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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 13/81)

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK DISCUSSES PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

Moscow O PROBLEMAKH RAZORUZHENIYA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 19 Sep 80) pp 1-2, 63-77, 270

[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, and chapter three from book "The Problems of Disarmament" edited by G. M. Korniyenko, Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 10,000 copies, 272 pages]

[Text] Prepared by a group of well-known Soviet diplomats and specialists in international affairs, this collection offers a deep analysis of the complex problem of controlling the arms race.

The authors persuasively demonstrate the tremendous harm done by the arms race to each country of the world individually, and to the entire world community as a whole. They reveal the depth and scope of Soviet political initiatives aimed at bridling the arms race, at disarmament.

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Foreword

It is sometimes said that the history of human society is the history of wars. If there is some element of truth to such an assertion, it would be no less valid to say that man has always dreamed of a time in which wars would leave his life forever. The biblical prophecy that a day will come when men will "beat their sabers into plowshares" was a reflection of this dream.

Today this is no longer simply an allegorical image, sculptured in bronze by the Soviet sculptor Ye. V. Vuchetich and standing before the United Nations building in New York.

Since the time that the creator of the world's first socialist state, V. I. Lenin, named disarmament the ideal of socialism, the task of implementing man's age-old dream of reforging death-dealing weapons into the implements of peaceful labor became a matter of practical policy of the Soviet state and, later on, of other socialist countries as well.

Being the greatest pragmatist, V. I. Lenin, in distinction from bourgeois pacifists who are satisfied with simply talking nostalgically about peace, perpetually emphasized that only real disarmament efforts can narrow down the material-technical base of warfare, and that only total disarmament is a real guarantee of peace, and the most dependable means of eradicating wars in general. Having a perfect understanding of history and being able to predict its development in many ways, V. I. Lenin warned back in 1915--30 years before the first atomic bomb was exploded--that war based on the latest mighty achievements of science and technology "may lead, and will invariably lead, to destruction of the conditions themselves of human society's existence."*

Lenin's warning is all the more valid today, and it is no coincidence that many of L. I. Brezhnev's speeches have it as one of their obvious themes. "Peace cannot be strong," he said in one of them, "until we put an end to the arms race we are now engaged in, to inflation of military budgets, and to creation of increasingly more terrifying mass destruction weapons. It has now come to the point where if the weapons now stockpiled were to be launched, mankind would be completely annihilated."**

Owing to the efforts of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces, certain results were achieved in the effort to restrain the arms race in the 1960's and 1970's. Had this not been so, there could be no doubt that the world situation would have been worse today, and the danger of war would have been greater.

But at the same time it is entirely obvious that the rate of progress and the scale of agreement on limitation of arms are still behind the rate and scale of the arms race. Moreover at the turn of the present decade the most aggressive circles of the USA and other imperialist powers assumed a course, in collaboration with Chinese

*Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 396.
**Brezhnev, L. I., "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, p 597.

hegemonists, toward further intensification of the arms race, in their desire to disturb the presently evolved military balance in the world in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to the detriment of international detente and the security of nations.

But this has not discouraged the proponents of peace and disarmament. Rather than weakening, they are increasing their efforts to preserve and deepen detente, to bridle the arms race, and to achieve a turning point toward real disarmament. And they look at the future with optimism because, as A. A. Gromyko noted, "now that the idea of disarmament has captured the imaginations of the masses, it is playing an increasingly greater role as a material force in world policy."*

The collection offered here describes what has been done to limit arms and achieve disarmament, why more has not been achieved yet, and what specifically is being done in this direction today.

Problems and Prospects of Limiting Strategic Arms

Strategic arms limitation holds a special place in the effort to halt the arms race, reduce the military danger, and preserve international peace. This problem has essentially become the key direction in Soviet-American relations. Being the two mightiest powers of modern times, the USSR and the USA must not permit the strategic arms they possess to grow in quantity in the course of an uncontrollable arms race, since this would increase the danger of nuclear war and undermine the prospects of consolidating peace and security.

Implementation of existing strategic arms limitation treaties and achievement of new ones may open new possibilities not only for halting the growth of nuclear missile arsenals and insuring their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for successively traveling the road of their significant reduction, having in mind full cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and liquidation of their stockpiles in the end.

The Soviet Uion's consistent struggle to bridle the arms race is based upon a meticulous analysis of the balance of power in the world, and on a full consideration of the military-strategic situation, the trends and prospects of its development, and the material-technical factors of armed forces development. In this struggle, the USSR bases itself on the need for both respecting the interests of the security of each state individually, and consolidation of international peace and security in general.

The process of limiting strategic arms began in November 1969 with initiation of Soviet-American negotiations alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. Their chief result was the signing, on 26 May 1972 during a Soviet-American summit conference in Moscow, of the permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, and the five-year Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the

* "Sovremennaya diplomatiya burzhuaznykh gosudarstv" [Modern Diplomacy of Bourgeois States], Foreword, by A. A. Gromyko, Moscow, 1980, p 15.

Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms.[1] Somewhat earlier, on 30 September 1971, the permanent Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War was signed between the USSR and the USA; it can rightfully be interpreted as part of the general complex of SALT-ONE agreements.

By signing the ABM limitation treaty, the USSR and the USA pledged to deploy not more than two ABM complexes on the territory of either of the sides. The treaty established the principle of the national technical means of verification in accordance with the universally recognized rules of international law. The sides pledged not to interfere with national technical means of verification, and not to employ intentional camouflage measures that would hinder verification. A joint Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission was created to promote achievement of the aims and satisfaction of the provisions of the treaty.

The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms "froze" the number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers possessed by the sides at those levels which were in existence as of 1 July 1972, and it set the limit on launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's).

These agreements were significant in that for the first time there was consent on concrete measures that would in fact restrain the growth of the quantity of offensive arms. Also of importance is the fact that the USSR and the USA agreed to interpret the signed SALT-ONE treaties only as the first step in efforts to further limit strategic arms. In a joint communique dated 30 May 1972, both sides emphasized that they "intended to continue active negotiations to limit strategic offensive arms, and conduct them in the spirit of good will, respect of the legal interests of one another, and compliance with the principle of equal security."[2]

The SALT-ONE documents signed in Moscow were met with great satisfaction on the part of the broad world public. But at the same time the enemies of disarmament and detente, both within the USA and in NATO, attempted to block enactment of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

A major struggle began between the treaty's proponents and opponents in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. In compliance with the USA's constitutional procedure, at the end of September 1972 the Senate approved ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation o. ıtiballistic Missile Systems, while the Senate and House of Representatives co. rmed the Interim Agreement. On 29 September 1972 the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and Interim Agreement were approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and on 3 October 1972 USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers exchanged certificates attesting to the treaty's ratification and adoption of the Interim Agreement at a White House ceremony. The treaty and agreement became law.

For the first time, the Soviet-American SALT-ONE documents spelled out the solutions to highly complex problems in national and international security, ones which appeared insoluble just 5-10 years previously. Together with the important document "Fundamental Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," these agreements on limiting strategic arms were an important step helping to weaken the threat of nuclear war and restrain the arms race.

In November 1972 the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Phase Two (SALT-TWO) began in Geneva. The Soviet side consistently led the talks toward agreement, and it submitted concrete proposals on new measures that would effectively limit strategic arms, promote stabilization of the military-strategic situation in mutual relations between the USSR and the USA, and strengthen the cause of peace and international security.

In June 1973, during a Soviet-American summit conference in Washington, a document spelling out the fundamental principles of negotiations for further limitation of strategic offensive arms was signed. It emphasized that the sides would follow the principles of equal security, and with the recognition that attempts to obtain unilateral advantages would be incompatible with reinforcement of peaceful relations between both states. The document asserted the need for introducing limitations affecting not only quantitative indicators but also qualitative improvements in strategic offensive arms. The sides confirmed the premise that the limits on strategic offensive arms must be subjected to verification by national technical resources.

The next step advancing the cause of limiting strategic arms was the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, which foresaw reducing the number of ABM deployment areas for each of the sides from the two permitted by the treaty to one.

As far as negotiations on a treaty to limit strategic offensive arms were concerned, they went on at a time of acute struggle between the proponents of the SALT treaty and reactionary militant circles in the USA which had formerly attempted to block enactment of the SALT-ONE treaty and were now making an effort to force SALT-TWO into a stalemate. Thus the talks proceeded irregularly, and periods of prolonged stagnation were observed. In his memoirs, former President R. Nixon admitted for example that in summer 1974 the Pentagon blocked the signing of the treaty by submitting the knowingly unacceptable demand of unilateral concessions on the part of the USSR.[3]

A certain shift occurred in SALT-TWO during a working conference between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974. The intention of the sides to sign a new long-term agreement to limit strategic offensive arms effective until 31 December 1985 was confirmed. It was proposed that this agreement, based on the principle of equality and identical security of the sides, would include, besides the appropriate provisions of the Interim Agreement, the following limitations:

"a) Both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities of strategic weapon delivery systems;

"b) both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles with independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)."[4]

Thus a ceiling for the total number of strategic weapon delivery systems was set, to include strategic bombers, which were not included in the previous agreement. Achievement of agreement to introduce a maximum limit upon strategic arms would doubtlessly have been a major step forward in the effort to limit the most destructive types of weapons.

A fundamentally new element in the Vladivostok agreement was establishment of maximum levels for ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. For this purpose the Soviet Union insisted during the strategic arms limitation talks that the production and deployment of missiles with independently targetable reentry vehicles be prohibited, thus averting an arms race in this area. The importance of the Soviet proposal for real limitation of the strategic arms race can be seen at least from the fact that in the last 10 years the number of nuclear warheads in the USA increased by about 1,000 units per year, while the number of delivery systems remained almost constant.[5] Therefore although it was not a radical solution, practical implementation of an agreement concerning the numbers of MIRVed missiles would have set a certain limit on the unrestrained race in this area.

In order to achieve practical implementation of the decisions made in Vladivostok, at the beginning of 1975 the work of the Soviet and American delegations was resumed in Geneva with the job of preparing the texts of the appropriate documents on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement. Fundamental problems associated with limiting strategic offensive arms were discussed in a meeting between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford during the time of the Helsinki Conference in August 1975. Negotiations conducted in 1975-1976 between L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko, and H. Kissinger had important significance to progress in strategic arms limitations.

Throughout the entire time of SALT-TWO, the Soviet Union persistently followed the line of achieving the greatest possible limitations of strategic arms. In the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev noted: "Attaching extremely important significance to this entire problem, we have persistently asked, and more than once, the United States not to close the matter with just limiting the existing forms of strategic weapons. We felt it possible to go further. Specifically,we suggested reaching agreement to prohibit creation of new, even more-destructive armament systems, particularly the new Trident class submarines with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 strategic bombers in the USA, and similar systems in the USSR. Unfortunately these proposals were not accepted by the American side."[6]

Following J. Carter's election to the U.S. presidency in fall 1976, the Soviet-American SALT-TWO negotiations drew to a halt, and in some areas there was even a digression from the approach agreed upon previously. Such was the case, for example, in March 1977, when the American delegation came to Moscow with an openly unilateral proposal which could in no way serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable solution. It is now becoming clear that the American administration, the U.S. Congress, and the American delegation in Geneva contained influential individuals who worked not to complete the effort of preparing the draft treaty, but essentially to block it. Many months of purposeful, meticulous work were required to return the negotiations to the mainstream of the Vladivostok agreement, and implement the directive of the 25th CPSU Congress--to prepare a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on limiting and reducing strategic arms.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter met in Vienna on 15-18 June 1979. On 18 June they signed the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on

Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation, the protocol to this treaty, and the Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms.

As is stated in a document of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Minister on the results of the Vienna Conference, "agreement on these issues became possible as a result of the long and hard work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, and L. I. Brezhnev's personal contribution to preparing and conducting the conferences, to consolidating universal peace, to bridling the arms race, and to developing mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social structures."[7]

Full implementation of the documents signed in Vienna would have opened up new possibilities not only for halting the build-up of strategic offensive arms and achieving their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for achieving a real reduction in these arms for the first time.

As far as the basic content of the SALT-TWO agreement is concerned, in distinction from the Interim Agreement, which dealt only with two types of strategic offensive arms (ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers), the new agreement foresaw maximum levels for the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASM's). The treaty establishes equal maximum limits for the nuclear weapon delivery systems of both sides; it foresees, as a start in the reduction process, reduction of existing nuclear arms; the treaty imposes, with the purposes of reducing the threat of the qualitative arms race, significant limitations on modernizing strategic offensive systems and on creating new systems.

The aggregate levels set by the treaty cannot exceed 2,400 units initially, and later on they will have to be reduced to 2,250 units. The established sublevels of 1,320 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with independently targetable reentry vehicles and heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles having a range greater than 600 km, and the sublevels of 1,200 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles and 820 units for the launchers of ICBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles had the objective of providing the fullest possible guarantee of a balance in strategic forces, without providing unilateral advantages to one side or the other.

Also serving the same purposes are limitations on the number of reentry vehicles that may be installed in ICBM's and SLBM's and on the number of cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km that could be carried by heavy bombers. Prohibition of the creation of new types of ICBM's (not counting one new type of light ICBM's) should limit the race in deployment of new, more-powerful types of ICBM's.

Permitting modernization of strategic arms within certain bounds, the treaty simultaneously prohibits rebuilding launchers for light ICBM's into launchers for heavy missiles, and creating ICBM's with a launch or cold launch weight greater than that of heavy ICBM's possessed by each of the sides.

Prohibition of a number of new types of strategic offensive arms, foreseen by the treaty, is a serious step in restraining the arms race. Article IX foresees, for

example, prohibition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 km for launchers on floating platforms that are not submarines; prohibition of resources for the launching of nuclear weapons or all other forms of mass destruction weapons into near-earth orbit, to include fractional orbital bombardment systems; prohibition of mobile launchers for heavy ICBM's, and so on.

Establishment of the sublimit of 1,320 units and simultaneous limitation of the number of cruise missiles with which a bomber may be supplied is equivalent in principle to establishment of a limit on the aggregate number of aircraft-carried cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km. Installing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles on cruise missiles is prohibited concurrently.

The protocol to the treaty, which will remain in force until 31 December 1981, sets the number of additional limits on cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km, mainly prohibition of the deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and prohibition of the testing of such missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The protocol also prohibits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, as well as flight tests of ICBM's with such launchers, and equally so, the flight testing of ASM's or deployment of such missiles.

The mutual pledge not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through any other state or states, or by any other means, has independent and, moreover, extremely important significance. This closes a dangerous loophole of possible erosion or weakening of the set limits and provides a strong guarantee of their stability and effectiveness.

The practice of notification concerning the launchings of ICBM's beyond the limits of national territory was introduced by the previously signed Soviet-American Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War dated 30 September 1971 and the Agreement to Prevent Incidents on the High Seas and in the Airspace Above Them dated 25 May 1972. The SALT-TWO treaty foresees a general and farther-reaching pledge on this account, foreseeing prompt notification as to the performance of all planned test launchings of ICBM's, with the exception of just single ICBM launchings planned within the limits of national territory. This pledge is an important measure aimed at increasing the trust between the sides.

The fundamental principle of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks is the principle of equality and identical security. The new treaty was structured mainly on the basis of this principle, and it expresses a just balance between the interests of the USSR and the USA. It is the result of many years of effort. Each provision of the treaty and of other documents associated with it was carefully thought out, and no deviations from the achieved agreement can be considered permissible. At the Vienna talks L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that "any attempts at shaking this intricate edifice, which was erected with such great difficulty, to change any details in it, or to tilt it in one's favor would be an unpromising effort. The entire structure might collapse--with serious and even dangerous consequences to our relations and to the situation in the world as a whole."[8]

Formation of the principle of equality and identical security began long prior to the opening of Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation as a result of Soviet disarmament initiatives in the early 1960's. Thus the text of the Joint

Declaration of the Governments of the USSR and the USA on Prearranged Principles for Negotiations on Disarmament, which were approved by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 1961 contains the following provision: "All measures of universal and total disarmament must be balanced such that in no phase of enactment of a treaty would one state or a group of states be able to receive a military advantage, and that security would be guaranteed equally to all."[9] Later this principle was embodied in the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement, and it was documented in the Fundamental Principles of Mutual Relationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America dated 29 May 1972, which confirmed the impermissibility of attempts "to obtain unilateral advantages, directly or indirectly, at the expense of the other side";[10] it is also documented in the Fundamental Principles of Negotiations on Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated 21 June 1973.

The preamble of the new treaty and the Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms, signed in Vienna by L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, devote a special place to this principle. Section One of the Joint Declaration states in particular: "The sides will continue to negotiate, in compliance with the principle of equality and identical security, on measures to further limit and reduce the quantities of strategic arms, and to further limit them in qualitative respects."[11]

In terms of limiting strategic arms, the principle of equality and identical security is essentially an expression of the recognition by both sides that parity is needed in their strategic arms, and that a balance in strategic nuclear missile power must be maintained, be it peculiar and, at times, dynamic. The principle of equality and identical security, the sole possible foundation for agreement on strategic arms limitation, is organically associated with the very nature of modern weapons and the objectively existing balance of strategic forces between the USSR and the USA.

During the Vienna talks in June 1979 between L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, each side declared that it did not aspire and would not aspire to military supremacy, inasmuch as this might lead only to dangerous instability, generating a higher level of arms and not promoting the security of either side.[12]

Discussing provisions worked out in the course of the strategic arms limitation talks and making up the basis of Soviet-American interaction in this area, we should note the important significance of combining quantitative and qualitative limitations. In this case the role of qualitative limitations grows significantly when equal maximum levels of strategic arms are established for the sides, and especially when these limits are reduced. The need for combining quantitative and qualitative limitations is dictated by the principle of equality and identical security, inasmuch as when quantitative limitations exist, it becomes even more important, than in their absence, to establish qualitative limitations that would exclude the possibility either side might have for shooting ahead through improvements in armament and obtaining unilateral advantages, even if the quantitative limits remain the same. In other words there is a constant possibility of so-called "technological breakthrough"--creation of new forms of weapons which, when placed in the hands of one of the parties to the strategic arms limitation talks, could provide the latter a unilateral advantage.

The provision of combining quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms was documented in the SALT documents as one of the fundamental principles of the negotiations.[13]

In addition to establishing quantitative limits, in order to reduce the threat posed by the qualitative arms race the SALT-TWO treaty imposes significant limitations on modernizing existing strategic offensive systems and creating new systems. These limitations pertain, in particular, to the launch and cold launch weight of missiles, the number of reentry vehicles per MIRV missile, and other parameters.

One important factor of the viability of SALT agreements is organizing verification of compliance by the sides. In application to SALT, the principle of verification effectiveness assumes the form of national technical means of verification. Article XII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems dated 26 May 1972 and Article V of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms state that "each of the sides uses the national technical means at their disposal in such a way as to comply with the universally recognized principles of international law." This same principle, which had now demonstrated its viability, was also included in Article XV of the SALT-TWO Treaty.[14]

The SALT-TWO agreements signed in Vienna in June 1979 are typified not only by the fact that they establish a system of mutually associated and balanced limitations on strategic offensive arms, but also in that they clearly define the future tasks associated with strategic arms limitations. These tasks are spelled out both in the text of the treaty itself and in a special document--Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms.[15] Discussing this aspect of the Vienna agreement, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko noted the following at a press conference on 25 June 1979: "...the present treaty creates a bridge leading to the next treaty.... It is our intention to not stop with what has been achieved, to go farther, to spare no efforts in order to achieve a further reduction of nuclear missiles."[16]

Here specifically are the goals set in the joint declaration cited above: Meaningful and significant reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms; qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, to include limitations on the creation of new types of such arms and on modernization of existing arms; limitation of strategic offensive arms that destabilize the strategic balance to the greatest degree; measures to reduce and avert the danger of a surprise attack; resolution of issues contained within the protocol to the treaty--that is, concerning mobile ICBM launchers, sea- and land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km, and on on.

As is spelled out in Article XIV of the SALT-TWO Treaty, active negotiations on strategic arms limitation were to be resumed immediately after the SALT-TWO Treaty entered into force. Thus the next step is to ratify the SALT-TWO Treaty, which would open the road for progress toward SALT-THREE.

However, in the time since the signing of SALT-TWO, serious obstacles have arisen to limitation of strategic arms, and new difficulties have arisen due to the inconsistency and hypocrisy of the policy of the USA and its allies, which are in

turn associated with negative trends in the growth of military expenditures and intensification of the arms race, trends which arose and developed back before the signing of SALT-TWO.

Throughout the entire time President J. Carter has been occupying the White House, Washington has continued to encourage further growth in military preparations. The USA's five-year military program calls for further expansion and qualitative improvement of the arsenal of strategic arms. Production of cruise missiles began in 1980. Efforts are under way to create the new mobile MX ballistic missile, which is to be deployed in the latter part of the 1980's, and the new Trident submarine system is being developed and introduced. Conventional armed forces are beginning to experience their largest growth in the postwar history of the USA. The ruling circles of the United States, resurrecting the infamous policy of dealing "from a position of strength", have assumed the road of directly subverting the efforts toward detente. To please business interests, U.S. Congress and the administration tabled ratification of the SALT-TWO Treaty indefinitely.

At the same time the leaders of the USA continue to proclaim that the SALT-TWO Treaty is still on the agenda of the U.S. Senate, and that the administration intends to see to its ratification in the future.

U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie said the following in a speech on 7 May 1980 to the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs: "I believe that signing the agreement for balanced arms limitation would strengthen our security. The SALT-TWO Treaty cannot be interpreted as our gift to our rivals. By limiting the threat hanging over us, it satisfies our own interests."

U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski follows the same line. Speaking for example on 11 October 1979 in Savannah (Georgia), he declared that the SALT-TWO Treaty strengthens the security of the USA, reduces the threat of war, and provides the basis for reducing nuclear arms, and that this treaty has vitally important significance to the future of the USA as a national entity.

Thus despite all of the zig-zags in practical policy, the ruling circles of the USA admit that limitation of strategic arms is in keeping with the fundamental national interests of the USA. Public opinion surveys show that most Americans are in favor of limiting or completely prohibiting strategic offensive arms. According to a survey conducted by NEWSWEEK in February 1980, 60 percent of the Americans have this opinion.

In turn the Soviet Union, true to its consistent policy of peaceful coexistence and reducing the risk of the outbreak of war, will do everything it must to keep intact all of the positive things that have been achieved so far in limiting strategic arms and restraining the arms race in general. The 1980's can and must become a time of significant movement forward toward real disarmament, including in relation to strategic arms. The SALT-TWO agreement creates the necessary prerequisites for this. Whether or not the favorable prerequisites are satisfied will naturally depend not only on the Soviet Union but also primarily on the United States. Progressive mankind hopes that the proponents of halting the uncontrollable arms race and achieving new agreement, on the basis of SALT-TWO, on further measures to limit and reduce strategic arms will prevail in the USA.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh SSSR i inostrannymi gosudarstvami" [Collection of Existing Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions Signed Between the USSR and Foreign States] (referred to hereinafter as "Collection of the Existing Treaties..."), Issue XXVIII, Moscow, 1974, pp 31-32.

2. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1972" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents. 1972], Moscow, 1973, p 79.

3. See PRAVDA, 24 June 1979.

4. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sbornik dokumentov. 1974" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents. 1974], Moscow, 1975, pp 171-172.

5. "Department of Defense Annual Report," Wash., 1980, p 77.

6. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 23.

7. PRAVDA, 22 June 1979.

8. PRAVDA, 18 June 1979.

9. "Mezhdunarodnoye pravo v dokumentakh" [International Law in Documents], Moscow, 1969, p 385.

10. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collection of Documents], Moscow, 1977, p 121.

11. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.

12. Ibid.

13. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," p 127; PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.

14. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 115, 119; PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.

15. See PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.

16. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.

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MYTH OF 'RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE' IN USSR REFUTED

Dushanbe AGITATOR TADZHIKISTANA in Russian No 3, Feb 81(signed to press 20 Jan 81) pp 31-32

[Article by A. Belov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "The Myth of a 'Religious Renaissance' in the USSR"]

> [Text] I have heard the statement that the number of believers is increasing in our country. Is this so?
>
> A. Navruzov, Tursunzade

No, it is not so. One of the great results of the 63-year history of the Soviet state is the dominance of the scientific materialist viewpoint in the consciousness of the overwhelming part of the population and the crisis of religious ideology. There are believers in our country, but their number is steadily growing smaller. Freedom of conscience, like all democratic rights in our society, is guaranteed by the USSR Constitution. Believers actively participate in the life of the country and in the building of a communist society.

The idea of a "rebirth of faith" in the USSR comes to us from abroad. "Sovietologists" of various kinds are making increasing use of the idea of a "religious renaissance in the USSR." I refer to an ostensibly observed process of religious rebirth in our country, which they say is a consequence of the "erosion" of socialism.

The VESTNIK RUSSKOGO KHRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA published in Paris declares with delight that "in Russia, the process of spiritual emancipation is widening... thousands of yesterday's atheists are returning to the faith and the Church. A book by archpriest D. Konstantinov published in Canada has the title: "Religioznoye dvizheniye soprotivleniya v SSSR" [The Religious Resistance Movement in the USSR]. All this only constitutes attempts to pass off a wish for reality.

Bourgeois mass information media impudently state that in our country judicial organs are forced to resort to repression to stop the "tempestuous growth" of religious mood threatening "official ideology."

Actually, there were several court cases, which have been reported in the press. But not a single one of those who came before the court was convicted "for belief," as is heralded by Western propaganda. Persecution for religious convictions is forbidden in the USSR. At the same time, no one, neither believer nor atheist, has the right to violate Soviet laws or to incite others to do this. A rebuff had to

be made to persons who engage in calumny against the Soviet state and have violated existing laws. Unfortunately, almost all the defendants admitted that they were supplied for the benefit of certain Western circles with tendentious information on the position of religion and the Church in the Soviet Union and that they engaged in lies against the Soviet order and attempted to incite believers to organizing "religious resistance."

The opuses of dissidents, who have no direct relation to church organizations, are of no help to antisoviets. Such, for example, are the works of Krasnov-Levitan. For many years he shrewdly peddled his work in the Western propaganda market, and after he had exchanged his Motherland for the "heavenly canopies" of the bourgeois world, he was elevated to the rank of prominent "specialist" on religious questions in the USSR. For lack of better Western protectors of the faith, they secure such representatives of "Russian religious-philosophical thought."

There are very few true believers among those who out of curiousity crowd on days of church holidays places of worship, who for the sake of a misunderstood style wear crosses on their clothing or acquire objects of church attribution. As a rule, we are dealing not with the religious views of people but with their interest in the art of choral singing, with old objects and culture of the past.

Bourgeois propaganda called "renewed interest in religion," for example, the creation in our country of the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, which is also concerned with church buildings of historical and architectural value. At certain stages of historical development, objects and manifestations of material and spiritual culture frequently assumed religious forms. The concern for the preservation of the rich cultural heritage of the peoples of our country stems from fidelity to Lenin's thesis to the effect that "Marxism by no means has rejected the very valuable gains of the bourgeois epoch but, on the contrary, has assimilated and refined all that was valuable in the more than two thousand years of development of human thought and culture."

Western falsifiers also consider atheistic propaganda in the Soviet press to be a sign of the growth of religiosity among the population. For in the opposite case, the press would hardly have been engaged in this, they assert. And here our ideological adversaries deliberately distort the truth.

It is generally known that atheistic education constitutes a composite part of communist education of workers. It has always been considered as an important task of party and public organizations. Our country is the first in the world to become a country of mass atheism, but far from everybody has mastered solid atheistic convictions. This is why the establishment of an atheistic conviction in all citizens continues to be at the center of attention of ideological, political and educational work.

Bourgeois clerical propaganda expends tremendous efforts for arousing religious moods in Soviet people. For this purpose, religious radio centers transmit purposeful propaganda to the Soviet Union. Religious-propaganda literature is sent by various means to our country. Noisy campaigns are conducted abroad in "defense of [religious] belief in the USSR."

But Western propaganda, despite all its efforts, is not succeeding in provoking believers to political opposition to the Soviet power. The religious renaissance exists only in the minds of antisoviets. In actuality, a natural process of the dying away of religion is proceeding in our country. It is also expressed in the weakening of religiosity among believers and in changes in their attitude toward traditional cult values and in the departure of many from the faith. Whereas in 1927, 40 percent of the schoolchildren in our country were believers, at the present time there are no more than 2 percent of them.

Nor are those right who refer as an argument in favor of the birth of religiousness in the USSR to the mass character of the rite of baptizing children in church. This is a manifest fiction. The number of baptisms for the country as a whole is decreasing, especially quickly in those regions where the new socialist rites are actively introduced into practice. In most cases, children are baptized under the influence of parents, relatives or wrongly understood traditions. Of the number of parents surveyed who had baptized their children, almost 95 percent admitted that they were nonbelievers.

History cannot be reversed. It is impossible to prevent the process of inevitable dying out of religion under conditions of socialism, when the deepest roots feeding it have been undermined. The hopes of the enemies of the Soviet power are to no avail, for they cannot find support among believers in the USSR.

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AZERI ACADEMICIAN ON PROFITABILITY OF RESEARCH

Baku AZARBAYJAN KOMMUNISTI in Azeri No 10, 1980 pp 77-84

[Article by H. Abdullayev: "Let Us Increase the Profitability of Research"]

[Text] The economy and the social and cultural development of a society under conditions of developed socialism depend upon results of scientific-technical progress to an increasing degree. Science is turning into a powerful means for the attainment of the duties of building communism. Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "...our party hopes that scholars will do research on new processes and phenomena even more deeply and courageously, that scientific-technical progress will more actively help in work, that emerging problems be solved more precisely, and that the scholars will make worthwhile suggestions on the best means to strengthen the power of the country, improve the life of the people, and build communism." (Leninskim Kursom [On Lenin's Path] v. 5, p. 394).

Soviet scholars have done much to increase the scientific-technical potential of the country by activating directives of the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, they have significantly broadened the scope of research, and strengthened the connection between scientific administrations and production. Scholars of our republic are giving colossal help in raising the profitability of scientific research. They are concentrating their powers in decisive directions of scientific research according to the needs of the day, they connect theoretical research with applied work, and hasten the application of the results of already completed work in the practice of building communism.

The celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Azerbaijan Communist Party was turned into a brilliant demonstration of the achievements won by the republic in all sectors of our life. A multi-faceted industry and a developed, mechanical agriculture were created through the self-denying labor of the people and the close participation of the scientists; the cultural structure broadened substantially. For example, in the field of semiconductor physics, as a result of successfully conducting fundamental research, the intensive development of electronics, micro-electronics, optical electronics, machine design, robotics and other industrial sectors of the future has been made possible.

It is natural that questions of the application of scientific achievements to production are always the center of attention of the Academy of Science collective, the "capital" of science in Azerbaijan. As is known, the fact that scientific results are at the present high level for practical use is the most necessary condition for their successful application. This level depends significantly, in its turn, on the situation of the experimental-production and design and construction /konstruktor/ base. Taking this into consideration, the Presidium of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences created 14 experimental institutions and construction bureaus which are economically accountable in recent years, to the extent that in the course of one year their work cost more than 20 million rubles. Institutes and bureau make it possible to attain in a short time the entire sequence from scientific research to application in the economy.

Scientific-industrial complexes exert an important influence on the job of hastening the application of the results of scientific research to the economy. They have great possibilities to successfully close the "research-production" chain. Seven such complexes, a qualitatively new form of connection between science, led by the responsible institutes in the Academy of Sciences system, and production have been created. Different departments (scientific research institute, special konstruktor bureau, experimental factory) of every complex have a specific program for realizing the development and application of new techniques and technology. Five field laboratories (machine design, technical resin, conditioners, etc.) have been created.

In the course of the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans a new form of organizing applied research and utilizing the results emerged--a form wherein the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, certain ministeries and chief administrators conduct work in conjunction with long-term complex scientific-technical programs. These programs make it possible to successfully attain a number of important economic objectives, define cooperative programs for the future, and keep in view the timely completion of scientific research projects and create the conditions for their application in production. An example of this would be job orders of the Republic Academy of Sciences and a number of Union and republic ministeries and head administrations (Union electronic, radio technology, electro-technology, industrial chemistry, chemistry and petroleum machinery ministries, republican agricultural and sanitation ministries, Käzärdänizneftgazsanaye (Caspian oil and gas industry) and "Azärneft (Azerbaijan petroleum) units. For example, in a contract connected with the Chemical Industry Ministry it is foreseen that 20 complex applied scientific jobs will be conducted making use of six scientific results.

A complex program to create multi-functional memory elements and to apply these on an industrial scale, which has been set up by the Physics Institute together with a number of scientific administrations and institutions, has great possibilities. These elements will be necessary for the development of specialized computers and will be broadly applied in automation, telemechanics, radio technology and other sectors. Their wide utilization will make possible savings of tens of millions of rubles alone, and in the country as a whole hundreds of millions, as well as raising the quality indicators.

A complex program for the preparation and development of apparatus for the study of space and the environment from the cosmos is being successfully attained. This

work is conducted through a joint attempt by the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences Cosmic Research Institute of the Natural Environment and the USSR Cosmic Research Institute, the state scientific research center for the study of natural environment, the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control and a number of industrial organizations on a Union scale. The preparation of 10,000 items a year of only one (galvano-magnetic equipment) of the new elements resulted in savings of approximately 5-6 million rubles.

The Academy of Sciences has applied a new form of cooperation with agricultural institutions and, for the first time in the country, it has become a shareholder in the inter-kolkhoz sheep breeding union. Now a broad scientific production experiment in the realm of raising Karakul sheep under Azerbaijan conditions is under way.

Creative cooperation between institutes of the Academy and scientific administrations and institutions of separate ministeries also plays an important role in attaining economic objectives. This cooperation helps in a nore profitable and more rapid use of the results of progressive scientific research, projected design and construction and technological work. The growth of the amount of work on economic agreements shows the strengthening of the connections of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences and industrial and agricultural organizations. The amount of work in relation to 1969, has increased 10 times; as for economically accountable organizations, roughly 40 times.

The development of new progressive forms of cooperation between scholars and producers has resulted in a significant growth of the amount of applied work and a rise in its economic profitability. The growth of work applied to production done by the Academy of Sciences collectives relevant to the state plan for the economic and social developmnnt of the Azerbaijan SSR economy is characteristic of this aspect. While only two applied jobs were done for the economy in 1970, in 1976 the number reached 11, and in 1977, 15. Forty seven jobs were included in the 1979 plan. In the years 1976-1979, 247 jobs, representing 280 million rubles a year of general economic profit were given over to production, but in the 9th Five-Year Plan 203 jobs were applied, representing an economic profit of roughly 235 million rubles. In accounting for every ruble expended, the profitability of scientific research increases unceasingly. From 1970 to 1978 this indicator has increased 3.5 times.

Scientific-technical progressive discoveries, inventions and profitability proposals are strongly tied to profitable utilization in the economy. Patent licensing work is one of the most important symbols characterizing the relationship of science to practice and the application of achievements. Recently the scope of work in this sector has been broadened. In the years of the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans scholars of the Academy of Sciences took out 1100 testaments of authorship (in the course of the first 25 years their number totaled only 230). Each of the inventions made it possible to solve a specific scientific objective and was put immediately into practice. Some of them have been included in new technical planning of a number of Union and republic ministeries and main administrations. At the same time 200 foreign patents from 34 countries were bought, and licenses were sold to 3 countries - the USA, Italy and Bulgaria.

A vast sector specifically for the production of high purity selenium, new, highly profitable selenium switches and dozens of different types of equipment and mechanisms(microphones, dynamics, time relays, pressurizers, vibrometers, etc) have been created on its basis in the country as a result of the complex of scientific work and experimental design and construction which was conducted by the USSR Electronics Industry Ministry together with a number of organizations. New selenium equipment matches the best world standards, and the state Quality award has been given for them. This equipment is widely used in the electronic, radio electronic and chemical industries, agriculture and transportation, and has been exported to a number of countries of the world.

The construction of the strongest elastic hoses for the oil and gas industry has been started; these hoses resulted from experimentation in the "Khazardanizneft-gazsanaye" production unit. The application of these makes it possible to eliminate metal pipes and will significantly raise the quality and the exploitable characteristics. The scientific bases for the building of a measurement system--subsatellite automated information--has been laid and such a system has been created. Its application to the economy will increase the profitability of using cosmic information in order to obtain important objectives in agriculture, geology, water problems, etc. Tool and construction steel which does not require expensive alloys, is extremely firm and economically advantageous has been achieved. New steel types are being applied in a number of institutions in the republic and the country. Results of experiments conducted in the field of calculating the conduction process, creating unlimited tension in wires conducting electrical energy are being successfully applied in energy output. This work has the goal of significantly raising the reliability of an electrical network.

Work connected with developing AI-93 non-ethyl automobile gas is in the stage of application. With the goal of improving the exploitable natures of lubricants, fuels and polymer materials, a number of profitable admixtures have been developed and applied; on the basis of these new lubricant compositions for automobile-tractor technology (transmission oil for "Zhiguli" automobiles, working solutions for heavy-duty tractors, hydrosystems, motor oils for carburetors and diesel engines, oil for special techniques, etc.) have been created. Experimental production of a new lubricating fluid for polishing steel parts has been set up.

A highly profitable reagent called "Azerbaijan - 4" for purifying natural water, well water and industrial polluted water from petroleum products, and for creating recycling water equipment systems in institutions has been synthesized. In institutions in our republic three purification plants are now in operation.

Work conducted in the realm of developing models for the optimalization of the industrial process for styrol production, a valuable raw material for the manufacture of synthetic rubber, in the Sumgait SK factory has great importance. The application of this work has made it possible to increase product extraction by roughly 40% in projected strength.

The technology of making a modified chlorcarboxylate /khlorkarboksilat/ polyethylene, which is an important raw material for the lacquer-paint and technical resin industry has been established and the first tons of this product have been produced on

an experimental scale. A compound material having high durability for components of grain-collecting combine elevators on the basis of chlorcarboxilate polyethylene has been produced and experiments in the field have been successfully carried out.

A number of profitable inhibitors protecting metal petroleum equipment from corrosion, and even a process which electrochemically extracts iodine from iodine concentrates are being applied under factory conditions.

A synthetic tar extraction process from abundant natural oils has been applied, and these tars have replaced plant oils in drying oil production. It is possible to use oligomers in the production of protective shields, lacquers and paints for construction.

Reaction apparatus and highly productive technology systems for extraction of valuable products such as ethylene oxide synthesized from petroleum chemistry, formaldehyde, maleic anhydride, allylchloride/alilkhlorid/ have been produced and turned over for production. Their application has great importance for the economy.

Output of certain ultra-pure rare materials to fill the need of the electronic, machine-building and other industrial sectors in the field of "micro-chemistry" has been ordered, and on their basis new aromatic substances are being produced as replacements for natural aromatic substances.

The technological bases of the complex manufacture of alunite have been developed. Aluminum oxide, common sulfur, sulfuric acid, gallium, vanadium, potassium manures, etc. are extracted from alunite through this technology. Applications of the results of this work will make it possible to raise the profitability of production in aluminum factories and prevent pollution of the environment through manufactured substances.

The process of extracting dosing salt for the electrolysis and food industries by the complex production of fluids which emerge together with oil is being applied.

A new type of microelemental boron superphosphate manure for the cultivation of cotton and other types of agricultural plant seeds has been developed. Now the production of the manure has reached 100 thousand tons a year, and its application makes it possible to save 40 million rubles a year. A new chemical substance called "Mughan", which replaces an American preparation for fighting cotton blight has been developed and its application has shown results.

Our scholars have evaluated prognoses of oil and gas resources of the Azerbaijan SSR and have isolated the most promising regions in which to concentrate exploration work. Oil strata have been located in the condensed gas bed in the South-2 /Janub-2/ area, and in the Sangachal-Sea /daniz/ and the Gurgan-sea. New principles in the field of increasing the oil yield of a stratum and intensifying oil and gas extraction by using high-yield reagents and wash from the petro-chemical industry have been proposed.

Highly profitable types of agricultural plants—hard and soft wheat, cotton, mulberry trees, grapes, fruit trees and subtropical plants and even "Gafgaz" (Caucasus)

breed buffaloes which give a rich, high-fat milk and hybrid animals resembling the zebu have been bred.

The technology for extracting products useful for industry from plant raw materials (henna, basma, chaytikany oil, etc.) has been developed, and the manufacture of protamine sulphate--a new Soviet preparation preventing the coagulation of blood--has been set up.

Despite all these successes, it is necessary to note that we have many unused possibilities in applying results. The fault for this often does not lie in the institutes of the Academy.

The application of science and technology and progressive practical achievements to production is a two-sided process. Together with demanding work towards the solution of the most important questions of production by the scientific administrations, it places the duty in front of the producers to show interest in the operational and timely application of results of scientific research. If relevant ministeries and main administrations had paid the necessary attention to this important question, the number of applied scientific results would be significantly greater than at present. For example, the quality of oils produced in the oil refineries of Baku now lags behind contemporary needs. The activation of timely recommendations which republic Academy of sciences scholars made would have assured the production of quality lubricating oils. It is a pity that the destructive means and weak pace of construction which the USSR Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry ministeries analyzed with the same goal did not make it possible to resolve this important goal of economics on time. A similar situation in the realm of applying processes for the extraction of ethylene oxide and allylchloride and a number of other valuable scientific results has been created.

It is necessary to note that the time element of planning work which must be applied faces great difficulties. The question lies in the fact that ministries and leading administrations normally demonstrate great interest in applying the results of this or that scientific work in their own institutions. Such work is included in the new technical plan of administrations. But only very rarely is the planned work output reached on time. This aspect interests some economic leaders only slightly because work output unattained when 45 days remain in the year of accounting can be wiped out of the plan without doing any damage. The same situation is repeated from year to year. Our endeavors to include the most profitable work in the plan, not of the administration's, but of the republic meet sharp opposition by both ministeries and leading administration.

In a number of cases the application and mastery of innovations lags because producers have a weak conception of the possibilities of scholars and the demands of production. In order to solve this question it would be appropriate to formalize a system of priorities on industry's demands for scientific research. Such priorities would be gathered in one organ, for example, in the scientific section of the State Planning Committee. It would play the "social priority" role to science and would serve a further rapprochement of science and production.

In industrial institutions themselves it would be appropriate to give broad scope to the creation of specialized application services in a position to finalize

scientific results and use them by taking the characteristics of an industry into consideration. Such service could work in a form connected with quality control services so that they would give great practical profit.

We understand that the problem of using the achievements of science in practice requires its own timely solution. For the successful activation of party guidelines on developing fundamental scientific research by all means and quickly applying its results to the economy it is necessary to unite the efforts of scientists and producers.

The further development and broadening of positive experience in the realm of the application of new progressive forms between science and production is foreseen. For example, in the decree accepted recently by the USSR Academy of Sciences "On Basic Positions of and Development Prospects for Scientific research in the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences" a science production unit (Kichik kimya EAB) for the development and production of low tonnage chemical products on the basis of design and construction technology, experimental production and scientific departments will be created within the system of our academy.

What are the prospects of scientific research connected with responsibilities for the coming five-year plan"

The attention of scholars, before everything, must be focused on problems whose solution would be soon useful to the economy. Along with this, they must broaden the scope of their research and they must create techniques and technology of the future in order to solve satisfactorily a number of problems of the republic's prospective economic and social development.

Deep fundamental research is the source of revolutionary changes in technique and technology. The further development of this research will aid in the successful attainment of the important economic goals placed before our party and government.

Scientific administrations of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Scinnces must strengthen fundamental and applied research by developing serious scientific and scientific-technical problems in the field of the further development of the fuel-energy complex, revealing new natural resources and the profitable utilization of known resources, raising the level of production in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, rapidly developing the chemical and petrochemical industry, creating high quality new materials and substances, highly productive and economically useful machinery and equipment and progressive technology, quickly developing the means of applied electronic computing techniques and automation, raising the technical level of the agricultural-industrial complex and developing the complex use of natural resources and agriculture.

All this research will serve in fulfilling economic demands and raising the profitability of production and will aid in the activation of duties which will ensure the fulfillment of the monumental plans of the 11th Five-Year Plan, an important stage in the building of communism in our country.

The patriotic movement with the slogan "We fulfill the five-year plan with shock-work, we great the XXVIth Congress of the CPSU with dignity" is broadening.

Scholars of our republic, inspired by the decree of the Central Committee of our party "On Socialist Competition to Greet the XXVIth Congress of the CPSU with Dignity", are in the ranks of the active participants, Their basic attention is directed toward activating the historic decrees of the XXVth congress of the CPSU the XXIXth congress of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, and the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU in November 1979 and June 1980. There is no doubt that our scholars will win new successes in further raising the profitability of scientific research and in expediting the application of work done for production and that they will give valuable help to the further raising of the economy of our native republic at this responsible stage of creation.

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