are obvious, as numerous facts show. As an example in comparison with 1950 the national income of the CEMA countries grew by 4.8 times in 1970, and by as much as 6.5 times in 1975. The countries of the European Economic Community, meanwhile, increased their national income over the 1950 level by just 2.5 times in 1970 and by 2.8 times in 1975. Between 1950 and 1975 the average annual growth rate of industrial production in the CEMA countries was more than twice higher than in the developed capitalist countries-- 9.6 and 4.6 percent respectively. In just a quarter of a century, the CEMA countries have begun playing an important role in the entire world economy. Although they have only 18.5 percent of the globe's territory and 9.4 percent of its population, they produced about a third of the world's industrial products. "The socialist fraternity," noted the 25th CPSU Congress, "has now become the most dynamic economic force in the world. In the last 5 years the industry of the countries in this fraternity developed four times faster than did the industry of developed capitalist countries. In 1975 the countries of our fraternity produced more than twice as much industrial products as did countries of the Common Market."¹¹ In comparison with 1970, industrial production increased in 1976 by 56 percent in the CEMA countries, and only 17 percent in the developed capitalist countries.¹²

Integration of socialist countries in the military-economic area is also qualitatively different from imperialist integration. Its purpose is not only to provide economic support to the defenses of the socialist powers but also to strengthen peace and the security of nations in all the world.

Military-economic cooperation among socialist countries is an effective form of utilizing the possibilities of socialism to mobilize material resources with the purpose of defeating any aggressor. It rests upon coordination of national economic plans and deepening of socialist division of labor, upon broader specialization and cooperation of production in the decisive sectors of the national economies of the fraternal countries, and upon unification of the results of the modern scientific-technical revolution with the advantages of socialist economic organization.

The close military-economic cooperation among socialist countries is creating favorable conditions for raising their defense capabilities. Capitalization upon these conditions depends to a significant extent on the military policy of the fraternal countries, which is aimed at making the economic potential capable of providing everything necessary to insure dependable defense of socialism. Military policy accounts for the great significance of the national economy's mobility in a war situation--its possibility for switching quickly from peacetime to wartime rails, and guaranteeing a high rate of growth in the production of the most important types of weapons and military equipment, and the fastest possible initiation of series production of new and promising weapon models. The economy's mobility helps to win time, which is very important to achieving decisive superiority over the enemy in war.

The viability of the national economy and the effectiveness of its protection play a tremendous role in modern war. Preservation of the country's power systems, upon which all of the society's functions depend, has especially great significance. The economy's viability is influenced by: the social organization of production and the nature of division of labor; the geographic distribution of the most important industrial centers and the vulnerability of the lines of communication; the capability for restoring industrial and other national economic enterprises.

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3. The Economic Potential and Economic Preparedness

When we describe the material support possible to the military power of the state, in addition to the economic potential we must consider the state's economic preparedness for war.

Economic preparedness for war entails materializing part of the economic potential while still in a state of peace. The structural elements of such materialization include: scientific planning of the economic support to be given to a war; economic preparation of the theaters of war; production and delivery of materials and equipment to the necessary troops and naval forces; maintenance of the economy's constant readiness to initiate military production; creation of reserves of material and equipment for the armed forces, and of raw materials, fuel, equipment, consumer goods, and food for normal operation of the rear; the training of various specialists specifically for the troops and naval forces, as well as for the war economy itself, and formation of reserves; maintenance of the national economy's viability. Concentration of economic efforts to support the most important military-political objectives, sensible use of time in the pursuit of military-economic objectives, continuity and flexibility of the economy's leadership, and other factors have important significance to the country's economic preparedness.

The economic preparedness of a country depends on the nature of its socioeconomic and political structure, on the state of its economy, and on the possibilities for economic mobilization, which are defined as the means available for channeling the national economy's resources in support of the main objectives of the state's defense. Economic mobilization pursues the goal of maintaining economic preparedness for war in peacetime, and of economically supporting military actions in war. The effectiveness of economic mobilization was associated by Marshal of the Soviet Union B. V. Shaposhnikov with the duration and means of industrial mobilization, with satisfaction of production's demand for manpower in general and for skilled laborers in particular, and so on.

The military-economic potential, which is a part of the overall economic potential, forms the direct foundation of economic preparedness for war. It can be described as the capability of the economy of the state (coalition) for satisfying the immediate needs of the armed forces. The elements composing the military-economic potential are the same as those of the economic potential.

Assessment of the military-economic potential requires implementation of the maximum coefficient of economic mobilization, which is the ratio of the military-economic potential to the economic potential. It indicates the maximum extent to which the economic powers of the state can be exerted with the purpose of satisfying its military consumption.

Depending on socioeconomic and political structure and other conditions, countries with approximately equal economic possibilities may have different military-economic potentials. As a rule, the military-economic potential grows faster than the economic potential as a whole in war--the demands of armed struggle have their influence. As an example in 1942, during an exceptionally difficult period for us in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR's gross industrial production was 77 percent of the 1940 level. At the same time production of the peoples commissariats of

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aviation and tank industry and of arms and munitions industry increased by 86 percent. In 1944, gross industrial production was 104 percent in comparison with the 1940 level--that is, it exceeded the 1940 level by 4 percent, while the production volumes of the defense industry sector commissariats indicated above increased by 251 percent.¹³

In a peacetime situation, the military-economic potential may vary depending on the political goals of the state, its position in the world arena, and so on.

The rear services of the armed forces--that is, that proportion of human and material resources allocated by the state to maintain the army's combat readiness or support military actions--are directly associated with the military-economic potential. If the rear services are to operate successfully, it is important to have centralized control, distribution, and use of material resources, concentration of men and equipment in the most decisive sectors of armed struggle, approximation of these men and equipment to the troops and naval forces being supported, high maneuverability of rear services, corresponding maneuverability of the operating troops and naval forces, integrated use of all forms of transportation, maximum utilization of local resources for the needs of the front, and so on. Today the role of the maneuverability and mobility of rear services is rising continuously, as is mechanization of supply, medical, and other forms of troop and naval support.

The relationship between a state's economic preparedness in peacetime and the course and outcome of a possible war is becoming increasingly more intimate today than before. This is associated with the presence of nuclear missiles, and the probability of their mass use. A low level of economic preparedness harbors disastrous consequences. Aggressive imperialist states are implementing a broad economic program in support of unjust wars. They have created sizeable production capacities manufacturing weapons and military equipment. These capacities are being used only partially today, to satisfy current needs. But their main purpose is to permit swift growth in military production at a particular moment.

All of these circumstances are accounted for by the Communist Party, which is providing daily leadership to development of communism in the USSR. Our plans for the country's national economic development are peaceful in nature. But at the same time they do foresee material support to the state's defense capabilities. The Basic Directions for Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976-1980, approved by the 25th CPSU Congress, state: "The 10th Five-Year Plan is a new, important stage in creation of the material-technical base of communism, in improvement of social relations and formation of the new man, and in development of the socialist way of life. This is a period of intensification of social production, of fuller utilization of the national economy's possibilities for multiplying the national wealth, and of strengthening the country's economic power and defense capabilities."¹⁴

The high growth rate in heavy industry foreseen by the 10th Five-Year Plan has important significance. Successful development of heavy industry is a prerequisite of expanded socialist reproduction, and of creation of communism's material-technical base. The level of equipment availability and labor productivity in all sectors of the national economy depend on it as well. Without developing heavy industry, we cannot adequately support the state's defense capabilities.

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The role played by the material factor in war depends in many ways on how effectively a state utilizes the resources it allocates to insure the battleworthiness of the troops and naval forces and favorable development of military actions.

Taking charge of the defense of the socialist country, during the foreign intervention and civil war in Russia V. I. Lenin created models of optimum utilization of men and equipment to defeat an enemy. He achieved economy of men and equipment in secondary sectors and a superiority over the enemy in the main, decisive sectors. Following this principle, and developing it, the Communist Party successfully managed to mobilize the state's men and equipment to repel the enemy and to defeat him in the Great Patriotic War.

The effectiveness with which the material potential is realized depends to a considerable extent on the economic preparedness of military personnel. M. V. Frunze wrote that "Our military leaders must be fully armed with not only military but also political and economic knowledge, since all of this is now woven into a single whole, and without knowledge in these areas it is impossible to successfully lead an army."¹⁵

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving Economic Education of the Laborers" (1971) states the need for examining economic training as a mandatory, important aspect of the qualifications of every worker. This pertains fully to military personnel as well. Their economic and military-economic training have tremendous significance. Such training is one of the preconditions for raising the scientific level of command and control of troops and naval forces, successful execution of missions in wartime, and formaintenance of high combat readiness in peacetime.

Skilled economic analysis in the armed forces, having the task of insuring the fullest possible satisfaction of the needs of the troops and naval forces at least cost, plays a great role in sensible use of resources allocated to the defense of the Soviet state. There is a considerable amount of room for the activity of military personnel in this area. The relationships between the armed forces and the national economy are multifaceted. There are military deliveries and transportation services to be considered. Moreover the army and navy have a diversified troop and fleet economy. They are engaged in capital construction, they make repairs on weapons, military equipment, and military property, and they have considerable material resources at their disposal. A thrifty attitude toward material valuables and their careful consumption are the obligation of every serviceman, as is legally documented in our military regulations.

Thus a country's economic power lies at the foundation of its military power, which is utilized in accordance with the state's military power and realized through military-political leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marks, K., "K kritike politicheskoy ekonomii" [A Criticism of Political Economics], Moscow, 1949, p 223.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 29, p 154.
3. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 175.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 9, p 156.

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5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, p 408.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 5.
7. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1975, p 96.
8. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 23, p 191.
9. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 34, p 194.
10. PRAVDA, 7 August 1971.
11. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 8-9.
12. PRAVDA, 30 March 1977.
13. See "Shagi pyatiletok. Razvitiye ekonomiki SSSR" [The Strides of the Five-Year Plans. Development of the USSR Economy], Moscow, 1968, p 121.
14. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 166.
15. Frunze, M. V., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Moscow, 1965, p 161.

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CHAPTER XI

MODERN SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON WAR AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

Great is the significance of modern scientific-technical progress. In the conditions of developed socialism, acceleration of scientific-technical progress is one of the key problems and priority tasks in terms of the basic directions and features of the party's economic policy.¹ The tremendous importance of this task is the product of the urgent needs of today's economic practice and the requirements of tomorrow. The progress of science and technology serves as the main lever for creation of the material-technical base of communism. It also deeply influences all other spheres of the life of the society.

Scientific-technical progress is playing an ever-increasing role in the system of factors having an influence on war and military affairs as well. Prompt and full use of the achievements of scientific-technical progress in military development is one of the decisive prerequisites of continuous reinforcement of the socialist state's defense capabilities.

1. Unique Features and Ways of Influence of Scientific-Technical Progress on War and Military Affairs

Scientific-technical progress is a complex social phenomenon. Being one of the aspects of social progress in general, it is a unity of two elements--science and technology.

Science is a socially dependent process of cognition of the objective world, and its results are used by mankind, in the form of a constantly developing system of knowledge, to transform reality and to solve other problems. Science arose in response to society's need for understanding the surrounding world. It is precisely when scientific knowledge is used in the interest of society that it begins to acquire social significance. Scientific knowledge may be used in the most diverse areas of life, to realize the most diverse social goals. The nature of its use depends in the final analysis on social and historic circumstances.

Technology is a system of artificial organs of social man, in which the work functions of individuals are predetermined by the level of knowledge of the laws of nature. Technical systems of any functional purpose and of any level of development are in a sense an extension of the natural organs of man,² broadening his

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possibilities to an enormous degree. This also means that every technical device is a product of human labor, a natural material transformed into organs through human will dominating nature, or through human activity in nature; every technical device is an organ of the human brain, created by man's hands, and an embodiment of the power of knowledge.³ In this sense science and technology are extremely close, organically united phenomena of the life of society.

Technology has relative independence. This can be explained by the fact that on one hand it is subordinated through the laws of nature while on the other it is a creation of man, being based to some extent on the laws of social development. While the level of technology depends on the state of productive forces and science, the orientation of its use depends on the dominating production relations and on the sociopolitical structure.

The relationship between science and production is an important characteristic of scientific-technical progress. This relationship grows constantly stronger. The history of science and production has traveled a road of convergence from independent existence to constant transformation of science into a direct productive force.

The concepts "scientific-technical progress" and "scientific-technical revolution" are kindred, but they are not identical. The former expresses the general trend in development of science and technology, while the latter is a concrete historic stage of scientific-technical progress. The modern scientific-technical revolution is typified by fundamental shifts in all components of scientific-technical progress: in science, in technology, and the forms of relationships existing between them. The scientific-technical revolution is based on change in the social role of science, on its active transformation into a direct productive force of society, which expresses itself concretely in the form of new factors affecting development of industry, agriculture, and other spheres of the society's life. This phenomenon also promotes growth of the influence of science upon improvements in military affairs. Science has now become one of the main factors of maintaining high combat readiness of troops and naval forces in peacetime, and of victory in war.

What is the "mechanism" and essence of the relationship between scientific-technical progress and military affairs?

State policy plays the main role here. It is the motive force causing convergence of science and military affairs, and it is responsible for working out the social motives, and goals of this process. Inasmuch as wars are a continuation of policy by violent means, the development of military affairs and broad use of scientific-technical progress in their behalf have a distinct political orientation, the one of imperialism being diametrically opposed to the one of socialism.

Forced development of military affairs under imperialism expresses the militant nature of this social structure, and its yearning to keep its peoples subjugated by military force and implement a reactionary policy in the international arena.

The existence and improvement of military affairs in social society are not the product of the state's internal needs; instead, they are the exclusive product of external causes. The need for opposing the constantly growing military power of imperialism forces the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to take effective steps to strengthen their defense capabilities.

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One important factor of this "mechanism" is growth in scale and change in the nature of the functions of military affairs. Military affairs have now achieved a position where not only the long-range problems of military development but also the daily tasks of personnel combat and political training, their combat duty, and use of weapons and military equipment could be effective only on a scientific basis. Utilization of science has now transformed from an occasional phenomenon into a continuous process, into a mandatory element of the diverse activities of the armed forces.

Consequently development of military affairs, which is constantly experiencing the influence of state policy, is in turn creating a direct demand for science, broadening the sphere of application of scientific knowledge. In this regard science is a means for improving military affairs and satisfying the growing demands of the army, demands having a sociopolitical basis and a moral motivation. Stimulated by state policy, the demands of military affairs for scientific knowledge may be satisfied only if science itself is developed to a sufficiently high level.

The relationship between science and military affairs has acquired a number of new traits today.

First, scientific development is now reaching farther and farther ahead of the development of military affairs. Studying the laws of objective reality, science permits us not only to improve traditional resources, methods, and tactics in military affairs, but also to find fundamentally new ones. An example of this can be found in creation of nuclear missiles, which could not have arisen through the simple evolution of fire weapons and aviation. And in regard to the future, we cannot name with full certainty any particular sector of scientific knowledge whose results could not be used in military affairs.

Second, the range of sciences influencing the development of military affairs has broadened. It now includes practically the entire front of scientific knowledge.

The social sciences are making a great contribution to raising the preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Marxism-Leninism is the philosophical and methodological foundation of military theory and practice in the socialist state. It arms military personnel with a deep understanding of the social dependence of the origin of wars and armies, it demonstrates their class essence, and it reveals the relationship between a state's military power and the system of factors governing social development. The complex of social sciences is studying the social and moral values in behalf of which our armed forces exist. Together with sciences studying man's biological and organic qualities, it serves as a foundation for clarifying man's possibilities in war. The conclusions and recommendations of the social sciences are used every day in the training and indoctrination of the personnel, and in leadership of the troops and naval forces.

The natural and technical sciences are playing an ever-increasing role in modern military affairs. With their help we design, produce, and operate military equipment and weapons, and reveal fundamentally new ways of its development. As an example it would be impossible to imagine military affairs today without systematic use of mathematical knowledge. This is true not only because mathematics has penetrated into all areas of military affairs, but also because it affects the style of thinking

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of military personnel. Mathematics has the influence of making all decisions adopted highly logical, grounded, and upholdable. Mathematical culture is a true sign of a high level of occupational thinking.

Military science occupies the most important place in the system of sciences influencing the development of military affairs. Independently studying many pressing problems, it at the same time performs the functions of a unique theoretical organizer, synthesizing the knowledge of different sciences for use in military affairs.

The significance of fundamental research in science is rising under modern conditions. "...progress in fundamental knowledge," said USSR Academy of Sciences President Academician A. P. Aleksandrov in his speech to the 25th CPSU Congress, "is changing what would seem to have been established and immutable points of view in science, it is opening up new areas in science and technology, it is fundamentally changing technology, it is leading to the arisal of new materials, and it is opening up possibilities for utilizing completely new, frequently unexpected phenomena in areas which had absolutely nothing in common with the initial area of research."⁴ The influence of fundamental research on science and technology is growing in intensity due to the decrease in the time required to achieve technical implementation of a given theoretical idea. Fundamental explorations proceed today in a direct relationship to applied research and experimental design work. To illustrate this we can turn to the history of the arisal of laser technology. The theoretical principles of laser instruments were developed by the late 1950's. Following this, just 2 years later, such instruments were created, and today their practical use in different areas of science and technology has already become commonplace. It is entirely obvious that the results of fundamental research are having a great influence on development of military affairs as well.

Third, significant growth in the role of science in military affairs has led to change in the nature of the organizational relationship existing between science and military affairs. For a long period of time these mutual relationships have existed as a chain from military affairs to science and from the latter back to military affairs. In this chain, military organs are responsible for precisely wording the orders for the research they require. They serve as the initiators, while the scientific organizations are the executors. This type of relationship is extremely widespread today as well. In it, military specialists reveal the weak points in technology and in other elements of military affairs, and they suggest concrete conclusions on the possible ways for eliminating them.

This type of relationship between science and military affairs does have its merits. They include the presence of ordered, well-organized ties, the existence of the appropriate organs to make the decisions on improving different components of military affairs and, finally, the presence of solid historic experience. However, this type of relationship between science and military affairs functions successfully only in the event that we consider improvements on weapon systems already in existence, and the methods of their use on the battlefield. It is not inherently adapted to effective solution of problems arising in response to a transition to qualitatively new paths of development in military affairs, and this is where its serious shortcoming lies.

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As the tasks of military theory and practice grow more complex, another type of relationship--from science to military affairs--is enjoying increasingly greater acceptance. In this relationship, the latest achievements of science essentially predetermine the prospects of military affairs, prospects which are not directly evident from their development. Although this type of relationship is distinguished by lower organization, in a state of swift, scientific-technical progress it may acquire the decisive significance in improving military affairs.

The increasing influence of science on military affairs is graphically evident from the expansion of the fundamental areas of its application. They include: weapons and military equipment; the people handling the weapons and military equipment; processes associated with control of the combat actions of troops and naval forces; the methods of armed struggle.

The resources of armed struggle, and mainly the weapons, are an element of military affairs to which scientific data have long been applied. Important landmarks on this road were the arisal and development of artillery, steamships and vessels with metal hulls, and motorization of the army. It was with fundamental changes in the system of combat weapons that the modern revolution in military affairs began. Creation of nuclear missiles was one of the examples of materialization of scientific knowledge in the resources of armed struggle. In our day, such a fundamental change in military technology would be possible only through the help of the latest achievements of science, and their application to the solution of practical problems. Owing to science, we are designing increasingly more sophisticated technical systems capable of effectively implementing the scientific principles designed into them.

The modern revolution in military affairs has imposed higher requirements on the individual--the principal force in war. The following law is becoming more and more obvious: The more complex military affairs become, the more substantial should the theoretical training given to military personnel be. Such training is a dependable foundation for the ability to think broadly, deeply, and quickly, to see the relationship between events and facts, to set maximum but attainable goals, and to find the best ways to reach them. This is an objective necessity, one which has time and again confirmed Lenin's premise that even the best armament cannot produce the needed results if no one knows how to use it, in the absence of people capable of knowledgeably utilizing the latest improvements in military technology.⁵

Extensive scientific knowledge is being mobilized with the purpose of preparing the personnel for combat actions in modern war. Such knowledge is needed primarily as a means for preparing soldiers in moral-political and psychological respects, for imparting high military and military-technical culture to them. Today as never before, the demands on the general educational level of the personnel are great as well. The Soviet Armed Forces are undergoing an active process of intellectualization of military labor. The comprehensive training level of the soldiers is growing continuously. The quantity of positions that must be filled by specialists trained substantially in the sciences is increasing. Frequently, combat work and the maintenance of equipment assume the nature of experimental scientific research.

Control of troops and naval forces is experiencing a true revolution in response to scientific-technical progress. The sharp increase in the volume of information

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that must support decision making in every unit of the military organism, the decrease in time to process and analyze this information, the need for minimizing possible errors, and the need for maintaining control over decision making in vast areas require the application of science to control of troops and naval forces. Optimization of this process is one of the pressing problems of military affairs.

Development of scientifically grounded methods of armed struggle is an extremely important area of science's influence upon military affairs today. While the natural and technical sciences have the greatest influence on development of military technology and the social sciences play the decisive role in formation of scientific methods for indoctrination and training of unit and ship personnel, the level of military science is most important to development of the ways and means of armed struggle. The invasion of precise quantitative methods into military theory has great significance. The effectiveness of modeling methods, of the use of computer technology permits us to analyze the methods of armed struggle not empirically but scientifically, with the most accurate possible prediction of the future.

2. Scientific-Technical Progress--One of the Sources of the Modern Revolution in Military Affairs

The growing role of science in development of military affairs has expressed itself especially clearly and effectively in the modern revolution in military affairs, which is having a tremendous influence on literally all aspects of military theory and practice. In a particular international political situation and in the presence of a certain economic base, the discoveries of the natural sciences in the first half of the 20th century became the theoretical foundation of fundamental changes in weapons and military equipment, and through them, in all military affairs. The modern revolution in military affairs is essentially the first historic example of the direct participation of science in qualitative transformations of this scale.

As with all other forms of human activity, military affairs develop in the form of gradual, barely noticeable quantitative changes, and in the form of abrupt fundamental, qualitative transformations. The latter vary in scale, and they embrace sectors of military theory and practice of varying significance. Changes which do not affect the fundamental, significant elements of all military affairs lead to qualitative transformations in certain relatively independent areas of military affairs. An example of this in military aviation was the transition to jet engines. Although the appearance of jet aircraft did have an effect on the development of military affairs, it could not and did not produce a revolutionary change in military affairs in general. Such a change can occur only on the basis of qualitative transformations of an all-embracing nature. "...revolution," emphasized Lenin, "is a transformation which breaks down the old in the most fundamental way; it does not alter it consciously, slowly, or gradually, in an effort to break down as little as possible...."⁶

Revolutionary transformations may occur in military affairs on the basis of fundamental changes in both the social quality of war and the resources of armed struggle, especially the weapons. In the former case a qualitative change in the "human material" elicits an entire series of transformations in all other elements of military affairs--in technology, in strategy, in organization of troops and naval forces, and so on.

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As an example birth of the free French citizen no longer restrained by the feudal yoke was the foundation of the victory of Napoleon's army in the first period of its existence, when it fought for the ideals of bourgeois democracy, against feudal reaction.

Fundamental changes in the social qualities of the "human material" reveal themselves even more clearly in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. The emergence of a new man in the historical arena, one free of all exploitation, and confirmation of socialism became the foundation of our army's brilliant victories in the savage battles against the enemies of the Soviet state.

As we can see, the modern revolution in military affairs is typified mainly by fundamental changes in weapons and military equipment. History is aware of a number of changes in this area which led in the final analysis to revolutionary transformation of all military affairs. They include invention and introduction of fire weapons, motorization of the army and, finally, appearance of nuclear missiles. The significance of science increased continuously in each of these stages. While fire weapons arose on an empirical basis and motorization of the army made extensive utilization of science necessary, the creation of nuclear missiles depended entirely upon science. Science was one of the roots of the revolutionary changes that have occurred in military affairs today.

As any "man-machine" system develops, the functions between these elements undergo redistribution. In a primitive system man performs the absolute majority of functions. As the machine improves, the situation changes, and responsibilities which had formerly been carried exclusively by man are turned over to the machine more and more. This raises the effectiveness of the entire system and increases the level of labor mechanization and automation. While automation affects operations based on the use of man's physical capabilities, automation has to do with mental operations--that is, it affects predominantly the control processes. Naturally, automation became possible only in the conditions created by the modern scientific-technical revolution, which is by essence associated with integrated automation of control.

This pertains to weapon systems as well. Their principal element is the means of destruction, the power of which defines the effectiveness of the entire system. Weapons are subdivided depending on the nature of the energy used to place the means of destruction into action into silent, fire, and nuclear. It would not be difficult to note that the revolution in military affairs which began with the arisal of fire weapons and the modern revolution in military affairs associated with the appearance of nuclear weapons had creation of fundamentally new means of destruction as their points of initiation.

Consequently the internal logic of improvements in a "man--military equipment" system (and, on its foundation, in all of military affairs) rests upon two highly important principles: the principle of mechanization and automation, eliciting redistribution of functions in the system between man and a technical device, and the principle of the decisive role of the means of destruction in relation to the effectiveness of the entire system. The modern scientific-technical revolution is having its influence on both of these factors.

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We can distinguish at least three areas of science that deeply influence modern military affairs. One of them is atomic physics. Use of atomic energy led to the creation of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. These theories became the scientific basis for efforts aimed at practical release of the tremendous energy of the atom. Owing to the Communist Party's forward development of Soviet science, and to the existence of a remarkable school of Soviet physicists, a most important scientific-technical and defense task--neutralizing the USA's monopoly over atomic weapons--was completed in limited time, and the atom was placed in the service of the defense of peace and the socialist fatherland against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

The birth and swift growth of aerodynamics and, later, rocket dynamics had a tremendous influence on military affairs. Arisal of the theory of aircraft flight gave a powerful thrust to development of aviation and missiles. Fundamental work was done in this area by the remarkable domestic scientists N. Ye. Zhukovskiy and K. E. Tsiolkovskiy. Academician S. P. Korolev, who took part in the first efforts to design Soviet missiles, made an outstanding contribution to the area.

Cybernetics, which arose to a certain extent due to the demands of military practice, mainly air defense, had decisive significance to revolutionary transformations in control resources. The ideas of cybernetics were developed by scientists of different countries, including N. Wiener, K. Shannon, and other scientists. The Soviet school of mathematics and logics played a great role in the origin and development of cybernetics. The outstanding Soviet mathematician A. N. Kolmogorov contributed imported ideas to cybernetics. Theoretical conclusions enjoyed swift technical realization. The first electronic computer was designed soon after the war--in 1946. Then three generations of computers appeared. Now there are more than 100,000 electronic computers in the world. Mankind now stands on the threshold of a new, fourth generation of computers.

First atomic and then thermonuclear bombs were created in the first stage of the modern military-technical revolution. Strategic bombers continued to be their delivery systems. The second stage was associated with the appearance of missiles as the means for delivering nuclear ammunition. The third stage is characterized by a qualitative turning point in control of troops and naval forces, expressed in full automation of command and control. These stages were not clearly delimited from one another. We must not think that attention was devoted in the first stage exclusively to the means of destruction and in the second stage to just the delivery systems alone. The process of qualitative changes in military affairs was significantly more complex, and these stages of the military-technical revolution reflect primarily the internal orientation of the development of military affairs, the dominant trend, the preferential rate of improvement of some particular element of military affairs, and the concrete tasks of military development in different periods.

The basic stages of the modern revolution in military affairs cannot validly be reduced to the moment of arisal of new technology alone. Inasmuch as a fundamental transformation in one of the elements of a "man-machine" system leads to redistribution of functions between the main components of such a system, and in the end to qualitative changes in the entire system, in its possibilities and effectiveness, and in the means of its use on the battlefield, fundamental changes occurred in all areas of military affairs in each of the stages named above. The military-technical

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revolution cannot proceed in isolation from these other areas, and it inevitably leads to revolutionary transformations in military affairs as a whole. As far as the term "military-technical revolution" itself is concerned, it naturally does have a right to exist, but its content is narrower than that of the concept "revolution in military affairs".

Introduction of the latest scientific-technical achievements and discoveries into military affairs is continuing. The achievements of supersonic aerodynamics have made a new step possible in aviation. Chemistry is giving birth to many new materials exhibiting high mechanical strength, heat resistance, acid resistance, and other highly important properties. Work in solid state physics is helping us to dramatically improve the technical characteristics of metals and other traditional materials. Since the moment of its arisal in the 1950's, quantum electronics has attracted the attention of specialists interested in the possibility of broadly utilizing its successes in various areas of technology including, as follows from foreign press reports, the military area.

Considering the trends of scientific-technical progress, we can distinguish two most important directions in which modern military affairs are improving.

The first direction is associated with utilization of already known laws of nature, scientific-technical achievements, and discoveries. It manifests itself as the continuing development of existing armament systems, having nuclear missiles at their core. As an example we can expect further improvement of nuclear warheads and missiles. According to Western press figures the family of ballistic missiles in the imperialist armies is exhibiting a tendency toward further differentiation in terms of purpose, power, range, and accuracy: the prospects for launching missiles with different types of equipment and under different conditions are broadening; the dependability, covertness, and invulnerability of launching complexes are rising, and their maintenance is growing simpler.

The conventional forms of armament are improving as well. Broad horizons have been opened before tanks, military aviation, conventional artillery, infantry weapons, all types of transportation resources, and other types of military equipment. Full automation of command and control offers tremendous possibilities. The areas into which major automated control systems are being introduced are growing in number, and continual improvement of such systems is making optimization of the control of military equipment and the actions of troops and naval forces possible. Progress in control automation will have an influence on the development of all military affairs.

Combat actions in Southeast Asia and in the Near East in the 1960's-1970's brought back the "old" question as to the dialectics of the struggle between offensive and defensive weapons with renewed vigor. These actions demonstrated the high effectiveness of modern antiaircraft and antitank defense resources, and they correspondingly promoted the problem of improving the protective properties of aviation and tanks. Solution of this problem requires active research in technical and operational respects. Changes have also been noted in the tactics of the ground troops. As an example the role of the long-range fire battle has risen. These and other trends have become possible in combat practice only owing to the achievements of science and technology.

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The second direction in development of military affairs is associated with new scientific and technical discoveries. Discovery of previously unknown laws of nature and the penetration of science into unexplored regions are capable of leading to fundamentally new ways of transforming not only individual forms of military equipment but also the entire system of armament, which would produce a new, revolutionary change in military affairs. It is practically impossible to precisely predict events of such a scale, but their basic probability cannot be doubted. Swiftly developing science is in a position to evoke creation of types of weapons of ever-increasing power.

Examining the prospects for development of military technology, we should not forget that there is no absolute limit to its improvement from the scientific-technical point of view. Such a limit may be imposed only through the exclusion of wars from the life of society, through universal and total disarmament. This means that such development is associated with world sociopolitical relations. The consistent struggle of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity to halt the arms race and initiate disarmament has tremendous significance to mankind's progress in this regard.

Noting the hopelessness of the attempts by militant circles of the USA to achieve military supremacy over the Soviet Union through the creation of new weapons of mass annihilation, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov writes: "Those who plan to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union with the help of such a weapon should remember that our country's economy, science, and technology are at such a high level today that we are in a position to create, within the shortest time, any type of weapon upon which the enemies of peace may wish to rest their hopes. The Soviet Union has declared many times that this is not the road we wish to travel. This is precisely why it suggested to the United States that we refrain, on a mutual basis, from developing new forms and systems of weapons."⁷

Much has already been done on the initiative of fraternal socialist countries in the struggle to halt the arms race and begin disarmament. Thus the international Convention on Prohibition and Destruction of Bacteriological Weapons was written, signed, and enacted on the basis of a draft submitted by the USSR and other states of the socialist fraternity. In recent years the United Nations adopted, on suggestion of the Soviet Union, important resolutions aimed at restraining the arms race and prohibiting the development and production of new types of mass destruction weapons, and new systems of such weapons.

But the arms race is continuing to grow in imperialist states goaded on by aggressive circles. This obligates the Soviet Union to constantly concern itself with strengthening its defense capabilities and providing the armed forces with everything they need for socialism's dependable protection, at the same time that it is fighting for peace and disarmament.

3. Science as an Element of a State's Military Power and as a Factor of Victory in War

Growth in the role of science in military affairs has led, as we saw, to the fact that science has become one of the independent elements of a state's military power,

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an important prerequisite of victory in war. This was reflected mainly in the category "military-scientific potential".

Military-scientific potential can be defined as the capacity and readiness of science to effectively participate in the effort to reinforce a state's military power, as required by its class essence and political needs. In this case a country's military power, when viewed in this aspect, depends not only on the level of development of military science and on the concrete research being conducted by various scientific institutions in behalf of the army, but also on the possibilities of science in general for influencing military affairs. The concept "military-scientific potential" includes not some isolated sectors of science, but all scientific knowledge, the sum total of science. This means that the status of science in a state, the particular discoveries of scientists, and the achievements of technical thought predetermine a country's military power in conjunction with the state's economic and sociopolitical status, its moral forces, and its specifically military possibilities.

Consequently military-scientific potential is a country's scientific potential used in the interests of raising its military power.

The qualitative and quantitative characteristics of scientific development influence military power. The former include gnoseological, social, and organizational characteristics of science.

The influence science has on a country's military power is governed mainly by its general gnoseological maturity--that is, by the depth to which it has penetrated into the laws of nature, society, and thinking. This property of science depends not only on the level of scientific knowledge but also on its social orientation.

In socialism, the goals of all society and science are one, and scientists do not face the threat that the results of their scientific research would be alienated and utilized to the detriment of society. In a socialist state, transformation of science into a direct productive force proceeds in an especially favorable situation. "We, the communists," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "base ourselves on the fact that only in socialist conditions can the scientific-technical revolution acquire a valid orientation reflecting the interests of the individual and society. In turn, it is only on the basis of accelerated development of science and technology that the final goal of the social revolution can be reached--development of communist society."⁸

The activities of scientists in a socialist country are glorified by the light of the high ideals of the new society's development, and protection of the revolutionary achievements of the laborers, as well as the peace and security of peoples on the whole planet. Aware of their noble mission, they experience the most profound personal responsibility for continually strengthening the defense capabilities of the socialist state and of the entire fraternity of socialist countries--the hope and bulwark of the progressive forces of civilization.

By its nature, capitalist society cannot create such a favorable social atmosphere for scientific creativity. In such society, science is subordinated mainly to the interests of monopolies and military-industrial complexes, the goals of which

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are antipopular, aimed against social progress. Imperialism uses many creations of human genius not for the benefit but to the detriment of mankind, which places a heavy moral burden upon scientists. The entire world is aware of the tragedy of the great scientist and humanitarian A. Einstein, who submitted a proposal in October 1939 to hasten creation of the atomic bomb, seeing within it a means of self-defense in the case of an atomic threat from fascism.⁹ However, his expectations did not bear out. The imperialist circles of the USA had different plans--using atomic weapons in their attempts to establish their world domination, and exert political pressure upon the Soviet Union and then upon other socialist countries.

One important qualitative indicator of military-scientific potential is the level of organization of science, and the possibilities for planning scientific research on a statewide scale.

The scientific research and experimental design institutions that work specifically on military problems are an inherent organizational element of science. As long as science was not directly responsible for development of military affairs, it was not necessary to create a special network of scientific research organizations with a military profile. Today the situation has changed. This is why a system of military scientific research institutions has been developed and is presently functioning with a number of objectives in mind: first, to assess the latest achievements of science, primarily the fundamental discoveries, from the standpoint of their possible application to military affairs; to predict the long-range future of the development of military affairs in general, and of individual forms of weapons and military equipment, tactics, and the processes of controlling troops and naval forces; second, to predict the immediate prospects for development of military affairs, to manage planning organizations, to plan and evaluate their activities, to develop the specifications of particular models of weapons and military equipment, and so on. The relationship between science and military practice achieves concrete form at this level.

In addition to qualitative indicators, there are also quantitative indicators of military-scientific potential. This division is rather conditional. In real processes of life, there are no boundaries delimiting something as exclusively qualitative or quantitative. To one extent or another the qualitative aspect of objects and phenomena reflects their quantitative character, while on the other hand their quantitative aspect reflects their quality as well. However, the study of the quantitative and qualitative indicators of objects and phenomena is proceeding nonuniformly. And yet we can evaluate military potential as an element of any state's military power only by comparing it with the similar potential of other countries, in both qualitative and quantitative respects. Isolation, within the structure of the military-scientific potential, of qualitative and quantitative characteristics permits us to see the parameters which do yield to mathematical computation right now.

The quantitative indicators of military-scientific potential include the availability of information, materials, and equipment to science, and the number of scientists capable of successfully solving complex problems.

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Soviet science possesses highly qualified personnel. The country contains about 1.3 million scientists, or about a fourth of all of the world's scientists. Of them, about 350,000 are candidates and more than 34,000 are doctors of sciences. The number of scientific institutions exceeds 5,300. This is an expression of the Communist Party's constant concern for developing science, and of the organic tie existing between socialism and science.

The volume of scientific information is growing extremely fast today. Each hour, 15-20 inventions are born on the globe. Just in the USSR alone about 50,000 are registered each year. Each year, according to foreign sources, the publication volume of printed material--scientific and patent--totals about 10 million titles. It is entirely obvious that the wealth of scientific information presupposes efficient organization of its use. A unified state system of scientific-technical information is undergoing active development in our country. It is being serviced by 155,000 persons. About 5 million scientists and specialists utilize the services of this system. A significant impact is anticipated from introducing automated scientific-technical information retrieval systems.

One significant indicator of the possibilities of science is the material-technical support given to it--mainly financing and supply of equipment for experiments. The finances allocated to scientific research and development in the USSR are growing constantly. The outlays on science increased in 1965-1975 by 2.5 times in our country.¹⁰

The amount of support given to Soviet science in terms of personnel, information, materials, and equipment attests to the tremendous possibilities of science's influence upon the most diverse areas of social life, including military affairs. The task of making effective use of these possibilities for further reinforcement of the country's defense capabilities is being worked on at different levels and through different means: through state planning of scientific research and planning-design work, through realization of the potential of the system of military scientific research and planning-design institutions, and through augmentation of the productivity of scientific explorations conducted by military researchers and planners.

The scientific potential of a country is channeled toward military needs in peacetime to the extent warranted by concrete historic circumstances. In war, science is switched to satisfaction of military needs to a significantly greater degree. In accordance with this, the state's military power increases and science becomes a factor of victory over the enemy.

A clear example of complete development and use of the possibilities of Soviet science in defense of socialism can be found in its contribution to the defeat of fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War.

From the moment Nazi Germany attacked our country, the CPSU led a tremendous amount of organizational work aimed at switching all scientific research and experimental design activity from a peacetime to a wartime posture. The task of science was to concentrate the entire power of Russia's technology, its colossal natural wealth, and the mighty talent of our scientists and designers upon the aggressor.

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One of the most important directions in which the contribution of Soviet science to the defeat of fascism manifested itself especially tangibly was improvement of weapons and military equipment. The army and navy were known to possess many superior models of armament even before the war. As an example Soviet designers had developed an original type of combat vehicle--the T-34 medium tank, which had no equals in the world in terms of its specifications. Soviet artillery, many models of which were significantly superior to fascist models, was distinguished by high quality. Even prior to the war, jet apparatus was being designed by the Scientific Institute of Jet Research of the Workers and Peasants Red Army (RNII RKKA), organized in 1933. Creation of the BM-13 ("Katyusha") rocket launcher was an outstanding achievement of this institute.¹¹ We also possessed other highly effective armament.

The effort to improve weapons and military equipment continued energetically throughout the entire war. Almost all armament in our army underwent qualitative change. The assault rifle became the most widespread weapon in the infantry. New machine gun systems, 160-mm mortars, and improved artillery pieces appeared. A number of characteristics of medium and heavy tanks were improved. Rocket artillery and aviation took a large step forward. Naval equipment also developed. As with the T-34 tank, our rocket artillery, Il-2 and Il-10 ground-attack aircraft, and other forms of weapons and military equipment were superior to foreign models. Ammunition characteristics were improved. Creation of the sub-caliber projectile had great significance to the fight against tanks.

Scientific explorations were extremely effective during the war. There was a close tie between theoretical and applied research. The leading scientists actively participated in the solution of concrete problems arising before the army and navy.

Thus as speeds became greater, aviation found itself faced by sudden disintegration of its airplanes due to arising of a unique sort of vibrations--flutter. A group of scientists headed by M. V. Keldysh was ordered to study this phenomenon. He developed a mathematical theory of flutter, practical application of which helped to achieve dependable protection of high-speed airplanes against the arising of vibrations. The outstanding Soviet mathematician Academician A. N. Kolmogorov, who applied probability theory to his work, was able to determine the most advantageous dispersal of artillery projectiles.¹² In just a few days, colleagues of the Institute of Physical Problems prepared recommendations on the sensible and safe disarmament of unexploded high-explosive bombs. A group of scientists headed by A. P. Aleksandrov and I. V. Kurchatov successfully dealt with the complex problem of demagnetizing warships, which increased their resistance to contactless (magnetic) mines actively employed by the enemy.¹³ Academicians A. F. Ioffe and A. I. Berg worked on the scientific-technical problems of air defense at the beginning of the war.

The most important direction of scientific activity was represented by a series of projects aimed at raising the effectiveness of industry and agriculture in wartime, as well as on mobilizing natural resources for defensive purposes.

During the war, Soviet science managed to successfully solve a number of complex problems associated with fundamentally improving production processes. Indicative in this regard is production of liquid oxygen. The war raised the demand for it

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considerably. Oxygen was needed by metallurgy, chemistry, aviation and tank industry, and munitions industry. Academician P. L. Kapitsa and his colleagues created, within the shortest possible time, the world's largest and most productive turbine-operated liquid oxygen producing unit. Such facts may be cited in relation to practically every production sector.

All of this permits the conclusion that Soviet science deserves great credit for our industry's wartime production of 137,000 airplanes, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 488,000 guns.¹⁴

The Communist Party constantly took steps to increase the state's scientific potential. Despite the extremely burdensome conditions of the war years, scientific research developed more and more broadly in the country. Much concern was shown for retaining scientific personnel. Scientists were called back from the operating army, which many of them joined voluntarily in the first days and months of the war.

Evacuation of scientific institutions from Moscow, Leningrad, and other major cities threatened by the enemy resulted in concentration of scientific work in the eastern and southern regions of the country. An entire network of large, authoritative scientific centers subsequently came into being in those areas. The total number of institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences increased to 143 during the war. The Kirghiz, West Siberian, and Kazan' branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences were opened. The Armenian, Uzbek, and Azerbaijan branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences were reorganized into republic academies of sciences. The academies of sciences held regular sessions, and they selected new academicians and corresponding members.

During the war our country began to actively study the nuclear problem. Specifically, projects that had been underway in the prewar years in different cities of the Soviet Union were continued. In February 1943 a small group of physicists in Moscow led by I. V. Kurchatov resumed research on the release of nuclear energy. A decision of the Soviet government created the Moscow Physics Laboratory, which was later reorganized as the Institute of Atomic Energy.¹⁵ The development of events demonstrated that activation of efforts in this area was timely.

The advantages of the socialist structure over the capitalist structure manifested themselves in the tremendous successes enjoyed by Soviet science during the Great Patriotic War. They included, first of all, state organization of science, its centralized control, the enthusiasm and creative boldness of scientists, their high patriotism, and their sense of social responsibility. Today as well, science is one of the forces promoting development of military affairs, and it is an important element of the state's military power, and of the combat readiness and battleworthiness of the army and navy.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 47.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 23, p 383.

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3. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 46, Part 2, p 215.
4. PRAVDA, 27 February 1976.
5. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 9, p 156.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 222.
7. KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1977, p 18.
8. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 47.
9. See Yung, R., "Yarche tysyachi solnts" [Brighter Than a Thousand Suns], Moscow, 1960, pp 80-81.
10. Computed from data cited in "SSSR v tsifrakh v 1975 godu" [The USSR in Figures in 1975], Moscow, 1976, p 69.
11. See Glushko, V. P., "Razvitiye raketostroyeniya i kosmonavtiki v SSSR" [Development of Missile Building and Cosmonautics in the USSR], Moscow, 1973, pp 20-21.
12. See Komkov, G. D., Levshin, B. V., and Semenov, L. K., "Akademiya nauk SSSR. Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk" [USSR Academy of Sciences. A Short Historical Study], Moscow, 1974, p 354.
13. See Astashenkov, P. T., "Akademik I. V. Kurchatov" [Academician I. V. Kurchatov], Moscow, 1971, pp 141-164.
14. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, p 644.
15. See Petros'yants, A. M., "Ot nauchnogo poiska k atomnoy promyshlennosti" [From Scientific Exploration to Atomic Industry], Moscow, 1970, pp 23-24.

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CHAPTER XII

MILITARY SCIENCE AS A FACTOR OF WAR

In the conduct of war, as in any other form of purposeful activity, people guide themselves by knowledge acquired in the course of social practice. Knowledge has been accumulated in military affairs since Antiquity, it has been handed down from generation to generation, it has been utilized in wars, and it has always been an important factor of victory. The birth of military science raised the role of this knowledge even more as a resource used by the military-political leadership to train the army and achieve the goals of war.

1. The Dependence of the Role of Military Science on the Nature of Social Relations

The significance of military science to development of military affairs and to victory in war stems directly from two important circumstances: first, the basic characteristics and features of war, and its requirements on people, and secondly, the maturity of military science, and its correspondence to the nature of war. These circumstances are organically and mutually related. Their roots lie in the material foundation of the life of society--in the means of production of material blessings. Development of productive forces and production relations causes transformations in the equipment available to armies, changes in their strength and in the quality of their personnel, and growth in the complexity of all military affairs, including the processes of war. Under the influence of these causes, military knowledge broadens and deepens, and its role in preparations for and conduct of war, and in the achievement of victory, grows. This objective trend can be traced throughout the entire history of class society. It has constantly served as a powerful stimulus for improving our knowledge of warfare.

Ariseal of military science was a response to certain social needs stemming, in the final analysis, from the economic foundation of antagonistic society. The social function of military science was immediately directed in this case at arming the classes of exploitation with a theory of army training and of waging wars against competing states and against peoples not wishing to endure their oppression submissively. The classes of exploitation have always interpreted military theory as a means of enslaving and plundering the laborers.

Developing under the influence of social factors, with time military science began to have an increasingly greater influence upon the course and outcome of wars. If

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we are to reveal at least some of the factors of this complex process and correctly assess the significance of military science today, we would need to examine the most important historic stages in improvement of military knowledge.

As we know, the rudiments of military theory appeared in deep Antiquity. The historians of that time described wars as individual engagements, philosophers tried to gain an understanding of the essence of these events, and certain intellectuals strived to generalize the experience of warfare and provide recommendations to military leaders on leadership of troops on the battlefields. However, the military knowledge of the ancient world was not yet a science. In general it represented a prescientific, empirical level of cognition of the processes of war, containing only the elements of military theory.

This state of military-theoretical thought persisted for many centuries, and it was not until the 18th century that an intense process of formalization of military knowledge into a more or less harmonious system was begun, and development of military science on the basis of bourgeois philosophy was started. Development of productive forces, broad use of gunpowder, and creation of fire weapons with which infantry could be suitably armed played a decisive role in this. Gunpowder, noted Engels, created a turning point in all military affairs.¹ On the other hand the needs of industry and the demand for social transformations provided a powerful stimulus to development of the natural and social sciences, and creation of the general method of philosophy, which could not but have an influence on military thought. Formation of military science was associated especially closely with the activities of G. Lloyd, K. von Bulow, Napoleon, H. Jomini, K. Clausewitz, Peter I, P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, and other military officials.

In the imperialist era, increasingly greater attention began to be devoted in capitalist countries to military science as a theory on the use of the resources of armed violence. Growth in productive forces and a high rate of scientific-technical progress made it possible for the bourgeoisie, the aggressiveness of which increased steadfastly, to transform military affairs into a highly complex, highly developed "homicidal industry",² in which the latest achievements of scientific-technical thought began to be utilized at a greater scale.

Military science functions in imperialist conditions as a particular unit of the system of knowledge concerned with organizing and training bourgeois armies and studying the methods and forms of conducting military actions in aggressive wars. In the past, bourgeois military science was also utilized in certain just wars, which the bourgeoisie was compelled to wage for particular, concrete reasons. However, in today's situation the reactionary military machine of the imperialist states is developing military science primarily for the purposes of unjust, predatory wars against socialist countries and young national states, and for the export of counter-revolution and suppression of revolutionary movements.

Bourgeois military science is typified by internal contradiction and limitation of the capacity for resolving many fundamental problems, due to its reactionary social orientation and the faults in its methodological foundations. The class position of Western military theorists hinders scientific understanding of the essence of war as a complex sociopolitical phenomenon, and it encourages assumption of an idealistic and metaphysical path leading to the rejection of the objective laws of war. As a result of this, bourgeois military theory finds itself devoid of a

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scientific foundation, the place of which is substituted by idealistic and metaphysical conceptions of war, and by subjective viewpoints on military affairs. Bourgeois military science essentially boils down to the conduct of military actions and army training, to substantiation of the art of war. It represents most fully the applied, military-technical side, and concurrently an integrated, truly scientific military theory is lacking. This is an indication that it is impossible, from the positions of the reactionary class interests of the bourgeoisie and without a scientific methodology, to completely surmount the narrowly empirical approach to the problems of warfare, or to close the gap between military science on one hand and a correct understanding of social life and the subjectivism and adventurism of the military strategy of imperialism associated with this on the other.

The class and methodological limitation of bourgeois military science is especially evident in its relationship, for example, to problems associated with clarifying the role of the popular masses in modern warfare. The antipopular nature of imperialist policy, which has unjust wars as its continuation by violent means, is sharply inconsistent with the need for using millions of laborers in a modern war. Fear of the popular masses, without which it is impossible to wage a war, often generated attempts in bourgeois military theory to prove the possibility that wars could be conducted successfully by small but technically well equipped armies, and even by forces using just one type of weapon alone. Military practice totally refutes metaphysical theories of this sort.

The ruling circles of the imperialist states are trying to isolate the personnel of the armed forces from political life, systematically brainwashing them with bourgeois ideology and politics. The idea that war is supposedly only an armed struggle, and therefore that the army has supposedly no reason to participate in political life is utilized for these purposes.

Though bourgeois military science may be limited, this does not provide the grounds for underestimating it as one of the implements of imperialist reaction. Relying upon the experience of military actions, Western military theorists are revealing, on an empirical level, some recurring relationships in armed conflict, though they do reject existence of objective laws of war. Bourgeois military science has quite thoroughly developed the principles of military development and the art of war, principles in keeping with the requirements of modern military action and the political objectives of imperialist states. Much manpower and money is expended on creating new technical resources for managing war and weapon systems. Great significance is attached to the ideological and psychological training of the personnel, and to class-based selection of servicemen for the most decisive positions of the imperialist armies, especially in subunits and units outfitted with the most powerful weapons.

Western military thought has enjoyed certain achievements in its research on the forms and methods of modern military actions. It is carefully studying the conduct of nuclear war, the use of various resources of mass destruction, and various military actions in local wars, and it is providing the appropriate recommendations. Bourgeois military science is acting in close contact with scientific research institutions. All of this means that in the event of imperialist aggression, our armed forces and the armies of other states in the socialist fraternity will have to deal with a formidable enemy.

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A qualitatively new stage in the historic development of military-theoretical thought was arising of Soviet military science. This was the product of, first, creation and broad dissemination of Marxism, of a materialistic understanding of development of society among the masses of the working class, which made it possible to reveal the essence and laws governing social processes; secondly, it was the product of the victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia and the birth of the world's first socialist state, which had to wage a just war against internal counter-revolution and foreign imperialist intervention under the guidance of the Communist Party from the very first days of its existence. The young Country of the Soviets found itself facing the vitally important task of developing a military theory reflecting the needs of socialism's defense.

Naturally, arising of a new, Soviet military science cannot be interpreted as some sort of single act taking place in a short time. In reality, it was a lengthy process. Its roots extend to the time of Marx and Engels, who laid the ideological-theoretical foundation of the working class's military science. The founders of Marxism clarified the role of violence in history and revealed the basic laws governing development of military affairs and their dependence on the level of productive forces and the nature of production relations. Engels is highly credited with developing a teaching on the dependence of the means of warfare on economic and political conditions, and a teaching on the role of people and military leaders in war. He reexamined, from the positions of dialectical materialism, a number of highly important categories of military science contemporary to him, and a number of premises in strategy and tactics.

Engels based his assessment of historic development of military knowledge on the fact that major social transformations inevitably lead to changes in military science. He foresaw that liberation of the proletariat would evoke a new means of warfare and a new military science. "Emancipation of the proletariat...", wrote Engels, "would express itself in a special way in military affairs, and create a special, new method of war."³ Later on he wrote: "The outstanding innovations Napoleon made in military science cannot be surmounted by a miracle; the new military science will be as necessary a product of new social relations as was the military science created by the revolution and Napoleon, which was the inevitable result of new relations born of the revolution."⁴

The ideological-theoretical premises of the working class's military science, developed by Marx and Engels, enjoyed further development in the works of V. I. Lenin; they were also embodied in the practical military activities of the bolshevik party and the army of a new type which it created. The great leader of the proletarian revolution, V. I. Lenin, became the founder of Soviet military science, which was brought into being by socialist social relations.

Considering the objective need for revolutionary violence by the laborers in their struggle against the reactionary violence of the exploiters, Lenin attached tremendous significance to the use of military science by the proletariat. According to N. I. Podvoyskiy he said the following just prior to Great October: "How strong the revolution has grown!... Now the main thing is to control it in such a way as to win, and without applying military science, we cannot win."⁵

In a situation where the victorious proletariat still did not possess its own established military science, as its first step the working class had to master the achievements of bourgeois military thinking. It was faced by the task, Lenin said,

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of "combining the enthusiasm and the new revolutionary creativity of the oppressed with the use of that reserve of bourgeois science and technology of militarism in their worst forms, without which it cannot master modern technology and modern war strategy..."⁶ Lenin encouraged regular party members to diligently study military affairs, and he himself served as a remarkable example of studying, creatively developing, and using military theory.

Lenin revealed the essence, nature, and types of wars of the imperialist era and the main factors decisively influencing the fate of military encounters, and he studied the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relationship of the military power of the warring sides. Lenin's works contained clear premises demonstrating the intimate relationship of a state's military power to its economic and sociopolitical structure and its economic and cultural level. Masterfully utilizing dialectics, V. I. Lenin demonstrated that people possessing high morale and competently handling modern weapons and military equipment are the main force of victory in war.

Lenin made a tremendous contribution to problems associated with the conduct of operations and battles. Leading the actions of the Soviet republic's army on the fronts of the civil war, he emphasized the significance of the offensive, he demanded reinforcement of the troop rear and protection of the lines of communication, and he required strict adherence to the principle of concentrating men and equipment at the decisive point at the decisive moment, use of the entire diversity of the forms and methods of military actions, and attainment of surprise in operations and battles. Lenin showed himself to be a great politician and strategist in determining the principal danger and the axis of the main strike in different phases of the civil war.

Soviet military science began its road at the level attained by military-theoretical thought in previous eras. Concurrently, at the moment of its arisal, it began to acquire traits and unique features which made it a qualitatively new step in military theory. These traits reveal themselves as early as in the years of foreign military intervention and civil war in Russia, and then they were developed in the period of peaceful socialist construction, in the Great Patriotic War, and in the postwar period, when fundamental transformations in military affairs associated with the scientific-technical revolution played themselves out in their entirety.

One typical trait and unique feature of Soviet military science is that it has new social relations at its sociopolitical basis, ones excluding exploitation of one man by another, and antagonistic contradictions between classes within the country. The socialist structure provides military science with unprecedented possibilities for moving ahead, and at the same time it imposes high requirements upon it, stemming from the objective need of military defense of socialism.

The social functions of Soviet military science differ fundamentally from the social functions of bourgeois military science. While bourgeois military science is in the service of the exploiters, Soviet military science is an instrument of the state's protection in the hands of the laborers. In its theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations, it relies upon the will, energy, and creativity of the popular masses, which are ready, in the words of the well known Soviet troop commander S. S. Kamenev, to not simply make war but to fight for victory in the full sense of the word.⁷ The possibility of relying confidently on the revolutionary energy of the laborers makes Soviet military science bold and decisive in its consideration and resolution of the pressing problems of military affairs.

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The progressive sociopolitical foundation of Soviet military science creates favorable conditions for developing and using maximally effective methods and forms of war. Preparation for aggression against the countries of socialism by imperialist reaction obliges the Soviet Armed Forces to be fully prepared to defeat the invaders. This would be possible only if the achievements of science and technology are broadly utilized, if the latest weapons are created and produced, if the personnel master them fully, and if the most suitable tactics of using modern weapons on the battlefield are developed.

Soviet military science feels one of its tasks to be that of studying the art of war of imperialist armies. If we are to be ready to repel and defeat an aggressor, we must know his strong and weak sides. "Everyone will agree," wrote Lenin, "that an army which does not prepare itself to master all of the forms of weapons and all of the resources and tactics which the enemy may possess is unwise or even criminal."⁸

Military science of imperialist states is trying to camouflage its class-bourgeois, antipopular purpose and emphasize its imaginary "neutrality" in relation to all classes and strata of society. In opposition to this, Soviet military science, which serves the interests of the working class and all laborers, openly declares its class, political and, consequently, party approach to the general and particular problems of military affairs as one of its most important principles. The scientifically grounded, progressive policy of the socialist state provides Soviet military science with political goals that are fully consistent with the tasks of socialism's armed defense. Consistent adherence to party principles in Soviet military science is insured by the Communist Party's leadership over all military development in the USSR.

Another trait and unique feature of Soviet military science is that its effectiveness as a factor of victory in war is achieved through the use of scientific, Marxist-Leninist methodology. Armed with a dialectical-materialistic and materialistic understanding of history, our military personnel are capable of deeply analyzing, on a theoretical level, the highly complex ties and relationships existing in modern warfare and in all military affairs. These ties and relationships express themselves in the systems of categories and laws of military science, which serve as the basis for recommendations and rules of practical troop activities. The most general of these rules, ones tested in battle, make up the system of principles of military development and the art of war. Such an approach imparts a harmonious, logical structure to military science, it makes its premises fully substantiated, it insures harmonious unity of theoretical and applied areas, and it excludes a narrow, empirical approach to solving the applied problems of military affairs.

Modern military actions, in which masses of people participate and a tremendous quantity of diverse, complex equipment is employed, cannot be conducted by intuition, without relying on good theory. This is all the more obvious in the face of the still-present threat of nuclear war. Because it relies on scientific methodology and because its premises are practically realized in the activities of the military personnel, Soviet military science is naturally playing an increasing role in strengthening the socialist state's defense capabilities. Able to peer into the future, foresee the nature of possible military actions, and determine in this

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connection the basic requirements upon the personnel, arms, and military equipment, it is one of the most important factors of victory in the event of war.

Finally, another trait and unique feature of Soviet military science is that the spirit of proletarian internationalism is inherent to it. Soviet military science serves the international goals of the working class and the laboring masses-- protection of socialism, peace, and the security of nations. Evidence of this can be found in the entire experience of the struggle waged by the Soviet Union and its armed forces against imperialist aggressors.

The premises of Soviet military science are also utilized by other states of the socialist fraternity in the development and training of their own armies; moreover these premises have enjoyed further development in the practical and theoretical activities of the military personnel of fraternal countries. Soviet military science made up the foundation and principal content of socialism's military science, which was the basis for organizing the joint military activities of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Such are the most significant traits and unique features of Soviet military science. They permit the conclusion that Soviet military science is a theoretical expression and substantiation of the ways and means of armed defense of the socialist fatherland.

An examination of the most important steps in development of military thought affords a possibility for envisioning the objective trend of military science's growing role in the history of wars. Change in social conditions is the root cause of this trend: development of productive forces and improvement of the material base of warfare; revolutionary transformations in the economic structure of society and consequent change in the qualities of army personnel; accumulation of general scientific knowledge; growth in the complexity and depth of the knowledge of war.

These factors led to warfare of a qualitatively different nature. Military personnel were required to have an increasingly greater understanding of the objective laws of war, and solid training in military theory, without which it was difficult to count on success. On the other hand growth in the role of military science as a factory of victory is organically associated with its own development, with the qualitative transformations experienced within itself. The entire history of improvements in military knowledge is a chain of large and small discoveries. Every historic era, every step of military history has contributed something new to military affairs. The principal landmarks along this path, ones which symbolize change in not only specific theoretical premises but also the nature and structure of military knowledge, included, first of all, arising of military science in the late 18th and early 19th centuries on the social basis of the bourgeois structure and bourgeois philosophy, and second, birth of a qualitatively new, Soviet military science on the social foundation of a socialist structure and a Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

2. The Role of Soviet Military Science in Protection of Socialism Against Imperialist Aggression

Throughout its entire history, Soviet military science developed in line with the need for protecting socialism against imperialist aggression. It played an

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enormous role in our army's brilliant victories in the time of foreign military intervention and civil war in Russia, and in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist aggressors. Relying upon the most progressive military science, and improving it, Soviet military personnel proved themselves to all the world to be models of military art overshadowing the most remarkable pages of military history in the pre-October eras.

As Soviet military science developed, its structure underwent modification, and its object of study, its range of problems, and its ties with other eras of knowledge were made more specific.

War viewed as a complex sociopolitical phenomenon is studied by many sciences, each having its own point of view. Historical materialism studies the social nature of wars, their place in society's development, and their influence on social progress, and it provides a sociopolitical description and classification of wars. These questions make up the basic content of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Military history analyzes the course of individual wars, the causes of their arising, and their consequences in each concrete case. Military economics is interested in the influence of wars upon the national economy and in the problems of providing economic support to wars. Military medical science deals with the task of preserving human health, and it studies war from this point of view, and so on.

As far as Soviet military science is concerned, its main attention is concentrated on the issues of military development and on armed struggle as a specific form of human activity following special laws. It should be kept in mind here that the process of warfare also includes within itself certain activities which are not specifically military. V. I. Lenin called these activities military work.⁹ These activities (mobilization and use of the country's material and spiritual resources in the interests of victory, organization of wartime production, and so on) are studied by special sciences. The task of military science in relation to these activities is mainly to reveal, on the basis of an analysis of the nature and unique features of war, the most important requirements they impose on various aspects of social life, and to provide the grounds for the country's defense needs, to be used as the raw data for the activities of the personnel of the socialist state aimed at restructuring its entire life for war.

Thus Soviet military science deals with military activities, which include organization and training of the armed forces, their use in the interests of policy, preparation for and conduct of war, and military preparation of the country for the defeat of any aggressor, including creation of the necessary reserves. For these purposes it generalizes the experience of former military practice (wartime and peacetime), it raises new issues requiring resolution, and it responds to them at the level of scientific-theory. Today, Soviet military science is a complex system of knowledge on the nature and laws of war, of preparing the armed forces and the country for a possible war, and of the means of its conduct. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate methodological basis of Soviet military science.

In order to wage war successfully, we must foresee its character, we must know what sort of weapons will be used, and consequently we must know what the Soviet state

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would need to have if it is to defeat the aggressor. Soviet military thought has managed to provide the correct answers to all of these questions, and thus create a military-theoretical foundation for formation of the Soviet state's military doctrine.¹⁰ Here lies one of the directions of the function of Soviet military science as a factor of successful warfare in defense of socialism.

Another such direction has to do with resolving the concrete problems of the military affairs. Development of the art of war is primary among them. For example the military practice of World War I and the civil war in Russia generated new forms of military action--army and frontal operations--which would not fit within the framework of classical strategy and tactics. A new theory was required, one which represented a middle link between strategy and tactics. The basic premises of this new sector of military science, which came to be called operational art, were first stated and substantiated in the works of Soviet military theorists written in the 1920's and early 1930's. By creating its theory of operational art, Soviet military thought advanced far ahead of bourgeois military science.

This period was also the time of development of the theory of the battle in depth and the operation in depth by Soviet military personnel. This theory was the central link of operational art. It was later absorbed by bourgeois military science. The theory of the operation in depth foresaw striking the entire depth of enemy defenses with the goal of defeating his operational grouping, it accounted for the possibilities of artillery, aviation, and armored troops, and it spelled out the conditions of their most suitable use. It provided a way out of the dead end of static warfare in World War I. The idea of surmounting deeply disposed enemy defenses was incorporated in the 1930's into the operational training of executives and higher staffs of the Red Army.

Relying upon Lenin's fundamental directives and working under the guidance of the Communist Party, in the period between wars Soviet military personnel solved the diverse problems of strengthening the USSR's defense capability and raising the fighting power of the armed forces. These problems included: the nature of the future war; the role of the country's economic development and the moral-political forces of the people and the army in strengthening the state's defense capability; the principles behind the organizational structure of the armed forces, the relationship between the arms and branches of troops and the naval forces, and their role in attaining victory; the forms and methods of military actions in the new conditions; the principles of strategic planning and leadership, and others. The Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of the fundamental ideas of Soviet military theory.

Soviet military thought developed on a broad front during the Great Patriotic War. Lenin's conclusions on the dependence of a country's military power on its social structure, on the paramount influence of policy in warfare, on the need for using diverse forms and methods of armed struggle in accordance with the available weapons, the quality of the personnel, the relationship of the forces of the sides, and the political content of the war, on the decisive significance of the offensive, and the role of defense, on the role of surprise, selection of the axis of the main strike, and concentration of men and equipment at the decisive moment at the decisive point, and many other conclusions served as the starting points for research conducted by Soviet military scholars with the goal of totally defeating the fascist aggressors.

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Several new manuals and regulations were written and published during the war on the basis of the combat experience and military theory. Thus in 1942 the troops received the Field Service Staff Regulations and the Infantry Field Manual. The draft Field Service Regulations, the Manual of Static Defense Penetration, the Manual of Fortified Region Penetration, and other guidelines were published in subsequent years.

Soviet military science played its role as a factor of victory in the Great Patriotic War brilliantly, solving numerous highly complex problems. Here were some of them: selection of the axis of strategic thrusts and counterthrusts; penetration of fortified, deeply disposed enemy defenses; use of a diversity of forms of strategic actions, to include the counteroffensive, encirclement, and division and annihilation of large enemy groupings; maneuver of men and equipment on a strategic scale; striking the enemy at times and in places when he is unprepared. Solution of these and other problems at the theoretical and practical levels had enormous significance to destruction of fascism's war machine.

Let us briefly examine the essence of a number of these problems.

Selection of the axis of the main thrust in a strategic operation was one of the fundamental issues posed to the Supreme High Command Headquarters. Its solution meticulously accounted for the political situation and the political objectives, and it was based on a deep analysis of the relationship of forces, the disposition and composition of enemy troop groupings, and the conditions offered by the theater of war. A creative approach to selecting the axis of the main thrust was an important prerequisite of the success of our offensive operations.

Theoretical solution of the problem of penetrating fortified, deeply disposed enemy defenses had great significance. The basic outlines of the solution were contained in a directive from the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the frontal and army military councils dated 10 January 1942. It turned attention to the need for creating strike groupings insuring superiority over the enemy on the main axes, and more-sensible use of artillery. The old system of artillery preparation, which had become obsolete, had to be abandoned, and a transition had to be made to the practice of the artillery offensive, in which infantry and tanks are supported from the very beginning to the end of a battle.¹¹ This requirement was a concrete expression of the principle of concentrating efforts on the decisive axis. An offensive could produce the required impact only if, the directive emphasized, a large superiority over enemy forces is created in one of the sectors. This goal was achieved by forming the appropriate strike groups in each front and in each army when organizing penetration of hostile defenses.

Implementing and developing these ideas, the Soviet troops successfully surmounted the enemy's lines of defense. Victories were won owing to the high moral-political spirit of our soldiers, their outstanding combat proficiency, the thorough preparation and support of the operations, artful concentration of men and equipment in the breakthrough sectors, dependable suppression of enemy defenses, a swift rate of advance, exploitation of the breakthrough in the direction of the flanks, air support to ground troops, and competent control of formations, units, and subunits.

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The great role played by Soviet science in the defeat of the fascist aggressors manifested itself clearly in the operations conducted by Soviet troops to encircle and annihilate large enemy groupings. These actions were exceptional in terms of their scope and fluidity. What is especially noteworthy is that in a number of cases the enemy was encircled and annihilated when the overall strength of both sides was equal. Such was the case, for example, in the Stalingrad operation of the Soviet troops, which made a decisive contribution to a fundamental turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War and all of World War II.

The operations of our army practically embodied the premises of Soviet military science on maneuver of men and equipment on a strategic scale. During the war the Nazi troops experienced strikes of increasing power. As a rule these strikes were a surprise to the enemy.

In the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military science fully demonstrated its creative nature and its ability to reply quickly to practical needs. It was developed through the efforts of our military personnel at all levels--from the Supreme High Command Headquarters down to the fighting troops themselves. Guiding themselves by Lenin's military-theoretical legacy and the directives of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, Soviet military commanders and all of our officers carefully studied and considered the concrete situation, the objectives and conditions of each operation, the relationship of forces, and the combat proficiency and moral-political state of the troops. Soviet military science persuasively demonstrated its undisputable superiority over military science of fascist Germany and militant Japan.

A remarkable group of Soviet military leaders, whose plans and decisions were distinguished by a creative approach, boldness, broad scope, and profound realism, came into being during the Great Patriotic War. The Communist Party nurtured its troop commanders in the spirit of firm adherence to party principles and a scientific understanding of the mutual relationship between the material and spiritual factors of war, and it demanded that all military personnel deeply penetrate into the phenomena of war and military affairs. The Marxist-Leninist philosophy of dialectical materialism helped Soviet commanders and chiefs find the most suitable decisions in the most complex conditions of war.

In the postwar era the Communist Party continued to devote daily attention to development of Soviet military science, the significance of which to socialism's defense continued to grow.

The role of Soviet military science is growing now because, first of all, modern warfare is drawing unprecedented numbers of people into its orbit. These people must be called up and mobilized for the struggle for victory, they must be organized and trained in moral-political and military-technical respects, and they must be supplied with weapons and military equipment.

The significance of Soviet military science to the course and outcome of war is rising, secondly, in view of fundamental transformations occurring in military affairs. Implementation of major scientific-technical discoveries has resulted in the fact that all branches of the armed forces, all arms and services, and the naval

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forces are saturated with diverse, extremely numerous, complex equipment. It is important to find the best ways to use it. In addition to studying equipment already available, the units and ships are continually assimilating new models of armament. Combination of old and new weapons and military equipment is adding complexity to the combat training of the personnel and to maintaining high combat readiness. Scientific control of the life and activities of the troops, not only at the strategic but also at other levels, is a prerequisite of successful completion of these tasks; this in turn requires deep theoretical development of many problems.

The planning, organization, and conduct of modern operations and battles requires full theoretical substantiation. The nature of operations and battles has changed significantly. The mobility of troop actions has grown dramatically. The idea of the operation in depth has enjoyed further development. While the depth of a number of offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War attained several hundred kilometers, modern military theory recognizes the possibility of conducting strategic operations of incomparably greater depth, essentially embracing the entire territory of a theater of war.

The high mobility of troops, which is continually increasing as new combat transportation resources are created, forces us to reexamine the problems of maneuvering formations and units in a new way, as does the need for quickly exploiting the results of fire strikes. Significant new factors have arisen in the relationship between offense and defense, and in implementation of the principle of concentrating men and equipment in the decisive moment at the decisive point, and of some other principles of the art of war. Life poses new problems before military personnel constantly, and they must be solved in peacetime, so that we would not find ourselves in a difficult position if imperialist aggressors unleash a war against us.

The role of Soviet military science as a factor of victory is also growing, in the third place, due to the tremendous rise in the fighting power of the troops. Modern formations and units are capable of performing complex, large missions in relatively short time, as a result of which the ratio of forces on the front or in some particular sector, and the combat, operational, and even the strategic situation may change dramatically. Thoughtlessness, insufficient substantiation of actions, and their inconsistency with concrete conditions are now much more dangerous than in relation to the former armies of tremendously lower fighting power. Theoretical development of the basic problems of troop activities and the corresponding training of personnel on the basis of progressive military science have become even more pressing today.

All of this says that the military personnel of the socialist state are facing growing responsibility for development of military theory, for success of scientific solution of not only traditional problems but also new ones posed by day-to-day experience, ones which have extremely great significance to protection of socialist achievements from imperialist aggression.

Thus problems associated with the strength of the army, its qualitative composition, its organizational structure, the relationship among different branches of the armed forces, arms and services, and naval forces, and preparation of reserves continue to

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be highly important today. If the activities of not only military personnel but also state organs associated with military development are to be successful, these problems will have to be solved.

There is now tremendous significance to theoretically substantiating the need for creating new armament systems and for making continual improvements on them, as demanded by the state's defense. This is a very complex area of activity. Considering the nature of modern armed struggle, Soviet military science is determining the basic requirements on the types of weapons and military equipment and on weapon systems in general, and it is posing concrete tasks to scientists and designers with a consideration for the country's economic and scientific-technical potentials.

Improvement of the forms and methods of military actions remains at the focus of the attention of our military personnel. Soviet military science recognizes the inevitability of arising of new forms of struggle. It interprets this issue dialectically, in an inseparable association with analysis of the concrete situation and the historic conditions. Hence follow the tasks of not only studying the existing forms and methods of military actions but also determining the basic trends in their development, generated by changes in weapons, equipment, and the quality of the personnel.

Other important areas include improvement of the means for repelling imperialist aggression, no matter where it may originate, and analyzing problems associated with maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces in high combat readiness. These issues have recently acquired new content, and the paths of their theoretical and practical resolution have become more difficult. The criteria for measuring the combat readiness of the armed forces have changed significantly. Soviet military science is actively and purposefully studying the ways to continually improve troop command and control, raise the mobility of the subunits, units, and formations, and improve the forms and methods of their interaction in a combat situation.

The training and indoctrination of armed forces personnel occupy a great place in the system of military scientific research. Studying this area, Soviet military science bases itself on Communist Party directives, and it relies upon a dialectical-materialistic understanding of social life and the possibilities of the individual, on the achievements of pedagogical and psychological thought, and on our knowledge of specifically military activity and the laws of war. One of the fundamental principles of Soviet military development is constant party-political work in the army and navy, and moral-political and psychological training of the personnel.

The creative nature of Soviet military science can be clearly seen in the history of its development. The military science of the socialist state accounts for changes in the social conditions of warfare, in the relationship of forces in the international arena, and in manpower, weapons, and equipment, and it displays purposefulness in its development of new fundamental premises and in determination of new methods and forms of military actions. At the same time it carefully preserves the military experience of the past, especially the experience of the Great Patriotic War, which in many ways has not lost its significance today.

Concurrently with the growing complexity of military affairs, Soviet military science is itself growing continually more complex, becoming more and more

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multifaceted and profound. New subdivisions dealing with new aspects and phenomena of war are forming within it. The mutual relationship between military science and other sciences is growing increasingly closer.

The work of just a few military theorists is not enough to permit effective solution of all of the diverse problems facing Soviet military science. Describing the scientific-technical revolution in the conditions of developed socialism, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "The success of the scientific-technical revolution and its beneficial influence upon the economy and upon all aspects of the life of the society cannot be insured by the efforts of just the scientists alone. Encouragement of all participants of social production, of all units of the economic mechanism to participate in this historically important process is acquiring an increasingly greater role."¹² In application to military science this means that its development and transformation of theoretical premises into practical results require the activities of military leaders, staff, political organs, military scientific research and educational institutions, and all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Creative development of Soviet military science in behalf of the defense of socialism against imperialist aggression does not cease for a single day. It embraces all aspects and subdivisions of military theory, and the entire system of knowledge making it up. Leadership of the Communist Party over all Soviet military development and its constant concern for strengthening the USSR's defense capabilities are the principal guarantee that Soviet military science will continue to be an important factor of socialism's security and of decisive defeat of any aggressor who may dare to unleash a war against us.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, p 171.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 31, p 197.
3. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 7, p 509.
4. Ibid., p 510.
5. KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1957, p 36.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 139.
7. See Kamenev, S. S., "Zapiski o grazhdanskoy voyne i voyennom stroitel'stve" [Notes on the Civil War and Military Development], Moscow, 1963, p 29.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 41, p 81.
9. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 52.
10. See pp 325-327 of this book for more detail on Soviet military doctrine.
11. See Vasilevskiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Lifetime Occupation], Moscow, 1975, pp 168-169.
12. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 48.

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CHAPTER XIII
THE SPIRITUAL FACTOR IN WAR

The spiritual capabilities of people for solving various problems manifest themselves in all forms of their activity. They also play a great role in military affairs, in the course and outcome of war. Moreover this role is constantly growing, and today it is greater than ever before. This can be explained mainly by the need for conscious, competent utilization of the tremendous military power in the hands of different states. The growing influence of the spiritual factor can also be explained by the increasing significance of ideology in all life of the society, by the continually increasing scope of the ideological duel between the two social systems, and by the unique features of modern war.

1. Essence, Structure, and Functions of the Spiritual Factor in War

The significance of the spiritual factor in war and its essence, structure, and function may be correctly revealed and understood only in light of the fundamental Marxist-Leninist premise on the priority of social life in relation to social consciousness, which possesses relative independence and which is capable, in turn, of actively influencing the course of social processes. A number of conclusions applicable to war and military affairs can be made from this premise.

First, analysis of the spiritual factor and its manifestations in war presupposes clarifying the nature and political content of a concrete war. Without this, it would be impossible to see the sociopolitical orientation of the spiritual factor in relation to each of the warring sides. "The social nature of war," Lenin wrote, "and its true significance are defined...by what sort of policy the war is a continuation of ('war is a continuation of policy') and what class is waging the war for what purposes."¹ The causes, goals, and nature of a concrete war directly determine the content and manifestation of the spiritual factor. A just war broadens the spiritual possibilities of the fighting masses, while on the other hand an unjust war dramatically limits and reduces them.

Second, it is important to correctly determine the spiritual factor within the system of other factors responsible for the course and outcome of a war. We know of many cases in which one of these factors has been made absolute. Some bourgeois military sociologists witnessing the accelerating rate of scientific-technical progress show an increasingly greater preference for technology at the expense of

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the individual. At the same time there is another point of view gaining increasingly broader acceptance abroad, in which the spiritual factor of war is made absolute. In particular, this point of view is represented by certain left-wing opportunist conceptions. These outwardly opposite viewpoints are similar in their metaphysical, unscientific nature.

As was noted earlier, Engels discovered and theoretically substantiated the most important law of war, according to which its course and outcome depend on the dialectical unity of "human material" and the economic and material possibilities of states. Lenin also pointed to the need for examining factors influencing war in their dialectical interaction. Criticizing, for example, attempts at making the spiritual factor absolute, he wrote: "We constantly come across references to the heroic patriotism and the miracles of military valor displayed by the French in 1792-1793. But what is forgotten is the material, historic, and economic conditions which could only have made these miracles possible."² Consequently only the unity and mutual correspondence of the material and spiritual factors can insure successful warfare. Being one of the most important, the spiritual factor does not create the preconditions for military success automatically; it does so only on the basis of the material factor.

Third, in order to understand the role of the spiritual factor, we need to give it a sufficiently concrete definition. There are a number of concepts in the literature associated with the spiritual possibilities and capabilities of masses and armies: "spiritual factor", "moral factor", "moral-political factor", "spiritual forces", "moral forces", and so on. These are kindred categories, ones of the same order, but they are not equivalent in their scope.

As an example it would be incorrect to reduce the spiritual factor just to its moral elements. The concept "spiritual factor" is broader than "moral factor". But from a historical standpoint it is no accident that the spiritual capability of the people and the army to complete various social tasks, including war, is usually called the moral factor. Within the context of war, the relationship of people to the war's goals, nature, and consequences expresses itself especially clearly and graphically in its moral form, and it is reflected in the ethical concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice, and others, while categories of the theory of military ethics such as "military duty", "a soldier's moral responsibility", "valor", "heroism", "self-sacrifice", and others are the most important manifestations of the spiritual factor in war. Therefore the broadly employed term "moral factor" is historically justified and acceptable, but it does not exhaust the entire content of the spiritual capabilities of the people and the army. The category "factor" (spiritual, moral, moral-political) is used more often in application to large social communities (a country, an army). But when we use the term "forces" (moral, spiritual) in an analysis of spiritual processes, we usually apply it to communities of smaller scale (the collective, the group, the individual).

The category "spiritual factor" is also broader, in its strictly scientific definition, than the concept "moral-political factor", which expresses the core, the nucleus of the spiritual factor. At the same time we must not interpret the spiritual factor too broadly, identifying it with social consciousness in general. Obviously, many elements of social consciousness are rather "indifferent" in relation to an assessment of a war, its nature, its consequences, and so on. Thus mathematical

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knowledge, certain esthetic theories, and certain natural and technical conceptions do not reveal themselves directly through the spiritual factor, though all of them are indirectly drawn into various processes associated with war, and in a certain sense they all support the spiritual capability of the masses for waging war. The spiritual factor is made up of those dynamic elements of social consciousness--mainly in its political and moral forms--which reflect most deeply the conscious, class relationship of people to social phenomena, and in this case to the goals, nature, and consequences of a war, and their spiritual capability for achieving victory over the enemy. The significance of other elements of the spiritual factor is also great, but they appear to stay more in the background. In the final analysis, the decisive role belongs to political and moral ideas, viewpoints, qualities, and feelings which predetermine the basic social orientation of the spiritual factor in war.

Considering all of the above, we can offer the following definition: The spiritual factor is a specific manifestation of social consciousness expressing the readiness and capability of the masses to complete concrete social, economic, political, and military tasks.

In view of this class content, the spiritual factor of the socialist state differs fundamentally from the spiritual factor of a capitalist state, and this difference manifests itself in wars as well. The spiritual factor in wars fought in defense of socialism, which are always just wars, represents a class-based, conscious relationship of the people and the army to the war, and their spiritual resolve and ability to withstand the most severe trials and maintain their will to fight and win. It embodies the preparedness of the masses of socialist society to meet mortal danger face to face, and perform their duty to the motherland to the end.

The spiritual factor of capitalist society, which is divided into antagonistic classes, cannot be represented as an integral construct. Bourgeois ideas and viewpoints dominating in such society do not reflect the fundamental interests of the laborers, and they do not express their moral and political relationship to the unjust war fought by imperialists. The impossibility of moral-political unity in capitalist society also predetermines the incurable weakness of the spiritual factor of bourgeois armies. This is why the imperialist propagandist machine broadly resorts to spiritual stupefaction of the soldier masses, to demagoguery, lies, and slander when preparing soldiers for a reactionary war.

In addition to social relationships (the dominant ones), the spiritual factor also includes gnoseological relationships. "The influences of the external world upon the individual," Engels noted, "impress themselves within his mind and reflect themselves within it in the form of feelings, thoughts, stimuli, and manifestations of will--in a word, in the form of 'ideal desires', and in this form they become 'ideal forces'."³ Therefore there are two "strata", two parts within the structure of the spiritual factor of war. By inspecting these strata we can determine the depth to which reality is reflected and, additionally, the force and orientation of the reverse influence of the spiritual factor upon it: These are the "upper stratum" (it may be called the rational-ideological stratum) and the "lower stratum" (psycho-social).

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As with the psychosocial part of the socialist spiritual factor, the rational-ideological part has a materialistic philosophy at its basis, the essence of which is expressed in Lenin's concise premise: "Consistent materialism, also embracing social life, and dialectics, as the most comprehensive and deepest teaching on development, a theory of class struggle and the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat, the creator of a new, communist society."⁴ But it is in the rational-ideological part of the spiritual factor that philosophical elements are expressed the most clearly, graphically, and completely, since these elements are precisely what reflect the integral viewpoints of people on processes occurring in nature, society, and thinking. Confirmation, in the individual and social consciousness of people, of philosophical attitudes having a distinct communist orientation in a sense creates the initial, basic class position of the individual and the collective in solution of concrete social, economic, political, and military problems of socialist society. These attitudes are the theoretical basis of the social actions and deeds of people, and of their intolerance of all that is alien and hostile to socialism.

The rational-ideological "stratum" of the spiritual factor includes predominantly the elements of two forms of social consciousness--political and moral. The following can be isolated as the main elements of this "stratum" of the spiritual factor in war: sociopolitical conceptions of war (concerning the essence, content, nature, types, causes, and consequences of wars, and so on), and social and moral-political knowledge and ideas on the socialist fatherland and its armed defense, on socialist patriotism and internationalism, and on the decisive role of the Communist Party in mobilizing the forces of the people for war. This stratum also contains ethical concepts of bravery, heroism, valor, and moral fortitude gaining concrete expression in the individual consciousness.

This social and moral-political knowledge and these ideals and goals reflect the fundamental social needs of the people and army of the socialist state, and their moral-political unity, which affirms itself in social actions aimed at the fatherland's armed defense. Through social and personal interests, the social needs of the masses become the concrete motives of their acts in war.

This same "stratum" of the spiritual factor also contains certain military-technical knowledge that creates a solid foundation permitting people to reveal their moral-political qualities in real combat. This knowledge goes a long way to support the moral atmosphere of confidence of the personnel in their strength, it promotes decisive, confident actions, and it makes the thinking of people sounder, more flexible, broader, and bolder. And on the other hand, weakness of the military-technical element of the spiritual factor significantly hinders estimation of the situation, decision making, and display of moral-political qualities by the soldiers in combat.

The components of the rational-ideological part of the socialist spiritual factor are typified by scientific soundness, harmoniousness, and logical completeness and certainty. They are permeated with the spirit of historic optimism, and a deep conviction in the triumph of the ideas of communism and of victory over all aggressors. Their formation proceeds not spontaneously but purposefully, in organized fashion, under the guidance of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Armed Forces this process is directed by commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations, daily implementing the ideas and policies of the CPSU.

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The psychosocial part of the socialist spiritual factor is made up of the psychosocial elements of morale and of some psychosocial constructs reflecting reality at the level of commonplace consciousness and influencing the latter. This "stratum" of the spiritual factor in war includes: the complex system of moral ideals and impressions held by people of the war, its course, and its consequences; psychosocial elements of revolutionary and combat traditions associated with military realities and with defense of the fatherland, patriotic feelings, the moral aspect of the combat experience, and military customs. All of these elements directly reflect the individual's relationship to the war, but without a theoretical, philosophical base they cannot be sufficiently deep and comprehensive.

The components of the psychosocial "stratum" of the spiritual factor exhibit different degrees of stability. Emotions, moods, and opinions are mobile, capable of frequent changes in the intensity and depth of their expression. Traditions on the other hand, and habits and customs, are stable.

There are more psychosocial elements in the spiritual factor than there are rational-ideological, but in terms of significance the latter play the decisive role. The reason for this lies in the fact that Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is the scientific foundation of the social actions of the working class and of all laborers in socialist society, concurrently performs a number of highly important functions in communist indoctrination of the individual, in development of his qualities as a builder and defender of a new society--as a patriot and internationalist. The rational-ideological components contain the foundation of the spiritual superiority of socialist armed forces over imperialist armed forces.

While the rational-ideological elements of the spiritual factor are formed as a result of the purposeful activities of the appropriate organs and institutions of society, as a result of the training and indoctrination of people, the psychosocial elements may take shape not only through an organized effort but also to a certain extent spontaneously, in direct response to the influences of the environment and concrete circumstances. As the system for indoctrination of the masses and for their moral-political and psychological training continually improves in the socialist state, the effectiveness with which all of the processes associated with formation of the components of the psychosocial "stratum" of the spiritual factor are controlled as well.

The boundaries between the rational-ideological and psychosocial components of the spiritual factor are mobile. The rational-ideological elements (mainly political and moral consciousness) permeate through the psychosocial components, imparting to them a class-based moral-political orientation, and evoking, in Lenin's words, "a feeling of class" and "revolutionary instinct". Political and moral ideas "saturate" the psychosocial "stratum" of the spiritual factor. In this case they influence the feelings, habits, opinions, moods, and desires of people, they concentrate their thought, will, and feelings on performance of their duty and a concrete task, and they promote accumulation of spiritual energy for a self-sacrificing act, and for manifestation of moral "endurance". In turn, the moral-psychological elements in a sense impart an emotional hue to the rational-ideological elements. What we see in all of this is one of the important elements of the interaction between different components of the spiritual factor.

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Military-technical and natural scientific knowledge that is contained in the spiritual factor of war and which raises the confidence of people promotes the blocking or attenuation of some unfavorable psychological states and, on the other hand, amplification of positive states. As an example we cannot imagine heroism today without deep knowledge, without a close unity of military-scientific and moral-psychological components in the spiritual factor of war. Bravery and boldness manifest themselves easier, more clearly, and more fully when they are based on high professional competency and special training.

The spiritual factor is a dynamic variable. The changes it undergoes are brought about by many causes. In addition to the main causes--socioeconomic, political, and ideological, the spiritual factor is highly influenced during war by the successes or failures of armies and coalitions in war, by combat experience, by the quality of combat equipment and weapons, by the maturity of the command, and by the capability for withstanding the enemy's ideological and psychological influences. Therefore if we are to concretely describe the spiritual factor of the army, the state, or the coalition in a given war, it would be important for us to understand its real content. Assessing the battleworthiness of an army, Engels referred to its morale as one of the most important characteristics.⁵

When we refer to the state of the spiritual factor, we have in mind the integral manifestation of the sum total of concrete ideas, viewpoints, and feelings dominating in the consciousness at the given moment, and evoking a certain qualitative level of spiritual possibilities in people. A concrete state of the spiritual factor expresses its effectiveness and the contribution made by its action to completion of social, economic, political, and military tasks. The optimism of communist ideology and of our political and moral principles imparts confidence, firmness, clarity, and consistency to the state of the spiritual factor of the people and army of a socialist state. Assessing the concrete states of warring masses and armies, Lenin made broad use of the terms "revolutionary passion", "combat enthusiasm", "revolutionary drive", "fighting mood", "arousal of the masses", "class spirit", and others, which not only aptly emphasize different shades of the states of the spiritual factor, but also reveal its class and political orientation.

The spiritual factor of the Soviet Union, as well as that of other countries in the socialist fraternity, is capable of performing a number of functions in war. First of all there is its function of providing ideological and moral-political orientation to the people and army. Forced to fight a war against imperialist aggressors, the laboring classes of socialist society pursue clearly just goals: defending socialism, defeating the invaders, and insuring, through military victory, favorable external conditions for the development of socialism and communism. By assimilating the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the laboring masses of the socialist state and all soldiers of this army are able to determine, from a class position, their place in the struggle against the enemy, and develop their own attitude--philosophical and practical--to the given war. There is another function of the spiritual factor that is extremely important: that of unifying, through its ideological elements, the people, the army, and citizens of all nationalities about the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and intensifying the society's moral-political unity. This fundamentally new social phenomenon expresses deep

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sharing of social and political goals of the Soviet Union's laborers. A great, invincible force is contained within the indestructible unity of Soviet society. This is why Lenin said with full certainty: "A nation in which the majority of laborers and peasants have recognized, felt, and seen that they are defending their own power, Soviet power--the power of the laborers, and that they are defending a cause which, if it ends in victory, will provide them and their children the possibility for enjoying all of the blessings of culture and all of the creations of human labor, will never be conquered."⁶

The Great Patriotic War provided a persuasive example of this function's realization. The people and army united themselves more closely about the Communist Party, transforming the country into a single military camp. Human history had never known examples of such monolithic unity of the people, of their union about the political leadership of a state. The social consciousness was dominated by the party appeal: "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!". The party's ideological appeals were maximally purposeful, and they mobilized all of the efforts of the Soviet people for a decisive struggle against fascism and for its total destruction.

The spiritual factor also performs the function of a direct stimulus and motive of the behavior of soldiers in combat. When the political-moral state of the personnel is high, it creates the spiritual prerequisites and the moral readiness to satisfy concrete requirements, respond to appeals, and perform missions in a combat situation. This function reveals itself most clearly in acts of military heroism, in selfless performance of military duty.

Such is the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the essence, content, and functions of the spiritual factor. It is directly opposite to bourgeois views on this issue.

First of all, Western theorists intentionally gloss over the internal class content of the spiritual factor, and its sociopolitical orientation. A significant proportion of them interpret the spiritual factor of the population of their countries as the moral capability of people for fulfilling their "duty" to the capitalist state independently of their social membership. They make broad use of categories from which their class content had been distilled out: "the spirit of the nation", "the psychology of military resolve", "the drive for freedom", and so on. But we know quite well that there cannot be unity of ideology, unity of morality, and unity of social psychology in an antagonistic state. Implacable class conflicts are inevitably reflected in the spiritual sphere as well.

Usually the structure of the spiritual factor is represented by Western sociologists as a conglomerate of inborn qualities, religious beliefs, bourgeois ideals, and pugilistic tendencies. The American military theorist K. Braun, for example, associates the fighting spirit of the imperialist army with its capability for annihilating the enemies of the bourgeois structure without vacillation. "This capability," Braun writes, "is based on a doctrine rejecting communism, traditional religiosity, and permanent instinct."⁷

Bourgeois ideals, instincts, and religious faith, expressed at the ideological and predominantly the biopsychological levels, are, in the opinion of Western

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authors, the basic elements of the spiritual factor of imperialist armies. This interpretation reflects to a certain extent the content of the spiritual factor of imperialist armed forces and the orientation given to this factor by militant circles. Unable to rely on the truth, they lean the moral-psychological training of the personnel of their armies more and more in the direction of exploiting the biopsychological elements of the individual's spiritual constitution. Psychologicalization of the spiritual factor and the process of its formation is typical of bourgeois sociology. Attempts are made to imprint the attitudes of bourgeois ideology in the psychosocial "stratum" of the spiritual factor, and to make anti-communism a national psychological trait of character of every individual in capitalist society. Ways are being developed for manipulating the social consciousness and creating the needed mental states and moods in the servicemen of imperialist armies.

The corporate factor occupies a prominent place in the viewpoints of Western military sociology on the spiritual factor. This is of advantage to the bourgeoisie, since it receives additional possibilities for manipulating the political and moral consciousness of servicemen. The corporate aspect of the spiritual factor of imperialist armies is amplified by the caste composition of their officer complement--the main bearer of militant traditions, and it is documented in official guidelines. "The corporate spirit is a source of battleworthiness in any military organization," asserts one of the Pentagon's directives on so-called "psychological warfare".⁸

By its consequences, the military-technical revolution has not only "hypnotized" many bourgeois military theorists and practical soldiers, but it has also increased the attention of Western sociology to the spiritual forces of people in war to a certain degree. This was reflected, for example, in the U.S. Army's Field Manual, which emphasizes: "The individual continues to be the main instrument of war."⁹ The "History of the Second World War", published in the FRG, notes that "the moral factor has decisive influence upon the course and the turning points of modern warfare."¹⁰ E. Teller, one of the ideologists of nuclear war, believes that man's role in such a war would be especially large, and therefore that people must be prepared for it beforehand. Soldiers must have superhuman, supermoral qualities, he declared.¹¹

However, discussing the greater attention devoted to the moral forces of people in modern warfare by bourgeois military sociology, all would be forced to admit that the ways the spiritual factor is formed in imperialist armies are fundamentally different from those in socialist armies. The sociopolitical reasons for this are obvious.

Imperialist ideologists are trying to resolve the fundamentally irresolvable contradictions in the sociopolitical and moral spheres of bourgeois society's social consciousness by intensively brainwashing the people by the most perverse resources and techniques. According to foreign press reports, Western military scientific research centers are testing biochemical and neurotropic agents which, it is asserted, can arouse or inhibit certain mental processes, and evoke certain spiritual states at will. And most significantly, the bourgeoisie possesses tremendous experience in social demagoguery, in ideological and psychological

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pressure upon the consciousness and feelings of people, sometimes forcing them to fight fanatically for interests totally alien to them. But in the modern situation this is becoming increasingly more difficult.

2. The Spiritual Factor in World War¹²

There are unique features to the way the spiritual factor operates and the status it assumes in world and local wars. Naturally these features depend on more than just the scale of a war. The main thing is the concrete political content of the war, and the class goals of the warring sides. In all types of wars of the modern era, a qualitatively specific spiritual state of the popular masses and the armed forces, elicited by the relations, dominant ideology, and war goals of the given society, has been inherent to each warring state. Therefore we can properly see the concrete state, nature, and content of the spiritual factor in a given war only on the basis of the sociopolitical criterion, the class criterion, with a consideration for the types, form, and kind of war under analysis.

It is especially difficult to assess the role of the spiritual factor in nuclear world war which, were imperialist reaction to unleash it, would be a continuation of imperialism's aggressive policy on one hand, and a continuation of the socialist policy of defending the revolutionary achievements of the laborers and the rights of all peoples for free, independent development on the other. By its sociopolitical essence, such a war would be an uncompromising, extremely savage class duel between two world social systems, in which the socialist system would naturally win. By the nature of the military actions, it would be extremely dynamic and mobile, and characterized by large losses and considerable destruction. The war would also introduce some fundamentally new factors in terms of the moral-psychological influence it would have on the consciousness, mind, and will of people. This influence would derive from a number of circumstances which may be conditionally divided into two groups.

The first group may include circumstances associated with the use of new weapons and military equipment. Extensive introduction of automation and cybernetics is amplifying, in military labor, the function of controlling numerous mechanisms, machines, and devices. We are in a sense observing a shift from brawn to brain, a change in the balance between mental and physical labor in favor of the former. The very process of combat is becoming dramatically more complex: The individual must simultaneously process and account for vast amounts of information, and the readings of various instruments and warning systems. The load imposed upon the intellectual side of military labor is growing noticeably.

In a situation involving the use of modern weapons and military equipment, maintenance of high combat readiness depends on the sharpness and coordination exhibited in the actions of numerous categories of specialists: machine operators, radio operators, sonar operators, and so on. Their important work is rather tiring, and it demands maximum attention and the ability to concentrate on what is most important and distract oneself from what is incidental. The important problem of surmounting two negative factors arises: tiredness in all of its manifestations and, as it were, technological equalization of human capabilities. What the latter means is that technology imposes basically the same requirements upon every member

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of a crew (the same rhythm, the same work rate, the same load, and so on), while the type of nervous activity, psychological predispositions, moral traits, and style of thinking of people vary.

A soldier may manage with these difficulties if he relies upon primarily his moral-political qualities--responsibility, self-discipline, and conscientiousness--and if he nurtures an individual style of work. It is extremely important to achieve full moral-psychological compatibility of the members of a crew; this implies deep community of interests, a deep understanding of each other, full awareness of all of the strong and weak points of each member of the collective, and so on. The more a soldier's moral qualities are in keeping with objective conditions--the mission, available time, the nature of the information, the intensity of the situation, and so on, the greater is the dependability of his combat activities.

The dependability of a soldier's combat activities can be raised in various ways. First, his proficiency can be improved. Engineering psychology is in a position to do a great deal by "adapting" machines and equipment to man. But even here, the ideological maturity of the individual, his internal, spiritual state, and his moral purposefulness, which in combination with optimum working conditions insure dependable combat activities, are among the decisive prerequisites of success.

It is precisely because of this that our commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations always base themselves in moral-political and psychological training of the troops and naval forces on the main principle of such training--a communist orientation in all measures associated with nurturing ideologically persuaded, competent defenders of the socialist fatherland and forming a Marxist-Leninist philosophy, high ideological-political qualities, and communist morality within them. Political training and ideological maturity make up the key link of the moral-political and psychological training afforded to personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Only communist conviction and ideological maturity are capable of directing the thoughts, feelings, and will of the soldier toward one goal in any situation--complete fulfillment of one's duty to the socialist fatherland. Patriotic and international indoctrination of the personnel has tremendous significance. The 25th CPSU Congress pointed out that "Affirmation, within the consciousness of the laborers, and mainly the young generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride for the Soviet Union and our motherland, and the readiness to rise in defense of the achievements of socialism has been and continues to be one of the most important tasks of the party."¹³

The second group of circumstances defining the moral-psychological influence of modern war upon the spiritual factor of the army is associated with the nature of the combat actions themselves in a nuclear war. Armed conflict acquires many new qualities and unique features in such a situation.

As an example the troops will not have enough time to prepare gradually for a transition from peaceful conditions to war. The logic of modern warfare dictates that every serviceman must be prepared for the worst beforehand--today, right now.

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In all previous wars, the personnel developed their final moral maturity in the course of combat. But we cannot count on this today, since a war may become a nuclear war from its very beginning. The fierceness and fluidity of combat actions will require soldiers to exhibit extremely dynamic thinking and the capability to quickly release themselves from probable states of depression and stress. And this would be possible only if the people's consciousness is dominated by a correct understanding of the war, and when its essence, causes, and nature are correctly understood. In a situation involving the use of the latest types of weapons, philosophical stability will also be made highly important factor permitting the personnel to bravely surmount all burdens and deprivations.

In a modern world war, and especially at its beginning, a significant proportion of the personnel will not see the enemy directly in front of them. But at the same time the danger of his actions may arise in any area. Even if the enemy is thousands of kilometers away, this would not guarantee safety, as had been the case before. To many soldiers, mainly those in the missile forces, the sensation of the enemy's presence would become somewhat different, "abstract" in a certain sense. As a rule the personnel would not even be able to directly see the results of their own actions (launching a missile from a launcher vehicle, from a missile carrying aircraft, from a submarine). All of this will increase the emotional and moral tension of the people. It can be alleviated (partially or completely) by switching the attention of the soldiers to active combat preparations, and so on.

The significance of competently dispersing the troops and the role of independent actions by isolated units and crews will grow in a war involving the use of modern weapons. As a consequence some of the traditional relationships (direct contact, the feeling of being in touch) will experience certain changes, and become more indirect. In such conditions the arising of feelings of isolation, uncertainty, and acute anxiety would not be excluded. It will be extremely difficult to shake off the sensation of a constant threat from an "invisible" lethal danger, radioactive contamination for example.

It is important to always be ready for the enemy's possible use of previously unknown weapons. Their novelty and the absence of experience in opposing them would have an extremely severe mental impact upon people. "The proportions of this mental injury," said M. V. Frunze in an analogous discussion, "cannot be reckoned, and in certain conditions they may many times exceed the material harm done by such implements of destruction."¹⁴

We know of numerous examples of the tremendous moral-psychological influence new weapons have. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. I. Yeremenko recalls one such case--the results of the first use of rockets, the famous "Katyushas", in July 1941 at Rudnya: "...the unfamiliar roar of the rockets shook the air in the second half of the day. The rockets sped upward like red-tailed comets. The frequent and mighty bursts paralyzed our hearing and vision with their intense thunder and blinding flashes.

"The impact of the simultaneous explosion of 320 rockets within 10 seconds surpassed all expectations. Enemy soldiers fled in panic. Even our soldiers located on the forward edge near the explosions took to their heels..."¹⁵

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Use of a previously unknown weapon in a sense catches the consciousness, and mainly its sensory-emotional level, unawares. And even if the novelty is reflected within the consciousness more or less accurately, its response would not always fit the situation, since the knowledge required for a correct response may not be present in the social and individual consciousness. Naturally this is a temporary, transitory situation in view of the activity of the consciousness, in view of its capability for filling in information gaps. Nevertheless the consequences of its state are very tangible.

In modern war, the results of using a new weapon would be much more diverse and intense. The battlefield scene itself will have an unusual moral-psychological influence upon the troops. The soldiers may witness great human losses, and considerable havoc and fires, they may experience extremely sharp light and acoustic stimuli, they may be subjected to intense pressure fluctuations, and so on. They would find themselves in a completely unusual situation, one capable of altering the manifestations of the individual's moral qualities, will, thinking, and memory. The new situation would also create a demand for new knowledge. In the absence of information on the course of the armed struggle, the enemy would invariably capitalize on this "vacuum" to mislead the other warring side, and to induce within it a sensation of despair and death, which it could relieve itself from, the enemy would "advise", only by laying down its arms. This is precisely the way the American manual on psychological operations prescribes for misinforming the enemy. Much attention to such acts of "psychological warfare" is also devoted by other imperialist armies. A book written by P. Nord, a bourgeois expert on subversive psychological activities, asserts that deception may sometimes be the decisive weapon of intellectual action, of irreversible aggression against human reason.¹⁶

Thus we can see the tremendous importance of promptly and fully predicting the moral-psychological consequences of the effects of a mass destruction weapon, and of taking all steps to weaken these influences.

How do we maintain the battleworthiness of the personnel and ward off or reduce the moral-psychological shocks they may experience in a possible war involving the enemy's use of a new weapon, and how do we make sure that every soldier would be able to perform his duty to the socialist motherland to the end, in the most complex circumstances?

The socialist army enjoys a tremendous moral-political superiority over imperialist armed forces. It is derived from the sociopolitical and ideological advantages of the socialist social structure, its just goals, and the qualities of the soldiers of the new formation. We know of many cases from the history of the Great Patriotic War in which our units found themselves in extremely difficult situations but successfully completed the most complex missions posed to them by the command. This was yet another expression of the moral-political advantage of the socialist army over the imperialist army, of the superiority of communist ideology and morale over bourgeois ideology and morale, of the capability communist ideology and morality have for multiplying the strength of the masses several times over.

Many bourgeois military theorists have also been forced to recognize the high qualities of soldiers of the socialist army. Thus in the book "Soldiers of the

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Eastern Bloc" written by the West German author F. Winer states: "The way of thinking of the Soviet soldier is such that collectivism, discipline, and faithfulness to communist ideals define all of his behavior. Thus it is easier for such a soldier to endure a situation of mortal danger in combat."¹⁷ There are also many other statements by bourgeois experts in which they are unable to avoid a high assessment of the qualities of armed forces personnel in socialist countries.

All of the prerequisites for keeping the spiritual forces of soldiers of the socialist army in a state of full mobilization and a constant readiness to endure all trials, and not lose the desire to fight and win, are objectively present in the battle and operation. But realization of these possibilities presupposes understanding and accounting for certain features in the way different people perceive danger.

"Danger is an element of war," Lenin emphasized. "Not a minute goes by in war where you are not surrounded by dangers."¹⁸ The state of danger reflects itself upon the consciousness of the individual in a way depending on his philosophy, convictions, combat experience, and internal preparedness to meet the force of certain collisions. Danger is perceived and surmounted less painfully when the individual is active than when he is inactive, since inactivity usually dulls the senses and will.

In modern war, the personnel will be subjected to immeasurably greater danger than before. Prolonged moral-psychological stress is capable of causing moral fatigue in the individual. Certain soldiers may begin exhibiting negative emotions and involuntary reactions. As we know, people blinded by fear cease to soberly evaluate the real conditions, and they perceive the world only on the basis of their terror-distorted impressions. It has also been proven that the sense of fear is higher among personnel insufficiently trained in military-technical respects. When the individual is in a depressed moral-psychological state, his attention worsens dramatically, memory weakens, and he makes mistakes much more frequently. In modern war, however, even isolated cases of loss of self-control are unusually dangerous.

A highly difficult situation may evolve as a result of exhaustive combat, uncertainty and, of course, use of a nuclear weapon by the enemy. In these critical moments it is important to make intensive use of various moral resources (in combination with others) to influence the consciousness of the personnel.

Immediately after an enemy nuclear strike, a sharp moral-volitional stimulus from without--a confident command, an appeal from a commander or political worker--would release people from possible stupefaction and a sense of depression quicker. The energy, decisiveness, self-control, and heroic example of the commander and political worker will play the decisive role. Constant personal communication of commanders and political workers with all soldiers, their confidence and firmness in control of the subunits, and maintenance of the strictest discipline will insure a continued effort to complete the mission under the most complex conditions.

Moral encouragement and praise to those who excel are highly effective in a difficult situation, since such actions affirm the bravery of soldiers in the eyes of their comrades and provide models for imitation. It is very important to make all

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servicemen quickly aware of strikes against the enemy and of the losses he is suffering. Such information helps to impart optimism to the moral state of the personnel.

In a complex situation, it is especially important to effectively use the rich arsenal of the forms, resources, and methods of party-political work, and to competently select the most effective of them in the given concrete conditions. No matter what nature the war may assume, Lenin's premise that wherever political work is conducted dilligently in the troops, there is no laxity in the army, its organization and its spirit are better, and its victories are greater in number, always remains applicable.¹⁹ Party-political work in combat is a mighty spiritual weapon that unites the people and mobilizes them for successful fulfillment of their operation orders. Party-political work in the troops insures highly effective operation of the spiritual factor and its control through concrete states.

Naturally the efforts of commanders, political workers, and party organizations to maintain high moral perseverance of the personnel in the complex conditions of modern combat will always have more than just withstanding the strikes of the enemy as its goal. Moral perseverance is the most important prerequisite of an offensive spirit--that is, a state in which all of the individual's spiritual forces are mobilized, and his moral-political set to annihilate the enemy and achieve total victory is consolidated. Systematic and purposeful influence upon the consciousness of people, upon the spiritual factor--upon both its rational-ideological and its psychosocial parts--permits the soldiers to gather their will, thoughts, and feelings into a single whole, and to acquire or reinforce their experience of maintaining moral-political control over their own behavior, and their ability to suppress or block certain feelings (fear, confusion) and reinforce others (military honor, hatred of the enemy, and so on). The capability for moral self-reassurance, self-discipline, and self-suggestion intensifies the positive spiritual motivation of the individual, and his resolve to defeat the enemy.

Steps taken to reduce the vulnerability of the troops have a large role in a combat situation: promptly dispersing subunits and units, raising their mobility, establishing back-up command and control, swiftly exploiting success, reducing combat preparation time, effectively reforming subunits and units in the event of major losses, and so on. These measures have not only purely military but also moral-psychological significance, inasmuch as they help to preserve the spiritual state of the troops at a high level.

As we can see, world war, were it to be unleashed by imperialist reaction, would impose extremely high requirements upon the spiritual forces of people. As before, the maximum capability for enduring all trials of war will be inherent to socialist armies, which by their nature wage only just wars. Socialist armed forces enjoy tremendous spiritual superiority over imperialist armies. Their moral superiority stems from the progressive orientation of the policy of socialist states in war, the colossal spiritual power of communist ideology, and the high moral-combat qualities of the personnel.

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3. Unique Manifestations of the Spiritual Factor in Modern Local Wars

Operation of the spiritual factor in local wars²⁰ is subordinated to general laws, and it has much in common with the action of the spiritual factor in a possible world war. Therefore it would be incorrect to place an impenetrable wall between states of the spiritual factor accompanying a possible world war and modern local wars, or to contrast these states. But at the same time it is entirely obvious that there are certain unique features to the way the spiritual factor manifests itself in local wars. It is very important to understand these features all the more so because imperialism rests high hopes on local wars. Refusing to abandon aggressive preparations on a global scale, and at the same recognizing the absolute uselessness of world war to itself, imperialism constantly resorts to local wars, counting on inhibiting development of the world revolutionary process with their help. All of this obligates our military personnel to thoroughly study the problems associated with modern local wars, make practical conclusions, and account for them meticulously in all of the daily activities associated with training and indoctrinating the personnel of the subunits, units, and ships.

Analyzing one of these problems--the unique manifestations of the spiritual factor in local wars, we are not reducing the essence of the issue just to questions of scale alone. This must be emphasized. As with world wars, local wars are always a continuation of a concrete policy by violent means, and therefore an analysis of their spiritual elements would be valid if it is made from the standpoint of the interests of the laborers, and if it is based on Marxist-Leninist philosophical and methodological orientations.

The nature of local wars brought on by imperialism was deeply revealed by V. I. Lenin. In his lecture "War and Revolution", for example, he demonstrated that these wars are based on a policy of the capture and extermination of entire nationalities, and unprecedented atrocities by imperialism.²¹

The Soviet state and the entire socialist fraternity are waging a consistent struggle against the reactionary wars of imperialism, with which it would like to strangle the struggle of peoples for their national and social liberation, and weaken certain units of the world socialist system. The need for opposing unjust, predatory imperialist wars and at the same time supporting the sacred struggle of oppressed peoples and their just wars of liberation was clearly expressed in the CPSU Program and in other documents of our party.

We can point out the following specific traits of modern local wars in terms of their moral-political content.

First of all, local wars unleashed by imperialism reflect not just a duel between individual countries but, in the final analysis, a historic duel between the forces of reaction and the forces of progress, a struggle between different socialist systems, philosophies, moral attitudes, and ideals, a struggle in a sense focused within a particular region of the planet.

Invariably, the Soviet Union and the entire fraternity of socialist states rise in the defense of the sacrifices of imperialist aggressors. The former provide full support and help to them. This is exactly why the forces of imperialist reaction have never been able to reach a conclusive victory in any of the local wars

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of the last few decades. In addition to others, the moral-political resources of conflict, ones emphasizing the just nature of the wars of nations against imperialist aggressors, played an effective role in repelling the invaders.

One unique moral-political characteristic of modern local wars is the need for the army and population of a state attacked by imperialist invaders to be prepared for the aggressor's possible use of mass destruction weapons, which would require extreme exertion of all of the people's spiritual and physical strength to repel the enemy. Such a threat is fully realistic. We know, for example, that Americans in the highest official circles have considered the use of tactical atomic weapons in the war in Vietnam.²² The possibility that imperialism may use mass destruction weapons in such situations harbors the danger that a local war may grow into a world war. In the event of further spread of nuclear weapons, this danger will grow.

Countries finding themselves the object of imperialist aggression experience tremendous moral-psychological stress in connection with the considerable duration of local wars (in many cases). This is another significant characteristic of local wars.

The moral perseverance of the army and population of the country, one of the significant indicators of the maturity of the spiritual factor, expresses itself as the capability for withstanding the prolonged, intense moral-psychological loads of war. As an example the war in Vietnam lasted about 20 years, and it meant colossal sacrifices and deprivations to its people. Nevertheless the American military machine and its Saigon puppets were unable to break the moral spirit of the freedom-loving Vietnamese people, and their will to fight for national salvation and liberty. And on the other hand, one of the main difficulties experienced by imperialist armed forces waging aggressive local wars lies in the moral-political sphere.

The spiritual factor of an imperialist army is uniquely blind to the social consciousness of bourgeois society together with its contradictory tendencies and domination of chauvinistic and militant elements. Assessing the state of the spiritual factor of imperialist armed forces, we should keep in mind that in the West, inflation of moral values is continuing, and amorality is growing. This is not even concealed by bourgeois authors today. "Modern bourgeois society," writes the English sociologist D. Macmillan, "is a witness to greater violation of moral customs and to a more violent assault upon universally accepted moral and spiritual principles than ever before."²³ All of this cannot but have an effect on the concrete spiritual state of imperialist armies. Most of their personnel do not understand the fundamental problems of war--its causes, goals, nature, and consequences. These factors are reflected in their consciousness in deformed form, through the prism of bourgeois propaganda. Thus the overwhelming majority of American servicemen captured by patriots in South Vietnam either had a totally distorted idea of the social meaning of the war they were waging, or they had no definite stance in relation to this issue.

As a result of the constant, active influence of bourgeois propaganda, the individual consciousness of most servicemen in the imperialist armed forces is not always receptive to anti-imperialist arguments and to the true political logic of things. As an example numerous facts tell us that as a social type, the modern American soldier usually has a standard, stereotypic way of thinking. He is pumped so full

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of the myths of Western "democracy", "freedom", and "the USA's moral right to lead the world", that whatever truthful information does manage to penetrate to him is either simply not perceived or grossly distorted by the filter of false philosophy. From the standpoint of his moral-combat qualities, such a soldier is an enterprising specialist with developed military and technical practical skills. A fetish of technology and personal enrichment coupled with low internal discipline and weak moral-psychological perseverance has rooted itself firmly in his consciousness.

A significant number of servicemen in imperialist armies waging local wars are mercenary. The main stimulus of their moral spirit is material reward. But, as combat activities by interventionists in Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, and other regions of the globe have demonstrated, the moral spirit of these mercenaries--frequently the social outcasts of society--is not very high.

Special attention is devoted to the influence of the psychosocial part of the spiritual factor in the brainwashing of the servicemen of imperialist armies. The U.S. Army manual "Psychological Operations" points out that "Psychological influence is the principal means for keeping the moral-psychological factor on par with the tasks of the most dramatic situation."²⁴ Special emphasis is laid in this wordy document on the need for "awakening feelings of love for America", which would supposedly play "the decisive role in spiritual motivation of the troops." Unmasking such bourgeois tactics, V. I. Lenin wrote in 1913: "The man in the street does not suspect that he is being led by the nose, that catchy references to 'patriotism', 'the honor and prestige of the homeland'...intentionally mask the fraudulent acts of financial swindlers and all sorts of capitalist adventurers."²⁵

As an example the command of the U.S. Army maintained the moral spirit of its troops in the war in Vietnam through intense ideological and psychological brainwashing of the personnel, as well as with the help of financial levers and creation of military-technical superiority. As long as these foundations of the bourgeois spiritual factor remain viable, the interventionist command can continue to arouse the impudence and self-confidence of its subordinates, and their arrogant attitude toward the enemy. However, when military defeats occur, despondency, apathy, and depression begin to dominate in the spiritual factor of the aggressors. In its desire to at least partially stabilize the moral spirit of the troops in these cases, the leadership of imperialist armies resorts even more actively to political demagoguery, to the most malicious anticommunism, to racial and nationalistic prejudices, and to threats of punishment.

The spiritual factor of imperialist armies fighting a local war is subject to violent fluctuations not only in response to successes or defeats, but also as a result of the influence of world public opinion, and of moral-political acts by progressive forces that unmask and condemn the aggressors.

Violent fluctuations in the state of the spiritual factor of imperialist aggressors--from blind militant confidence in the superiority of the Western "superman" to sheer terror and an acute fear of just compensation for crimes committed--are the product of general social causes, and the moral-political vulnerability of the bourgeois social consciousness. But there are specific causes as well.

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Because of the low moral spirit of their armies and other circumstances, imperialists fighting local wars are forced to periodically replace personnel in the theaters of military actions. New contingents of troops find themselves in a situation so unusual in all respects that it takes them a long time to adapt themselves to it even partially. The heroic struggle of patriotic forces of liberation, the unconcealed hatred of the local public, and other factors produce the most unexpected shift in the consciousness of the invaders (despair, repentance, apathy, and so on), which noticeably weakens their moral possibilities. The flaws in the spiritual factor of imperialist armies are especially visible on the background of the high moral-political spirit of the patriotic forces of liberation.

Imperialists usually begin local wars undeclared, suddenly hurling their fighting power against a selected object of attack. The insidiousness, the higher state of mobilization, and the sizeable military-technical superiority of the invaders can produce a noticeable and sometimes tremendous military advantage.

In such conditions the spiritual factor of patriotic forces of liberation might not manifest itself fully at first. This can be explained both by the suddenness of the attack and the aggressor's high degree of readiness, and by the certain amount of time required by the leadership of patriotic forces to determine its program in the ways and means of the struggle, and to organize ideological influence upon the consciousness of the masses consistent with the new conditions. This is especially typical of developing countries, where religion and nationalism are often important instruments by which to stabilize spiritual forces.

But no matter how a local war begins, the objective law of growth in the moral superiority of patriotic forces of liberation over that of interventionists distinctly manifests itself in its course. This superiority becomes indisputable in a socialist country. It is the result of a highly progressive socialist state and social structure, truly scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology, the moral-political unity of the society, and the unity of all the people around the Communist Party.

Among the most important preconditions of the moral superiority of patriotic forces of liberation, we should name first of all the full support, including moral-political, given to fighting peoples by the Soviet Union, by other countries of the socialist fraternity, and by all progressive society. The concept "we" in the consciousness of the fighting patriots gradually extends beyond the framework of their nation. A spiritual atmosphere of a broader community arises, permitting indirect infusion of the support, sympathy, and solidarity of many progressive countries and organizations into the spiritual factor of the forces of liberation. Moods, which are usually highly fluid, acquire greater stability, and they begin to be dominated by the ideas and feelings of optimism and an unshakeable confidence in the final victory. At the same time the imperialist aggressors find themselves perpetually encountering the condemnation of world public opinion for their predatory actions, political isolation in the international arena, and irresolvable difficulties in maintaining the moral spirit of their troops at the necessary level.

There is another important objective circumstance responsible for growth in moral superiority of the forces of liberation in war. The latter fight such a war on their own land. The cradle of the fatherland is an inexhaustible source of the people's high moral spirit in the struggle against imperialist aggressors. A partisan movement, for example, is possible only on home territory. The soldiers of the

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forces of liberation have almost all elements of the surrounding natural environment--jungles, mountains, and so on--as their direct or indirect allies. Most modern local wars have been fought in Asian and African countries--in places where troops of the main imperialist states are less adapted to combat actions due to natural and other conditions. Elements which under normal circumstances cause suffering, trouble, and deprivation to the local public (high air temperature and humidity, lengthy rains, and so on) become positive things for patriots in a local war. It stands to reason that natural conditions affect both warring sides identically. But patriotic forces capitalize upon them more competently. All of this gives the forces of liberation not only moral-political but also military advantages.

Finally, growth in the moral superiority of the forces of liberation over the moral spirit of the troops of imperialist aggressors can have its roots in positive manifestations of national feelings and self-consciousness. A people defending their independence and liberty feel themselves more keenly to be a nation, and this national factor is a significant consolidating element, occupying an important place in the structure of the spiritual factor. "National enthusiasm," Engels notes, "has tremendous significance to war..."²⁶ The experience of wars fought in the last few decades by various countries against imperialist aggressors persuasively confirms this thought. But even the national factor may be correctly understood and utilized only on the basis of correct political leadership of the masses, and their recognition of the class content of the struggle and the decisive influence of socioeconomic causes upon the course and outcome of a war.

There are also other unique features in the way the spiritual factor of the forces of liberation manifests itself in the combat activities of local war.

First of all a local war imposed upon a country by imperialist aggression is far from always a "minor" war to that country. To a state serving as the object of aggression, one having less material and human resources than the invader, a local war is universal in nature, inasmuch as it affects the vital foundations of its existence and demands maximum mobilization of all resources. From the very beginning, it imposes extremely high requirements upon the spiritual forces of the people and army, without which the nation cannot count on preserving or winning its liberty and independence. As far as the imperialist aggressor--the larger and materially stronger state--is concerned, a local war does not always force it to exert all of its possibilities.

In a number of cases the patriotic forces of liberation are forced to oppose not only foreign invaders but also the troops of local puppet regimes, and bands of emigrant counterrevolutionary circles. This complicates the struggle, imparting to it the attributes of a civil war (which is advantageous to the aggressor, since he can thus cover his leading role in instigating and conducting the unjust war), making moral-political unification of all patriots difficult. It should be noted at the same time that the troops of puppet regimes and other counterrevolutionary rabble do not have the support of the masses, and their morale is low as a rule.

Patriotic forces of liberation also enjoy noticeable moral-combat superiority in a local war because in their just struggle, they competently combine the methods of a regular army and partisan formations. As experience has shown, imperialist

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invaders are unable to completely adapt themselves to such combined forms of action by the enemy, which affords patriots not only purely military but also specifically moral advantages. The aggressors find themselves in an atmosphere of constant danger, tension, and anxious anticipation, which may produce feelings of depression, uncertainty, and fear in them.

Local war is utilized by imperialism to test new tactics and weapons, and methods for raising the effectiveness of psychological operations. In the wars in Syria and Vietnam, for example, American troops used napalm, phosphorus and antipersonnel ball-bearing bombs, some unmanned airborne resources and guided missiles, and infantry weapons such as the "Armalite", "Vulcan", and ("Spiv") for the first time on the battlefield. Chemical preparations intended to destroy large areas of vegetation, resources of so-called "meteorological warfare", and others were also employed. The psychological influence of all of these resources upon the consciousness of the people was meticulously studied at the same time.

Subjected to the action of new military-technical and psychological weapons and tactics, the forces of liberation are able to find effective countermeasures successfully. Thus in Vietnam this took the form of widespread application of underground mining tactics, night actions, intensification of combat efforts in rainy seasons, and so on.

As we can see, the manifestations of the spiritual factor in local war depend, as in world war, on the sociopolitical goals of the warring sides, the social structure of the states, and the condition of their armed forces. Natural, ethnic, and national preconditions, which usually become the allies of patriotic forces and another enemy to the aggressor, play a significant role.

This chapter's examination of the essence, structure, state, and functions of the spiritual factor and of the unique features of its manifestation in world and local wars again and again confirm the indisputable moral-political superiority of socialism over capitalism. This provides it a number of decisive advantages in the event of another war: The political and military leadership of socialist countries would be able to set tasks of the greatest historic complexity to the armed forces with full certainty that they would be completed successfully; owing to deep communist conviction and a high moral spirit, the population and army of states in the socialist fraternity possess reliable immunity against imperialist ideological sabotage, and they will be able to handle the tremendous moral-psychological loads of war better than the aggressor. In a time of war, the spiritual factor of socialist society will become a sound spiritual foundation of victory over any aggressor who would risk attacking countries of the socialist fraternity. Developing countries subjected to an imperialist invasion also have a great spiritual advantage. In this case the law of sociopolitical supremacy of the side fighting a just war reveals itself fully and clearly.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 34, pp 196-197.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 34, p 195.

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3. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 21, p 290.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 26, p 48.
5. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 31, p 360.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 315.
7. Braun, K., "The Moral Challenge of Communism," New York, 1973, p 48.
8. "Character Guidance Discussion Topics," New York, 1970, p 18.
9. "Polevoy ustav armii SShA. FM-105" [U.S. Army Field Manual. FM-105], 1966, p 8.
10. "Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges," Vol 2, Wurzburg, 1966, p 5.
11. Teller, E., "Alternatives for Security," p 94.
12. Inasmuch as the threat of world war has not yet been eliminated and local wars are not abating in the world, this chapter will examine manifestations of the spiritual factor in possible world and local wars.
13. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 75.
14. Frunze, M. V., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 2, Moscow, 1957, p 358.
15. Yeremenko, A. I., "V nachale voyny" [At the Beginning of a War], Moscow, 1964, p 227.
16. Nord, P., "Arme absolue de la guerre subversive," Paris, 1973, p 289.
17. Winer, F., "Soldaten im Ostblok," Munich, 1973, p 12.
18. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 210.
19. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 56.
20. This section of the chapter analyzes the unique manifestations of the spiritual factor in local wars between imperialist and socialist states, and between peoples who are fighting for their national liberation or who have already assumed the path of sovereign development, and imperialist states following a colonial or neocolonial policy.
21. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 32, p 86.
22. See Pyadyshev, B. D., "Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks SShA" [The Military-Industrial Complex of the USA], Moscow, 1974, p 230.
23. Macmillan, D., "The Roots of Corruption," London, 1973, p 9.

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24. FM 35-5, "Psychological Operations," New York, 1970, p 14.
25. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 23, p 121.
26. Engel's, F., "Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Military Works], p 459.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN WAR

Ideology occupies an important place within the spiritual factor. It has a tremendous influence on all spheres of a society's life and activities, including in a time of war. Through ideology, warring classes and states try to create grounds for the war they fight which would produce, in the consciousness of the people, an acceptable opinion of this war and a positive attitude toward it. In the course of a war, the struggle for the consciousness of the masses, which proceeds even in peacetime, acquires an especially acute character. The aggressiveness of the people's actions at the front and in the rear depends on the degree to which their consciousness masters ideology.

Ideological Weapons in the Struggle of Classes

Ideological weapons are defined in their broad sense as a system of teachings, theories, and ideas spread through the masses with the help of agitation-propaganda resources and methods. In the course of their ideological activities, classes and political parties try to materialize their ideas.

Marxism-Leninism, represented by a well-organized system of philosophical, economic, and sociopolitical viewpoints coupled with a system of propaganda and agitation, the press, radio, television, and so on, is a powerful ideological weapon of the CPSU and of all fraternal communist parties. "As with all of the CPSU's revolutionarily transforming activities," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "communist indoctrination rests on the firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory. Marxism-Leninism is the sole dependable basis for developing correct strategy and tactics. It allows us to understand the historic perspective, and it helps us to determine the direction of socioeconomic and political development many long years into the future, and correctly orient ourselves in international events."¹

Attaching important significance to social ideas, theories, and viewpoints, our party constantly tries to make the fullest use of ideological weapons in its efforts at development of communist society. The 25th CPSU Congress reached the profound, scientific, creative conclusion that the effectiveness of the party's ideological activities must be intensified on the basis of an integrated approach to the organization of all indoctrination--that is, close unity must be achieved in ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination, with a consideration for the unique features of different groups of laborers.

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The Communist Party's ideological activities express themselves in the following basic directions: further development of Marxist-Leninist theory; communist indoctrination of the people, infusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology into the consciousness of the laboring masses, and their mobilization for active practical revolutionary efforts; the struggle against bourgeois ideology and against right-wing and "left-wing" revisionist conceptions with the basic objective of credibly unmasking viewpoints hostile to us, answering them decisively, and preventing penetration of alien ideas, morals, and customs into the consciousness and behavior of the laborers.

As we know, ideology is that part of the social consciousness in which the viewpoints, ideas, theories, and teachings of a certain class on society and social relations are systematized and theoretically substantiated. The same social phenomena are reflected differently in the consciousness of opposite classes. Consequently ideology always bears a deeply class nature, a party nature. What the latter means is that it expresses and defends the fundamental interests of certain classes through social ideas and theories. The ideologies of opposing classes are just as irreconcilable as are their economic relations. Therefore in the presence of antagonistic classes (in the international arena and within particular states), the ideological struggle is an objective reality, an objective necessity brought about by the opposition of the goals and ideologies of these classes.

Ideology's capacity for serving as a spiritual weapon in the struggle between classes has its roots in its relative independence as an element of the superstructure above the economic foundation of society, in the unique features of the way different forms of social consciousness interact and mutually influence themselves, and in the mutual relationships existing between social and individual consciousness.

Being relatively independent, ideology actively influences the material conditions bringing it into being. It unifies or separates, organizes or disorganizes people, and accelerates or decelerates the process of history. Ideology serves as both a means of controlling the behavior of the masses and a weapon in the struggle between progressive and backward social forces.

The consistency or inconsistency between social and individual consciousness has a great influence on ideological relationships existing in society. If social consciousness is totally in keeping with development of social life, then individual consciousness experiences the influence of not only social life, the macro-environment, but also the living conditions of the given social stratum and the immediate surroundings, the microenvironment. Moreover the individual's personal qualities also make an imprint upon individual consciousness. In view of these circumstances, every individual can fully reproduce, within his individual consciousness, the social consciousness of the entire class, or he may deviate from it and even abandon the positions of his own class. Thus we can fully understand the desire of classes and their parties to use the resources of propaganda and agitation in their struggle to keep the individual consciousness of their members within the bounds of their ideology, of their social psychology, and to win over the consciousness of people belonging to other classes and social groups.

The ideology activities of progressive classes are unique in that they represent a weapon of conviction, and not compulsion. Conviction presupposes a readiness to

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defend a certain point of view and act accordingly. Conviction is shaped through systematic and purposeful propaganda and agitation, which are highly important resources classes and parties possess for ideological and psychological influence upon social groups and individuals. Through diverse forms and types of propaganda and agitation, the social ideas and theories of classes, their political and legal doctrines, philosophical, moral, and artistic viewpoints, and religious or atheistic positions are spread. Ideas transform into the convictions of a personality only when the latter actively participates in social life.

Promoting formation of social ideas and viewpoints, the ideological activity of classes and parties simultaneously arouses social feelings of a concrete political orientation: class sympathies or antipathies, patriotism or chauvinism, internationalism or nationalism, and so on. The nature of this orientation depends on which class is influencing the masses through propaganda and agitation.

2. Ideology and War

Since it creates the theoretical base for assessment of all phenomena and processes of the life of society, ideology also lies at the basis of our understanding of the essence and origin of wars, and of their role in history, revealing the initial uses of war as a means for achieving the political goals of certain classes and states.

Revealing the mutual relationship between war and ideology, Marxism-Leninism bases itself on the fact that there are no direct cause-and-effect relationships between them, as we find between war and economics, and between war and politics. Therefore the assertion by some Western theorists that wars are supposedly evoked by ideological disagreements between classes is incorrect. In all eras of history, wars have been rooted deeply in private ownership of the means of production--that is, in economic causes. But at the same time we should keep in mind that the economic cause of wars has never acted on its own, apart from the consciousness and will of people. The possibility of war embodied in private ownership and of the means of production becomes reality mainly through the political relations of classes and states.

War is a political act, and policy is the product of classes, parties, and their leaders. The principal orientation of policy is dictated by the economic interests of the classes. But the process itself of developing policy, of determining the ways and means of its implementation depends to an enormous degree on the ideology and philosophy of its creators.

Ideology influences selection of the object against which a war is to be prepared, and the methods by which military force is to be used. The misanthropic ideology of fascism, for example, found its expression in German imperialism's barbarian methods of warfare (mass extermination of people, cruelty in relation to prisoners of war, women, the elderly, and children, and so on).

The relationship between war and ideology has manifested itself differently in each historic era. Thus under feudalism, when religious ideology and the Church had paramount influence upon society, economic interests were defended in bloody wars between different groups within states and between states under the cloak of religion.

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Under the influence of fanaticism, the classes of exploitation and the clergy managed to draw enormous masses of people into the crusades, in which the cross and the sword sowed havoc and death.

In the era of ascending capitalism, in connection with the development of nations and nation states, nationalism was the ideological banner under which antifeudal wars of liberation were fought by the bourgeoisie. Today many of the wars of national liberation fought by peoples breaking the chains of colonialism and neo-colonialism are also proceeding under the flag of nationalism.

The role of ideology in wars between capitalism and socialism is especially great. Preparing for and unleashing war against socialist states, monopolist bourgeoisie pursues decisive socioeconomic and political-ideological goals: restoring the capitalist order in socialist countries, and halting the historic process of mankind's transition from capitalism to socialism. In their plans for achieving these goals, imperialists place high importance upon the struggle in the ideological sphere, on attempts to undermine the philosophical foundations of socialism.

In World War II, the ringleaders of fascist Germany declared many times that in terms of political and ideological orientation, their fight against the Soviet Union was not the same as their fight against England and France. In one of the major military-political conferences held at the eve of the attack on the USSR, Hitler said that war against the Soviet Union would not simply be a war between two states, but a war between irreconcilable philosophies, a war of national socialism against bolshevism. This idea was constantly emphasized later on in various fascist propaganda publications. As an example a pamphlet published in May 1943 by the German army's main command, "The Political Objective of the German Soldier in the Cross Section of Total War", stated that the decisive prerequisites of a victorious conclusion to the war in the East included not only successes on the battlefield but "also whether or not the Germans will win the hearts of people who had been under the power of bolshevism up to this point."²

It is not surprising that it was precisely in the war against the Soviet Union that the fascist leadership sensed the weakness of the political steadfastness of its soldiers, and was forced to sharply intensify their ideological processing. A secret booklet of the main directorate of the SS troops published at the end of 1943 stated: "The war between two philosophies, between national socialism and bolshevism, is revealing the goal of political indoctrination in the most unambiguous way. Total war demands placement of priority on the basic premises of political indoctrination."³ Ideological brainwashing of personnel of the German Army entailed introduction of extremely reactionary fascist ideology into their consciousness.

Bourgeois ideologists and military officials discussing the nature and features of wars between capitalist and socialist states following World War II have not limited themselves to emphasizing the role and significance of the ideological factor in these wars. They assert that the ideological struggle proceeding in the modern era is supposedly equivalent to war. Using this tactic, imperialist ideologists hope to achieve a far-reaching goal: Capitalizing on the fact that the ideological struggle is proceeding continuously, not only in wartime but also in peacetime, they wish to erase the boundary between war and peace and thus make it

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difficult for the popular masses and all proponents of peace to fight against the threat of a new war. They also pursue another goal: discrediting the idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures, making it dependent on ideological relations. It is no accident that bourgeois ideologists and politicians are insistently publicizing the idea of peaceful coexistence in ideology.

Because of relaxation of international tension, renunciation of the struggle of ideas is often viewed in the West as a unique sort of guarantee of prevention of war and maintenance of peaceful coexistence. The proponents of ideological disarmament want to portray themselves as the zealots of peace. The logic of their reasoning is about as follows: In the struggle of ideologies, the debate sometimes becomes so acute and passions are inflamed to such a degree that the temptation to resort to armed violence comes about. To avoid war we must, they say, renounce ideological warfare.

Of course the ideological duel between antagonistic classes does not isolate it from other spheres of the struggle between them. Every class and its political party try to ideologically influence the masses in order to organize and mobilize them for particular actions--progressive or regressive, revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. It all depends on what class is involved, and which ideas it preaches. Militant propaganda of monopolist reaction lays the road to war. But, first, the cause of war does not lie in the propaganda itself. Second, the militant propaganda of imperialist magnates is opposed to the peace-loving propaganda of socialist states and other progressive forces, which expresses the real aspirations and hopes of mankind. It is an important means of unmasking and foiling the dangerous political course of the warring circles of imperialism. Therefore the objective of consolidating the peace requires not this infamous ideological disarmament, but a more aggressive struggle by all progressive forces against the imperialist fomenters of war including in the ideological sphere.

The 25th CPSU Congress noted that positive shifts occurring in world politics and detente are creating favorable possibilities for the wide spread of socialist ideals. But on the other hand the ideological duel between the two systems is becoming more aggressive, and imperialist propaganda is becoming more sophisticated. "In the struggle between two philosophies," emphasizes the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "there cannot be any room for neutrality and compromises. What we need here is high political alertness, active, effective, and persuasive propaganda, and timely repulsion of hostile ideological diversions."⁴

Such are the basic outlines of the relationship between war and ideology, as revealed in an examination of this issue from the point of view of the causes of war. In addition to this, there are mutual relationships and mutual influences between war and ideology typical of the process of war itself.

In a modern war, the opposing sides strain all of their material and spiritual resources in order to achieve victory. In this case ideology becomes one of the means for mobilizing the spiritual forces of the society, and it is an important factor having tremendous influence on the course and outcome of the war.

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History provides numerous examples of the use of ideology as a unique sort of weapon in war. But before states possessed effective technical resources for spreading ideas, and when most soldiers and the public were still illiterate and spiritually oppressed, the possibilities for ideologically influencing the masses remained relatively limited. Oral statements by orators to small groups of people, prayers and sermons, the spread of rumors, placement of signs having a terrifying or an emboldening influence, and of written or objective symbols along the path of troops, the inspiring words of the commander prior to an engagement, the sound of a trumpet and the roll of a drum and, finally, a "Hurrah!" shouted by many voices made up the arsenal of the means of spiritual influence upon the masses in wars of the past.

Different horizons came into view in wars of the 20th century. The spread of literacy and culture among the broad strata of the population, publication of large numbers of newspapers, periodicals, and books, and the appearance of mighty sources for shaping public opinion--radio, movies, and later television--opened up unprecedented prospects for using ideological weapons. In the first and second world wars, as well as in local wars of the subsequent decades, warring states used agitation-propaganda resources for influencing the masses on a tremendous scale.

Owing to the modern scientific-technical revolution the technical possibilities for using ideological weapons have grown exceptionally large. It would be sufficient to point out that thousands of radio stations and television centers are now making regular broadcasts throughout the world. Their programs are received by 700 million radios and 300 million television sets.⁵

One of the prerequisites of successful use of ideological weapons is correct determination of their place among the resources of war. Priority is placed in this case on the resources of armed violence, and all other resources, including ideological, play the role of auxiliary weapons.

Use of ideological weapons in war is aimed mainly at two highly important, mutually associated objectives: 1) raising the moral-political level of the population and army of one's state to the fullest with the goal of achieving victory over the enemy; 2) subverting or weakening the moral-political state of the population and army of the enemy's state with the goal of paralyzing their will to fight. Moreover ideological resources perform other tasks in times of war, for example they shape favorable world public opinion, mobilize allies within a coalition, and so on.

Fundamental ideological issues are usually at the focus of the influence of propaganda and agitation. They usually have to do with the political goals of the war, the nature of the social and state structure of the warring countries, the class content of their domestic and foreign policy, the mutual relationships within each of them between the government, the people, and the army, an assessment of the historic past of the peoples of the dueling states, their customs, traditions, social ideas, and so on.

These issues are analyzed on the basis of economic, political, and social doctrines, philosophical and religious (or atheistic) viewpoints, and the ethical and esthetic positions of different classes. The success of propaganda is ensured when the

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arguments employed affect sociopolitical feelings such as national pride, patriotism, class solidarity, hatred of the class enemies, civic and military duty, and honor.

Propaganda bears results at the ideological and theoretical level when it associates the general objectives of the war with the interests and trials of every citizen and soldier. Such an inseparable relationship between that which is general and that which is personal exists only in socialist society. The psychological factors of the personality may be supported and reinforced, or on the other hand they may be weakened. People convinced in the justice of the cause for which they are fighting are capable of suppressing negative emotions brought on by the elements of war. Combined with properly organized psychological training, purposeful ideological work reduces psychological tension and keeps the battleworthiness of the troops and the perseverance of the population of the socialist state high. Propaganda and agitation can also be used to raise psychological tension among the troops and population of the enemy, thus reducing their moral spirit.

Inasmuch as the nature of ideological weapons used in wars depends on the class content of the ideology, on the social and state structure of the warring sides, and their goals, there are fundamental differences in the use to which these weapons are put, and in the ways they are used in wars waged by different classes and social systems.

3. Ideological Weapons in the Wars of Imperialist States

Bourgeois propaganda tries to portray the Western world as a single social organism in which total agreement reigns. This is clearly a fabrication. Throughout the entire history of bourgeois society, it has been torn apart by profound internal contradictions which have often led to wars between capitalist states. A certain role was given to bourgeois ideology in these wars.

Analyzing and assessing the role of ideological weapons and ideological activities in imperialist wars, we should consider that the monopolist bourgeois ideology of states warring against each other is basically the same in terms of its class essence, and therefore we do not see as dramatic an ideological duel as between the bourgeois and the working class. Nevertheless, it would be fully valid to refer to internal ideological mobilization of the population and armies of countries participating in an imperialist war, and to an ideological struggle between nationally independent factions of monopolist bourgeoisie.

Being the same throughout in class essence and role, bourgeois ideology is not an integral system of ideas, perceptions, and concepts. It is an eclectic assortment of the most diverse theories and conceptions, ones which occasionally contradict each other, often borrowed from the ideological arsenal of former eras. To justify its self-interested desires, the bourgeoisie resorts to nationalistic, racial, and other myths. In view of this, the bourgeois ideology of a particular nation possesses unique traits and characteristics, from which it tries to gain its support in its domestic and foreign ideological activities.

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Imperialist states use ideological weapons as multipurpose resources: to mobilize public opinion during preparation for war and in its initiation, to inspire the population and the army to aggressive military actions, to demoralize the enemy and weaken his fighting power, to justify and validate the results of war, and so on. The experience of imperialist wars shows that the bourgeoisie is able to draw the broad laboring masses into a struggle for monopolist interests alien to them to a great extent owing to timely military brainwashing. Ideological preparation for aggression has become an inherent part of the activities of imperialist reaction.

Preparing for war in ideological respects, monopolist bourgeoisie hopes to surmount anti-imperialist and antiwar moods in its own state, ignite pseudopatriotic feelings in the people, impart the appearance of a just nature to the war from its point of view, and facilitate control of the behavior of tremendous human masses in war. At the same time it does everything it can to discredit the goals of the enemy. Efforts are taken to ideologically brainwash the population and army of the enemy state. The bourgeoisie uses its ideologists and a broad mass media network to achieve all of these objectives.

In its ideological preparation of the people for participation in imperialist wars, the bourgeoisie has always attached primary significance to publicizing militancy, aggression, and piracy, and to preaching the cult of military force--in both disguised and open form. As an example in the period between the first and second world wars the politicians, ideologists, and military officials of the imperialist countries cynically glorified war. O. Spengler, a German philosopher popular at that time, asserted that war is a permanent form and the greatest good of human life, and that the entire meaning of a state's existence supposedly lay in warfare.⁶ The fascist bible--Hitler's book "Mein Kampf"--was a glorification of the cult of war through and through. The initial premise of all discussions in the military-theoretical literature of Germany in the 1920's and 1930's was the thesis that war is permanent, inevitable, and beneficial. In Japan, militant ideology was introduced with the slogan: "War is the father of creation and the mother of culture". In Italy, the people were subjected to military-ideological brainwashing just as unabashedly and cynically as in Germany and Japan. "We have always been and continue to be mainly a warring nation,"⁷ said Mussolini in 1933. Militant propaganda assumed significant proportions in England and the USA. "History shows," wrote W. Churchill, "that war is the destiny of the human race."⁸

The bourgeoisie attaches great importance in ideological preparation of the masses for imperialist wars to preaching chauvinism, nationalism, and racism. It makes broad use of these sentiments in an attempt to impart "legality" to its aggressive actions of seizing foreign territories and enslaving other nations. Geopolitical conceptions occupy a certain place in the arsenal of bourgeois ideological resources. With their help, imperialists try to "justify" their right to expand their "living space" through war.

Since the time of arisal of the world's first socialist state, monopolist reaction has been placing its main emphasis in ideological preparation for aggression on anticommunism. This poison-tipped ideological-political weapon of imperialism basically takes the form of slandering the socialist structure and falsifying

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the policies and aims of the communist parties, and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Anti-Sovietism is at the core of anticommunism.

In the period prior to World War II the militant circles of the bourgeoisie tried to cover up their aggressive designs against all peace-loving peoples with anti-bolshevik slogans. Thus the plans of German-Italian-Japanese imperialism of world conquest were camouflaged with anticommunist and anti-Soviet appeals. The military-political blocs and pacts of the aggressors were given the corresponding names. For propaganda purposes they were named "anti-Comintern", "antibolshevik", and so on, even though they threatened all mankind. But while anticommunist propaganda associated with preparations by the monopolist bourgeoisie of some states for aggressive acts against other capitalist countries was used as a unique sort of screen to conceal predatory designs in a competitive struggle within the imperialist camp itself, anticommunism performed a direct function in preparation for wars against the forces of socialism--"justifying" aggression against a society representing an opposite class.

For many years following the victory of Great October bourgeois propaganda misled the public of the capitalist states, persuading it that a "crusade" against the Soviet Union would be inevitable and necessary. Nazi Germany made especially intense ideological preparations for war against the USSR in the 1930's. Goebbels' propaganda tried to leach sympathies toward the people of the Soviet Union out of the consciousness of the German people, induce a hatred of all that was Soviet and socialist, and draw the laborers of Germany into the military adventure against the USSR being prepared by fascism. All resistance to this policy and ideology was savagely crushed by the Gestapo.

Following the signing of the Nonaggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1939, official Nazi propaganda altered its tactics: It no longer incited anti-Soviet sentiments openly, but it did intensify covert preparation of ideological weapons to be used in the war against the USSR. Special propaganda directives along the lines of "Barbarossa" (document C-26) were written. These directives, which consisted of 14 points, explained the general objectives of propaganda against the Soviet Union, and they contained concrete operational instructions on propaganda communication centers, places of information transmission, the nature of leaflets to be published and the methods of their dissemination, the use of loudspeakers, the duties of propaganda companies, and so on.⁹

Imperialism is continuing to use anticommunism as its main ideological-political weapon. Using anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda, the bourgeoisie is trying to shape a distorted impression of the essence of the socialist structure in the minds of the popular masses of the capitalist states. Passing over the great achievements of socialist democracy in silence, the imperialist press, radio, and television do everything they can to slander the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity. Thus monopolist reaction hopes to gain approval for all aggressive actions against socialist states.

Concurrently, imperialism uses anticommunist and anti-Soviet slogans in its military, political, and economic interference in the affairs of developing countries. Cases are known in which the USA's military intervention in countries assuming the road of struggle for national liberation was based on the excuse of averting the "communist threat".

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In a situation of acute ideological struggle in the international arena, imperialism is trying to broaden the sphere of influence of its ideological weapons. Using modern technical resources, it is constantly shooting poison-tipped arrows of anticommunism in the direction of the socialist states, across their borders, hoping to strike the minds and hearts of the builders and defenders of the new society. The efforts of bourgeois propaganda are aimed at devaluing the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, "eroding" socialist social consciousness, and introducing an apolitical, unprincipled orientation, and indifference to social affairs and to the fate of the socialist motherland into the consciousness of the citizens of socialist countries. Interesting attempts have been made by bourgeois propaganda to leach, out of the consciousness of the peoples of socialist states, their sense of socialist patriotism and internationalism and their traditions of heroism, military valor, troop comradeship, and mutual assistance in combat, and at the same time incite nationalistic prejudices. Thus imperialism hopes to undermine the moral potential of the socialist fraternity.

All of this requires the peoples of the socialist states and their armies to maintain constant political and military alertness, to have the ability to expose the ideological diversions of imperialism, to firmly defend their communist ideals, and to be prepared for annihilatory repulsion of all aggressors.

The basic orientations of bourgeois propaganda's ideological influence upon social consciousness which had evolved in the prewar years persisted through periods of war as well. The propaganda services of imperialism support a militant mood in their countries, utilizing the mass media for this purpose. These services concern themselves mainly with the goals of war. Bourgeois ideologists used nationalistic, religious, racial, psychological, and other conceptions in their attempt to cover up the predatory nature of imperialist war. Imperialist propaganda resorts to various techniques in order to morally and psychologically subvert the enemy on one hand, and encourage the population and army of its own state.

The first and second world wars demonstrated that the psychological actions of dueling imperialist states rests mainly on arguments of a psychological nature, and not an ideological one. In its agitation and propaganda, the bourgeoisie attaches primary significance to influence upon the psychology of nations as well as upon small groups of people and individuals.

The psychological actions of imperialism against socialist countries are dominated by arguments having to do with class ideology, with direct psychological pressure woven in. Indicative in this respect is the principal orientation of German fascism's propaganda in its aggression against the Soviet Union. Throughout the entire war the Nazis undertook tremendous efforts to ideologically "substantiate" and "justify" the political aim of their aggression: annihilation of the world's first socialist state, and transformation of all Soviet people into the slaves of German princes and barons. This attempt was based on racial theory, geopolitical theory, and open anti-Sovietism. From one day to the next, especially after the defeat of fascist troops at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, Nazi propaganda used the methods of psychological pressure in order to persuade the Germans that victory would mean bread, oil, and labor for Germany, while defeat would mean the death of the entire German nation.

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Possessing not even a single progressive idea in their arsenal, the Nazis promoted abortive promises of "liberating" the Soviet people from the socialist way of life in their propaganda aimed at Soviet soldiers and the population of the USSR. On temporarily occupied Soviet territory, fascist invaders undertook various steps, including propaganda, to spiritually disarm our people and distill the ideas of Marxism-Leninism out of their consciousness. In addition German propaganda tried to legalize the system of fascist terror. Scenes of mass annihilation of Soviet citizens and mockery of the human personality were used in Nazi newsreels as one of the methods for psychologically suppressing the will of the Soviet people to resist the fascist hangmen.

Despite all of the efforts of the Nazis, their ideological weapons misfired time and again. Soviet people everywhere--at the front and in the rear, on land temporarily occupied by the enemy--remained faithful to socialism, fought off the alien ideology, and selflessly struggled for the triumph of communist ideals. Socialist ideology enjoyed a total victory over the ideology of fascism. This is the objective conclusion made by history itself. Its validity is confirmed by the total military, economic, and political victory of the Soviet state over the fascist aggressors.

Naturally it does not follow from this that were imperialist invaders to once again attack the USSR, they would reject the use of ideological weapons as not living up to their expectations. This is not at all true. Learning its lessons from fascism's defeat, monopolist reaction is striving to improve its ideological weapons, and it is laying considerable hopes on them. It makes broad use of ideological resources in its preparations for unjust, aggressive wars, placing its main hopes on the methods and techniques of anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda. All of this permits the assumption that were imperialism to renew aggression, the ideological and political aspects of influence upon the population and armed forces of the socialist states would continue to be paramount in bourgeois propaganda.

As far as ideological brainwashing of the population and especially the armed forces of its countries is concerned, we can clearly see the bourgeoisie's traditional desire to, first, camouflage the true aggressive designs of imperialism and, second, to distort and soil the essence of the socialist structure, the domestic and foreign policy of socialist states, and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. The forms and methods of this brainwashing are highly diverse. The bourgeois way of life is advertised in every possible way, imperialist blocs are praised, the history and combat road of the Soviet Armed Forces are falsified, chauvinism, nationalism, racism, and Zionism are preached, and so on. Concurrently with special lessons aimed at ideological brainwashing of the personnel, the troops are given large doses of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism in combat training itself. The bourgeois press, radio, movies, television, and church have a constant influence, forming the political inclinations of the imperialist armies.

New trends that had been nonexistent prior to World War II can also be found in the ideological preparations being made by imperialism for war against socialism. Together with open anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, broad use is being made today of covert ideological sabotage, in which sociological theories fashionable in the West--"postindustrial society", "convergence", and so on--are publicized. We can see from this that bourgeois propaganda is attempting to impart a scientific nature and the appearance of objectivity to anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

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Another innovation in the ideological activities of monopolists aimed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is a close relationship with revisionism of all persuasions. Being the spiritual champion of counterrevolution, revisionism thus directly aids imperialism in its preparations for aggression.

The military adventures of imperialism in Southeast Asia and its aggressive acts against peoples in other regions of the globe in the 1960's-1970's demonstrate that most personnel of the imperialist armies are deeply saturated with the poison of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, and brainwashed in the spirit of hatred toward the Soviet Union, toward all socialist states, toward the world communist and workers movement, and toward the national struggle of liberation. At the same time some enlisted men and even officers in the imperialist armies are becoming more uncertain of the justice of their mission, and the correctness of the political course followed by ruling circles in the West. Their indifference and inertia is growing, often transforming into open displeasure and even protest. These processes reflect profound phenomena of the general crisis of capitalism, which has now embraced its economic and state structure, its policies, and its ideology.

The experience of past wars shows that in this time of growing influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology upon the minds of people, and in this situation of continual change in the balance of power in the international arena in favor of peace and socialism, trends implying that the imperialist bourgeoisie is experiencing increasing difficulties in the use of its ideological weapons in the interests of aggression are becoming stronger and stronger.

4. Ideological Weapons in Wars in Defense of Socialism.

In wars fought to defend socialism, Marxist-Leninist ideology is a mighty spiritual weapon in the struggle against the aggressors. In a military collision unleashed by imperialism between states having different social structure, the ideological struggle between them attains its highest intensity. In this case the ideological activities of communist parties differ fundamentally from the ideological activities of bourgeois parties. This difference is associated mainly with the content of the opposing ideologies and the mutually exclusive military objectives and, consequently, political goals of the warring sides.

While ideological work is conducted in imperialist states with the purpose of forming a false impression of the political content of a given war in the consciousness of the masses, and of forcing them to fight obediently for a cause alien to them, the ideological organs of socialist countries are interested in making the masses aware of the true nature of war--unjust and reactionary on the part of imperialism, and just and progressive on the part of socialism.

In wartime, all ideological work done in the socialist state is subordinated to the objectives of defeating aggressors and supporting the liberation struggle of other peoples wearing the yoke of capitalist slavery. Political agitation and propaganda is foremost in this work. Lenin formulated the principal requirement imposed on such work during the struggle of the young Soviet republic against foreign interventionists and White Guards. "Whether we like it or not," said Vladimir Il'ich in a speech to a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive

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Committee on 29 July 1918, "the situation is now like this: We are at war, and the fate of the revolution will be decided by the outcome of this war. This must become the first and last word of our agitation, of all of our political, revolutionary, and transformational activity."¹⁰

Hence it follows that the main efforts of political agitation and propaganda are focused in wartime on closer ideological and moral-political unification of the people around the Communist Party, and on explaining, to every citizen of the socialist state, the policies and programs of the fatherland's defense developed by the party, and the concrete ways for defeating the invaders. All forms of ideological activity, and mainly political agitation and propaganda, are aimed at reinforcing the moral spirit of the people, raising their political awareness and their responsibility for the fate of the country, and developing feelings of socialist patriotism, internationalism, and hatred toward the imperialist aggressors.

The most important resources of political agitation and propaganda are the press, radio, movies, television, literature, and art. During the Great Patriotic War, 18-23 million copies of central newspapers were published in single editions in the USSR.¹¹ The Soviet Armed Forces published 4 central, 19 frontal and fleet, and 103 army and flotilla newspapers. Their total number of copies was about 3.5 million.¹² Soviet radio broadcasts continued for over 18 hours a day in more than 70 languages of the peoples of the USSR and in 28 foreign languages.¹³ During the war about 170 million copies of creative literary works were published.¹⁴ All ideological work is conducted in socialist society in inseparable unity with the organizational activities of the party and state. The deep ideological convictions of the people and manifestation of these convictions in acts of combat and labor heroism are indicators of the effectiveness of ideological work.

Inasmuch as modern world wars are waged by coalitions of countries, ideological consolidation of the socialist states and their people has extremely important significance.

Socialist countries join together in a military coalition on the basis of the uniformity of their socioeconomic structure and the unity of their political goals and ideological viewpoints. This makes it possible for fraternal states to achieve closer economic, political, military, scientific-technical, and ideological cooperation in their pursuit of a shared international objective--protecting the achievements of socialism and defeating the common enemy in the event of war. Here lies one of the tremendous advantages of a socialist military coalition over an imperialist one. Realizing this advantage, and achieving international unification of the peoples and armies of the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialist aggressors is one of the most important objectives of the ideological activities of the communist parties of the socialist states.

Defending its class interests in World War II, the USSR fought against the fascist aggressors as part of a coalition containing a number of capitalist countries as well. Creation of such a union of states with different socioeconomic structures was possible only on the basis of temporary agreement of interests associated directly with the objective of defeating a common enemy threatening all mankind. This union involved the military, economic, and diplomatic efforts of the countries. In terms of ideological composition, however, the anti-Nazi coalition was not only

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diverse but also fundamentally polarized. Therefore the ideological struggle within this union--between states having different socioeconomic systems--continued. It was waged on our side by means of methods in keeping with the objectives of the Soviet Union in that period of history. Ideological measures implemented by the socialist state in its mutual relationships with the capitalist countries of the anti-Nazi coalition entailed, first of all, mobilizing the allies for the total military defeat of the enemy, defending our class point of view on postwar reconstruction of the world, answering the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie upon the socialist consciousness of the Soviet people and their army, explaining the essence and orientation of the socialist country's policies and the goals of the common struggle to the peoples of capitalist states in the anti-Nazi coalition, and so on.

The ideological struggle between a socialist state and an imperialist aggressor requires exposure of bourgeois ideology, its roots and sources, its political aims, and its social harmfulness to mankind, exposure of its creators and bearers (the bourgeois political parties, their leaders and ideologists, government propaganda services, and state ideological institutions), and the conduct of political work among the people and army personnel of the enemy.

It stands to reason that these two levels of the ideological struggle are closely associated and practically indivisible, but propaganda at the first level sets the general tone. It predetermines the political orientation of all agitation and propaganda during a war or in its individual phases. This propaganda experiences great foreign political resonance, promoting creation of benevolent world public opinion.

Political propaganda among enemy troops and public is aimed directly at the common people, whom the imperialist bourgeoisie uses as cannon fodder in its counterrevolutionary plans. The necessity and possibility of such propaganda follow from the fact that the class designs and political aims of imperialism in a war against socialist states are diametrically opposed to the interests and aspirations of the laborers in capitalist countries. This contradiction is the source of the internal weakness of bourgeois armies.

During the years of foreign intervention and civil war in Russia, Lenin insistently demanded that agitation and propaganda be conducted among interventionist troops in order to undermine their power. He constantly led this work, and he personally participated in the preparation of leaflets and appeals addressed to the soldiers and workers of capitalist countries. Under the influence of Soviet agitation, as well as agitation by communist internationalists in other countries, interventionist troops conducted massive antiwar and anti-imperialist demonstrations. Soldiers and seamen refused to fight against the Soviet republic. This gave Lenin the grounds for saying: "We took the Entente's troops away from it through agitation and propaganda. We vanquished the imperialists not only with the help of our own soldiers but also with reliance upon the sympathies of their own soldiers toward us."¹⁵

The following main objectives are pursued in political work conducted by socialist countries among the enemy public and troops: explaining the just goals of the war of liberation on the part of socialist states, and exposing the unjust, predatory goals of the war on the part of imperialism; demonstrating the power of

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socialist states and their armed forces, and the inevitable failure of imperialism's military plans; exposing the reactionary nature of the bourgeois parties in power, and the antipopular essence of the capitalist state; demonstrating the contradictions existing within bourgeois armies and coalitions; spreading the idea that soldiers should quit the enemy armies by giving themselves up and organizing mass surrender.

Ideological issues have always been at the forefront in propaganda and agitation conducted by socialist states among the population and troops of the enemy. At the same time the ways and means of influencing the enemy's mind in such a way as to paralyze his will to resist, to sow fear, and to evoke disorganization and panic have occupied a prominent place.

If imperialism does unleash a new world war, the role of ideological weapons will grow even more. The ways and means of influencing the enemy's mind will grow in significance as well. Imperialism will attempt to achieve its general political and ideological goal in such a war--liquidating the world socialist system. In this situation, the fraternity of socialist states will decisively defend its revolutionary achievements and fight for total defeat of the aggressor.

The ultimate importance of the political goals of the war will inevitably influence the ideological and psychological struggle between the warring sides, which will assume unprecedented scale and intensity. We can see from all of this the tremendous role played by continual, purposeful moral-political and psychological preparations of our troops. Concurrently we must improve the ways and means of moral-political and psychological influence upon the troops and population of the enemy.

Discussing the prospects of the duel with imperialism in the event that it unleashes a new world war, we must express our unshakeable confidence in our victory over the aggressors. This confidence is based on the advantage of the socialist social and state structure over the capitalist structure, on the superiority of socialist ideology over bourgeois ideology, and on the awareness of every citizen and every soldier in socialist society of the justice of defending the revolutionary achievements of the people. Awareness of the rightfulness of one's cause generates a great spiritual force, which in combination with the material power of socialism will defeat all aggressors.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 72.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], f. 32, op. 11309, d. 240, l. 128.
3. Ibid., l. 441.
4. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 74.
5. See Kashlev, Yu. B., and Maksudov, L. M., "Mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye i ideologicheskaya bor'ba" [Peaceful Coexistence and the Ideological Struggle], Moscow, 1973, p 10.

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6. See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 1, p 44.
7. Ibid., p 45.
8. Ibid.
9. See "Nyurnbergskiy protsess" [The Nuremburg Trials], Vol 2, Moscow, 1958, pp 573-577.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 15.
11. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, p 413.
12. See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz" 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History], p 454.
13. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz," Vol 5, Book 1, p 413.
14. See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz," Vol 5, Book 1, p 422.
15. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 125.

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CHAPTER XV

THE ROLE OF THE POPULAR MASSES AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN WAR

The spiritual factor in war, examined in previous chapters, is not a self-contained entity. It is embodied within the activities of popular masses, classes, parties, and individuals. The popular masses play a decisive role in material production, in the development of material and spiritual culture, in social revolutions, and in the course and outcome of a war.

The question as to the role of the popular masses and the individual in war is part of the general question as to their place in history. The role of the people in war can be assessed from what they do to create the economic, technical, and moral prerequisites of warfare, and from their direct participation in combat activities.

1. The Popular Masses in Modern War

The role of the popular masses has risen in all spheres of social life in the modern era. This is the product of all processes of social development. Most of the earth's population, Lenin wrote in a characterization of the revolutionary changes occurring in the world, "has now awakened, and it has begun a movement which even the strongest powers are unable to halt."¹

Arousal of the people to active struggle elicited unprecedented acceleration of historic development. Lenin emphasized: "History is now being created independently by millions and tens of millions of people."² This activity is especially high among people in socialist countries, in which they are consciously and purposefully transforming life, and building socialism and communism.

The greater influence of the popular masses also manifests itself in war. This influence is predetermined by the development of productive forces, the economic and political structure of the society, the position of the classes, the nature of war, the weapons and military equipment employed, the consciousness and unity of the masses, and the extent of their direct participation in military actions.

Participation of the people in wars has now become especially significant. A number of general traits are inherent to modern wars in this aspect. These traits are the product of new sociopolitical conditions, the greater scale of wars, and

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broad use of powerful weapons and military equipment in them, which requires tremendous (and maximum in a number of cases) application of the economy, and creation and maintenance of massive armies.

The first typical trait of modern wars, especially world war, is that the efforts of armies alone are not enough for their conduct. While in the past, the outcome of a war was often decided by relatively small armies, the situation changed dramatically later on. As long ago as in 1905, Lenin wrote: "Wars are now being fought by entire nations...."³

The low level of development of productive forces in slave-owning and feudal societies would not permit the ruling classes to maintain massive armies. Wars were fought predominantly by soldier classes or mercenary troops outfitted with primitive equipment. In most cases the combat activities involved limited areas, and they barely affected the deep rear of the countries. The popular masses influenced war through the production of weapons and other materiel, but as a rule they were not extensively drawn into the combat activities themselves. There were periods, however, in which popular masses, full of resolve and patriotic enthusiasm, did rise in the defense of the homeland against foreign invaders.

Wars of the modern era draw many millions of people into their orbit, transforming into enormous battles. The more decisive the political aims and the broader the scale of wars, the more countries are drawn into them and the more significant is the participation of the masses. People participate directly in armed struggle, and they have an influence on the course and outcome of wars through material production and through the spiritual factor.

Second, wars of unprecedented scope and savagery subject the social and state structures of the dueling sides, and all of the material and spiritual forces of the people, to an all-out test. They demand colossal exertion of effort, and the tremendous endurance and perseverance of the masses, who carry all of the burdens and tribulations of war on their shoulders. Victory in war, Lenin taught, belongs "to the one with larger reserves, greater sources of power, and people with greater endurance."⁴ All of these advantages can be found in the socialist state.

Third, the degree and nature of participation of popular masses in wars also reflect, in a certain way, the new factors contributed to military affairs by scientific-technical progress.

Introduction of nuclear missiles and new military equipment into the troops has immeasurably increased their combat possibilities, and caused a revolution in the organizational structure of the troops and in tactics. But even the most sophisticated weapons and equipment are not an independent factor of victory. Success depends not only on the power of weapons but also on the superiority of the moral-political and combat qualities of the people using the weapons and equipment, controlling these weapons, and organizing and carrying out the defeat of the enemy. In war, the individual continues to be the main and decisive force; it is precisely the individual who is the master of the menacing resources of armed struggle. Airplanes and missiles climb into the sky, radar antennas begin to revolve, and submarines dive into the oceanic depths at his will. It is of such people--ones having faultless mastery of weapons and military equipment, seasoned in moral-political respects--that the Soviet Armed Forces are composed.

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Consequently the nature of modern wars and the level of development of military affairs impose ever-increasing demands upon the combat, ideological-political, and moral-psychological qualities of the personnel.

The decisive role of people manifests itself differently in different wars depending on the economic and political structure of the society and the socio-political nature of the war.

Just wars of all types (wars for the independence of a state, wars of national liberation, civil revolutionary wars, wars in defense of the socialist fatherland against imperialist aggressors) are fought in the interests of progress. The strength of the people reveals itself most fully, deeply, and comprehensively in a war in defense of the socialist fatherland, for which a conscious attitude of the laborers toward their duty to the motherland is typical. In such a war, the people demonstrate unprecedented organization, and conscious discipline. Noble goals unify them. Favorable conditions are created for coordinating the activities of the masses and for making maximum use of the country's economic, political, moral, and specifically military possibilities to defeat imperialist aggressors. In one of the first documents of scientific communism--"The Elberfeld Speeches"--Engels made the remarkable prediction in February 1845 that in the event of war, members of communist society would fight the enemy with such great inspiration and such great steadfastness and bravery that the mechanical fighting style of capitalist armies would be no match for them, since the members of the new society would be defending their real fatherland.⁵

Defending the socialist fatherland, laborers display initiative and enthusiasm every day. The whole people's desire to reach the noble goals of war makes an impression on the creativity of the entire system of strategy and tactics, on the search for new methods of military actions and new forms of the state's military organization, and on development of massive patriotic movements to help the front. The pulse of the revolutionary creativity of the masses reveals itself in all elements of social life.

Lenin called the very first years of the existence of Soviet power a time of "achievements in proletarian military, administrative, and general political creativity never before seen in the world..."⁶ The military actions of our army were distinguished by decisiveness, boldness, and broadness of operational and tactical thinking. M. V. Frunze's explanation for this was that people "permeated by the active ideology of the working class"⁷ stood at the head of the Red Army.

Soviet soldiers proved themselves to be remarkable examples of military art in the Great Patriotic War. Our armed forces were well schooled in the use of all resources, forms, and methods of struggle, and in the art of their proper combination at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Everyone from the commander in chief to the common soldier unceasingly improved their ability to fight the enemy. The battlefield was a real academy of combat proficiency for millions of Soviet soldiers. This mass training, this desire of all personnel to master advanced skills, really increased the fighting power of our army, making its strikes upon the aggressor more and more devastating. The military maturity

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of the soldier masses grew constantly. We know that many soldiers who began the war as privates or sergeants ended it as the commanders of battalions and even regiments, as well as division and corps staff officers.⁸

A search for the new is also typical of all activities of Soviet Armed Forces personnel in peacetime. In tactical exercises and drills, in the air and on sea cruises, at firing ranges, tank driving ranges, proving grounds, airfields, and missile complexes--wherever combat proficiency is forged and tested, our soldiers demonstrate creative initiative in mastering weapons and military equipment and in assimilating new methods of armed struggle. In the course of socialist competition, the number of outstanding soldiers, of outstanding subunits and units, of rated specialists, and of masters of military affairs grows.

Mass heroism of the army and all the people is typical of wars fought in defense of the socialist fatherland. This heroism is a product of new social relations and motivations, communist ideology, and the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party. Brilliant victories on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War were the result of mobilization of the material and spiritual forces of all Soviet society. The bravery, fearlessness, and endurance of the Soviet people elicited the admiration of friends and the amazement of enemies. Only a hero-people were capable of enduring the colossal burdens of 1,418 days and nights of struggle against the tremendous military machine of fascism, and annihilating an aggressor who had the resources of almost all capitalist countries of Europe at his disposal. Millions of Soviet people performed acts of heroism.

Thus the collective bravery of units, ships, and formations was recognized by almost 11,000 government awards. More than 11,000 soldiers earned the title Hero of the Soviet Union. For courage and bravery in battles against the enemy, Soviet soldiers were awarded 5.3 million orders and more than 7.5 million medals. Two hundred thirty-four partisans became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Participants of the partisan movement received more than 184,000 orders and medals. Communists and their assistants in combat--Komsomol members--were always in the most difficult and critical areas.

The Soviet people displayed mass labor heroism in factories and plants, and on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. During the war the selfless toilers of the rear were awarded orders and medals more than 204,000 times. One hundred ninety-nine of the most distinguished workers of the national economy received the title Hero of Socialist Labor.

Continual growth in the country's economic, political, and moral forces and in the power of its army's offensive spirit is a natural expression of the people's enthusiasm in war. In the hardest months of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people not only replenished their losses but also enlarged their armed forces quantitatively and improved them qualitatively.

The international solidarity of the laboring masses reveals itself clearly in the just wars of the modern era. Soon after the birth of the Soviet state, when imperialism tried to strangle the young Soviet republic, the international working class demanded: "Hands off Soviet Russia!", and it provided all of the support it could under those conditions. In turn, the Soviet people have always come to

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the help of the laborers of other countries throughout their entire history, and in all situations, no matter how complex.

The traditions of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity of the laborers revealed themselves clearly in the war against the fascist invaders. The peoples of many countries of the world made this their contribution to the overall victory. Communists--true patriots and internationalists, consistently fighting for the liberty and independence of peoples--marched in the advance guard of the struggle against the most dangerous enemy of mankind.

The Soviet people endured special hardships, taking on the main thrusts of the invaders, armed to the teeth with the most sophisticated armament of that time. The aggressor was engaged in a savage fight. The Soviet people played the decisive role in the defeat of fascist Germany and militant Japan. "In this long war, the hardest in the history of our motherland, the Soviet people performed an act of heroism of which mankind had never witnessed an equal. They managed not only to defend their liberty and independence, but also make a decisive contribution to the rescue of European and world civilization from annihilation by fascist barbarians."⁹ Progressive mankind will always be grateful to the Country of the Soviets for its great international deed.

In the postwar period the numerous aggressive plans of imperialism were foiled owing to international unification of laborers, and mainly as a result of the combined power of the states of the socialist fraternity. One of the latest examples of this was the defeat of American imperialism in the war against the people of Vietnam. The heroic Vietnamese people, enjoying the full support of socialist countries, won a remarkable victory in their war of liberation against American aggressors and their South Vietnamese puppets.

The decisive role played by popular masses in the course and outcome of a war manifests itself not only in wars of liberation but also in predatory, unjust wars. Before we can explain this thesis, we would have to answer the following question: How can the laborers predestine, in the final analysis, the outcome of an aggressive war if it is brought on not by the people but by militant circles, by the ruling monopolist clique?

We know that aggressive, unjust wars unleashed by imperialist invaders are waged in opposition to the interests of the people, and at the same time with their hands and blood. The bourgeoisie tries to achieve its class goals "by leading on a certain faction of deceived, uninformed, oppressed workers..."¹⁰ Through systematic ideological brainwashing and coercion, the predators of capital have been able to cast many tens of millions of simple people into the abyss of imperialist wars.

However, imperialist war has its own logic of development, independent of subjective designs. It is easier for monopolist reaction to begin a war, and much more difficult to get out of it. The possibilities offered by moral forces in imperialist armies are limited. The bourgeoisie does manage to lead on a certain faction of the people through various connivances. As Lenin wrote in his work "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", one cannot lead the masses to a predatory war by the strength of secret conspiracies and then count on their

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enthusiasm, one cannot elicit heroism in the masses without breaking one's ties with imperialism.

During World War II, although the Nazis did manage to ideologically stupefy many people and encourage them to aggressive actions, the morale of the army and population of fascist Germany was significantly shaken by the development of events at the front. Military defeats undermined their temporary "elation" and produced declines in morale and a critical attitude toward the "optimistic" predictions of Nazi propaganda concerning the prospects of the war. The activity of antifascist organizations became more aggressive in the country.

This considerably troubled the political leadership and military command of Germany. For example after the defeat of fascist troops at Stalingrad, General Sherner, commander of the XVIX Mountain Infantry Corps, published a special order in February 1943 demanding that the officers exert an "ideological influence" upon soldiers displaying "an indifferent or obtuse attitude toward the events."¹¹ Following the defeat of fascist troops at Kursk, Goebbels began calling for "concentration of the German spirit", which had been substantially undermined. General Jodl, one of the highest fascist military leaders, declared in 1943: "A contagion of decay is spreading throughout the entire country."¹² In their directives, the Nazis began referring to a "disease" which they called "spiritual influenza".

Naturally under certain circumstances deceived soldiers in an imperialist army fighting in behalf of interests alien to them may bring about some degree of success for "their" bourgeoisie. However, if they begin to see the light, they would do everything to oppose their use as cannon fodder, and then the machine of aggression would invariably begin stalling, and it may even escape the control of those who prepared it and placed it into motion.

The popular masses are capable of undermining the positions of imperialist invaders in material production as well. By their passive attitude toward their work, and through covert or overt actions against the militants, they could significantly reduce the economic potential of the aggressive state. The people may also undertake even more decisive measures, putting an end to the war by revolutionary change of the social structure.

The power of the people has now grown so strong that conditions permitting solution of the problem of war and peace in a new way have arisen. "In the new historical era," states the CPSU Program, "the possibilities of the popular masses for actively intervening in the resolution of international issues have grown immeasurably."¹³ The forces of war can now be opposed by the powerful will and unity of action of the progressive forces of peace in behalf of the prevention of war.

The ranks of the warriors against war, of warriors for a sound, just peace on earth, have now grown large, and they are more organized than ever before. They are represented mainly by the powerful Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist fraternity, which are marching in the front ranks of social progress and placing their tremendous material and political power in the service of peace; the international working class and its organizations, primarily the communist parties; the national liberation movement; peace-loving nonsocialist countries which do not share in the imperialist yearning for war and which prefer peaceful coexistence between states

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with different social structures; the world movement of the warriors for peace. "Peace-loving society," said L. I. Brezhnev when the "Gold Medal of Peace" was conferred upon him, "is the watchful, unsleeping eye of mankind, its all-seeing conscience. It is called upon to raise and weld the people for defense of universal peace and security."¹⁴

Consistent implementation of the program of peace and international cooperation, and of the liberty and independence of peoples, announced by the 24th CPSU Congress and subsequently developed by the 25th CPSU Congress, is having an increasing influence in the resolution of the major, fundamental issues of world politics. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on the decisive role of the popular masses in war and peace is giving the laborers confidence in the inevitable triumph of their just cause.

History has demonstrated that everything which is opposed by the people and not supported by them is unsound, temporary, ephemeral. Such has been the fate of empires, and crowns line the sidewalks by the dozens. On the other hand, that which is precious to the laborers, that for which they fight is unshakeable. There are no forces on earth which could destroy the socialist fraternity, since it is being guarded by brotherly peoples faithful to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, devoted to the socialist fatherland, united around the Communist Party, and possessing tremendous economic, political, moral, and defensive power.

A historically new community of people--the Soviet people--arose in the course of the development of socialism and communism in the USSR. This community was formed on the basis of public ownership of the resources of production, the unity of economic, sociopolitical, and cultural life, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the interests and communist ideals of the working class. The Soviet people are a socialist union of all nations and nationalities in the country, serving as the social foundation of a multinational, whole people's state. It is a fundamentally new community of people based on relationships of friendship and cooperation between all laboring classes and social groups, and nations and nationalities. World history has never witnessed such inviolable unity of aims, will, and action or such spiritual kinship, mutual trust, and harmonious combination of national and international interests in the mutual relationships of the masses as it now sees in the Soviet state.

The brotherly union of socialist nations and nationalities is one of the powerful sources of Soviet society's material and spiritual strength, and one of the decisive factors in successful development of communism and dependable protection of our revolutionary achievements.

2. The Role of Military Chiefs in Attaining Victory

The Marxist-Leninist assessment of the role of the popular masses as the creator of history not only does not deny the significance of leaders, but it also represents the scientific basis for correctly understanding their activity and their place in history. Science is incompatible with ignorance of authority in social life. Authority and a certain degree of subordination are mandatory in any social organization in which collective activity goes on. Denial of authority and leadership in general, and in military affairs in particular, objectively means an appeal for disorganization, anarchy, dispersal of forces, and erosion of discipline.

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Military practice knows of no cases in which an army deprived of competent leadership could have successfully fought the artfully controlled armed forces of the enemy under otherwise equal conditions. The command is the backbone of the army, It is a personification of firm organization, discipline, and order. Without the command, armed forces would be incapable of not only victory but also existence. However, we must seek the definition of the commander's purpose not apart from the activities of the soldier masses and the people, and we must not contrast military authority against the rest of the army personnel; instead, we must consider the inseparable unity of command and personnel. The assumption of a public career by a certain individual, the nature of the leader, and the manifestations of his talent and moral qualities can all be understood only with a consideration for the concrete historic situation and specific social relations.

The promotion itself of a state official, a military leader, or a naval commander is governed by social needs. As an example Napoleon's natural endowments were capitalized upon by the bourgeoisie, which at the time of feudalism's decline needed a leader reflecting the spirit and requirements of his class. England's need for a leader of a large navy brought Admiral Nelson, who demonstrated enviable capabilities in naval engagements, into the limelight. A. V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, P. S. Nakhimov, F. F. Ushakov, and others were able to apply their talent in military affairs because Russia needed troop and naval commanders.

Soviet military chiefs displayed their outstanding qualities throughout all the history of our state, because throughout all of this time the country faced the necessity of armed defense of the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Inasmuch as the threat that monopolist reaction might unleash a new war has still not been eliminated, we continue to experience a need for strong, battleworthy Soviet Armed Forces and talented troop and naval commanders, and they continue to exist.

In a state of exploitation, and mainly in an imperialist state, the promotion of military chiefs does not depend upon the will of the people. The main factor here is which patrons are more successful in enriching themselves at the expense of the laborers, and find themselves more influential in ruling circles. Imperialists show preference and render support to those military officials who embody, more fully than others, the traits of the parasitic class--obsequiousness and cruelty, and a disdain for the common man. Naturally their knowledge of military affairs and presence of organizational capabilities are considered, but in all cases the emphasis is placed mainly on how faithful a servant of monopolistic capital the military chief would be.

The bourgeoisie devotes special attention to the social composition of all ranks of military leaders--from the highest to the lowest. It takes steps to make sure that commanders express and defend the interests of the propertied classes.

In opposition to this, the representatives of the laborers are promoted to executive positions in socialist armies, ones which are truly popular by their nature. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has nurtured a large detachment of troop and naval commanders with the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and their work in the military, their military ideals, and their conceptions have become the apex of modern military science and military art. These people are typified by unshakeable communist

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conviction, devotion to the socialist motherland and to the cause of the party; they are people with a broad outlook, with deep knowledge, and with indefatigable energy and initiative; they are capable of predicting the course and outcome of events, and their thinking is bold and original; they implement decisions firmly, and they are always ready to assume the entire responsibility of their actions. The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces persuasively confirms Lenin's thought that the army of a socialist state, in which the command consists of representatives of a people knowing what they are fighting for, is invincible.

In the same way that promotion of a military leader would be unimaginable without certain demands upon his public life, his activities are governed by history, and they cannot be torn away from objective factors.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on necessity and freedom is the scientific basis for answering the question as to the role of the military leader. This teaching rejects both voluntarism, which reduces human history to the independent will of heroes, and fatalism, which interprets history as a spontaneous chain of events which the individual is not in a position to seriously influence.

Objective ties and relationships inherent to nature and society cannot be formed or denied by the simple force of subjective desires, personal sympathies or antipathies, and prejudices. Being a specific social phenomenon, war is not a chaotic heap of different circumstances; it follows certain laws. However, people are not powerless in the face of objective reality. Laws do not transform man into a slave, and they do not place him in the position of the plaything of inevitable phenomena. Man is free to the extent that he understands reality and to the extent that he has the means for controlling it. A knowledge of laws gives people strength, arming them with the ability to make decisions with a deep understanding of what is going on. A military leader who has learned the laws of war and military affairs can solve the problems he faces more successfully, and with the least expenditures of men and equipment.

The founders of scientific communism gave a high assessment to military leaders who deeply understood the logic behind the development of events and the internal trends of military affairs, such that they were able to gain victory even when fighting a numerically superior enemy. Engels believed decisiveness, persistence, and purposefulness coupled with organizational capabilities, personal bravery, and the ability to gain authority in the army and lead it to be the positive traits of a military chief. Thus, delighting in Garibaldi's campaign in Sicily and Southern Italy in 1860, Engels wrote: "This was truly one of the most remarkable military feats of our century, and it would have been almost entirely unexplainable, had the revolutionary general's prestige not preceded him on his triumphant march."¹⁵

And on the other hand, a military chief who failed to understand the needs of an objective process, failed to grasp the logic of developing events, and found himself, as Engels noted, imprisoned by staff-grade scholasticism, often led the troops by the shortest route to defeat. Engels cited numerous facts implying that battles were lost not by troops but by the command--due to an inability to correctly estimate the real situation and creatively apply the principles of military art. For example, Engels believed, the responsibility for the Austrian defeat at Magenta in 1859 lay wholly upon the command, upon a henchman of the court, the inept "hero" of

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Magenta Gyulai.¹⁶ Interference in the course of military actions by the Austrian emperor, the "arrogant youth" Franz Joseph, who directed his forces in the most senseless fashion was also disastrous. "Indecisiveness, vacillation, contradictory orders--the aim, it would seem, was to intentionally demoralize the troops--it was precisely in this way that in the course of 3 days, Franz Joseph irreversibly ruined himself in the eyes of his army."¹⁷

Consistently defending the principle of unity in his assessments of the objective and subjective factors of military affairs, Engels spared no satire in his characterization of the Prussian military writer General Villizen either. Villizen neglected objective processes and formulated scholastic principles of military art on the basis of just the hollow schemes of Hegelian philosophy. "...but it was not very much to Villizen's credit," Engels noted ironically, "that Napoleon's greatest successes were achieved each time with total disdain for Villizen's basic rules--a result which a righteous Hegelian might incidentally explain away to himself quite well by saying that such disdain would not in the least make these rules invalid."¹⁸

A leader who by his will opposes the needs of society's development and the objective laws inevitably strays to the path of adventurism, and history makes a harsh judgment of him.

The importance of skilled leadership by a military commander is extremely great. But the talent of a single individual is not all-powerful. No matter what capabilities a troop or naval leader may be endowed with, he is unable to exceed the existing real possibilities or compensate, by his personal qualities, for the faults of a society of exploitation. The Russian admirals P. S. Nakhimov, V. A. Kornilov, and S. O. Makarov, for example, whose gifts raised them a head above the admirals of other countries, found themselves powerless to alter an undesirable course of events in certain engagements. The talent of an individual could not compensate for losses predestined by the inertness and mistakes of the autocracy, or prevent the fall of Sevastopol' in 1855 and the demise of the 1st Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur.

A military leader cannot win if he strays beyond the bounds of objective conditions, but within the bounds of these conditions, he can and must fight decisively for victory. Of course, we should not overstate the role of the subjective factor; however, we should emphasize that when favorable objective preconditions are at hand, proper leadership--a capability for organizing the forces and guiding them to successful completion of missions defining the fate of a battle, operation, and the entire strategic plan as a whole--has decisive significance.

The wisdom, knowledge, and will of an outstanding military leader leave a deep impression on the development of military art. But the activity of military leaders proceeds in dependence upon the people's support, upon the moral-combat qualities of the army, and upon other factors. The merits of a military chief are inseparable from the heroism of the masses. The people and the army give a military leader not only the material resources but also the moral possibilities without which he would become a pawn of fate. V. I. Lenin believed one reason for Czarist Russia's defeat in the war with Japan to be the fact that officers of the Czarist army had no ties with the soldier masses, and did not utilize their support.

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Closeness to the people, to the soldier masses, has always made the military chief strong. Military leaders who have earned worldwide glory were the beloved of their troops; they new the way to the hearts of the soldiers, and they competently assessed and accounted for their moral possibilities.

The more fully the military chief expresses the demands and aims of the progressive class, the more significant is the role he plays. True mutual understanding between officers and soldiers, and between chiefs and subordinates is achieved only on the basis of class kinship and a community of political interests. Such a foundation exists only in the socialist army.

The strength of our commanders lies in the fact that they have intimate ties with the people, with the soldier masses, that they subordinate all of their activities to the noble aim of implementing the Communist Party's policy, and to the cause of defending the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution; their strength lies in the fact that they rely upon the mass initiative of the soldiers, upon the support of all Soviet people.

Closeness to the fighting masses helps the command improve military art and make correct theoretical generalizations. The conclusions of the theory of military art derive from practice, from the military experience of popular masses fighting on the battlefield with weapons in hand. The lowest elements of the army hierarchy, which are well aware of the merits and shortcomings of military equipment and which directly experience the enemy's tactics, often make changes in the methods of combat actions on their own.

A Soviet military chief is the bearer of high authority. His great responsibility to the party and people obliges him to constantly satisfy the requirements imposed on every Soviet leader, as stated by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress: "The modern leader must organically unite, within himself, adherence to party principles and deep competency, discipline and a resourceful, creative approach to his work. At the same time, no matter where he works, the leader is obliged to also consider sociopolitical and educational aspects, to be tactful toward people and understanding of their needs and demands, and to serve as an example in work and in personal life."¹⁹ Communist ideological convictions, selfless devotion to the party and people, exemplary personal discipline and organization, constant exactingness toward oneself and subordinates, fatherly concern for subordinates, initiative and independence, firm will, efficiency and perseverance in attainment of goals, organizational capabilities, a high level of professional training and diverse cultural experience, and the abilities of an educator and indoctrinator--all of these qualities are mandatory prerequisites of a Soviet military leader's success.

Specifically military leadership is inseparable from political leadership, and its effectiveness may be understood and assessed only in its interaction with political leadership. Military development is an inherent part of the Soviet Union's overall development. Military issues are always resolved in our country from the standpoint of general state and party interests. All of the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces proceed under the guidance of the Communist Party, which is inseparably tied to millions of laborers, and which leads them, develops the revolutionary initiative of the masses, and unites and directs their efforts toward the single goal.

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It is in Communist Party leadership that the main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' power lies. All victories of the Soviet people and their army were won under the tested leadership of our party. Under party leadership, Soviet soldiers--privates and seamen, sergeants and petty officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals stand a watchful guard over peace and development of communism in a single combat formation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 45, p 174.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 36, p 82.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 9, p 154.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 237.
5. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 2, p 539.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 108.
7. Frunze, M. V., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], p 92.
8. See "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History], p 586.
9. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," CPSU Central committee Decree, 31 January 1977, Moscow, 1977, p 6.
10. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 143.
11. Cited in "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945], Vol 3, Moscow, 1964, p 529.
12. Cited in Komkov, G. D., "Ideyno-politicheskaya rabota KPSS v 1941-1945 gg." [The Ideological-Political Work of the CPSU in 1941-1945], Moscow, 1965, p 421.
13. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 58.
14. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 403.
15. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 15, p 63.
16. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 13, pp 392, 413, 458.

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17. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 13, p 421.
18. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 28, p 57.
19. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 70.

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PART THREE

THE ARMY AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

CHAPTER XVI

THE ORIGIN OF THE ARMY AND ITS PLACE IN THE SOCIETY'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.
TYPES OF MODERN ARMIES

Our analysis of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon leads us to the necessity for examining the army and its origin and essence as the principal instrument of war. This problem is important in both the theoretical and practical aspects. Our understanding of the army's role in social life and the trends of its development, and in the relationship of people to military service depends in many ways on correct solution of this problem.

The question as the origin and essence of the army and its place in the society's political organization is one of the objects of the acute ideological struggle in the international arena. Imperialist theorists and revisionists of all persuasions are attempting to distort the fundamental scientific, Marxist-Leninist premises on the army, and to impose their own reactionary, antiscientific viewpoints upon the masses. This makes it necessary to persuasively unmask the ideological intrigues of the enemies of socialism, and bring the only valid teaching on the army, the Marxist-Leninist teaching, to the masses.

1. The Army--An Instrument of Policy

Engels gave a scientific definition to the concept "army" as a sociological category. He wrote: "The army is an organized unit of armed people maintained by the state for the purposes of offensive or defensive warfare."¹ This definition has great theoretical and methodological significance. It reveals the nature of arisal and development of the army in class society, and it contains its principal traits. First, this definition reveals to us that the army is a product of society, having arisen only at a certain stage of its existence; second, this definition emphasizes the army's social membership, and thirdly, it indicates its place among the various social phenomena and state organs, and its role in the life of society.

The most important trait of an army is that it is a state organization. The arisal, development, and, in the future, disappearance of the army as a state organ are the product of, correspondingly, formation, development, and elimination of classes and states.

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Associating the existence of the army with class society, with the state and wars, Marxism-Leninism thus reveals the causes and laws of its arisal and development as a social phenomenon. In his work "The Origin of the Family, Private Ownership, and State", Engels noted that war and organization (of the army--*Editor*) become regular functions of society when growth in production and labor productivity lead to the arisal of private ownership and division of society into classes. A greedy desire for wealth brings wars into being as a means of plunder and of consolidation of the power of the nobility and the army as an organization for popular suppression.² Elimination of the classes of exploitation on a worldwide scale would lead to elimination of states and armies.

A unity of the historic and logical approaches helps us to see the intrinsic nature and essence of the army, and understand the mechanism of its function.

Inasmuch as a state has a historic and class character, the army, being one of the organs of the state, also has a historic and class character; it serves as a specific military instrument of the ruling classes. The approach of dialectical materialism to the army as a historic and class phenomenon is the fundamental methodological foundation of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. This approach developed in the course of the struggle against bourgeois, opportunist, and revisionist viewpoints.

In the final analysis, bourgeois conceptions reject the historic and class nature of the army. According to them, the army is essentially a permanent phenomenon. They view the state as a permanent organ of control in the society, from which it supposedly follows that the army--one of its most important instruments--is a permanent phenomenon as well. It is asserted in this case that the army is intended for military missions supposedly in behalf of all members of the society--though of course, meaning a society of exploitation.

It stands to reason that this is not so. The entire history of antagonistic society shows that the army is a special military-political force by which the dictatorship of the ruling class is consolidated. It arose as a special apparatus in the hands of the economically and politically uppermost class to protect, consolidate, and expand its domination, and to fight internal class opponents and external enemies. Consequently within the political organization of antagonistic society, the army immediately assumed the role of an instrument specifically intended for regulation of the political relations among social groups and states in the interests of the ruling classes. Having arisen as an organized armed force, the army immediately pitted itself against the significantly larger part of the society of exploitation, and it began to be used by the smaller part of the society to suppress and enslave the laboring masses and peoples. It was precisely the possession of an armed organization--the army--by the minority of antagonistic society that permitted it to achieve domination over the majority--the oppressed classes, and to achieve its own goals in domestic and foreign policy. Thus the army is the main support and the most important state organ of antagonistic society. It is the bearer of the political essence of certain classes governing the state, and the champion of their policy. Having arisen in concrete historic conditions as a political phenomenon, the army will remain as such until it disappears. A political content has been intrinsically inherent to the army in all stages of its function.

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Revealing the political meaning behind the existence and activities of the army of a state of exploitation, Lenin often noted that references to the army as supposedly being apart from politics and neutral in relation to the political interests of different social strata are intended to deceive the masses. "An army," Lenin emphasized, "cannot be, never has been, and never will be neutral."³ "Keeping the army out of politics--this is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and Czarism, who in fact have always drawn the army into reactionary politics...."⁴ As long as exploiters need an army as the instrument of their domination, as an instrument to protect their class interests, then the "vulgar, hypocritical, false doctrine that 'the army must remain outside politics' is especially convenient as a means for masking the true intentions of the bourgeoisie in this regard."⁵

Lenin's assessment of the social meaning of viewpoints on the army hostile to us fully retain their significance in relation to modern conceptions on the army, publicized today by the ideologists of imperialism and revisionism. This assessment was persuasively confirmed by the tragic events in Chile in 1973. These events demonstrated that the Chilean army was not neutral in political respects. Being under the influence of reactionary forces, it sided actively with the counter-revolution.

One important trait of the army is that it is an organization of armed people, serving as a political instrument of organized military violence. The exploiting state creates and maintains an armed organization in the form of an army, to be used as a material instrument for imposing orders advantageous to the dominant class upon all society. "A permanent army and police," Lenin wrote, "are the main instruments of the force of state power...."⁶

Another significant trait of the army is that it is an armed organization intended for warfare. Its origin, development, and future withering away are organically associated with the arising, development and, in the future, disappearance of wars. This trait indicates, first, the political nature of the army, inasmuch as war is a continuation of the policy of certain classes and states by violent means, and secondly, that the army is the main instrument of military violence. Military violence is not simply an act of volition. It "requires," Engels noted, "quite real preconditions for its enactment and, especially, certain implements..."⁷ Thus the implement of violence is the army. Lenin emphasized that violence in the era of civilization "is not the fist and not the club, but the army."⁸

As we can see, the class essence of the army and its sociopolitical nature are predetermined by the nature and content of concrete policy expressing the interests of certain classes. The class nature of the army is significantly dependent upon the society's sociopolitical structure. All of this predetermines the place of the army in the struggle between social forces, and its role in history.

Marxism-Leninism is based on the fact that the class essence of the army reveals itself in all spheres of its activity, in all of its units, and in the close ties the army has with the fundamental interests of a particular class. These ties and the class essence of the army as an implement of direct class suppression are especially clearly evident in civil war.

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The class essence and the historic purpose of the army are concentrated in its functions--the direction, nature, and content of the army's activities, as defined by the state over a long period of history.

Marxism-Leninism concludes from a scientific, class-political analysis of the purpose and history of armies that being an instrument of the state, the army has domestic and foreign functions. Engels described the army of an exploiting society as "an obedient army drilled into discipline, always prepared for foreign conquests and for cruel suppression of popular movements within the country."⁹ Lenin pointed many times to the reactionary domestic and foreign purposes of the armies of exploiting states. In these states, the army is a resource without which ruling classes are unable to implement their policy of oppression and invasion.

The domestic function of the army of exploiting society can be summarized as, primarily, supporting the interests of the dominant class within the country, and holding class enemies at bay.

This function is the product of the very nature of an exploiting state. Engels wrote that "the state of Antiquity was, first of all, a state of slave-owners having the purpose of suppressing slaves, the feudal state was an organ of the nobility for suppressing serfs and dependent peasants, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of hired labor by capital."¹⁰ The main implement by which exploiting states completed and continued to complete these domestic tasks is the army.

The armies of the slave-owners held the slaves in check, and mercilessly crushed their uprisings against cruel exploitation. "The history of slavery," Lenin noted, "covers many decades of lengthy wars for liberation from slavery.... The Roman Empire, which was entirely based on slavery, experienced the shocks and blows of a tremendous uprising by slaves armed and brought together under the command of Spartacus, who formed an enormous army. In the end they were slaughtered, captured, and tortured by the slave-owners."¹¹

And so it was in the time of feudalism as well. An army consisting of feudal lords opposed the serfs as an armed force, always prepared for merciless suppression of uprisings. "The hierarchical structure of land ownership and its associated system of armed detachments," wrote Marx and Engels, "provided the nobility with power over the serfs."¹² The armies of the land-owning feudal lords dealt cruelly with peasant uprisings. As an example in 17th century Russia, Czarist troops suppressed uprisings led by Bolotnikov and Razin, and in the 18th century the troops suppressed uprisings led by Bulavin and Pugachev.

The bourgeois army performs a similar internal function. Lenin pointed out that a permanent army, "even in the most democratic bourgeois republic, in Switzerland for example, is a weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletarians. This is such an elementary truth that we need hardly dwell on it specially. It would be sufficient to recall the use of troops against strikers in all capitalist countries."¹³ The armed forces of the bourgeoisie strangled the Paris Commune in 1871. In Czarist Russia, an example of army reprisals against workers participating in the Moscow December uprising of 1905 can be found in the events at Krasnaya Presnya. The army is constantly being summoned to suppress the struggle of laborers in capitalist countries for their rights.

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The foreign function of an army of an exploiting society involves expanding the borders of the state by seizing the territory of other countries, stifling rivals or protecting the territory of its own state against foreign enemies, exporting counterrevolution, and suppressing the struggle of liberation of peoples in other countries.

Performing its foreign function, the army also acts in the interests of the dominant class, and it serves as an instrument of its class policy. Eloquent evidence of this can be found in all history. Thus the armies of slave-owning states were the implement of numerous predatory wars, which were the principal means for acquiring slaves and achieving hegemony. Examples of the latter were the wars between Athens and Sparta for domination in Greece.

Under feudalism, when "might made right", when right belonged to the strongest, in the countless internecine, dynastic, and other unjust wars, the armies of the feudal lords served as an implement of violent enslavement of peasants, seizure of new lands, and plunder of other nations.

The foreign function of capitalist armies is exercised in the interests of the bourgeoisie and, under imperialism, mainly in the interests of monopolistic capital.

Being the army of a state in which no form of social oppression exists, the socialist army is also a class army in terms of its origin and historic mission. However, its class essence is fundamentally opposite to that of the army of antagonistic society. It is created as the armed force of the proletariat, as an army of the country's working majority opposed to the exploiting minority. Its activities are aimed at defending the revolutionary achievements of the working class and all laborers, and at promoting the conditions for development of socialism and communism and, consequently, formation of the preconditions for the withering away of armies. Here lies the basic difference between the socialist army and the armies of all exploiting states.

Thus the Marxist-Leninist approach to analysis of the essence and functions of the army presupposes recognition of its historic-class nature, and of the natural process of its arising, development and, finally, its inevitable withering away, simultaneously with the elimination of antagonistic classes on an international scale, and the disappearance of wars.

2. Historic Types of Armies

Dialectical materialism's definition of the army as an instrument of policy is the scientific basis for explaining the category "historic type of army". This category expresses, in concentrated form, the class essence of the army and the qualitative determinacy of its political nature and purpose. The type of army is significantly dependent on the type of productive relations forming the economic basis of the society and the state corresponding to it. Each type of economic basis is typified by its own type of state, while the latter is typified by a concrete historic type of army. Consequently a certain army is inherent to every socioeconomic formation. The transition from one historic type of army to another occurs as a result of the replacement of an old socioeconomic formation by a new one. In the course of this replacement the system of class relations changes, a new class comes to power, new forms of government are consolidated, and a new army is created to support the interests of the new ruling class.

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We can see from this that the concept "historic type of army" reflects a concrete step in the process of history. In this case we can refer to armies only following the arising of states. Inasmuch as there were no states in primitive society, there were no armies. The first historic type of army is the army of the slave-owning state. "Among armies of the ancient world," wrote Engels, "the first about which we have any sort of authentic information is the army of Egypt."¹⁴

Marxism-Leninism also distinguishes other historic types of armies corresponding to concrete types of states: feudal, bourgeois, and socialist armies. Sometimes we encounter the concept "army of a transitory type" in the literature. It would obviously be more proper in such a case to refer not to a special transitory type, but rather to a transitory state, to a stage of transition in the development of the army, when its sociopolitical content includes elements of the old and new types of armies, the traits of the past, present, and future sociopolitical systems.

The sociopolitical content of a certain type of army does not remain unchanging. Within the framework of a type, as within the limits of a yardstick, they may change, though they would preserve their qualitative determinacy. Development of the sociopolitical content of an army expresses change in the composition, role, and place of the class forces of which it is an instrument. These changes are based on shifts in the economic structure of the society and in the material and political status of classes, shifts occurring within the socioeconomic formation.

In this connection it is important to distinguish armed forces, within the limits of one historic type of armies, on the basis of their sociopolitical content, which reflects a concrete stage of development of the state. This makes it possible to correctly understand the role of the army in the social process, and its place in the class struggle.

Under feudalism, for example, a transition from feudal detachments and feudal militia to the mercenary army of the head of government occurred together with society's transition from a state of political separateness to a unified state. In this transition, the social foundation of the army became smaller, and its sociopolitical content changed within certain limits: With time, the army became the protector of the interests of primarily the ruling elite of the feudal land-owners.

The sociopolitical content of the bourgeois type of army is also subject to change. We find obvious, for example, the unique features of the army serving as an instrument of the entire bourgeois class, typical of the period of premonopolistic capitalism, and the unique features of the imperialist army, which as a rule serves as the instrument of not the entire class of capitalists, as was noted above, but mainly of monopolistic bourgeoisie. Although they are of the same historic type, these armies differ from one another by their concrete sociopolitical content, the relationship of their functions, and their social base, which becomes significantly more narrow under imperialism.

Certain changes also occur in the sociopolitical content of an army of the socialist type. These changes are associated with economic development of socialist society and change in its class structure. In this aspect we can distinguish between an army of a state creating the foundations of socialism, and the army of a state representing developed socialism. This permits us to see more clearly the dialectics of

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that which is general and that which is specific in development of the socialist army, and to more successfully complete the task of strengthening the security of countries in the socialist fraternity.

Noting that development of the sociopolitical content of an army within the limits of a single historic type proceeds in accordance with a certain law, we cannot ignore the unique manifestations of this law in opposite socioeconomic formations. Thus while change in the sociopolitical content of armed forces based on narrowing of their social base is typical in particular of the historic types of armies of exploiting states, development of the sociopolitical content of armies of the socialist type is associated with, in addition to other factors, expansion of their social base. Here lies one of the fundamental differences between the armed forces of exploiting and socialist states.

The army depends not only on the nature of productive relations but also on the state of productive forces. As weapons and military equipment develop, the structure of the army and the methods and forms of its actions change within the framework of the existing economic basis and the superstructure corresponding to it. Military traditions, national features, utilization of combat experience, and the achievements of military theory and practice of previous eras and other armies play an important role in the function and development of an army. The development of an army also proceeds with a consideration for the fighting power, organization, and armament of the probable enemy. In this case the armed forces of states with opposite sociopolitical structures may have common features in their organization and tactics, and they may possess the same kinds of armament.

The relationship between the content and form of armed forces has important significance. The sociopolitical content of an army consists of its class-political purpose of being an instrument of warfare in the interests of certain classes. Form, as we define it, represents the organization of the content of the army, and the means of existence and interaction of its elements. In this sense the form of an army may be interpreted as its organizational structure and the organizational principles of its development.

As an instrument of purposeful armed violence, an army would be unimaginable without a clear organizational structure. It includes within itself, first of all, a recruiting system (mercenary, voluntary, based on a universal military obligation, and so on); centralized and untypic control; standard armament and gear in the troops and naval forces; a single training and indoctrination system; a common order of career service, and equal regulation of the life of the personnel; military discipline insuring unity of will and the unity of people in the performance of a mission.

Different, occasionally opposite social foundations of military discipline, control, and training and indoctrination are inherent to different historic types of armies, though they do have outward similarity in organizational structure. As an example one-man command exists in both bourgeois and socialist armies, but it is based in each of these two types of armies on fundamentally different sociopolitical foundations.

The organizational structure of an army is also characterized by the number of men it contains, its composition, the proportion of military equipment available, the way it is divided into the appropriate combat units, and the ratio of different arms, naval forces, and branches of armed forces.

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Finally, the form of an army depends on whether it is a regular army or a militia; this is an expression of an important principle of armed forces development.

All of this shows that form represents the military-technical side of an army. It depends significantly on the sociopolitical content of the armed forces, the concrete conditions under which they function, and the state of military affairs, as well as the socioeconomic and political changes occurring in society and the changes in quality of human material. Here lies one of the fundamental differences between the definition given to the army by dialectical materialism and the idealistic, metaphysical definition typically offered by bourgeois sociologists. The organizational structure of an army is affected not only by the "exclusively internal factors of military affairs", as the ideologists of capitalism declared in the past and continue to assert today, but also by policy, by political goals. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, a prominent military chief, turned his attention to this. "...policy," he wrote, "resolves, in the last analysis, problems associated with organization of armed forces..."¹⁵

Within the limits of one historic type, an army may be permanent, mercenary, and so on. These and other unique features of the form of an army are defined by the level of society's economic development, the nature of weapons and military equipment, the status of class forces, and the acuity of the struggle between them, all of which has an influence on the sociopolitical content of the army, and through it, its form. To a certain extent the organizational structure of the armed forces depends on the nature of the theater of war, national features, the country's historic traditions, and so on.

In the transition from one historic type of army to another, new type, certain aspects of the old form may survive: armament, tactics, and elements of the old organizational structure. The same form may exist in different historic types of armies. However, under the influence of the new sociopolitical content, new traits and features arise in the old form. The old form does not change and is not in a position to change the sociopolitical nature of the army of the new historic type.

We should state in this connection that some bourgeois ideologists classify armies of different historic types in terms of their form--that is, in terms of their outward characteristics. What they are trying to do by this is to substitute the problem of the class essence of armed forces and analysis of their sociopolitical content by the question as to the form of the army. The theorists of imperialism try to "prove" that the nature of an army is supposedly the product of its organization, armament, recruiting system, and so on. This approach is groundless from a scientific point of view, inasmuch as the form of an army cannot provide an impression of its class essence and, consequently, of the type of army. This can be seen in a concrete examination of the historic types of armies.

The armies of slave-owning states (Egypt, Greece, Rome, etc.) played the role of the implement for reinforcing domination of the slave-owners. Almost all forms of armies (permanent, mercenary, and so on) had already appeared by that time. However, their essence remained common, and independent of their form--these were armies of the slave-owning type. Thus the armies of Greece and Rome were initially manned only by free citizens capable of arming themselves for military service.

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Later, in view of massive ruin of the free peasantry, a transition to recruitment of mercenaries occurred. The army transformed into a permanent organization of professional soldiers maintained entirely at the expense of the state.

A new type of army appeared with the advent of feudalism--the feudal army, which had its own forms of organizational structure and principles of development. By social nature and purpose, it served as an instrument for reinforcing the feudal, land-owning structure. While at first the army of the Roman Empire consisted basically of a militia composed of free peasants, as the peasants underwent enslavement, military service transformed into the privilege of feudal lords. The peasant militia was thus superseded by an army of knights.

In distinction from West European countries, from the moment of its birth the army in Russia was basically a peasant and urban militia. It was not until the mid-fifteenth century that the aristocratic army became the main military force of the Russian state. In addition to it, however, a permanent strelets army, which made up the core of the infantry, was created. Together with the aristocratic army, it served as an instrument of suppression of peasant uprisings. A regular army was instituted in Russia by Peter I in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. It was formed by recruitment of serfs; still, however, it was divorced from the people. The officer corps in its charge came only from the nobility, which permitted the ruling class to make the army its obedient instrument, including to suffocate the liberation movement of the peasants. By its social essence, this was a feudal army of serfs.

The bourgeois revolution led to the arising of a new type of army, the bourgeois army--the implement of the new ruling class of exploiters. Liberation of peasants from the bondage of serfdom created the prerequisites for the existence of mass armies based on compulsory military service. Change in the nature of wars and growth in their scope resulted in the creation of multimillion permanent armies having a complex organizational structure.

The victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and the birth of a new socio-economic formation free of all exploitation necessarily caused formation of an entirely new type of army--the socialist army, a truly popular one in terms of its historic purpose, the principles of its development, and its composition.

As we can see, the class essence, the sociopolitical purpose, and the historic type of an army are defined not by its form but by the type of state of which the army is an organ. As far as the form, the organizational structure of the armed forces is concerned, it depends in many ways on the class nature of the army and on the missions posed to the armed forces by the ruling class. We should add to the discussion above that, for example, the army of Ancient Egypt had military settlements at its basis. This was dictated by the level of development of slave-owning society and by its caste structure.

As a form of army, the feudal militia was typical of early feudalism. The natural economy and feudal separateness dominating in that time precluded the possibility of maintaining permanent armies. Development of commodity and financial relations, growth of cities, and formation of centralized feudal states created the preconditions for mercenary professional armies. Bourgeois armies were first created as volunteer armies, and later on through compulsory military service.

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With the development of capitalist society and its transition to its highest stage--imperialism, new forms of government appeared, which also had an effect on the forms of armies. Thus establishment, in their time, of openly terrorist, fascist dictatorships by monopolists and a financial oligarchy in Italy, Germany, and a number of other states led to changes in the form, organizational structure, and principles of development of their armies. This expressed itself, for example, in significant growth in the size of armies, in creation of special formations of the SS type, in intensification of ideological brainwashing and direct repressions of the personnel, and in cruel arrest of attempts to spread the ideas of socialism. Such processes can also be discerned in some modern imperialist states.

Consequently a unique historic type of army corresponds to every stage in development of class society, together with a certain sociopolitical content and military-technical form. This makes the army an instrument of policy of a given ruling class. Its development and the interaction between its content and form proceed on the basis of objective laws.

3. Laws Governing Development of the Army

Marxism-Leninism concerns itself with the study of the development of the army and its laws in close interaction with all social development, and it demonstrates that material, economic, class, political, and ideological factors have decisive significance in this process.

Manifesting themselves in the development of the army, objective laws permit us to see this development as an integral phenomenon proceeding through all stages of the history of class society. These laws link transitions from one historic type of army to another into a single conditional process, in which certain laws act in all stages. Every historic type of army, being a certain stage in development of this social institution, is at the same time an expression of something universal in something special and separate. Laws specific to different historic types of armies act in dialectical unity with general laws. All of this says that as society develops and as it changes and grows more complex in social and technical respects, the army undergoes modification, as does its function--both in content and in form.

Being a social organism, a militarized fragment of society, the army follows the general laws of social development. Concurrently, being an organization intended for warfare, it also follows its own unique laws. The most important of them were revealed and formulated by the classicists of Marxism-Leninism. We already examined one of these laws earlier--the dependence of the army's sociopolitical content on the sociopolitical nature of the state, on the political goals of the ruling classes. Another of the most important laws is the dependence of the army and its fighting power on the economy. Engels was the first to formulate this law, noting that "the entire organization of armies and the tactics they employ, as well as their victories and defeats are found to be dependent on material--that is, economic--conditions..."¹⁶ Lenin made mention of this law several times. He emphasized that the army and its power are based on the means of production.¹⁷ Material production is the necessary foundation of technical support to the armed forces and of their manning by the appropriate personnel.

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As an implement of war, a political instrument of organized armed violence, the army is the principal bearer of military affairs, it is a form of association of people and military equipment which promotes the most effective attainment of the aims of war. The material base of this dialectical unity consists of equipment and armament. Without armament, there can be no army. Therefore in addition to a sociopolitical side, the army has a military-technical side, and in this sense we can say that the armed forces are a copy of the society's economy, science, and technology. The military-technical side of the army evolves not on its own but depending on the political aims of the ruling classes, on the basis of the development of the country's productive forces and the achievements of science and technology, under the influence of changes occurring in the means and forms of armed struggle, and with a consideration for the state of a probable enemy.

As we know, pursuing the goal of pushing socialism back from the positions it had attained, following World War II imperialism laid its hopes on preparing a war against it using weapons of mass destruction, mainly nuclear weapons. This was a conscious act of the use of the latest achievements of science in the interests of aggressive war. The development of the economic and scientific-technical foundation of imperialism was guided in the appropriate direction. Such utilization of scientific-technical progress was not the result of some sort of independent development of military technology, but the fruit of certain political aims, a product of the growing aggressiveness of monopolist capital's policy. A goal consciously set by an individual, Marx noted, "operates as a law, defining the means and nature of his actions...."¹⁸ It is precisely in behalf of its reactionary political goals that imperialism is constantly outfitting its armies with mass destruction weapons of increasing malevolence. In this situation, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity are forced to constantly strengthen their defense capabilities.

One of the most important laws of development of the army is the dependence of its fighting power on the level, quality, and quantity of weapons and military equipment. In modern conditions, change in arms and military equipment, creation of, primarily, nuclear missiles, and the decisive nature of the political aims of a possible war have naturally led to profound changes in the basic elements of an army's fighting power.

One significant result of fundamental transformations in military affairs was the qualitative changes that occurred in the entire military-technical base of the armed forces. This process is still continuing today. The entire military-technical arsenal is undergoing qualitative improvement--from the personnel and the means of protection afforded to the individual soldier, to the most powerful forms of armament. The rate of renovation of weapons and military equipment is accelerating. While in the past, it took a number of decades to fully replace the entire military-technical base of an army, today this happens in an extremely short period of time. New armament has necessitated a significant rise in the level of mechanization and automation of the diverse processes of military activity. Automation resources permit fuller utilization of the possibilities of modern weapons, dependable control of the propulsion units of atomic submarines, and so on. A transition to various automated systems and to powerful weapon complexes, to creation of resources for automatic control of troops and naval forces has begun in the development of military technology.

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In addition to qualitative changes, the military-technical base is also experiencing quantitative changes. In comparison with the time of World War II, the amount of military equipment in the armed forces has increased significantly. It should be noted in this case that continuous development of armament is proceeding in the armies of not only those countries possessing nuclear weapons, but also of other states that have the required technical-economic and scientific potentials.

Transformation of the military-technical base, which is the basis and an inherent part of the revolution in military affairs, is producing changes in the entire structure of the army, in the organization of the branches of the armed forces, the arms and services, and the naval forces, and in their role and purpose. Other elements of the army's fighting power, to include military science and military art, are developing according to the same pattern. We can insure the highest level and unity of all of these elements of fighting power only with a regular army.

Marxism-Leninism has also revealed another important law--the dependence of an army's development on spiritual and ideological factors. We know that Lenin emphasized the close relationship of a country's military organization not only with the economic but also the cultural structure of the state.¹⁹ Consideration of this law has priority methodological and practical significance to a deep understanding of the mechanism behind development of an army's fighting power, since spiritual and ideological factors have a decisive influence upon the quality of the personnel.

Inasmuch as people are the main force in war, all military-technical transformations must be interpreted in organic unity with the change experienced by the individual himself. The military-technical base of an army creates certain conditions for victory, but the victory itself is brought about by people who have perfect mastery of their weapons and military equipment, and who possess high moral-political and combat qualities.

In the conditions of scientific-technical progress, man is transferring more and more operations requiring physical strength to machines. The labor of people is by nature becoming more intellectual, meaningful, and important. Assuming the mechanical operations of human labor, the machine leaves the creative functions behind for the individual. Such processes are also quite extensive in military activity. Creation of highly effective military equipment does not replace the labor of the soldier; instead, it only modifies its nature, changing the place of the individual in military labor.

Today, the results of a soldier's activity depend directly on the level of his scientific and military-technical knowledge, and on his ability to creatively use this knowledge in a complex and extremely dynamic combat situation. Assimilation of modern armament would be impossible without a knowledge of the fundamentals of radio engineering, electronics, telemechanics, nuclear physics, and other sciences. The military serviceman must essentially be proficient not only with the weapon for which he is specifically trained, but also with all weapons of the subunit, and he must make competent use of communication resources, transportation, materiel, and so on. Moreover what is needed is not a simple minimum of scientific and military-technical knowledge, but a high and continually rising level of such knowledge.

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The revolutionary transformations occurring in different areas of military affairs are naturally being accompanied by qualitative shifts in the system of personnel training and indoctrination. All military personnel have the important task of maintaining high alertness and combat readiness in the army and navy. The nature of modern military actions--unusual decisiveness and swiftness--imposes continually growing demands upon the combat, moral, and physical qualities of the soldiers. All of this is producing significant changes in the methods and forms of comprehensive preparation of the personnel for competent, resourceful, and decisive action in the most complex conditions of modern combat.

Such are some of the laws of army development. Each of them is deeply dependent upon policy. The main role in formation of the sociopolitical content of the armed forces and in the use of the achievements of economics and culture, and of science and technology to strengthen the army, is played by the state, by the policy of the ruling class. Marxism-Leninism bases itself on the premise that the objective laws of society's development are also the laws governing the activities of people. Spontaneously or consciously, people pave the road for the action of laws. This also pertains to the conscious utilization of economic, scientific, and technical achievements by the ruling classes to improve the army as an instrument of policy. Thus they pave the road for realization of the dependence of the army on state policy.

We cannot but see that development of certain elements of the form of an army follows its own logic, its own laws. In the course of an army's development, new laws may also evolve. This means that our military personnel must deeply understand the laws of military affairs, and constantly study the qualitative transformations occurring in military development.

Thus only Marxism-Leninism provides a truly scientific explanation of the army as a social phenomenon, revealing its true essence and purpose. The Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the origin of the army and its essence permits us to see the fundamental opposition existing in the nature and functions of bourgeois and socialist armies.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 14, p 5.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, pp 163-165.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 12, p 58.
4. Ibid., p 113.
5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 13, p 283.
6. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 33, p 9.
7. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 170.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 152.

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9. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 21, p 354.
10. Ibid., pp 171-172.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, pp 76, 77.
12. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 3, p 23.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 135.
14. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 14, p 5.
15. Tukhachevskiy, M. N., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 2, Moscow, 1964, p 4.
16. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 175.
17. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, pp 345-346.
18. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 23, p 189.
19. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 9, p 156.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE REACTIONARY ESSENCE OF IMPERIALIST ARMIES

The Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the laws governing arisal, function, and development of armies affords a possibility for revealing the reactionary socio-political nature and class essence of the armies of modern imperialist states. Concurrently it allows us to see the scientific groundlessness of the apologists of imperialist policy, who are doing everything they can to defend and justify the army's growing role in the domestic and foreign policy of imperialist states, to portray militarism as a positive phenomenon, and to raise the prestige of imperialist armies.

1. The Antipopular Sociopolitical Content of Imperialist Armies

The ideologists of imperialism assert in numerous books and articles and at international sociological congresses and conferences that the army of the bourgeois state is supposedly "the servant of the nation", "the servant of the people". By doing so, they try to camouflage the true class essence of the imperialist army, to portray it as supposedly a "classless" spokesman of the interests of all strata of society, intended to perform general national functions.

Contrary to the efforts of Western sociologists, all history, and especially the modern realities, say something else: Bourgeois armies are separate, divorced from the people, serving as an instrument of oppression of the laborers. As a state organ, the army of bourgeois society is an instrument of the policy of not the entire nation but of the dominant exploiting minority. The economic and political interests of this minority are what determine the social orientation of the bourgeois state's army.

The army of any exploiting state is its driving force. Marx called it the omnipresent organ of state power.¹ The founders of Marxism noted a tendency of dramatic increase in the role of the army in bourgeois society. This was demonstrated especially clearly with the example of the French army in the time of Napoleon III.² Development of capitalism and its transformation into its highest stage--imperialism--deepened this tendency even more. Continual aggravation of all contradictions of imperialism is constantly intensifying its reactionary nature in all areas, including in the military. V. I. Lenin revealed this tendency in the imperialist era on the basis of the premises of Marx and Engels. He demonstrated that while in the 1870's the military machine of England and the USA still occupied a rather modest

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position, later on these countries strayed "into the European, dirty, bloody swamp of bureaucratic military institutions that subordinated all and suppressed all."³ Under imperialism, which has intensified the role of the reactionary military machine more than ever, states "have transformed into military monsters exterminating millions of people in order to resolve the debate as to who is to dominate the world, England, Germany, or some other representative of financial capital."⁴

The reactionary, aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed today. The anti-popular sociopolitical content of imperialist armies remains as before. These armies are extremely hostile to the laborers, and to their aspirations and yearnings. This is precisely why Lenin said that the army of the imperialists is "the staunchest bulwark of bourgeois discipline, of support of the domination of capital, and of preservation and reinforcement of slavlike submissiveness and subordination of the laborers to it."⁵

The antipopular sociopolitical content of modern imperialist armies manifests itself mainly in the fact that they serve as an instrument of state-monopolistic capitalism, which unites the forces of the monopolies with the forces of the state into a single mechanism of enrichment of the imperialists, suppression of the struggle of the working class and the national liberation movement, salvation of the capitalist structure, and initiation of aggressive wars. State-monopolistic capitalism is deepening the chasm between the people and the monopolists, between labor and capital, it is aggravating the contradictions of capitalism even more, and it is shaking it to its very foundation. All of this is leading to greater militarization of imperialist states, to growth in the role of their armies in the reactionary violence of monopolistic bourgeoisie within its own countries and in the international arena. They stand guard over the interests of the exploiters, especially rabidly protecting the positions of monopolistic capital. This refutes the assertion of bourgeois ideologists that the armies of the Western world are supposedly an instrument of the people.

As state-monopolistic capitalism grows, imperialist armies fall more and more under the influence of the political leadership of the largest monopolies. This line has expressed itself in its most monstrous fashion as formation of the military-industrial complex--a union of professional militants and monopolists involved in arms production, who are consequently interested primarily in military markets. Speaking at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said that "the malevolent union of professional militarists and monopolies growing rich from the manufacture of the implements of war--commonly called the military-industrial complex--has become a sort of 'state within a state', acquiring self-contained power. Militarism is disfiguring not only the society which brought it into being. The exhausts of the machine of preparation for war are poisoning the political atmosphere of the planet with the fumes of enmity, terror, and violence."⁶

A number of legislators, scientists, and public figures in the USA who critically analyzed the state of American society declared many times that the USA is transforming more and more into a "garrison state", into a "warring state". This was pointed out by the well known scientist R. Lepp, sociologist G. Marion, pamphleteer F. Cook, and others. Senator E. McCarthy wrote in LIFE that in the USA, "the influence of the war machine in the social, economic, and political areas is such that the military has for practical purpose become the 'fifth estate' in the political structure of the American state."⁷

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Charles A. Schultz, a professor of Maryland University's economics department, notes that "America possesses a complex of institutions joined together into an aggressive war machine, of which bureaucratic egoism is typical. So many people profit by it-- profit not only in the narrow sense of corporate profits, but in the sense of the income of private individuals--that it is extremely difficult to restructure it in some fundamental way."⁸

And in fact, the military-industrial complex, which is highly responsible for the entire economic countenance of the country, tries to materially interest broad circles of industrialists and the laboring masses in the arms race. It creates a situation in which the problem of eliminating or reducing unemployment is made dependent, in the eyes of a certain faction of bourgeois society, on further development of military production. As an example in 1975, when industrial production dropped in general by 9.1 percent in the USA, the volume of military production increased by more than 10 percent. Thus the illusion is created that war industry is capable of increasing employment.

The American military machine places enormous military orders among numerous monopolist associations, which consequently receive colossal superprofits, and thus for practical purposes it subordinates the entire economic life of the country to its militant aims. According to foreign data the profits of employers in the military-industrial complex are 60 percent greater than in nonmilitary sectors.⁹

In turn, monopolists generously reward the military machine for its faithful service to financial bosses, offering advantageous posts in capitalist companies and firms to their retiring servants in military uniform. We know, for example, that more than 1,400 retired American officers, including 261 former generals, have gone to work in recent years namely in those enterprises which have been successful in acquiring arms contracts. According to data of the U.S. Congress, following the end of their careers, more than 2,000 Pentagon employees have recently joined firms in which war production makes up two-thirds of the production volume.¹⁰ All of this is stimulating even more-zealous defense of the privileges of the monopolists by the military machine. It is no accident that in a time of maturing revolution, when it is impossible to avert it, the imperialist bourgeoisie is transferring the entirety of its power to the army, thus promoting establishment of military-bureaucratic and fascist regimes. "The financial oligarchy," notes the CPSU Program, "resorts to establishment of a fascist regime and places its hopes on the army, the police, and the militia as the last anchor of salvation from the outrage of the people, especially when the laboring masses attempt to exercise even their curtailed democratic rights, defend their interests, and put an end to the supreme power of the monopolies."¹¹ It is namely in behalf of preserving its domination that the bourgeoisie assumed the course of establishing regimes of open military dictatorship in Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and a number of other countries.

Thus when the army becomes the main support of the state, all social life becomes militarized. Engels pointed out the fact that the army of exploiting society is the foundation of militarism. "The army," he wrote in his work, "Anti-During", "has become the main goal of the state, it has become a goal unto itself; peoples exist only to supply and feed the soldiers. Militarism is dominating Europe and devouring it."¹² Lenin noted the increasing trend in militarization. He emphasized that "today, the imperialist bourgeoisie is militarizing not only the entire nation but also the young people. Tomorrow, perhaps, it will begin militarizing the women."¹³

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The modern realities support the conclusion of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism that imperialist militarization is tending to grow.

The imperialist states are experiencing extensive militarization of ideology and spiritual life in general, ranging from militarization of science, the use of its achievements for the benefit of imperialism's military policy, to fabrication of antiscientific conceptions on war and the army, and expansion of military psychosis with the help of the myth of a "Soviet threat." These efforts are aimed at beclouding the consciousness of the people in relation to the causes and nature of modern wars, and they represent attempts at making the masses accept, through ideological brainwashing, the aggressive military policy of imperialism, aimed against the fraternity of socialist countries as well as against peoples fighting for their social and national liberation. An enormous propaganda machine under the control of the militants is playing a prominent role in completing these tasks and in creating a military-ideological atmosphere in imperialist states that would be favorable to the monopolists. All of these circumstances persuasively demonstrate that the reactionary role of imperialist armies is growing even more. Such are the real processes occurring in bourgeois society.

Being an instrument of the dominant minority, imperialist armies can also sometimes serve as a means of attaining general national objectives (as was the case, for example, with the armies of England, France, and the USA in the anti-Nazi coalition during World War II). It stands to reason that this does not change the class essence of imperialist armed forces, since the general national objectives they support are predominantly ones of the ruling class, which agree for a certain time with these general national objectives. On the whole, however, exploiting classes implement their own self-interested reactionary policy, utilizing their armed forces for this purpose. This was manifested once again immediately after the end of World War II. The armies of the leading capitalist countries--participants of the anti-Nazi alliance--were immediately targeted against the Soviet Union--their former ally in the fight against Nazi fascism and Japanese militancy.

Consequently when the imperialist army assumes national foreign political objectives, it does so not out of its intrinsic nature but only owing to external circumstances. This role is temporary, and it in no way alters the social purpose of the imperialist armed forces--being the instrument to support the interests of monopolistic capital. This is why attempts by imperialist ideologists to embellish the imperialist army and whitewash its antipopular sociopolitical nature by manipulating these transient and rare exceptions are unfounded.

The manifestations of the reactionary class essence of imperialist armed forces are diverse. They reveal themselves especially distinctly in the social functions and in the place and role of the imperialist army within its own country, as well as in realization of foreign policy goals.

As was demonstrated above, irrespective of their social composition all modern imperialist armies are the most important instrument of consolidating the economic and political domination of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, and an organ of suppression of the laborers of mainly their own countries. This is their internal function.

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Broadly capitalizing on the possibilities of exploitation offered to them by the capitalist means of production, imperialists concurrently resort more and more to noneconomic measures of coercion, to the use of direct military violence. It is for this sake that they constantly improve their colossal machine of violence and its main element--the army. Lenin pointed out that "no state, even the most democratic, is free of constitutional loopholes or qualifications permitting the bourgeoisie to move its troops against the laborers, introduce martial law, and so on 'in case of a disturbance of order', which in fact means 'disturbance', by the exploited class, of its subservient position and an attempt by it to behave in a non-submissive way."¹⁴

Continual reinforcement of the military machine of the bourgeoisie, especially the army, which opposes the unarmed people, made it necessary for the founders of Marxism to supplement their conclusion on the inevitable breakdown of the old army in a socialist revolution with the premise that under certain conditions, the revolution must begin within the army.¹⁵ In this case the need may arise for waiting until the army joins the side of the revolution.¹⁶

Imperialists constantly employ the army to influence internal political relations. They use military force, first of all, to suppress the struggle of the laborers for their rights, and in reprisals against strikers and demonstrators. Second, the troops take part in dispersal of antiracial demonstrations and suppression of the struggle of oppressed national minorities. Third, imperialists often use the army against the laborers in production as well. Bringing in military units as strike-breakers to take the place of the strikers, monopolists try to force laborers to surrender by this "peaceful" means.

The social realities of imperialist states persuasively confirm Lenin's thought that military force is employed by the imperialists as a weapon "to suppress all (economic and political) movements of the proletariat..."¹⁷ The validity of these words is especially evident in relation to the USA. While in the last quarter of the 19th century the American army participated about 350 times in the suppression of popular uprisings within the country, in the quarter of a century following World War II it performed this role more than 700 times. This tendency continues to grow.

This situation is also observed in other imperialist states. English imperialists make broad use of troops to suppress popular demonstrations, and the Chilean military junta is continuing its bloody repressions against the laborers. All of this demonstrates that supporting the total power of the monopolies is the principal use of the army within an imperialist state.

The content of the external functions performed by imperialist armies entails fighting world revolutionary forces, seizing foreign territories, oppressing the peoples of occupied countries, and supporting the interests of their bourgeoisie in the inter-imperialist struggle in the world arena.

The aggressiveness and reactionary nature of the external function of the imperialist army is readily apparent from the example of the U.S. Armed Forces. Their bloody ledger of the past century lists about 120 wars, armed landings, colonial campaigns, and punitive expeditions. In the period between the start of the 20th century and World War II, American imperialism committed not less than 50 aggressive acts of war, armed attacks against other nations, and acts of brazen piracy.¹⁸ Following World

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War II, the American troops were used against other peoples dozens of times. And even today, the politics of American imperialism retain aspects which, as was noted by the 25th CPSU Congress, "threaten the liberty and independence of peoples and represent gross interference in their internal affairs in behalf of the forces of oppression and reaction."¹⁹ Between 1949 and 1966 English troops participated in 85 military actions, mainly against so-called "insurrectionists". Even today they are engaged in punitive activities in Ulster.

The power of imperialist armies is directed today mainly against the socialist states, the world workers movement, and the popular struggle of national liberation. In its duel with socialism, in its struggle against the entire liberation movement of the laboring masses and peoples, imperialism is placing special hope on the armed forces as the main implement of its policy. It is using the army to hinder social progress on the entire globe, and to perpetuate the possibilities exploiters have for growing rich at the expense of the labor of the popular masses.

Thus the modern armies of imperialist states serve as a means of suppressing national freedom in the hands of the classes of exploitation, and mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie, they are hostile to the laborers, and they play a reactionary role both within their countries and in foreign policy relations.

2. The Class Orientation of the Recruitment and Indoctrination of Imperialist Armies

The antipopular essence of the imperialist army generates profound contradictions, first between the imperialist army and the peoples of other countries, second between the army and the people of the imperialist state itself, and third, between the soldier masses and the officer corps of the imperialist armed forces--the instrument of the reactionary policy of monopolistic bourgeoisie.

Imperialists are making attempts to weaken these contradictions. One of the most important resources of these attempts is the use of the class principle in recruitment of personnel for the armed forces. Most personnel in the armies of imperialist states are common soldiers--laborers and peasants. Speculating on this, bourgeois propaganda tries to camouflage the antipopular sociopolitical essence of imperialist armies. Because, Western theorists say, the bourgeois army is recruited from the representatives of the people it supposedly serves the people, standing above the interests of any one stratum of society and outside the policies of different classes.

This is a lie. Because the bulk of the rank and file of the imperialist army is recruited from among the laborers, this does not mean that the army is popular in nature. Exposing such false declarations, M. V. Frunze said that in the past, the word "popular" was just a cover-up for the domination of exploiting classes, it was only a manifestation of the political hypocrisy of these classes. The most important thing to consider is the policy and the class of which the army is an instrument. Imperialist armed forces do the will of monopolistic capital, all of their power is aimed against social progress, and this determines their reactionary, antipopular essence.

The imperialist bourgeoisie employs the class principle in various ways in an effort to recruit personnel for its armies.

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First, this principle is exercised through meticulous class selection of the command of the armed forces, their general staff and officer corps. Middle and senior grade commanders belong to the dominant class in their overwhelming majority. In his book "The Professional Soldier", the American sociologist M. Janowitz admits that in terms of social composition, 45 percent of all American regular officers are from the middle stratum of the bourgeoisie, and 47 percent are from the upper middle stratum. The situation is the same in the West German, English, and other imperialist armies.

Second, inasmuch as modern warfare is unimaginable without massive armed forces, in the process of their compulsory replenishment of the army with representatives of the popular masses, the imperialists meticulously check out the political "reliability" of the new soldiers. As a result a significant number of persons are weeded out due to political considerations.

Third, the ruling elite of the capitalist countries tries to isolate its armed forces even more from the people by creating mass armies consisting of professional mercenary soldiers. This also pursues the goal of reducing unemployment, at least outwardly, relieving the favored sons of the bourgeoisie from the burdens of compulsory military service, and using, in addition to the traditional resources of ideological brainwashing, the lever of material stimulation in order to achieve better competency of the personnel in combat.

The United States of America is known to have changed to a mercenary army as of 1 July 1973. The English armed forces consist completely of mercenaries. In the army of the FRG, all noncommissioned officers are mercenaries; mercenaries make up 90 percent of the fleets, 60 percent of the air forces, and 40 percent of the ground troops.

Fourth, exercising the class principle of army recruitment, imperialists attach special importance to creation of special military formations to suppress revolutionary movements of the popular masses both within the country and beyond its borders, and to quell disturbances in the army itself. These include military police, marine units, special purpose troops (the "Green Berets" in the USA), paratroopers, national guard units, and so on.

Mercenaries serve in these select units on the basis of long-term contracts, they receive higher allowances, and they enjoy other privileges. Before their acceptance, they undergo especially careful scrutiny for political "reliability". Preference is shown toward various sorts of defectors and traitors fleeing their motherland. Many of them have criminal pasts. The personnel of these formations undergo intensified comprehensive processing and drill aimed at developing the qualities of merciless and mindless assassins and ruffians.

The imperialist bourgeoisie is trying to weaken the contradictions noted above also through intensified ideological processing of all of its troops and the population of its state and of those countries in which imperialist armies are deployed or in which they subject the unsatisfied and the nonsubmissive to "pacification". In addition to utilizing civilian state organs with their own special personnel and their tremendous material and technical resources, the imperialist armies themselves have great potentials. Thus for example, the U.S. Armed Forces possess 260 radio stations and 91 television broadcasting centers scattered all over the world. Moreover the

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U.S. Defense Department publishes many different kinds of political pamphlets, books, and journals. The annual volume is about 8 million copies. Periodical press material is regularly sent to 140 military newspapers. Dozens of newsreels are shown to American servicemen every year together with regular features. The Department of Defense also produces film shorts intended to provide special information to the troops.

Mutual mistrust and sometimes even hostility between officers and soldiers is typical of modern imperialist armies. The military command tries to surmount the antagonistic contradictions by forming a corporate spirit in the personnel. However, the sense of membership to opposite classes, the contemptuous attitude of officers toward soldiers stemming from the very nature of a society of exploitation, and the consequent disrespect of officers by the soldiers create insurmountable obstacles in the way of these efforts. Trying to deal with these obstacles, the command imposes cruel discipline and employs a special system of influence upon the soldiers in the course of all of their service. This system includes severe measures of coercion, unmasked bribery, merciless, dulling drill, and intense brainwashing employing both the traditional methods (religion, nationalism) and the latest sophisticated tactics of bare anticommunism, using various technical resources.

The experience of history shows that the imperialist bourgeoisie uses these methods and resources successfully to keep the army in check, and that it employs the army as an instrument of reactionary policy of struggle against the country's own people and the peoples of other countries fighting for national and social liberation, and against the peoples of socialist states. It would be sufficient to cite Hitler's aggression against many countries, the intervention of American troops in Korea and Vietnam, the violence of English troops in Ulster, and other facts. This means that we must be prepared to repel an attack by an aggressor possessing a technically strong army appropriately processed in the moral-psychological respect. M. V. Frunze's statement that "in an analysis of the nature of future collisions, we must turn our main attention within our own military organization not to the hopes of political decay of our enemy but to our actual possibilities for actively, physically crushing him"²¹ still remains important today in this connection.

All of this once again demonstrates that the numerical strength of the army and the way it is organized do not determine its political role; on the contrary the way the army is organized and its numerical strength depend on the policy of which it is an instrument, and in the final analysis, on the state of productive forces and production relations, and the degree of development of the class struggle within the country and in the international arena.

War is not the business of just the army alone. An ever growing proportion of the population is taking a direct part in it. The broad laboring masses are relied upon to supply the troops with the latest armament and other forms of materiel, and the moral-combat spirit of the army depends to a significant extent upon them. The ruling circles of the imperialist states understand this as well. This is why they actively subject the population to ideological brainwashing in a militant spirit, and inflame anticommunism and chauvinism. Various conceptions on the army developed by the modern ideological servants of monopolistic bourgeoisie play an important role in the ideological brainwashing of army personnel and the broad popular masses.

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3. A Criticism of the Modern Apology of Imperialist Armies

Western theorists and sociologists propose numerous conceptions on the imperialist army and on its essence and purpose. This wealth of viewpoints can be explained by both the resourcefulness possible in deceit and by the complexity of the military organism, by the diversity of its aspects and facets, which are made absolute by certain ideologists and used to explain the army as a whole. Bourgeois theories of former centuries and philosophical and methodological principles accepted today in imperialist ideology make up the ideological sources of modern Western conceptions on the imperialist army.

Modern bourgeois viewpoints on the army reflect, one way or another, profound socio-political changes in the international arena, which are forcing the imperialists to adapt themselves to new conditions and make corrections in their preparation and use of the armed forces within their own countries and abroad. Intensification of the militancy of imperialist states is also having a direct influence on the development of these viewpoints. Monopolistic bourgeoisie demands that its ideological weapon-bearers "justify", "explain", and ideologically "legalize" this process, and this is what is reflected in the Western conceptions of the imperialist army. These circumstances predetermine the apologetic nature of these conceptions, and their extreme reactionary and antiscientific nature.

One of the most widespread and influential bourgeois viewpoints on the imperialist army is represented by sociopolitical conceptions. They interpret the army as a classless force of the imperialist state, as a permanent instrument of control, in the interests of the entire nation, of political relations within the society and between states. In this case the political relations themselves are also felt to be permanent. Proponents of this conception assert that inasmuch as society has always needed, now needs, and will continue to need such a controlling force, the imperialist army remains a permanent, necessary organ functioning in the interests of all society, of all its strata and groups. Such ideas are contained in the works of the French sociologist R. Aron, the American ideologist Prof W. Rostow, the American military popular writer H. Baldwin, and other well known bourgeois authors. In his book "Strategy for Tomorrow", for example, Baldwin suggests that because armed conflicts between groups of people will supposedly persist for an indefinite time, and even perhaps forever, as long as man exists, the army will be permanently necessary as an arbiter and an instrument of society in these conflicts.²²

This point of view was supported in the book "The Causes of War" by Prof G. Blainey, published in London. In it, the author concludes on the basis of prejudiciously selected historical material that wars are supposedly elicited by an aggregate of causes of varying nature, with psychological circumstances being foremost among them--maliciousness, envy, military ambition, and so on. These causes--the author lists more than 30--are precisely what make wars permanent, so he says. The army also remains a permanent organ, Blainey declares, since it serves as the instrument by which these causes of war are erased or dissipated. Blainey believes the modern imperialist army to be a model of such an instrument.

We can clearly see the apologetic essence of the sociopolitical conceptions on the imperialist army in all of these arguments. Also obvious is their scientific groundlessness. As a rule they seek all possible secondary or totally fabricated factors and phenomena as the basis for existence and development of the modern bourgeois army, thus substituting for and masking its real sociopolitical basis.

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This is precisely how Western ideologists are presently trying to blur the class nature and the antipopular, reactionary character of the imperialist army, and represent it as the alleged defender of the interests of all nations, and a necessary prerequisite of society's function and development. These arguments are used by them in the form of starting points for attempts to justify the military policy of imperialism, a policy aimed at strengthening the army of the imperialist state as an instrument of the monopolistic bourgeoisie.

The so-called institutional theory is among the most fashionable and widespread modern sociopolitical conceptions on the imperialist army. What it essentially says is that the army is a vitally necessary institution (hence its name) of society, without which its function and, consequently, its existence would be impossible. The proponents of this theory dig for arguments in defense of their viewpoint in the writings of the Ancient Greek philosopher-idealist Plato, the 17th century English materialist T. Hobbes, and others.

One of the most important points of the institutional theory is rejection of the class essence of the army. As an example the Dutch sociologist Doorn writes that the army of bourgeois society is "a politically neutral institution". Such declarations by imperialist ideologists reinforce the thesis that modern bourgeois society is supposedly a "free", "pluralistic" society in which the interests of every stratum are held sacred. Therefore, they say, the imperialist army acts only in behalf of the interests of the society as a whole. "In free, pluralistic societies," asserts a sociological dictionary published in the FRG, "the army cannot perform a reactionary function, since it is under rigid control. The entire system of mass social organizations and the power of their positions prevent the military from engaging in any antisocial cause."²³

Representatives of the institutional theory view the imperialist army as a necessary organ which is supposedly capable of insuring internal stability of modern bourgeois society. Owing to this the imperialist army, as the American sociologists S. Lipset and H. Eckles attempt to prove, serves as an instrument of civil peace.²⁴ In justification of this, they present the argument that only an army that is "a politically neutral force" is in a position to resolve disputes in bourgeois society with total disinterest.²⁵ These authors write that inasmuch as different economic interests lie at the basis of existence of civil social groups, disagreements inevitably arise among them; in such a situation an army bound together only by professional military interests would have a favorable influence on the domestic life of bourgeois society, resolving disagreements in behalf of the entire nation.

The proponents of this conception, attempting to portray the imperialist army as only a purely professional institution, one which supposedly stands apart from the political aims of specific classes and strata, try to lay a certain ideological foundation beneath the transition being made in modern bourgeois states to mercenary armies. Confusing the reasons for this transition and at the same time defending it, Western theorists want to portray the mercenary imperialist army as an organization of professionals which supposedly expresses "national interests" to the supposedly "fullest" and "most disinterested" extent possible.

By such assertions, imperialist ideologists "justify" the need for amplifying the role of the army in the domestic life of bourgeois society. As long as economic goals lie at the basis of the interests of civil social groups, they say, and the

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nature of the activities of the military is defined by professional interests, then the influence of the latter upon policy is entirely disinterested. Bourgeois theorists intentionally ignore the fact that an army's activity is not "purely professionally military", but that it is an area of policy and that the goals of professional servicemen are defined in the end by sociopolitical aspirations. Life rejects the fabrications of Western ideologists concerning the imperialist army as an institution that is "disinterested" in the vital activities of bourgeois society and which is not associated with any particular interests of certain social groups. This army operates, as was demonstrated earlier, in behalf of not the entire nation but the bourgeoisie, and mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie. In moments of sincerity, the imperialist war machine itself does not conceal whom it serves. Interesting in this connection is an admission by U.S. Army Major General Smedley D. Butler: "I spent 33 years and 4 months in active military service in the most mobile American troops--the Marines. I traveled a road from 2d lieutenant to major general. And throughout this entire time I was a first-class bonebreaker in the service of big business, Wall Street, and the bankers. I was a capitalist hood."²⁶

The neomilitarist theory is another sociopolitical conception of the imperialist army. It attempts to portray the army of the bourgeois state as an organization intended to play a productive social role aimed at raising the welfare, culture, and educational level of all members of society. This premise is used as the basis not only for the conclusion that an imperialist army is a vitally necessary institution, but also for the belief that it supposedly plays a positive social role, as does militarism as a whole. The adherents to this conception try to persuade the masses that the imperialist army promotes employment in the society, providing many jobs to the unemployed, and that its orders weaken crisis phenomena in the economy.

Such assertions, which pursue the goal of making the people comfortable with the constantly growing military expenditures, are false from beginning to end. They are intended to raise the social prestige of imperialist armies by means of deceit. Being an inevitable, incurable disease of capitalism, crises cannot be eliminated by militarizing the country and making it absorb colossal resources. The burden of these expenditures is becoming increasingly heavier upon the shoulders of the laborers, reducing the purchasing power of the masses and thus narrowing the domestic market, which aggravates the crisis phenomena even more.

One of the tactics of the proponents of the neomilitaristic theory is to justify growth in the role of the imperialist army by saying that it is supposedly associated with growth in its educational function in relation to the nation and the young, and that it is necessary as a means for strengthening the "moral health" of the bourgeois state. In his book "Capitalism and Freedom", Prof. M. Friedman of the University of Chicago, a well known American sociologist, associates military service in the U.S. Armed Forces with moral indoctrination of all citizens, and especially those serving in the army. He argues for broader recruitment of student protesters into the army as a means for "getting them on the right road". But as the facts show, service in the imperialist armed forces kills everything that is human, transforming people into soulless ruffians and assassins. It is no accident that one of the acute problems in the American army is crime (assault, robbery, narcotics, and so on).

Technical-sociological conceptions on the imperialist army are close in content to sociopolitical conceptions. They make military-technical transformations in the imperialist armed forces absolute, suggesting that these transformations also change

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the sociopolitical countenance of the armed forces. Typical in this sense is the so-called technotronic theory. Its representatives, including the West German sociologist R. Brand, try to show that the major military-technical transformations of the nuclear age have neutralized the functions of armies, which now boil down to just a single mission--protecting the state. Another West German sociologist, N. Galay, tries to persuade the public that possession of nuclear weapons, and the level of organization and equipment availability of the Soviet and American armies supposedly make them similar not only in military-technical but also in social respects.

Bourgeois ideologists treat the external function of modern imperialist armies as absolute, simultaneously trying to deny their internal function. Using this tactic in conjunction with anticommunist attacks, such theorists have fabricated the myth that the existence of imperialist armies is supposedly associated with the "threat" to the Western world on the part of socialist states and their armed forces. In this situation, they assert, the army of the imperialist state must be viewed as a national, purely technical force directed from without. This is precisely how the army's social meaning is defined by G. Snyder, a professor of political sciences at New York University. The imperialist army, in his opinion, must insure the security of its state by maintaining the threat of an annihilatory blow.

To some politicians and ideologists of the West, the premises of the technotronic theory serve as the basis for justifying the need and importance of creating professional armies. They declare that because of military-technical transformations and due to improvement of the organizational structure and the entire form of the army, a historic era of rejection of mass armies based on compulsory military service has inevitably arisen.²⁷ These premises are also used to justify the bourgeois thesis that inasmuch as the army is the most competent organ in military-technical issues, in the nuclear missile age it should have the decisive role in foreign policy.

The ideologists of imperialism try to persuade the public that military-technical changes have made international issues foremost in the life of society, and that this has also brought the army to the forefront. By such arguments, the apologists of militarism try to justify the greater role of the army in the reactionary foreign policy of imperialist states. They say that in contrast to the militarism of the "Prussian type", modern militarism is "peaceful", its functions are "purely technical" in nature, and they are exercised "for the good of all".

The technotronic theory is also used to justify the aggressiveness of imperialist armies, to hide their fundamental differences from the armed forces of socialist states, and to justify the arms race. With it, everything is turned upside-down. The content and development of the army and change in its sociopolitical essence are affected not by military technology and weapons but by sociopolitical processes occurring in society.

The theory of convergence of the army and civil organs occupies a noticeable place among the technical-sociological conceptions on the imperialist armed forces. The essence of this theory is, as the American sociologist M. Janowitz asserts, that because of technical progress in the bourgeois armies, differences between military and civilian specialties, and consequently between the army and nonmilitary organizations, are being erased.²⁸ Saturation of the troops with an ever-increasing number of civilian technical specialists is supposedly causing the armed forces to lose

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their reputation as a professional military body, as a military caste; concurrently the "civilianization" of the imperialist army is broadening and growing deeper, with the armed forces and different civil organs coming together, converging.

The proponents of this theory as well as army representatives involved in ideological brainwashing of the personnel assert that technologization and professionalization of the army are supposedly being accompanied by growth in its democracy. Today, the armies of the bourgeois states are supposedly a model of "equal opportunity" for all servicemen, regardless of race, color of skin, creed, or nationality. Day-to-day activities dismiss the entire falsehood of these declarations. Mind-dulling drill dominates in imperialist armies, and human worth and the rights of the soldier masses are suppressed.

Thus modern Western conceptions on the imperialist army represent an aggregate of sociopolitical and technical-sociological theories expressing the point of view of the bourgeoisie, and mainly its monopolistic elite. These conceptions are anti-scientific and reactionary, inasmuch as they are based on idealism and metaphysics, they serve the aggressive policies of imperialism, and they are an open apology of militarism. The most important social function of these conceptions is to deceive the popular masses concerning the essence, nature, and purpose of the armed forces of the imperialist states, and to distort their social countenance with the goal of hiding the fundamental difference existing between imperialist and socialist armies. Understanding the progressive role played by the armies of countries in the socialist fraternity, which are serving as the guarantors of universal peace, liberty, and independence of nations, Western ideologists are trying to slander their sociopolitical nature, falsify their historic purpose and social functions, and identify their social countenance with that of the imperialist armies.

The declarations of bourgeois ideologists suggesting that socialist and imperialist armies are identical are unfounded in the theoretical aspect, and they cannot withstand the test of experience. Facts also refute the thesis of Western theorists that imperialist armies are "popular" in nature, and they graphically demonstrate that these armies were and still are an instrument of the policy of exploiting classes, mainly the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Despite the diversity of the arguments of bourgeois conceptions on the army and certain differences between them, they are all made kindred by their anticommunism, apologia, and hypocritical glorification of the aggressive essence of imperialism and its armies.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 17, p 339.
2. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 12, p 413.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Selected Works], Vol 33, p 38.
4. Ibid., p 119.
5. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 295.

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6. Brezhnev, L. I., "Za spravedlivyy, demokraticheskiy mir, za bezopasnost' narodov i mezhdunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo" [For a Just, Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Cooperation], p 23.
7. Cited in "Amerikanskiy militarizm 1970" [American Militarism 1970], Moscow, 1972, p 7.
8. Ibid., p 220.
9. PRAVDA, 8 April 1977
10. Ibid.
11. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 34.
12. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 20, p 175.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 155.
14. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 253.
15. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch.," Vol 36, pp 218, 219.
16. Ibid., p 207.
17. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 17, p 187.
18. See Belashchenko, T. K., "SShA: 200 let--200 voyn " [The USA: 200 Years--200 Wars], Moscow, 1976, p 227.
19. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS", p 21. .
20. See Frunze, M. V., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], Vol 2, p 38.
21. Frunze, M. V., "Sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p 247.
22. Baldwin, H. W., "Strategy for Tomorrow," Harper and Row, New York, 1970, pp 8-9.
23. "Worterbuch der Soziologie," Vol 2, Frankfurt am Main, 1972, p 546.
24. "The Perceived Role of the Military ," Rotterdam, 1971, pp 279-291.
25. See "Amerikanskaya sotsiologiya. Perspektivy, problemy, metody" [American Sociology. Perspectives, Problems, Methods], Moscow, 1972, p 211.
26. Cited in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 21 February 1968, p 15.
27. MILITARY REVIEW, February 1972, p 15.
28. MILITARY REVIEW, February 1972, pp 14-15.

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CHAPTER XVIII
ARMIES OF LIBERATED COUNTRIES

Proper assessment of the military-political situation and analysis of the disposition of the forces of progress and reaction, and of socialism and imperialism in the world arena would be unimagineable without an understanding and consideration of the complex and diverse phenomena occurring in liberated or, as they are also called, developing countries and their armies. These are more than a hundred independent states that have arisen in the course of decay of imperialism's colonial system, which collapsed under the powerful pressure of the people's struggle of national liberation. About 70 percent of the population of all nonsocialist states resides in these countries. They possess tremendous raw material resources. Their social and economic development will have a major impact on the rate of all mankind's historic progress and on the manner in which the issue of war and peace is resolved.

1. The Role of Armies in the Social Life of Liberated Countries

One of the most important features of the development of liberated countries is that their colonial yoke was eliminated under the influence of the ideas of Great October, in the era of a revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale, of transformation of the socialist social structure into the decisive factor of human society's development, in an era in which the example of real socialism is having a tremendous revolutionizing influence upon the laborers of all countries in the world. Under these conditions the popular masses of the liberated countries are rising with ever-greater energy for a decisive struggle against imperialism and internal reaction, and for all-out social progress. Many developing countries are experiencing a complex process of realignment of class forces, and growth in the class struggle. The struggle for national liberation has for practical purposes become a struggle against the relations of exploitation, both feudal and capitalist. Many developing countries have assumed a socialist orientation. Profound progressive transformations are occurring within them.

The final report of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe states that "the struggle of peoples in recently liberated countries against imperialism and all forms of domination and exploitation, and for establishment of a new international economic order satisfying the interests of the people has great significance to progressive transformation of the world, and it is powerful support to the struggle of European nations for peace, security, cooperation, and social progress."¹

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At the same time, there are also liberated countries in which the classes of exploitation have managed to retain and consolidate their domination, and direct the development of these countries onto the capitalist road. In some countries, progressive development was temporarily interrupted as a result of the victory of internal reaction and the henchmen of imperialism, who established fascist and military dictatorial regimes.

In most liberated countries, armies play an active role in these contradictory social processes. In some states their significance is not limited to the additional function of an instrument of power in the hands of reactionary, exploiting or revolutionary, progressive classes. In a number of countries, at certain stages of development the armies play a decisive role in political transformation and in formation and implementation of state policy, and they have an active influence on the changes experienced by production relations, on the ideological activities of the state and the mass media, and on solution of problems associated with national relations and other fundamental problems of social life.

The armies of some liberated countries actively participate in progressive revolutionary programs aimed at achieving and reinforcing political independence, eliminating economic and cultural backwardness, improving the material living conditions of the laboring masses, and supporting real democracy. At the same time, the armies of other states play the reactionary role of an antipopular instrument of imperialism and internal reaction. In some countries, the significance of armies in social life changed significantly following the assumption of leadership by progressive young officers. In other countries, the "military bourgeoisie" seized power over the armies, and this resulted in their transition from support of progressive transformations to support of reactionary, antipopular forces.

As a rule, reactionary military coups are prepared for in liberated countries and carried out either under the initiative and guidance of imperialist states and their intelligence agencies, mainly the USA's CIA, or with their direct participation. These coups are by nature antipopular and antinational; they make it possible for neocolonialism to cruelly exploit the people of the given country and plunder its national wealth. Aggravating all social contradictions to a critical degree, reactionary coups intensify the contradictions in the army itself as well, between generals and officers on one hand--the representatives of the oligarchy and hired neocolonists, and patriotic, progressive officers and soldiers on the other hand. Such coups cannot result in the establishment of stable state regimes.

On the other hand participation of armies in progressive transformations insures them the support of the broad popular masses, consolidation of progressive regimes, and the possibility for laborers to implement their revolutionary measures more decisively and comprehensively. Conditions promoting formation of conscious officers and soldiers, true patriots, and active warriors for national sovereignty, democracy, and social progress are created only in armies participating in progressive transformations. As a rule the growth of the political awareness of personnel in these armies is closely associated with growing general literacy of the soldiers, with their broader participation in public work, and with the assistance they provide to the popular masses in rehabilitating the national economy and developing it. Only in such armies do the combat qualities of the personnel grow quickly, and sociopolitical convergence of soldiers and officers is possible.

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Another unique feature of these armies is that they are capable of making the most effective use of the assistance rendered to them by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The experience of the struggle by the peoples of Angola and a number of other countries against imperialist aggression persuasively testifies that when they can rely on the support of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist fraternity, oppressed peoples can gain their national independence while liberated peoples can defend it. Now that the balance of power in the world arena has changed fundamentally in favor of socialism, and now that anti-imperialist forces in non-socialist states have become more active and unified, the military power of imperialist aggressors is more restrained, and the strongest imperialist armies are suffering one defeat after another in local wars against national liberation movements and revolutions.

One of the important laws of the modern era of revolutionary transition to socialism on a worldwide scale is that by its example and its advantages, real socialism plays the role of the most active and persuasive agitator for the transition of all peoples to a socialist path. This powerful, favorable influence of socialism is also felt in the armies of liberated states.

Many officers from liberated countries study abroad. They have especially great possibilities for comparing the capitalist and socialist social structures, and persuading themselves of the advantages of socialism. Progressive, patriotically predisposed officers are also persuaded of the superiority of Soviet military science over bourgeois science, and of the unprecedented moral-combat qualities of personnel in socialist armies. Any officer studying military affairs and military history inevitably ponders over the causes of the Soviet people's victory over the armies of the fascist bloc in World War II, and over the roots of the swift and sure growth of the economic, political, and military power of the world of socialism, and of the fundamental changes in the balance of power in favor of socialism during the postwar period. Many officers from developing countries recognize that cooperation with socialist states is an important prerequisite for insuring protection of national sovereignty and the possibility for social progress in liberated countries. On comparing the conditions and rate of development of the life of people in the socialist world and in socialist countries, some officers and soldiers in liberated countries have already concluded or are beginning to realize that only the socialist path will sharply accelerated historic development of peoples and insure a transition, in a short time of history, from extreme economic, political, and cultural backwardness to the highest level of social development, to true freedom for the broad popular masses.

Armies occupy a special place in liberated countries from the standpoint of social relations. This can be explained first of all by the fact that armies are the most centralized, unified, and decisive organizations in the political systems of many of these countries. In a situation where classes and political parties have not yet formed into an organized political force, and where intertribal enmity and caste and class contradictions are tearing the population and state administration apart, the army, represented by patriotic officers, expresses national policy and the interests of all the people. Laboring masses gaining their freedom from the colonial yoke see in their army a guarantee of national sovereignty. But reactionary military regimes sometimes take advantage of this in order to camouflage the class nature of their policies, which pursue the goal of keeping the country on the capitalist road.

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Weapons and military equipment are under the control of the army; therefore many officers, including patriotic and progressive ones, have come to think that by relying on force, they could and should impose a particular way of life, a particular socioeconomic orientation upon the popular masses "from above". These officers adhere to the positions of subjective sociology, they exaggerate the role of the personality in history, and they understate the role of the popular masses. Even those officers who fight sincerely for progressive development of all peoples and who side with socialist transformations, often fail to understand the historic role of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist parties. In a number of cases they try to hasten social transformations artificially, through decrees and force. Of course, these attempts cannot produce a positive result, and their initiators, on suffering failure, sometimes either renounce the revolutionary struggle or become extremists divorced from the people, hindering the truly progressive struggle of the working class and all laboring masses. At the same time, the most democratic and progressive officers assume the theoretical positions of scientific socialism, and in their practical activities, which proceed in close unity with the laboring masses, they participate in the most important transformations in the interests of the people, and in the struggle for development on a socialist orientation.

Achievement of progressive social transformations in some liberated countries by military personnel who assumed state power and administration of the state sector of the economy confirms the Marxist-Leninist conclusion that the social base of both anti-imperialist, antioligarchical and socialist revolutions is broadening at a rapid pace today. But successive development of anti-imperialist and antioligarchical revolutions and their transformation into socialist revolutions would be possible only when the laboring masses take an active part in the revolution under the guidance of a revolutionary party. The progressive military leaders of a number of countries either participate actively in the creation of mass revolutionary parties wishing to develop socialism, or they cooperate with the parties of the working class and the broad laboring masses. This insures the most favorable conditions and possibilities for the army's active participation in fundamental social transformations.

As the experience of history has shown, the army can play such a progressive role only in the event that its progressive forces undergo consolidation, active political work is conducted among officers and soldiers, and the relationship of the army to the people and to the political party (or parties) favoring revolutionary alteration of the society develops. Another prerequisite for consolidation of an army's progressive nature is to resolutely ban, from positions of military leadership, reactionary officers and those who oppose consolidation and development of the army's ties with the working class, all laboring masses, and the revolutionary parties.

The reactionary generals and officers of some liberated countries fiercely fight for army leadership and for use of the army against progressive transformations. The events in Indonesia, Chile, and some other states have shown that following the army's seizure of power, reactionary circles physically annihilate, on a mass scale, the democratic, progressive officers and soldiers and, equally so, progressive laborers, peasants, and representatives of the intelligentsia and the middle classes. Therefore decisive elimination of reactionaries from the army would insure not only maintenance of its progressive role but also prevention of the extermination of the people's and army's progressive forces.

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2. The Armies of Liberated Countries Having a Socialist Orientation

In recent years, the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress notes, "new progressive changes have occurred in the economy and political life of Arab, African, and Asian countries with a socialist orientation."² Under the guidance of progressive organizations and with the active participation of their armies, the broad popular masses of Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Iraq, Angola, Yemen, the Congo, Ethiopia, and some other developing countries have achieved significant successes in creation of states expressing the vital interests of the laborers. In their economic policy, these countries are shifting the center of their efforts to development of the state industrial sector, they are eliminating feudal land ownership, they are comprehensively supporting development of cooperative forms of agriculture and small-scale industrial production, and they are nationalizing foreign enterprises. In their foreign policy, they speak out actively against imperialism and its aggression, and for friendship and cooperation with states of the socialist fraternity.

As a rule those armies which were created by the people in the course of their armed struggle for liberation from the colonial yoke and against pro-imperialist puppet regimes participate most actively in the progressive transformations occurring in countries with a socialist orientation. Conscious, politically resourceful warriors for the national and social liberation of the laboring masses have made up the core of these armies. In a number of countries the representatives of parties adhering to the principles of scientific socialism and consistently fighting for broad participation of the laboring masses in revolutionary transformations and for creation of conditions permitting subsequent development of their countries along the socialist path play the leading role in national liberation armies.

From the very beginning of their creation, these armies not only fought an armed struggle but also did a great deal of work to politically educate the laborers and to mobilize them for a revolutionary struggle against imperialism and internal reaction. Participation of commanders, political workers (where they did exist), and soldiers in progressive political, economic, and cultural measures on liberated territory and, in the end, throughout the entire country served as a direct means for reinforcing the unity of the national liberation armies and the popular masses. The officers and soldiers of such armies have become state and party executives, and the organizers and leaders of the popular masses in their efforts to develop their states. Also worthy of note is the fact that representatives of land owners and compradorian bourgeoisie were either absent from among the officers of these armies, or they made up an insignificant minority. Thus feudal lords, compradors, and the oligarchy could not make use of the army in their fight for power and against progressive changes.

National liberation armies could fight and win against imperialist interventionists and internal reaction because they constantly relied upon the popular masses of their country, and upon the support of the Soviet people and peoples of the other socialist countries. Dwelling in close communication with the popular masses, the soldiers and officers of the national liberation forces gained the awareness of the need and inevitability of making fundamental social changes in the interests of the laborers.

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The officers and soldiers of the armies of liberated countries had the possibility for meeting representatives of the Soviet people and the peoples of other socialist countries, and of acquainting themselves with the socialist way of life first hand. This helped to persuade them of the tremendous advantages of the socialist structure and the significantly faster, comprehensive social development possible under socialism, and to understand the consistently scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism, and the laws of socialism's victory over capitalism.

An acquaintance with the combat road of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the armies of other socialist states, and with the dialectics of transformation of a number of national liberation armies into socialist armies greatly benefits the personnel of armies representing countries with a socialist orientation. These dialectics were clearly manifested, for example, in the history of the development of the Vietnamese peoples army, the patriotic armed forces of Laos, and the revolutionary armed forces of Cuba.

The first subdivisions of the Vietnamese peoples army were formed in December 1944 under the guidance of the Marxist-Leninist party. They were manned by politically active, conscious representatives of the working class, laborers, peasantry, and national intelligentsia, by people with great experience in the class struggle against foreign oppressors and their own exploiters. The selfless struggle of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and their decisive contribution to the victory over the common enemy--Nazi fascism and Japanese militarism--was an inspiring example to the soldiers of national liberation formations.

Fighting against the Japanese invaders and then French colonizers who returned to Vietnam in 1945, the peoples army constantly participated in explanation of the goals of the armed struggle to the population, and in implementation of progressive economic, political, and cultural transformations. This insured close, continually stronger ties of the peoples army with the broad laboring masses, and it raised hundreds of thousands and millions of Vietnamese to action against imperialist interventionists and the Saigon puppet regime.

Following the victory of patriotic forces in 1954 over the French colonists in North Vietnam, peaceful socialist development began there. Being a national liberation army by its nature, it transformed into a socialist army--an active builder of a new society and the defender of the revolutionary achievements of the people against the aggression of American imperialism, which lasted until 1973.

In the country's south, with the assistance of all Vietnamese people and relying on the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Peoples Armed Forces of Liberation of South Vietnam (PAFLSV) began a heroic struggle against American invaders and their local puppets. The American army, more than half a million strong and outfitted with an abundant supply of the latest weapons and military equipment, and the army of the Saigon regime, which contained more than a million officers and soldiers, suffered a serious defeat under the blows of the Vietnamese people. The American troops were forced to get out of South Vietnam. In spring 1975 the Saigon regime capitulated forever. The entire Vietnamese people were joined together into the single Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The PAFLSV was placed within the composition of the socialist Vietnamese peoples army.

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The people of Laos also fought a stubborn struggle for their liberty. As is noted in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", "with the victory of patriotic forces in Laos and assumption of the country's leadership by the Marxist-Leninist Peoples Revolutionary Party, the family of socialist countries has been expanded."³ The patriotic armed forces of Laos, who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese people under the guidance of the Peoples Revolutionary Party against American invaders, became the nucleus of the army of the new socialist state.

Following the overthrow of the antipopular dictatorship in Cuba, the army of rebels was transformed into a regular army--the defender and an active force in the implementation of economic, political, and cultural measures of a socialist nature.

The many years of struggle by the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba against American imperialism and its henchmen led to the deep recognition, by soldiers of the peoples liberation armies and by the laboring masses of these countries, of the need for fundamental socialist transformations so as to liberate themselves from all forms of national and social oppression. That the people entrusted army leadership and state rule to Marxist-Leninist parties for the purposes of implementing revolutionary measures in behalf of laboring masses was to be expected as well.

The tendency for development of the revolutionary nature of the forces of liberation also clearly manifested itself in Africa in the course of the people's struggle for liberty and independence. In the 1960's, when the Movement of the People for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) raised the popular masses against Portugese colonists and created armed national liberation formations, it did not make it its objective to subsequently enact socialist transformations, and so in their overwhelming majority, the soldiers of the army of national liberation felt their only purpose was to expel the colonists. However, in the course of many years of heroic armed struggle, most members of the MPLA came to understand the need for the country's progressive development, including for socialist transformations. It was in this spirit that the MPLA nurtured the personnel of the peoples liberation army and the broad laboring masses of Angola since the late 1960's.

Indoctrination of the masses in the spirit of the struggle for socialism was assisted in many ways by the disinterested assistance given to the Angolan people by the USSR, Cuba, and other states of the socialist fraternity. Army personnel and the laborers of Angola became graphically persuaded that only socialism can successfully solve the problem of establishing truly fraternal relations between peoples of different races and nationalities, and that only it can create the possibility for constantly raising the level of material and cultural development of all the people.

The armed struggle of the people of Mozambique was led by the FRELIMO movement, which traveled the same road as the MPLA: from a program of national liberation to a program of struggle for social progress. The efforts of the peoples of Angola and Mozambique not only culminated with the liquidation of colonialism in their countries, but they also played their role in hastening the fall of the fascist regime in Portugal, and they had and are having an active influence on development of revolutionary processes over the entire African continent. As in the victories of national liberation movements in other countries, the support given to the people by states of the socialist fraternity played a major role in the victory of the peoples of Mozambique.

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Burma's modern army also developed in the course of a struggle of national liberation. Following World War II, when the Burmese people won their political independence, army-supported progressive officers initiated a struggle for anti-imperialist and antifeudal transformations, and for development of the country on a noncapitalist road. In March 1962 the Revolutionary Council, which consisted of progressive officers, took power in its own hands and began implementing the revolutionary program of social liberation of the laboring masses from feudal and capitalist oppression.

One important measure of the Revolutionary Council was creation, with the army's participation, of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which transformed into Burma's ruling party. In 1971 the BSPP was reorganized into a mass party. In 3 years it achieved a following of about a million and a half members, candidates, and sympathizers, enjoying the support of the broad masses. Peoples organs embracing the overwhelming share of the working class and the peasantry, and having an increasingly greater influence on the state's political and economic life, were formed.

Thus a shift of leadership of a country's entire life from the hands of just the military to the hands of a party uniting representatives of the military and the broad laboring masses significantly broadens the social base of those who actively participate in society's reorganization. Participation of the military of some liberated states in creation of mass political ruling parties, mainly out of representatives of the laborers, signifies that many of these laborers have come to recognize the groundlessness of the conception of "exercising state functions for the masses but without the masses", still encountered here and there. This historic experience, witnessed in specific conditions, once again confirms the scientific validity of the Marxist-Leninist conclusion that successive implementation and successful protection of revolutionary democratic and, especially, socialist transformations would be possible only if they are performed with the participation of the working class and the majority of the laboring masses under the guidance of a party of scientific socialism. An army led by officers devoted to the people and the cause of social progress can play an active role in the overthrow of a reactionary regime and in creation of favorable political conditions for manifestation of the revolutionary creativity of the popular masses, and it can participate effectively in progressive measures. But an army is incapable of playing the role of a progressive, conscious, organized vanguard of the working class, and it cannot perform its functions as the political and ideological leader of the working class and its allies, and all the more so it is not in a position to replace the progressive revolutionary class--the proletariat, the gravedigger of capitalism and the creator of a socialist social structure.

The national liberation army of Algeria was also born in the fire of an 8 year long struggle of the Algerian people against imperialist colonists. The joint actions and merger of communist armed formations and the armed formations of the Algerian National Liberation Front tangibly helped many officers and soldiers reach a correct understanding of the ideals of socialism. The different and, in a number of cases, directly opposite relationship to the just anti-imperialist war displayed by the major bourgeoisie and the feudal land owners on one hand and the broad laboring masses on the other, and the close ties of the soldiers with the broad laboring masses during the time of partisan struggle helped many officers and soldiers deeply recognize the need for eliminating the system of exploitation following national liberation. After the end of the war, the army of the Algerian Peoples Democratic

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Republic took an active part in eliminating feudal relations in agriculture, in collectivizing the peasants, in providing assistance to state-owned enterprises and farms and to self-administered labor collectives, and in organizing and improving the economy in the interests of the people.

Thus in many cases armies that evolve in the course of wars fought by peoples against imperialism and internal reaction and for national liberation become an active, inherent part of social forces struggling to develop countries with a socialist orientation.

Armies which had been created by colonists or reactionary regimes and which had seized power after the country's liberation have remained in existence in some developing states with a socialist orientation. Their development exhibits unique features.

A significantly larger part of the officer corps of such armies represents local feudal lords, compradorian bourgeoisie, and oligarchical groups. There are also many officers who had taken their training in military educational institutions of capitalist countries, where not only are all students subjected to systematic ideological processing, but also certain officers from developing countries are subjected to open bribery and recruitment by the agents of imperialist intelligence agencies. The soldiers of these armies had not undergone the school of patriotic and revolutionary indoctrination offered by a just anti-imperialist national liberation war. To one degree or another, the legacy of imperialist propaganda, which had been waged in the past in colonial armies and in armies of reactionary regimes, does have its effect.

Therefore transformation of these armies into ones representing progressive states has occurred and is now proceeding in a situation of an acute struggle between the forces of progress and reaction within the armies themselves, within the countries, and often in the conditions of direct interference in this struggle by imperialist states. All of this not only complicates the army's transformation into an instrument of progressive forces, but it also harbors the possibility of reactionary military coups--until such time that the army is not cleansed of the influence of reactionary circles as a result of a number of political, ideological, and organizational measures.

Nor do the progressive forces in the armies of liberated countries and their socio-political viewpoints and positions remain constant. An important stage in this development is the transition from recognition, by progressive officers and the soldier masses, of a need for national liberation and protection of the country's state sovereignty, to realization of the need for revolutionary-democratic transformation aimed against feudal vestiges, the oligarchy, and the major bourgeoisie. The next stage in evolution of viewpoints which many progressive servicemen in liberated countries have now reached is the understanding of the need for fundamental social transformations in all social life. This evolution of viewpoints proceeds in close association with socioeconomic and political changes occurring in the given country and in all the world, mainly under the influence of the successes of real socialism.

The evolution of viewpoints and political positions of progressive officers who had served in old colonial armies and in armies created by reactionary regimes can

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be traced with the example of Nasser--a prominent leader in the struggle for progressive development of Egypt. During World War II and prior to the victory of the 1952 revolution he led, Nasser was a nationalistic patriot by persuasion. He believed the goal of the revolution to be to liberate Egypt from the imperialist yoke by overthrowing King Farouk and the corrupt elite surrounding the king. It was not until the military took power in July 1952 that Nasser and his allies in the "Free Officers" union understood the insufficiency of the superficial political changes in terms of real progress of the people. Development of internal class contradictions in the country encouraged Nasser and other progressive officers to conduct an agrarian reform, which undermined the position of the most reactionary class of feudal lords in Egypt at that time, and brought the peasantry--the most numerous class in Egypt--over to the side of the revolutionary administration. In order to preserve their won national sovereignty and create the possibility for economic and cultural progress in the country, Nasser and his associates were forced to counteract the pressure of the major bourgeoisie. They assumed the task of eliminating the control monopolies had over the government, and at developing the state sector within the economy. In order to break the economic blockade established by the imperialists and insure development of Egypt's economy, Nasser signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

This evolution of Nasser's political viewpoints and positions was promoted, on one hand, by his patriotism, by his sincere desire to fight for progressive development of the Egyptian people. On the other hand the self-condemnation of the country's major bourgeoisie and world imperialism, which tried to keep Egypt from developing on the path of social progress, play a certain role. The subsequent course of the class struggle in Egypt and Nasser's desire to sign a pact corresponding to the interests of the popular masses led him to a policy which opened up the prospects for socialist development.⁴

The evolution of Nasser's political viewpoints and positions is typical of many officers in Arab, African, and Asian countries with a socialist orientation. In Syria, for example, the leadership of the Ba'th party, which contained many progressive officers, published an official document in 1966 justifying nationalization of the resources of production belonging to the major bourgeoisie. The document stated: "The party has decided that control over the economic sector would be impossible until such time that this sector is transformed into a public one. It has also become persuaded that only socialism is capable of creating appropriate conditions for development of a modern industry and a national economy in a weakly developed country. The party has also decided that the bourgeois class is an exploiting, ineffective force...."⁵

Officers and politically developed soldiers of armies of liberated countries come to the conclusion as to the need for profound social transformations on learning the indisputable facts of social life. Full correspondence of the process of history with social laws, as revealed by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, intensifies the deep interest shown in scientific socialism by an ever-increasing number of progressive officers. A program of the country's development on a socialist orientation, declared by Ethiopian military servicemen who overthrew the monarchical regime in 1974, is a new confirmation of the inevitability and irreversibility of the growing influence of the ideals of socialism among all progressive strata in nonsocialist states, including those under military command.

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But the laws of social life manifest themselves not uniquely, but only as a trend. This can be seen in the social processes occurring in liberated countries. In them, some officers not only continue to defend the bourgeoisie and the capitalist social structure, but they also often cause reactionary military coups with the purpose of leading the country's development from the path of progress. Some officers are bought by imperialist intelligence agencies and internal reactionary forces, others become major owners of the resources of production and try to consolidate the system of exploitation, a third group are fearful of radical transformations and the prospects of the working class transforming into the guiding force of social progress, and a fourth group get involved in counterrevolutionary transformations on a chauvinistic basis. Frequently some officers participate in reactionary overthrows only because they blindly fulfill the orders of pro-imperialist elements of the military leadership.

The most effective means of struggle against reactionary efforts is, history has shown, mobilization of the broad laboring masses for active implementation and defense of revolutionary measures, including creation of armed formations of the politically most conscious laborers, working peasants, and people's intelligentsia. At the same time, injecting the elements of democracy into the officer corps has very important significance, as does the purging of officers hostile to progressive transformations from the army. In some armies of countries with a socialist orientation, revolutionary-democratic and other progressive parties conduct purposeful organizational and ideological work among the soldiers and officers. Under such conditions, attempts at reactionary overthrows end in failure as a rule.

Thus several years ago a number of changes were made in the army command of the Guinean Republic in order to do away with the "fifth column", which was created among the officers by some foreign states. By decision of the republic's president, a peoples revolutionary militia corps was organized as a means for defending the achievements of the people. In the Peoples Republic of the Congo, in addition to creating national armed formations of volunteers to protect the revolution, unreliable elements were purged from the officer corps. The Congolese Labor Party initiated extensive organizational and ideological activity among servicemen. The Congolese Trade Union Federation and the Union of Socialist Congo Youth also participate actively in army indoctrination. Similar processes are also occurring in some other countries.

The progressive forces of liberated states with a socialist orientation and the popular masses in general are making important conclusions from the tragedy of Chile. Planned and paid for by foreign imperialism, the fascist military coup caught the revolution unawares. Tens of thousands of persons were killed, tortured, and thrown into prison, to include many officers and soldiers who sided with democracy and progress. The events in Chile have forcefully recalled to us that the revolution must know how to defend itself, that it must remain alert to the intrigues of domestic and foreign reaction, and that progressive forces in liberated countries must strengthen their cooperation with the powerful forces of socialism. "The experience of the revolutionary movement of the last few years," states the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "has graphically demonstrated that whenever domination by monopolistic capital and by its political henchmen is really threatened, imperialism resorts to everything, casting off all appearances of anything democratic. Imperialism is ready to infringe upon

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the sovereignty of states, and it is prepared to commit all unlawful acts, not to mention nonhumanitarian ones. Slander, stupefaction of the public, economic blockade, sabotage, organization of starvation and devastation, bribery and threats, terror, organization of the assassinations of political officials, and purges in the fascist style make up the arsenal of the modern counterrevolution, which always operates in an alliance with international imperialist reaction. But in the end, all of this is fated to failure. The cause of freedom and the cause of progress are invincible."⁶

One of the most important prerequisites of the victory of progress and prevention of reactionary military overthrows, the practice of many liberated countries shows, is a decisive struggle by revolutionary forces for the army, and removal of nonloyal and unstable generals and officers from positions of leadership in the units, formations, branches of troops, and armed forces. This experience also persuades us that revolutionary, progressive forces in liberated countries with a socialist orientation are fighting more and more effectively to transform their armies out of instruments of national liberation into instruments of defense and active participants of fundamental revolutionary-democratic, and later socialist, transformations.

3. The Armies of Countries Developing on the Capitalist Path

Because the world socialist fraternity exists and is continually growing stronger, because of the fall of imperialism's colonial system, and because of the continually deepening general crisis of capitalism, imperialism is no longer in a position to have a decisive influence upon development of human society. But it continues its stubborn struggle to preserve and consolidate its structure of exploitation and oppression, and to regain lost positions, including in those countries which have acquired political independence. In some developing states, imperialism and internal reaction have managed to gain temporary victories over the forces of national democracy and social liberation. Semifeudal and even slave-owning relations are artificially preserved in the social life of these countries, or capitalism is allowed to develop. In many countries of Latin America and in a number of countries of Asia, capitalist relations have become dominant in the city, and they play a major role in agriculture. However, as was noted at the international Conference of Communists and Workers Parties held in Moscow in 1969, "countries assuming the capitalist path have been unable to resolve a single basic problem arising before them. They have collided with the growing displeasure of the people, and the internal reaction of these countries is organizing an offensive against democratic liberties with the support of imperialism, and in a number of cases it is cruelly suppressing the democratic and patriotic movement of the masses."⁷

The principal instrument of internal reaction and imperialism in the struggle against the movement of the masses for national and social liberation in countries that have assumed the capitalist path is the so-called "national" armies of these states, which are often relatively small in size, well armed, and trained with assistance from imperialist states.

In many cases the control over the armies of such countries is exercised by the Pentagon and the USA's CIA. Transformation of such a "national" army into an instrument of American imperialism demonstrates its antipopular and antinational nature especially graphically. The armies of some developing states proceeding on the capitalist path participate in wars against laboring peoples, serving as a tool of

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the USA's "Pacific Ocean Doctrine", and of other military strategic conceptions of imperialism. The essence of these conceptions entails the conduct of imperialist wars by the hands of Asians against Asians, Africans against Africans, and Latin Americans against Latin Americans. For example the army of the Saigon regime fought not only the Vietnamese people but also the peoples of Laos and Cambodia (Campuchia). The South Korean army and Thai mercenaries participated in the war of American imperialism against the Vietnamese people. Imperialism brought mercenaries in from Zaire and some other African countries for military actions against the people of Angola. In the war against the patriotic forces of Lebanon, imperialism used the armed formations of right-wing forces supported from without.

In accordance with the strategic conceptions of imperialism, the armies of a number of national states within the system of the imperialist bloc are preparing themselves to play the role of cannon fodder in the war against the socialist fraternity in general and in wars against particular socialist countries. The armies of such national states located not far from the socialist countries are the largest (some have several thousand men), and they are outfitted with modern weapons and military equipment supplied by the USA, West Germany, England, and other capitalist countries.

The armies of a number of other developing countries traveling the road of capitalism are preparing mainly for so-called "antiguerrillawars"--that is, actions against revolutionary uprisings by the popular masses. Thus according to the American press tens of thousands of officers and noncommissioned officers from the states of Central and South America have undergone training in an "antiguerrilla warfare" program at training centers in the USA and at American military bases in Latin American countries. In the 1950-1960's, the leaders of the fascist military junta in Chile also underwent similar training. In some Latin American, Asian, and African countries, "special purpose troops" have been formed and trained under the guidance of American instructors. These troops consist of hired professional soldiers, criminals, and declassed elements.

The American military has helped its allies in the struggle against the forces of progress to study and implement criminal methods of warfare: physical annihilation of the peaceful population, and the laying waste, with napalm and chemical poisons, of the land, the air, and the water of tremendous regions in which rebels and partisans might operate.

Selecting personnel for the armies of states traveling the capitalist road, reaction accounts for and utilizes national and intertribal contradictions, presence of a language barrier in many countries of Asia and Africa, and the religious fanaticism and low level of political awareness of the peasantry, petty merchants, craftsmen, and other representatives of the petty bourgeoisie.

The armies in many of these states are officially declared to be "outside politics"; in fact, however, they are a direct instrument of bourgeois policy. They are openly purged of progressive elements, often by the methods of the cruelest terror. As an example following the revolutionary military overthrow in Brazil in 1964, more than 5,000 officers and sergeants were expelled from the armed forces. In Indonesia, following the 30 September 1965 military coup, thousands of servicemen who had expressed displeasure in the regime of terror in the country, were shot and sent to concentration camps. Thousands of progressive servicemen were repressed in Thailand following the reactionary revolution of 1976.

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But reaction cannot count on any sort of terror as a means to "ward off" the inevitable movement of human society from capitalism to socialism. This movement will unavoidably take hold even in countries that are presently on the capitalist road. Development of capitalism is inseparably associated with growth in the size and organization of the working class, transformation of broad masses of peasants and some of the middle classes into the proletariat, and creation and reinforcement of the union of the proletariat with the broad nonproletarian masses, including the intelligentsia and white collar workers, the numbers of whom is rising especially quickly in these times of scientific-technical revolution.

Today, more and more soldiers and officers representing the laborers are entering the armies of developing countries with a capitalist orientation, having had experience in the class struggle against imperialism and internal reaction. They continue to live in the interests of the laborers while in the army. The increasing spread of Marxism-Leninism, and of the truth of socialism and its great advantages over capitalism, is having a tremendous influence on progressive, patriotic officers in countries with neocolonial and reactionary regimes as well. The number of officers recognizing the need for fundamental social transformations in the interests of the laboring masses is rising. As an example the Argentinian sociologist E. Kuenka writes in his book "The Military in Argentina" that in the period of military dictatorship, "a large number of Argentinian servicemen...cast off their deep-rooted prejudices, took steps closer to the communists, and decided to acquaint themselves with the Marxist-Leninist assessment of the Argentinian situation. Experiencing a sense of patriotic concern for the fate of their motherland, they would not agree to the slanderous anticommunist campaign conducted by certain circles of the supreme military hierarchy."⁸

Growth of the anti-imperialist and antioligarchical mood of officers and soldiers is manifesting itself more and more frequently in their support of uprisings by the working class and all laborers.

The laborers of Latin America are continuing their struggle for social rights. The working class of Latin America numbers 38-40 million persons. In many countries, communist parties are the authoritative political force, and the true leaders of the laboring masses. Together with its allies, the proletariat is able to attract some soldiers and officers to its side under certain conditions in the stubborn and heroic struggle in behalf of all laborers. This is promoted by the fact that the overwhelming majority of servicemen in the armies of Latin American states join because military service is compulsory. The example of Cuba, its successes in socialist development, growth of the material welfare and cultural level of the laborers, and affirmation of real democracy and social freedom in the country are having a great influence on soldiers and progressive officers.

Naturally, we cannot forget the significant differences existing in the socioeconomic and political conditions present in liberated countries traveling the capitalist road. Class forces are politically polarized in almost all Latin American and some Asian developing countries, and almost all of them have authoritative communist parties that have been seasoned in class struggles. In this situation, the progressive efforts of military leaders in the struggle against foreign exploitation and for social justice encounter the active support of communist parties, progressive trade unions, the working class, and its allies.

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The bourgeoisie of many African and some Asian countries is represented mainly by foreign exploiters; the national bourgeoisie has not formed into a politically dominant force, the proletarians do not exist as a politically independent class force, and mass political and social organizations are absent. The state administration of such countries does not have a strong social foundation, and its authority is often undermined by acute national or intertribal contradictions, corruption of government officials, and the struggle for power among individual groups and people. In such conditions the progressive officers are the bearers of the ideals of patriotism and national sovereignty. They influence development of the viewpoints of many of the soldiers. On the whole, however, the political activity of the soldiers is low. This is associated with their apartness from the laboring masses, since on the background of the extreme poverty of the overwhelming majority of the people, even soldiers are a privileged segment of the population. In states of this form, military coups are often the result of a struggle for power between various groups representing the exploiting minority of the population. But even in these countries the progressive forces are forming. For the moment they are forming mainly out of the middle strata, the national intelligentsia, and revolutionary-democratic officers, but the role of the developing working class and laboring peasantry is becoming increasingly larger, and their influence on polarization of class forces in the country and army is growing. This, in the final analysis, is one of the expressions of the inevitable development of all mankind in the direction of democracy and socialism.

In some liberated countries, power is in the hands of that segment of the national bourgeoisie which follows a policy of neutrality and defends the sovereignty of its states in the international arena, but pursues a course of eliminating feudal relations and developing the government-owned sector of the economy within the country. The armies of these countries are an instrument of protection of state sovereignty and of national interests in the struggle against neocolonialism and the aggression of imperialism, but in terms of internal policy, they are used in a number of cases against striking workers, and to suppress political demonstrations of the laborers.

We can make the following general conclusion from the premises, events, and facts discussed in this chapter: Given all the diversity of the role of armies in the life of liberated countries, the dominant and constantly clearer trend in the internal development of these armies can be stated as constriction of the social base of reaction and growth of the forces of democracy, social progress, and socialism in the duel against the forces of imperialism and reaction. This trend is one of the unique confirmations of the conclusion of the 25th CPSU Congress that capitalism is a society without a future. The future belongs to socialism, to communism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Za mir, bezopasnost', sotrudnichestvo i sotsial'nyy progress v Yevrope. K itogam Konferentsii kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiï Yevropy. Berlin, 29-30 iyunya 1976 roda" [For Peace, Security, Cooperation, and Social Progress in Europe. The Results of the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe. Berlin, 29-30 June 1976], Moscow, 1976, p 42.

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2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 12.
3. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," CPSU Central Committee Decree, 31 January 1977, p 16.
4. Following Nasser's death (1970), changes occurred in the political leadership of Egypt attesting to its departure from Nasser's political line. Right-wing circles, which now became active, assumed a course of eliminating the socio-economic and political achievements of the Egyptian revolution, and of creating a breach in the relations with socialist countries.
5. Cited in Mirskiy, G. I., "'Tretiy mir': obshchestvo, vlast', armiya" ["The Third World": Society, Power, Army], Moscow, 1976, p 330.
6. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 30.
7. "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii. Dokumenty i materialy" [The International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1969, p 313.
8. Kuenka, Eduardo, "Voyennyye v Argentine" [The Military in Argentina], Moscow, 1973, p 18.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE SOCIOPOLITICAL NATURE AND PURPOSE OF SOCIALIST ARMIES

Considering the constantly existing threat of imperialist aggression, the dependable defensive power of the socialist countries and presence of armies within them satisfying the highest requirements of the day are extremely important. We can protect the achievements of socialism against the intrigues of international imperialism armed to the teeth, avert a new world war, and foil the aggressive designs of adventurist circles only if we possess mighty armed forces. Socialist armies are the most important resource against the imperialist policy of aggression, and they are a counterweight to the reactionary armies of imperialist states and of their military blocs. Within all of this, we see a manifestation of the social nature of socialist armies, their noble and humanitarian historic mission.

1. The Social Nature of the Socialist Army

The socialist army is an instrument of the socialist state, and consequently it is part of the political superstructure of socialist society. The socialist type of state predetermines the socialist type of its army. A socialist state creates, improves, and uses its army as one of the instruments by which it resolves a number of fundamental problems in the interests of development of socialism and communism.

The most important trait associated with the social nature of the socialist army is that it expresses the interests of the laboring classes, mainly the working class, and it protects them. In contrast to the imperialist army, which serves the goals of an exploiting minority, the socialist army is an army of the laboring people. V. I. Lenin clearly revealed this trait of the socialist army in the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviet. In his speech to the congress, Lenin described something that once happened to him.

"While I was traveling in a Finnish railcar, I was witness to a conversation among several Finns and one old woman. I could not take part in the conversation because I did not know the Finnish language, but one of the Finns turned to me and said: 'Do you know what unusual thing the old lady said? She said: Now I don't need to be afraid of a man with a gun any more. When I was in the forest, I was met by a man with a gun, and instead of taking my brushwood away from me, he even found more for me.'

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"When I heard this, I said to myself: Let there be hundreds of newspapers, no matter how they call themselves--socialist, almost-socialist, and so on, and let there be hundreds of extremely loud voices shouting to us: 'dictators', 'tyrants', and so on. For we know that a new voice is now rising in the popular masses. The masses are saying: We no longer need to be afraid of a man with a gun, because he is protecting the laborers, and he will be merciless in crushing the domination of the exploiters."¹

Another distinguishing trait associated with the social nature of the socialist army is that it embodies socialist social relations that have evolved within the particular country--economic, social, political, and ideological. Being a system, a living, functioning organism, the socialist army is, in M. V. Frunze's words, "an exact copy"² of these relations. All of the principal processes occurring in society and in state and party development reflect themselves within the army as well. Its entire life and all of its activities, the indoctrination and training of the personnel, military order, the mutual relations existing among servicemen, and their relationships with the people are based on the principles of socialism. Here lies one of the unique features of the character of the socialist army, its social nature. V. I. Lenin constantly emphasized the need for developing the Soviet military in the spirit of general Soviet development,³ for strengthening socialism within the army, viewing this to be a source of its invincibility.⁴

Socialist economic relations manifest themselves in the socialist army mainly in the fact that all of its material resources and all of its property represent national socialist property. The personnel maintain a thrifty attitude toward the material base, and they fight for economical use of resources and materials. Based on public ownership, the relations existing among servicemen in the course of their military and combat activities are typified by true cooperation and mutual assistance, similarly as with the relations seen in socialist material production.

Socialist social relations also manifest themselves deeply in the socialist army. The truly popular nature of the socialist army can be clearly seen from its structure, organization, and composition. Expressing and defending the interests of the laborers, the army is manned by laborers from bottom up. Even in a period of transition from capitalism to socialism, when the society still possesses the vestiges of exploiting classes, an army recruited mainly on the basis of the proletarian-class principle, consists only of laborers as a rule. So it was in our country as well, where the honorable right to defend the revolution with weapon in hand was the privilege only of the laborers during the period of transition. And in accordance with the first Soviet constitution, other military responsibilities were given to the non-working elements. But during the civil war, when a mass army had to be created in the face of a shortage of commanders representing the people, representatives of the nonworking classes of exploitation were recruited into its ranks--officers and generals of the old army, and various military specialists. As of 15 August 1920 the Red Army contained 48,400 officers, 10,300 military officials, about 14,000 physicians, and 26,800 lower medical workers.⁵ At the end of 1920 about 34 percent of the Red Army commanders were military specialists from the old army.⁶ However, all of the activities of the old military specialists were under the strict surveillance and political guidance of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. This was the main reason why most of the old military specialists served honorably in the Red Army and made a significant contribution to development of the Soviet Armed Forces and to victory in the civil war.

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In the conditions of victorious socialism, there is no need for any sort of social or class restrictions on army recruitment, inasmuch as the society consists only of laboring classes and strata.

The socialist army is an army of friendship of peoples and of proletarian internationalism.

National oppression and all forms of national and racial discrimination are eliminated from socialist society. All citizens in a socialist state perform their responsibilities of defending their motherland irrespective of their racial and national membership. They enjoy equal rights of acquisition of a military education, and of promotion in accordance with their successes and acquired experience. Friendship of peoples is one of the motive forces behind the development of socialist society, and a source of power of the socialist state and its armed forces.

Indoctrination of the socialist army in the spirit of friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of one's country is organically united with its indoctrination in the spirit of fraternal solidarity with the laborers of all countries, with all peoples, irreconcilability in relation to our enemies, and deep awareness of one's international duty and role in the defense of world socialism. "Our army", Lenin said, "was organized out of select elements, conscious peasants and laborers. Each carries with him to the front the awareness that he is fighting for the sake of not only the Russian but also the whole international revolution...."⁷

The mutual relations existing between officers and soldiers and between chiefs and subordinates are qualitatively new in the socialist army, being one of the manifestations of socialist social relations. They are distinguished by real collectivism, cooperation, mutual assistance, and mutual respect on the background of fulfillment of military duty before the people, while in bourgeois armies class irreconcilability is inherent to such mutual relations.

The new, progressive nature of the socialist army is also the result of the socialist political relations manifesting themselves within it. The political structure of socialist society is reflected in the socialist army. Political organs and party organizations are created within it, they function actively, and they implement party policy in the soldier masses, firmly and consistently.

Party construction in the Soviet Armed Forces is a scientifically grounded system of measures implemented by the Communist Party to create, develop, and strengthen armed forces political organs, the party-political administration, and party organizations, to conduct ideological and organizational work aimed at nurturing the ideals of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet soldiers, and to mobilize all personnel for the missions facing them.

The socialist army represents many social organizations--youth, sports, military-scientific, military-technical, creative, and others.

Servicemen in the socialist army enjoy the full rights and freedoms of the citizens of their society, as foreseen by the constitution, to include the right to elect and be elected to all organs of state rule. Servicemen who are party members can be

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elected to all executive party organs. As an example more than 13,000 representatives of the Soviet Army and Navy are soviet deputies. Servicemen that are CPSU members staff rayon, city, oblast, and central party organs. In 1974, about 5,000 servicemen of the Polish Army participated in the work of local party organs, organs of peoples rule, and sociopolitical organizations, and 6,000 were members of the Front of Peoples Unity, the Society of Polish-Soviet Friendship, and other organizations. We can say with full grounds that the socialist army is the most democratic in history. Here lies one of its main advantages and one of the sources of its power.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the socialist army stems from its socialistic ideological relations. They manifest themselves in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the personnel, in the socialist content of the entire training and indoctrination system of the armed forces, and in the operation and development of all forms of socialist social consciousness: political and legal ideals, morality, art, and science in application to the task of socialism's armed defense.

Such are the basic factors producing the fundamentally new character and social nature of the socialist army.

As a sociopolitical institution, the socialist army is built on the foundation of objective laws. Among these objective sociopolitical laws, we can include: leadership of the army by the Marxist-Leninist party, gradual transformation of the army from an organ of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an organ of a whole people's state, the withering away of its domestic function and expansion of its external function, continual reinforcement of class unity of the army and people, growth in the qualitative level of the personnel, and others.

These laws define the sociopolitical principles of development of the socialist armed forces: leadership of the army by the Communist Party, the unity of the army and people, a class approach to development of the armed forces, one-man command, highly conscious military discipline, faithfulness to proletarian internationalism, and so on.

The main principle of armed forces development in the socialist state, one which reflects the full nature of the armed forces, is Communist Party leadership in the solution of all basic problems associated with army organization, control of troops and naval forces, recruitment, and personnel training and indoctrination. This principle, which is documented in the programs of the fraternal parties of socialist countries, is implied by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the leading role the communist party must play in a socialist state.

One of the most important principles of socialist army development is the class principle, which also clearly reflects the army's new social nature. It essentially requires that we follow a policy in recruitment of personnel, in selection, training, and placement of military personnel, in ideological-political indoctrination of the soldiers, and in other areas of the socialist army's creation and development which would insure strict and complete consistency of the army's nature and purpose with the nature of the socialist social and state structure, and with the goals of the struggle being waged by the working class and all laborers for socialism and communism. No matter what forms in which this principle may manifest itself, its content is always proletarian and communist, it is aimed against the bourgeoisie in its

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policies and ideologies, and against all reactionary forces defending the structure of exploitation and oppression. This premise was clearly expressed by V. I. Lenin, who emphasized: "Ours is a class army, opposing the bourgeoisie."⁸

Created on the basis of objective laws and the principles they imply, the armies of countries in the socialist fraternity are undergoing constant improvement, and in their sociopolitical development they are proceeding through a number of stages corresponding to the basic stages of development of the socialist state. Thus our army, which was born as an instrument of a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, transformed into an instrument of the whole people's state in the course of the development of socialism in the USSR.

The army is a whole people's army in that it expresses the interests of all the people, of all social strata of the society, indoctrinated in the spirit of socialism and unlimited devotion to it. In a multinational state, the whole people's nature of the army also presupposes that it expresses the fundamental interests of all nations. A new historical community of people--the Soviet people--became a reality in the USSR following profound, comprehensive sociopolitical changes. Our army protects the class interests of this multinational historic community of people.

The whole people's nature of the socialist army is a factor which raises its social unity to an even higher level, and attests to its greater cohesion with the people.

Being a whole people's army by its nature, the socialist army is still a class army, as is true of the state as a whole. Its class essence can be seen in the fact that the working class, headed by the Communist Party, has the leading role in military development; as before, the army expresses the interests of the working class and other laborers, and it stands guard over the interests of socialism, its achievements, and its ideals. "The class nature of the socialist army," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech to military academy graduates in the Kremlin on 8 July 1968, "predetermines its intimate ties with the laborer and peasant masses, and it performs its social role of defending the cause of socialism under the leadership of the working class and its party, with the active support of all the people. Here lies the source of power and true democracy of the armed forces of socialist countries."⁹

Other socialist armies also experience similar stages of development. In the course of their development, increasingly more favorable conditions for growth of the socialist state's defensive power and for strengthening combat cooperation between its army and the armies of fraternal socialist countries are created.

There is important theoretical and practical significance to revealing the stages of sociopolitical development of the army of a socialist state, and to applying the approach of dialectical materialism to its sociopolitical nature, the latter being its most dynamic, constantly developing attribute. First of all, this approach permits us to determine the maturity of the armed forces from the standpoint of the extent to which they reflect and utilize the relations and advantages of socialism; second, it allows us to envision the prospects of further sociopolitical development of the socialist army in full correspondence with the course of creation of the new society; third, it is the theoretical basis for differentiating and utilizing the experience of different countries in military development; fourth, it promotes better organization of military cooperation among fraternal armies.

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2. The Historic Purpose of the Socialist Army

The ideas on the historic purpose and nature of armed forces in socialist society were spelled out in the works of the founders of Marxism.¹⁰ They were discussed most thoroughly and deeply by Lenin in new historic conditions, when the socialist revolution and development of socialism became the immediate task of our country's working class.

Revealing the historic purpose of the new proletarian army, Lenin said that "This army is called upon to protect the achievements of the revolution, our popular rule, the soviets of soldier's, worker's, and peasant's deputies, and the entire new, truly democratic structure against all enemies of the people..."¹¹ The leader of the Communist Party emphasized that this purpose of the army, when recognized by the people, becomes the source of the Soviet government's indestructible strength.

Lenin's premises on the purpose of the socialist army enjoyed confirmation and further creative development in the proceedings of congresses of the CPSU and fraternal communist parties, in the constitutions of the socialist countries, and in other party and state documents. Thoughts on military theory suggested by socialist countries made a significant contribution to this area.

The lofty purpose of the socialist army has been confirmed by history. It is clearly demonstrated within all activities of the armies of states in the socialist fraternity, and mainly the Soviet Armed Forces--the army of the world's first socialist state, which through its combat deeds has earned high glory as the guard of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the bulwark of universal peace.

The historic purpose of the army of a socialist state manifests itself in its functions--domestic and foreign. Its domestic function can be stated as armed defense of the socialist achievements of the people against the intrigues of overthrown exploiting classes and their vestiges in the country, which may for some time offer not only economic, ideological, and political but also military resistance to the development of socialism.

The domestic class function of the socialist army differs fundamentally from the domestic function of an army of a capitalist state. While the bourgeois army is used to suppress demonstrations of the laborers against the exploiters, and it is, in Lenin's words, the servant of capital in the struggle against labor, and the executioner of national liberty,¹² the army of the socialist state is directed against the exploiting minority, it suppresses its demonstrations, and it best defends the interests of the laborers, and the majority of the society.

We can distinguish three basic ways in which the socialist army performs its domestic function: protection of social security, a combat function, and the function of deterrence. The army participates in the protection of social security whenever the struggle against hostile classes or their vestiges grows keener in the country, but before this reaches the point of open armed collisions. In this period, militia and internal affairs organs perform the basic tasks of protecting public order and the state's security, while the army provides support to them.

The socialist army engages in direct combat activities when the resistance of the enemies of socialism within the country assumes significant proportions and becomes

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persistent, long-lasting, and intense (counterrevolutionary uprisings, mutinies, banditry, civil war). Civil war is the most acute form of class struggle, and the socialist army may participate in it.

The socialist army's deterrent domestic function has to do with the fact itself that the socialist state possesses an army; this has an influence on its class enemies, restraining them from open armed uprisings.

The domestic function of the army of the Soviet state revealed itself most fully during the civil war, when overthrown exploiting classes, relying on the assistance and direct military participation of international capital, attempted to strangle the newly born Soviet republic and restore the old orders. With the active support of the people, the young army of the Country of the Soviets defeated the troops of the White Guards and the interventionists, and it created the necessary conditions for peaceful development.

The CPSU Program notes that "the general trend in development of the class struggle within socialist countries in the face of successful socialist development is one of growing strength of the positions of socialist forces and weakening of the resistance of the vestiges of hostile classes. But this development is not proceeding along a straight line. In certain periods of time the class struggle may become more intense due to certain changes in the domestic and foreign situation. Therefore constant alertness is required, so that the intrigues of both internal and external hostile forces could be halted in time..."¹³

Guiding the development of socialist society, our party never weakened its revolutionary alertness for even a single day. In that period of history of the Soviet state, the army had to be ready--and it was ready--to perform its domestic function of combating the intrigues of the vestiges of exploiting classes.

With the victory of socialism and formation of the whole people's state, the domestic function of our army associated with the need for suppressing armed resistance by exploiting classes (their vestiges) became no more. In the course of the new society's development, classes of exploitation were eliminated from the USSR. The laborers united themselves even more closely around the Communist Party. The whole people's state expresses the interests and the will of all the peoples. It contains no internal social forces hostile to socialism, against which an army would have to be employed. "From the standpoint of internal conditions," states the CPSU Program, "the Soviet Union does not have a need for an army."¹⁴

Thus the domestic function of the socialist army is gradually disappearing, withering away under the influence of changes in the society's social and class relations.

In addition to having a domestic function, which exists only in a particular stage, the socialist army has a permanent foreign function. It entails protection of the socialist fatherland against the aggressive transgressions of international imperialism. The external function of the socialist army is its main function, inasmuch as it is directed against the main danger threatening development of socialism and communism. It, as well as the socialist army itself, will continue to exist as long as imperialism remains on earth, together with its aggressive desires. "...inasmuch as a military danger originating in the imperialist camp still exists,

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and because total and universal disarmament has not been achieved," states our party's Program, "the CPSU feels it necessary to support the defensive power of the Soviet state and to keep the combat readiness of its armed forces at a level insuring decisive and complete defeat of any enemy who may dare to transgress upon the Soviet motherland."¹⁵

Today the external function of the socialist army is naturally expanding and deepening. This can be explained by the tremendous sociopolitical changes occurring in the international arena.

First, a world socialist system--a social, economic, and political fraternity of free, sovereign nations traveling the road of socialism and communism and unified by common interests and goals and by the tight knots of international socialist solidarity--has formed and grown stronger. In this connection the socialist state and its army have the task of defending, together with other socialist states and their armies, the entire socialist system and not just the particular country.

Second, imperialism's colonial system has suffered failure, and the national liberation movement of peoples has risen to a new level. Imperialists are doing everything they can to hinder further development of liberated countries, and they are trying to hold them in the nets of economic and political dependence, and retard their social progress. For these purposes they attempt military adventures, and they unleash local wars which threaten not only the liberty and independence of individual peoples but also the cause of peace in all the world. In such a situation it is the international duty of the socialist state to support and assist liberated countries to halt imperialist exportation of armed counterrevolution.

Third, the general crisis of capitalism continues to grow more intense. This expresses itself in all areas of life in imperialist states, and in their growing militarization. Certain imperialist circles have still not rejected the idea of reaching their political aims through world war.

It is the task of all progressive forces to bridle the aggressors, to take away their possibility for forcing mankind into a new world war. This may be achieved mainly by opposing imperialism with a powerful armed force, by creating a situation of inevitable retribution for aggression. This is what the states of the socialist fraternity are called upon to do, and this is what they are capable of doing.

Consequently the external function of the socialist army exhibits a number of orientations. Today, this means: defending the given state against attacks by aggressors; defending the entire socialist system and each country of this system in cooperation with other fraternal armies; providing assistance to peoples fighting for their liberty and independence; defending the peace in all the world.

As with its domestic function, the socialist army performs its foreign function in different forms. There may be direct military actions in defense of the socialist fatherland, or deterrence of aggressors through constant reinforcement of the army's combat readiness in peacetime.

Performance of its domestic (at a particular stage of development of the new society within the country) and foreign functions (throughout the entire existence of the socialist army) is the decisive factor defining the social role of the army in

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socialist society. Protecting the fatherland against the intrigues of enemies, and insuring a possibility for creative activity by laborers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, the socialist army essentially participates in development of socialism and communism.

The socialist army also makes a contribution to development of socialism and communism by carrying out a number of cultural, educational, economic, and technical tasks, especially in peacetime. These tasks cannot be referred to as functions of the army, inasmuch as they are incidental and they do not fit within the attributes of the army--that is, the army is not created specifically for their completion. Nevertheless they are very important, and their completion by the army is highly beneficial for this society, helping to strengthen the unity of the people and the armed forces of the socialist state.

First there is the cultural and educational task. Throughout the entire process of a soldier's training, he undergoes development as a citizen of socialist society. Constant attention is devoted to his ideological, political, and moral indoctrination. And inasmuch as almost the entire male population of the socialist state serves in the army at some time, the latter's significance to communist indoctrination of the young is extremely great. The accountability report of the party Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress emphasizes: "Young people enter the military family without the experience the school of life has to offer. But they return from the army as people who had undergone a school of endurance and discipline, as people who had received technical, professional knowledge and political training."¹⁶

This assessment of the Soviet Army by the party congress as a school of indoctrination raises the responsibility of our military personnel for preparation of highly idealistic and competent defenders of the socialist fatherland even more. This high assessment, points out USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "places many obligations upon commanders, political workers, political organs, and party organizations, and it requires that we organize all indoctrination in such a way that it would promote continual growth of both the political awareness of the soldiers and their professional military proficiency, and the swiftest possible mastery of combat skills. We must consider in this case that the higher general educational and cultural level of the young people now entering the army and navy and their broader interests make it necessary to constantly improve the entire system of personnel ideological-political indoctrination."¹⁷

Another social task of the socialist army is an economic and technical one. For example military builders help erect cultural and personal services facilities, housing, and land reclamation systems, military motor vehicle units participate in agricultural operations, and many soldiers aid in the collection of scrap metal. Military railroaders are doing a significant amount of work in construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline, the greatest construction project of the century. Whenever natural disasters occur, soldiers come to the aid of the population of cities and towns. Rescuing human lives and material valuables, they surmount numerous difficulties and display bravery and valor.

The amount of equipment possessed by the army grew immeasurably during the postwar era, and it is continuing to grow. Specialists of the most diverse areas of technology are trained in the army on a large scale. This is extremely important to both the state's defense capabilities and its national economy. Military servicemen retired into the reserves find broad applications for their technical knowledge and skills.

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Describing the cultural, educational, economic, and technical tasks of the socialist army, we should note once again that they are carried out mainly within the framework of the military's main mission--personnel combat and political training, improvement of military proficiency, and maintenance of high combat readiness.

Thus being an army of a new type, the socialist army lives a single life together with the people. The inseparable, constantly growing unity of the people in the army and exemplary fulfillment of important responsibilities by the soldiers are among the most important prerequisites for successful development of socialism and communism.

3. A Criticism of Bourgeois Conceptions of the Social Nature and Purpose of the Socialist Army

In its ideological struggle against the world of socialism, bourgeois propaganda turns the most persistent attention to the socialist army. Western sociologists understand quite well that socialist armies and their cooperation in combat create a mighty shield for the world socialist system and all anti-imperialist forces. This is why they try to use ideological resources to weaken this shield, to "soften" it, to render it useless, to present the social nature and purpose of the socialist army in distorted form.

Bourgeois sociologists representing the most aggressive and reactionary circles of imperialism lead the ideological attack upon socialism's military policy and military organization. Right-wing and "left-wing" revisionists, including Maoists, essentially side with them and join together with them.

Distortion of the social nature of the socialist army, and primarily the army of the Soviet state, mainly entails ignoring and concealing its socialist content. The apologists of imperialism, recognizing that they have no arguments to support their criticism of the sociopolitical foundations of the socialist army, prefer to even avoid mention of this army as one of a new type. In general the bourgeois literature refuses to make any sort of comments on the conclusions and assessments of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party revealing the essence of our army as an element of the socialist state. Instead, they broadly spread the thesis of its "commonplace nature", its "similarity" to the old Russian army and to armies of developed capitalist countries, including that of the USA, even going as far as deeming them "identical".

Thus on reading the Western press we may encounter the assertion that "the giant war machines of the developed countries are identical"--having in mind the armies of the USA and the USSR. The "truth" of this assertion is as simplistic as it is unscientific--its authors refer to outwardly similar processes and phenomena in the development of the armies of the USA and the USSR: presence of nuclear missiles, mechanization and automation of various processes, presence of similar weapon systems, and so on. These military-technical characteristics are pushed to the forefront and presented as the most profound, decisive characteristics of the armies.

In fact, however, the only real criterion that can be used to determine how similar armies as sociopolitical institutes are, would be their sociopolitical nature, which depends on the nature of the social structure and on the policy and ideology of the

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ruling classes. The propagandists of imperialism carefully avoid this criterion, since were they to use it, they would inevitably have to conclude that there are fundamental differences between the armies of the USA and the USSR, and that they are not only not "identical", but that they are also directly opposite. And it is precisely in the opposite sociopolitical nature of these armies that the reason for different manifestation of outwardly similar factors lies. As an example in the hands of an imperialist army, the U.S. Army in this case, nuclear missiles play an extremely reactionary role, creating an unprecedented threat to mankind. In the hands of our army, meanwhile, they serve as a means for protecting a progressive social structure and peace in all the world, and they are a powerful deterrent to the aggressor.

By "identifying" the armies of the USA and the USSR, Western ideologists try to influence the minds and feelings of people innocent in political respects. In a situation where the U.S. Army has attained the highest point of self-compromise, having conceded for itself the disgraceful glory of world policeman, its "identification" with the army of the Soviet state is an attempt to undermine the authority of the USSR Armed Forces and "rehabilitate" the army of the USA.

As an example in his work "The Elements of Military Conservatism: Traditional and Modern" the Swedish sociologist B. Abrahamsson, though offering some realistic facts indicating conservative trends in the development of modern imperialist armies, loses his sense of reality and objectivity, mechanically ascribing these trends to armies of a qualitative new, socialist type. Declaring that he sees no differences between bourgeois and socialist armies, Abrahamsson contrives to prove "similarity" between the Czarist army and the Soviet Armed Forces. The Swedish sociologist offered the following "arguments" as his "proof": presence of officer ranks, officer's clubs, and Suvorov military schools in the Soviet Armed Forces, and other openly biased "proofs".

It is clear to every unprejudiced individual how different are the goals of bourgeois and socialist armies, and how opposite their roles are in world social development. But imperialist ideologists want nothing to do with the objective realities, and they are in no way embarrassed by the obvious inconsistency between their declarations and the facts of history.

Falsifying the social nature of socialist armed forces, bourgeois ideologists attack the nature and principles of their mutual relationships with the state, the people, and especially the Communist Party. Thus one of the favorite tactics of Western military Sovietologists is to contrast the positions taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet state in issues concerning armed forces leadership. But such a contrast is totally unfounded. The CPSU is the leading and guiding force of all socialist society, including its army. However, exercising leadership over the armed forces, the Communist Party does not usurp state control over the armed forces. After all, the USSR Armed Forces are an organ of the Soviet state intended to perform the function of protecting the socialist fatherland. The USSR Constitution states that the government must insure the security and defense capabilities of the country, and supply everything necessary to the USSR Armed Forces.

Distorting the nature of our army, bourgeois and reformist ideologists try to treat the role of armed violence in the CPSU's policy of restructuring the society as absolute, thus discrediting the party, its doctrine, and its communist ideals.

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Marxism-Leninism does not deny the need for using the army to fight the bourgeoisie in the course of development of a new society, and the experience of history confirms this need. However, this need stems not from the nature of communism but from the concrete historic conditions in which the new structure is developing, from the fact of existence of aggressive imperialist forces, and from the fact that the enemies of socialism refuse to abandon their attempt at undermining the foundations of socialist state rule by the force of arms, interrupt socialist transformation of the society, and regain power. As we saw earlier, from the perspective of history the socialist army is performing a relatively temporary task, one of objective necessity. Once aggressive imperialist forces are eliminated from the world, the need for a socialist army will fall away. Meanwhile construction and development of a new communist formation will continue, and the struggle for the triumph of the great ideals of Marxism-Leninism will go on. It will be waged by all laborers, by all national organizations. Thus even this thesis of the bourgeois ideologists is unfounded.

Attempting to find fault with our army, the apologists of imperialism call it a "caste army"--that is, they once again try to ascribe traits inherent to a bourgeois army to it. This fabrication is also refuted by life, by the facts. The personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces fully reflect the social structure of Soviet society. Here are persuasive figures which bourgeois ideologists carefully avoid: More than 56 percent of Soviet soldiers presently in active service worked in industry, transportation, and construction before joining the army, about 30 percent worked in agriculture, and more than 15 percent are representatives of white collar workers, students, and so on. The officer corps is also inseparably tied with the people. Any citizen of the USSR possessing the required political-moral and working qualities can become a Soviet officer. The results of a certain sociological survey conducted in the troops produced a typical pattern. Many junior officers in different branches of the armed forces were interviewed. Their social origins turned out to be as follows: laborers and office workers--82.5 percent, kolkhoz farmers--17.5 percent. Among those interviewed, there were representatives of almost all nationalities making up the population of the USSR. About a third had served previously as privates and sergeants. Similar data typify all categories of offices. Therefore there can be no discussion of "caste" attributes in our army, or in any other socialist army.

Bourgeois ideologists do everything to falsify the historic purpose and function of socialist armed forces. Thus the Soviet state, and consequently its army, are pictured by them as a permanent "apparatus of violence" supporting the "internal domination" of one class. Right-wing revisionist theorists essentially stand on similar positions. R. Garaudy for example, distorting the true position of the army in developed socialist society in the USSR, promotes the fabricated, slanderous thesis that the Soviet Army may "interfere in the affairs of the society".¹⁸

All of these assertions are totally absurd. Attempts to distort the domestic function of the socialist army and to say that it performs this function in the stage of developed socialism are falsifications of the realities. A domestic function is a permanent attribute of the bourgeois army, and it remains present throughout the entire history of such an army. On the other hand the internal function of a socialist army, which is entirely different in content and orientation, is temporary and transitory.

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Bourgeois falsifiers do everything they can to distort the true meaning of the socialist army's foreign function as well. Unable to make peace with the continually growing power of the socialist state, and especially the Soviet Union, and with the unrestrainable growth of the influence of socialist ideals, and trying to justify the aggressive acts of their own foreign policy, imperialists and their apologists attach the "aggressiveness" label to socialist countries. In order to create the appearance of likelihood, they speculate on the defensive measures implemented by socialist states. Western propagandists tried to frighten the public of their countries with the myth of "the USSR's aggressiveness", of "Red militarism", which had been fabricated in Kautskiy's time, caught up by defeated White Guards, and then resurrected on a new foundation by the rulers of fascist Germany with the purpose of "justifying" a war against the USSR.

That an anticommunist ideological campaign is proceeding is no accident. It has the purpose of whitewashing the numerous crimes of imperialism and its policy of aggression, and casting a shadow upon the policy of states in the socialist fraternity--a deeply humanitarian, consistently peace-loving policy reflecting the interests of all laborers.

The bugaboo of "a Soviet threat" has been taken up by the Maoists. They are spreading the false notion that the USSR supposedly wants to "attack China". Maoists are doing this in order to cover up their chauvinistic, hegemonic course.

Fabrications of a "Soviet threat", of "Red militarism" have long been refuted by the entire course of historic development. Militarism and aggressiveness are the attributes of imperialism, and not socialism. They are the natural satellites of imperialism, ones associated with its nature and its essence. Monopolist capitalism, Lenin wrote, "is distinguished in terms of its fundamental economic properties by the lowest level of respect for peace and freedom, and the greatest and most universal development of militarism."¹⁹ Lenin's conclusion is fully confirmed by today's conditions. Therefore all assertions as to the aggressiveness of the USSR, other fraternal socialist countries, and their armies are monstrous lies.

The socialist army has been in existence for six decades. This is not a usual military organization. It is an army of an entirely new type, differing fundamentally from the armies of exploiting states. It reflects the nature of the new, socialist social and state structure. It serves the interests of a just, progressive cause, and it is the defender of the interests of socialism and the laborers. The armies of fraternal socialist countries stand as a united front in opposition to the forces of aggression and reaction, they insure development of socialism and communism within the states of the socialist fraternity, they facilitate the struggle of the peoples of other countries for national liberty and social progress, and they defend the security of all mankind.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 269.
2. Frunze, M. V., "Izbr. proizv." [Selected Works], p 330.
3. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, pp 76-77.

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4. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 200.
5. See "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1968, p 158.
6. See Ibid., p 159.
7. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 76.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 43, p 230.
9. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stati" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 256.
10. See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 2, p 539; Vol 7, p 518.
11. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 35, p 216.
12. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 12, p 113.
13. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], pp 23-24.
14. Ibid., p 111.
15. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz," p 111.
16. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 75-76.
17. KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1977, p 15.
18. Garaudy, R., "Toute la verite," Paris, 1970, p 13.
19. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 37, p 248.

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CHAPTER XX

MILITARY COOPERATION AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The historic duel between the forces of progress and reaction, between socialism and imperialism in the world arena is accompanied by deepening internationalization of all spheres of social life, including the military. As the international front of the liberation struggle expands and more and more new peoples assume the path of socialism, imperialism's resistance is transforming from national to international. The enemies of peace and socialism are trying to unify their efforts on an international scale; this includes integrating the military-economic power of the imperialist states. Close economic, ideological, political, and military unification of the socialist countries has vitally important significance to protection of socialism's achievements in the evolved conditions. The International Conference of Communists and Workers Parties (1969) noted that "the successes of socialism, its influence upon the course of world events, and the effectiveness of its struggle against imperialist aggression depend to a significant degree on the unity of the socialist countries. Unity of actions of the countries of socialism is an important factor of unification of all anti-imperialist forces."¹

1. The Objective Necessity and Foundations of the Military Unity of Socialist Countries.

That the socialist structure will emerge victorious over the capitalist system in all the world has not only been proven theoretically. This victory is evident in practical respects as well. The theoretical premises of the law of revolutionary replacement of capitalism by socialism have clearly materialized themselves in the arising and development of the world socialist system. Formation of a world socialist system is a qualitatively new level of the revolutionary process started by Great October. "Development of the socialist countries, growth in their power, and intensification of the beneficial influence of their international policy," emphasizes the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "are what now make up the main direction of mankind's social progress."² Warriors for social and national liberation of peoples in other regions of the globe have also achieved major successes.

As we know, the old does not give way without a fight. By its nature, the main contradiction of modern times--that between socialism and imperialism--represents mainly a struggle between the new and the old in the development of history. The new usually arises in objective reality as something apart. But in the struggle

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with the old, it affirms itself, becomes special, and later on it becomes common. The inevitability of the new, of the revolutionary is a law of historic development.

Imperialism is making hopeless attempts at blocking the action of this law. All of its postwar policy is based on the desire to weaken the positions of socialism by any means, suppress the national liberation movement of peoples, hinder the struggle of laborers in capitalist countries, and delay the irreversible fall of capitalism. The force factor is given a special role in this. Atomic blackmail, creation of military bases around the USSR and other socialist countries, armed intervention, and the use of economic resources to enslave the people make up the postwar political course of imperialist reaction, which has come to be called a policy "from the position of strength". A little time following the end of World War II, which brought uncountable woes and sufferings to the people, the most reactionary officials of imperialist camps initiated a propaganda campaign on a third world war, representing it as something "necessary" and "unavoidable".

The militants realized that the predatory war they were planning against the world socialist system would be impossible without unifying their efforts, and therefore they took desperate steps to turn public opinion in favor of creating aggressive imperialist military blocs. Using all resources at their disposal, they began leaching out, from the consciousness of the people, their tendencies of antifascism and liberation, their feelings of sympathy and friendship toward the Soviet Union, and their desire to continue their cooperation with it, and to act together with it in the struggle for a lasting, sound peace. Creation of the myth of a "Soviet threat" was selected as one of the means for swaying public opinion to the side of militancy.

In a regrettably famous speech on 5 March 1946 in the city of Fulton (USA), W. Churchill appealed to Anglo-Saxon countries to create a ring of forces--political, economic, and military--around the Soviet Union and countries of peoples democracy³--that is, to form an aggressive military-political bloc of imperialist states in opposition to them. The idea of a "crusade" against socialism transformed into the leitmotif of the official statements by the then American President Truman and by other government officials of the USA. Spelling out his "doctrine" in a message to Congress on 12 March 1947, Truman hypocritically declared that it was the USA's obligation to "help free peoples support their free institutions and national integrity in the face of aggressive movements attempting to impose totalitarian regimes upon them."⁴

The malicious fabrication of a "Soviet threat", which even its authors did not believe, believe, was dissminated worldwide through the efforts of the politicians and "academic servants" of imperialism. Under the cover of the noise it raised, American imperialism tangled many countries of the capitalist world in a web of foreign "obligations", acquiring the right to use their territory for military purposes. By offering loans, selling weapons, participating in development of armed forces, and supporting reactionary regimes, American imperialists created a situation in which Washington began to significantly influence the policies and control the economies, material resources, and armies of many of its allies.

A concentrated expression of the imperialist conceptions of anticommunism and the policy of dealing "from a position of strength" was the North Atlantic pact signed

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on 4 April 1949 by 12 states--NATO. This is the most powerful aggressive grouping in imperialism's history, making up the core of the entire system of imperialist alliances. Creation of the North Atlantic military bloc opened up a new stage in the cold war, and it marked a transition by imperialist states to the most menacing form of confrontation--the arms race and provocations of armed conflicts. In September 1954 imperialism created a military bloc in Southeast Asia--SEATO, and in 1955 it created the so-called Baghdad Pact, renamed CENTO in March 1959 (following Iraq's withdrawal); other blocs were created as well. The aggressiveness of imperialism and mainly of its principal military coalition--NATO--increased even more when treaties signed on 23 October 1954 at the 14th NATO Session in Paris opened the doors of the North Atlantic pact to the FRG. A course toward militarization of West Germany and its transformation into the forward springboard of NATO was assumed. A serious threat to peace was created in the center of Europe.

A great mission rose up before the world socialist system--eliminating the real danger of a new world war, saving the peace, and insuring the security of its own and all other peoples.

A policy of independence and isolation in solution of international problems, especially those associated with peace and with the struggle against aggression, is alien to the socialist countries. Socialist nations are opposed to dividing the world into military unions and blocs. As a counterweight to the reactionary course of imperialist powers, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have continued to successively implement their peace-loving foreign policy, and actively fight for consolidation of the peace, disarmament, prohibition of mass destruction weapons, and creation of an extensive system of collective security.

At the same time, facing a real military danger from the capitalist camp, they have constantly displayed concern for strengthening their own defense capabilities and raising the combat readiness of their armies. The signing of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between socialist states played a major role in this. However, because of the growing military threat of imperialism, bilateral treaties between socialist states soon became inadequate. The collective actions of the socialist states of Europe were needed to repel the united forces of aggression concentrated mainly in the NATO imperialist bloc. On 14 May 1955 the multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed in Warsaw. It was signed by the heads of government of eight European socialist countries.⁵ Creation of this defensive organization was an objective necessity, a forced response by the socialist states to the growing threat to their security on the part of the NATO imperialist bloc.

The threat to the security of the socialist fraternity is still present today. Forces of aggression, militarism, revenge, racism, Zionism, neocolonialism, and various forms of neofascism exist in the capitalist world and are operating actively today. The total strength of NATO armed forces is about 5 million men. Expenditures by imperialist states on preparation of the material base of war continue to increase. Group exercises called upon to show the "muscle" of NATO are held regularly. As a result of the actions of imperialist reaction an explosive situation remains in different regions of the planet, military conflicts, incidents, and provocations arise, and conspiracies are organized.

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All of this requires the communist parties and peoples of the socialist countries to keep their defense of revolutionary achievements strong.

In today's situation, close military unity of the socialist states acquires special meaningfulness and importance. This can be explained mainly by the fact that in a situation where the world of socialism is opposed by the united front of imperialism, which possesses the latest weapons, including nuclear weapons, the socialist countries can make the most effective use of their possibilities for defending the revolutionary achievements of the peoples only if they rely on close military-political unity. The defensive power, the nuclear missile shield of the Soviet Union--the most powerful state in the brotherly family of countries in the socialist fraternity--is a guarantee of the protection of all socialist countries. There is no doubt that imperialism would have attempted long ago to implement its aggressive designs over the entire planet, had not an insurmountable obstacle--the power of the world's first socialist country--stood in its way. "There is no unprejudiced person in the world who would not recognize," said Comrade Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee at the 10th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, "that mankind is not engulfed by the flame of a new world war, that imperialism cannot coarsely impose its will upon recently liberated countries, and that socialist countries are successfully creating a new life owing to the Soviet Union, owing to the Red giant that has taken a stand at its full height over one-sixth of the globe, a strong, peace-loving power of brotherly generosity, ready to come to the aid of any nation fighting for its liberty and independence, for a better life."⁶

The military unity of the socialist states is also vitally important because a new world war, were the enemies of peace and socialism to unleash it, would be a coalition war, a duel between the forces of socialism and imperialism on a global scale. This would require the countries of the socialist fraternity to achieve economic, political, and military-technical unity while still at peace.

This means that we cannot insure the security of all countries of the socialist fraternity in the present international situation only by having each exercise its right to individual self-defense. Their exercise of the right of collective self-defense--that is, of unification of the efforts of peace-loving socialist states on the basis of equality and sovereignty for the purposes of joint restraint of the aggressor--is an indispensable prerequisite for averting imperialist aggression and protecting dependably against it. As the experience of history has shown, the most suitable form of military-political alliance of countries in the socialist fraternity is the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Having arisen in response to causes external to world socialism, the Warsaw Pact reflects the internal essence of the socialist socioeconomic formations. This defensive organization of socialist states is an embodiment of the social and international nature of socialism, and the highest manifestation of the unity of international and national objectives of fraternal peoples in their efforts to protect their achievement against the intrigues of international reaction.

The Warsaw Pact differs fundamentally from imperialist military blocs in terms of its origin, essence, nature, and the principles lying at the basis of the relations among the members, as well as in its functions and its objective role in historic progress. These differences are as follows.

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First, as with other military coalitions of imperialism, the NATO military bloc is an aggressive military union intended to fight forces responsible for social progress, and mainly world socialism.

The Warsaw Pact is a truly defensive organization. As was emphasized above, its creation was a response to the arisal and intensification of the direct military danger from imperialist states. Socialist countries participating in the Warsaw Pact threaten no one. They joined together in a military alliance in order to protect the achievements of socialism, and the freedom and independence of their peoples, and to strengthen peace in Europe and in all the world. The pact states that the member countries of this organization will implement "coordinated measures necessary to strengthen their defense capabilities so as to promote protection of the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territory, and insure defense against possible aggression."⁷ The defensive nature of the military union of fraternal countries is also distinctly and obviously evident from another highly important tenet of the pact, stating that "in the event of an armed attack in Europe upon one or several members of the pact by some other states or a group of states, every member of the pact, exercising its right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will provide immediate assistance to the state or states subjected to such an attack, individually and on agreement with other members of the pact, and with all resources deemed necessary, to include the use of armed force."⁸ These actions by the defensive Warsaw Pact would be deeply revolutionary and just, because they would be aimed at defeating an aggressor. Consequently the Warsaw Pact is an implement for averting war, an instrument for preserving peace. Its power is aimed against forces generating aggression and war. "This pact," noted the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "dependably serves the interests of peace and socialism."⁹

Second, the military blocs of imperialism are closed military coalitions. NATO, for example, will not admit countries whose policies are not in keeping with its aggressive aims. It is no accident that the Soviet Union's proposal in 1954 to consider its participation in the North Atlantic Alliance placed the organizers of this bloc in a difficult situation. Had the leaders of NATO in fact wanted to transform this military-political alliance into "an instrument of peace and control of disarmament", as is volunteered so readily in official statements, there would have been no objections to the Soviet proposal.

The Warsaw Pact is open to other countries, irrespective of their social and state structure, to all who strive for peace and the collective security of nations. The general democratic legal principles and norms making up the basis of the relations among Warsaw Pact members would be acceptable to any state interested in universal peace.

In turn, the countries of the Warsaw Pact have expressed their readiness to participate, in a spirit of sincere cooperation, in all international acts having the purpose of insuring international peace and security:

Third, the North Atlantic military alliance is not in keeping with the UN Charter. NATO members do not believe the Security Council to be the sole organ which, according to the UN Charter, bears the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The USA and the North Atlantic military alliance it

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created, ignoring this premise, have "imposed" the "responsibility" for maintaining universal peace and security upon themselves, using their own forces and methods. They "awarded" themselves the authority to use armed forces against states and movements arbitrarily declared to be aggressive, ones which do not in reality create any sort of danger to peace. The executive organs of NATO and other aggressive imperialist military blocs, usurping the rights of a universal international organization and ignoring Article 51 of the UN Charter, are attempting to strike the revolutionary forces of modern times under the guise of a struggle against the violators of international peace and security.

The Warsaw Pact does not infringe upon the rights and authorities of the UN Security Council. Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact states that all measures that are undertaken by its participants in the exercise of their right to self-defense would be reported to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. These measures would be halted as soon as the Security Council takes the steps necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. In other words, we should emphasize once again, the provisions of the Warsaw Pact concerning the exercise of the rights of states for self-defense against aggression are fully in keeping with the spirit and letter of the UN Charter.

Fourth, the aggressive imperialist military blocs are typified by the unequal status of their members, by domination of the stronger over the weaker, and by the tendency for the imperialist officials of one country to resolve strictly national issues in the interests of the partners in the bloc. And this is understandable, since open plunder of the weak is the essence of international relations under capitalism.¹⁰

But Marxists-Leninists are far from ignoring the fact that imperialist military blocs have been in existence for a long time as a unified structure, and that the struggle within them is often overshadowed by the common aim of opposing world socialism and other modern revolutionary forces.

The fighting military-political alliance of countries in the socialist fraternity is free of internal antagonisms. It organically unites the interests of each of its participants with the common interests, and there is a clearly pronounced tendency for continual growth in the unity of states in the socialist fraternity.

The strength and inviolability of the defensive Warsaw Pact and its advantages over imperialist military coalitions stem from the fact that it possesses sound socio-political, economic, ideological, and military-strategic foundations.

The sociopolitical foundation of the indestructible combat union of fraternal socialist countries derives from the uniformity of their social and state structure. Socialist countries are continually developing on the road of social progress. Their peoples have become persuaded of the advantages of the socialist structure from their own experience. Further reinforcement and development of socialism and of the power of the laborers headed by the working class, and protection of socialist achievements against the transgressions of imperialism are vitally important tasks of the laborers, the collective peasantry, and the labor intelligentsia of the socialist countries. Unity of class interests and aims generates unity of will: the will to build socialism together, to defend it together.

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The economic foundation of the Warsaw Pact derives from socialist public ownership of the resources of production. Being the basis for eliminating exploiting classes and, consequently, class antagonisms in society, public ownership on an international scale serves as the material foundation for establishment of the relations of mutual trust, friendship, and mutual assistance between socialist countries. In distinction from imperialist economic alliances, which are an instrument of subordination of some states by others, socialist economic integration is based on mutual advantage and socialist internationalism. It multiplies the advantages of socialism and creates optimum conditions for further division of labor, specialization of production sectors, growth of new types of production responsible for modern scientific-technical progress, for concentration and expansion of production, and for equalization of the levels of economic and cultural development in the socialist countries.

The advantages of the socialist economic system and the principles and methods of socialist economic cooperation permit us to collectively raise the defense capabilities of the fighting union, and to develop and implement a commonly agreed upon military-technical policy.

The ideological foundation of the military unity of the socialist countries derives from Marxism-Leninism. The most important source of Marxism-Leninism's invincible power lies in the fact that it embodies proletarian internationalism at its core. Marxist-Leninist ideology consistently expresses the unity of the fundamental interests of the working class and all laborers, irrespective of their nationality. Assimilation of Marxist-Leninist ideology affords national detachments of the working class and all laborers the possibility for realizing the importance of their class unity and of rejection of all manifestations of nationalism--this mortal enemy of the revolutionary cause. Assimilation of Marxist-Leninist ideology also permits the peoples of socialist countries to penetrate with deep understanding into the premise that joint armed defense of socialism is an objective necessity.

The military-strategic foundation of the Warsaw Pact derives from the unity of military-strategic viewpoints on collective defense of socialism based on the ideas of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and on defense of the socialist fatherland, and on the achievements of progressive socialist military science.

Thus the military unity of socialist states and their economic, sociopolitical, ideological, and military-strategic foundations are objective, natural factors.

2. The Principles of Military Cooperation and the Functions of the Warsaw Pact

The objective conditions for continual reinforcement of the unity of states in the socialist fraternity in all of its aspects, including military, are being realized successfully owing to the political and organizational activities of the Marxist-Leninist parties of the fraternal countries. "The main foundation of our close cooperation, its living spirit, and its guiding, organizing power," emphasized the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "is, of course, the inviolable fighting union of the communist parties of the socialist countries, the unity of their philosophy, the unity of their goals, and the unity of their will."¹¹ The communist parties are constantly applying their effort to make sure that the world socialist system would be a friendly family of

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peoples building and defending a new society together and mutually enriching one another with their experience and knowledge, a close-knit and strong family in which all people would see the prototype of a future world community of free nations. The communist parties, their collective wisdom and unbending will, and their organizing and guiding role are the power which created the defensive Warsaw Pact and which is constantly strengthening it. Leadership of the development of socialism and communism, and of the defense of the laborers' revolutionary achievements, by the Marxist-Leninist parties is the life source, the guarantee of continual development and consolidation of the unity of fraternal countries and their armies on the permanent foundation of Lenin's principles of socialist internationalism.

The most important of these principles is class proletarian solidarity. It is based on the unity of interests and aims of the working class and all laborers of different countries in the struggle for their social and national liberation, for defense of their revolutionary achievements, and for the security of socialist states.

Marx made it the legacy of the communists "to see that workers of different countries would not only feel but also act as brothers and comrades fighting for their liberation within a single army."¹² Developing the teaching of Marx and Engels on proletarian solidarity in imperialist conditions, Lenin justified the need for a close military union of all national detachments of the working class, and of all peoples assuming the path of socialism. "...standing opposite the enormous front of imperialist powers," Lenin noted, "we who are fighting against imperialism represent a union requiring close military cohesion, and we interpret all attempts at disturbing this cohesion as completely impermissible phenomena, as betrayal of the interests of the fight against international imperialism.... We say that unity of armed forces is necessary, and deviation from this unity is impermissible."¹³

Having joined together into a single Soviet state, the peoples of our motherland acquired invincible, unprecedented strength. They defeated the White Guard and foreign interventionist troops down to the last man, even though the imperialist powers--the organizers and participants of the "crusade" against the young Soviet republic--possessed incomparably greater economic and specifically military potentials. The duel with the most dangerous enemy of mankind--Nazi fascism--also graphically demonstrated the great, insurmountable power of the fraternal union of the peoples of the USSR. Through their joint efforts they defended their liberty and independence and their revolutionary achievements, and they won a victory of world historic proportions.

The difficult trials of World War II are fresh in the memory of mankind. Because there was no collective system of security in Europe, Hitler's army was able to seize almost all western countries of this continent--individually, they could not stand up against the fascist war machine. The destruction of Nazism and liberation of the sacrifices of fascist aggression cost the people dearly, especially the people of the Soviet Union, who carried the main burden of the struggle against the darkest forces of imperialist reaction. The laborers of countries in the socialist fraternity made the proper conclusions from these lessons of history. They put their efforts together to protect their socialist achievements.

The communist parties of the Warsaw Pact countries are constantly improving the pact's mechanism and organizational structure. Establishment, by decision of the Budapest Conference (in March 1969), of the Political Consultative Committee under the Committee

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of Ministers of Defense to develop coordinated recommendations and proposals on strengthening the defense capabilities of the allied countries and raising the combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces was an important stage in reinforcement of our military cooperation. A new statute on the Combined Armed Forces and the Combined Command, and other important documents were approved at the same conference. The Military Council and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces were created.

The plans for developing national armed forces and raising their combat readiness are coordinated upon jointly. All armies of the Warsaw Pact members use their readiness to perform their patriotic and international duty in defense of their state and other countries of the Warsaw Pact as the criterion of their battleworthiness.

There is constant mutual assistance in supplying the fraternal armies with new military equipment and weapons, and in assimilating them. The Combined Armed Forces possess top-class weapons. They have modern missiles, armored equipment, aviation, anti-aircraft complexes, and warships of various classes at their disposal. The USSR's nuclear missile power stands guard over the security of the states of the socialist fraternity.

Capitalization upon the advantages of international socialist division of labor, specialization and cooperation in defense industry, long-range plans for development of weapons and military equipment, and coordination of scientific research and experimental design efforts to improve available armament and create new resources of war are acquiring increasingly greater significance in the production of military equipment and weapons, and in their supply to the allied armies.

Socialist military science is developing, and unified viewpoints on the nature of a possible war and its strategy are being worked out through joint efforts. As a result of cooperation in military science, the armies of the socialist fraternity have adopted common important standards, and manuals, regulations, and instructions agreeing in their basic premises. Such community is also typical of the military doctrines of the fraternal socialist states, which have absorbed the rich combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and other friendly armies.

The general principles and methods of developing the armed forces and training the troops and staffs are being introduced into practice. Experience in combat and operational training, in personnel training, and in indoctrination of the personnel in the spirit of socialist internationalism is being exchanged extensively for this purpose. Extensive mutual assistance in the training of military specialists has been organized.

The Combined Command regularly conducts exercises to work out various problems in the joint actions of the troops and staffs. Conferences of the executives of fraternal armies, operational meetings of representatives of different branches of the armed forces, scientific conferences, and mutual consultation meetings, at which the results of the combat and political training of troops and naval forces are summarized and new tasks are determined, and at which a creative exchange of opinions and experience in military development occurs, are organized.

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Close business ties with political organs and systematic exchange of experience in party-political work have important significance to the continual reinforcement of combat cooperation among the fraternal armies.

Joint exercises conducted according to plans of the command of the Combined Armed Forces play a great role in strengthening the fighting power of the Warsaw Pact. Interaction between arms and services, branches of troops, and naval forces of the allied countries is practiced, their combat proficiency is increased, the potentials of the weapons and military equipment are tested, and the international brotherhood of soldiers of the armies of different Warsaw Pact countries grows stronger on the exercise field, in the air, and at sea. Exercises such as "Brotherhood in Arms", "Shield-76", and others have been a remarkable school of personnel field training, a school for improving the organizational capabilities of commanders and staffs, and their abilities to control the troops in the course of dynamic combat activities. Joint combat training and mutual assistance and support in the difficult conditions of the exercises bring the people closer together, strengthen their feeling of togetherness, raise their confidence in their brothers in arms, and promote indoctrination of the soldiers in the spirit of international friendship.

The functions of the defensive Warsaw Pact are also based on the principle of equality of its members. Unity through equality--this is how Lenin interpreted the dialectics of the true solution to the national question, of establishment of relationships of friendship and brotherhood among nations. Faithful to Lenin's commandments, the fraternal communist parties of the socialist countries view equality as a prerequisite of all unity, including military unity.

Warsaw Pact organs--the Political Consultative Committee, the Committee of Ministers of Defense, the Military Council and Headquarters of the Combined Armed Forces, and the Technical Committee--were created and now function on the basis of the principle of equality. All states participating in this defensive organization are represented in these organs. The decisions of all organs of the defensive organization of the fraternal countries are mutually coordinated upon, and unanimously adopted.

Men and equipment placed into the composition of the Combined Armed Forces as agreed upon by the members remain under the direct leadership of the national defense ministers in peacetime.

The unity of socialist patriotism and internationalism is an important principle in the activities of fraternal communist and workers parties aimed at strengthening the Warsaw Pact. Patriotism and internationalism are in deep organic unity in socialist society. The highest patriotic duty of peoples in fraternal countries is the development of socialism and communism, and their defense. And inasmuch as this duty is common to all, it also becomes international. This is why socialist patriotism and internationalism exist in inseparable unity. Developing the love of the Soviet people for their fatherland, the CPSU believes that with formation of the world socialist system, the patriotism of the citizens of socialist society reveals itself in their devotion and faithfulness to their motherland and to the entire fraternity of socialist countries.

Other armies of states in the socialist fraternity are also built and nurtured in the spirit of the unity of patriotism and internationalism. For example the communists of the GDR and the German peoples state itself believe the main mission of their National Peoples Army to be that of defending the state borders of the German

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Democratic Republic and of the allied socialist states jointly with the Soviet Army and with other fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact. "We will continue to devote due attention to strengthening our common political and defensive organization," declared Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany at the Ninth Party Congress.¹⁴

The greatest achievement of the CPSU and other brotherly parties of the socialist fraternity is development of a soldier of a new type--a patriot and an internationalist. "Our army," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "has been raised in the spirit of deep devotion to the socialist motherland, the ideals of peace and internationalism, and the ideals of friendship among peoples. It is precisely in this that the Soviet Army differs from bourgeois armies. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet people love their army, and are proud of it."¹⁵ Soviet soldiers honorably perform their patriotic and international duty. Standing shoulder to shoulder with their brothers in class and their brothers in arms, they alertly stand a combat watch at the forward edge of the socialist fraternity--on the territory of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. And wherever they are, the sons and grandsons of those who forged the victory of fascism in the Great Patriotic War are honorably bearing the exalted title of soldier of the army of liberation, of the army of patriots-internationalists. The noble feeling of international responsibility elicits an influx of new strength in the Soviet people and their soldiers, and encourages them to acts of heroism in their daily labor.

The principle of correct combination of international and national interests in defense of socialism has great significance to consolidation of the Warsaw Pact. Lenin believed this principle to be the central issue in the internationalistic policy of every communist party. The fact is that on one hand, there can be no discussion of fulfilling international responsibilities apart from the struggle for fundamental national interests. And on the other hand national interests cannot be satisfied unless the general, international tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat are realized. Successful resolution of this problem would be possible only on the basis of a class approach, on the basis of the consideration and expression of class interests of the proletariat and laborers of all countries. Only a class approach permits us to interpret national interests as a part of the whole world revolutionary process, causing us to understand the need for placing priority on international interests. This principle is expressed by communist and workers parties through the well known slogan: "The defense of socialism is the international duty of communists".¹⁶

The signing of the Warsaw Pact was fully compatible with the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of allied states, and noninterference in their internal affairs.

The fraternal communist parties are persuasively exposing imperialism's malicious fabrication that cooperation of a socialist country in the Warsaw Pact supposedly means infringement upon its national sovereignty.

As with the highest type of state sovereignty, socialist sovereignty derives from the essence of the socialist state, from the international nature of the world socialist system, and from the relations existing between socialist countries, based on the principles of socialist internationalism and true equality. The sovereignty

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of a socialist state means, first of all, its right to follow the socialist path and to protect its revolutionary achievements. "Our experience makes it undebatably clear that a socialist state can retain its sovereignty only on the condition that the working class, headed by the Communist Party, remains strong and insurmountable, and its power remains invincible," said Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Comrade G. Husak at the 24th CPSU Congress. "And if this power is seriously threatened by counterrevolution, the very sovereignty of a socialist state finding itself dependent on imperialism may itself thus be threatened."¹⁷ The Warsaw Pact does not restrict socialist sovereignty. On the contrary it is a dependable guarantee of the sovereignty and security of countries in the socialist fraternity.

Communist parties of the socialist fraternity decisively refute all attempts at "justifying" the needlessness of the Warsaw Pact and at identifying the aggressive military blocs of imperialist states with the defensive union of the socialist countries.

Bourgeois and revisionist ideologists assert that inasmuch as NATO and the Warsaw Pact are military-political alliances, they intensify international tension to an identical degree. This is another lie. It is unnatural to place the aggressive NATO bloc and the defensive Warsaw Pact in the same bag. The fundamental differences existing between them were discussed above in detail. Militant circles in the NATO states are the ones trying to intensify international tension, and not the participants of the Warsaw Pact. This is why the responsibility for torpedoing detente as a whole is borne totally by these circles, and by only them.

As far as the existence itself of the Warsaw Pact is concerned, we should once again emphasize that its existence is a forced reaction. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress: "We decisively oppose both division of the world into opposing military blocs and the arms race. Our position is well known on this account. But we must make it fully clear that as long as the NATO bloc persists, and as long as militant circles continue the arms race, our country and other participants of the Warsaw Pact will continue to strengthen this military-political union."¹⁸

The brotherly parties and governments of countries in the socialist fraternity discredit the nationalistic course of "relying on one's own strength". The CPSU teaches that a course of isolated development of socialism, apart from the world fraternity of socialist countries, is wrong in theoretical respects because it contradicts the objective laws of development of socialist society. It is harmful to economic relations inasmuch as it means dispersal of social labor, decrease in the rate of production growth, and the country's dependence upon the capitalist world. It is reactionary and dangerous in political respects, since it separates rather than unifies the people in the face of the united front of imperialist forces, it feeds bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies, and in the end it may cause the loss of socialist achievements.

Rejecting revisionist and nationalistic conceptions, the fraternal communist parties and socialist states are developing and defending the new society on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism. Questions associated with reinforcing the defense capabilities of the Soviet state and the socialist fraternity as a whole

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occupy a special place in the multifaceted activity of our party. The CPSU is constantly concerned with making sure that every step of the Soviet motherland on the road of peaceful development would concurrently mean a higher level in its defense capabilities and in the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces in the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The need for constantly increasing and improving defense capability and for being in a position to perform the duties of a member of the Warsaw Pact is stated as a priority task of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria in the program documents of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Comrade Todor Zhivkov once again confirmed at the 11th Congress that the Bulgarian Communist Party "has always acted and will continue to act in the interests of even greater unification of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, and reinforcement of the main political and military alliance of countries in the socialist fraternity--the Warsaw Pact."¹⁹

Other fraternal parties also offer a high assessment of military-political cooperation involved within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Thus documents of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party have noted several times that Hungary is fully resolved to continue performing its responsibilities as a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The party program adopted at the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany states: "Together with the fraternal parties, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany will make its contribution to reinforcement and development of the Warsaw Pact as the principal area of coordination of security policy and the military policy of states in the socialist fraternity."²⁰

Speaking at the Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party Comrade E. Gierek said that the Polish Peoples Army "will continue to improve itself as a dependable guard of the motherland's soldiers, and an unshakeable component of the socialist defensive alliance--the Warsaw Pact...."²¹

The importance of developing cooperative relations between socialist states in the Warsaw Pact and between the armies of these states is discussed in documents of the Romanian Communist Party.

The need for constantly reinforcing comprehensive, including military, cooperation among countries of the socialist fraternity is emphasized in documents of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

The Marxist-Leninist parties, governments, and peoples of the allied countries are strengthening their unity, they are raising their revolutionary alertness, and they are constantly concerned with improving collective defense on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism.

Subordinating all of their activities to the interests of social progress, peace, and the security of nations, the Warsaw Pact performs a number of functions.

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The main function of the Warsaw Pact is protection of socialism against imperialist aggression.

The firm and resolute position of the Warsaw Pact members has had a sobering influence upon imperialist aggressors many times, forcing them to abandon reactionary designs. With the brotherly assistance of the Soviet Union, the Hungarian people crushed an imperialist-inspired counterrevolutionary mutiny against socialist achievements in the Hungarian Peoples Republic in 1956. In 1961, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies forestalled military provocations being prepared by imperialism against the GDR with the purpose of doing away with the first socialist state on German soil. Assistance provided by five socialist states to the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia, where in 1968 socialism found itself threatened by the actions of international and internal reaction, was a clear manifestation of proletarian internationalism. Once again the counterrevolution failed. "The entry of allied troops representing five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of international solidarity, satisfying both the common interests of Czechoslovak laborers and the interests of the international working class, the socialist fraternity, and the class interests of the international communist movement. This international act saved the lives of thousands of people, insured adequate internal and external conditions for peaceful labor, strengthened the western borders of the socialist camp, and destroyed the hopes of imperialist circles for reconsidering the results of World War II"²²--such was the assessment given to the fraternal assistance of the socialist countries by a plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee in its document "The Lessons of Crisis Development".

Performing their international duty, the Warsaw Pact states have rendered full assistance to the heroic Vietnamese people for many years in their just struggle against American aggressors and their Saigon puppets. The heroism of the Vietnamese patriots, multiplied by socialist solidarity and by the broad assistance provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, led to the victory of the Vietnamese people over the forces of imperialist aggression.

Bourgeois politicians and ideologists do not conceal the fact that attempts at subverting the socialist fraternity from without or from within, by military or by "peaceful" means, is less promising today than ever before. The experience of history teaches us that the fraternal unity of the socialist countries is the most dependable barrier in the path of forces attempting to attack and weaken the socialist fraternity, and to undermine and cancel out the socialist achievements of laborers. The peoples of the fraternal countries have clearly demonstrated to all the world that they will not give up their revolutionary achievements, and that the borders of the socialist fraternity are inviolable.

Defense of the peace is another important function of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact states are credited with the initiative for proposing and implementing a consistent program of peace in Europe and beyond it. Socialist countries have declared their readiness to disband the Warsaw Pact simultaneously with liquidation of NATO many times. Worthy of note is the fact that at the very first session of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague in 1956, a declaration proposing liquidation of the military groupings existing in Europe, their substitution by a system of collective security, establishment of a special arms limitation and control zone in Europe, and withdrawal or limitation of foreign troops in both parts of Germany

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was adopted. It was only at the fault of the Western powers that this proposal was not implemented.

The Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee in 1958 submitted a proposal to conclude a Nonaggression Pact between the countries of the opposing coalitions, inasmuch as a new world war would most probably be a consequence of a conflict between these groupings. The people of the world met this proposal with hope, but the NATO leadership continued its previous cold war course.

Concerned with the aggressive plans of imperialism to create multilateral nuclear forces in NATO, the Political Consultative Committee examined, at its 1965 Warsaw meeting, the question of instituting defensive measures in the event that these plans were put into motion. A proposal by Poland to freeze nuclear arms and create a nonnuclear zone in Central Europe, as well as to convene a conference of European states to promote security in Europe was supported. The Political Consultative Committee also supported East Germany's proposal to have both German states reject nuclear weapons. NATO's plans for providing West German militants access to nuclear weapons were foiled and the international positions of the GDR were strengthened through the efforts of the socialist countries.

The Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee (1966) was an important landmark in the struggle for peace. The declaration adopted was a comprehensive program for insuring peace in Europe. It foresaw: development of good-neighbor relations between European states, simultaneous dissolution of the corresponding military alliances, elimination of foreign bases from the European continent, withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, exclusion of West German access to nuclear weapons of all forms, recognition of the *de facto* borders between European countries, peaceful settlement of the German question, and other important measures. The need for convening a European conference to discuss European security was confirmed once again.

The Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee (1969) made a tremendous contribution both to strengthening the defensive power of the Warsaw Pact and to insuring European security. In an appeal to all European countries, the conference participants declared that the only real alternative to a Europe divided into military blocs and to the arms race would be development of European cooperation.

A Declaration of Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe was adopted in January 1972 at a conference of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The conference participants expressed their conviction that at the present stage, collective action of the European states in the direction of strengthening European security was important and attainable. The declaration suggested the principles of European security and of the relations between states in Europe: inviolability of borders; nonaggression; peaceful coexistence; good-neighbor relations and cooperation in the interests of peace; mutually advantageous ties between states; disarmament; support to the UN.

The struggle of the socialist countries for European security made it possible to normalize relations between the GDR and the FRG, to conclude the Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the FRG, to confirm, on an international scale, the inviolability of the western borders of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and to normalize relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG.

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The fraternal communist parties and the peoples of the socialist fraternity feel that the conditions have now been created for a strong system of security and cooperation in Europe, one which would satisfy the interests of all mankind.

It was with the most active participation of the Soviet Union and all members of the Warsaw Pact that treaties were signed on prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in three mediums--with the exception of underground tests (1963), on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (1968), and on prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor.(1971).

Implementation of the Peace Program proposed by the 24th CPSU Congress and expanded by the 25th CPSU Congress, expressing the common platform of the countries of the socialist fraternity, has great significance to the struggle of socialist forces for a strong peace.

At the 25-26 November 1976 Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative Committee, executives of the Warsaw Pact states examined problems associated with preventing war and deepening relaxation of international tension, and concerning the struggle for security and development of mutually advantageous cooperation in Europe; they expressed their resolve to increase their efforts aimed at consolidating peace in Europe and in all the world. They came to the conclusion that acceptance, by all states that had signed the Helsinki Agreement, of the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other would be in keeping with these aims, and they suggested a draft for such a treaty.

The active, resourceful international policy of the socialist states, which relies upon their combined power, has promoted positive changes in the world situation, and a turn from the cold war to detente. The principles of peaceful coexistence as the rule in relations between states having different social structures enjoyed broad recognition. The signing of a number of treaties and agreements between the USSR and USA has been an important contribution to improving the international situation. These include, first of all, a document concerning the principles of mutual relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, a treaty and agreements on limitation of antimissile defense systems and offensive strategic weapons, and an agreement to prevent nuclear war. The CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties of the socialist fraternity are exerting an effort to make the favorable changes in the international situation permanent.

Containing the main imperialist forces of aggression and consistently guiding themselves by Lenin's idea of the union of the working class and the national liberation movement in their foreign policy, the Warsaw Pact countries are performing their international duty to nations struggling for national liberation and for their independence, and against all forms of colonial and neocolonial oppression. Support to the national liberation movement can be seen especially clearly in the comprehensive assistance provided to countries and peoples forced to defend their right of national independence and social liberation against the imperialist aggressors with weapons in hand. "We," said L. I. Brezhnev, "are helping and will continue to help fighters against imperialist interference in the affairs of nations, and the sacrifices of imperialist aggression. The forms of this help may be the most diverse, depending on the circumstances--political, diplomatic, economic, or military--but their content will always be the same: repulsion of aggressors, protection of the right of people for independent development, defense of the cause of peace and

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right of people for independent development, defense of the cause of peace and national security, and thus, defense of the interests of socialism."²³

The entire history of the postwar era persuades us that the Warsaw Pact is an important instrument of peace and national security. The power of Warsaw Pact states is an insurmountable obstacle which has halted and will continue to halt all aggressive intrigues of international imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii. Dokumenty i materialy" [International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties. Documents and Materials], p 304.
2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 27.
3. See "Istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i vneshney politiki SSSR" [History of the International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol 3, Moscow, 1964, p 146.
4. Commager, H. (Editor), "Documents of American History," New York, 1958, p 705.
5. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed on 14 May 1955 by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. Albania did not take part in the work of the Warsaw Pact beginning in 1962, and in September 1968 it denounced the treaty on a unilateral basis.
6. "X s"yezd Bolgarskoy kommunisticheskoy partii" [Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party], Moscow, 1972, p 7.
7. "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1975. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Warsaw Pact Organization 1955-1975. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1975, pp 7-8.
8. "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora 1955-1975. Dokumenty i materialy," p 7.
9. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 8.
10. See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 20, p 245.
11. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 7.
12. Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 16, p 195.
13. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, pp 98-99.
14. PRAVDA, 19 May, 1976.
15. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 76.

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16. "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii. Dokumenty i materialy," p 303.
17. "XXIV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Minutes], Vol 1, p 263.
18. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 8.
19. PRAVDA, 30 March 1976.
20. "Programma Sotsialisticheskoy yedinoy partii Germanii. [Program of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany], Dresden, 1976, p 73.
21. "VII s"yezd Pol'skoy ob'yedinennoy rabochey partii. 8-12 dekabrya 1975 g. Osnovnyye materialy i dokumenty" [Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers Party. 8-12 December 1975. Basic Materials and Documents], Moscow, 1976, p 108.
22. Cited in "Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1971, p 13.
23. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, p 128.

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CHAPTER XXI

THE METHODOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST
TEACHING ON WAR AND THE ARMY

The most important prerequisite of the fruitful activity of military personnel in a socialist state is deep assimilation and creative utilization of the all-triumphant ideals of Marxism-Leninism in concrete areas of military theory and practice.

Knowledge and use of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, which performs important methodological functions, directing the scientific and practical activities of military personnel, has special significance to the fundamental problems of military development and control of the troops and naval forces, and to improvement of their battleworthiness and combat readiness. In order to reveal this active role of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, we would need to demonstrate the resources of its methodological influence, and the way it affects solution of the concrete theoretical and practical problems of military affairs.

1. Theoretical Principles and Methodological Resources of the Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army

When we talk about the methodological role and the methodological significance of one theory or another, we consequently emphasize that its content and conclusions have a certain influence upon other sciences, directing and regulating cognition and practice in general or in a certain area of science.

Scientific theory performs methodological functions if, first, it reveals the laws and formulates the premises upon which another theory rests, and from which it derives; second, if it analyzes and develops concepts and categories having fundamental significance to another theory; third, if it develops and "supplies" certain methods--that is, particular approaches and procedures--to another theory, utilization of which leads to the goal of analysis. The sum total of these laws and premises, concepts and categories, and approaches and procedures make up the resources (the methodological machinery) through which the given theory directs and regulates solution of problems in other areas of cognition and practice.

The composition and nature of the methodological resources of any theory are the product of the object of its analysis, and of its position within the system of scientific knowledge. Every theory has a certain, greater or lesser, breadth and generality. Occupying the appropriate level in the hierarchy of sciences, on one

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hand it rests upon those which study more-fundamental laws, and on the other hand it itself reveals certain laws and has an influence on narrower, more-specific areas of knowledge, upon solution of individual cognitive and practical problems. Correspondingly, the methodological machinery of a theory consists of the laws, categories, basic conclusions, and methods of more-fundamental sciences. Concurrently this machinery is significantly supplemented by laws and categories revealed and developed in the study of the particular object of the given theory.

We can determine and assess the methodological machinery of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army from the aspect of these premises. This teaching has its own object, and it occupies a unique place within the system of scientific knowledge. It deals entirely with the laws governing arisal and development of war and the army. It performs this function on the basis of Marxism-Leninism--a unified system of philosophical, economic, and political knowledge.

Obviously the entire wealth of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, viewed as a theory and as a scientific method, makes up the general theoretical and methodological foundation of the teaching on war and the army. Marxism-Leninism forms the most fundamental, rudimentary part of the general methodological resources through which the teaching on war and the army solves its problems and influences special areas of military theory and practice. This rudimentary methodological base is made up of the laws, categories, principles, theoretical premises, and conclusions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economics, and scientific communism.

The general methodological resources include, primarily, the principles developed by Marxism-Leninism as a unified system of viewpoints. They necessarily apply to all areas of science and practice requiring revolutionary thinking and revolutionary action. They include the principle of a party-class approach to real phenomena, the principle of the unity of theory and practice in general and of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice in particular, and the principle of an effective and creative approach to solving all theoretical and practical problems.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is primarily based on the principle of adherence to proletarian party tenets in analysis and evaluation of the phenomena of war and military affairs. The complexity and contradictory nature of these phenomena require that we maintain an especially clear class-party position in their analysis. In its struggle against bourgeois objectivism, which essentially adheres only to bourgeois party tenets, and in the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army solves problems on the basis of the interests of the working class and of the laboring masses, on the basis of the historic prospectives of society's revolutionary development on the road to socialism and communism. The party-class approach, which is applicable to the very foundations of military affairs and to analysis and assessment of the essence of war and military affairs, thus has a bearing on all activities of Soviet military personnel, in both scientific and practical areas.

The principle of the unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice, which is organically inherent to Marxism-Leninism as a whole, is also characteristic of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. What is important to the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is not speculative wisdom and not theory for

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the sake of theory, but constant consideration of the interests of revolutionary practice, and the practical testing and utilization of theory as an implement of practical activity. The teaching not only makes use of this principle in its area of analysis, but it also promotes its introduction into military science, into the multifaceted activities of military personnel.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army itself makes use of the principle of a concrete approach to solution of theoretical and practical problems, and it encourages application of this principle in all spheres of military affairs. In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "The strength of Marxism-Leninism lies in constant creative development. This is what Marx taught. This is what Lenin taught. Our party will always be faithful to their commandments!"* Brezhnev noted further that "at the present stage of the country's development, the need for further creative development of theory is not decreasing; on the other hand it is becoming even greater."** This premise is fully applicable to military affairs as well. If we are to continually strengthen the defensive power of the socialist state, we would have to be concrete, effective, and creative in our work, and we would need to know how to envision and support innovations, since stereotypy and inertia of thinking are incompatible in this work. Marxism-Leninism is precisely the foundation for forming and developing the creative thinking of military personnel in countries of the socialist fraternity.

Discussing Marxism-Leninism in its entirety as the general theoretical base of the teaching on war and the army, we would need to emphasize that dialectical and historical materialism form the core of the scientific philosophy, serving as the universal methodology of cognition and practice, and as the general theoretical foundation of both political economics and scientific communism. Marxist-Leninist philosophy unifies political, economic, and general sociological analysis, and it provides guidance to integrated analysis of the problems of war and the army.

Correspondingly, the philosophical principles, laws, and categories of dialectical and historical materialism and the requirements of the dialectical method make up the most important part of the methodological machinery of the teaching on war and the army.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army rests upon a materialistic answer to the basic question of philosophy, on the dialectical conception of mutual associations and development. In its analysis of the phenomena of war and military affairs, it guides itself by the requirements of their objective, comprehensive, and concrete examination as a single system of opposites developing by way of a continuous struggle between the new and the old, between the progressive and the reactionary. All laws and categories of materialistic dialectics are also employed in the analysis of the military practice of different classes and states. Works written by the founders of Marxism-Leninism offer models of concrete application of the resources of dialectical logic to the fundamental problems of military affairs.

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 72.

** Ibid.

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The army, war, and military practice in general are social and historic phenomena inherent to a number of socioeconomic formations. Therefore scientific analysis of war and the army would be unimaginable without the utilization of general sociological laws and categories expressing a dialectical-materialistic interpretation of history. The categories of ethics and esthetics (duty, justice, noble, lowly, and so on) are used in unity with the categories of general sociology (social life, social consciousness, basis, superstructure, classes, class relations, and so on). Relying on these categories, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army analyzes military practice and creates the conditions for applying these categories in other, special military studies. Thus solution of concrete problems in military development requires analysis and consideration of the class structure of society; development of a theory of personnel training and indoctrination would be impossible without considering the dialectics of social life and social consciousness, and so on.

The methodological resources which the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army utilizes and by which it influences other theoretical and practical areas of military affairs also include certain conclusions of Marxist-Leninist political economics. The teaching on war and the army analyzes phenomena closely associated with production, phenomena dependent upon the level of economic development of states (coalitions). It rests upon laws and categories reflecting the contradictory nature of capitalist and socialist means of production, it reveals the role of military-economic potential in preparation for and conduct of war, and so on.

The dialectics of modern international life are such that the turn to detente and the major successes enjoyed in the foreign political activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties require even greater alertness in relation to the intrigues of imperialist reaction, consolidation of the military power of countries in the socialist fraternity, and reinforcement of their armed forces so that they might serve as a dependable bulwark of peace and of the struggle for social progress.

Reflecting these dialectics, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army reveals the role of military violence, wars, and armies of different states in the modern era, it examines the relationship between war and socialist revolution, and it analyzes the place of armed forces within the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat and within the national state, as well as their role in the defense of socialist achievements. Also used for these purposes are the laws, categories, and principles of scientific communism, as well as its theoretical conclusions and the approach it offers to modern phenomena. These laws significantly enrich the arsenal of the methodological resources of the teaching on war and the army.

Employing the entire diversity of methodological resources of Marxism-Leninism, the teaching on war and the army works on problems corresponding to the object and subject of its analysis. In the course of this analysis, we reveal the social laws governing development of the forms and resources of the military practices of different classes and states, we determine the content of a number of specific categories, and we make general conclusions. The sum total of such laws, categories, and fundamental premises makes up a specific part of the methodological resources by which the teaching on war and the army directly influences different directions of military scientific research, and the practical activities of military personnel.

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The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army offers a definition of the essence of war and the essence and functions of the army, and it develops the basis for classifying military violence and wars, and assessing them from a political-class standpoint.

The works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin have revealed the basic laws of the origin of war, the relationship between war and state policy, between war and economics, and between war and ideology, and the mutual relationships existing among the factors influencing war.

Solving the problems facing it, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army produces a number of specific concepts. They include: "military violence", "war", "the social nature of war", "the social type of war", "military organization", "army", "military power", and "the spiritual factor in war". These concepts are specific categories of the teaching on war and the army. They play the role of "steps", of "key points" in the understanding of the phenomena of war and military affairs.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army does not create its own unique empirical and theoretical procedures of military analysis, but it does arm military science and practice with a particular method of approaching the phenomena under investigation. As with any other science, it performs the role of "applied logic", indicating not only the basic principles of cognition but also the general order of movement through the material under analysis. The teaching on war and the army performs its role because its laws, categories, and principles, when correctly understood, are a necessary instrument for posing and successively solving the problems of the theory and practice of military affairs.

The following conclusion may be made from this description of the methodological arsenal of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Utilizing the entire wealth of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and its laws, categories, and principles, the teaching on war and the army promotes their introduction, as methodological resources, into all spheres of military theory and practice. At the same time, formulating a number of specific laws, categories, and basic premises, this teaching directly influences solution of specific military theoretical and applied problems. Owing to this, the teaching on war and the army is a necessary theoretical link joining the general theory of Marxism-Leninism to special military analyses, and it is the immediate methodological foundation of the military doctrine and military science of the socialist state. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army methodologically guides the activities of our personnel in military development, in personnel training and indoctrination, and in troop command and control, both in peace and in war.

2. The Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army--the Immediate Methodological Foundation of the Military Doctrine and Military Science of the Socialist State

The unity of thought, will, and actions of Soviet military personnel and of all Soviet people in their effort to strengthen the country's military power and the battleworthiness and combat readiness of its armed forces are formed through the multifaceted ideological, theoretical, political, and organizational activity of the CPSU. A unified military doctrine is an important tool it uses. In a socialist

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state, the very existence of military doctrine is a forced phenomenon, a consequence of the military threat brought about by imperialism.

By its nature and essence, Soviet military doctrine is an expression of the class-political line of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. It is a system of scientifically grounded, official viewpoints on the essence, nature, and strategy of a war that may be imposed upon the Soviet Union, and on the requirements imposed on military development and upon preparation of our armed forces and the country for an aggressor's defeat. Military doctrine is developed by the country's political leadership with the participation of the highest military organs. Its content is represented by two mutually related groups of issues--political and military. These issues are resolved on the basis of careful analysis of many factors--the international situation, the balance of class forces in the world, the material, spiritual, and specifically military possibilities of the country and those of probable enemies, the status of the resources of armed struggle, and so on. Such a comprehensive analysis is performed with the help of many sciences. But the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and on military science plays a special role in substantiating the military doctrine of the socialist state.

The teaching on war and the army provides the methodological framework for defining, first of all, the political content of Soviet military doctrine. This definition makes use of all of the categories, laws, and basic conclusions of the teaching on war and the army. But we should note first of all the significance of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the essence of war and of its deep ties with the domestic and foreign policy of states, and with the economic basis of society. Other premises serving as starting points include those on the causes and sources of wars, on the criteria used to determine whether a war is just or unjust, and on the general laws of preparation for and conduct of war.

Developing and creatively applying these premises to an analysis of wars in the modern era, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are developing a system of viewpoints expressing the peace-loving nature of the Soviet state, and at the same time they are emphasizing its readiness to dependably protect socialist achievements, all that has been created by the hands of the people, with full resolve. The party points out the concrete resources of wars and of the military danger today, and it provides a clear political-class evaluation of a possible war between the reactionary forces on one hand and the USSR and the entire socialist fraternity on the other. It is on this basis that the political aims of the Soviet state in such a war, its basic strategy, the nature of political interaction with allies, and the ways to prepare the country and the army for a possible war are determined. The sum total of these premises makes up the political content of Soviet military doctrine. This political content is formulated in a more concrete way in the CPSU Program, in decisions of our party congresses and of plenums of its Central Committee, and in other party and state documents.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army also performs a methodological function in relation to the military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine, which deals with the concrete ways the political aims and strategic objectives of war are realized, and, correspondingly, with the basic directions of military development: development of the organizational structure of the armed forces, weapon and equipment supply, personnel training, improvement of the battleworthiness and combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

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In this case this methodological influence is naturally indirect for the most part, exerting itself through the concrete content of military science and resting upon the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Of decisive significance in this regard are the fundamental ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the dependence of the entire military organization and war strategy on the quantity and quality of "human material" and the technical base of war, on the sociopolitical structure of the state, and on the attitude of the popular masses to the war and the army. Studying the nature and unique features of wars in defense of socialist achievements and the interaction of different factors and especially the role of the spiritual forces of the people and army in modern war, and working out the content of the categories "a state's military power", "military potential", "military organization", and others, the teaching on war and the army creates the methodological prerequisites for formation of the military-technical content of our doctrine.

It should also be emphasized that the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is a tool used in analysis and criticism of the military doctrines and conceptions of imperialism. Resting upon the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the results of specific research on war and the army, it reveals the eclectic, metaphysical, pragmatic nature of the methodological foundation of militarism, and its reactionary, antipopular political orientation. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army reveals the groundlessness of the viewpoints of opportunism and revisionism on problems associated with war and the army, and it objectively evaluates abstract pacifism, demonstrating that true maintenance and consolidation of peace are served not by passive love of peace, but by an active struggle for peace, by decisive opposition to the aggressive actions of imperialism, and by international assistance to the warriors for liberty and independence of peoples.

Discussing the methodological significance of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army to formation of Soviet military doctrine, we should also note the reverse influence military doctrine has on today's development of the teaching on war and the army and on the nature of its problems and objectives. Being an aggregate of ideas and requirements that are directive in nature, Soviet military doctrine cannot but guide both the practical and the theoretical activities of our military personnel. Therefore the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army not only develops the theoretical foundation of military doctrine, but it also bases itself upon the requirements of military doctrine in its determination of the importance of concrete problems requiring comprehensive research.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate methodological basis of the socialist state's military science.

The general methodological foundation of all military scientific research, beginning in strategy and ending with special technical problems, consists of the entire wealth of Marxism-Leninism, of its philosophical, economic, and sociopolitical content. It is obvious at the same time that those premises of Marxism-Leninism which directly reflect the fundamental problems of war, the army, military affairs, and the social laws of the military practice of classes and states have special significance to military science. They are directly responsible for giving form to the initial positions of the military scientist, they determine his approach to all aspects of military affairs, and they arm him with the resources he needs for analyzing military phenomena. In other words the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army stands

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the most closely to the socialist state's military science, and it is the immediate methodological basis of all military scientific research.

It would be pertinent to note in this connection that military science studies the same object that the teaching on war and the army does. But its subject, its individual "cross section" within this object is specific. Its attention is centered on the specifically military aspect, on concrete problems of military development and military art. But a "purely military" aspect of war and military affairs could be isolated only as an abstraction. Military practice is social in all of its manifestations, and military science cannot but consider the political-class nature of military practice. In fact, every problem, no matter how specialized it might seem (even going as far as problems associated with developing the methods for using military equipment or the means of troop activities at the tactical level), does have a political content, it bears the impression of social relations, and it requires consideration of economic, political, ideological, and moral-psychological factors.

All of this emphasizes not an external tie but the organic internal unity between the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and the socialist state's military science. Our military science solves its problems, develops its own concepts, and forms special methods for empirical and theoretical investigation of military phenomena. The depth and effectiveness of its research and its fundamental advantages over bourgeois military science stem mainly from the fact that it relies upon the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, upon the laws, categories, principles, and fundamental conclusions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The content of certain categories of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, such as "military violence", "war", "military organization", "army", "a state's military power", and others guides the development of specific concepts unique to our military science: "armed struggle", "military actions", "armed forces", "fighting power", and so on. Military science of the socialist state not only accounts for the general laws revealed by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and describing the relationship war and military affairs have with economics, politics, and ideology, but it also treats them as "its own" laws, and rightfully so. Relying on them, it performs concrete research and formulates the specific laws of war. Thus the general law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relationships of the material and spiritual forces of the warring states (coalitions) is fundamental to a deep understanding of one of the most important laws of military science--the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of armed struggle on changes in the relationship of the fighting power of the dueling sides. The conclusion of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army concerning the relationship between material and spiritual factors in war is used as the reference point for analysis of concrete problems having to do with military development, reinforcement of the battleworthiness of the troops and naval forces, and so on.

The amount of methodological influence the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has on different divisions of military science varies. Its methodological function reveals itself most directly and broadly in the general theory of military science, which examines the broadest special and logical-methodological problems of military research. The relationship between the general theory of military science and the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is so profound and organic that it is difficult to draw a sharp line between them in the course of military-

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theoretical analysis. The general problems of a socialist state's military science are solved with the help of all of the methodological resources afforded by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The research proceeds in such a way that sociopolitical analysis and special military evaluations interact constantly, and penetrate each other mutually.

The most important general theoretical problems of military science include revealing the nature of probable modern wars (specifically in the military respect) and the possible methods and resources of their conduct, determining the basic directions of military development with a consideration for modern scientific-technical progress, and revealing the main trends in development of the armed forces of other states. Understandably, solution of these problems would be possible only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist conclusions on the sociopolitical essence of wars, on the class nature of armies, and on the social laws governing development of military affairs.

The general theory of military science also poses and examines a number of its own logical-methodological problems. These problems involve revealing the subject of a socialist state's military science, its internal structure, and its place within the system of sciences, and analyzing its basic concepts and methods. Naturally, it must also concern itself with similar problems in regard to bourgeois military science. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army also has its influence on this research, inasmuch as it reveals the social essence and social functions of the military science of socialism, and the military science of capitalism; it analyzes the interaction between military science and different aspects of modern scientific-technical progress, and it develops the categories which make up the basis of the special concepts and methods of socialism's military science.

The methodological functions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army manifest themselves in relation to special areas and directions of military scientific research in a more indirect way. This teaching influences them mainly through the general theory of military science. In a number of cases, however, it does have a direct influence on these areas and directions, especially through some of its specific premises.

Thus the theory of Soviet military art rests upon the entire content of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, in which case strategy rests most closely and directly, operational art is mediated by the latter, and tactics rest on this theory the most indirectly. But the premises of Marxism-Leninism on the role and forms of military violence and on the general law (principle) of achieving political and military success by concentrating forces in the decisive direction at the decisive moment have special significance in this case.* And of course, development of strategy, operational art, and tactics bases itself on Lenin's ideas on protection of the socialist fatherland and on the role and relationship of the material-technical and moral-political factors in modern war.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army also has a significant influence upon the military-technical sciences. It helps them isolate and correctly evaluate the sociopolitical aspect of the problem to be analyzed. In this case the premises concerning modern scientific-technical progress and its influence upon military

* See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 6.

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affairs and upon the content and trends of further development of the revolution in military affairs play the priority role.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army provides an answer, in the methodological aspect, to one of the fundamental problems associated with scientific-technical progress--the relationship between man and machine in modern war. Its conclusions, which have fundamental significance to the military-technical sciences, are as follows: No matter what the level of development of military equipment, and no matter how highly its control is automated, man has been and continues to be the decisive force of war; in these times of scientific-technical progress we must concern ourselves not with the contrasts between man and machine, but with the ways to bring them together in the best way, to permit man to make the fullest use of the machine's potentials. Relying upon the conclusions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army in regard to this problem, the military-technical sciences study the concrete ways for raising the equipment availability in the troops, achieving optimum compatibility between man and machine in weapon systems, and effectively utilizing weapons and military equipment.

The role of scientific troop control and of the scientific system of personnel training and indoctrination is growing to an unusual extent today. Military cybernetics, military psychology, military pedagogics, and a number of other sectors of science are conducting increasingly more active research in these areas. As a result independent subdivisions of military science are gradually forming--the theory of troop command and control, and the theory of personnel training and indoctrination.

This research and these subdivisions of military science rest organically upon the Marxist-Leninist premises on the laws governing the structure and function of the military organization in a socialist state, and on the guiding role of the Communist Party and the principles of its management of the armed forces and all military development. They account for the conclusions made by the teaching on war and the army concerning the laws governing formation of the socialist military collective and the personality of the soldier, and the ways and means of strengthening the moral-political state of the troops.

The requirements imposed upon material-technical support to the troops and to military activities are growing with every day. Special military-economic research on rear services activities, including those of supply organizations, is being broadly conducted in this connection. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army develops the premises guiding this research. Most important among them are the conclusions on the role of the material-technical factor in war, on the economic foundations of a state's military power, and on military-economic potential. Military science bases itself on these conclusions when it prepares concrete recommendations on the forms and methods of comprehensive support to the armed forces in peacetime and in wartime.

Military science develops in inseparable unity with military historical science, in relation to which the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army also plays a methodological role.

Military historical science tries to reveal the real causes, goals, and conditions of arisal and the course of concrete wars and military conflicts, to demonstrate the

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sequence and relationship of military historical events in time, and find the laws governing these events, brought into being by the entire historical era and by the concrete stage in development of classes, nations, and states. In this case being a subdivision of military science, the history of military art concentrates its efforts on the problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics in wars of the past, and in periods of peace between them.

Both military history in general and the history of military art in particular cannot be abstracted from the mutual relationship of wars with the economics, politics, and ideology of the particular era, and they must account for the dependence of military art on the entire diversity of sociopolitical factors. The basic premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, which describe these complex relationships, make up the immediate methodological foundation of military historical science. We should emphasize at the same time that these premises play such a great role because they in turn are a scientific generalization of the results of historical research.

Soviet military historical science bases itself on Lenin's tenet that war is "a supremely variegated, diverse, complex thing. It cannot be approached with a common template."* Analysis of every war requires a party-class, concretely historical, dialectically flexible approach, and consideration of the laws of social development.

Following these requirements, Soviet military historical science studies, first of all, the political content of war, and its relationship to concrete economic and sociopolitical conditions. Revealing the causes of each war taken individually, it guides itself by the conclusions of Marxism-Leninism on the economic and political sources of wars, and on the political and ideological resources of their preparation and initiation. Studying the course of military events and their mutual relationships, military historical science accounts for the influence all social factors have on it, and the reverse effect war has on the life of society. It wages an ideological struggle against bourgeois and revisionist falsifications of the history of wars and military art.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army creates the necessary prerequisites for analysis and criticism of bourgeois military science and of all theories "justifying" the military policy and war doctrines of imperialism. It participates quite actively in this criticism, revealing the methodological faults and the general reactionary social orientation of the military research of bourgeois theorists, demonstrating that even the few achievements they have enjoyed in concrete areas are deeply antisocial in their essence, serving reactionary forces and an unjust cause. At the same time, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army warns us of the danger of nihilistic rejection and understatement of bourgeois military science, and demands that we study and utilize its concrete results with critical thoughtfulness.

Thus the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army makes an important contribution to development of the theoretical content of the socialist state's military doctrine, and it arms its military science ideologically and methodologically. It imparts a revolutionary political-class orientation to all military research, forms the principles of the approach to complex phenomena of war and military affairs,

* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 49, p 369.

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promotes development of the most important concepts and categories of socialist military science, and directs and intensifies its critical functions in relation to bourgeois military science.

3. The Significance of the Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army to Practical Troop Command and Control and to the Training and Indoctrination of Soldiers

No scientific research, or the theoretical conclusions associated with it, is an end in itself. The purpose of such research is to serve practice, to raise its effectiveness. However, as Marx noted, ideas and theories cannot change anything on their own; they become a material force only when mastered by the masses--that is, when embodied within the minds and hearts of people, within their objective practical activities.

The development of the armed forces and all military practice of the socialist state are guided by the Communist Party and by the state's highest organs. Communists and officers are the immediate executors of party and government policy in the army and navy. They engage in multifaceted work aimed at developing the organizational structure of the armed forces, training the personnel to use modern weapons and military equipment, unifying military collectives, strengthening discipline within them, improving the combat and political training afforded to troops and naval forces, and raising their combat readiness.

All of this activity is successful because it rests upon Marxist-Leninist ideas and scientific principles, and it is based on a creative party approach. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the achievements of modern science become a material force, a school by which to solve practical problems of constantly growing complexity, to the extent that these ideas and achievements are assimilated by military personnel of the socialist state.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army introduces, into the activities of socialist military personnel, the principles of a political-class approach, party purposefulness, and a deep understanding of the nature and purpose of armed forces.

All of the practical efforts of Soviet military development are methodologically guided mainly by Lenin's well known premise of the unity of the principles of military and general Soviet development.** Continual adherence to this principle throughout all of the history of the Country of the Soviets made it possible to create qualitatively new armed forces. Being the offspring of their people, they embody all of the main characteristics of socialist society, and they reflect the socialist way of life. All activities of Soviet soldiers are permeated by deep devotion to the socialist motherland, the ideas of peace and socialist internationalism, and friendship among peoples.

One unique feature in the practical activities of today's Soviet military personnel is that the nature of social processes in our developed socialist society, scientific-

* See Marks, K., and Engel's, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 1, p 422.

** See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, pp 76-77.

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technical progress, and the revolution in military affairs are having a great influence on all areas of their work. Fundamental transformations which have occurred in the army and navy have affected more than just weapons, military equipment, organizational structure, and the art of war. They are penetrating more and more deeply into troop command and control, and into personnel training and indoctrination, requiring that officers and all soldiers acquire new knowledge and skills, and exercise a dialectical style of thinking.

The contribution made by the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and its role in this aspect are as follows. First, it provides a sociopolitical analysis of the prerequisites, essence, and basic trends of the development of the modern revolution in military affairs. In this way, military personnel are armed with a deep understanding of these issues, thus permitting them to structure their activity at a scientific level. Second, the entire content of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army participates in formation of the spiritual world of Soviet soldiers and nurtures a creative attitude toward work by raising the most important and pressing problems.

One of the most important tasks of military affairs today is to improve troop command and control systems and processes, and introduce scientific principles and methods of control.

Control of troops in war and in peace is an unusually complex process involving numerous stages and forms of activity. We can distinguish two principal ones among them: a) the analytical work of commanders and control organs with the purpose of estimating the situation and the status of the troops, working out decisions, and planning training and combat actions; b) practical organizational efforts aimed at implementing adopted decisions and at insuring fulfillment of combat and training missions in satisfaction of military organizational, ideological, and moral-psychological principles.

All of this activity requires scientific principles and methods. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army plays an important role in the system of scientific principles of troop command and control. For example the main thing in the cognitive and planning efforts of commanders and control organs is to correctly and quickly estimate the situation and make an optimum decision. But the larger the troop units and the more complex the processes for which commanders, staffs, and political organs are responsible, the less they can be satisfied by just the special premises of military science and the greater the role played by the knowledge and use of the laws of social development, economic, political, and ideological factors, and the methods of sociopolitical analysis, to include military-political analysis. This makes the estimate of a situation deeper and more comprehensive, the prognosis of its changes more justified, and an adopted decision more effective.

The significance of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army to practical organizational efforts is even more obvious. After all, troop command and control means, first of all, control of people, and only after that, through the people-- control of weapons and military equipment. The science of troop command and control is necessarily a science of man to a certain extent, and control practice is always a process of forming and controlling human relations. This is why the social sciences, including the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, cannot but perform a methodological function in relation to the theory and practice of troop command and control.

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The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army studies the social laws governing development of military organization, the armed forces, and their place within the society's political system, and it examines the role of the individual and his physical and spiritual forces in war, and the role and significance of the military collective. Conclusions produced by such research guide the organizational activities of the commander and of control organs, and promote formation of a Leninist style in troop leadership.

The Leninist style of leadership is a multifaceted concept. It means presence of ideological-political, moral-psychological, and professional traits developed by an entire system of objective and subjective factors inherent to socialist realities. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army makes a substantial contribution to formation of these traits in the area of troop command and control. Thus soldiers become aware of their personal responsibility for the fate of the motherland and for raising the battleworthiness and combat readiness of the troops to a tremendous extent owing to assimilation of Lenin's ideas on protection of the socialist fatherland. One-man command exercised on a party basis, with reliance upon the military collective, is deeply rooted in the premises of the laws governing formation and function of the socialist army. The teaching on war and the army also promotes affirmation of other traits of the Leninist style of leadership, such as correct selection and placement of personnel in accordance with their ideological-political and organizational qualities; high exactingness toward oneself and toward subordinates, combined with respect for people, and trust in them; systematic surveillance over fulfillment of missions, and others.

The premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army influence all ideological and moral-psychological training of the personnel, and the entire process of training and indoctrination as a whole.

One of the priority tasks in this area is to indoctrinate the indoctrinators. Today, more than half of the officers have a higher military and military-special education. A significant portion of the officer positions are occupied by engineers and technicians. But experience teaches us that professional military knowledge and good training as an engineer or a technician do not automatically make the officer a politically mature leader, an organizer of combat and political training, and a thoughtful indoctrinator of his subordinates. The officer also needs ideological maturity, a broad political outlook, high moral qualities, and a comprehensive knowledge of the theory and practice of party-political work.

Mastery of Marxism-Leninism, and deep assimilation and creative use of the fundamental premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army are among the most important prerequisites for formation of the Soviet officer as an educator and indoctrinator. After all, an understanding of the essence of modern war, the purpose of the army of the socialist state, and the role of the individual and of spiritual forces of the army and people in war are precisely what insure correct definition of goals and selection of effective training and indoctrination resources. It is only on this basis that we can effectively utilize the achievements of psychology, pedagogics, and other sciences, as well as the accumulated practical experience.

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The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army also has a direct influence on the consciousness of the broad soldier masses. On being deeply understood and assimilated, it materializes within their concrete acts aimed at raising their combat skills, strengthening conscious military discipline, and improving all other components of the high combat readiness of the army of the socialist state. The USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations state: "Military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces rests on the high political awareness of servicemen, on their deep understanding of their patriotic duty and the international tasks of our people, and on their selfless devotion to the Soviet motherland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government."*

The entire system of combat and political training, and of agitation and propaganda in the armed forces and among pre-conscript youth is called upon to shape precisely this relationship to military discipline. Propaganda dealing with the fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, aimed at nurturing conscious social responsibility for protection of socialist achievements in all personnel, plays an important role in this system.

Describing the methodological functions of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, we should emphasize that the more concretely and creatively it reflects the modern realities, the stronger and more deeply it can influence all spheres of the scientific and practical activities of military personnel. The teaching on war and the army is not a finished, solidified system of knowledge. Its basic premises are enjoying further development and confirmation in documents of the CPSU and fraternal parties, and in Marxist-Leninist works on military theoretical problems.

Development of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and deep assimilation and creative use of its premises by military personnel in their day-to-day work are among the most important prerequisites for successful completion of the continually more complex military theoretical and practical tasks aimed at raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening the defensive power of the entire fraternity of socialist states.

* "Distsiplinarnyy ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil SSR" [USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations], Moscow, 1975, p 3.

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CONCLUSION

We can make a number of general conclusions from our theoretical analysis of the fundamental problems of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and its methodological functions.

The arisal of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army was a natural consequence of the revolution brought about by Marxism in philosophy, economics, politics, and military theory. The works of Marx and Engels on military questions, development of their ideas by Lenin, and his comprehensive, deep analysis of the problems of war and the army in the new historical era were responsible for formation of the basic content of this teaching. It enjoyed further development in subsequent years, and its development is now being creatively continued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by other fraternal communist parties, and by Marxist scholars with a consideration for the sociopolitical changes in the modern world and the deep transformations in military affairs.

The laws governing the arisal and development of war and the army, and the class-political content of these phenomena make up the subject matter of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. As the classicists of Marxism-Leninism have shown, deep analysis of such a complex subject would be possible only if a comprehensive, integrated approach is taken to it. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the result of such a comprehensive, integrated analysis of the fundamental problems of war, the army, and military affairs through the resources of, mainly, dialectical and historical materialism, as well as Marxist political economics, and scientific communism, making use of the achievements of historical and other sciences.

The truth of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has been confirmed by sociohistorical practice. It was proven especially clearly and persuasively by the victorious outcome of many revolutionary wars of the proletariat and the popular masses against imperialism, in behalf of socialism and in the defense of its achievements, by the world historic victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, and by the successes enjoyed by national liberation troops against colonialism. It is confirmed by the indestructible defensive power of the fraternity of socialist states, and by the effectiveness of its political and military support to people fighting for national independence and social progress.

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Creative Marxist-Leninist analysis of the problems of war and the army is especially needed today, in a time when the struggle of progressive forces for peace and international cooperation, and for the liberty and independence of people is continuing. Such research is needed, first of all, as a means for arriving at an objective, scientific, party-based analysis of the present sources of war and military danger, of the aggressive nature and essence of militarism, and of the basic types of wars of the modern era and their role in history, and second, as a means for developing a proper attitude toward these phenomena in the working class and in all laboring masses, and justifying the policy of the communist parties in questions of war and peace, military development, and military defense of socialism.

The CPSU and other fraternal parties standing on the positions of proletarian internationalism constantly account for the interests of the laboring masses and the prospects of social development; they decisively condemn imperialist, predatory, unjust wars, and they firmly stand on the positions of an active struggle for peace and social progress. Abstract pacifism is alien to communists. They believe it their international duty to ward off all transgressions upon the achievements of socialism and upon the unity and integrity of the socialist fraternity, to provide all possible support to the just struggle of people for national liberation and for democracy and socialism, and against imperialism, against all forms of exploitation and oppression.

Studying the laws of the arisal and development of the army, its place in the political superstructure above the economic foundation, and the nature, features, and function of war, the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army defines the ideological, theoretical foundations of socialist military development. The most important principle of Soviet military development is Communist Party leadership of the armed forces, and intensification of the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy. The guiding role of the party in military development is constantly rising together with growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks associated with protecting the achievements of socialism against the aggressive intrigues of its enemies.

Basing themselves on the concrete conditions of the modern historical era and the achievements of scientific-technical progress, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its Central Committee are doing everything necessary to constantly strengthen our country's defense capabilities and improve its armed forces. The armed forces are constantly being supplied with improved modern weapons and military equipment, and the quality of combat training and ideological maturity of the personnel are rising. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, "...the Soviet people may be assured that the fruits of their creative labor are being dependably protected."*

The Soviet Armed Forces are performing their international missions in formation with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries. The ideological, sociopolitical, economic, and military unity of the socialist fraternity is the foundation of their power and invincibility. As they develop, the countries of socialism naturally grow closer together, and their mutual relationships grow stronger. One of the most

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 83.

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important forms of cooperation among fraternal socialist countries is the Warsaw Pact. It dependably serves the interests of peace and socialism. The armed forces of the allied states are at high combat readiness, in a position to guarantee the peaceful labor of the fraternal peoples.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate methodological foundation of military doctrine and military science of the socialist state. The essence of its laws, categories, and basic premises is the implement of formation and scientific substantiation of mainly the political content of military doctrine, and it also indirectly influences the special, military elements of military doctrine. Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army ideologically and methodologically guide the development of socialist military science, they impart a proletarian-class party nature to it, they stimulate a creative approach to solving important problems, and they strengthen the tie of military science to revolutionary practice. Studying the specific laws of the conduct and support of war, development of the armed forces, and the means of warfare, the military science of a socialist state accounts for the action of economic, political, ideological, and moral-psychological factors, and when it analyzes these factors, it relies upon the conclusions and methodological principles of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

Aggravation of the ideological struggle in the international arena, on one hand due to deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and on the other hand due to the successes of socialism and the entire world revolutionary process, is affecting all spheres of ideological and social psychology. The ideological struggle is being waged on the fundamental issues of social development, to include the problems of war and peace, war and revolution, and the role of military violence in history. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is our dependable weapon in the modern ideological struggle. It unmask the reactionary essence of militant ideology and practice, and its main force--the reactionary imperialist circles of the USA. The teaching on war and the army is the framework for analysis and criticism of the class, ideological-theoretical, and methodological principles of the war doctrine and military-political conceptions of imperialism, bourgeois military science, the militant ideas of the Maoists, and other opportunist distortions of Marxist-Leninist premises on war, the army, and development of military affairs.

In the face of the unceasing military ventures of imperialism, the Communist Party and its Central Committee have imposed an important and honorable task upon the military personnel of the Soviet state--maintaining the armed forces in high combat readiness. Performing this task, the officers and all personnel of our armed forces are doing a great deal of intense work. The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army plays a major role in ideological and methodological support to this work. It actively participates in formation of the viewpoints, convictions, and ideological-political countenance of the Soviet soldier, it promotes deep understanding of the essence and significance of military service in the army of the socialist state, and it arms military personnel with the most important principles and premises that directly guide their concrete practical activities. Persistent study and creative application of Marxism-Leninism and its teaching on war and the army is a guarantee of further success in all areas of military science and practice.

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