

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9760

29 May 1981

# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 6/81)

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9760

29 May 1981

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 6/81)

CONTENTS

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

European Ramifications of GDR-FRG Relationship Analyzed (Peter Bender; DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, Mar 81) .....	1
Paris Painting Exhibition Prompts Discussion of GDR Art (STERN, 12 Mar 81) .....	17
Past, Current Condition, by Rolf Schneider Artistic Freedom and Limitations, Willi Sitte Interview	

ROMANIA

Repressive Treatment of Religious Figures Described (Lia Wainstein; LA STAMPA, 25 Mar 81) .....	22
--	----

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

EUROPEAN RAMIFICATIONS OF GDR-FRG RELATIONSHIP ANALYZED

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Vol 13 No 3, Mar 81 signed to press 20 Feb 81  
pp 251-264

[Chapter of book, "Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters--Die Europaeisierung Europas" (The End of the Ideological Era--The Europeanization of Europe), by Dr Peter Bender, correspondent, West German Radio (WDR), West Berlin; ARD radio correspondent in Warsaw for many years; author of "Offensive Entspannung--Moeglichkeiten fuer Deutschland" (Active Detente--Possibilities for Germany), Cologne-Berlin, 1964: "Europe and the Germans: The Alleviation of a Problem"]

[Text] The following text is the Germany chapter of a book on Europe, which will be published--under the title "Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters--Die Europaeisierung Europas" [The End of the Ideological Era--The Europeanization of Europe]--by Severin und Siedler, West Berlin (269 p, cloth-bound, DM 32). Peter Bender, who delivered a report on this subject at the 13th Conference on Research on the GDR in May 1980, proceeds from the decline of ideology as a spiritual force in the East and shows the resulting consequences in regard to East-West relations (reduced to power and interests), the relations between the Europeans of both sides and the great powers USSR and United States, the rivalries of the great powers and the need for solidarity among the Europeans. Bender's principal thesis: the rivalry of the world powers necessitates solidarity among the Europeans in East and West. (The editors)

1. History and the Remembrance of It

In 1965, Henry Kissinger wrote: "For at least 300 years, the status of Germany has been the key to Europe's stability"; and after a historical illustration, he continued: "Germany has always been either too weak or too strong in regard to peace in Europe."

In the period following World War II, this experience was confirmed anew. At first, the entirely powerless Germany, which was divided into zones of occupation, was a bone of contention between East and West; since the 1960's, the two developing German states have again become a problem, this time in the opposite way--on account of their weight, which is threatening to turn into preponderance. Germany was and has remained a--literally--central concern of Europe and the "German problem" (the existence of which is called into question only in Germany) is a problem of the entire continent.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This becomes fully comprehensible only if it is viewed in a broader--not merely political--context. Neither of the two German states has fully achieved normalization of relations with the world around it and the reasons for this are similar on both sides. After the war, the Federal Republic and the GDR turned into allies too quickly--they were drawn into agreements, ties and integrated systems, without there having been established the necessary psychological framework. Both the East and the West made the Germans allies out of necessity, not out of conviction or inclination.

As a result, both Bonn and East Berlin showed a tremendous need for compensation. The SED became more communist, and the West German parties, more democratic than the Communists and Democrats elsewhere. The Federal Republic and the GDR submitted more readily to the influence of "their" leading power than did the other Europeans. Consequently, West Germany has long been considered by its neighbors a mini-America, and East Germany is regarded by many Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Romanians as a Soviet republic advanced to the West. The Germans were--and have in part remained--the most anxious and zealous members of their alliances--both states alert toward either side: toward the enemy across the border and toward the lame friends within that border. This certainly did not make them popular; rather, it served to confirm the old, all-European view of the Germans, who always try--austerely, doggedly and terribly efficiently--to be the best and who--to the annoyance of the others--generally do come out on top.

Both the FRG and the GDR also had to prove to their neighbors that Nazism was definitely a thing of the past; in different ways, however, they both failed. The FRG compensated for excesses of the Western allies' "denazification" through pronounced nonchalance in the selection of the new civil servants; as a result of this, there was no end to the scandals over Nazis in positions of leadership and these scandals will eventually end not for political, but for biological reasons. The GDR was radical and consistent in eliminating brown residues; but the traces of the old it had eliminated immediately grew back from within its own system.

Moreover, as an authoritarian party, the SED was very receptive to all traditions of the German authoritarian state. The firm conviction to have totally eradicated Nazism made the East German Communists oblivious to the fact that they themselves--with reversed premises--were continuing what they had thought they had eliminated. This self-righteousness has negatively affected the GDR's foreign relations. In placing--with autosuggestive persistence--the blame for all the errors of Germany's past on the Federal Republic, the GDR gradually came to repudiate all historical responsibility. The functionaries expected the "fraternal countries" to treat them as comrades and they were greatly surprised to learn that the others regarded them first and foremost as Germans. But the majority of the population, too, heard about the German crimes only in connection with the Federal Republic and many people got used to the idea that they themselves had nothing to do with it. To most of the East Germans, Poles and Czechs are no longer the enemies of old; rather, they are fellow-sufferers from the "adjoining camp hut."

Thus there is little room for guilt feelings or even considerateness. And this is why East Germans in East Europe often conduct themselves in a totally free manner, which conduct then is viewed by the host countries as very "German." The loudness of GDR visitors in Polish restaurants is by now almost proverbial; and no one is likely to forget the statement in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to the effect that the GDR--as

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

a socialist country--could count itself among the "victor nations of history" (the author was always one of the "victors": NSDAP member since 1936; presently deputy editor in chief of the SED party organ). At the end of October 1980, when the GDR had sealed itself off vis-a-vis Poland, there followed a second statement in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, which will not be forgotten: "In the attempt to solve the pending complex problems and to consolidate socialism, all truly Polish patriots can count on the unrestricted support of the German Democratic Republic." Germans who instruct Poles on Polish patriotism!

Until the mid-1960's, however, the Federal Republic did not present itself in a much better light. East Europe suffered much more heavily from the war and the German occupation than did the West Europeans, but Bonn never took note of this. In regard to the Saar question, Adenauer was willing to make a sacrifice that proved unnecessary; in regard to the Oder-Neisse problem, he insisted--as did the other West German parties--on a revision that was impractical. In regard to the West, the FRG knew it had to carry the burden of a dark past and it acted accordingly; in regard to the East, most people believed that since Communism was in power there they were free from any responsibility and that was the way they acted. In doing so, almost all people repressed the fact that it was Hitler's war that had given rise to the Communist regimes extending up to the Elbe River. The nations of East Europe were punished by the Germans for having fallen--through Germany's fault--into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.

"History" is the cue for another element the two Germanys have in common--the lack of historical consciousness. After the collapse of the German Reich, most Germans ran away from their past and sought refuge in ideology or internationalism. In the East, it was communism, and in the West, anticommunism; in the East, it was the socialist community, and in the West, the European community, in which the political elites tried to find refuge and a sense of purpose, after the Germans as a nation had failed so dreadfully. But the neighbors have a very good memory; they live with and through their history. This is evident not only in France and Poland, but also in the small states bordering on Germany. Thus there have arisen many misunderstandings. The Germans do not sufficiently understand that while for Germans rapprochement is quite easy, rapprochement with Germans is another story. Since they have repressed the past, they feel considerateness and tact have become less important. Since they orientate their foreign relations according to the power of the partners, they overlook that now as before the others (above all the French and the Poles) regard their relationship to the Germans as a special relationship. Since the Germans--starting in 1945 at zero, as it were--have continuously been ascending, they hardly understand what it means to old world powers such as England and France to be constantly on the decline. Since the Germans have recovered so well, they forget that it was they who inflicted the wounds from which the others have trouble recuperating. Since they have totally devoted themselves to producing measurable results, they are not aware of the concern they arouse in others: whether one can match the German achievements, without "selling one's soul" (Robert Held).

For the most part, this applies to both East and West Germans. They have become an ahistorical people--practically a foreign body in the Old World. Only gradually is this becoming attenuated. The German achievements are admired by all, but most people do not want to live in Germany--and in regard to FRG citizens, this has even been confirmed by a public opinion poll. The other countries expect the Germans to

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

lend economic assistance, but they are somewhat ill at ease about it. The governments are on friendly terms and the borders are open, even for the East Germans in the East (leaving aside the special case of Poland in 1980). As regards everyday living, the fashions and customs--especially those of the young people--show a surprising degree of conformity. German visitors are no longer a problem in any European country; fair, just--albeit subjective--reports, in fact entire books on the Germans have been published in almost all countries. Nevertheless, there remains something unresolved.

One of the reasons for this is the understandable distrust, which--since it is irrational--is insurmountable; it will disappear only when the generation that consciously experienced war and occupation passes away. Another reason is the character of the Germans, which remains mysterious to the other Europeans--precisely because it appears to be innocuous. The Germans have no national identity; they have nothing but their affluence--but what is going to happen, if that affluence shows the first cracks? In brief, this was the question a critical, but quite benevolent Frenchman asked in the mid-1970's. One can put this in a different way: After the war, the Germans were dazed. They did what was necessary and practical and concentrated on material progress. They became affluent and thus further numbed themselves. Not until the mid-1960's, when an unbiased generation reached maturity, did the West Germans gradually recover their senses. Not until then did people ask the question who and what the FRG citizens really are and what they should be. In the GDR, this process began even later, if it began at all.

Nevertheless, the Germans are beginning to search. They are becoming aware of the loss of the past and they are realizing that therefore there is no future, either. The other Europeans see or sense this; and they are worried about what this fermentation process may produce: a new German nationalism or two ordinary European states? The others can attain a normal relationship to the Germans only if the Germans appear normal to them--and this is still not quite possible. Europe will come to terms with the Germans only when the Germans have come to terms with themselves.

## 2. German Strength and Want of Clarity

In any political discussion of Germany, the most important consideration is the fact that both German states have grown much stronger than expected--in part absolutely and in part relatively, i.e. as compared with their weakened allies. The Federal Republic even grew into the strongest state in Europe, aside from the great powers; and it has thus created--irrespective of the German question--a problem for its alliance. Henry Kissinger reports on the America visit of Georges Pompidou in 1970, when the French president explained to the Nixon government his Europe policy: "It was the fear of a restored Germany, said Pompidou, that had prompted him to give up de Gaulle's opposition against Great Britain's accession to a united Europe. Pompidou's arguments did not differ at all that much from those expressed by Wilson 2 weeks previously. Great Britain was supposed to join the Common Market so as to keep Germany in check. Pompidou even spoke of a London-Paris axis as a counterweight to the uncontrolled German nationalism.... Most likely, Pompidou was concerned above all with the legacy of Richelieu. In his view, prevention of the recovery of Germany at France's borders took precedence over the fear of a more distant Russia, which--after all--was in the sphere of influence of American foreign policy."

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

That was in 1970. In the meantime, the relative weight of the Federal Republic vis-a-vis its West European partners has further increased and this is no less worrisome to the East Europeans.

The GDR gives rise to a similar concern: As much as it is needed--politically as well as economically--in the East, its German virtues--industry and efficiency, order and discipline--provoke both admiration and alarm. In addition, there are all those traits that are felt there to be so obtrusively German. The "ever ready" roar of an FDJ [Free German Youth] roll call, the Prussian marches, the Wehrmacht-style uniforms, the drill-sergeant ways of many border guards, the official correctness turning into disputatiousness, the petit-bourgeois narrow-mindedness that poses as the new culture, the dogmatism that degenerates into didacticism: "Only the people from the SED know what socialism is--even the Russians are not so sure about that." The GDR is the maximum of German ways that the East Europeans will put up with. Warsaw fears the GDR may become the second state of the Eastern Alliance and in critical periods the GDR even generates the old nightmare: Poland hemmed in by Russians and Germans.

Thus, in view of the fact that either side has difficulty in coping with its German hunk, nearly 80 million Germans united in one state would be intolerable to all Europeans. Even the Soviet Union probably just pretends to be able to afford to accept a unified Germany. The Americans--the only country that could actually afford to accept it--are likewise concerned, albeit for a different reason. The Europeans and Moscow feel threatened above all by the power concentration of a unified Germany--no matter whether it would be neutral or leaning toward the West or the East. The Americans, on the other hand, are afraid of losing "their" Germany, the Federal Republic. The Eastern equivalent was supplied by Petr Abrassimov, the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin, who told representatives of the Western powers: "You control your Germans; we will control ours."

The fact that the Germans are closely watched by the other states is attributable above all to the combination of historical guilt and newly acquired power. Another factor is the policy pursued by the Federal Republic. The Grand Coalition and--even more so--the Social-Liberal Coalition attempted to free Europe from the disturbances caused by the German problem. Bonn wanted to present itself to the West European community as a reliable member that no longer has any unsettled border problems in the East. It wanted to become a trustworthy partner for all East European states, a partner who--even though it does not approve of the East-West split--respects it as a fact, firstly in order to establish a normal relationship between the Federal Republic and the East and secondly, in order not to impede any longer the European detente desired by all.

This intention has largely, but not entirely, been realized. The agreements contained reservations: the qualification that the Warsaw Agreement applies only to the Federal Republic, not to a unified Germany; the "letter concerning German unity" and then the well-known peculiarities of the inner-German relations. The East accepted these reservations, because legally Bonn had no alternative and because the East hoped that formalities would remain formalities and would gradually become politically insignificant. But these expectations proved illusory: The Federal Constitutional Court declares the border between the Federal Republic and the GDR to be "similar" to the borders "between the states of the Federal Republic of Germany." The Federal Social Court pronounces judgments, as though a



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Warsaw Agreement was never concluded; and the strongest party, the CDU/CSU, bases its Ostpolitik on an all-party Bundestag [Lower House] resolution, according to which the East Treaties "do not establish a legal basis for the presently existing borders." Thus Franz Josef Strauss, the union parties' candidate for the chancellorship, stated that as long as there was no peace treaty to the contrary Silesia was German. As a result of all this, the political intent of the treaties is perverted and the foundation of the entire Ostpolitik, the recognition of the status quo (including finality of the Oder-Neisse border) is called into question. Individual Germans are for the most part trusted in the East, but the Federal Republic is still suspected--by the West as well--of double-dealing.

The formal and rhetorical ambiguities are irritating primarily because Bonn's foreign policy lacks ultimate clarity. What is the interrelationship between West- and Ostpolitik? Officially, it is supposed to be an integrated whole, but even terminologically, there are two different policies: "Europe" policy is concerned exclusively with West Europe; the other things fall under "Ostpolitik." The ultimate objectives of the latter--and the interrelationship of these objectives--have never been clearly defined. Is Ostpolitik pursued for its own sake or is it merely an instrument of Germany policy? And what is the objective of Germany policy, if it is to be more than GDR policy? What is meant by "European peace system"? This concept is hardly used any longer: Is this because it was a meaningless formula or because the underlying intentions have flagged? The list of questions could be extended, but it shows at least one thing: The Federal Republic has not yet found its political place in Europe.

Bonn is committed in equal measure to European detente and to Germany's unity; but these two objectives--if they are to be translated into policy--are irreconcilable; and even if this is merely rhetoric, Bonn still arouses understandable distrust. Detente is based on equilibrium--one reads this in the newspapers almost every day; but the division of Germany is an integral part of the equilibrium--and this is much less talked about. Naturally, this European equilibrium is a very subjective matter: Nobody can prove that precisely two-thirds of Germany should be on the Western side, and one-third, on the Eastern side for the forces of the two alliances to be balanced. But in other situations, too, equilibrium frequently is nothing but a distribution of weight that one has become accustomed to. Unless there is a blatant disproportion, a long-standing situation is gradually seen and eventually defined as equilibrium.

In practice, the crucial factor in regard to equilibrium is the general consensus and that means: the existence of two German states has become a constituent element of European detente. The abnormality of the division of Germany is the condition indispensable for normalization in divided Europe. We have seen it in many discussions--the last argument always runs as follows: "Even though your right to national unity is well-founded and even though your wish to attain it is understandable--you are disturbing the status quo." In present-day Europe, to upset the equilibrium is a sacrilege.

Naturally, the objective is not--not even in the medium term--the ultimate: political unification of Germany, a German confederation, a German economic community. There will be no major shifting of the ground--it is the nuances that are problematic: Even minor tampering with the equilibrium generates fear; even insignificant changes are seen as the beginning of major changes. Both the West and the East

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

pay close attention when Bonn and East Berlin conclude agreements worth billions and they watch even more closely any notable accord between Bonn and Moscow.

The increased strength of the Federal Republic, the uncertainty concerning the Federal Republic's long-range objectives, and the concern about European detente--these three--largely new--elements explain why in both East and West the German question keeps generating latent anxiety and why the Europeans and the great powers want just one thing: The Germans must not disturb. They must not again impede (as they did before 1969) the rapprochement of the other Europeans and they must not get too close to each other. They should come to terms with each other, but they must not fraternize.

In practice, this means: The Germans can never do things quite right. Whenever Bonn and East Berlin clash--e.g. in or around Berlin, where there still is no lack of matters in dispute--the Allies and also the Soviet Union exert a dampening influence; and when Bonn and East Berlin communicate through confidential channels, some observers immediately suspect a conspiracy. That a stable relationship between the German states is a stabilizing factor for Europe is not recognized everywhere--not even theoretically.

The international framework governing the relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR does not grant much latitude. The relations between Bonn and East Berlin may benefit either German state, but they must not benefit Germany. The European requirements are to take precedence over the German demands--in short: A Germany policy oriented toward Europe has the best chance of getting European support.

### 3. The Germans and Europe

For a long time, the Federal Republic and the GDR were the least "European" states of Europe; not until the mid-1960's--and in the GDR not until the mid-1970's--did this change, but the change was not thorough. "Least European" means: Both in Bonn and in East Berlin, the sense of the unity of the continent remained underdeveloped; political thought and action were restricted to their own half of Europe and to the national question. In contrast to the respective other part of Europe, Bonn and East Berlin for a long time fixated on their German opposite number, and depending on the given circumstances, fear and demand alternated.

No politician in the East would have committed the blunder Ulbricht made in the summer of 1968, when he stated the goal of "West German imperialism" was "hegemony not only over Europe, but up to the Bug River." "Europe" here has the same meaning it has in Bonn, namely West Europe; this proves that at that time the East German Communists had no political concept of Europe. They knew only two things: the "socialist camp" and the "European policy" pursued by Bonn, i.e. a West-European power concentration they considered dangerous. At that time, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Romanians had already developed conceptions of their own, conceptions distinguished by their emphasis on Europe as a whole. Prague and Budapest made propaganda for themselves by pointing to their location "in the heart of Europe." But East Berlin did not progress beyond the European disguise of its desire for recognition. Aside from the Leipzig Fair with its solid economic function, the GDR has been able to launch just one European event: the "Baltic Sea Week"--which was discontinued after the GDR had been recognized. Those who in the

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1960's drew attention to European perspectives for the Germans met in East Berlin with distrust or lack of comprehension.

This did not change until the GDR was internationally recognized, but the changes were not sufficiently comprehensive. For one thing, a deeply rooted complex can be overcome only with difficulty. To East Germany, West Europe and America remained an alien, even uncanny world. Moreover, there were practical difficulties, evidence of which was the hectic atmosphere characterizing the mid-1970's, when many functionaries disappeared for months so as to learn English in intensive or short courses.

On the Western side, however, the process of changing thought patterns proceeds at least equally slowly. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the GDR by the whole world, including their own allies, was the calculated consequence of the social-liberal Ostpolitik--but it was an unavoidable, not a desired consequence. It was the entrance fee that the FRG had to pay to be able to gain a political foothold in East Europe. And no one in Bonn would be likely to be enthusiastic, if East Berlin's relations with Paris and Washington developed as vigorously as Bonn's relations with Warsaw and Moscow. However, since most NATO states take only a limited interest in East Germany, the GDR's relations with West Europe have been developing very slowly. For a long time, the GDR was excluded from the European exchange of diplomatic visits. At the end of 1980, Honecker paid his first state visit to a Western country, namely Austria; and until then, the only leading politicians to visit East Berlin had come from neutral countries. From NATO countries, three foreign ministers visited East Berlin; among them was the French foreign minister, on account of whose visit Honecker even interrupted his vacation. The Federal Chancellor's visit to the GDR did not get off the ground for several years. Legally, the GDR is a member of the community of European states, but "socially" it has not yet been integrated into this community.

The Europe-related deficiencies of the Federal Republic were less evident, because Bonn--in the Western part of the continent--was zealously striving for the occidental spirit and supranational integration. For a long time, however, the European commitment of the West Germans was lacking the ultimate credibility, because vis-a-vis the East Bonn maintained a narrow-mindedly national position. Adenauer demanded unification of Germany, regardless of Europe; he refused even to discuss the question all Europeans considered crucial--the military and political status of a unified Germany. Only very slowly did Bonn come to admit that German unity and European security are interrelated. Nevertheless, the Adenauer and Erhard governments insisted on an "isolated" Germany "solution," i.e. a settlement to be concluded only by the Four Powers and extending only to Germany. When de Gaulle stated that the German question was a European question to be decided by all Europeans, this caused as much indignation in the FRG capital as did the statement of the French president to the effect that a unified Germany was conceivable only upon recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Eventually, Bonn's policy reached the point of arrogance, when Erhard and his foreign minister, Schroeder, demanded that at any given time European detente go no farther than the advances made in regard to German unification.

It was the Kiesinger/Brandt Government that introduced changes in this respect: It reversed the Schroeder Doctrine and proclaimed the primacy of European detente, stating that without that detente improvements in Germany would not be feasible,

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

either. On 17 June 1967, Kiesinger made his--by now near-classical--statement concerning the "critical order of magnitude" of a unified Germany: "It is too big not to play a role in the balance of forces, and it is too small to keep in balance the forces surrounding it.... Consequently, the growing together of the divided parts of Germany can be conceived only within the framework of the process of overcoming the East-West conflict in Europe."

Subsequently, however, the Grand Coalition was not consistent. Whereas the government preceding it had acted in an excessively German and insufficiently European manner, the Christian and Social Democrats after 1966--while showing a European spirit--could not bring themselves to do the necessary German steps. They offered to establish diplomatic relations with all East European states except for the GDR. They overlooked or glossed over the fact that at that time Europe was dependent on Germany and that no progress could be made in regard to essential, above all multi-lateral matters, as long as Bonn was keeping out the GDR, relying in this on the--increasingly reluctant--support of its allies.

At the end of 1969, the Social-Liberal Coalition drew the following conclusions from this: Both Ostpolitik and Germany policy must be an integrated whole; the one cannot be pursued without the other; they must jointly be charted and carried out. The offer Brandt made in his first government declaration--"two states in Germany"--was addressed above all to Moscow and Warsaw and only in the second place to the GDR. And indeed, that was the way it functioned: It took a decisive step in regard to Germany policy--recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state--to get the Ostpolitik off the ground. But without the Ostpolitik, i.e. the agreements with Moscow and Warsaw, the Germany policy would have remained blocked by Ulbricht's maximal demands.

Subsequently, this interconnection has repeatedly been confirmed, but it does not look as if the Federal Republic has fully learned its European lesson. Ostpolitik and Germany policy are still two different things in Bonn. Both are equally committed to detente, but in other respects--aside from exceptional situations--they are separate rather than integrated.

One of the reasons for this is the constitutional framework that separates Germany policy from foreign policy. The second reason is more deeply rooted. The West Germans are still fixated on Germany. In the mid-1960's, all Bundestag [Lower House] parties began to realize that the building of German bridges presupposes European bridges. They firmly believe in the "state of peace in Europe, in which the German people--freely determining its own destiny--will regain its unity"; but only very few appear to have fully comprehended this formula. Most people use it to state the claim to German unity, but the European precondition is thereby distorted past recognition. The "state of peace in Europe" is the reunification formula of the 1970's; essentially, it means no more than the demand for "free elections" in the 1950's. And listening to the politicians--irrespective of the party or the occasion--one gains the impression they think as though only Germany, not Europe, were divided. Some politicians--and they are in the minority--have drawn the conclusion that the Federal Republic must forgo German unity in every form. But even if this were legally practicable--which is not the case--the other countries, e.g. France or Poland, would not believe it. But even more important is the following: The West Germans cannot forgo something that is claimed and desired as much by the East Germans--as far as we know, the desire for unity is stronger there than here.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is not a question of renunciation, but of clarity and consistency in regard to the objectives' order of precedence. In this respect, it becomes apparent that the unification of Germany is a historical prospect, not a possibility of practical politics. But even if there were such a possibility, it would be less important than the primary objectives, peace and European unity. But the order of precedence is not everything. For the unification of Germany--if it is pursued politically--is at variance with the primary objectives. Both peace and the rapprochement of East and West Europeans presuppose detente; detente presupposes equilibrium, and equilibrium presupposes the continuing division of Germany. Insistent and continuing emphasis on German unity, the continuous talking of "keeping open" the German question produce the exact opposite of what is desired. They interfere with detente and thereby impede both the improvement of the situation in Europe and improvement of the situation in Germany.

## 4. Bonn's Place in Europe

What the Federal Republic has since Adenauer's time come to consider a matter of course in the West, it will have to accept in the East as well: the necessity to give precedence to European requirements over German demands. This should not be difficult, since the matter at issue is no longer half, but all of Europe. For the West Germans, the best way of reducing the doubts concerning their long-range objectives would be to set themselves reasonable goals: neither reunification--which would mean upsetting the European equilibrium--nor the total submergence in West Europe that had been Adenauer's goal--for that would be a degree of national renunciation that would be equally suspect. The Federal Republic needs to define what it must do, what it can do and what it wants. Whatever it is, it must not exceed the FRG's strength or upset the entire continent, but it must meet its national needs.

The situation of West Berlin has been improved immensely by the Four-Power Agreement; fundamentally, however, it has not been changed, since geography cannot be changed. The city remains the trouble spot of the West; even slight pressure causes sharp pain. Such pressure can be exerted even without direct violation of the Four-Power Agreement, and this can be prevented only through political means, not through agreements. In this respect, Bonn's possibilities are limited. It can pursue two lines of approach: In the West, it can try to influence its allies, if their actions become too drastic; in the East, especially in Moscow, it can keep alive the interest in the Federal Republic, which--on account of consideration for the Federal Republic--would suggest consideration for West Berlin as well.

It is obvious that the GDR, too, exerts pressure on Bonn in regard to Ostpolitik. The less reference is made to the "special" relationship, the more it becomes apparent how special it still is. Even if the last formal reservations were eliminated (citizenship, etc.), the East Germans would remain oriented toward West Germany to such an extent that every Bonn government will be compelled to give in to this expectation-related pressure (which pressure will come from its own populace as well). Every Bonn government is forced to maintain and establish the maximum level of relations of all kinds--no matter whether it views and justifies this from a national, European or humanitarian point of view.

In addition to these special commitments--GDR and West Berlin--there is a third element. The West Germans are closer to the East than are all other West

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Europeans--closer in almost every sense: geographically, historically, economically, technically, politically, militarily, and to some extent also in regard to mentality. The annoying ignorance one often encounters notwithstanding, the Federal Republic still shows the greatest awareness of the fact that peoples speaking Slavic tongues and writing in Cyrillic letters are Europeans, too. The West Germans and the East Europeans are in closer contact; they take a greater interest in each other and they are more dependent on each other. This is true in both the positive and the negative sense; it is fraught with danger, but it also contains opportunities and even responsibilities.

The Federal Republic has an--unparalleled--national interest in Europe. As a 60-million state in the center of the continent, it also can do more good and more damage than the other Europeans and it profits the most from any improvements in East-West relations. Finally, the FRG is burdened by its recent history. In the name of Germany, Hitler destroyed Europe. Thus it is Germany's responsibility to save and restore as much of Europe as is possible.

The question concerning the Federal Republic's political place in Europe is self-evident. Willy-nilly--West Germany has a European function (not a "role" or even a "task"--that would be presumptuous). It has a function and this means: It exerts itself for Europe not only for "German" reasons, but also in its capacity as frontier country between East and West; even if there were no Germans beyond the Elbe River, it would exert itself.

In political terms, what does this mean? First of all, it largely means continuation of what Chancellor Brandt began and what Chancellor Schmidt--in his own way--developed further. Bonn does not "vacillate" between the alliances, but it uses its position in the Western Alliance for helping settle conflicts between the alliances. Bonn's Ostpolitik begins in the West; it begins with the effort to introduce the all-European point of view into the EC and NATO discussions: Bonn as the "expert" and "lobbyist," as the "advocate" of European requirements, trying to make the "European Community" attend to the Eastern part of its own continent at least as much as to the Third World; trying to make the West pursue vis-a-vis the East not only a trade and security policy (with the subcategory "detente"), but also a European policy; trying to insure that the CSCE is not viewed primarily as competition of the EC or as a test for the "EPZ" (West European political cooperation) and not abused as an arena for propaganda bouts, but that it is used as the practically only instrument available for a European policy.

But advocates also speak with the opposing party. Chancellor Brandt made possible what formerly nobody dared to think: a German as mediator between the "camps"; a German who was almost as close to Brezhnev as to Kissinger; a German who did and achieved more than mere promotion of German interests. Schmidt's Moscow visit in the summer of 1980--undertaken in spite of and on account of Afghanistan--is another example, which is also remarkable on account of its effect on the West. The chancellor's desire to pay a visit to Brezhnev was the subject of public debates for months; unexpectedly, however, Giscard d'Estaing--anticipating Schmidt--met with the Soviet general secretary in Warsaw. If competition was the primary motive here (and this must be assumed), the West German Ostpolitik was successful, for without Schmidt's travel plans Giscard would hardly have gone to Warsaw.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Playing the main role or the vanguard cannot be in Bonn's interest--on the contrary. If Bonn were alone in the tricky East-West arena--the old suspicions would be rampant: Rapallo, disengagement, self-Finlandization, neutralization. A close alliance with France--even if it occasionally turns into rivalry--is extremely helpful to the Federal Republic. Paris and Bonn complement each other and they both benefit from this in their relations with Moscow and Washington: Whereas Paris wants to attract attention, Bonn must not be conspicuous; Paris needs German support for its independent policy, since by itself it is not strong enough; Bonn needs a French Ostpolitik for its own Ostpolitik, because politically, the French can afford to be more daring.

But of course not only the French. Any policy for Europe is also a policy for Germany. Whatever the Europeans of either side do to reduce the rift between them--it is of benefit to the Germans. Every agreement, every state visit, every private encounter is a step in the German interest, even if Germans are not involved. The objective is not a preferential detente for the Federal Republic--for this would soon lead to its isolation--but detente in general. The more the West Europeans, and above all, the more the Americans commit themselves to this objective, the better for the Germans on either side. Bonn's function is restricted to inspiring and provoking the commitment of its allies.

Thus the Federal Republic cannot be a mediator between the alliances, without at the same time championing its own alliance. Formerly, such a dual role was repeatedly played by Poland, from the other side. This comparison shows that in playing this dual role the Federal Republic is not going to slide into a "third" position; it is true, however, that it is linked with the nonaligned and neutral nations by strong common interests. Bonn needs detente as much as Belgrade, Vienna and Stockholm need it. However, the preconditions are quite different: The Yugoslavs, Austrians and Swedes derive their importance from the freedom from ties, whereas the Federal Republic derives its importance from the strength of its ties with the Western alliance. It is precisely because of Bonn's membership in this alliance that it carries weight in the West, and it carries weight in the East, because it is one of the principal powers in the EC and NATO.

The Federal Republic will not only remain a member of the Western communities: In the future, it will invest more energy in the consolidation of these communities than in the building of bridges to the East. When the chips are down, the FRG will vote for its allies here and against the partners there. But it considers it to be of special importance to prevent situations in which such a decision would be necessary. And it remains committed to the objective to promote understanding and thus agreement by pleading in the West for the requirements of the East, and in the East, for those of the West.

A European policy entails consequences for Germany policy. What the Federal Republic and the GDR for understandable reasons failed to do and made up for only in part must now be made good. Thus the aim of an up-to-date Germany policy would be the Europeanization of Germany. The consequences extend to various areas.

1. In regard to their thoughts, statements and actions, the West Germans should now do the exact opposite of their previous ways. If it is true that the Federal Republic makes headway not by the all-German approach, but only through an all-European policy, it must no longer lament the German calamity and remain fixated on

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

German unity; rather, its main concern must be the division of Europe and its main objective must be the unification of Europe. The Federal Republic will then have to prove that this is not a trick, not a European detour with a German destination. It will then have to overcome the contradiction of the 1950's--European toward the West and German toward the East.

Thus, in regard to the attempt to establish good relations with East Europe, there should not be any order of precedence, but this does not preclude special consideration for the great power USSR: There are no attempts of plying off one member of the Warsaw Pact against any other member. The cooperation offer is addressed to Prague as much as to Warsaw, to Sofia as much as to Bukarest. And in regard to East Berlin and Moscow, Bonn must take special care not to produce the impression of siding with one against the other. In practice, not all relations will develop equally well, but this should be for no other reason than the given circumstances, i.e. the given internal state of the Eastern partners.

2. Thus Bonn must refrain from doing anything that could impede the "Europeanization" of the GDR. Competition-related concerns are quite out of place here, since the Federal Republic is the naturally preponderant state; but such concerns are politically unjustified as well. Both German states have seen that as they break away from the necessities and dependencies of the German question, they become less restricted in their foreign policies. At one time, Bonn gave itself more latitude through the social-liberal Ostpolitik, and as a result of this Ostpolitik, East Berlin obtained greater latitude as well. The outcome was a normalization in the literal sense. It is only since the GDR stopped exhausting its strength in the struggle for recognition that it has been able to turn to other objectives; not until the GDR stopped staring at Bonn like the rabbit at the snake has it been able slowly to break away from its second fixation, the fixation on Moscow (but this does not mean: disengagement from Moscow). It is only since that moment that the GDR has begun to turn into a totally--in contrast to a partially--European state.

The competition between the two Germanys is not going to stop; it can only be mitigated. But in this competition, the Federal Republic--as the stronger state--can afford greater farsightedness. Thus it was not disadvantageous to Bonn that in the course of the 1970's East Berlin and Warsaw effected a certain rapprochement, even in their views on detente in Europe; and it was a loss, not a gain, for the Federal Republic and West Berlin, when in the fall of 1980 the GDR rigorously and offensively "delimited" itself vis-a-vis its Eastern neighbor.

The same applies to the relations between East Berlin and West Europe. It is in the West German, German and European interest fully to integrate the GDR into the framework of European politics. Any state that is admitted to a community must open itself to it; it assumes obligations and will not so easily kick over the traces. The FRG should support any venture that would serve to give the GDR European functions (for a state in the center of the continent, there are quite a few conceivable possibilities), as long as this does not harm the Federal Republic or West Berlin. It is interesting to imagine the effect of a visit to East Germany by the British Queen. Would only Honecker feel flattered? Or would perhaps all GDR citizens come to feel respected and no longer so totally excluded from the world?



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. The citizens of the Federal Republic and those of the GDR are linked by the circumstance that they are both German; but as regards the relations between the two states, the opposite is true. The fact that both are German is not an asset, but an obstacle to them. Thus they need a greater common denominator and that denominator can only be Europe. East Berlin does not tolerate any rapprochement in the name of Germany and the other Europeans become extremely suspicious, whenever the Germans come together as Germans. However paradoxical it may sound: For national reasons, the Germans are dependent on Europe. Europe creates the distance needed by the GDR leadership and it makes possible the rapprochement desired by the FRG. An excellent instrument is available for this purpose--the CSCE. At the first all-European summit conference at Helsinki in 1975, Schmidt and Honecker had the opportunity to get to know each other in an informal manner. Thanks to the CSCE, one can now justify bilateral agreements with reference to European requirements. For example, had there been European transport agreements, the inner-German repair of the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn could have been presented as a European requirement, for it also serves to link Moscow with Paris. With time, this could even function the other way round: Ventures that are of benefit to Europe would then become practicable on a bilateral level as well. To continue this line of thought: It may turn out that a great many projects exceed the level of bilateral agreements, since they can be implemented only in a European framework. In the Western part of the continent, this stage has been reached for some time.

4. As is well known, the ultimate cause of the West Berlin troubles is the loss of the old economic, national and ideological ("outpost of freedom") functions. Hamburg and Cologne can exist without functions; they are important cities in the FRG--that is sufficient. West Berlin is different: An island embedded in an alien, even hostile state is unparalleled in the world; at a time when German unity is utterly remote, this is becoming more and more absurd. If it is to endure, a city in such a position must have a *raison d'etre*. It can and will revive only to the extent that it knows what it lives for. It will gain a new function only if the location-related disadvantage can be turned into an advantage, if the former battlefield between East and West can be turned into a place of mediation.

But this will not be possible without the Federal Republic. The old wisdom that an "isolated" Berlin solution is impossible applies also to the role of the city in a divided Europe. Politically, West Berlin cannot be different from West Germany. With the Federal Republic posing (or having to pose) as the frontline state of NATO, West Berlin must be the frontline city of the West. The sooner the FRG can turn into the mediator between the "camps", the sooner the island in the East will be given its European chance.

It is of little use to West Berlin, if the world keeps regarding and treating it exclusively as a West German and West European city. It is located as much "in the heart of Europe" as are Prague, Vienna or Budapest. It is a European city and that means: Not until it is considered a European, not merely a German city, can it change from an appendix of the Federal Republic into a place with its own function. European policy is Berlin policy as well.

5. Reflection on Europe may aid national stock-taking. As a rule, the West Germans have run into difficulties with themselves, whenever they wanted to be both Germans and West Europeans. The struggle of the 1950's revolved around the question: German

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

unity or European integration. This old--as yet unsettled--conflict will be sooner resolved, if the FRG citizens try really to be what they are, namely Germans and Europeans. These two qualities are not mutually exclusive, but complementary: The Federal Republic would thus be able to remain allied and anchored in the West and to be a partner in the East.

Equally important is a second consideration: If the West Germans consider themselves (as is generally the case) Europeans in the sense of West Europeans, where does that leave the 17 million people in the GDR? Are they East Europeans? Or are they possibly merely Germans and nothing else? Germans as candidates for West Europe? This would certainly be in accord with the thoughtlessness and self-centeredness of FRG citizens. In the discussions on "self-image" and "identity" (as it is called today), one is struck by the fact that the Germans on the other side mostly remain outside; hardly anyone in the FRG reflects on what they are and what they could be. In this respect, too, there is only one answer: A nation that has a state in both the western and the eastern part of Europe can neither be Western nor Eastern; it can only be European.

## 6. The Social Division of the Germans

In the course of the 1970's at the latest, it became evident both in the Federal Republic and in the GDR that the Germans were becoming more German again. On either side of the Elbe River, there arose an increasingly strong sense of being a German, which subsequently developed into self-assurance. Examining the reasons, one finds the exact opposite of what is generally assumed abroad: It is not growing all-German sentiments that underlie this self-assurance, but the disappointment of supranational hopes. After de Gaulle, the only goal attainable in the West is a "Europe of fatherlands." For the foreseeable future, the national state will remain the key political formation.

The same picture obtains in the "socialist community" in the East. In dealing with its allies and fellow party members, the GDR, too, encounters nothing but national states and at times even a pronounced nationalism. In this respect, the Soviet Union is no exception.

There is another important factor: Both the FRG and the GDR are among the most stable members of their alliances. However annoying it may be always to be the "treasurer" or the helper in need--these roles serve to boost the Germans' self-esteem. This is especially true when the Germans are told that in certain respects they are better than the respective camp's leading state. The Eastern equivalent of the relation between dollar and deutschmark is the arrogance of the old industrial nation vis-a-vis East European backwardness. Finally, there is the decline of Communism in the East and the weakening of anticommunism in the West. The German question--and this is sensed rather than consciously realized--is no longer a question of ideology; rather, it is almost exclusively a question of power politics and maintenance of control, with both elements appearing in ideological disguise. Thus, for the Germans in this Europe, is there an alternative to being German? This is not to say that the other countries push them back into nationalism. But it is obvious that in both parts of the continent national thinking is so preponderant that it furthers--and even provokes--in the Germans the consideration of their nationality.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A different matter is the relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR. In consequence of the Ostpolitik, there took place a certain rapprochement--between the people as well as between the states. The millionfold personal encounters have restored a network of relations and ties, the political significance of which is immeasurable; it is safe to say, however, that the feeling of fellowship has been strengthened. To go much further than that would be risky, for the interest the East and the West Germans take in each other must be examined as well. For what reason do FRG citizens and West Berliners travel to the GDR? Primarily to visit relatives and friends; those who do not have relatives or friends in the GDR do not go, and there are not many exceptions. The danger of simplification notwithstanding, one can say: The West Germans have a predominantly private relationship to the GDR; most of them are not opposed to unification on the state level, but they do not see any prospect of this and they are satisfied to cultivate their personal relations.

The East Germans' interest in West Germany is much greater, not only because it is Germany, but above all because it is in the West. If the GDR bordered on France, many of its citizens would probably learn French so as to be able to participate--via TV and radio--in Western events. From the West come all the things that--though not always pleasing--are always interesting and stimulating and in any case "modern." From the West come the standards, the demands, even the dreams. To the East Germans, German unity has always been more important than to the West Germans, since they wanted to escape thereby the narrowness of GDR life. The more this life is broadened and enriched, the sooner the East Germans can forgo German unity. They, too, hardly believe in it any more; hopes still arise, but only occasionally and in spite of their better knowledge, originating less from logic than from psychological grounds.

The German question is a social rather than a national question. In the future, the West Germans can live without the East Germans just as easily as have the majority of them for at least 20 years. The East Germans could accept the division, if the conditions in the GDR became tolerable in a way which would not evoke anew dissatisfaction and trigger comparisons with the freer and richer Germany. The urge for German unity is not the problem, but the never-ending misery of the GDR. Since this is also the misery of all of Eastern Europe, it again becomes apparent that the German and the European concerns are identical; they can be dealt with jointly or not at all. To the extent that this can be done the German question loses its potential explosiveness. Europe need no longer fail on account of the Germans.

8760  
CSO: 2300/202

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

PARIS PAINTING EXHIBITION PROMPTS DISCUSSION OF GDR ART

Past, Current Condition

Hamburg STERN in German Vol 34 No 12, 12 Mar 81 pp 251-252

[Article by Rolf Schneider, East Berlin writer, about the development of socialist art, on the occasion of the GDR painting exhibition in Paris: "GDR Art I: No More Red Flags"]

[Text] Immediately after the end of World War II, the hall of East Berlin's Friedrichstrasse Railroad Station was decorated with a mural. It was an expressive, technically original work--a male figure, divided into prisms. The painter was Horst Strempel. For 12 years, the years of the Hitler period, the public had not seen anything comparable and people reacted accordingly: Approvingly or aggressively, but always loudly. The negative voices were in the majority and thus the authorities removed Strempel's painting from Friedrichstrasse Station.

The event was symbolic, and it was not unique: For more than 20 years, the visual arts of the state that now called itself GDR submitted to the dictate stipulating works agreeable to the public and refrained from all extravagances in regard to form and subject matter. The visual arts thus disengaged from the development of contemporary world art, including that of the neighboring states, the people's democracies of the GSSR and Poland. They also cut themselves off from their own art-historical foundations.

The artists representing German Expressionism and the New Objectivity in the 1920's had for the most part been associated with the political Left; many of them had been registered Communists. They considered the GDR--a state controlled by Communists--their natural political home. However, if they continued to follow the artistic trends they had developed before 1945, they were liable to run into difficulties.

For from 1950 on, the artistic doctrine of the young GDR was realism. The principal enemy was formalism, a term denoting all of modern art. Realism meant a simple objectivity intelligible to anyone. The artists were supposed to paint as though they were contemporaries of Menzel and Thoma. Picasso never existed, as it were.

These stipulations pertained to method and form. As for subject matter, the following were acceptable motifs: Work, construction, happiness, class struggle,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

socialism. The objective behind all this was political agitation and education. Walter Ulbricht--at that time the leading man in the state--viewed and put it this way: "In articulating these new, progressive elements in the development of mankind, the artist helps to turn millions of people into progressive individuals."

The works produced in this way and exhibited in the "German Art Exhibitions" (as they were called at that time) showed machines, muscular men, laughing women and red flags. The artists frequently tried to meet the high-blown artistic requirements by way of large format. The interest was focused on the "monumental"--a term much in vogue during that period.

Those not willing to submit to these demands were liable to suffer untoward consequences. A large number of frustrated artists--including a star such as Karl Hofer--crossed the inner-German border, which at that time was still open. Others, who out of conviction or stubbornness stayed in the country--and among these there were extraordinary individuals such as Conrad Felixmueller, Curt Querner and Hans Grundig--paid dearly for it: They suffered setbacks, exhaustion and anonymity. Ernst Barlach, who had been praised and honored for his resistance against Hitler, was all of a sudden rebuked for his "pessimistic character"; at that time, this was equivalent to an aesthetic death sentence.

Would GDR art ever be able to recover from this philistinism? At that time, this question was usually answered in the negative. Reality appeared to preclude a positive outcome.

The colossal painting showing people working happily and waving the red flag may have been the GDR cultural functionaries' ideal canvas, but it was not sufficient to maintain a diversified artistic ambience. Landscapes, still lifes and portraits were escapist motifs and the escapee would be rebuked only mildly, for landscapes, still lifes and portraits were time-honored and generally undisputed forms of pictorial expression. In the event of conflict, the only thing needed was a politically unequivocal signature.

This was one stratagem, but there were others. There were evasions, niches and hiding-places. The graphic arts--a field unsuitable for monumental works--were not subject as much to official scrutiny as was painting and the graphic artists were more uninhibited. Those who did not at any price want to give up their formalistic-modern ways turned to industrial design or kept their work to themselves.

The art scene of that time brought forth peculiar individuals, one of whom was Gerhard Altenbourg. This stubborn and solitary artist from Thuringia and his surrealist work had for many years been totally unknown in the GDR and even now he is not very well known there. The GDR museums that bought his works stored them away from public view. Most of Altenbourg's works went--via GDR foreign trade channels and West-Galerie [not further identified]--to capitalist West Europe (thus yielding coveted foreign currency), where they were in great demand. Altenbourg was the first GDR representative of the visual arts to acquire an international reputation.

The public admired primarily his brilliant technique. And brilliant technique came to be a hallmark of GDR art in general. For even in the darkest period of GDR cultural policy two elements remained alive: The technical precision resulting from the continuous occupation with objective subject matter and the interest

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the public generated by incessant propaganda.

Later, when regimentation was no longer so outrageous, both these elements turned out to be interest-yielding capital. The regimentation ended in 1970, when the state leadership passed from Ulbricht to Honecker. The first evidence of the changed atmosphere in the studios was the Seventh GDR Art Exhibition, which was staged in Dresden in 1972. The international breakthrough occurred 5 years later, at the Kassel "documenta," an international modern art exhibition. The works exhibited there by the GDR were so different from the other art shown that excitement and attention were assured. The most important trend-setter in the country, Peter Ludwig, a chocolate manufacturer and private collector from Aachen, promptly made purchases. The visual arts have since been the GDR's principal aesthetic export article.

The GDR, too, now has all that is found in the rest of the world: Nonobjective as well as objective art, surrealism, happening. According to the presently most influential art critic of the GDR, Lothar Lang, the country has at its disposal "that broad spectrum of expression and style that is appropriate to art."

To be sure, it is the imprint of the objective painters that has given GDR art its unique quality. Tuebke and Heisig, who perfected their technique through emulation of the European Renaissance masters, practically have no equal anywhere in regard to technical skill. Wolfgang Mattheuer presently is the most consistent practitioner of the New Objectivity in painting. Most of the regulations concerning subject matter are no longer observed. The GDR people portrayed by the GDR painters tend to be gloomy, sad and suffering.

Mattheuer is one of the cult figures of the exhibition of GDR art that is presently being held at the Paris Musee d'Art. This exhibition is showing 130 works by 30 artists. According to the organizers, these works testify to the "wealth and dynamism of the cultural and intellectual life in the GDR." As far as painting is concerned, this statement is undoubtedly true.

Artistic Freedom and Limitations

Hamburg STERN in German Vol 34 No 12, 12 Mar 81 pp 254-255

[Interview with Willi Sitte, president, GDR Association of Graphic Artists, by Dieter Bub, STERN correspondent: "GDR Art II: I Am Concerned With the Inner Commitment"]

[Text] [Question] The Paris Painting Exhibition is said to be representative. Is there a form of the visual arts that is peculiar to the GDR?

[Answer] Our art is based on socialist realism. This is not a rigid dogma, but a foundation that is derived from reality and that must be realized at any given time by the individual artist.

[Question] In your view, are the graphic arts and painting part of a GDR national culture?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Yes, but not in the narrow sense of party policy. I believe that from the development of the two German states one can infer basic differences. Our art is peculiar to the GDR. So I would not say there is a GDR national culture.

[Question] A short time ago, you exhorted your colleagues to show greater commitment. In regard to class consciousness, do you see any tendencies toward slackening?

[Answer] Partly in response to the wishes of the association's leadership, I addressed above all the younger generation. For not all of the young people show sufficient commitment to the GDR and to international problems, not as much as was shown in regard to Vietnam and Chile.

[Question] Are you advocating artistic production according to party directives?

[Answer] I do not mean that. I am concerned with subjective commitment, without there necessarily being a need for outside directives. I am concerned with the inner commitment; if that is present, there will always be a client.

[Question] But doesn't this mean that those who show party-oriented commitment will then be honored and awarded prizes?

[Answer] That is not entirely correct, since within a broad spectrum we consider even Christian themes a permissible way of making an artistic statement about present-day world events.

[Question] But a GDR painter will be more likely to find a buyer, if he or she paints pictures that extol, let us say, the 10th SED Congress or International Solidarity.

[Answer] It is true that as artists we are preparing for the 10th Party Congress. But I doubt that our work is goal-oriented. Rather, the problem is that we now have a public that takes a great interest in the visual arts; people now buy paintings and works of the graphic arts for their own private enjoyment. So an artist can be successful just by painting still lifes and landscapes. I am somewhat troubled about the fact that presently private demand for art is sharply increasing, while the social commitment is stagnating.

[Question] Over the past few years, there have been more and more critical accents and these were very much in evidence at the Eighth Dresden Art Exhibition: A drunken brigade at a works party or the tristesse of new residential housing sectors. Are the GDR artists now less optimistic in regard to everyday life, less confident about the future? Is the monumental rejoicing part of a past that has been confronted and dealt with?

[Answer] That period with its ostentatious optimism was not in accord with reality. And it was not typical of socialist realism. The past was no better than the present. The world situation in the 1950's was no less critical. We--and a large part of the population--now identify ourselves with critical paintings. We derive great benefit from that.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] According to the journal BILDENDE KUNST, nonobjective painting is in disfavor.

[Answer] In this field, we never imposed any restrictions. There are quite a few colleagues who make use of this mode of expression. They are allowed to exhibit their works, even though this trend is not entirely in accord with our ideals and is not given any special support.

[Question] How is it that international developments such as Minimal Art, Land Art or Environments have never exerted any influence on GDR art?

[Answer] Why should we emulate--after many years--styles in regard to which we are not even sure whether or not they can be considered art. One need not slavishly copy such trends. We have found our own way in the divergent developments in the socialist countries. But it is not necessarily the right way.

[Question] Could Joseph Beuys work today in the GDR?

[Answer] I would not champion Beuys in our country. He is of no interest to me and the public would not take note of him. He certainly could work here, but I doubt that he would like it.

[Question] Artistic freedom is restricted--where are the limits? For example: The exhibition of discarded doors in the Dresden Leonhardi Museum aroused your indignation. Why?

[Answer] We draw a line vis-a-vis things that have nothing to do with art. In my view, refuse exhibited in a museum is not art. I am sorry--that is the way I see it. To declare non-art to be art--we do not take part in such nonsense and the justifications advanced by art theoreticians are of no avail here. In this regard, our position is clear.

COPYRIGHT: Gruner & Jahr AG and Co. 1981

8760  
CSO: 2300



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ROMANIA

REPRESSIVE TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES DESCRIBED

LD300845 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 25 Mar 81 p 3

[Report by Lia Wainstein: "Special Chain for Romanian Dissidents"]

[Text] Two Romanian Baptists, who, thanks to the accelerated program sought by President Reagan, will soon be leaving for the United States, where they will finally be able to study theology, are in Rome--one of them since the end of February and the other as of a few days ago. Dimitrie Ianculovici (born in 1948) comes from a family of Baptists--the Protestant sect which has been widespread in Romania since 1850 through the work of U.S. and German missionaries. At present, out of the 60 confessions recognized before World War II, only 14, which do not include the Greek Catholic Church (Uniates), the Reformed Seventh Day Adventists or the Romanian Orthodox Movement "The Lord's Army," are officially allowed under the strict control of the State Department for Religious Affairs.

A group of protestants (predominantly Baptists) founded the "Romanian Christian Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Religion and Conscience" (ALRC) on 2 April 1978, which demanded "freedom of worship, an end to state interference in ecclesiastical affairs, the right to propagate their convictions through the news media and religious education in schools." Ianculovici--one of the founders of the committee--was immediately dismissed from his job and expelled from the Theological Seminary.

Sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment for parasitism, he spent part of his sentence in a tent set up in the courtyard, since the prison was crowded and there are no prison camps in Romania. He was then forced to apply for a passport and to emigrate with his wife and four children. According to Ianculovici, among the Romanian believers--about 95 percent of the population--the neoprotestants are repressed and are debarred from enrolling in nine faculties; for instance, international law, law, psychology, sociology, economics and commerce and humanities. Moreover, the authorities allow men of proven communist faith to become priests who choose that path as one of the means of advancement. Information, even about domestic affairs, is supplied by Radio Free Europe, which is called "The People's University," and to which the Romanians can listen in their own homes.

The son of an Orthodox mother and a Catholic father, Ioan Tarziu (born in 1951) decided at the age of 18 to follow the Baptist faith. In the electrical appliances factory where he worked, he received a favorable "characterizare" (good conduct certificate) in 1976, when he wished to take the entrance examination for the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Theological Seminary. Nevertheless, Ioan Stanca--a Baptist priest loyal to the authorities--caused him to be rejected. In 1978 Tarziu became an active member of the Christian Committee, which frequently met at his home. Some 2 years later, he was arrested at work and accused of planning to hold a demonstration outside the embassy [as published] in Bucharest and of founding an anarchist group.

At a trial in Camera, at which he was forced to appear handcuffed and partly undressed, Tarziu was sentenced to 5 months' imprisonment. In the three prisons (Timisoara, Rahova and Poarta Alba), in which he served the sentence, he was able to observe a special treatment inflicted for an indeterminate space of time on certain prisoners, either because they were deemed dangerous or because they had attempted to escape: their wrists were tied to their ankles by means of a special "T-shaped chain." Sometimes several men were chained together.

A typical figure of Romanian dissidence, Ianculovici and Tarziu agree, is not the well known writer Paul Goma, who emigrated to Paris in 1977, but Father Calciu Dumitreasa. This Orthodox priest, who had already been a political prisoner from 1949 to 1964, was expelled from the Bucharest Theological Seminary in 1978 for defending students belonging to an unauthorized sect. Father Calciu, who had denounced the practice of chaining, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment (in 1979). He is now a patient in the hospital following the hunger strike which was begun last November in the hope of finally securing a public trial.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.

CSO: 3104

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY