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# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 12/81)

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USSR REPORT  
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NATIONAL

COLLECTION OF TIKHONOV SPEECHES, ARTICLES

Moscow N. A. TIKHONOV: IZBRANNYYE RECHI I STAT'YI in Russian 1980 (signed to press 8 Aug 80) pp 1, 3-5, 418-424, 442-443, 444-448

[Annotation, two speeches, table of contents from book by Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, Politizdat, 100,000 copies, 448 pages]

[Text] From the Publishers

This collection of selected speeches and articles by Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, covers the period between 1949 and 1980. It includes speeches presented by N. A. Tikhonov to electors, at party conferences, administrative aktivs and international forums, addresses delivered at meetings for the formal presentation of awards to a number of Union republics, oblasts and cities, reports delivered at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and articles published in the magazine KOMMUNIST, in the newspapers PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and in other periodicals.

Most of the book describes the work performed by party, soviet and administrative agencies to implement the program of economic and social development for the nation worked out at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses. It convincingly demonstrates the fact that the Communist Party's policy conform to the basic interests of the workers, of all the Soviet people, and to the tasks involved in building communism, strengthening friendship of peoples and fighting for peace.

The author focuses upon the issues of the CPSU's economic strategy, raising the effectiveness of public production and the quality of the work, improving management, thoroughly applying the achievements of scientific and technological progress, increasing labor productivity, strengthening state discipline and further enhancing socialist democracy, labor and political activeness among the masses under developed socialism. The author thoroughly describes the activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government aimed at achieving increasingly fuller satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the Soviet people.

The book discusses specific tasks involved in providing planned and proportionate development of the national economy and its leading sectors at the contemporary stage, intensifying production, making efficient use of material, labor and

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financial resources, increasing the output and improving the quality of consumer goods and other products. The author convincingly demonstrates the advantages of the socialist system of management and provides a specific analysis of shortcomings present in certain areas of economic development.

Many of the sections describe the foreign policy activities of the CPSU with respect to strengthening the world commonwealth of socialist nations, implementing the Program of Peace put forth by the party and relaxing international tensions. A considerable portion of this material deals with the improvement of our nation's foreign economic relations and the development and enhancement of all round political, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist nations. A number of the sections deal with the development of mutually advantageous, foreign economic relations between our nation and the capitalist nations in the interest of peace and progress.

A prominent place in the book is devoted to articles and speeches by N. A. Tikhonov as chairman of the Commission for Observance of the International Year of the Child in the USSR. This material illustrates the constant concern demonstrated by the Communist Party and the Soviet state for the upcoming generation and describes the extensive work performed by party, soviet and public organizations and labor collectives in our nation in connection with the declaration of 1979 as International Year of the Child by the United Nations organization.

The concluding sections of the book describe the enormous amount of creative work being performed by the Soviet people to implement decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The author's speeches and articles stress the exceptional importance of the multifaceted and productive work of the CPSU Central Committee and its Leninist Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, outstanding political figure and statesman of modern times and tireless champion of peace.

A number of the items included in the book have been condensed.

Some of N. A. Tikhonov's speeches are published here for the first time.

Raise the Level of Management (from a speech delivered at a meeting of the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 January 1980)

Comrades!

We have heard reports by Comrades N. K. Baybakov and V. F. Garbuzov and speeches by ministers and chairmen of Union republic councils of ministers. Permit me to sum up some of the results of our discussion, focusing your attention on the main results of 1979, but most importantly--on the tasks which lie ahead.

Decisions coming out of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the speech by Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev contained a thorough and principled appraisal of the nation's social and economic development, and outlined a specific program of action for all sectors in the building of communism.

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The most important tasks of Union republic ministries and councils of ministers to emerge from plenum decisions were defined in a decision of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. Now, we have to specifically define these tasks for each level of management, taking into account the results of the economic work already performed under the 10th Five-Year Plan.

On the whole, our economic and cultural development has advanced. We have taken another step forward to improve the material welfare of the people. Party, soviet and management agencies are performing a large amount of organizational work toward fulfillment of decisions coming out of the 25th party congress.

Today, however, we must focus our attention on unfinished tasks, on obstacles to progress, as required by the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

First of all, I would like to turn your attention to the fact that although we have been successful in fulfilling the social program and have significantly increased the real income of the population, public consumption funds, the earnings of blue- and white-collar workers and the wages of kolkhoz workers, and the quantity of consumer services provided for the population, we can still not be satisfied with the present level of public production effectiveness, labor productivity or the quality of the goods produced. We know that a society can only distribute what is produced, and our central task therefore is still one of making fuller use of the intensive growth factors, production reserves and possibilities for economy and conservation.

Certain ministries and Union republics did not fulfill last year's plan with respect to some extremely important indices. Certain other branches, such as the coal industry, ferrous metallurgy and the lumber, pulp-and-paper and construction materials industries and many construction ministries failed to increase production volumes. Development lags in the chemical industry and nonferrous metallurgy.

It was pointed out at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that this was not just a matter of last year's adverse weather conditions but that many ministries and departments were unable to overcome the force of inertia, to resolutely and consistently improve product quality, increase labor productivity and achieve the best possible end results. I will not go into details about inadequacies in the performance of all the ministries but will discuss only those which have especially retarded our national economic development.

With respect to the fuel branches, I have to point out the fact that there was a significant deterioration in the performance of the Ministry of the Coal Industry. Planned coal production assignments were not fulfilled, of course. The main cause of this has been a lag in the creation of new capacities, the development of new capacities and the technical updating of enterprises. Almost half of the mines and pits failed to master production capacities placed into operation. Coal production was short by almost 40 million tons because of this. Coal production losses increased as a result of a drop in the average monthly output of the workers and for other reasons. Despite repeated, sharp criticism, the ministry has still not taken steps to remedy the situation. Coal extraction enterprises of the Kuznetsk Coal Basin and mines operated by the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of the Coal Industry continue to perform unsatisfactorily.

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Today, we have a right to ask those in charge of the ministry: Just when are the coal enterprises going to operate smoothly and insure that the established assignments are fulfilled?

Nor are we satisfied with the performance of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. Last year the consumers were shorted a large quantity of finished rolled products and pipe. Production of the economical types of metal products is being mastered too slowly, as a result of which possibilities for conserving metal in the national economy have been reduced by approximately 1.5 million tons. The Ministry is not taking effective steps to improve the performance of such large metallurgical enterprises as the Nizhniy Tagil Combine, the Krivoyrog Ore Dressing Combine, the Ore-Dressing imeni Dzerzhinskiy in Dneprovsk, the Lebedin Ore-Dressing Combine, and certain others have not fulfilled the plan for the entire metallurgical cycle in several years. There is extensive downtime for capital equipment in the branch, as a result of which metal production fell short by a large quantity.

For a number of years now the USSR Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry has not provided the yeast industry with liquid paraffin, as a result of which capacities available at enterprises of the microbiology industry have not been utilized for a long time. An ethylene production unit at the Lisichansk Refinery is being mastered extremely unsatisfactorily. Only slightly more than 10 percent of the planned output was achieved at this unit last year.

We have also heard major complaints today about the machine-building ministries, which are not fulfilling the production plans for many of the most important types of equipment. Production capacities continue to be unsatisfactorily utilized in the machine-building ministries, and the shift index is still low.

Nor can we say that the performance of the Ministry of the Pulp and Paper Industry is satisfactory. Such large industries under the Ministry as the Bratsk Lumber Industry Combine, the Selenginsk and Amursk Pulp and Cardboard Combines and the Segezha Pulp and Paper Combine did not fulfill their assignments, while meeting the Ministry's raw material needs. We have complete grounds for stating that this ministry is not moving rapidly enough to work out problems affecting improvement in the performance of these enterprises, is not determining the causes of their high accident rate or of violations of technological and production discipline, and is not taking the necessary steps.

The performance of rail transport, as you know, was held up to especially sharp criticism at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Transport proved to be the weakest link in the system of national economic sectors. Assignments were not fulfilled for many extremely important indices which describe the quality of this branch's performance. Productivity per car dropped below the 1978 level, the average turnaround time increased by five percent, and demurrage related to cargo-handling operations increased. Labor productivity for rail transport was below the 1978 level. It should be borne in mind that all of this occurred despite the fact that the ministry has constantly received substantial assistance.

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The Ministry of Railways has reported on steps it plans to take to correct the situation in transport. We hope that these steps will actually be implemented and that transport will cease to be a bottleneck in the national economy.

All of today's speeches have reflected special concern about the state of affairs in capital construction. USSR ministries and department and Union republic councils of ministers failed to bring about a significant improvement in this important branch last year. A large number of extremely important production capacities in the fuel and energy branches, in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and in the chemical industry were not placed into operation.

What is the matter? Construction ministries and Union republics attribute the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the capital construction plan to a shortage of workers, among other things. We need to take a close look at such explanations, however. Why is there a shortage of workers in construction organizations, when there is a surplus of able-bodied population in the republics? Apparently, it is primarily a matter of the Union republic councils of ministers not doing enough to attract workers into the construction branch. This applies most of all to the councils of ministers of the Kazakh SSR, the Uzbek SSR, the Turkmen SSR, the Kirghiz SSR and the Tadzhik SSR. Furthermore, the construction ministries--the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Industrial Construction--have systematically failed to fulfill their plan for the training of skilled workers. Therein lies a shortcoming also of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education of the USSR.

Because of poor management and the unsatisfactory use of available materials, equipment and personnel, labor productivity is not growing in most of the construction ministries, and in 1979 it was below the 1978 level for the main construction ministries. There is frequently an extremely large difference between the output per worker for enterprises under various ministries, with equal working conditions and wages.

Construction organization capacities are not being fully utilized. Between 1975 and 1978 the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, the Ministry of Industrial Construction and the Ministry of Construction invested several billion rubles to develop their production base, but despite this the volume of contracted work last year was several hundred million rubles less than the 1975 figure. Ministries and departments, Stroybank [All-Union Bank for the Financing of Capital Investments], Gosbank and the People's Control Committee should exercise more stringent control over the observance of state plan discipline at construction sites and in contract organizations, resolutely eliminate localistic tendencies in construction affairs and prevent the diverting of labor, materials and equipment from extremely important national economic projects.

I want to discuss specifically the production of consumer goods. Right now, a draft decree is being prepared in the USSR Council of Ministers on certain additional steps to increase consumer goods production in 1980. Assignments are being increased for the production of a number of goods, including children's undergarments, bed linen, thread, socks, toothbrushes and simple cultural, personal and household items--by a total of almost 360 million rubles at retail

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prices. It is planned within the near future to hold a special conference of deputy chairmen of Union republic councils of ministers in charge of organizations for the production of consumer goods and trade.

We are hoping that the Union republics will most carefully reexamine matters pertaining to consumer goods production and affined additional resources so as to increase production in 1980 not by the 360 million rubles presently planned but by considerably more. It should be brought to the attention of Union republic councils of ministers that we must increase the production, improve the quality and enlarge the assortment of consumer goods produced at local industry, consumer service and consumer cooperative enterprises. Maximum use must be made of local raw materials for this purpose.

I would like to touch upon those explanations given for failure to fulfill plan assignments, which have to do with the fuel and energy supply for the national economy. It needs to be stated that there are inadequate grounds for such explanations. Weather conditions at the end of last year and the beginning of this year were conducive to industrial operations, that they made it possible for enterprises both to operate normally and to fulfill fuel conservation assignments. There were no cases in which production units were cut off from the electric supply system, and in general, requests for fuel and energy were promptly satisfied. In December and the first 20 days of January, however, the production plan for a number of extremely important types of manufactured products was not fulfilled. This included the production plan for polyethylene, A.C. electric engines, metal rolling equipment, electric locomotives, lumber and other products. Production rates dropped in industries under the Union republic councils of ministers (for Union republic and republic ministries).

How does one explain this? I can say without exaggeration that one has the impression that the leaders of certain ministries and departments focused all their efforts not upon fulfilling the plan but upon adjusting it, and in the process they demonstrated extraordinary zeal and a great sense of urgency, which unquestionably deserved better application.

Unfortunately, many ministries failed to have their enterprises operating smoothly in January as well. This applies to such branches as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the coal industry and rail transport.

The absence of such objective reasons as bad weather or a shortage of fuel and energy indicates that certain ministerial leaders apparently have not mastered the modern style and methods of management and are unable to resolve important economic matters or to manage the branch in accordance with modern requirements.

We hope that the Union republic councils of ministers will derive the proper conclusions from the decisions made at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and from the requirements set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Responsibility for the assigned work and for plan fulfillment must be increased drastically.

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Comrades! 1980 is an important year in the life of our party and our people. This is the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan, the year in which we celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the year of preparations for the 26th party congress. The CPSU Central Committee calls upon all party organizations and all labor collectives to commemorate these historic events in the nation's life in a fitting manner. Our present task is one of considerably improving management in all sectors of the national economy, strengthening state and plan discipline and making fuller use of existing reserves and possibilities for making public production even more effective, strengthening the nation's defenses and improving the people's welfare.

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 4 March 1980

Dear Leonid Il'ich!

Respected comrade members of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet!

As you know, important proposals and comments were made by the permanent commissions of the chambers and the Supreme Soviet deputies upon reviewing the draft plan and budget for the current year and the report by the USSR Council of Ministers on fulfillment of the 1979 plan at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation.

Their objective is primarily one of revealing more thoroughly and making fuller use of reserves in the national economy, strengthening state discipline and eliminating bottlenecks in the development of the economy, as well as shortcomings in the performance of individual branches, especially those which were the focus of attention in Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's speech at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

By way of carrying out the task assigned it by the USSR Supreme Soviet, immediately following the session the Presidium of the Council of Ministers ordered ministries and departments of the USSR and Union republic councils of ministers to review the proposals and comments pertaining to them, to take the steps necessary to implement them and to report on the results.

There is no need to describe the steps taken in detail at this session, since the members of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet have the government's report on this matter. I need only to underscore the fact that the main attention of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Union republic councils of ministers and the ministries and departments of the USSR is directed toward the most important and urgent matters in the development of the nation's economy, improvement of the people's welfare and the development of culture.

Specific measures have been worked out and are being implemented with the objective of successfully fulfilling decisions coming out of the 25th CPSU Congress and the July 1978 and November 1979 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and assignments established by the plan, continuing the dynamic and proportionate development of public production, raising its effectiveness and improving the quality of the work.

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The USSR Council of Ministers is devoting special attention to the matters of resolving the fuel and energy problem and achieving basic improvement in the performance of rail transport, to the state of affairs in capital construction, the matter of improving agricultural production and implementation of the social program worked out by the party, primarily with respect to further improving housing conditions for the workers and providing better health protection for women and children.

At the personal initiative of Leonid Il'ich the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers have reviewed and adopted decisions on matters of improving the material circumstances of Great Patriotic War veterans.

Constant attention is being given to the implementation of decisions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the matters of improving planning and perfecting the economic system, strengthening labor discipline and reducing labor turnover, stepping up scientific and technological progress in the most important sectors, increasing environmental protection and improving management.

A number of important decisions have been adopted recently with respect to accelerating the economic development of a number of the nation's regions, particularly Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan and a number of regions in the North.

A great deal is being done to achieve more effective consumption of materials and finances, particularly fuel, metal products, other raw and processed materials, to improve the use of secondary resources in the national economy and to increase the protection of socialist property.

Ministries and departments have reported to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the deputies on action taken on comments and proposals made by the permanent commissions of the chambers and by the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

We feel that today's discussion of this matter at the meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is proof of the great concern demonstrated by the nation's highest governing body and by you, Leonid Il'ich personally, for the implementation of the course worked out by the party to further improve the nation's economy and strengthen its defenses, to improve the people's welfare, to perfect the democratic principles underlying our society and involve the masses more extensively in management. (Prolonged applause.)

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AZERI POLITICAL THEORETICIAN ON SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, NEW SOVIET MAN

Baku AZARBAYJAN KOMMUNISTI in Azeri No 1, 1981 pp 95-103

[Summary of Article by G. Zaliyev: "The Formation of Social Consciousness and the New Man under Conditions of Developed Socialism"]

[Summary] "One of the important duties of our development is to constantly raise social consciousness" and "social consciousness is a component of the practice of mass revolutionary change which is active under socialism and whose influence is constantly growing." "Social consciousness embraces the social feelings, mentality, qualities, already formed traditions, characteristics of the psychology of different classes and social groups and the psychic form of nations and peoples."

After reviewing the process of historical materialism which is the basis of Marxism-Leninism it is concluded that "the actively changing role of ideas and consciousness and their influence on all aspects of the life of a society increases to a significant degree under conditions of socialism, especially under the conditions of a developed socialist society." "The national independence of social consciousness appears in the cultural heritage of humanity, in the reflection of ideological forms on the economy and the fact that these do not correspond to social truth at any specific time." The theory of Marxism-Leninism demonstrates that social consciousness has the "capacity to outstrip historical development."

"Social consciousness" is dependent on "individual consciousness," which is "an expression of social and class consciousness," and is "more specific and multifaceted" than social consciousness. "Social consciousness" however "is a new quality emerging from social relations," and can be separated into "theoretical" and "empirical" levels. "The social perceptions, ideas and mentalities of men take theoretical shape in ideology." "Socialist ideology plays an important role in the struggle against the reactionary ideology of the contemporary imperialistic bourgeoisie."

It is conceded that "there are definite differences in the psychology of the working class, the kolkhoz workers and the intelligentsia..." "As noted at the XXVth Congress of the CPSU, the study of Marxism-Leninism by the masses has turned into the most important characteristic of socialist social consciousness..." The significance of the document "Basic Directions of the economic and social development

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of the USSR...till the year 1990" is stressed for its strategy which "consists of raising the material and spiritual way of life and creating better conditions for the multi-faceted development of the personality." "It is also very important to demonstrate that successes in the building of communism depend on the high activity of the masses...and their political consciousness."

As noted at the XXVth Congress of the CPSU "the most important result of the last sixty years is the Soviet man..." "The educating of the new man is a necessary condition of our further progress..." "By changing living conditions, man himself is changed" but "it is impossible to form the new man without political education and without the communist ideology." The decree "On the further improvement of ideological work and political education" points out the significance of political education. "The scientific level of communication...is defined by its capacity to form a Marxist-Leninist world-view as a complete system of knowledge within men."

"Under conditions of developed socialism labor education is based on principles which have great socio-economic and political importance and which define the content of the spiritual resources of a mature socialist society." The importance of the work ethic in the society is stressed. At the XXVth Party Congress, while the importance of the spiritual education was emphasized, the obligation to form an active life stance was put forth. The two qualities inherent in this stance are: firstly, recognition and comprehension "of the high social goals" in Marxism-Leninism, and secondly, ability and readiness to perform work useful to the society. The All-Union Scientific-Practical Conference in Baku stressed this point as noted by H.A. Aliyev in his book "The Formation of an Active Life Stance: The Experience and Current Problems of Spiritual Education" (Azarnashr, 1979).

"The new view of the Soviet man, his communist morality and his world view rest upon a constant...struggle with remnants of the past...A scientific world-view, communist morality, general and polytechnical education create a spiritual cultural wealth which is necessary for the multi-faceted development of the personality."

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VIEWS OF PAST SHOWN IN 'ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM FAMILY'

Moscow ISLAM I SEM'YA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 21 Nov 80) pp 114-153

[Part II of book "Islam and the Family" by Mikhail Vagabovich Vagabov, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 10,000 copies, 173 pages]

[Excerpt] Singularities of the Manifestation and Reasons for the Preservation of Vestiges of Islam in Marriage and Family Relationships

The 60-year history of Soviet society has corroborated the Marxist proposition that religion will disappear proportionate to the development of socialism. Socialist building in the USSR initiated the process of the conception of history's first mass atheism and the formation of a new man free not only of socioeconomic but also spiritual oppression.

The fundamental transformations in our society's social, economic and cultural life have led to the point where the bulk of the population has been liberated from the influence of religious ideology. Believers' departure from a religious philosophy of life is a general sociological regularity ensuing from the essence of socialism.

At the same time we cannot ignore the vestiges of the influence of reactionary religious ideology, including the ideology of Islam, which are still impeding our successful advance toward communism.

In our country the social roots of religion have had the soil removed from under them and the base on which the church relied for centuries has been done away with, but, nevertheless, religious prejudices and superstitions live on in the minds, mentality and everyday existence of a part of the population. Vestiges of religious consciousness in our society are manifested in various spheres of our life; in some they make their presence felt more intensively, while in others their influence is quite negligible. To speak, for example, of the sphere of political ideology, all religious systems and the ministers of all religions accommodate themselves to the statutes and measures of the Soviet state inside the country and internationally. Practically all clergymen are loyal to them and support them.

It is quite a different matter in the spheres of everyday life, where the vestiges of religious consciousness are manifested comparatively intensively and statically. Everyday consciousness is the part of the social consciousness which is most lagging in its development behind the qualitative changes in social being. Here the attitude toward traditions and receptiveness to what is new is displayed in the most conservative form.

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The process of the withering away of religious vestiges at the time of the transition from one socioeconomic formation to another has its own specific features. As distinct from political and legal ideology, religion, together with philosophy, is considerably further from directly reflecting the society's economic system and has a relative independence. For this reason even after the destruction of the economic system which gave rise to religion, vestiges of the latter are preserved in the social and, particularly, everyday consciousness.

The classical authors of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly observed that, as distinct from many aspects of social relationships, family and everyday traditions of past eras have a great conservative strength in the new society and, compared with other survivals of the past, are preserved considerably longer: "The traditions of all dead generations tower, like a nightmare, over the minds of the living."<sup>1</sup> They still take root in many people's everyday life and consciousness long after the socioeconomic conditions which engendered them have disappeared.

The dependence of family-everyday customs and traditions on all contemporary religions has deep historical roots. Thus the solemnization of a marriage, wedding rituals, divorce, the birth of a child, property relations and a person's death were not initially of a religious nature. But the religions brought them under their auspices and imparted to them the definite form of religious rites and rituals, and in these forms they gradually became a tradition, became a part of people's everyday life and became second nature to man. These customs were handed down from the elder to the younger generations and from one era to another, and many of them in fact became indispensable norms, as it were, of man's being.

That which was introduced and hammered into man's consciousness over centuries became an inalienable part of everyday life and does not, naturally, desert it immediately with a change in socioeconomic conditions. The victory of the October Revolution in our country did not lead and objectively could not have led to the immediate automatic disappearance of habits and traditions and customs and views which had for centuries prevailed in people's minds and mentality, although it initiated the great turnabout in the minds and hearts.

Thus the preservation of vestiges of the past, including Islamic statutes, in family and marriage and everyday relationships under the conditions of the transition from one socioeconomic formation to another is inevitable. However, this by no means signifies that we should not fight them. Ideological struggle against vestiges of the past which are hindering the establishment of new relationships is a struggle for communism.

The classical authors of Marxism-Leninism pointed out repeatedly that the struggle against religion cannot be successful if it is conducted merely with the use of naked coercion. It should primarily be ideological and have a profound natural scientific basis and should be cogent in that the masses might themselves be convinced of the groundlessness of religion. It was not fortuitous that V.I. Lenin demanded that we "organize the struggle against religion more scientifically."<sup>2</sup>

To realize the most important propositions of Marxist-Leninist atheism and to ensure that scientific-atheistic upbringing be conducted comprehensively and in

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skilled fashion, on a scientifically cogent basis, what is primarily needed is a most profound understanding of the social nature of religious manifestations in our society and their place and role in the population's consciousness, mentality and everyday life. It is essential to probe more deeply the spiritual world of believers and ascertain the general and specific causes of the existence and practice of a belief. This is undoubtedly a complex, but extremely necessary task.

Determination of the extent of the population's religiosity, a social analysis of the state of religiosity in different regions and republics, determination in precisely which spheres of people's relationships vestiges of religious consciousness are manifested in the most intensive form--all this is not only of theoretical-cognitive but also the most topical practical significance. Only a determination of the real state of the masses' religiosity and the spheres of its intensiveness afford an opportunity for the selection of the most effective ways to surmount the vestiges of religious consciousness. Without such an all-around dialectical study of the social nature of the manifestations of religious consciousness, without an in-depth study of the nature and singularities of the historical, social and ideological nature of religious vestiges and without a scientific comprehension of the essence of all these phenomena it is hardly possible to talk of the effective development of work on atheistic upbringing.

A study of the state of the masses' religiosity must under no circumstances be approached in stereotyped fashion. A differentiated, concrete-historical approach is required here. Although the manifestation of vestiges of religious consciousness (mainly, as already said, in the spheres of everyday consciousness) is characteristic of all religions in our society, these manifestations are, nevertheless, highly varied, depending on the specifics of each religion and on the historical and social conditions of the development of this people or the other.

A comprehensive investigation and a social analysis of religiosity show that Islamic vestiges are preserved in the most enduring form in family and marriage and other everyday relationships. Despite the far-reaching socioeconomic and cultural-social changes which have occurred in the life of the peoples of the Soviet East in the years of socialist building, we still encounter numerous manifestations of Islamic, particularly Shariah, statutes and medieval norms of feudal morality in marriage and family relationships and in the attitude toward women. The spheres of marriage and family relationships and everyday life are not only a pocket of conservation of the vestiges of Islam but also remain to a certain extent a source of the reproduction of religious consciousness in our society.

Devotees of the past are trying consciously or subconsciously to prevent the formation and establishment of new, Soviet family relationships and the equality of the sexes and the spouses in a family. Under current conditions they are attempting to act not as champions of the faith (least of all in this role) but as supporters and defenders of "national distinctiveness" and "national traditions" under the flag of devotion to their nation and national group. The data of concrete-sociological research conducted in many republics of the Soviet East testify to this. The majority of the believers and nonbelievers questioned why, for example, they arrange a Shariah marriage answers, as a rule, that it is the national form of contracting a marriage. Here the spirit of devotion to the nationally distinctive prevails in many respects over the spirit of observance of religious obligations, and this feature of the national mentality is used by representatives of the Muslim religion

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to preserve religiosity among the population. Speculating on national sentiments, the representatives of the Muslim religion (and fanatical believers) present themselves, however, as the custodians of national values.

Correspondingly, there are frequent instances in our social reality of devotion to the traditions of Islam and observance of its feasts being wrongly considered the observance of national traditions. Arguments can be heard frequently that it is necessary not only to preserve but also return to full citizenship such outmoded norms of Shariah injunctions and Islamic morality as bride money, Muslim seclusion, the arranged marriage of minors, polygamy and so forth. All this the devotees of Islam present as "purely" national, popular traditions. Observance of the traditions, customs and rituals of Islam as national and popular is a characteristic feature of the manifestation of religiosity among part of the population of the republics of the Soviet East at the current stage.

Such speculative propaganda of Islamic norms finds favorable ground mainly among the population with a backward consciousness, particularly in rural localities. This is explained by the duration of the domination of Islam and the syncretism of its traditions with national traditions.

The idea was implanted in the minds of the masses for centuries that allegiance to a religious creed is a basic indication of national allegiance. Having assimilated popular customs and traditions and having accommodated them to its religious practice, religion acts the part of the creator and custodian of national distinctiveness. Consequently, loyalty to Islam and its traditions, in the arguments of representatives of the Muslim religion, is an essential condition of loyalty to one's people, and, on the contrary, indifference or a negative attitude toward Islam (the belief of the fathers) is categorized as national apostasy.

It is very important under contemporary conditions to reveal the interconnection of Islam and nationalist survivals. It is essential to show the inseparable connection between the vestiges of Islam, including (and mainly) those in marriage and family relationships, and the vestiges of nationalism, which are often mutually complementary, impede Soviet people's international upbringing and become an obstacle on the path of the creation of inter-nation families. Upon an analysis and critique of such complex phenomena it is essential to clearly distinguish national singularities, nationalist, religious survivals and popular customs.

Another characteristic of the manifestations of vestiges of Islam in our country, including its survivals in family and marriage relationships, is the fact that they have to a considerable extent been subject to change a la contemporary mode. Much that is new has appeared. The spirit of Islam is not always adhered to literally in the observance of many rites, and strict observance of religious statutes is lacking in many instances. This applies to the preservation of female seclusion, the processes of the solemnization of a Shariah marriage, mutual relations between spouses and so forth--the aspects of the rites which are of an ugly nature in the eyes of the contemporary believer are rejected. Thus the former patriarchal attitude toward the woman and children on the part of the head of the family--the husband--and also the father and brother is not observed in the majority of believers' families. In many cases these manifestations of Islamic morals are of an ambivalent and not entirely consistent nature.

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Almost all marriage and family rites and rituals of Islam in our country have been subject to considerable change both in essence and also in form. This evolution is a logical phenomenon since it has been brought about by the fundamental transformations in Soviet people's socioeconomic and cultural life. There has been a change in Soviet people's spiritual world--as a consequence of social progress. This is paramount. And, furthermore, the representatives of the Muslim religion and activist believers are themselves frequently concerned to implement certain "reforms" in order to prolong the life of the rites, having adapted them to a certain extent to believers' contemporary requirements.

Modernism is also consistently applied in the sphere of marriage and family relationships. Thus the Islamic renovators in our day ignore the antifeminist spirit of the orthodox sources of the Muslim religion, but, on the contrary, assert in their sermons, fatwa and appeals to believers that Islam has always defended the interests of the woman in the family, demanded a humane attitude toward her and so forth. And they most often have recourse here to the services of the Sunnah and to its Hadith which are most fitted to the spiritual requirements of the contemporary believer. The saying attributed to Muhammad "Your Paradise is at your mother's feet," for example, has become very fashionable and, correspondingly, is used frequently.

The representatives of the Muslim religion wish to strengthen their positions among believers by way of a change in certain aspects of ritualistic activity in a spirit of contemporaneity. A representative of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan directly declared that "a priest who organizes his work without regard for the conditions and spirit of the times cannot be called an intelligent person."

For the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with the Shariah representatives of the Muslim religion frequently require a marriage certificate of the registry office. The quadi of Kabardino-Balkharia spoke of the need to observe this procedure in an address to priests. "Servants of the mosques will be held strictly accountable for the violation of Soviet religious legislation," he declared.<sup>3</sup>

Representatives of the Muslim religion are deliberately proceeding toward a renovation of the moral-legal concepts of Islam. But it is absolutely not a matter of their now acting the part of champions of progress but of their being concerned at the status of Islam in our society.

In interpreting the [ayaty] of the Koran and the Hadith of the Sunnah in a new fashion and even sometimes engaging in "Hadith creation" the priests are primarily concerned to conceal the essence of the teaching of Islam and to rehabilitate its ideological sources. But in declaring now that the unequal position of the Muslim woman was brought about not by the spirit of Islam but, on the contrary, by a departure from the principles contained in original Islam the Muslim clergy is also undoubtedly taking into account the fact that the percentage of believers is higher among women. The priests of the Muslim religion understand full well the tremendous potential of women believers in the reproduction of the religious consciousness among members of the family, particularly the children. This is a most important reason for the evolution of the views of the contemporary Muslim clergy and its renunciation of the orthodox views of Islam on the family and women.

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A most important reason for the preservation of the vestiges of Islam in the republics of the Soviet East was, as has already been said, the harsh legacy of the past and a socioeconomic and cultural backwardness equal to an entire historical era. It is a question of these republics' transition to socialism, bypassing the capitalist formation.

Whereas in Central Russia and other union republics capitalist relationships and capitalist production had evolved, in the main, on the eve of the October Revolution, feudal-patriarchal relationships predominated in all the republics of the Soviet East. Correspondingly, family relationships and the position of the sexes in society were organized on a feudal-patriarchal basis here; marriage and family relationships were regulated exclusively on the basis of Shariah statutes; and the feudal-patriarchal relationships were not done away with and were not affected even by the limited bourgeois secularization. This, as has already been said, was intensified by the illiteracy of the population, cultural and economic backwardness, family and national exclusiveness and the lagging of the entire spiritual life of the society.

It is primarily the social nature of the Muslim religion which may be attributed to the factors contributing to the preservation of the vestiges of religious consciousness in marriage and family relationships. The vestiges of Islam are manifested most intensively in the sphere of everyday life. In no other contemporary world religion has the sacralization of family and everyday relationships reached such a high degree of detailed elaboration as in the Islamic world. The profound penetration of the dogmatics, ethics and social theory of Islam into the mentality and family life and the absolute dependence over many centuries of the Muslim's spiritual work explain the strength of the survivals of this religion in the everyday consciousness and in marriage and family and social relationships.

Despite the general antifeminist spirit of Islam, religiosity is most firmly preserved among Muslim women, which, in turn, is contributing to the preservation of the vestiges of Islam. Women constitute 70-85 percent of believers unionwide. And in areas of the traditional prevalence of Islam the percentage of women believers is, it is believed, not lower but considerably higher.

What are the reasons for the higher-than-usual religiosity of the female population among the peoples which confessed Islam in the past? Let us dwell on the most important of them.

The remnants of the inequality of the sexes and the confinement of women's sphere of activity to housework are the main reason. It was not fortuitous that V.I. Lenin termed housework stupefying. It does not contribute to the spiritual awakening of the housewife, whose little social world is confined to the narrow framework of the home, the kitchen and the children. Women who do not work in social production are also outside of ideological influence. It is difficult to conduct any kind of organized educational, scientific-atheistic work with them.

Another important reason for the higher-than-usual religiosity of women of the indigenous peoples of the Soviet East is the considerable percentage (compared with the female population of other areas of the USSR) of semiliterates among them.

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The decade following the 1959 census showed that a quantitative growth could be observed throughout the union of women with higher, incomplete higher and secondary specialized education and general secondary education. This is a general growth trend. The same process, but somewhat slower, is also occurring in the republics of Central Asia and the Azerbaijan SSR. The results of the 1970 USSR population census testify to this. However, it is not only women with basic education who constitute a large percentage of the female population in the republics of the Soviet East, particularly in rural localities. There are many semiliterates and even total illiterates there. These are mainly women of advanced years, but there are a fair number of them among the indigenous female population nonetheless. Furthermore, this category of women is "the one that counts" in the family, particularly if it is considered that they perform the function of bringing up the younger generation.

A negative attitude toward women's education still exists among the backward part of the rural population of the peoples which confessed the Muslim religion in the past. The negative attitude and the old, patriarchal views on women's education were manifested particularly strongly here in the 1930's and 1940's. These views have undergone considerable changes recently, it is true, testifying to the trend toward a closing of the gap between men's and women's education, which is a regularity of the developed socialist society. But in the rural regions of Dagestan and in Central Asia, Azerbaijan and other areas of the prevalence of Islam the process of young women dropping out of the general educational schools after the junior classes is still to be observed. The dropout rate of girls from the general educational schools is particularly pronounced in grades 8 through 10. This problem is assuming particular social acuteness in our country in connection with the adoption of the law on the need for the universal secondary education of the country's population.

The higher-than-usual religiosity of the female population in the republics of the Soviet East is also explained by the preservation of feudal-patriarchal views on women.

In the Islamic world the educative function of the mother is manifested exceptionally strongly inasmuch as the upbringing of the younger generation is considered the mother's primary duty. Among part of the population, particularly in rural localities and where children of preschool age are not enveloped by creches and kindergartens, the educative function is left entirely to the mother. But what can a woman give her children if she is illiterate or semiliterate and if her spiritual world is confined to day-to-day routine and her mind filled with religious superstitions and prejudices? She will naturally bring up her children in the same image and likeness. The raising of children by a backward religious mother is a further reason for the preservation of the higher-than-usual religiosity of the population and constitutes a main channel of reproduction of the religious consciousness in the generations.

Representatives of the official and unofficial clergy, religious fanatics and sectarians and religious activists, particularly in rural localities, try to take advantage of the woman's special role in raising the younger generation. Through various channels they penetrate the exclusive sphere of the family, influence believers and sometimes nonbelievers also and create a "positive public opinion" around religious families.

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A reason of considerable importance for the preservation of the population's religiosity, in family life also, is the presence in the republics of the Soviet East of unofficial religious organizations in addition to the official ones and also religious educational institutions and sects and the vigorous activity of the priests and their believer-fanatic assistants. For example, Dagestan currently has the Religious Administration of Muslims of the North Caucasus and Dagestan and 27 officially registered operating mosques. And the sphere of influence of these 27 mosques is not confined, moreover, merely to the villages and cities where these mosques are located. Thus believers from all nearby centers of population attend the Makhachkala Mosque for Friday prayers or religious festivals. The same can also be said about the Khasavyurt, Buynaksk, Derbent and other mosques. In the USSR as a whole there are 1,330 mosques for four religious administrations of Muslims. It should also be noted that the representatives of the official Muslim religion are taking advantage of everything possible for the propaganda of religious ideology in measures contributing to the revival of religion, but are doing this very cautiously, lest they be accused of violating Soviet religious legislation. This applies particularly to such questions as teaching children the Koran, public speeches propagandizing religion and so forth. An essential condition of all their sermons is complete political loyalty in respect of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Another characteristic feature of contemporary sermons is their time-serving tone.

To influence the minds of the population of the former Muslim outlying regions the clergy is taking advantage of its obligatory participation (official or unofficial) in wedding ceremonies, at funerals, upon solemnization of a Shariah marriage and childbirth and so forth. By its active participation in these ceremonies it is contributing to the strengthening of its positions and the positions of religion. With the observance of the sacral rites of Islam it is attempting to influence not only believers but also nonbelievers.

In our view, the influence of Muslim ideology through the observance of holy Muslim rites, traditions and rituals is considerably greater than directly through the mosque inasmuch as the range here is not confined merely to believers.

Together with the officially registered mosques unregistered mosques also operate in places in the republics of the Soviet East. Like the official mosques, they also contribute to the preservation of the population's religiosity--to no less an extent, if not to a greater extent.

Pilgrimages to so-called sacred places is on the same footing with the mosques (for conservation of the religious consciousness). In its national period orthodox Islam recognized no pilgrimage other than to Mecca, but later the worship of saints acquired particular strength, and other major centers of pilgrimage appeared in the Islamic world together with the Ka'bah, both Sunni and Shi'ite, the principal ones of which are the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina and the tombs of the Caliph Ali and his son Hussain in Kerbela and Najaf. In addition to the "centralized" "holy cults" in the Muslim countries there also appeared the cults of "saints" of a "lower rank," and this ultimately became virtually the fashion, so that in prerevolutionary Dagestan, for example, there was hardly a center of population without its own "sacred place" where various public religious ceremonies were conducted.

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How does pilgrimage to the "sacred places" contribute to the preservation of religiosity among the population?

The pilgrims come to the "sacred places" from all over. Passing through the villages en route, they sing hymns, attracting attention to themselves, but the main thing is that on return from the "sacred places" they become active information workers with respect to "miracles" which they have "seen and heard."

Unsatisfactory supervision on the part of the local soviets of the activity of the Muslim clergy contributes to a considerable extent to preservation of the religiosity of the population. Instances of the clergy's violation of the principles of the socialist law on worship are frequent in the republics of the Soviet East.

Shortcomings of scientific-atheistic propaganda are also among the reasons for the preservation of vestiges of Islam in our country. Shortcomings, oversights and miscalculations in this work are inevitable, and it is our task to adopt a critical approach to their evaluation and take all steps necessary to overcome them.

Scientific-atheistic propaganda's insufficient coverage of all strata of the population, as a result of which atheistic ideas do not reach all groups of the population, figures among its main shortcomings. This applies particularly to rural localities and to people not employed in the material production spheres, particularly housewives. In fact among them the atheization of the social and individual consciousness is occurring more under the influence of objective conditions (the development of our society) than under the impact of subjective factors. In a word, precisely that section of Soviet people which is in most need of our daily assistance and ideological-theoretical education is beyond the bounds of active ideological influence. This is the principal shortcoming of our scientific-atheistic propaganda.

Another shortcoming of scientific-atheistic propaganda under current conditions is the shortage of skilled propagandist-antireligionist personnel. The shortage of such personnel is again revealed particularly in rural localities, where it is specially needed. Far from all of the big army of rural teachers, agricultural specialists, medical workers and others participates actively in the atheistic education of the population of the republics. A part of the intelligentsia also has a nihilistic attitude toward scientific-atheistic propaganda, although the groundlessness of such an attitude is obvious. And, what is quite intolerable, certain representatives of the intelligentsia themselves sometimes act as the purveyors of vestiges of Islam and a backward patriarchal-feudal everyday life, that is, are themselves in need of atheistic education. Our scientific-atheistic propaganda is also lacking in consideration of this specific feature.

A major shortcoming of our scientific-atheistic propaganda is the lack of concrete consideration of the audience and also the degree of religiosity, educational level, age, sex and professional composition of the believers and their spiritual interests and so forth. Very frequently scientific-atheistic measures are for this reason conducted in the production collectives, where the percentage of believers is negligible. A failure to take account of the special features of the urban international audience leads to situations of a lecturer criticizing the ideology of Islam being heard by the followers of other religions (or vice versa). And speeches by representatives (albeit formally) of other faiths or nationalities evoke believers' negative reaction, as a rule.

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Elements of stereotype are to be observed in scientific-atheistic propaganda. The basic, principal place is occupied by lectures; such atheistic measures as question-and-answer evenings, special-subject evenings and so forth are conducted insufficiently.

We have dwelt here merely on the basic, principal shortcomings of scientific-atheistic propaganda reducing its efficacy the most.

The success of scientific-atheistic propaganda will largely depend on the enlistment in the ranks of active fighters against vestiges of Islam of the broad public: the production collectives, all aware workers and the wide circle of the intelligentsia, particularly the rural intelligentsia. Primarily, though, each communist must be a militant atheist.

#### The Shariah Marriage and its Manifestations in the Socialist Society

The Shariah marriage is a most enduring manifestation of Islam in the sphere of family life. An analysis of the results of concrete-sociological studies in Central Asia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Checheno-Ingushetia and elsewhere testifies to this, in particular.

The overwhelming majority of marriages is registered here, as throughout the USSR, on the basis of Soviet legislation in registry offices and the rural soviets, but many marriages are still solemnized on the basis of Shariah statutes, that is, there is a dual solemnization of the marriages. Particularly many Shariah marriages are solemnized in the countryside. M.O. Tsipikova (on the basis of material of Checheno-Ingushetia)<sup>4</sup> and other experts write about this.

The influence of the Shariah marriage in the republics of the Soviet East is so strong that recourse is had to its "services" even following grandly celebrated Komsomol-youth weddings (see in this connection Rakhim Esenov's article in PRAVDA of 14 March 1975).

There is also a category of citizens, small, it is true, which restricts solemnization of a marriage solely to a Shariah basis, without registering it in accordance with Soviet legislation. Members of various Murid organizations, individual religious fanatics and also willful violators of Soviet family law figure primarily in this category. As M.M. Mustafinov reports, according to the material of concrete-sociological research conducted in the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR, 10.1 percent of Chechen and 3.2 percent of Ingush polled registered their marriages solely in accordance with the Shariah.<sup>5</sup>

What place does the Shariah marriage occupy in the world of believers and nonbelievers and what is the attitude of both toward it?

When discussing the Shariah marriage, it should primarily be borne in mind that in our society it is arranged not only by believers and not only from purely religious motivations. Some nonbelievers are also frequently forced to resort to it. The latter perform this rite, as a rule, under the impact of public opinion (at the insistence of the parents, close relatives and so forth); yet many mistakenly consider it the national form of marriage.

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According to the results of recent sociological studies in the republics of the Soviet East, the motivation for solemnizing a marriage in accordance with the Shariah is different in the world of believers and nonbelievers. An analysis of the different views of the Shariah marriage of different groups of people is of importance for a differentiated approach to its guardians.

When the question is put concerning the reasons for the solemnization of a Shariah marriage, strong believers answer that without the [nigyakh] established by the Prophet Muhammad a woman is forbidden for a man, and, consequently, he cannot live with a wife without the arrangement of a Shariah marriage. Similar responses during a verbal survey were obtained not only from men but also from many women. In the category of people giving such an answer were primarily representatives of advanced years of both sexes. Many of them had been brought up in the spirit of strict observance of the rites and traditions of Islam in the family and in relation to women. Among the activists of this orthodox category are representatives of the official religion, itinerant mullahs, members of religious organizations, sectarians and other fanatical believers. A characteristic feature of this group of believers is their active position with respect to religion and Shariah traditions.

For a second, more populous category of persons--persons with weak religious convictions--the Shariah marriage represents an essential social tradition. It is considered a "behest of the fathers" and a national custom, although for the peoples of the Soviet East the Shariah marriage is not national and has always been only a religious marriage.

The bulk of representatives of this group of the population, although keeping to the marriage and family principles of Islam, is not consistent always and everywhere.

There is further a special category of persons who solemnize Shariah marriages despite an indifferent attitude toward religion. These are, for the most part, total nonbeliever representatives of the local intelligentsia (teachers, agronomists, medical workers, students) and sometimes scientific assistants even. Some 58 teachers, 45 students and more than 20 doctors arranged the marriage in parallel along Shariah and Soviet legislation lines in 1975 in Andizhanskaya Oblast alone. Numerous instances of solemnization of the marriage along Shariah lines by representatives of the intelligentsia were determined by a student scientific expedition in villages of Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia.

Incidentally, the true number of Shariah marriages cannot always be determined precisely since in many instances, particularly where there are no mosques, marriages are solemnized without written registration. Furthermore, it is not obligatory to have recourse to a mullah; this simple act can be performed by any believer, so that in many areas of the Soviet East which lack registered mosques and representatives of the official clergy all the Shariah marriages are solemnized by private individuals familiar with this rite.

As studies which have been conducted show, the majority of newlyweds unscrupulously agrees to solemnization of the marriage in accordance with the Shariah in spite of its ideals and views, giving way to the elders. In other instances believer parents and relatives, independently of the young people and without seeking their consent, themselves appoint representatives for the groom and bride who solemnize the marriage

at the mullah's. The parents and the elderly relatives, who are in violation here of a principle of the Shariah marriage (the presence at the solemnization of the marriage of the betrothed themselves or their personal representatives), are interested not so much in the question of observance of the principles of the Shariah as in the formal aspect--lest they be reproached for departing from the "behests of the fathers." A considerable part is also played here by the fact that, as distinct from the Christian church marriage, with its luxuriant ceremonies, the Shariah marriage is solemnized without the observance of any publicity. Attempts are often made to conceal the time of the solemnization of the marriage even to avoid all conceivable "magic" spells and the "evil eye" on the newlyweds. The parents or relatives also attempt not to publicize their children's Shariah marriages lest the latter become the subject of discussion and condemnation at meetings and in the press.

A particular devotion to the traditions of the past may be observed in the solution of questions connected with marriage and family relationships. For this reason the role of backward public opinion which has evolved on the basis of religious consciousness is so significant here. Religious public opinion acts as a factor resisting the introduction in family life of new, modern, progressive ceremonies and traditions. Official representatives of religion and the nonmosque mullahs exert a particular influence on the formation of backward public opinion and on preserving it.

The activity of the official and unofficial Muslim clergy plays a particular part in strengthening the tradition of the Shariah marriage in the republics of the Soviet East. Recommendations of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan speak of the need for the Shariah marriage. The contemporary clergy performs the role of champions of liberating the Shariah wedding from unnecessary ceremonial extraneous features. According to the Shariah, a marriage should be solemnized, its representatives claim, without any encumbrances, as attested by the following saying of the Prophet: "The abundance of the wife is connected with the lightness of the marriage; the heavier the marriage, that is, the more it is accompanied by expenditure, the more it is unsuccessful" and so forth. However, they are hardly really profoundly concerned about the "colossal expenditure" at weddings and upon solemnization of a marriage in accordance with the Shariah. In presenting such appeals they are primarily taking account of the social sentiments of believers and nonbelievers and their attitude toward the ceremoniousness of the wedding and its excessive encumbrances for the majority of people and the fact that many aspects of the wedding ceremony utterly fail to correspond to present-day requirements. And at the same time the clergy propagandizes and idealizes the "advantages" of the religious marriage, instilling the idea that a Shariah marriage is stronger and that it sanctifies a highly moral and ideal union.

The clergy's higher-than-usual interest in the solemnization of Shariah marriages is explained mainly by two aspects, primarily material interest. Upon the arrangement of each Shariah marriage the mullah receives a fee from the groom's parents or relatives--money or valuable gifts. The second aspect is no less important: the Shariah marriage is regarded as an important means of strengthening the influence of religion and its reproduction. Being a prevalent vestige of Islam in the USSR, the Shariah marriage constitutes a serious channel of galvanization of the vestiges of religious consciousness.

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Particular activeness in preservation of the old, outmoded family traditions based on the principles of the Shariah and adat is displayed by the representatives of various religious groupings in the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR. They idealize the Shariah marriage and present it as a "purely" national phenomenon.

The declarations of representatives of the clergy about their special interest in the stability and happiness of the family are fraudulent from start to finish. The mullahs are most interested in a large number of marriages and divorces, on which their income and influence depend.

The solemnization of Shariah marriages is utterly incompatible both with the moral principles of the socialist society and also with the legal nature of the new, Soviet family. For this reason revelation of the anti-humanist essence of the Shariah marriage and a demonstration of its harmful social consequences in Soviet society are of most urgent significance. Only an in-depth comprehensive social analysis of the Shariah marriage affords an opportunity for a correct understanding of its antisocial nature and its incompatibility with the Soviet way of life and the ideals of the builders of the communist society.

The social harm of the Shariah marriage is manifested in several aspects. For the first time in man's history objective conditions have been created in our country for the solemnization of a truly free marriage, which is organized on the basis of the complete equality of the man and the woman. Marriage between persons one of which is already married and between minors and forced marriages are prohibited. Only a marriage registered in accordance with the established procedure is deemed valid, and this marriage imposes on the spouses definite obligations for supporting and raising the children, confers the right to succession of an estate and a pension and so forth. Soviet legal relationships in questions of marriage and the family ensue from the nature of the socialist system and reflect socialism's economic relationships.

Soviet legislation does not recognize the legality of the Shariah marriage. The latter has no legal force and engenders no legal consequences. Article 6 of the Fundamentals of USSR Legislation on Marriage and the Family speaks of the removal of the church from participation in the regulation of marital and family relationships. Such a solution of the question in our society is of fundamental significance for surmounting prejudices and superstitions. Removal of the church from the solemnization of marriages is also of exceptional importance for the republics of the Soviet East.

The Shariah marriage plays a considerable part not only in the everyday life but also in the public and individual consciousness and mentality of believers. Moreover, it is still actually creating new families, determining certain relationships between spouses and parents and children and creating the conditions for peculiar private law relationships. And there are families in our day which have arisen on the "pure" basis of Shariah legislation, and there are many of them.

In rural localities there are frequent instances of persons of the older generation and sometimes young people also accepting the tenets of Islam and confining themselves to the solemnization of a Shariah marriage. The number of such marriages is declining from year to year, it is true, but they still exist, nevertheless,

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and in certain centers of population even constitute a significant percentage of total marriages. The results of surveys conducted in certain centers of population of different areas of the Dagestanskaya ASSR and also rural soviet documents testify to this. Upon an investigation of 1,220 married representatives of the local population it transpired that 432 of them had solemnized the marriage with the registry office authorities, 109 had confined themselves to solemnization of a Shariah marriage and 679 had registered their marriage with the registry office authorities and, additionally, in accordance with the laws of the Shariah. The persons who confined themselves to solemnizing their marriage on the basis of the Shariah married mainly prior to the October Revolution or in the first years of Soviet power. They included people who were unaware of the legal and moral significance of a civil marriage.

In our time more often than not it is swindlers, rogues, violators of socialist legality and morally degenerate elements together with a variety of religious fanatics who resort to the solemnization only of a Shariah marriage. The ease of procedure of the Shariah marriage and divorce leads to very harmful social consequences for women and children. Thus M.G., a native of the village of Gergebil' of the Dagestanskaya ASSR's Gergebil'skiy Rayon, was married and divorced six times in 27 years. With the exception of the first marriage, he arranged all the others in accordance with the Shariah and effected all the divorces also on the basis of the magic words of the talaq.<sup>6</sup> A kind of record for Shariah marriages and divorces was set by G.A., a resident of the village of Mugergeren of the Dagestanskaya ASSR's Magaramkentskiy Rayon, who was married and divorced 16 times. U.A., a resident of the village of Goyty of the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR's Urus-Martanovskiy Rayon, solemnized his marriage to his wife in accordance with the Sharia. They had children. But, having divorced his wife, U.A. acted "scrupulously in accordance with the Shariah" in respect of the children, namely, kicked out their mother and kept them, including a babe in arms, with him. After this, also in accordance with the Shariah, he married a second, third and, after a certain time, a fourth time even, and his malicious attitude toward his wives is considered perfectly normal and in conformity with Islamic traditions. U.A. reasons: "I did not like her, so I kicked her out. There are many women, and I will take who I want."<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, these are not isolated instances. There are also admirers of Shariah marriages and divorces and "knights" of Islam in other republics of the Soviet East.

The solemnization of marriages on the basis of the Shariah in our time has regrettable consequences for the women, as a rule. DAGESTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 31 July 1975 wrote about one such victim of a Shariah marriage. The social harm of the Shariah marriage is further expressed in the fact that it is hindering the rapprochement of the peoples of our multinational motherland and the emergence of inter-nation families. The number of inter-nation marriages in the republics of the Soviet East grows increasingly from year to year, it is true.

The solemnization of a Shariah marriage very often leads to divorce--talaq--in accordance with which on the slightest whim of the husband the wife is usually forced to leave the home and sometimes abandon the children also. In the eyes of believers the social role of the Shariah divorce is considerably higher than the civil divorce. If a believer husband pronounces one of the dogmatic divorce formulas, the family disintegrates instantaneously. The talaq is particularly socially

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dangerous in cases where the marriage has been solemnized solely on the basis of the Shariah, that is, only the husband's benefits in the family have been enshrined. In fear of the talaq the wife submits absolutely to all the whims of the husband. Therefore although the talaq in Soviet society has undergone certain changes under the influence of the surrounding socialist reality, it remains in its social content and forms of manifestation a reactionary vestige of the past demeaning to the dignity of the free and equal Soviet woman.

The social harm of the Shariah marriage in our society is revealed particularly strikingly upon an analysis of certain phenomena contradicting the basic principles of Soviet family law and the basic standards of communist morality. These are primarily the socially dangerous vestiges of Islam, punishment for which is provided for in Soviet criminal legislation. It is a question of polygamy, forced marriages, arranged marriages of minors and also of the prevention of marriage, which are quite prevalent in the republics of the Soviet East.

It is precisely the Shariah marriage which is contributing to the presence in our society of such survivals of the feudal-patriarchal system ideologically justified by the ideological system of Islam. Thus the Shariah marriage is not only itself a medieval vestige but also the basis, spiritual factor and source of the emergence of other, no less harmful survivals in marriage and family relationships. Possibly with the rare exception, there is not a single instance of a polygamous marriage or the marriage of minors and so forth without a Shariah marriage. In perpetrating all these immoral actions, which are alien to the ideals of the socialist society, the Shariah marriage acts the part of a moral-legal factor creating the illusion of "lawfulness."

The enumerated Islamic vestiges in marriage and family relationships represent in our society a socially dangerous evil, and revelation of the essence of each of them and a demonstration of their harm and their contrast to our social interests is of importance for surmounting them.

Among the survivals of Islam of a certain prevalence among the peoples of the Soviet East a particular place is occupied by the polygamy which exists on the basis of solemnization by the Shariah. Statistics of the USSR Supreme Court<sup>8</sup> testify to the instances of polygamy.

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Azerbaijan SSR	--	40	50	42	38	39
Armenian SSR	--	1	4	4	1	2
Georgian SSR	--	3	9	1	5	6
Kazakh SSR	--	16	18	21	25	13
Kirghiz SSR	12	27	44	17	9	2
Tajik SSR	39	39	47	39	30	31
Turkmen SSR	14	6	22	15	15	10
Uzbek SSR	32	66	39	41	30	59
Total	98	188	223	179	153	162

Polygamy is prevalent mainly in the most backward rural milieu, in areas where the strong influence on the population of religion and the Muslim clergy has been preserved. It was precisely in such areas that instances of polygamy became somewhat more frequent after the Great Patriotic War, which was connected with the

consequences of the war, which left many women without husbands and fiancés. In certain areas of Dagestan basically all second wives of bigamists were at that time wives of soldiers slain in the war or young women who at the same time were unable to find themselves a husband owing to the shortage of men and who for this reason alone agreed to marry in accordance with the Shariah to a person already married and become a second wife. And public opinion did not always roundly condemn them for such behavior.

Unfortunately, polygamists in rural localities are not always representatives of the Muslim clergy or believers under the influence of feudal-bai traditions. They also include simply morally unstable people. They have sometimes proven to be kolkhoz chairmen, brigade leaders, commodity dairy farm, kolkhoz warehouse and club chiefs and school directors even. The director of Chechen-aul'skaya High School of the Checheno-Igushskaya ASSR's Groznenskiy Rayon, among others, the father of four children, brought home a second wife. The chief of the club of the same village also proved to be a bigamist.<sup>9</sup> The newspaper GROZNENSKIY RABOCHIY reported on 22 April 1973 the conviction for bigamy of Kyure Agabekov, a veteran worker with secondary education of the village of Darvag of the Dagestanskaya ASSR's Tabasaranskiy Rayon. An analysis of the precedents of the Dagestanskaya ASSR Supreme Court in polygamy cases shows that approximately 30 percent of polygamists are persons who at one time occupied or now occupy management-administrative positions on the kolkhoz, in the rural soviet and so forth.

In order to escape criminal proceedings and punishment polygamists resort to every conceivable dodge and attempt to arrange matters such that their actions not constitute the elements of the definition of the crime provided for by article 235 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the union republics of the Soviet East concerning polygamy. For this they formally divide up their household among the wives and keep the children of the wives with whom they have no civil marriage separate from themselves, claiming that they have neither a common household nor family relationships with them. As a result it turns out that actual polygamy exists, but legal proof is difficult. There are children from two or three wives, these children have a single father, the children consider themselves brothers and sisters, both wives consider themselves the wife of one husband, they strictly observe conjugal fidelity, no one has a right to marry either of them for everyone in the village, including the representatives of the official authorities, knows that they are the wives of a specific person, and nevertheless...legally their husband is not a polygamist. Our legislation needs, we believe, to define a criterion of polygamy which takes account of the real state of affairs and a rectification of the formal legal approach to an important question.

The attitude toward a polygamous marriage of women is of considerable interest, although this sphere of family relationships is of an intimate nature and is therefore most difficult for concrete sociological study. One thing, however, is clear: any woman endeavors to have a husband whom she does not have to share with another, so that the principle of the voluntary nature of marriage in a polygamous marriage is, naturally, excluded.

In the family of any polygamist there is always rivalry among the wives on account of the attention to them and the children on the part of the husband. This struggle is mainly of an intrafamily nature, and the walls of the house conceal it

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from the outside world, but no woman wishes to be the second, third and fourth wife in a polygamist's family. However, after solemnization of the Shariah marriage, she is guided by the need to maintain the family honor, preserve her modesty and be humble and outwardly does not, as a rule, display her dissatisfaction. The less so in that she has to please her husband and the other wives in every way in order not to be driven out of the home. The least disobedience and discontent threatens divorce in accordance with the Shariah and the loss of home and children even. And backward public opinion also condemns her. Therefore she submissively endures all life's burdens, and, consequently, one of the main reasons of the patient attitude of the women themselves to polygamy is again the actual inequality of the sexes in the family and the depersonalization and suppression of the woman.

This is also indicated by the court cases of the republics of the Soviet East, in which an instance of proceedings having been instituted following a woman's petition is unprecedented. Women do not oppose the humiliating feudal-bai attitude toward them on the part of their husbands. Raised from childhood on the traditions of Islamic morality, they humbly endure everything. And even in instances of proceedings having been brought against their husbands they themselves attempt to exonerate them.

This latter is also explained by economic considerations. The point being that if the wife of a polygamist has several children and the father is their sole breadwinner, his conviction could have a negative effect on the economic situation of all his families. Moreover, her acknowledgment in court of conjugal relations with the polygamist could anger the spouse and again lead to a divorce, which is highly undesirable given two, three, four and even more children. And, finally, if she testifies against the husband, backward public opinion would condemn her. For this reason the investigation of polygamy cases is usually complicated by the victims themselves--the women.

The women who consent to be the wives of bigamists or polygamists are for the most part illiterate or semiliterate with a limited inner spiritual world and for this reason easily fall under the influence of the moral-legal rules of Islam. Women, however, who are educated or with sound industrial skills, who know their worth and who occupy a high social position in society rarely agree to be a second or the third wife. On the contrary, they actively oppose polygamy and the old traditions, as a rule. Instances of educated men having two or more wives are also rarer.

A Shariah marriage not only gives rise to polygamy in our society but also promotes the marriage of underage girls and, more rarely, underage boys.

As we have already said, Islamic theory and practice establishes unduly early, unnatural ages for marriage. The Soviet state has determined the marital age by proceeding from the interests and preservation of the health of citizens and the moral-legal principles of the new social system. The Soviet state has proceeded here from the specific and historical singularities of each union republic and has taken account of national traditions, climatic conditions and the mentality of the people. The marriage of minors is considered a crime in our society, and those guilty are liable under article 234 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and, correspondingly, the criminal codes of the other union republics.

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However, despite this, marriages of minors are still prevalent in the republics of the Soviet East, particularly among the rural population. Court statistics for the republics of the Soviet East testify to this, among other things. Thus criminal proceedings were instituted against 13 persons in the Tajik SSR's Kulyabskiy Rayon in 1969 for crimes connected with marrying off underage girls. The people's courts of the Dagestanskaya ASSR convicted 15 persons of such crimes in 1971, 11 in 1974 and 8 in 1975.<sup>10</sup>

An analysis of the facts shows that marriages of minors are arranged mainly by people with a limited world outlook and backward views. But there also sometimes prove to be representatives of the intelligentsia among those marrying underage girls. Thus, for example, having abandoned his wife, Seytkhanov, a teacher at the Beneyevskaya High School, took as his wife an eighth-grade student and married her in accordance with the Shariah. Magomayev, a teacher at the Gilyashinskaya High School of Checheno-Ingushetia, married the same way.<sup>11</sup>

All marriages with persons who have not reached marriageable age are, without exception, solemnized only by religious persons, in accordance with the Shariah, and in violation of Soviet legislation on marriage and the family. So that here also the Shariah marriage acts as a decisive social factor.

A characteristic feature of the marriages involving minors in the republics of the Soviet East is the fact that parents and relatives play the main part here. A study and collation of the material of the people's courts of a number of republics shows that almost all marriages involving minors are arranged on the initiative and insistence of the parents of the groom and bride and the religious "authorities," without regard for the interests of the young people themselves. Such marriages, which are arranged on the basis of the principles of past traditions and customs and without regard for the interests of the betrothed (particularly the girls), frequently end tragically.

The Checheno-Ingushskaya republic newspaper GROZNEFSKIY RABOCHIY carried a letter on 29 July 1969 from M.Kh., who had been divorced in accordance with the Shariah. M.Kh.'s parents had forbidden her at the end of the eighth grade to continue her studies and had coerced her into marriage. Family life did not go well, and after a certain time the husband divorced her in accordance with the Shariah. She was left alone with two young children. The young woman was confronted with the question of how to feed herself and the children. She could not bring suit against her former husband for alimony since the marriage had not been registered in the registry office but merely "blessed" by a mullah.

The violation of Soviet laws on the family and marriage and the arrangement of premature marriages leads to extremely negative social-moral and physiological consequences. Early marriages have a negative effect on the state of health, particularly of women (they lead to infertility and premature aging and so forth). Underage marriages are a cause of girls being torn away from their studies and social life, deprive them of the opportunity to acquire a special trade and prevent the formation and establishment of firm views on family life, the acquisition of the essential moral attributes of the person of the socialist society and so forth.

The forced marriage of women or the prevention of marriage also figure among the harmful antisocial survivals. Some 11 persons were convicted of such crimes in

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the Dagestanskaya ASSR in 1971 alone, 15 in 1974 and 16 in 1975.<sup>12</sup> Freedom and the absence of compulsion in contracting a marriage are not only a chief principle of Soviet family law and communist morality but at the same time a great gain of socialism. Only following the victory of the socialist revolution have there been real opportunities for the realization of this principle. The genuine marriage which ensues from the nature of socialism must not be predetermined either by the material aspect or outside pressure. The betrothed declare their will freely, irrespective of the will of others.

But vestiges of the past inequality in the free choice of spouse exist in the republics of the Soviet East. Parents' interference often assumes ugly forms. The children, on the other hand, are often afraid to offend their parents with a refusal and draw down on themselves and them the anger of the devotees of the old times, piety and the judgment of public opinion.

The patriarchal custom of the abduction of young girls exists in places in the Soviet East. In order to escape punishment the abductors attempt to solemnize religious marriages with the abductees. The abduction of young girls for the purpose of forcing them to marry is not condemned by Muslim morality. In such cases representatives of the Muslim clergy and the religious authorities put pressure on the parents or relatives of the abducted girl in order that they might "voluntarily" be reconciled with the fait accompli and not appeal to the investigating authorities. Here is a typical example of such a "solution" of the question. "My daughter," a father of an abducted girl of the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR wrote the editorial office of the newspaper GROZNENSKIY RABOCHIY (8 April 1973), "attended eighth grade. I thought: she will graduate from the 10th grade and then attend the institute and the tekhnikum. But these dreams were not to be. The admirers of the old days got in the way. The girl was abducted at the school doorstep. What decision should I, her father, have made in this case? Settling the score in the old way is against the law. The court punishes the aggressor--you make blood enemies. Bring the daughter home--the fellow villagers would consider her dishonored and begin to point. And in addition the old men knock at the door every day: 'Come to an understanding, be reconciled, you will be relatives.' So I had to leave Mar'yam in a home that was hateful to her."

In respect of the abduction of girls backward views are also sometimes expressed by representatives of a certain part of the local intelligentsia, which considers abduction a national tradition and a display of "chivalry" on the part of the male. Furthermore, certain officials whose job it is to struggle resolutely against instances of outrages against women themselves become party to the crimes and, in particular, attempt (in order "not to wash their dirty linen in public") to conceal the facts of the crime, act as conciliators and so forth.

Various religious fanatics and the leaders of Muslim groupings in our society encroach particularly on the principles of Soviet family law of the free choice of spouse and the voluntary nature of marriage. Contrary to family legislation in force, they determine for members of religious associations extremely distinctive rules for marrying and demand their unswerving fulfillment. Thus a gathering of leaders of Murid groups, which adopted a "10-Point Abstract," assembled in April 1969 at the cemetery of the village of Al'tiyev of the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR's

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Nazranovskiy Rayon. Together with other family problems it examined the question of the rules of the marriage of members of the religious group. When a girl of a Murid family reaches 18 years of age and a young man 20 (account is taken of the marriageable age according to Soviet legislation), the Vis-Hadji, the ringleader of the Murid sect, announces at the next gathering of Murids: "The daughter of such-and-such a Murid and the son of such-and-such a Murid must on their coming of age be joined in matrimony in accordance with the everlasting decision of Allah. The act of matrimony according to the Shariah must be performed tomorrow." No one has the right to speak or disturb the religious mentor's injunction, and, furthermore, the desires of the bride and groom are completely ignored, and they are actually compelled to marry at the discretion of the head of the religious association.

The spiritual fathers and leaders of the Zikrit communities forbid women of their group to marry representatives of other groups and so forth. This applies particularly to the Beloshapochniks and Batalhadjis.<sup>13</sup>

Mittertowe have spoken of survivals of the ideology of Islam in marriage and family relationships which emerge directly on the basis of the Shariah marriage.

However, these survivals are not confined merely to this sphere. Other vestiges of Islam are preserved in other spheres of family life. But they are also connected with negative social survivals and also prevent the formation of communist family life.

Vestiges of the seclusion of women manifested in the wearing of ritual veils (the paranja, chachvan, yashmak, chimmat and chadir) are still encountered at times in the republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, although the majority of the population of the republics of the Soviet East regards the wearing of ritual veils with revulsion, which is taken into account by the representatives of the Muslim clergy in their time-serving activity. But the sphere of manifestation of the vestiges of seclusion are considerably wider than the wearing of ritual veils. Tearing young girls away from their studies and the incorrect upbringing of children in the family according to sex fall into this category.

In the majority of rural schools of the peoples of the Soviet East girls constitute 50 percent of the students from grades 1 through 4, but they gradually begin to drop out from the fifth grade onward. This is indicated, in particular, by the data on the dropout rate of girls from the senior grades of the Dagestanskaya ASSR's rural schools in 1971-1972 academic year.<sup>14</sup> There has been a gradual deceleration of this process recently, it is true. A similar situation exists in the rural schools of other republics of the Soviet East. In an irreconcilable struggle between the old customs of seclusion and the new, socialist traditions the latter are making a way for themselves and will ultimately be victorious. But the complete emancipation of the woman has yet to be achieved, particularly in regions with a strong religious influence.

Even if they afford their daughters an opportunity of completing school in their native village, many parents do not allow them to leave for the cities to continue their education. In certain villages backward public opinion has a negative view of any trip by young women beyond the village.

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The leaders and members of the Murid associations are categorically negative toward women's education and the instruction of children in school. Some 98 children of Batalhadji families failed to attend school in the 1973-1974 academic year in Nazranovskiy Rayon (Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR); of these, 83 were not even enrolled for school. The children of certain Batalhadjis are not even registered in the local soviet and, naturally, are not receiving tuition in school.<sup>15</sup> Religious fanatics frequently threaten to kill young women for studying in VUZ's, and a very insignificant number of persons--from the Batalhadjis' religious association--has higher education.

There are considerably fewer young women of local nationality in VUZ's and tekhnikums than young men.

In recent years in many republics of the Soviet East the process of women obtaining an education has assumed significant proportions and the influence of religious consciousness and the devotion to traditionalism are declining even among believers. This entire process has been brought about by the general thrust of our development along the path of scientific-technical and social-spiritual progress. The representatives of the mosque clergy are also now adopting a different approach to women's education.

Vestiges of Islam's disdainful attitude toward women in various spheres of social and family life are contributing, as we have already said, to the preservation of the higher-than-usual religiosity among the female population, which, like a press, is weighing heavily on the consciousness of the women themselves and is a social factor of the conservation and reproduction of religiosity in our society.

Studies of the religiosity of the population conducted in the republics of the Soviet East in recent years show that, as before, the percentage of believers is higher among women everywhere. They constitute the majority of believers and observers of such widespread rites and festivals as Uraza, Friday prayer, Uraza-Bayram, Kurban-Bayram and so forth. And women constitute the overwhelming majority of those making a pilgrimage to so-called holy places and also of those persons who turn in cases of sickness to mullahs, sorcerers, tabibs and fortune tellers.

Among the women themselves there are not only those who perform religious rites and observe festivals. Some of them are active propagandists of religion and the old standards of Muslim morality.

Observance of the vestiges of Islam in the spheres of family life is a serious obstacle to the formation of the new man and the active and aware builder of communism who combines within himself spiritual wealth, physical perfection and moral purity.

#### Bride Money--Harmful Vestige of the Past

An enduring vestige of the past to be observed in the creation of a family in the republics of the Soviet East is bride money. This is a most shameful social vice inherited from the exploiter past. Various forms of bride money are still relatively quite prevalent among certain peoples. A letter from Tajik soldiers carried in the newspaper KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA of 17 May 1970, in particular, testifies to this.

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The authors of the letter complain that upon returning to their families they are to marry, but that there is the danger that they will not be able to do so because the parents are demanding for their daughters a great amount of bride money. Earlier the girls were sold openly, but bride money is now taken in the form of gifts.

Articles by Turkmen SSR poetess Toushan Esenova published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 22 May 1974 ("Hated Bride Money") and 28 May 1975 ("All Together Against Vestiges of the Past") were also devoted to this urgent theme. Letters assailing bride money have also been received by the editorial offices of the newspaper DAGESTANSKAYA PRAVDA, KOMSOMOLETS DAGESTANA and GROZNEENSKIY RABOCHIY and the editorial offices of the republic newspapers in the languages of the peoples of Dagestan. The article of F. Aliyeva, people's poetess of Dagestan, "Marriage Without Bride Money!" played a particularly big part in awakening the population's public opinion. Much is said about bride money at meetings, seminars and public gathering. Cases concerning the payment and receipt of bride money frequently become the property of the investigating authorities. None of this is fortuitous.

Bride money is a harmful and disgraceful survival of the distant past which contradicts the fundamentals of Soviet legislation on the family. It is utterly incompatible with the high moral ideals of our society. Bride money, with its private ownership thrust, is preventing the formation of communist relationships in the family and the assertion of new family moral-legal ideals.

The purchased marriage or the acquisition of a wife for a certain fee has not been in existence always but was a product of society at a certain stage of its historical development.

On the territory of our country the bride-money form of marriage was prevalent prior to the October Socialist Revolution and occupied a dominant position not only among the Central Asian peoples and Kazakhs but also among many other Turkic-speaking peoples. In the Caucasus the bride-money marriage was just as widespread among the Kumyks, Nogay, Balkhars and so forth. "Bride money was so great," Prof S.Sh. Gadzhiev writes of the Kumyks, "that it frequently ruined the peasant farm."<sup>16</sup> The amount of the bride money, what constituted it and the time of payment differed with different peoples. The Turkic-speaking peoples made adjustments to the traditions of the Muslims' marital relationships also.

The bride-money marriage, which had existed among the Turkic-speaking peoples and tribes prior to their adoption of Islam, retained its influence as a variety of purchased marriage. The general spirit of the bride-money marriage did not contradict the social essence of the purchased marriage in the Islamic world. Under the conditions of Turkic influence Muslim ideologists did not condemn it. On the contrary, they supplied bride money with a theoretical basis. Bride money, with the exception of certain formalities, began to perform the same role as marriage with the payment of [makhra] performed in the Arab world.

In the East of the Muslim world marriages were not contracted without the payment of bride money in practice. Bride money is also a main social institution of women's enslavement not only in the family but in society also. Thanks to bride money, she became virtually the husband's slave without any civil, property and political rights.

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Wealthy people who were able to pay any bride money took for themselves second, third and fourth wives and 10 concubines of the prettiest and youngest girls.

For representatives of the needy and indigent strata, however, marriage was always a difficult problem because of the bride money. Some families collected bride money for decades in order to marry off the son.

Soviet power abolished the Shariah laws on marriage, bride money, divorce and so forth as not corresponding to the standards of the new society. New families came to be built on the basis of mutual love, equality and the absence of compulsion. The economic calculation, which had been of decisive significance in the past, ceased to play any significant part in the contracting of a marriage.

However, despite the removal in our country of the objective conditions giving rise to the bride-money marriage, instances of its payment and receipt still occur in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Dagestan and among certain other USSR peoples. Therefore the problem of bride money as a vestigial phenomenon in our society remains and still has to be solved.

This is what the figures indicate. In 1974 the investigating authorities of Dagestan examined 10 cases concerning the payment and receipt of bride money and in 1975 they examined 7 cases.<sup>17</sup> Bride money is widespread in the southern regions of Tajikistan, Kulyab, Dangara, Pyandzh, Kul'sangir, Garm and elsewhere. It is also prevalent in many other areas of the Soviet East.

Has bride money remained the same as before? What changes have occurred in bride money in our time? In what instances do wedding expenses appear as bride money and in what as gifts? This question is very important since the solution of other no less important questions pertaining to bride money depends on its correct solution.

A definition of the subject of bride money is provided in article 232 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and in the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other union republics, where it is said that "The acceptance of a redemption fee for a bride by parents, relations or relatives by marriage in the form of money, livestock or other property is punishable by imprisonment...." However, this definition does not, we believe, reveal the full essence of bride money. The lack of a precise definition of bride money gives rise to contradictory judgments and opinions and leads to serious errors in our propaganda and judicial practice. Bride money is often confused with other phenomena in the press and in scientific-atheistic propaganda and practice. On the one hand virtually every gift to the bride and her relations is considered bride money. On the other, essentially, it is precisely the payment for the bride which assumes a disguised form.

The point is that bride money under modern conditions does not appear in "pure," "classical" form, as was the case in the past, when it was an acknowledged obligatory attribute of a marriage. A large amount of bride money was a sign of prosperity and felicity. The greater it was, the greater the enthusiasm it aroused on the part of the society. The bride-money givers were extolled and so forth. And, the reverse, a small amount of bride money aroused public condemnation.

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After the Soviet power's abolition of bride money, its payment not only came to be concealed from the public but this payment itself came to be made in concealed form--in the form of gifts and material aid to the parents on the pretext of wedding and other expenses and so forth.

The "pure," official bride money of the past has in Soviet times come to be manifested in the most varied forms representing an intricate interweaving of national customs and traditions with religious-patriarchal survivals. In order to escape punishment under criminal law the devotees of bride money "clothe" it in every conceivable "national" costume.

Disguise is the principal singularity of modern bride money. Another singularity of it lies in the preservation of national features. As before, bride money or, rather, the forms of its payment, amount, what constitutes it and so forth differ considerably among different peoples. The survivals of bride money have preserved their specific features in almost every republic. In addition, these survivals also have their own narrower, local specific features.

Two opposite viewpoints are encountered in the attitude toward bride money in our society. The representatives of the first do not consider bride money a socially dangerous phenomenon but a national tradition. Accordingly, they do not find the elements of the definition of a crime in instances of the payment and receipt of bride money. "Let us begin with the arguments of the amateur 'theorists'," Rakhim Esenov from Ashkhabad writes in PRAVDA (14 March 1975), "who do not believe bride money to be a survival. It is, they say, only a gift and a sign of gratitude to the parents who raised the girl. They attempt to substantiate the endurance of patriarchal-feudal and religious customs also with...national traditions." But even if we acknowledge bride money to be a national tradition, this does not mean that it should unflinchingly be idealized. It is precisely one of those phenomena which outlived themselves long since and which have long failed to correspond to the social and spiritual requirements of our time and society. We are not about to cling to every national custom merely because it is national.

The other extreme in the attitude toward bride money is ascribing every gift or wedding expenditure of the groom to bride money and seeing in them the elements of the definition of a crime.

The appearance in our literature and verbal propaganda of the above two opposite opinions concerning bride money is explained by an incorrect understanding of the very social nature of bride money, the difficulties of a precise determination of the boundaries between the national and the religious in the sphere of traditions, rites and customs and by the complex ceremonial nature of weddings and ethnic differences. As a whole, wedding rites have been and are from start to finish among the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Azerbaijanis, the mountain folk of the Caucasus, the Tatars and the Bashkirs both in the past and currently distinguished by an intricate ritualism, distinctiveness, uniqueness and originality. All this is explained by the fact that in the past these peoples lived without economic relations between each other, without spiritual communication, in different regions and so forth. The principle unifying them was Islam with the canonized norms of the Shariah and Muslim morality.

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Take, for example, the Dagestani peoples, particularly the Lezgin, among whom the ancient ritual of matchmaking exists. When they come to seek a girl for marriage, the fiance's parents come to an agreement with her parents on the time of the wedding, the necessary material expenses connected with the wedding and so forth. Usually, according to tradition, the wedding expense is assumed by the fiance and his parents and relatives. In addition, the fiance must offer the traditional personal presents: the ring, clothes, footwear, perfumery and others to the bride herself and inexpensive, symbolic gifts to her mother and uncle on the mother's side (he usually receives a sheep). It should be noted that there is no set obligatory amount of wedding expenditure. The material situation of the fiance and his financial possibilities and so forth are taken into consideration in each individual case, although the bride's parents frequently try to "squeeze" as much from the fiance's parents as possible.

With the significant improvement in people's well-being one further negative phenomenon connected with the wedding ceremonies has appeared in recent years. It is a question of acquiring luxuries for the young people: expensive suites of furniture, automobiles, carpets and so forth. And mainly the entire burden of this expenditure is borne by the fiance and his parents. This inclination toward luxury and show is not usually to be observed in the worker, peasant and laboring intelligentsia milieu but among persons living off unearned income. The latter with their feudal-vulgarian ways are exerting a demoralizing influence on the ceremonial nature of weddings and family life and doing enormous harm to the formation of truly socialist marriage and family traditions.

We are by no means against parents, guided by considerations of concern for the new family and their children, rendering necessary material assistance, proceeding from their possibilities and within reasonable limits. A new family, particularly on the threshold of its existence, needs such help, and the rules of intelligent practice operate in such cases. But it is bad when this kind, good concern assumes the ugly form of luxury mania. And, incidentally, as practice shows, a family disintegrates more often precisely in a circle with such vulgarian ways, where disinterested love and mutual fondness is overshadowed by a love for material values.

The contemporary wedding ceremonies of the mountain folk of Dagestan are least of all connected with bride money. In our opinion, the money and produce expended at the time of the wedding and also the personal presents to the bride and her close relatives cannot be reduced to bride money, even in cases where their value is impressive. The bride's parents here not only do not derive any material benefit but, on the contrary, as a rule, themselves bear considerable expense. The daughter's wedding entails certain outlays, and quite sizable ones, moreover: the parents send off their daughter to the fiance's home with a dowry.

Among the Dagestani mountain people the marriage of a daughter and the expenses connected with this, like the marriage of a son, have always been a problem for the family. The Avars, Dargin, Lezgin and other national groups even in the past did not regard the marriage of a daughter as a source of revenue. Monuments of the customary law of Dagestan, in which the "bride money" concept is entirely lacking, testify to this. On the other hand, they often mention [makhra] and the terms of its payment. Among the mountain people of Dagestan of the prerevolutionary period the Shariah marriage with certain elements of local specifics predominated.

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Only the statues of Shamkhal Tarkovskiy mention bride money. However, it should be noted that vestiges of the bride-money marriage have recently spread partially among all the non-Turkic-speaking peoples which confessed Islam in the past.

We see an entirely different picture among the Kumyks, Nogay, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other Turkic-speaking peoples. As we have already observed, among these peoples giving a daughter in marriage in the past was always looked on as a barter deal. At the time the bride's hand was being sought in marriage at the home of her parents a specific amount of bride money in cash terms and dresses, lengths of cloth, produce, livestock and so forth was determined. Of the money, livestock and produce obtained, the bride's parents spent part on the wedding, but the most part they kept for themselves--as bride money for their daughter.

The basic criterion of the definition of bride money should be the fact of its use for the bride's relations deriving material benefit. Here we have manifested the social spirit of bride money and its feudal-patriarchal essence. Under the conditions of the socialist society bride money is a socially dangerous, amoral vestige of the past. That is why the criminal codes of the RSFSR, Turkmen SSR, Tajik SSR and Georgian and Armenian SSR's perfectly correctly regard it as a criminal act punishable by imprisonment with confiscation of the bride money (redemption fee). Consequently, the struggle against bride money is being waged at the constitutional-law policy level. Unfortunately, analogous articles are lacking in the criminal codes of the Azerbaijan, Kazakh and Uzbek SSR's--the republics of the traditional prevalence of bride money. We believe that the exclusion from these republics' criminal codes of articles stipulating punishment for the payment of a redemption fee for a bride is premature and unjustified in practice. Instances of the payment and receipt of bride money exist here also, and this approach to the solution of an important social problem cannot be viewed as anything other than a manifestation of subjectivism with very negative consequences. The history of kaytarma (detaining the woman in the parents home--see below) is being repeated here in Turkmenia. In drawing up the new criminal code of the Turkmen SSR its compilers excluded therefrom an article providing for punishment for kaytarma, which had allegedly disappeared. But, to spite the lawyers, it proved highly durable, such that the republic Supreme Soviet had to introduce (rather, restore) by special decree the article on kaytarma in the republic criminal code (in 1975).

Experience shows that under the conditions of developed socialism it is essential to wage the struggle against survivals of the bride-money marriage not only by way of social influence and methods of persuasion but also by way of compulsion. Only then will it be possible to decisively put an end to bride money.

The bride-money marriage leads, as a rule, to violation of the principle of the spouses' freedom of choice. Such a marriage, arranged at the insistence of the elders, usually leads either to the disintegration of the family or to the complete suppression of the personality of the woman in the family.

But the harm of the bride-money marriage is not confined to these negative consequences. Survivals of the bride-money marriage lead to the conservation in everyday life of other no less harmful vestiges of a feudal-patriarchal nature and to the preservation of obsolete Muslim and pre-Muslim social traditions, customs and rituals. Thus, for example, the payment of money for a bride contributes to

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the preservation of such a repulsive custom as the invitation to the wedding of a tremendous number of guests, in the hope that their cash contributions will compensate somewhat for the wedding and bride-money expense. This contribution is practically obligatory for all those invited to the wedding. Arriving at such a "family celebration," you might not catch a glimpse of the groom and bride, who are usually hid from strangers' gaze, but you are met at the entrance by a man with a notebook and a woman with a large bag. The guest's name is carefully recorded in the notebook and alongside--the amount of the humiliating savbol (contribution).

As already mentioned, the bride-money marriage is practically always accompanied by its solemnization according to the Shariah in the presence of a mullah and also other procedures demeaning to the dignity of Soviet woman. The vileness of the bride-money marriage is manifested particularly in cases of kaytarma (return) customary among certain Turkic-speaking peoples, particularly the Turkmen. The essence of kaytarma lies in the following. If prior to the marriage the groom has paid only part of the bride money, after the wedding and the honeymoon the bride's parents return (kaytarma) the young wife to the parental home and keep her with them until the groom pays the bride money which has been discussed in full. According to the laws of the adat, the bride's relatives even have the right to kill the husband of their daughter or sister should he attempt to meet his own wife. In certain cases kaytarma has lasted for decades, and the husband has been forced to live apart from his wife until he is gray.

The practice of kaytarma lives on here, unfortunately, in some places. Toushan Esenova, poetess emeritus of Turkmenistan, writes about this, in particular, in the article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA which we have already mentioned. And, moreover, this ugly survival is observed not only by ordinary kolhoz members and workers but also communists, teachers and local soviet deputies. Manifestations of the vestiges of the bride-money marriage and their harmful consequences are preventing the conception and formation of communist family relationships. It is essential to wage a decisive, uncompromising struggle against them not only by the method of explanation of their harmful social essence but also, considering their social danger, by the method of compulsion.

## FOOTNOTES

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