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West Europe Report

(FOUO 27/81)

MITTERRAND'S FRANCE:
PROPOSALS AND PROSPECTS
FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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PROPOSALS AND PROSPECTS FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

ARMAMENTS, ALLIANCES, MILITARY, FOREIGN INTERVENTION POLICY

Hernu Details Party Policies

Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Apr 81 p 4

[Article by Pierre Darcourt]

[Text] Charles Hernu, deputy mayor of Villeurbanne, is the Socialist Party's (PS) defense representative. He is unquestionably that party's most senior and most qualified expert on defense matters. Hernu recently met in the National Assembly with reporters specializing in military affairs and briefed them on his party's program in clear and unequivocal terms. He began by reminding them that Francois Mitterrand supported modernization of all strategic deterrent forces. Yet "because of current technological conditions," he explained, "priority must be given to modernizing our strategic naval force. It is our view that two nuclear-powered missile launching submarines should be built and placed in service during the next presidential 7-year term." In referring to the neutron bomb, Hernu said the PS was not opposed to the continuation of studies and tests. "Yet this essentially antitank weapon does worry us because it makes the idea of war 'commonplace,' establishes thresholds of engagement, and can draw us into a 'forward battle' in Europe."

Francois Mitterrand contends, as indeed President Reagan has himself stated, that strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons constitute one homogeneous force whose employment is wholly subject to the decision of the chief of state, the sole official responsible for this terrible power of destruction that cannot be released "piecemeal" by subordinate military authorities.

With reference to detente in Europe, Charles Hernu revealed that, in the event of a socialist victory, Francois Mitterrand could immediately make a certain number of proposals, the first of which would be to ask the Soviets "to withdraw their mobile SS-20 surface-to-surface missile as far back as the Urals." This would place France beyond their effective range while at the same time delaying deployment of the American Pershing 2 missiles. It would also possibly permit redefining in Europe the 'zero point' of detente for opening new realistic and concrete negotiations."

Independence, National Unity

The socialist member of the National Assembly from Villeurbanne reaffirmed that France must "restore full independence and national unity to its defense."

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Francois Mitterrand, and the PS along with him, will remain faithful to the Atlantic Alliance as long as there does not exist in Europe a real system of collective security. We shall refuse to allow the Atlantic Alliance to be an instrument of submission to American military strategy. We insist on preserving our complete independence in decision-making. On this particular point, Valery Giscard d'Estaing has placed himself on dangerously 'shaky ground'. He has stopped referring to the 'national sanctuary' and laid emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, thereby indicating acceptance of the possible employment of our forces outside our borders. To my knowledge, the Elysee Palace issued no clarification after the recent statement made by General Rodgers, an American, who had asserted that in the event of war in Europe, the French would return to NATO's integrated military command and their troops would fight forward of their borders.

In discussing the reduction of compulsory military service to 6 months as proposed in the "socialist plan," Charles Hernu said "the actual length of the term of service appears to be of minor importance today. What does count is its content and effectiveness. If we should decide to reduce the term of service, this change would have to be accomplished very gradually. Our action in this matter will bear on two main points. First, on full application of Article 17 of the standing orders which is now being very poorly enforced. The participation of draftees in decision-making about their service must not be limited to discussions on operations of the service club or the organization of photographic clubs and leisure activities."

Intervention Forces

The second point has to do with the intervention forces. "These forces are necessary for fulfilling our commitments and our defense agreements with our African friends in particular. Only regular career personnel must be assigned to these forces. Sending draftees outside of metropolitan France is out of the question." These forces must be equipped with a type of transport aircraft giving them the capability to react rapidly and at a long-range. "Work is already underway on the second-generation Transall transport." It may be completed in due time, but the requirement for a heavy and high-speed transport is imperative, whether it be French or foreign aircraft. On the other hand, the personnel strength of these external action [rapid deployment] units must not be increased. Particularly, the Foreign Legion which has had no reason to increase its strength or maintain an overseas presence since decolonization, and which, above all, must no longer have a majority of foreigners in its ranks (currently 60 percent foreigners and 40 percent "Frenchmen").

Lastly, Charles Hernu firmly stated that we must no longer change the armed forces chief of staff so frequently (three in less than 2 years: Mery, Van Cremersch, and Lacaze). Too many general officers at the highest command levels [chief of staff] come from the intervention forces. Janou Lacaze, the new armed forces chief of staff, spent his entire career in the colonial infantry, Foreign Legion, and paratroopers. In addition, he served for 5 years in the SIECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] and commanded the 1st BE [Airborne (Paratroop) Division]. General Delaunay, the army chief of staff, is also originally from the colonial troops. Hernu's views on this particular point are regrettable and unreasonable. Moreover, they imply that, in the event of a socialist victory, two more general officers would have to be added to the list of those already too frequently relieved from assignment to these positions. General Lacaze is a "field soldier" who when assigned to combat duty, demanded, as was traditional, to serve in elite troops more often than others. Above all, he is a veteran of the Resistance. He is acknowledged to be an exceptional leader and is respected by the three services.

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General Delaunay is every inch a "trooper." To make matters worse, he is being blamed by traditional units, especially the marine [formerly colonial] troops, for wanting to "fragment" them by assigning overseas commands and positions, heretofore reserved by right for marine infantry officers, to "metropolitan" [home forces] officers who are admittedly excellent officers but without overseas experience.

Mitterrand Arms Policy Statements

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Apr 81 p 13

[Text] In a statement made to AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE on 15 April, Francois Mitterrand said that because of current technological conditions, modernization of French strategic and tactical forces must be accomplished "with priority being given to the naval component." The socialist candidate considers "the national strategy of nuclear deterrence to be currently the only possible strategy likely to banish the danger of war. France's defense must be secure and our decision-making independence guaranteed. This does not mean, however, that we have to neglect our conventional forces." He then added that a defense, "even one based on highly improved equipment, is nothing unless it first rests on the resolve of the entire nation."

While the current defense budget is, in his opinion, apparently sufficient, he said that "defense spending should not exceed 4 percent of the gross domestic product" and suggested that there ought to be a better distribution of priorities and more rigorous program choices. Moreover, the socialist candidate considers the 1976-1982 military programming law's results to be unsatisfactory as far as modernization of the armed forces is concerned. He noted that delays in equipment deliveries--an average of 2 years in the navy, 1 to 3 years in the army, and 2 years for the new French aircraft--have been stigmatized in several parliamentary reports.

Referring to the external action forces, Mitterrand recalled that although it is necessary to have such forces to "help our fellow citizens when they are threatened abroad," he is opposed, however, to the present excessive increase in their personnel strength which he views as "incompatible with those foreign policy goals in regard to the Third World" which will be his if he is elected.

In the socialist candidate's opinion, necessary reforms should be made in those aspects of compulsory military service related to the conditions under which that service is performed: length of the term of service, full participation of all in everyday service life, real exercise of civil rights, association with tasks in the national interest, and also assistance to the Third World.

Mitterrand on Euromissile Deployment

Paris L'UNITE in French 28 Mar 81 p 10

[Article by Alain Barrau]

[Excerpt] After Kalevi Sorsa had described the socialist disarmament plan adopted by the Madrid Congress and the Socialist International late last year, Francois Mitterrand outlined the elements of "a comprehensive conception of security in Europe."

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He reiterated his request for a new definition of the rights and obligations of member nations of the Atlantic Alliance and elaborated upon the proposals contained in the analyses he had presented to the National Assembly during its debate on deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe. Francois Mitterrand thought that consideration had to be given to the fact that the USSR is prepared to have a dialogue, as Brezhnev declared in his address to the 26th CPSU Congress. This proposal must be examined and pursued as far as possible by participating in negotiations. Of course, agreement must be reached on the letter and particularly the meaning of the moratorium on deployment of new medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles in Europe. When NATO approved the deployment of Pershing missiles, the Soviet Union made negotiations with the Western nations conditional upon their not arming themselves with these weapons. Now, however, the Soviets are talking about a moratorium. Thus there has been some progress." We must seize upon the USSR's willingness to dialogue, while seeing to it that neither of the two superpowers is in a position of inferiority."

In this connection, Francois Mitterrand pointed out that the SS-20's aimed at Europe should naturally be included in the negotiations. He also noted that the appearance of any new equipment altering the strategic East-West balance had to be a matter of concern for those who want to work for disarmament and security.

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON SOCIALIST NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN PROPOSALS

Paris L'UNITE in French 23 Jan 81 pp 3-4

[Article by Frederique de Gravelaine: "Energy: When the Socialist Party Goes to Coal!"]

[Text] In presenting a detailed plan the PS wanted to show that another energy policy--based on conservation and diversification--is possible and that total nuclear energy is not a foregone conclusion.

"Everything is fine, Your Grace!" This is how Paul Quiles, national secretary of the Socialist Party (PS), defines the government's position on energy policy. Unfortunately, everything is not fine. A massive nuclear program that seems highly uncertain, a piecemeal supply policy -- as in the case of the Chalandon affair and the failure of negotiations with Algeria, which led the government to lower its estimated gas consumption estimates for 1990 -- a chronic authoritarianism on the part of Minister Andre Giraud and demagogic promises, such as the Carburol Plan [alcohol fuels project] launched last week, cannot conceal the fact that another policy is possible. That is what the Socialist Party tried to prove in presenting its energy plan.

Its principle is to refuse to adapt the operation of society to the energy choice. This is the opposite approach of that taken by the government, which poses in principle the need to pursue an "all nuclear, all electric" program without properly evaluating the consequences and without comparing them with those of alternative solutions.

"Strong" But "Different" Growth

Acceleration of the nuclear program, responsible for meeting 30 percent of national needs by 1990, thus encourages greater consumption of electricity in the summertime or at night: Electric heating is in fact supposed to absorb a large share of the production of a nuclear power system that is very difficult to modulate. However, these needs are essentially variable, depending on outside temperature, for example. It is this inconsistency for which the development of air conditioning in the summer and night work are to compensate! And unless double facilities are installed, users are asked to use another type of energy at peak hours....

In order to limit our oil imports, the government has found only one solution so far: limiting economic growth. Actually, no other serious energy conservation policy has been undertaken since 1975. At that time, the Central Planning Council set as its objective for 1985 the saving of the equivalent of 45 million tons of oil. This goal was reduced to 35 million in 1978. Without some modification in

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the current guidelines, it will probably not be possible to save more than the equivalent of 25 million tons of oil.

During this period, coal production continued to decline and the so-called "re-launching" announced in 1980 merely checked the downward trend while emphasizing the need to import coal. At the same time, hydraulic investments were limited and equipment dismantled. As for new sources of energy, the credits earmarked for them remain ridiculous. The Giraud plan, made public in April, is in fact confined to an intensification of the nuclear program. Cost: 35 billion francs a year out of over 80 billion devoted to the plan, which also provides for a sharp reduction in oil consumption.

According to the plan, France's energy picture for 1990 would include, for a total equivalent of 242 million tons of oil used, 73 million supplied by nuclear power, 33 million by coal, instead of 28 million following another plan; 68 million by oil, instead of 80; 42 million by gas, instead of 37; 12 million by new sources of energy, instead of 10, and 14 million by water power.

The Socialist Party contrasts these estimates with those of the socialist proposals, which derive from a different economic and social logic, an opposite type of development. First of all, there is the growth objective, a "strong" but "different" growth of an average 5 percent yearly, dissociated from the growth in energy consumption because the socialist objectives propose to restore full employment with the equivalent of 230 million tons of oil. The other goals set by the socialists are: greater national independence, security for the workers and respect for the environment.

Worked out by means of the mathematical model of the IEJE (Economic and Legal Institute of Energy) and the work of members and experts, these estimates, unanimously accepted by the Executive Bureau, can be summed up as follows: Out of the equivalent of 230 million tons of oil consumed in 1990, coal would supply 43, oil 71, gas 39, new sources of energy 13, water power 16 and nuclear energy 48.

Systematic Search for Economic Approaches

The gap between the two sets of estimates is much smaller than it first appears because of the growth objectives set by the Socialist Party. In order to meet social needs, create jobs and increase investments in the industrial sectors threatened by international competition, the socialists define a policy based on a systematic search for approaches and procedures that save on energy: by improved insulation of new housing, by modifying products manufactured by industry, encouraging greater longevity and reducing the amount of energy used and of raw materials used in manufacture, for example, and finally, by developing mass transport. In urban areas today, automobiles are occupied by one or two persons on the average and consume four times more energy per passenger than a bus three-quarters empty. Likewise, for long-distance transportation, the railroad is twice as economical as traveling by car. Nor can one ignore the important effect of the 150,000 to 200,000 jobs created through the relaunching of investments.

Corresponding to this energy conservation, the cornerstone of the socialist plan, is first of all a better adaptation of sources of energy to needs, thereby

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preventing scandalous waste. For example, it is ridiculous to use sophisticated and risky nuclear-produced energy to heat apartments or offices to 19°. By the same token, electricity is without a doubt the best type of energy for transportation, while oil is now being eaten up by it. Finally, industry can use electricity for high temperatures, coal to produce steam and gas for all uses that require clean energy.

This adaptation of the French system of consumption facilitates the indispensable diversification of the energy supply. The first idea consists of making the best possible use of coal, a national resource. Our reserves are substantial but insufficiently known. The Socialist Party estimates that evaluating them must be a priority. Until such an evaluation is completed, production should be maintained at the highest possible level and then new operations started. Consequently, the objectives defined for 1990 are relatively modest, lower than those of the Communist Party, at any rate, inasmuch as the prospecting has not been undertaken by the current government.

With respect to heating, the socialists recommend the massive development of heating systems, systems that make it possible to recover thermal exhaust from industries, electric powerplants and the incineration of urban waste, while promoting the use of geothermal energy. The goal for 1990 is to distribute the equivalent of 9 million tons of oil by the heating system -- instead of the 4 million set by the government -- including 7 million in the residential and tertiary sectors, thereby reducing the use of electricity. These are ambitious objectives requiring high investments and a system of aid for financing to be completely worked out.

The fact is that in this field, as in that of new sources of energy, the government has consistently manifested its shortcomings, shortcomings in terms of action. The Socialist Party's ambition is to make renewable sources of energy the major element in the energy picture for the 21st century, an ambition that should be tackled starting now through research and increasing numbers of decentralized experiments carried out by local groups. The regions, departments and communes headed by socialists have already set an example. In Nord and Pas-de-Calais, a solar equipment program was launched covering 36,000 housing units in 3 years. In Languedoc-Roussillon, an energy picture was drawn up for the region and starting in February, debate began on the types of energy consumption and production that would be desirable and on the contribution it could propose to the nation. Geothermal energy is being looked at in Valence, Creil and Coulommiers; biomass energy in Limousin and Provence. Examples of this type are legion and prove that a climate of encouragement immediately gives rise to creativity and dynamism.

However, these cases are still relatively isolated. Everything remains to be done. The decline in the use of the nation's coal is also part of the heritage left by the government that has been in power for decades, as does the construction of nuclear powerplants. "We cannot just do away with this heritage," states Paul Quiles. Henri Fauque, secretary of the Socialist Party's energy committee, adds: "We cannot suddenly deprive ourselves of 39,000 megawatts of nuclear power already installed or being built. We need at least 4 years to complete the first set of coal powerplants that we are planning to make up for the nuclear plants that we reject but that have been planned."

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The socialists are therefore determined to make nuclear energy an energy of transition and to gradually loosen its predominance by planning the rapid construction of coal powerplants. It will then also be possible to face the consequences of a program whose haste and scope involve both industrial risks -- what will happen if the leaks found in the last plants opened become dangerous within 10 years when their cost was figured on a life span of 20 years? -- and risks to the environment and the health of the people and workers.

Opposition to Breeder Reactor

The socialist plan therefore integrates all the nuclear powerplants ordered before December 1980, plants for which major expenditures have already been committed. Neither Plogoff nor Nogent-sur-Seine nor Cattenom would be launched, for example, before a debate would have decided the fate of nuclear energy in the country.

By 1990, some 40 nuclear units would therefore be operating, producing 215 billion kilowatt-hours, or 21 percent of all national consumption. This calculation was made on the basis of operating the powerplants for 5,500 hours a year, although the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] is currently counting on 6,200 hours a year, even though some of its most important officials recognize that these estimates could turn out to be extremely optimistic after a few years of operation. "This reduced availability must make it possible to take more time for inspections, shutdowns, repairs, and allow more latitude in the case of a serious incident," Henri Fauque explains.

Concerning the breeder reactor, the Socialist Party continues to state its opposition to any industrial facility, although the government announces 10 by the year 2000. The socialists denounce the technological impasses of the program and pledge not to put the Creys-Malville facilities into service unless all safety conditions are ensured, which is very likely never to happen.

The rejection of the breeder reactor is partially due to the uncertainties having to do with the reprocessing of fuel exposed to radiation, reprocessing that is indispensable for the charging of these plants. The socialists therefore wonder about the need to pursue a policy of reprocessing or about the development of a policy for the storage of waste. This is one of the many points that must be debated during the consultation which the socialists want to develop. The need for a nuclear law -- France is the only Western country without one -- the massive diffusion of contradictory information and the launching of a debate that could lead to a referendum and enable Parliament to decide in the final instance: That is what the socialists propose, unlike the centralized, authoritarian approach of the government. The resignation of Jean Servant, head of the inter-ministerial committee on nuclear safety, who complained of running into systematic opposition from the Ministry of Industry, is one example of this. Then there is the very offhand manner in which Andre Giraud brushed aside a report presented by Planning officials who made wide-ranging criticisms of the government's positions.

The burden of this technical as well as political heritage makes the socialists' task all the more complex if they should come to power this year, especially since their choices will encounter inertia of unsuspected strength; the inability of

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the French administration and other decision-makers, after decades of "all oil" succeeded by "all nuclear," to take marginal contributions of 2 or 3 percent into account, unable to understand that small streams make mighty rivers.

The nuclear choice is the direct result of such logic. It is a policy that would cover France with nuclear powerplants that are rapidly abandoned, after some 20 years of operation at best. Another alternative exists. The Socialist Party has but to be given the means to take up the challenge.

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FRANCE

COMMUNISTS CRITICIZE FLAWS IN SOCIALIST ENERGY PLAN

Paris REVOLUTION in French 6-12 Feb 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Jacques Cramaix: "A Weak Energy Plan"]

[Text] This may never happen again! At the end of January the PS published a relatively detailed expose in which it describes its energy policy. However, the long text contains many ambiguities.

The language is determinedly "social" but the means recommended would lead to a totally different application. Furthermore, one is justified in asking questions about the wisdom of embarking on such a program when that party's presidential candidate reserves the right to choose his "options."

The Socialist Party claims that its energy policy is based on economic growth of 5 percent a year, which would be fine. But the hypotheses and technical means chosen certainly do not make it possible to support such growth. As a result, the Socialist Party ends up recommending a plan that is a step down from the government's proposals.

Let us take a brief look at these means because the technical choices conceal the main political guidelines.

The first assumption is that energy savings should result in only a .4-percent increase in energy use when growth rises 1 percent. This is a dangerous wager that could deprive France of means of growth, but this technical "optimism" actually serves to excuse choices that are much more dangerous, particularly regarding nuclear power.

While the Socialist Party is forced to recognize the usefulness of nuclear energy, it seeks every possible excuse to check its development: cost, safety, technical problems, but inasmuch as its arguments are nothing less than deliberately obscure, it prefers to claim confidence -- premature, to say the least -- in the so-called "new" forms of energy (solar, water, wind), even if current techniques and costs pose numerous problems for heavy expansion of the sector.

In other words, the technocratic, ecological discourse conceals a specific and extremely worrisome position: abandonment of the breeder reactors. Now then, this French technique would not only make it possible to increase France's energy independence, but would also enable France to get ahead of the United States and other imperialist countries technologically, without mentioning a number of ecological advantages.¹

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One cannot fail to compare this choice with those of the government which it intends to continue studying within the Eighth Plan. This (socialist-Giscardian) moratorium is for the purpose of allowing the United States to catch up. Yielding to such pressure is totally inadmissible. The Socialist Party's approach coincides with governmental plans on two other points.

1 -- Since energy and energy conservation are costly, the manufacturers must be given aid: "It is normal for taxes to finance part of the investments" (p 81) through savings (p 80) as well as through local communities (p 79).

2 -- Energy consumption of the people must be reduced: "The relative price of electricity will not be lowered, for this would constitute an artificial incentive to use electricity and therefore, waste energy" (p 82). In addition, it is necessary to reduce electric heating of apartments and check the spread of household appliances (the Socialist Party proposes the following percentages for 1990: dishwashers, 35 percent; freezers, 38 percent).

The Socialist Party speaks of nationalization only once: in connection with Saint-Gobain Pont-a-Mousson. Furthermore, we know what its concept of nationalizations is, consisting of "nationalizing" only a few "strategic" sectors of a firm. The SGPM would come out of it very well.

This should be compared with G. Defferre, who wrote in the 30 January issue of LE MONDE ("The New Techniques Serving Man"): "The program of the Socialist Party provides for nationalizations. Without waiting for this to come about, major national companies such as the EDF [French Electric (Power) Company], Renault and SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company], can be used for the purpose (making the government and the private sector partners). Through the partnership of big national companies and private enterprise, the general interest will be protected and administrative ossification prevented, without affecting the nationalizations that must occur in certain multinational firms."

The last orientation developed by the "European" Socialist Party is European cooperation, for coal, for example, imports of which should increase despite the (timid) recovery proposals which the Socialist Party makes and late at that.

Behind numerous antigovernment statements, the socialist plan therefore works out many ways in which it would coincide with the Giscardian policy of abandonment and integration.

France and its new growth require a totally different policy based on our country's many assets. The fight may cause government setbacks, as in the case of subordinating nuclear power to the American company Westinghouse, and just as the miners are backing off on coal. While Georges Marchais may have "lost one of his favorite political slogans,"² he is proposing a whole series of measures for a true energy policy based on nuclear power (breeder reactors, the modification of Euratom, the nationalization of Empain, Pechiney, the CGE [General Electrical (Equipment) Company], Imetal, Saint-Gobain, and so on), French coal and the search for new forms of energy and energy conservation so that our country may have the means to relaunch consumption and production.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See on this subject the very remarkable book by J.-C. Dubart: "Energies, le Grand Tournant," Ed. Sociales.
2. One should note the unwitting homage of ECHOS, which on 26 January 1981 wrote, concerning the Framatome-Westinghouse agreement: "G. Marchais has lost one of his favorite political slogans: 'Yes to nuclear power and no to an atomic program set by Washington time,' for while everyone knows that the secretary general of the Communist Party is a fierce backer of this energy, it is equally well-known that he is a firm supporter of national independence. Valery Giscard d'Estaing gives him cause for satisfaction while checking his election thrust. France will not renew its license agreements with the United States...."

However, the question remains concerning this agreement: Has France agreed to yield to American enterprise its breeder reactor technology, a field in which the United States is far behind and whose industrial application in France it wishes to check, supported in this by Giscard and the Socialist Party?

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

FRANCE

COMMUNIST CRITICISMS OF MITTERRAND'S ENERGY POLICY

Paris REVOLUTION in French 17-23 Apr 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Jean-Charles Dubart: "Mitterrand Wants To Cut Off the Current"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand's declarations concerning energy, particularly nuclear energy, follow one another. Their irresponsibility rivals their electioneering and demagogic contents.

Francois Mitterrand claims that nuclear power creates few or no jobs!
At the same time, he states that "a powerplant uses more oil than it saves in 10 years, counting from the time of the decision to build it." If this were true, it would mean that construction of a nuclear powerplant would mobilize an enormous share of productive activity because the oil consumed is used in the form of steel, concrete, processed uranium, and so on, and consequently, would mobilize the corresponding jobs. Construction of four nuclear installments actually requires hundreds of thousands of tons of concrete, thousands of tons of steel, but less than a year of operation is needed for it to return the energy needed to produce these materials in the form of electric power. Moreover, it is a law common to any energy "investment": In order for the fiber glass used in insulation to save as much energy as was needed to produce it, one has to wait four or five years, even longer.

The same nuclear powerplant mentioned will provide work for some 5,000 persons, 70 to 75 percent of them from the region in which the plant is located. When the unit goes into operation, it will employ at least 1,000 EDF [French Electric (Power) Company] workers, 1,200 if the proposals of the communists and the fights succeed in obtaining the 35-hour work week and elimination of interim work.

There are already nearly 200,000 jobs directly linked to nuclear energy: 30,000 on the sites, the rest in uranium mines, concentration plants, the fuel cycle, construction of reactors and electromechanical equipment, maintenance, safety and research. The confirmation of interim personnel or personnel under contract, including persons responsible for loading nuclear fuel into the plants, will mean the immediate hiring of over 10,000 persons with EDF status. The program to start nuclear powerplants and coal plants such as the communists propose will create 6,000 jobs a year. Using French pressurized water reactors and the rapid decision to build the Hyperphenix 2 breeder reactors will mean technological progress with multiple effects.

Concerning the program underway, Francois Mitterrand says: "We shall finish the powerplants under construction and I shall take time to reflect, not too much time, but enough to act properly."

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This way of replying, which gives the impression of saying "Give me time to think," is typical of the method employed by Mitterrand. In over 30 years, France has developed a nuclear industry and in April 1981, Francois Mitterrand noticed that he had not yet had time to think about the matter! However, he seems to have found time to reflect on the Euromissiles and the neutron bomb much more rapidly!

Furthermore, to say at one and the same time that one can put the powerplants built into operation and halt the startup of new construction is to have a particularly elastic, "geographic" notion of security. If nuclear-produced electricity were the source of unacceptable risks for workers or the population, the communists would lead the fight to abandon the use of such energy everywhere. Any other position is profoundly demagogic.

Halting new construction, as the socialist candidate suggests, would be both a social and economic disaster. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are directly or indirectly at stake. It would mean that the EDF could not meet the needs of the French people or their families, local communities, industry. Even the mirific "energy conservation" projects so frequently mentioned could not be undertaken. Therefore, in order to bring about a real policy of energy conservation, one would have to consider what we propose and not the ersatz presented by the Socialist Party, which, like the government's policy, actually programs austerity and short-ages for workers.

Throughout the scientific history of the great discoveries, struggles and successes of generations of researchers, engineers, technicians and workers, our people have accumulated knowledge concerning civilian applications of nuclear energy. Never, despite the injunctions of the government and the arrogant determination of capital to monopolize this great productive force for its own profit, has the mass of nuclear workers given up regaining control of their work. Civilian nuclear energy is one of the great assets of our people and our country for a diversified energy policy. All those who, along with the communists, wish to meet the needs and aspirations of the French people and who are concerned about national independence will not let the upper bourgeoisie or anyone else spoil such an asset.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

MITTERRAND ON PROPOSED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES

[Paris L'EXPRESS in French 4-10 Apr:81 pp 87-92]??

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand by Christian Fauvet, Albert du Roy, Jean-Francois Revel, and Robert Schneider, of L'EXPRESS, on 1 April; place not given: "Mitterrand: 'What I Will Do'"]

[Text] L'EXPRESS: As in the case of the other candidates, we propose that you focus this talk on a vital theme: the economic and social measures that you will take if you are elected.

Francois Mitterrand: Agreed.

[Question] You announced that you would immediately have a balance sheet of the French economy drawn up at the end of the 7-year period that is drawing to a close. Why?

F.M.: I believe that it is a mistake, when one passes from one policy to another, to be held responsible for the liabilities of the previous administration or, what is more, when one goes from one majority to another. When the day comes that the public asks for a reckoning, it will not be able to distinguish between what devolves upon the heir or upon the one who preceded him. Obviously, that must be done soon, and honestly. I will ask that this balance sheet be drawn up by representatives of the main governmental departments.

[Question] You are simultaneously undertaking a series of consultations...

F.M.: ...With the worker, employer, and agricultural organizations, the National Education Federation, family associations, etc. The president must provide the impetus; before being replaced by the head of government. But, since the aim is to have social partners negotiate, the intervention of the state, at this level and at this moment, must be considered an instigation. It is only in the event that the social partners should run aground on some points that would seem vital to me, would I again take up the initiative. Why not believe, a priori, that the partners will reach agreements? It is better to change society by agreement than by executive order.

[Question] So, a series of separate talks, but no overall negotiation.

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F.M.: No. Because the trade union world at present is not in a position to engage in this method. It needs time. In the case of Grenelle, it was Pompidou in May 1968; in the case of Matignon, it was Blum in 1936: circumstances were favorable, and I had dreamed, in 1974, of something similar. The big labor unions had agreed. Today that would be difficult. Why risk failure?

[Question] What are the "vital points" of which you speak?

F.M.: First of all, the situation of all those--there are at least 3 million--who do not have the guarantee of a statute or of a collective agreement: temporary workers, contract employees in public jobs, the wage earners who have a contract for only a specified period...And again, young people who have had the benefit, so-called, of an employment agreement and who become unemployed at the end of 6 months. With the interoccupational minimum growth wage earners, that makes close to 4 million people who need priority attention. Assistance to young unemployed persons and their training will be priorities because, out of the 47 percent of the unemployed persons who are not compensated, nine-tenths are young people.

Also vital, as I have said, is negotiation regarding the 35-hour work week, lowering of the retirement age, low salaries, the organization of labor with the introduction of new technologies...The new partners will be invited to talk about all of that. If I become aware that there is no progress, my government of course will again initiate discussions or will take necessary steps. But I do not want to substitute my desire, prior to an examination of the case, for the desires of the responsible persons whose opinions I am soliciting. One can build economic prosperity only on a living network of social relations and by increasing the possibilities of expression of the workers concerning their work and living conditions.

[Question] Third series of initiatives after your election: decisions. Which decisions can you make with a transitional government, without awaiting the re-election of the assembly?

F.M.: I am thinking of acting immediately, by means of decrees and executive orders, in a great number of domains; for example, issuing a big state loan to finance industrial development, guarantees for people's savings, increased social allotments (for families, the elderly, handicapped, unemployed, housing...), repeal of the social security contribution paid by the insured ordered by the decree of 15 January 1980, credits for the installation of young farmers, an energy conservation program, etc. The complete list would be too long. The international initiatives that a president or a government can undertake should also be added.

In the foreign domain, Europe first of all. Let us agree, it is not going well. I would thus propose a consideration to our partners, then some decisions in three fields: the relaunching of European construction based on defense and a reform of the joint agricultural policy with greater cooperation of the Ten in the realms of industry, energy, and research, capable of meeting the challenges of the

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1980's; a concerted support of our economies, so that Europe will not be carried away by a recession, like a pebble by the sea; from there, a coordinated fight against unemployment, which corresponds, I must add, to the desires of other heads of government. I will resume a discussion on the access of our fishing vessels to community waters and, if need be, on a determination of agricultural prices.

In addition to European problems, when I consider that the voice of France must be heard, I will be present and active in all cases.

[Question] The negotiation plan that you envisage supposes a calm social climate. Well, some people, like Georges Marchais, threaten you with agitation in the street.

F.M.: Picture an elected leftist president. First of all, if he is elected, it will be because he has obtained the votes of leftist voters, who are not there--after immediately going to set about to do away with the one for whom they have voted. This will be a historical event for them. For the others, with the exception of the extremists, the republican reflex will come into play: they might not have wanted that president but, since he has been elected, they will help him. If necessary, they will try to correct what he is undertaking, but in civil peace.

Do you believe that, in this psychological climate--which I have called "the state of grace"--a party or a labor union, whose voters or members have participated in the victory, can or will want to undertake a harsh action? Will they demand negotiations? Since it is my desire to encourage them, I do not see where there will be any difficulty.

[Question] Will the transitional government, charged with implementing this policy and with preparing for the legislative elections be a single socialist political party?

F.M.: It will be one that is consonant with my presidential options. It will not necessarily consist only of socialists; it will not be a party government. If I find talents and qualifications elsewhere, and there are some, I will not deprive myself of them.

[Question] If you are elected in the second round, you will have obtained the support of the communists. Will they be among those who will have supported your options?

F.M.: I have asked some questions of the Communist Party directorate. One cannot say that at present the replies that have been received are those that would make a political agreement possible right after the second round. Moreover, at that moment, it will be up to the leftist political parties and organizations to discuss them.

[Question] During the "Great Debate" on TF 1 you said that, even if you were sure of being able to offer comprehensive measures that are more effective than those of

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Giscard, you would be doomed to failure, as in his case, if you do not carry out another policy. Can you define it?

F.M.: First of all I should like to remind you that I offered this other policy 3 years ago. It therefore is not a new plan for the occasion. I simply adapted it to take into account changes that have occurred, notably in the international environment and in the situation of the French economy.

I am integrating into this plan the matter of energy, which is vital. That is what the outgoing candidate did. But I will integrate it into the general framework of my measures, and not, unlike him, as a preliminary explanation. In doing that, Giscard d'Estaing implies that petroleum is the cause of the crisis. Well, petroleum is only one of the factors. Let us not forget that inflation had started prior to the rise in petroleum prices. Everyone knows that petroleum has a great bearing on it, but only to the extent of about a maximum 3 percent out of the approximate 14 percent increase in last year's prices.

What I am opposing is a policy that considers an increase in salaries as the basic cause of inflation. That policy leads us to a recession, without an abatement in inflation, while there is an increase in unemployment, that evil that consumes our society and discourages both innovation and a propensity to work.

Consequently, all aspects of the crisis deepen and unemployment becomes more and more costly. In the face of a stagnant market, enterprises are investing less and less and are raising their prices. Whence, too many purchases abroad, a retreat in the face of foreign competition, and its fatal consequence: dismissals, more unemployment. It is this dynamics of the crisis that must be stemmed so that we may start off again on the right road.

The Giscard-Barre policy causes the domestic market to be reduced progressively and completely. Foreign penetration has increased in all branches: 40 percent of the electric household appliances were imported in 1973, while at present 54 percent are imported; in the case of electronic equipment, 26 percent in 1973, compared with 33 percent at present; in the case of footwear, 15 percent in 1973, 35 percent today.

My approach is opposite to this. When I speak of a revival of growth, I do not say that it is necessary to achieve it in all domains and no matter how. Otherwise, I would risk inflationary trends. First of all, I intend to give a new impetus to consumer goods. If people with modest incomes had the means, they would buy more. What? First of all, food products, clothing, electric household appliances and, in the case of some, automobiles.

French industry is not operating at full capacity in these four fields. General consumerism will revive production.

[Question] But there are sectors where consumer goods are not of great significance.

F.M.: Those sectors will be stimulated by industrial reorganization measures and financial incentives for investment and research. I am thinking of machine tools,

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textiles, wood, paper, iron and steel, hi-fi's, microprocessors. All sectors--traditional or new--where we must import less and export more.

At the moment, we are at zero. One growth point represents 30 billion francs. Since total previous deductions--fiscal and social--will probably amount to a current 42 percent, that means that for each growth point a dozen billion will be available for social expenditures and increased resources for the state.

[Question] If you succeed in this revival, a logical consequence will be a drop in unemployment...

F.M.: ...Yes, it will also create additional wealth through the jobs that are created. Unemployment costs today represent about 100 billion, taking into account allotments and the lack of earning power reflected in the absence of social contributions or of tax receipts. Unemployment will not disappear all of a sudden, but the money that one will spend to put people back to work will nevertheless be more profitable than the money used for unemployment compensation.

I will also call for the taxation of large fortunes and for a fight against tax fraud, which represents, I am told, 60 to 80 billion...In short, I do not believe that I will have trouble in covering most of the expenditures that I would incur for the revival.

[Question] What will you do to prevent the revival from being inflationary?

F.M.: I will direct demand to the domestic market and I will see to it that demand increases reasonably. I will fight against inflation through costs, through a rigorous monetary policy. Finally, it will be necessary to attack all causes of inflexibility, all privileges, the inequalities that produce an increase in prices.

[Question] Do you envisage a return to price controls?

F.M.: A priori, I have no intention of returning to price controls. Except when competition does not work. When it comes to equal quality and identical prices, I will also ask the distribution sector not to place French products at a disadvantage. Having said this, I now say that I loathe bureaucracy: I will do everything to suppress it.

In any case, the risk that you mention is less serious than the risk of doing nothing, of remaining where Giscard d'Estaing and Barre are. When the public authorities concern themselves with industrial development, when a reconquest of the domestic market is encouraged, I am sure that French industry will again operate at a good pace, and will supply quality and innovative products at competitive prices. Our enterprises, our creative people, our workers are capable of this.

[Question] There remains the matter of energy.

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F.M.: My position is simple: I do not reject any form of energy. But I say that the "all-nuclear" solution is excessive and even dangerous. The time that is spent in implementing the nuclear power stations program should be better utilized to increase energy conservation. Giscard d'Estaing boasted of saving the equivalent of 100 million tons of oil during his 7-year period. That is not correct. The publications of the Ministry of Industry speak of 25 million.

It is estimated that new types of energy will represent 5 percent of the total production of electricity in the year 2,000. Studies that I have had made show that 10 percent could be attained.

When I propose a revival of the national production of coal, there are objections that this coal will cost more than the coal that is bought abroad. But how many jobs, how many regions put back to work does the coal that is produced in France represent?

The nuclear method? The plants that are under construction will be completed. But I will take time to examine results. The energy plan will take into account four main sources of energy: traditional energy sources, new energy sources, nuclear sources, and the conservation of energy. For the present, priority will be accorded to the conservation of energy—less costly and more productive of jobs than the nuclear method, the scientific and technical standards of which will be changed within 30 years as a result of a transition from nuclear fission to fusion.

[Question] After your election, do you envisage protective border measures?

F.M.: Why? The borders are not threatened. Oh, yes, Giscard d'Estaing claims that my policy will lead to a closing of the borders! He presupposes, in fact, that it will cause an invasion of foreign goods. He bets on failure, while I bet on success; and, in my case, the term is not correct: I am not betting; I am acting logically.

But if I were to admit that the foreign imbalance cannot be appreciably reduced while the industrial reorganization has not been carried out successfully, I do not see why I should go beyond the protective clauses provided by the Rome Treaty. And then again, only if that is really necessary.

All of these orientations naturally fall within the framework of an overall economic policy that supposes democratic planning, the broadening of the public sector, and a resolute decentralization.

[Question] Can one also suppose that "big capital" will work against you?

F.M.: If you are thinking of the evasion of capital, remember that we have emerged from the romantic period when people carried ingots in their pockets. Almost all of the movements of capital are registered; for that it is enough to ask the banks.

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There are also periods in which a patriotic reflex comes into play.

I do not think that penal repression is the answer for these kinds of problems, which have to do with psychology. I believe more in the confidence...

[Question] Those of the large industrial groups also...

F.M.: I look for the confidence of workers. I will address myself to the staffs and the business leaders who have an appreciation of national interest and who are more numerous than one thinks when it comes to wanting a change in policy. As for the large industrial groups who fear nationalization...they are in the act of paying for the electoral campaign of my competitors!

[Question] If the national assembly that is elected at the end of the transitional period were to have a rightist majority, what portion of your projects could you realize?

F.M.: My election will radically change French policy, will produce a national impetus, will free new forces. The legislative elections will be won by the parties of progress, by the left, by all those who participate in the people's movement.

If that hope is frustrated, it would still be my duty to wisely guide events in France, but the change that I have just mentioned, that of 10 May, will not stop there!

[Question] If we were to look forward, to the period of your possible 7-year term? How do you see the France of that time? What is your No 1 objective?

F.M.: The main objective is full employment. The French people must not be deceived by being told that this can be realized in the first years. First it is necessary to reverse the course of things, in order to be able to climb back up again. In a situation of full employment, the most acute problems will be resolved.

[Question] Then it would have to be the result of the measures that you offer in the plan that we published elsewhere.

F.M.: Of course. I will be able to justify my presidential responsibility during 7 years only if I have also succeeded in radically changing living conditions. In other words, a more egalitarian society, where everyone will have an opportunity to be fulfilled for the greatest benefit of the community. But also a France that is in good order, one that will be able to assume its responsibilities in the world.

[Question] In what way will France be different?

F.M.: I do not advocate an abrupt passing from one system to another, what one views as a revolution. Since the industrialization of nations with large work forces, there has been no revolution of this kind among them. But, in the case of some of them, there have been profound changes through struggles and under the

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guidance of the socialists. Reformist? No. Over the period of a century the word has taken on a negative connotation. But how can society be changed if not through reforms? Vigorous ones, obviously. History will be the judge

The Mitterrand Plan

1. A program is coherent only if the economic and the social aspects are closely linked. In order to get the country out of the deep crisis in which it finds itself it is necessary to create jobs in order to increase available resources and to provide an impetus for expansion in order to create still more jobs. This revival will be produced by and for a reduction in inequalities, by and for the development of investments for modernization and expansion, investments that the new technological revolution makes possible. Finally, in order to ensure the independence of France with respect to energy, we will put into practice a balanced consideration of the four actions that are possible: priority for energy conservation, reasonable continuation in the nuclear field, increased recourse to traditional forms of energy (coal), development of new sources of energy (sun, biomass, geothermy).

2. The basic objective of this program is a return to full employment. Its implementation can only be gradual, because of the heritage bequeathed by the outgoing candidate: a weakened economy, a high level of inflation, a considerable foreign deficit, a domestic market that must be recovered, wasted human resources, the relegation of women to second place.

3. Thanks to the expansion of the public sector to 10 industrial enterprises and to the banks, thanks to the development of private investments, housing, and public works, our economy will be successively stimulated and reorganized and its competitiveness increased. Which will make it possible to finance our importations, which will alleviate the positions recovered on the French market. Which will reduce the burden of the fixed costs of the nation and thus will contribute to the fight against inflation, within the framework of a rigorous monetary policy. Which will avoid, finally, an increase, beyond their present rate (42 percent), in the obligatory previous deductions.

4. Thus, through coherent planning and resolute decentralization, priorities will be defined and will be matched with appropriate means, for France to find a way out of the crisis, on the path of a respectful social growth of natural environment and human balances, rich in the possibilities of well-being, responsibility, and freedom.

A. Six Measures for Full Employment

Selective recovery of the economy, beginning with the raising of low incomes, negotiated by the social partners: low salaries, family allowances, housing allotment, minimum old age income, resources for the handicapped...

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Planned reduction to a 35-hour work week through decentralized agreements, adapted to the situation of each branch and of each enterprise.

Implementation of a program of public and private investments, as well as assistance for research, through a big national loan for industry. Special attention will be accorded the building, public works, and housing sectors, which constitute the vital basis of activity in numerous regions.

Creation of 150,000 jobs in the public sector (health, education, post office, social services) and 60,000 other jobs offered to associations that see to the quality of life, the protection of environment, and various social and cultural activities.

Reduction in the social expenditures of enterprises for manpower through a change in the basis of social contributions.

After consultation with teachers' labor unions and occupational organizations, the application of an active and concerted policy with respect to training and employment. A training salary and the right to social protection will be accorded all young people in search of a first job.

B. Six Social Justice Measures

Within the limit of the present previous deduction (42 percent of the gross domestic product), I propose the following reforms to modernize the French tax policy and to reduce inequalities.

Income Tax

Greater tax exemption for incomes, to 20,000 francs per unit. Thus, families with two children whose gross income is less than 5,000 francs a month will be exempt from an income tax.

The family quotient amounts to be paid will be calculated according to the number of dependent children.

A tax on salaries for tradesmen and craftsmen, as well as their wives when the latter assist them, will be established. They can thus have the 20 percent deduction that is granted salaried employees, on condition that they keep an account of receipts and expenditures. The tax policy in regard to them will be the subject of a consultation with representative organizations.

All tax deductions (interest on loans, land income, Monory law, etc.) will be replaced by a tax credit intended to encourage family savings and, in particular, personal savings, which will be indexed.

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Tax on Large Fortunes

A tax on large fortunes will be established beginning with 3 million francs per household. It will be progressive, with rates by brackets from 0.5 to 8 percent (for the incomes above 50 million francs). It will be done on the basis of a declaration of income.

Goods used in occupations (agricultural, industrial, commercial...) for individual exploitation will be exempt.

Inheritance taxes (up to 3 million francs) will be reduced by doubling the personal allowance; this will be extended to brothers and sisters. The tax will be adapted to the personal situation of the heir and the size of the patrimony transferred.

With respect to the TVA [value-added tax], goods that are absolutely essential will be exempt. The tax on cultural goods and services will be reduced. The tax on maintenance and repair activities will be reviewed to favor the creation of jobs.

Local finance resources will be increased.

The system of local contributions and the tax on dwellings will be revised to take into account the actual resources of each household.

The occupational tax will be reformed and its basis changed, in order to no longer penalize the creation of jobs and investments.

Finally, the proceeds from taxes on petroleum profits will no longer be allocated to the state, but to the territorial communities.

The financing of social security will be adjusted by adopting a basis for employer contributions that will take into account all the added-value elements. The national agency will establish a fair equalization of allowances for the various social security administrations.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

SOCIALIST EMPLOYMENT POLICY PRESENTED, DISPUTED

Unemployment Policy

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Feb 81 p 33

[Article quoting from Mitterrand interview with COMBAT SOCIALISTE, new PS daily]

[Text] In an interview with COMBAT SOCIALISTE on the occasion of the launching of the Socialist Party daily on Tuesday afternoon, 24 February, Francois Mitterrand, socialist candidate for president, revealed the measures he proposes for fighting unemployment. Mitterrand said that:

"Six measures must be taken immediately:

"1) a selective relaunching of the economy based on an increase in low incomes so as to emerge from this climate of recession that leads to bankruptcies, discourages entrepreneurs and weakens certain regions.

"2) the materialization of this fine idea of sharing work -- that is, solidarity between those who have jobs and those who do not. By encouraging management and trade unions to open up real negotiations on a gradual reduction to achieve the 35-hour work week, it will be possible, through decentralized agreements adapted to the situation of every branch and every enterprise, to give some the time to live and jobs to others (...).

"3) application of a public and private investment program and aid to research, which will strengthen economic potential in medium-range terms, but which in the short run will help support activity and create jobs. Special attention will be paid to the building-public works and housing sectors, which constitute the vital basis of activity for many regions.

"4) the creation of 210,000 jobs in order to respond to indispensable needs: 150,000 in the public sector (health, education, post office, social services) and another 60,000 other jobs, also of collective benefit, offered to organizations that have to do with the quality of life, protection of the environment and various social and cultural actions. The cost of these measures will be some 12 billion francs, one-fifth of the funds used to pay unemployment compensation. Is it not preferable and sensible to use these sums to put people to work and meet needs, while putting an additional 4 billion francs into Social Security?

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"5) a reduction in the social charges of enterprises for labor through a modification in social deductions.

"6) the application, following consultation with teachers unions and professional and trade union organizations, of an active, coordinated policy for training and employment (...).

"Waste is what one sees in the policy now being followed: 56 billion francs to pay unemployment compensation or to try to have some effect on jobs, 30 billion francs in losses for Social Security, a national production 100 billion francs lower than it could be. Turning this waste into resources and restoring the individual's chance of having a job: These are the priorities of the other policy, my policy."

Mitterrand Discusses Situations, Plans

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 20 Apr 81 pp 28-29

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand, socialist candidate for president; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Considering your proposals and the evolution of the population, what employment prospects do you see for 1985?

[Answer] I am happy that you have begun our interview with that question. It is a sign that my concern for making employment the essential issue in this campaign has been understood. But employment is at stake in every enterprise, not in the national bookkeeping.

I visit the regions; I talk with the French people, the blue- and white-collar workers, management personnel and executives. I realize not only the economic and financial ravages, but the psychological, family and social impact of unemployment and bankruptcies. The incumbent constantly repeats that our country has to face formidable foreign competition, particularly since the two oil crises. That is true, but how does he expect the country to overcome its difficulties by wasting its labor force, by injecting uncertainty into millions of men, women, families and young people?

There is no possible way out of the crisis without restoring the French people's hope of a better economic future. And there is no better future without a change in employment prospects. I therefore propose to make employment a way to emerge from the crisis and not make the crisis a way to force people to accept unemployment. Answering your question very precisely presumes using the technical tools of forecasting.

Now then, unlike in many foreign countries, one of the signs of how our democracy is behind, predictions cannot be made freely. The most recent ones are those of the Ministry of Planning. They show that if Giscard d'Estaing's policy is applied, that is, if the Barre plan is followed, there will be 2.5 million unemployed persons by 1985. They also show -- and this is very interesting -- that with another

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policy, mainly based on more sustained consumption and investments and on a reduction in the work week, leading to 35 hours by 1985, one can create between 1 and 1.5 million jobs between now and that date and reduce unemployment. Based on such estimates, made within the framework of a liberal policy, I believe that it is possible, thanks to the additional measures which I have presented, to achieve a net reduction in the level of unemployment by 1985 and start the economy growing again without any foreign imbalances.

Finally, before comparing his program and mine, the incumbent should draw up his balance sheet. For my part, I put it at 1.29 billion francs. He has still not disputed that figure. Every year, he has cost much more than, according to him, I "would cost" in 7 years.

[Question] What particular policies do you recommend in order to take the diversity of the unemployed persons into account?

[Answer] I would remind you that unemployment affects everyone. It is linked to the rate of growth and type of development of our society and our economy, to the evolution of technology. That is why I do not believe in the efficacy of partial, sporadic measures to fight unemployment, which would not be part of an overall plan. The incumbent's proposals are a caricature in this respect. Without changing anything in the economic policy followed to date and with the help of a few isolated measures, he thinks he can solve the problem.

That is not believable and furthermore, no one believes it. For over 7 years, the Giscard plan has meant 3 million unemployed. Your question is also pertinent because some groups are hit harder by unemployment than others. For example, during the 7-year term of Giscard d'Estaing, the number of unemployed youth has increased five times. That is why I would propose that a much more active policy of professional training be followed for them. During that training, the young people should receive a wage enabling them to meet their minimum needs. Likewise, social security should be provided for young people seeking their first jobs. Women make up over half the unemployed. Consequently, fighting unemployment first of all means working to find jobs for women. Furthermore, we must respect the equality of men and women and particularly the principle "equal wages for equal work," which is far from the case in France. From this standpoint also, the incumbent has failed.

Unemployment of upper-level personnel is becoming an increasing burden, rising 3.5 times since 1974. They understand better than anyone else the absolute need to modernize our economy, to find a way of meeting competition outside our borders and at home, for they are the victims of a weakening economy. They are losing any possibility of taking the initiative in business because the weight of the hierarchy is so great and their fear of losing their jobs so strong. And it is being suggested that they retire early at the age of 57! By the time they reach 50 or even 45, when they are in their prime, it will be increasingly difficult to go into a new field, to change jobs. The crisis has a different effect on management personnel but in the final analysis, the effect is every bit as great, without mentioning the drop in purchasing power. These people understand better than others our economy's absolute need to regain its vigor because they are the main victims of a weakening economy. We must also make it possible for them to face

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technological changes. I foresee the establishment of a fund for 2 years of training that could be used freely by upper-level personnel during their career.

[Question] In your opinion, where are the jobs of the future when the decline of the traditional industries means fewer jobs and when the sectors of the future would create few jobs?

[Answer] The jobs of the future will first of all be found in the restoration of economic activity and a reduction in the work week. If you ask me in what sectors, I would tell you in all of them as soon as the current recession has been halted. There are not peak sectors. They can all be if they use the most modern technology. It is nevertheless true, as you suggest, that some areas will create jobs less rapidly than others because of technological trends or the international division of labor. That is why I believe that the movement toward the tertiary sector of the economy will continue, particularly the movement having to do with the expansion of jobs in data processing in the broadest sense of the word (information, word processing, and so on). But one must not forget about the many jobs that could be created in industry, housing and public works in particular, through the stimulation of the economy.

[Question] How would you approach the problem of new types of production that may eliminate jobs?

[Answer] One must not move toward reactionary or Malthusian positions because jobs are the first priority. When technical progress makes it possible to improve living conditions and to do away with heavy labor, I am happy. That is why the problem facing our society today is not a choice between new types of production or jobs. Rather, it is a matter of adapting the supply of jobs to the new types of production -- that is, reducing the work week, changing manpower training, and so on. I am therefore quite in favor of this technological progress, provided that the enterprises involved and our society as a whole organize the mechanisms of transition preventing some types of workers from being the only ones to have to face the radical changes this progress entails.

[Question] What is the meaning of a "levy or tax on machinery" that you mention?

[Answer] It is very simple. Two forces contribute to production: work and machines, and in a broader sense, capital. If you add up deductions for benefits and all the taxes levied on wages, you will note that most of the obligatory deductions -- with the exclusion of the added-value tax on consumption -- affect wages. I believe it would be normal to seek a balance in this situation, especially at a time when, because of the modernization of technology, human labor is increasingly being replaced by machines.

[Question] Does your program not risk worsening obligatory deductions and contributions and the charges of enterprises on the whole?

[Answer] You make exactly the same mistake as Giscard d'Estaing and Barre: You forget the other side of the scales. During the last 7-year term of office, obligatory deductions rose from 37 percent of the GNP to over 42 percent, even though growth collapsed. Why? Because the increased charges affected an

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economy in recession. But if the economy gets off to a new start, which is the goal of my policy, it will be able to finance public spending without any increase in deductions.

I would add -- and your informed readers are perfectly aware of this -- that according to official figures, the total charges affecting French enterprises (I mean by this wages plus benefits) are about 20 percent lower than what they are in Germany, which shows that the financial aspect is not the only thing -- even if it is very important, naturally -- that has an impact on the competitiveness of an enterprise or an economy. The very strength of an enterprise, the quality of products, the technical and commercial intelligence of executive and management personnel, the participation of workers in the goals and smooth operation of the business: All of these things count just as much.

[Question] Is the reconquest of the domestic market not similar to a kind of protectionism?

[Answer] No, not any more than the conquest of foreign markets is similar to dumping. There are rules, in this instance, those of the Common Market and GATT. We shall respect them and we shall demand their application when they are skirted.

Contradictions in Policy

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Apr 81 pp 1, 12

[Article by Michel Durafour, former minister, UDF [French Democratic Union] deputy from Loire: "The Socialist Utopia"]

[Text] All the presidential candidates -- or at least the most serious among them -- are undoubtedly sincerely concerned about reducing unemployment, stabilizing prices and eliminating excessive inequalities. But it is a long way from good intentions to accomplishing the fact. Verbal generosity alone is not sufficient to guarantee economic balances.

The socialist candidate has just repeated his proposals in a major weekly (L'EXPRESS, see LE MONDE of 5-6 April). Once again, public opinion will be disappointed, even deceived. Mitterrand's proposals have not gained much in precision. They are still not accompanied by figures and they remain just as contradictory.

First contradiction: The recovery envisaged by Mitterrand could only be financed by a massive increase in taxes. Otherwise, a massive deficit in the government's budget would be the first consequence. In other words, more inflation.

In the absence of any figures, it is difficult to evaluate the cost of the socialist recovery. The only thing we know is that it would involve the relaunching of consumption and therefore, a particularly costly move. When one adds up -- for Mitterrand has not been stingy with promises -- the increase in social benefits, the boost in low incomes, the lowering of retirement age, the hiring of public employees and the elimination of the added-value tax on basic commodities, one arrives at a budgetary cost of over 100 billion francs. This sum must be compared with that of the government's budget: 615 billion.

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One must also add the cost of aid to investments to this total. The socialist candidate, whose economic analysis increasingly appears to be one crisis late, actually suggests a systematic policy of major projects to reduce unemployment. When will we have the proposals for a return to the national workshops of 1848 or the compulsory work rule for everyone?

Mitterrand is definitely not as prodigious when he takes up the subject of what resources would finance these extravagant expenditures. Doing away with fiscal credit, the taxing of fortunes of over 3 million francs and the increase in the income tax, particularly through the limitation of the effects of the current family tax relief based on dependents, could scarcely produce over 30 billion francs. Even this contribution would be immediately nullified by the effects of a new bewildering proposal: allocating the tax on oil products current collected by the government to local communities.

No Figures

In the face of a public burden now increased by some 150 billion francs, insofar as one can make an estimate, there would be but one alternative: either crushing taxation or bankruptcy. Either taxes and deductions for benefits would have to be increased in intolerable proportions for enterprises and private parties (for example, one would have to double the individual income tax) or the government, bled white, would go into bankruptcy.

Second contradiction: The "social shock" that Mitterrand wants would ruin the competitiveness of our enterprises. One has but to think about the reduction in the work week, suddenly taken from 40.8 to 35 hours. Naturally, such a reduction is desirable and confirmed by all factions, but one must realize that with wages remaining the same, the hiring of additional personnel would mean an increase in the wage mass of some 140 billion francs.

How could our enterprises, which face ever greater competition during this period of crisis, stand such a shock without going broke? The inevitable effect of the new wage costs on sales prices would force us to capitulate to foreign firms. This would be a brutal condemnation of our ability to compete. International competition, like the Communist Party, does not recognize any "state of grace"!

Third contradiction: The formidable inflation engendered by the budgetary deficit and by the higher production costs would mean the end of the French foreign trade balance. Our exports would suffer enormous losses while the oil bill would remain just as high. And what can be said about the domestic market that the socialists would claim to reconquer? The increase in production costs would give the lion's share to competing foreign companies. As is the rule, failure abroad would immediately join the domestic deficit. Or we would have to close our borders and worse, leave the Common Market. With all the consequences.

These are the three insurmountable contradictions of Mitterrand's economic and social program. Let them not claim that there would only be a few difficult months, following which the balances would be restored! The extent of the disorder would prevent the reconstruction of our economy. And, having noticed their blunder, let them not try to suggest that some social measures would be spread out in time. The whole apparatus will have broken down long before. That is why

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the socialist measures are not accompanied by figures. That is why they are trying to conceal the truth from the French people.

Behind its generous facade, that is the socialist utopia.

The French people do not have the time to dream. One cannot govern a country with incantations.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

SOCIALIST NATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES, POLICIES, PROGRAMS

Nationalization of Industry

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Feb 81 p 7

[Article by Laurence Allard]

[Text] "It is necessary to restore the plan and to revitalize industry by relying on an expanded public sector and a private sector that has regained its dynamism." So say the leaders of the Socialist Party [PS] in a brochure published the day before yesterday under the title "Socialism and Industry."

1. Reestablishing the plan: According to them, the plan must play a new role in industrial strategy and in the distribution of roles within the national community.

How? By carrying out a futurological study so as to detect far enough in advance the technological changes that will be decisive for the competitiveness of industry. That study will form the basis for the allocation of aid to research and investment, to which the government will devote 2.5 percent of the GNP, as compared to the current 1.76 percent.

The Socialists say they refuse to favor any particular industrial sector. But "vital" programs will be established in sectors regarded as underlying the others; examples being information and its processing in the broad sense (data processing, telecommunications, microelectronics, and so on), energy and raw materials, transportation, iron and steel, automobiles, industrial biology, robotics and machine tools, and agroindustry and animal proteins.

The Socialists also consider it appropriate to support the basic sectors, which are the only ones capable of solving our employment problems in the immediate future while also insuring a reconquest of the domestic market. Sectoral development plans will be established for industries such as glass; shipbuilding; heavy industrial equipment (electrical engineering, railway construction, and so on); heavy chemicals; construction and public works; textiles; wood, paper, and board; hides and skins; and others.

2. A broad public sector: "The public sector will be the chief instrument for stimulating and directing industrial policy," say the Socialists. This means the nationalization of CII [International Data Processing Company]-Honeywell-Bull, Pechiney Ugine-Kuhlmann, General Electric Company, ITT France, Rhone-Poulenc, Roussel-Uclaf,

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some of Creusot-Loire's activities (nuclear power and high-grade iron and steel), and MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation, and Traction Company].

Certain subsidiaries of nationalized groups may also be included in the nationalizations. "The scope of the public sector may be enlarged whenever a monopolistic trend is noted in a vital sector or when products necessary to the country's security and independence are in question."

Government control of the iron and steel industry (for which the Socialist Party is advocating the continued existence of two producers) and of petroleum will also be strengthened so as to place it beyond dispute.

Peugeot may benefit from government assistance. But that assistance will have to take the form of government ownership of some of the group's shares. The Socialists feel, however, that the coexistence of the two industrial entities is desirable.

Those nationalizations will affect 600,000 wage earners. They therefore mean a 60-percent increase in the number of workers employed in the public sector.

What is called a sector for encouragement will be developed alongside the "stimulating" public sector. It will intervene in areas where activity appears to be declining or has been taken over to too large an extent by foreign capital. Those sectors will remain private, however. This applies to the wood, board, and paper industry, construction and public works, textiles, and the optical and household appliance industries.

3. A private sector that has regained its dynamism: To improve the performance of the private firms, which employ nearly 7 out of 10 wage earners, the authorities are to draw up a subcontracting code and adopt suitable measures for strengthening the capital and liquid assets of small and medium-sized businesses. They will also stimulate the formation of industrial networks like the one planned for steel, special steels, and the engineering industry. Complementary production, both upstream and downstream, would be tied in with their activity.

Nationalization of Financial Institutions

Paris LE FIGARO in French 25-26 Apr 81 p 6

[Editorial by Georges Hervet, chairman of the Coordination Office for Private Banks and president-director general of the Hervet Bank]

[Text] The French are going to elect their chief of state for 7 years. That is a political choice for which--and there is reason to regret it--they seem to be showing scarcely any enthusiasm, even though the stakes are considerable.

If I consider it necessary to express my point of view here, I do so in my capacity as chairman of an association representing the great majority of the private banks, but also as the head of a bank whose clients include several tens of thousands of firms and households whose future is closely linked to the balloting on 10 May.

I feel that in this debate, in which the economy occupies such an important place, the bankers, who have some experience with the economic machinery, have a duty to make their opinion known.

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The prospect of seeing the Common Program of the Left implemented once aroused legitimate concern in many voters who nevertheless leaned toward the opposition, but some of them may now feel reassured by its abandonment following the breakup of the union.

What is the true situation?

During his campaign, the Socialist candidate has never stated, to my knowledge, that the basic provisions in the common program are obsolete, and in my opinion, the public would be committing a serious error if it felt that in 3 years' time, he had been transformed into a Social Democrat.

The vagueness in the economic objectives does not suffice to conceal the goals actually being pursued. I have read that the philosophy behind the Socialist program is that of voluntarily planning the control of technology and capital and of simultaneously organizing the flowering of a cultural program. I wonder about the nature and extent of the "controls" being "planned voluntarily," and I see nothing in them but the premises of a technocratic planned economy that all the free countries are currently trying to combat.

The truth is that the French left stands out in the Western World as the only one maintaining a policy of nationalizations and expressing a self-management doctrine whose lack of realism has already been demonstrated. Lastly, it advocates an excessive degree of planning whose evil effects have manifested themselves wherever it has been applied.

"French-style socialism" is definitely a promising expression. It leads one to think that we alone will avoid the traps into which every similar system without exception has fallen. But how could the same causes fail to produce the same effects?

It has been said, for example, that we would not founder in bureaucratism. The first infringement of that commitment: the creation of more than 200,000 new civil service positions. What will those government employees do, and who is going to pay them?

It is obvious that when the proportion of jobs that are not directly productive increases in relation to the total active population, the average purchasing power can only decrease to that same extent. To me it also seems illusory to believe that the nationalizations can maintain, let alone increase, the profit-making capacity of the firms concerned.

Let us add that a nationalized firm cannot, by definition, go bankrupt. It will always be kept afloat--artificially, by the way--through bank loans or ever-increasing financial aid from the state. When all is said and done, who is going to pay for it, if not the nation in the form of taxes or inflation?

Of all the nationalizations announced, the one most fraught with consequences is, in my opinion, the nationalization of credit. It is a political weapon that gives the government discretionary power in the distribution of credit, knowledge of incomes and assets, and control of the economy.

It will be objected that more than two-thirds of the banking system is already nationalized today. That is true, and in my opinion, it is excessive. The fact remains that in the current state of things, there is free competition and--regardless

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of what anyone may believe--very active competition among the banks, whether nationalized or not.

Today anyone can decide freely to borrow money to buy a house or automobile or to expand his business. How would things stand in the future?

More simply, if anyone is dissatisfied with his bank, he can go to another one. If all the banks were nationalized, the situation would be completely different. Since they would all belong to the state, many of them would lose their individuality, and we would undoubtedly see many mergers.

It is more likely that we would see the establishment of an investment bank--which, incidentally, is called for in the common program. Its purpose would be to finance investments, but those investments would be distributed according to a centralized plan established by civil servants enjoying absolute power in that field.

What people should realize is that, contrary to what the opposition would like to have us believe, the nationalization of credit does not constitute the completion of an undertaking begun back in 1945; it would represent not a further development but an upheaval binding the firm's hand and foot to the state, which alone would hold the keys to credit.

What people should realize is that the existence of a private sector, even if it is a minority, is the only guarantee of free dialogue between the banker and his client.

Besides, what have the private banks done to deserve this? Who can deny that their initiative and creativity have been decisive in financing the investments that have made the tremendous postwar economic boom possible?

Who can question the quality of their management, considering that although they comprise scarcely 30 percent of the total number of banks, they pay nearly 80 percent of the taxes on profits?

Regional and local banks everywhere are fulfilling a difficult mission every day on behalf of small and medium-sized businesses. They must meet the needs of a clientele which resembles them in size and which they, by their proximity and the permanent presence of their management, know better than anyone.

Many regional firms--and for that matter, many individuals--are so appreciative of the local banker's presence in their town or the administrative center of their canton that he has become part of the familiar scene.

The intention is to nationalize those banks whose managers, because of their origins, not only know what men are worth but also, because of that, can render services that anyone else, looking only at dossiers, would refuse.

Nationalizing those banks means nationalizing the PME [small and medium-sized businesses].

It is too often forgotten that one of the first victories of the French Revolution was that of economic freedom. The Le Chapelier Law, which put an end to the old system of trade guilds, preceded universal suffrage.

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Let us beware of restricting the freedom of an enterprise now, almost two centuries later.

Nationalization, Industrial Policy

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 6 Apr 81 pp 76-77

[Interview with Pierre Mauroy, spokesman for Francois Mitterrand; date and place not specified]

[Text] "Look what we are doing in Nord!" Steeped in his experience as chairman of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council, Pierre Mauroy, Mitterrand's spokesman, discusses industrial policy from the standpoint of decentralization. Nationalizations, planning, and industrial independence--all the major chapters in Socialist policy--are rewritten in terms of the regions. Mauroy says: "It is necessary to bring the regions into step with industrialization."

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: The actions taken in recent years tend to show that it is possible to influence the large firms without nationalizing them. Do you think that nationalizations are still as necessary as in 1978?

Pierre Mauroy: What are you referring to? The state as customer? Of course, government purchases are one way of guiding industrial development. As a Socialist, I consider that the few firms whose only--and generous--customer is the government (telecommunications, nuclear power, and military aeronautics) must be controlled directly by the government.

As for the billions in public funds that are bestowed on the owners of the French iron and steel industry, we know the results: decline, dispersion, and inconsistency. In their case, nationalization will be a necessary and even moral clarification.

More generally, a strong public sector, extended to the well-known major groups, will have a strong chain effect on private industrial initiative in these difficult times. It is not said often enough that under Giscard d'Estaing, private industrial investment has fallen by 15 percent in 7 years. Since 1974, public investment's share of total French investment has risen from 15 to 26 percent. So Giscard d'Estaing has "nationalized" 11 percent of French investments! That is as much as is represented by the groups we want to nationalize.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Doesn't nationalization contradict the maintenance of a market economy, which you advocate?

Pierre Mauroy: We are in favor of a new type of nationalization that is radically removed from administrative management of the economy and from government bureaucracy. If the state-owned firms become industrial ministries, we are courting failure. They are not empires, but instruments in the service of the community. Today, in my view, the idea of nationalization is inseparable from that of decentralization and regionalization, which will be the central point in the actions of a leftist government, since all the others will depend on it.

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I.E. NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How do you conceive of cooperation between the Peugeot and Renault groups, as proposed in the PS's "plan to save the automobile industry"?

Pierre Mauroy: The Socialist position is clear: we have stated that we are in favor of acquiring a blocking minority of shares in Peugeot by increasing the amount of capital reserved to the state and also of awarding contracts for modernization and new equipment to both builders as part of the plan. But we are very much attached to autonomy of management in the two groups, because nationalization does not signify monopoly. In the iron and steel industry, for example, we will have two national firms. As far as the automobile industry is concerned, I feel that competition must exist in the French industry. In all likelihood, that will not exclude financial assistance for the Peugeot group. But there will be no government aid without control or quid pro quo.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Mitterrand said this to COMBAT SOCIALISTE: "Special attention will be paid to the sectors of construction and public works, which are the vital foundation of activity for many regions." Will major construction programs be started? How will they be financed?

Pierre Mauroy: Look what we are doing in Nord and Pas-de-Calais. We are mobilizing local savings through a loan by the regional council for the benefit of a regional transportation plan. The result is 900,000 hours of work, a railway industry safeguarded by orders for modern railroad cars, a completely renovated rail system, and an increase in the number of passengers that has exceeded our hopes. And millions of hours of free time regained for the workers. We have applied the same financial procedure to the plan for housing and settlement. By reviving the construction of 25,000 dwellings in 3 years, we are going to protect employment in an industry that is in trouble, but we are also going to develop technologies for the conservation of energy and materials.

We did that with a modest regional budget of 450 million francs. Imagine what we could have done with a budget 10 times greater--and even that would not be a tremendous budget. Above all, imagine what it would mean on the national scale if we had a policy for the renovation of housing and the development of mass transit and infrastructures that would mobilize simultaneously the major basic industries, the PME, and the craftsmen while also reducing inflation and recourse to imports!

All of that presupposes that the regions, which consume 60 percent of the investment credits, will have greater resources. A leftist government would increase transfers of the nation's tax revenues to the regions so that in 6 months, their current share of 19 percent would be up to 25 percent.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How would you treat the sectors in crisis or the "lame ducks" of a particular industry?

Pierre Mauroy: What do you mean by "lame ducks"? Are you referring to errors in management? I was very struck by a study made by the National Office for Government Contracts, which showed that half of all business failures are due to such errors. Withholding information and rejecting social dialogue within the firm make it impossible to react in time when signs of future difficulties appear. I would like to think that active information and participation on the part of the employees, especially the executives, could prevent many bankruptcies that are not at all inevitable.

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Are you talking about innovative small and medium-sized businesses that experience temporary cash problems during expansion? I know too many tragic stories about firms that were strangled by their banks. Or, to be more precise, by a system of credit distribution that is centralized, finicky, and guided exclusively by a rule of short-term profitability.

We say that the rules for allocating credit must be changed to conform to the basic objectives of innovation, research, modernization, and the protection and creation of jobs. In short, a credit system designed to help firms grow, including those in threatened sectors when the possibilities for adaptation and conversion exist.

The credit policy must be one of the plan's instruments. If concerted, decentralized, and contractual planning existed, there would be a lot fewer lame ducks and a lot more small and medium-sized businesses in expansion.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Does the PS intend to continue the present actions in favor of so-called strategic industries?

Pierre Mauroy: I do not believe in the spot policy which the government advocates--but does not implement in a credible manner--and which leads to a tearing of the industrial fabric. Just one example: they claim to be specializing in telematics and robotics, but they have long neglected the production of microprocessors. In today's world, that kind of strategy resembles Russian roulette! All the more because at the same time, they are letting entire pieces of French industry collapse.

Industrial independence and the satisfaction of domestic demand require that a country like France possess a broad industrial base. There is no obsolete sector. There are production methods that we have been unable or unwilling to modernize. That applies to the furniture and shoe industries as well as to machine tools or medical equipment.

Oceanographic research, industrial biology, and telecommunications, of course! But French industry as a whole will not be revitalized and full employment assured if we are content to concentrate on a few high-technology industries while abandoning all the rest to the law of the world market.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Since a growing number of industrialists are calling for it, wouldn't an annual scheduling of working hours be preferable to the chaotic alternation between overtime and partial unemployment?

Pierre Mauroy: If it is a question of reducing vacation time and generalizing work on Sunday, the answer is obviously no. In some industries, the employer demand for an annual scheduling of working hours has a real economic basis. In others--and they are the majority--it reflects a pure and simple desire to save overtime costs. So the question cannot be considered except in the first case mentioned, and it must be approached through negotiations between employers and unions, by branch and by firm. It must be approached from the standpoint of two requirements: that of placing the problem within the general framework of a reduction in working hours and that of guaranteeing the wage gains achieved so far. And with a limit: the maximum legal workweek.

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More generally, the reduced workweek is a necessity that is becoming increasingly recognized. It is the fruit of productivity. In my opinion, the objective of 35 hours is therefore a realistic goal and a negotiated process: it will not be imposed all at once and in the same manner everywhere. But we will pursue it with determination.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: The present government has made price deregulation a prerequisite for its industrial policy. What is the PS philosophy in that regard?

Pierre Mauroy: In the case of factory prices, we favor allowing the firms--unless they have a monopoly or dominate the market--to retain the possibility of setting their own prices. But in all other cases, and here I am thinking especially of bread, rents, tenant service charges, and books, the matter will have to be completely reconsidered.

Inherent Problems in Nationalization

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Antoine-Pierre Mariano]

[Text] For the moment, an item common to both Georges Marchais' program and that of Francois Mitterrand has passed almost unnoticed in this election campaign: it concerns nationalization. And yet it is perhaps the most dangerous plan as far as our country's future is concerned. Moreover, it is useless and expensive. Here are a few facts on which to base a judgment.

1. What would the nationalization program consist of?

Proposal No 21 in the Socialist program says: "The public sector will be expanded through nationalization of the nine industrial groups included in the common program and the Socialist program, the iron and steel industry, and the armament and space activities financed by public funds. The nationalization of credit and insurance will be completed."

If the Socialist-Communist proposal were implemented, it would bring the following groups under government control: Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, the CGE [General Electric Company], the PUK [Pechiney Ugine-Kuhlmann Company], Rhone-Poulenc, Thomson-Brandt, Roussel-Uclaf, Marcel Dassault Aviation, ITT France, CII-Honeywell-Bull, Usinor, Sacilor, Creusot-Loire, Matra, Manurhin and--although not included implicitly [as published] in the Socialist program--Peugeot-Citroen.

To that we must add all the subsidiaries of those firms, the banking sector (with such prestigious names as PARIBAS [Bank of Paris and the Low Countries] or the CIC [Industrial and Commercial Credit Bank]) and insurance. In all, more than 1.2 million people would be affected by those nationalizations.

2. What would be the consequences of nationalization?

The consequences of nationalization would be of three kinds: political, economic, and financial.

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Political: It would mean the almost total socialization of the economy. All major economic decisions would be made by the government or by civil servants, and private enterprise would be reduced to nothing.

Economic: Over half of the investments would be made by the government, which would control eight-tenths of all research and nearly half of the turnover of the major French firms abroad.

Financial: In addition to the fact that the stock exchanges, and particularly the Paris Stock Exchange, would no longer have any reason to exist, we must also consider the indemnification of stockholders of the companies targeted by the nationalizations. In 1979, the stock market value of the groups mentioned in the Socialist program was 55 billion francs. To that minimum sum (because stocks are greatly undervalued on the Paris Stock Exchange) we must add the cost represented by the nationalization of banking and insurance. Where will we find the money?

3. Why nationalize today?

When he mentions the nationalizations--which he does very rarely--Francois Mitterrand never fails to remind us that in such an eventuality, he would simply be completing what General De Gaulle started just after World War II. But the France of 1981 is not the France of 1945. And is it necessary to remind Mitterrand that Renault's nationalization was more a matter of reprisal than for the purpose of building an automobile industry? In the same way, coal and electricity were placed under government management because it was necessary to get energy under control in order to put the country back on its feet.

4. Is an expansion of the public sector desirable?

The public sector in France currently produces 11 percent of the total added value, compared to 7 percent in the FRG. That is a serious handicap for France.

But why nationalize when the big firms are doing a very good job as creators of wealth and as exporters? A nationalized FRAMATOME [Franco-American Atomic Construction Company] will not sell a single additional nuclear power plant abroad, and it is not by nationalizing Rhone-Poulenc and Roussel-Uclaf that we will cause research to advance.

Besides, the government already possesses tremendous means for imposing its will on the economic agents. Why add others which, in the long run, would only hamper its action? By regulating credit, promoting investment, making purchases, or asking Parliament to amend the tax system, the government can already impose almost anything it wishes on the firms.

5. Is the public sector more profitable than the private sector?

In 1979 the added value produced by state-owned firms totaled 115.3 billion francs; they paid 404 million francs in taxes and received financial assistance (meaning the taxpayer's money) totaling 30 billion francs (in capital grants and balancing subsidies).

In that same year, the private firms produced 1,183.7 billion francs in added value; they paid 42.35 billion francs in taxes and received 15 billion francs in public

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funds. The employers quoting those figures emphasize that in other words, assuming equal production, the state-owned firms are taxed one-tenth as much as the private firms but receive 20 times as much in subsidies.

6. Do the state-owned firms invest more than private firms?

That is an argument developed by the Communist Party and the Socialist Party during this election campaign. And it is true that while investments by state-owned firms amounted to 20.4 percent of those by private firms in 1974, that percentage had risen to 37.4 percent in 1979. This leads the Communist Party and the Socialist Party to say that the state-owned firms are much more dynamic than the private firms.

There are several answers to that.

The notion of profitability is not the same in a firm whose stockholder is the state as it is in a private firm. In a private firm, it is the stockholder--that is, the saver--who loses money in case of difficulty. In a state-owned firm, the loser is the state--and that means the taxpayer. It is hardly necessary to remind our readers that a private firm invests only if the project is profitable. As an example, what private firm in France could have committed itself to the Concorde program? Not one.

In a period of slower expansion, it is natural that firms should invest a little less. In this case, since 1974--and for the express purpose of keeping activity going--the government has accelerated the investment effort in the state-owned firms.

Lastly, in considering those figures, it is necessary to keep in mind the size of the nuclear power program undertaken by the EDF [French Electric Power Company]. In 1979, investments by the EDF alone represented 36.5 percent of the undertakings by all state-owned firms. And if electricity had been in private hands in France, as it is in many other countries, those 23 billion francs in EDF investments would, of course, have been included with investments by the private sector.

7. Why are state-owned firms flourishing in France?

The good health of the state-owned firms has returned since the government decided to impose stricter management rules on them than previously. In the case of those providing a public service, they are being asked to return to the realities of pricing, while the others are being asked to pit themselves against international competition.

Let us take only two examples: the government could have prohibited Renault from buying into American Motors and asked it instead to invest its profits in a factory in France that would have created jobs. Such a decision would have been harmful to Renault, because what it needs to do today is find markets abroad, and to do that it must get a foothold wherever there are potential buyers.

If Air France had had to buy all the aircraft that the successive governments have tried to force on it, it would no longer be making a profit today. The government was well aware of that, and to make up for a past error, it is now taking responsibility for the Concorde's deficit.

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Socioeconomic Consequences of Nationalization

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Apr 81 pp 1-2

[Comments by author Michel Crozier as recorded by Bernard Bonilauri; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Basically, I believe that Francois Mitterrand supports the plan for economic nationalizations through a sort of intellectual laziness. He does not think it is important. Since General De Gaulle undertook the nationalization of a few major sectors of activity just after the war, the Socialist leader can by that means situate himself in the Gaullist tradition. After all, Renault, the spearhead of our exports, is a symbol. In my opinion, Mitterrand must be thinking in those terms. All the more since he would be running the risk of definite political danger if he said "nyet" to the nationalizations after saying "yes" for years.

In the present circumstances, nationalizing the economy would be a real catastrophe. Placing the EDF under government ownership brought with it many advantages. It has cost us a lot in bureaucratic and union sluggishness. The fact that the Communists are able to paralyze industrial production by turning off the current is a very real one. But the EDF's status favored the launching of a modernization policy to begin with and the beginnings of energy independence later on through the development of nuclear equipment. France will soon enjoy cheap energy, and that will mark a reversal of our traditionally deficit situation.

It is possible to influence the economy's development effectively by controlling a few key positions, provided that those positions are not too numerous and do not lead to the creation of artificial monopolies. But the nationalizations planned by the Socialists are not at all of that type. They would have disastrous consequences. They would lead to a turning of France's interests inward again and would reduce to nothing all the efforts made over the past half-dozen years to adapt ourselves better to international practices.

The nationalization of the country's economic leadership would also definitely reinforce the power of top government officials. It is easy to foresee the negative effects of such a choice by society: reduced mobility, a crystallization of the status quo, and a proliferation of corporatists. It would be a step backward to a kind of mortally frozen organization. As for organizing a sizable portion of the active population along civil service lines--one of Francois Mitterrand's major options--such a step would probably have the result of toppling the French nation into a state of socioeconomic inertia. Considering the situation being experienced by Europe, stopping would mean going backward in France's case.

Jacques Attali is one of the Socialist Party's prestigious figures. He is an eccentric technocrat who possesses, to a remarkable degree, the ability to come out with brilliant formulas. And to change them at will. I suspect him of secretly admiring the Western capitalism that he constantly denounces in his writings. His personal itinerary shows how greatly American thought has fascinated him. His plunge into the economic decision theories and management models worked out by American specialists has been effected with a great deal of intelligence and not enough modesty.

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Attali manipulates the ideas he gathers from his reading without really testing them: without making them an object of research. That superficial curiosity leads to all kinds of intellectual pirouettes. From the field of economic interpretation he takes the notion of profit. He adds to it the abstract outline of control. Then, and still in the abstract, he poses as the guardian of the national economy.

Nothing satisfies the mind of a conjuring theorist more than a conception of society in which the firms would produce performance and profits and the supertechnocrats would administer the whole thing. Experience proves that such a combination leads inexorably to bankruptcy.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

MITTERRAND ADVISER ON CHANGES IN FISCAL TAX POLICIES

Perspective From the Left

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Mar-5 Apr 81 p 23

[Roger Priouret analysis of economic measures proposed by Pierre Uri: "Taxes: The Socialist Remedies"]

[Text] "Changing Taxes": This is the title and theme of the book by Pierre Uri just published by Editions Ramsey. Since the author is one of Francois Mitterrand's advisers, one may consider that the work presents the Socialist Party program for tax reform.

This reform affects only direct taxes and, lacking figures, one cannot say whether, as would be desirable, their share of all taxes would be increased. Pierre Uri favors elimination of the 7-percent added-value tax on common consumer products. But he honestly admits that one can only achieve this objective by phases. It is in fact necessary to find a replacement formula and it could only be obtained by increasing the rate of taxes on major consumer products such as automobiles and radios, already 33 percent, and television, which now has a 17-percent rate.

On the other hand, concerning direct taxes, Pierre Uri makes a merciless and stinging attack on the current system and offers specific, clear proposals as well. The proposals are based on three principles.

The first is the elimination of fraud. He proposes to do this, not by inquisitorial controls, but through crosschecking made possible by information yielded by other taxes: on the one hand, a gradual, low-rate tax on large fortunes (from .5 percent to 3 percent over 25 million); and on the other hand, a tax on inheritances which, with a broad basic abatement, would have rates from 5 to 45 percent and a correction factor to provide relief for large families, handicapped persons, orphans, and so on. Finally, there would be a simple but heavy tax on unearned income after correcting for inflation and losses.

The second principle is encouragement given to savings and investment. The savings banks' passbook A accounts, whose interests are tax-free, would be maintained, but another type of account would be created whose interests would be indexed on prices but subject to the income tax. It would therefore be advantageous only for those who do not pay or who pay very little income tax. The

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formula is ingenious and more equitable than that of the indexing of all passbook A accounts, which would have been beneficial to medium and large incomes. Furthermore, within limits, taxpayers would be able to deduct that share of their taxable resources that they may have saved. The third principle is justice and equality. For example, non-wage earners who do not enjoy the 20-percent deduction for professional expenses would have the right to it under certain conditions. The tax allowance for dependents, which helps the wealthiest class, would be done away with and replaced by a lump deduction for every child equal to the amount of family allocations. Finally, the current lump sum for farmers would be eliminated.

Ineffective Driving Force

Pierre Uri's book is richer and more complete than the provisions I have singled out. It is accessible to everyone. However, I regret that it contains a concession to demagogy and that it reveals some weakness for the bureaucratic system. For example, he provides for an annual 1.5-percent tax on corporate capital. The justifications given by the author do not stand up before this objection: Corporate capital is their working tool. One cannot at one and the same time favor the promotion of investments and tax them once they are made. It is normal, using the tax on large fortunes, to affect those who are owners in society. It is not normal to tax productive capital, even if this does attract applause at public meetings!

In addition, Pierre Uri tells us that the driving force of growth, under the capitalist system, is inequality and that for the left, it will be the reduction of inequalities. Actually, this reduction cannot constitute a motivation for wage earners. The sin of capitalism is the appropriation, by the owners of the means of production -- not profit itself, which alone makes it possible to develop the economy. Another economic system should give their fair share to the wage earners by better remuneration of those who cooperate with an enterprise that makes profits.

Uri goes on to write: "Planning must be the union of the production policy, the financial policy and the social policy." This means that it is planning that would set Renault's production and not its current market and the market it can win by new models. It is planning, and not the officials of the nationalized banks, that would provide the firm with the means of expansion, planning that would set wages rather than free discussion between social partners. Uri undoubtedly does not realize that he is thus recommending a system closer to the Soviet Gosplan than to free socialism. The lesson to be learned is that the Socialist Party has not yet managed to define the respective roles of planning and the market.

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Perspective From the Right

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Apr 81 p 2

[Jean-Pierre Fourcade analysis of same measures: "Taxation According to Mitterrand"]

[Text] An attentive reading of the essay just published by Pierre Uri, "Changing Taxes (in Order To Change France)", is particularly interesting. With talent and

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precision, the author paints an apocalyptic picture of the present French tax system and proposes to build a "system that is more ingenious than the cheaters."

One cannot fail to subscribe to this simple, effective departure. But Uri inserts his proposed tax structure into the framework of Francois Mitterrand's socialist proposals. In other words, he intends to use taxes as an instrument of social leveling rather than as a tool to modernize French society. The overlapping of the "design long reflected upon" of the one and the proposals to "change life" of the other yields curious results that must be analyzed.

Without claiming to understand everything in a work rich in attractive proposals, I would like to warn taxpayers about a few false or dangerous ideas that constitute the foundations of Uri's essay. Four points seem to have to be remembered at this point in the examination: the concept of a self-regulated tax system, the trap of the savings deduction, the overtaxation of capital and the effects of the proposals concerning business.

Fight Against Fraud

For Pierre Uri, the taxation of income and inheritances must be a "closed" system preventing fraud. According to him, it is enough for tax departments to have better knowledge of the evolution of inheritances in order, through a general and non-inquisitorial mechanism for crosschecking, for income and unearned income to be better detected and therefore, correctly taxed. The concept of the self-regulated tax system thus constitutes the essential key to the reform proposals affecting the income tax, the tax on capital and the tax on unearned income.

The fact that the author seeks to do away with tax evasion is praiseworthy. The fact that he guarantees this is possible in a purely rational way through a system that will detect and punish fraud seems debatable, for his observations depend on a double contradiction.

On the one hand, contrary to what Uri might think, France is one of the few countries in the world where the tax departments have such abundant crosschecking of the inheritances of taxpayers. Thanks to statements of dividends, which make it possible to know all investments in transferable securities, and to the civil certificates circuit, which provides exhaustive information on immovable property, the administration follows the evolution of inheritances quite closely.

Furthermore, one of the major problems in the fight against fraud resides in the fact that those who fail to declare or who undervalue their income are careful not to invest their savings in identifiable investments. Setting up a complex cross-checking system does not deal with the concealment of some cheaters who buy gold, jewels or residences abroad.

The idea of eliminating fraud without intensifying control is attractive, but it proceeds from a false idea, for the cheaters, fearing crosschecking, carry out all their operations outside the tax system.

Uri's second debatable proposal is to do away with all tax incentives for savings and to replace them with a tax reduction equal to 20 percent of the savings

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invested during the year. In return for this advantage, taxpayers should declare all of their holdings and pay a "statistical tax" equal to .5 percent of the market value of the estate. Likewise, an additional tax would be paid by any person who would take money out of investments.

In the guise of simplicity, one finds in this structure an obsession with the automatic control of income and the beginning of a general tax on inheritances. As for the economic consequences for the construction of housing, the strengthening of the enterprises' own funds and the stimulation of the transferable securities market, the author does not outline them. However, since the system recommended would be optional, one does not have to be a wizard to figure that many French people would not exercise their power of option because of their fear that some time later, the percentage of the savings tax reduction might be lowered and the rate of the statistical tax raised. Furthermore, in order to handle such a system, the tax administration would be forced to have individual treasury balances for several hundred thousand taxpayers. This is undoubtedly one of the explanations of the numbers of jobs created for government employees which the socialist manifesto also proposes!

Overtaxation of Capital

Easier to appreciate and welcomed with delight by the well-disposed people who deliberately confuse tax reform and the taxation of capital, the mechanism for taxing capital envisaged by Pierre Uri includes no less than six different taxes. One in fact finds, in addition to the statistical tax just mentioned, a tax on the "large fortunes" of over 2.5 [sic] million francs, a land tax on the market value of real estate, a tax on corporate capital, a whole series of inheritance taxes including a graduated tax and a surtax on the fortune of the heir, and finally, taxes on real estate transfers applicable to transactions subject to certain liabilities. It is definitely here that Uri concedes a few points to his socialist friends. Anxious to reduce inheritance inequalities, I believe that he goes much too far. His proposals risk giving rise to strong rejection and appear likely to harm the vigor of the economy as well as the transfer of companies. He writes (page 46): "Taxation of income, unearned value, savings and fortunes: The system is closed and ensures equity in both directions: The tax is fair and no one escapes the tax." I believe that this "closing" mechanism will turn out to be as complex as it is useless.

Enterprises

It is obviously in the area of corporate taxation that Pierre Uri's essay is the most dangerous. In a few pages, he anticipates doing away with the degressive amortization, authorizing the reassessment of balance sheets taking gains from inflation affecting liabilities into account, doing away with the system of consolidated profits for firms working abroad, instituting a tax on capital, and finally, stricter regulation of expenses that are deductible from profits. Finding existing legislation too favorable to investment, the author wants to overturn traditional tax rules for business and penalize foreign companies that invest in our country. Beyond the bit of demagogy concerning the deductibility of moving and restaurant expenditures, Uri lets himself be carried away by the socialist proposals that seek to break with the current organization of the French economy. If

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the proposals accepted the idea of an autarkic economy that presumes leaving the Common Market, one would understand the provisions proposed. Otherwise, why reassess balance sheets and tax corporate funds? Why do away with the degressive amortization? The incoherence of such proposals is obvious. But it is business' ability to compete that may well pay the price.

By virtue of his very determination to be absolutely rational, Uri's tax essay is outside the realm of reality. Conceived in an abstract manner, can taxation be an exact science capable of supplying a single, overall response to the problems of society? No lucid political leader pushes utopia so far. In vain Pierre Uri wagers that "if this overall reform were applied, it would serve as a model for the rest of the world." I fear that the obstinate search for pure logic does not constitute, in taxation or elsewhere, the best path to reform.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

QUESTIONS, OBJECTIONS, FALLACIES IN IMPLEMENTING SOCIALIST PROGRAM

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9 Feb 81 p 25

[Article by Roger Priouret, of LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: "Mitterrand Chooses Plain Speaking"]

[Text] In the opinion of Roger Priouret, the candidate of the Socialist Party took all kinds of risks in his manifesto, including that of clarity.

Francois Mitterrand could have remained ambiguous with respect to the economic portion of his electoral manifesto: that would doubtless have made it possible for him to win some votes from the center. He chose clarity. I do not believe that it was merely to please the PS [Socialist Party] militants. It was because this man, who had a career in the center left, was, at the beginning of the fifties, won over to the concept of socialism.

Today his conviction has been strengthened by the development of technology. The machine of the 20th century has replaced the muscular power of man and capitalism has taken over. The modern machine replaces the memory and the judgment of the individual. It would be an intolerable oppression if the same men who today have the means of production were to keep it in their possession. Making use of what this modern machine brings us is a chance for freedom for man: "a change in ideas and customs, the possibility of new forms of expression." Clearly, it "is preparing the other revolution, that of economic structures and social relations."

This socialism of freedom does not exist anywhere in the world. Therefore there is no model. It cannot be inspired by the experience of other countries (not even the case of Yugoslavia is indicated). Today one cannot foresee either its future aspect or the steps to attain it. "In their Plan the socialists are not delivering a ready-made society. They do not ordain in advance the stages of social change; they do not codify the future; but, faithful to the lessons of history, they outline an approach, propose goals, determine the means." This does not prevent the socialism toward which Francois Mitterrand seems to be tending from having a libertarian coloration, since it grants rights to citizens in the matter of policy and administration and to the wage earners in industry.

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But this impression is greatly changed by the fact that the socialist approach is no longer that of the "Joint Program" of 1972, which above all was concerned with better dividing the wealth in France, without being too concerned with the international environment. The latter is the opposite of the focal point of the manifesto's concerns. And not at all in a defensive spirit. It is a question of having France adapt to the "greats" of technology, by expanding the traditional means of progress: basic and applied research, "development" in order to industrialize innovation, investment to make mass production possible. The Plan, which very fortunately will be flexible, will guide this change: "contract procedures will be implemented between the state and public enterprises, on the one hand; the state and the private enterprises that desire it, on the other hand, the state guaranteeing the necessary assistance for the planned investments."

The nationalizations, themselves, will be implemented in this spirit of technological progress since, apart from the firms that exercise a monopoly, they will aim at "the activities that call for the technological independence of the country and those that exist as a result of an indispensable budgetary assistance and public financing."

Too Much Rigidity

This is where one asks a first series of questions. Many of the 380 specific measures tend to give the work committees the possibility of control over investments and even over management, and to wage earners the possibility of keeping the same job through the protection of a strict statute. Will one then, within the firms and because of the desire of some representatives of personnel, be able to call in question the basic options of the Plan? A head of an enterprise and his team must be innovators. Can they be that if one weaves a spider's web around them that will paralyze them? Every wage earner tends to want to keep his job and to entrench himself behind the guarantees that one offers him and refuses another. Is this consistent with the technological change that one wants? It is normal for the most advanced sectors to pay better than the traditional activities do. Is this compatible with the fixed categories of remuneration? I fear that because of a legitimate concern over protecting jobs, one has introduced too much rigidity into the system to enable the desired technological revolution to take place.

If a dynamic socialism is the future objective of the manifesto, the immediate concern is employment. One will create 150,000 jobs in the deficient public sectors (postal, hospital, etc.). One will make available 60,000 to local communities and associations. Others will be opened up by granting a fifth paid vacation week and the "progressive and negotiated" passing to the 35-hour work week. Above all, the economy will again realize growth. Through improved investment, of course. But also through the social measures that the left has advocated since 1972, in behalf of all the disadvantaged categories: the SMIC [the Inter-occupational Minimum Growth Wage], brought to 2,400 francs in March 1978 (which will be 3,500 francs next 10 May), improvement in pensions, minimum old-age pensions, assistance to the handicapped, family allotments, etc. It is not a question of a general increase in salaries.

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A Prime Minister Bound Hand and Foot

A question and an objection arise at this point. The question concerns the means of meeting these new responsibilities. Nothing has been provided for businesses. Will they be able to recover their costs from their prices? As for the state, one purposely has not made any calculations. Of course, some tax measures will increase receipts: tax on large fortunes, taxation of the capital of companies on the basis of reappraised net assets; suppression of the tax allowances for shares and also for the family quotient; increase in the TVA [value-added tax] for luxury items. But these tax measures are sometimes accompanied by allowances that attenuate and even cancel their effect. For example, suppression of the tax on low incomes and small inheritances, as well as the TVA on essential goods. There is also an ambiguity concerning the tax on the capital of companies. There would be a great deal to do in this domain, starting with doubling the number of inspectors in order to check on whether there is any tax fraud connected with overhead expenses and reserve funds and whether profits should be taxed at 50 percent. But what is the capital of companies if not their production tool, that is, something that must be developed and not taxed?

The objection focuses on the heart of the matter. Francois Mitterrand's manifesto states--and general opinion confirms--that the heritage from Raymond Barre is a heavy burden--in particular because of inflation. According to the calculations of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], without the direct and indirect influence of the increase in the price of energy, the increase in prices in 1980 was about 10 percent in France and 2 percent in Germany. It seems to me that the failures of the predecessors would make it necessary to lay out promises according to a calendar, as Pierre Mendes-France always proposed.

Finally, one must say that Francois Mitterrand had announced that he would limit himself to defining general orientations, leaving the task of specifying concrete measures and the time limits for their application up to the future government. By appending to the brilliantly composed preface the 380 measures of the "Socialist Plan," he ties down the prime minister that he will appoint, if he is elected. And even in some difficult measures to be applied, like the rehabilitation of prostitutes...

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PROJECTED COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING, FINANCING SOCIALIST PROGRAM

Budgetary Impact, Cost Breakdown

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Apr 81 p 7

[Article by Minister of Budget Maurice Papon: "Socialist Pipedreams"]

[Text] While reading and listening to Francois Mitterrand, a thought came to my mind: Contrary to what many politicians and commentators think, since his disastrous experience in 1978, the socialist candidate has learned a great deal. He has in fact manifestly sworn never again to fall into the diabolical trap of figures set for him by his Joint Program allies.

Consequently, his many statements -- even those written down, as in the case of his interview with L'EXPRESS -- obstinately avoid defining with any precision or exactitude the measures proposed. It is said, for example, that "a ceiling will be set for tax relief for dependent children" and that tax deductions for savings will be replaced by a "tax credit." But within what limits? The French people will not find this out. It is said that "a public and private investment program" is being worked out. But how much money is involved? The French people do not know. It is said that a training wage and the right to social security will be granted to all young people looking for their first job. But under what conditions and at whose expense? The French people will not be told.

Naturally, by referring to the Socialist Manifesto, even to the amendments periodically filed by the socialist group during budget discussions, one can try to clarify these matters, but I am not sure that Francois Mitterrand makes these references entirely his own. There are enough vague areas to warrant the most serious questions.

A constant appeal, in social and tax matters, for a complex process of negotiation and concertation will reassure no one: What would be the result? We do not know. The French voter is thus asked to trust, in advance, the result of hypothetical agreements made by trade union or professional organizations that are not necessarily indifferent to group interests and an executive whose intentions one does not know and who is very careful not to define the national interest he nevertheless represents.

Because of the lack of precision and despite the careful style, what comes through is disturbing. The implacable logic of the socialist program and the reality of

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the measures proposed gradually reappear. And from the critical analysis that becomes possible, two conclusions plainly emerge: Too frequently, Francois Mitterrand is deceived; too frequently, Francois Mitterrand deceives the French people.

List of Errors

The list of errors grows as time passes. One fine day, the socialist candidate promises the French people a minimum old-age pension that has been in effect since 1 January, a nice, however unwitting, homage to the policy of Valery Giscard d'Estaing! To erase the ill effects of this mistake, a laborious correction is put together at the Press Club and additional advantages are included: Mitterrand's "lapsus" would cost the budget an additional 19 billion francs.

On another day, he promises to recruit 210,000 government employees on the basis of a deliberately underestimated cost which his communist allies immediately point out in order to condemn its absurdity. According to L'EXPRESS, he expects a miraculous 60 to 80 billion francs from the taxing of large fortunes and the fight against tax evasion, figures to which at the outset, Francois Mitterrand pays only lip service, protecting himself with an anonymous "They tell me," by way of timely caution!

The fact that Mitterrand makes mistakes is of no importance as long as he is kept out of power. But if he should come to exercise it, the facts would wreak their vengeance mercilessly and without delay when he would have the formidable task of drafting the 1982 budget. It would then become apparent that it was not only Mitterrand who made a mistake, but the French people as well.

Paralyzed Economy

What is in fact the cost of his program for the state? I shall deliberately limit my evaluations to the few measures proposed which, in the intentionally maintained vagueness, begin to take shape. I shall not take into account the stifling effects of this program on enterprises, even though this must be done.

The table below sums up the essential elements: 74 billion francs for the "six measures for full employment," 68 billion francs for the "six measures for social justice," a total of 142 billion francs, to which since Sunday evening one must add the additional 19 billion francs: a total of 161 billion francs so far.

What do these 161 billion francs represent? More than one-fourth of the government's current receipts, clearly more than the income tax (136 billion francs in 1981). How would this considerable sum be financed? Mitterrand naturally tells us that he does not expect "to have any difficulty in covering the major portion of the expenditures." Where does he get his "calm" assurance?

I am not speaking of the taxation of large fortunes, for which I allowed 10 billion francs in my estimates in order to avoid any dispute. Nor am I speaking of the fighting against tax evasion. Unless one adopts the inquisitorial methods rejected by society, the proceeds could not far exceed the current figures of 10 billion francs or have immediate effects.

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However, I am more interested in economic growth which, with every additional point, according to him, would bring in about 12 billion francs. Without even contradicting, for the time being, the estimated receipts that every additional point would procure, a growth of 13.4 percent in volume would be needed, beyond that currently foreseen, just to finance the expenditures which Mitterrand would pledge to make.

Who can seriously believe in these pipedreams? The logic of this economic program, if indeed there is any, is basically contradictory. Naturally, it is founded on the massive injection of additional revenue, but at the same time, it organizes the paralysis of the economy through a rapid reduction in the work week, by self-management innovations and by forcing enterprises to bear the crushing weight of wage and social welfare charges. What other result could there be at a time when France is courageously fighting in a tumultuous international environment? Mitterrand undoubtedly refers to the difficulties we are experiencing as a "negative balance sheet," drawn up without any reference to current conditions in the world. This is to scorn the effort of the French people, even though it now places our country among the leading industrial nations and puts it in a tie with Japan with respect to growth and purchasing power.

No Miracle

The truth is that there will be no miracle, even in a "state of grace," and that Francois Mitterrand's plan is not financed. The truth is that Mitterrand misleads the French people when he states that he can apply his plan without having "to increase obligatory deductions beyond their current rate" (42 percent). The truth is that Mitterrand, on the basis of his present intentions, faces a formidable dilemma: He must either allow the deficit to "pay out," thereby squandering the budget funds inherited from the preceding 7-year term and beginning runaway inflation caused by printing money, or raise the rate of deductions affecting individuals and enterprises from the current 42 percent to some 47 percent, which would mean more than doubling the income tax.

Will my readers believe me when I say that I wish I were wrong? The fact is that as a democrat and a Gaullist, I cannot rejoice over seeing a man whom the French people might choose to fill the highest office present his proposed economic and financial policies in such a casual and fallacious manner.

That is why Francois Mitterrand owes it to himself to give the French people the clarifications they are awaiting.

When I refer to his political statements, I have little hope he will do so, for they are marked by what I would moderately call extreme ambiguity. He always leaves to others: trade unions, professional organizations, Parliament, the task of defining a policy and drawing up the conditions for application. In invoking his ability to lead France, he begins by ducking the responsibilities that belong to a president of the Fifth Republic. He has just suggested -- without seeming to have anything to do with it -- that the nuclear policy should be the subject of a referendum when the majority in Parliament has already clearly assumed its responsibilities on the matter in backing the government. How can he risk questioning the conquest of our energy independence? How can he thus protect the credibility of nuclear deterrence? These examples show that his refusal to take

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a clear stand and his refusal to explain his positions go very far. Is this then the "other policy" that Mitterrand is offering the French? Is this a sample of the alternative he wields as an argument?

The alternation of power is not amenable to incantations. It is the consequence of a decision made by the sovereign people through universal suffrage. By dint of accumulating uncertainties, Francois Mitterrand administers at least one certainty: that of the serious risk he represents for France and the French people.

Projected Costs, Additional Considerations

Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Apr 81 p 7

[Article by Maurice Papon: "Cost of the Socialist Program: 306 Billion Francs"]

[Excerpt] Let us observe on this subject that the budget figures which I estimated and reported in the 7 April issue of LE FIGARO, labeling them as "socialist pipe-dreams," have not received any valid response to date. Nothing has been forthcoming except additional expenditures that have fattened the total along the way. New measures announced in the course of the campaign carried the addition of 161 billion to 306 billion francs. Even so, these calculations are probably not complete.

Literary Objections

The objections have remained literary. Mitterrand is wrong to claim that "the administration would be diverted from its mission of public service to the benefit of a candidate." This is an oblique answer and even hints that the calculations are correct. Let him be reassured. The preparation of three budgets enables a politician, assuming he is normal, to figure up the budgeted cost of a program. Some of his loyal aides have brought up "the obscure battle of the figures" and invoked "a test of coherency resting on a combination of the desirable and the possible, expanded by the mobilization of productive forces." Experience has taught me that the best test of coherency was one which consisted, without beating around the bush, in lining up charges on one side, resources on the other, and trying to make them coincide. It is a thankless task and yet, it is indispensable.

When a great captain sets objectives for his armies, he defines a maneuver and, in keeping with a clearly worked out arrangement, positions the forces needed for success. Mitterrand does none of this. Let him therefore follow the example of Giscard d'Estaing. When the latter defines a coherent employment policy, he matches it with the proper means. This is true of the creation of a million jobs before 1985, duly estimated and financially within the reach of France, or the recourse to resources from a French-German loan to be used for investment and hiring. Everything is clear, precise and realistic.

In order to be complete, I must recognize, however, that some elements in the initial estimates have been clarified. For example, with a concern for moderation and objectivity, I had estimated the cost of increasing family allocations by 50 percent to be 17.5 billion francs, assuming that the rate of increase would apply only to the family allotments. However, Mitterrand confirmed, in COMBAT

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SOCIALISTE, to be precise, that his proposal did in fact include all family allocations. One must therefore add 17.7 billion francs to the initial cost. Likewise, by 7 April, Mitterrand had not yet exactly considered the cost of the socialist program for the construction of daycare centers for 300,000 children or school enrollment for all children from the age 2. It is has been done, meaning the addition of another 14 billion francs, without counting the 7.6 billion that this would represent for the local communities.

The new commitments finally come to 103 billion francs. The socialist program, which has steadily grown as the days have gone by -- and fortunately, the presidential campaign is coming to an end -- now totals some 306 billion francs, to be divided between the government, to the tune of 234 billion francs, and social security, which will bear 72 billion. Even these figures leave out other charges, whose vagueness defy any rational calculation and proceed much more from election dealing than romantic dreaming! This is enough to demonstrate the credibility of a candidate.

Paying the Bill

In order to understand the inadequate socialist response, how is one to interpret the strange mission which Mitterrand would entrust to the higher organs of the administration, if he were to be elected, the mission of drawing up a balance sheet of the 7-year term of his predecessor? This tactic undoubtedly has no other motive than that of preparing an alibi for breaking commitments made to the voters! Actually, and despite their good health, our public finances, which by far represent the lowest budgetary deficit and the least indebtedness of all our economic partners, would be inundated by the tidal wave of the 306 billion francs in new expenditures. How would one pay them? Either the new majority would be forced, despite Mitterrand's promise, to block the current rate of deductions at 42 percent, triple the income tax or, if one were to resort to lower taxation, make a substantial increase in social welfare deductions. Enterprises and families would be in a quandary. Our productive potential would collapse. Another solution would be a massive increase in the deficit, which would mean spiraling inflation that would endanger the franc and our foreign credit -- that is, our independence.

Furthermore, if Mitterrand should be planning a retreat from what he has promised the voters, the Communist Party would not let him off. Or, if one prefers, it would not fail to count Mitterrand's promises and make him pay for them. That is when the socialist candidate would finally stop considering the quarrel over the figures as "ridiculous and below him."

Then, as Juquin says, the fog would lift, revealing France's economic and financial bankruptcy, the French's people's adventure. And under the vigilant eye, the jeering grin of Marchais' legions, thanks to the "revolutionary consciousness" of some 4.5 million communist voters, as we heard Sunday evening. For it would no longer be up to Mitterrand whether he would no longer continue to depend on Marchais.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

PROJECTED CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING SOCIALIST PROGRAM

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Apr 81 p 5

[Article by Antoine-Pierre Mariano: "The Vicious Cycle of the Socialist Program"]

[Excerpts] Without wishing to go into detail today, let us see what has been proposed to us through Francois Mitterrand's economic philosophy. The line of reasoning used by the left-wing candidate shapes up along two axes: a revival of so-called "low-income" consumption to get the economic machinery going again; an increase--which will quickly become an omnipresence--of the role of government in economic life as a result of three types of action: hiring of civil service personnel, government incentives for practically all sectors of industry, total nationalization of the loan system, the banks, and the insurance companies, as well as the major industry groups.

Far from extricating France from the crisis, the implementation of such a program would on the contrary lead the country to ruin. And that would be true for many years to come because our competitors will have quickly seized the places which we will have lost.

Inflation, Deficit, Unemployment

Here is how this vicious cycle would be triggered.

1. Mr Mitterrand would revive consumption by distributing money to those who do not have enough of it. Now, he does not have that money. To get it, he can use two methods: he can create additional money, that is to say, he can make inflation or he can get the necessary money through taxation. In the first case, he will be contributing to a rapid price rise; in the second place, he will slow down the domestic demand because those who have a little more in terms of purchasing power than the others will consume and thus return their assets into the economic circuit; a supplementary tax would have the effect of slowing the demand down. The socialists will then be forced to use both methods at the same time--printing money and collecting new taxes--but they will do so by emphasizing primarily the former.

The conclusion is clear: trying to distribute purchasing power which does not exist boils down to creating more inflation.

2. Supposing that, in spite of the risk of inflation, we did distribute the purchasing power, we have a massive revival of demand; that would have the consequence

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of an equally massive increase in imports. Mr Mitterrand would in particular like to persuade the French to buy mostly textiles, electrical household appliances, and cars. Since our competitors (Japan, the United States, Italy, or Germany) produce at lower cost than we, they can increase their output more easily than our French factories--partly already because they need no authorization from the labor inspector to get their workers to put in extra hours--France will very quickly be invaded by foreign products.

Here again the conclusion is obvious: reviving consumption boils down to encouraging imports.

3. The only thing then to do would be to close the borders; and since France would reject foreign products, the foreigners would refuse to buy French products. And, since one out of every five Frenchmen works for export, the result of this operation would be to increase unemployment. And here we are not even considering the obvious risk of a depreciation in money which would spring from such a policy.

The Death of the Spirit of Free Enterprise

Along with this breakup of the major equilibriums which are essential for the economy, we would--if the socialist program were to be carried out--witness government control over the entire economy and, by the same token, the death of the free-enterprise spirit. Here are some simple examples.

The government is already the country's first-ranking employer. So what. We would be adding 150,000 persons to the civil service register and there would be another 60,000 employees in the communities or departments.

By nationalizing the loan system and the banks, which are not yet nationalized, as well as the biggest French enterprises, the government would be making all of the major economic decisions; the small enterprises would have to bow to the rules spelled out by the government.

To finance the creation of jobs, as provided for in the socialist program, the compensation of stockholders of nationalized companies, the various incentives for industry, as well as the social measures proposed by Mr Mitterrand, we would have to find additional budget funds, unless we wanted to accept the kind of indebtedness that would be fatal; middle-income and high-income earners would be bludgeoned by the internal revenue service, a tax would be created on capital, a new tax would be instituted on the assets of companies, and inheritance taxes would also be upped.

By giving the business committees a veto right in any hiring or any firing, we would in the end interrupt any creation of new jobs in industry; how, indeed, could a business manager hire personnel if at the same time he is not authorized to lay people off if his orders decline?

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

PROJECTED ECONOMIC GROWTH UNDER MITTERRAND'S PRESIDENCY

Paris LE POINT in French 13 Apr 81 pp 64-69

[Excerpts] "EcoFrance," selected by LE POINT, is an independent model of parties and government agencies. Managed by Plus-Consultants, a consultant firm established in 1969 by a young HEC [School for Advanced Business Studies] graduate by the name of Jean-Pierre Nordman, it has been used for the past 7 years by businesses, employee organizations, government agencies, and the press (LE POINT has been publishing its predictions since October 1978 as a sign of rare reliability).

On the one hand we thus have promises. On the other hand, we have their consequences, analyzed on the one hand in short-range terms (1982) and on the other hand in medium-range terms (1985). Economic consequences regarding growth, inflation, the budget deficit, foreign trade (balance of trade), business investments, and household consumption, in other words. Also, social consequences regarding unemployment, social welfare benefits, the development of the SMIC [interoccupational minimum growth wage], purchasing power, and profits.

These results evidently--assembled in the tables in the following pages--do not claim to express some kind of mathematical truth. (Who indeed could express such a truth?) They are confined to indicating what would happen most likely if each of the four candidates were elected and if--of course--they all conscientiously were to implement the programs which they have been advocating to their voters. Let us say right away that such a test bench has every chance of dissatisfying each of the candidates; and it would dissatisfy them even more, the more easily they have been multiplying their promises.

To be fair, we must state specifically that "EcoFrance" has been operating on the basis of an international environment characterized by the following:

A worldwide inflation rate of 11-12 percent per year;

Petroleum prices rising 15 percent per year;

International trade growing at a rate of 4-5 percent by volume each year.

But let only one of these assumptions fall by the wayside and the results of the model, as far as France is concerned, would then also be modified.

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Here is another restriction on our analysis. "EcoFrance," like its counterparts, is having much difficulty in precisely spelling out the exact effect of certain qualitative measures, such as the development of industrial policies, the impact of decisions concerning energy savings, or vocational training, etc.

Francois Mitterrand: "Social" Changes But Unemployment Not Dead

The Socialist Party's strategy essentially rests on the revival of business. It must be controlled by two instruments: 1. The revival of low-income consumption (hiking low wages and increasing social earnings); 2. Revival of investments through selectivity of loans and aid granted by all banking institutions which will have been nationalized. All of this is to be done within the framework of industrial development planning.

The results emerging from the "EcoFrance" model are not entirely in line with the anticipated objectives. This is essentially true to the extent that the growth achieved (a little less than 4 percent)--more than that of the other two preceding candidates--is accompanied by higher inflation (12.5-13.5 percent per year) and a by no means negligible foreign trade deficit.

This deficit, caused by inflation bringing about a loss of competitive capacity on the part of the enterprises, during 1983 should lead to a devaluation of the franc on the order of 15-20 percent so as to attempt progressively to restore the foreign balance.

Such a policy, Bernard Piganiol thinks, would be threatened very seriously if there were to be a new petroleum shock that would add even more to the energy bill in 1982-1983. The only way out then would be to resort to harsh government control measures, such as protectionism, control of trade, petroleum product rationing.

In social terms, the results are more favorable than in the preceding scenarios for the lowest-wage categories and for beneficiaries of family and welfare benefits. On the other hand, the purchasing power of non-wage workers, like the purchasing power of supervisory personnel, should level off or perhaps slightly decline. Company profits finally would be heavily reduced in 1982 (their investments will depend on borrowing).

This leads us to an apparently paradoxical conclusion: The unemployment situation although better than in the case of the VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] program, is not up to the level of hopes created by the socialist candidate. Bernard Piganiol explains why: In spite of all measures taken, only 1.4 million jobs will be created until 1985. This is so simply because the enterprises will hesitate to hire wage workers who are paid considerably more than before and because they will prefer to make investments in productivity.

Program

Jobs. Creation of 210,000 jobs in the civil service in 1982, followed by 40,000-50,000 additional jobs each year, starting in 1983. Right to retire with full benefits at age 60. Reduction in working hours (35 hours in 1985).

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Social measures. Increase in SMIC to Fr 3,300 as of 1 July 1981, followed by an increase of 4.5 percent per year in its purchasing power. Heavy increases in minimum old-age benefits, family allowances, compensation for young unemployed.

Budget. Increase in public expenditures by about 5 percent per year in terms of volume. Creation of a capital tax but stability in the average rate of mandatory taxation (taxes and social security withholdings).

Money. Easier setup of loan system (total money volume increasing 17 percent each year).

Foreign trade. Desired objective: maximum slippage of franc (loss of value) 2 percent per year. Restriction on energy imports through development of energy savings but stoppage of nuclear program at its current level.

Economic Balance Sheet	1982	1985
Growth (by volume, annual rate)	+ 3.8%	+ 3.3%
Inflation (annual rate)	+ 13.5%	+12.5%
Investments by enterprises (volume, annual rate)	+ 3 %	+ 3 %
Household consumption (volume, annual rate)	+ 4.8%	+ 3.5%
Budget deficit (in billions of current francs)	- 65	- 85
Balance of trade (in billions of current francs)	- 20	- 35
 Social Balance Sheet	 1982	 1985
Unemployment (millions, annual average)	1.8	1.8
SMIC (annual purchasing power increase)	+ 6.5%	+ 4.5%
Social benefits (annual purchasing power increase)	+10 %	+ 5 %
Average wage earner income (per capita, annual purchasing power increase)	+ 5 %	+ 2.5%
Average non-wage worker income (per capita, annual purchasing power increase)	- 3 %	+ 3 %
Company profits (annual purchasing power increase)	-12 %	+ 2.5%

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST ECONOMIC SOCIAL PROGRAMS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 4 May 81 p 6

[Article by Antoine-Pierre Mariano: "The Economic and Social Blueprints of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party--Mitterrand-Marchais: Same Language, Same Program"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand has seduced a certain number of voters who, until recent years, were supporters of liberalism. He managed to achieve this exploit by stating that he wanted to hear no further talk of communists and also, we must admit, by being as discrete as possible regarding his program. This was a real bluff of sorts.

Those who are still naive enough to believe in the innocence of the proposals made by Francois Mitterrand we would thus advise to read the table below.

The first column contains some of the essential proposals in the socialist manifesto. In some cases, references are added (all of which are perfectly verifiable) regarding the proposals sustained by Francois Mitterrand during his campaign.

The second column shows the same proposals (most of the time in the same terms) such as they are contained in the last version of the common program of the left. And--here is a significant fact--for our comparison we did not use the common program of 1972 but the last edition of that program, the one that was re-issued by the Communist Party on the eve of the spring 1978 legislative elections and which the Socialist Party did not sign.

For that edition, the Communist Party had the excellent idea of mentioning the origin of the proposals which enables us to present the whole thing to everyone for proper reflection.

In conclusion, here is a common-sense question: If they had really wanted to break with the Communist Party, would the drafters of the socialist program have been inspired as much by the proposals of their natural allies?

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Socialist Proposals	<p>Proposition No 14: "Economic revival program..." In his remarks, Francois Mitterrand specified that the revival would be aimed at developing purchases of food products, textiles, electrical household appliances, and cars.</p> <p>Socialist candidate estimates growth at 3 percent.</p> <p>Proposition No 19: It is entitled "A New Growth." It states the following: "The Plan, democratized and decentralized, will give a new content to economic growth. Social growth will be based on the dynamism of the public sector."</p> <p>Proposition No 18: "There will be created 150,000 jobs in public and social services with a view to improving working conditions and public service accommodation capacity (health, education, PRT [Post Office, Telegraph, and Telephone Service], etc.); 60,000 community jobs will be made available to local associations and communities."</p> <p>Proposition No 31: "The SMIC will be increased; the new wage scale spelled out in collective bargaining agreements will be complied with."</p>	Growth and Plan	Common Program	<p>Page 17: "To revive economic activities, it is in particular necessary to develop low-income consumption, which is the basis of the domestic market." (Proposal of communist origin)</p> <p>Page 78: "The establishment of this new growth necessitates a democratization of economic and political life. For this reason, the plan..." (Proposal of communist origin)</p> <p>Page 73: "The extended and democratized public sector will have the following missions: 1. ... 2. To guarantee the implementation, among the main sectors, of the major economic guidelines provided for in the Plan." (Proposal of communist origin)</p> <p>Page 22: "There will be created 150,000 jobs to improve the quality of public service (education, culture, health, leisure, sports, post office and telecommunications) and 60,000 jobs will be made available by the state for local communities." (Proposal of socialist origin)</p> <p>Page 18: "The SMIC will be upped immediately..." (Proposal of communist origin).</p> <p>Page 19: "A rearrangement of the wage schedule will be implemented." (Proposal of communist origin)</p>
		JOBS		
				SMIC

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Page 20: "The minimum retirement age will be set at 60 for men and 55 for women." (Proposal contained in common program)

RETIREMENT

Page 70: "The company or establishment committees, the personnel delegates assisted by labor union representatives, shall be able directly to intervene with the company management regarding hiring, firing, and working conditions. The implementation of these measures shall be suspended following an understanding between the parties concerned. The representatives of the wage earners shall also be able to appeal to the labor jurisdiction [court]." (Proposal contained in common program of 1972)

COMPANY COMMITTEES

Proposition No 82: "The right to retirement at full benefits will be granted to men starting as of the age of 60 and to women starting at the age of 55."

Proposition No 60: "The company committee will have all information on the company's operation. For hiring, firing, work organization, training plan, new production techniques, it will be able to exercise a veto right with appeal before a new labor jurisdiction."

Proposition No 61: "The hygiene and safety committee shall have the power to stop operations in a workshop or at a work site for safety reasons."

Proposition No 23: "The work week shall progressively be reduced to 35 hours following negotiations between the social partners."

"The fifth team shall be instituted for difficult jobs."

"The fifth week of paid leave shall be generalized."

Pages 20 and 21: "The actual work week shall be progressively reduced while wages shall be kept completely intact to attain the objective of 35 hours."

WORK WEEK

"The minimum duration of annual leave shall be immediately increased to 5 weeks."

"Switch to five teams to reduce the work week to 33-1/2 hours in branches currently operating with four shifts in continuous service." (Proposal of communist origin)

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Proposition No 21: "The public sector will be enlarged through the nationalization of the nine industrial groups listed in the common program and in the socialist program, regarding the steel industry, armament activities, and space financed by public funds. The nationalization of the loan system and the insurance companies will be completed."

NATIONALIZATIONS

Page 73: "To break the rule of big capital and to institute a new economic and social policy (...), the government will progressively implement the transfer, to the community as a whole, of the most important production means and financing instruments currently in the hands of ruling capitalist groups." (Proposal contained in common program of 1972.)

The 1972 text calls for the nationalization of the following groups: Dassault, Roussel-Uclaf, Rhone-Poulenc, I.T.T.-France, Thomson Brandt, C.I.I.-Honeywell-Bull, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, Compagnie generale d'electricite.

Proposition No 35: "The direct tax will be reduced for small taxpayers and it will be increased for large incomes."

TAXATION

Page 102: "Taxation on modest incomes will be reduced. It will be increased progressively for high incomes." (Proposal contained in 1972 common program)

During his campaign, Mr Mitterrand has indicated that all tax deductions (interest on loans, real estate income, the Monory law) would be replaced by a tax loan intended to encourage household savings. Proposition No 35 of the socialist party furthermore calls for the elimination of the tax credit.

Page 102: "The tax credit and the other tax privileges on capital earning will be eliminated." (Proposal contained in the common program of 1972)

Proposition No 34: "A tax on big fortunes, starting at Fr3 million and calculated according to a sliding scale, will be instituted." Mr Mitterrand stated during his campaign that tax rates would vary between 0.5 and 8 percent.

Page 103: "Taxes on modest inheritance and donations will be reduced but they will be increased on big fortunes." (Proposal of communist origin)

"Inheritance taxes will be changed to provide relief for modest inheritance and to collect additional taxes from big inheritance."

Page 103: "Taxes on modest inheritance and donations will be reduced but they will be increased on big fortunes." (Proposal of communist origin)

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Page 103: "A big modern tax on the capital of companies and other corporations will be created. It will be assessed on the value of real property, stocks, and partnership shares." (Proposal of communist origin)

"Company capital will be taxed on the basis of the net, re-evaluated assets."

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

MENDES-FRANCE ON DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-17 Apr 81 pp 52-55

[Interview with Pierre Mendes-France by Josette Alia: "What We Have To Do to Enable Francois Mitterrand to Win and to Open a New Era in France's History."]

[Excerpts] Just one month prior to the final round of voting, the majority, unable to agree on the record of its tenure, can only come out with the old bogeyman: if the socialist candidate is elected, that would mean economic chaos. In an interview with Josette Alia, Mona Ozouf and Roger Priouret, Pierre Mendes-France explains why it is the left, on the contrary, which will be better equipped to restore the country's situation. But he also says under what conditions that can be done.

NO [LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR]: Let us now talk about economic problems. The socialist program calls for the rapid adoption of social measures such as an increase in the SMIC [interoccupational minimum growth wage], family allowances, etc. Are you not afraid of their inflationary effect? After all, you have always been in favor of spacing such measures out in terms of time?

Pierre Mendes-France: Resignation and passivity--what some people call liberalism--are no longer acceptable. Suddenly, the administration has discovered unemployment. Did you know that, in the Common Market (and I am not including Ireland and Greece here), we are fifth in terms of unemployment rate among people of employable age, sixth in terms of unemployment among young people, and sixth in terms of unemployment among women? Is that acceptable?

We must at last take action other than stopgap measures which only have an anesthetizing effect and which cannot solve anything. We must have a will to build.

A left-wing administration will have to undertake two series of actions from the very beginning. The first one, I dare say, is political: Rendering justice unto those who suffer most from the current situation, responding to needs, to legitimate impatience after the very long period during which the right has been in power. It is essential quickly to take initial measures aimed at establishing a better social balance, to get everybody to realize that we are entering a new chapter in our history.

It is true that this policy entails risks. But speed does not rule out caution or the technical approach; the steps taken will have to be properly organized, confined,

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and fitted into a rigorous timetable so as not to lead to excesses which are not inevitable.

At the same time--and this is the second aspect--it will be necessary to visualize a plan for the improvement of growth, a structural reorganization, as well as industrial redeployment, in other words, we will have to start to build for the future.

In-depth reforms obviously will not bear fruit instantaneously. A reorganization of our taxation system, for example, will not have immediate effects; that is just one more reason for launching this effort as quickly as possible. A left-wing administration will without delay have to prepare the indispensable revisions and reforms so that their effect may take hold as rapidly as possible.

There will be a time of struggle, lasting several months, a year, perhaps more, as the case may be; this will be a difficult stage, a valley to be crossed. We must not fail to note that.

Some people expect tensions if Francois Mitterrand is elected. But our economy and our community life have been frozen for a generation to the benefit of egotistical and conservative structures. Do you think that--regardless of the result on 10 May --we can indefinitely ignore the impatience of an entire people who wants more humanity and more justice? With growing unemployment and with constantly rising prices, we must realize that 1981 and 1982 will be tense in any case.

NO: During the first period, right after the presidential elections, there are two problems that will come up: the problem of money and the problem of foreign payments.

Pierre Mendes-France: These two problems are tied together. For a certain time, one can accept the idea of a certain imbalance in payments. We can take a limited deficit, provided foreign loans are used to finance investments that will save future foreign-exchange expenditures rather than covering current consumption expenditures.

NO: Especially since we do have "reserves."

Pierre Mendes-France: I do not believe very much in those "reserves" which the administration is talking about because that is "floating" and very volatile money which has been flowing into France for a year or 2 years but which can go out again even faster. On the other hand, 5-year or 10-year loans, such as we have already had them, can certainly be envisaged if they save foreign exchange later. It is likewise possible to tighten the currently rather loose links in foreign exchange control without even amending the law.

By taking certain precautionary steps, a left-wing administration will have to and will thus be able to respond to the first needs whose character of justice and humanity is indisputable and at the same time it will have to draft longer-range projects to be submitted to a renewed Assembly without delay.

NO: But at that point the risk is political. You said the other day that the policy of the current administration is bound to fail because it has no popular

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support, no national confidence. After the recent statements by George Marchais, should we not fear a situation in which the government would have the communists and the right-wing against it?

Pierre Mendes-France: In France we have for a long time been using the term "policy of confidence" in referring to a policy that was designed to reassure the banks and business circles. That was the policy of Pinay or Poincare. Confidence is an entirely different thing for a left-wing administration: it means support which it must find, the hope which it must arouse among the vast masses of the country so as to make sure that decisions will lead to successful action in the end. This mobilization, this popular faith can overcome resistance and overreaction. At the start of the Popular Front it was the support of the entire nation that permitted the Blum cabinet to push through the reforms which the country had not forgotten. Right-wing opposition forces were unable to regroup until several months later. A new administration therefore must act very quickly and benefit from a climate of enthusiasm which permits the adoption of major measures and changes, even though the total effect may not be achieved right away.

The action, the determination, and the strong moves by the left, at last in power, cannot be equivocal or hesitant. They must be fast and they must be absolutely clear so as to disarm any kind of distrust, impatience, or excesses. The announcement of clear blueprints, proposed quickly to a new Assembly, will produce understanding, favorable attitudes, a desire to help, and at the same time it will paralyze the campaigns of demagogy, illusionism, or defeatism.

Public opinion will stand by and wait after an election such as the one in May to see what the new administration will do. Can one rely on it? If we see that it provides a great opportunity, a real change, then the impact in public opinion will be immense and nobody will be able to resist it.

NO: Is not what we call Mendèsism precisely the capacity to modify the political facts of life? In 1954, Francois Mitterrand, talking about you, said that the politician who arouses dash and verve is the man who is also a catalyst, capable of attracting scattered or floating elements to him. Is that still true?

Pierre Mendes-France: This is always true when one adopts a political line of action whose correctness the country can feel.

NO: In summary, you too believe that, after the elections, there will be a "honeymoon" during which the president will have a free hand. But it is this very latitude--combined with the fact that the new legislative elections will suspend the operations of the Assembly--which sometimes worries the voters.

Pierre Mendes-France: The new president can, himself, take certain steps but he cannot amend the law. He cannot, for example, carry out nationalization measures without parliament. Moreover, even regarding decisions that are within his purview, he can only spend money voted by parliament. I never heard Francois Mitterrand nor anybody else talk about measures that would go beyond the authority of the executive branch. The period prior to the parliamentary elections, announced by Francois Mitterrand, will not be a period that will just be a blank page: the

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administration will continue to discharge its normal functions. But, without losing time, it will then have to prepare the followup action, that is to say, the measures on which the Assembly will have to vote as soon as it has been reconvened.

NO: You talked about bold projects. What are the first of these bold projects that are necessary?

Pierre Mendes-France: There is one thing that has been much debated: the duration of the working day, the 35-hour work week.

NO: The incumbent likewise seems to be in favor of the idea but that is only lip service and it is incomplete, at that, in his plan against unemployment.

Pierre Mendes-France: I will come back to that. The thing that shocks me in Giscard's plan is not so much the details of the measures announced--those could be debated--but rather the fact that all of this leads to nothing. He has scraped the bottom of the barrel, he has combined measures that have already been taken, a little more for early retirees here and a little tap for the effort to return foreign workers there, etc. No innovations, no imagination. This is just a quickie touchup job but it is not a policy. We do not know where this will lead. Audacity today calls for much more.

France is going through a difficult time. Things are not going to be easy for several months in any case. There may perhaps even be cases of imprudence--perhaps inevitable?--and even risks. But we must know exactly where we are going, we must explain the situation to the country, we must prepare the country and we must get ready to overcome difficulties. We know that, in the end, we are going to have the 35-hour work week; all of our actions must show that this is our determination. That does not mean that this is going to be proclaimed tomorrow in a theatrical fashion: "No worker may work more than 35 hours"--which would not be any great help in this form. The essential thing is to act quickly but not blindly, abruptly, in an indiscriminate fashion. The essential thing is for everyone to determine what he wants to do, where he wants to go, where the political determination is.

Does that mean that all of this must be imposed in an authoritarian and technocratic manner by a central, paper-mill bureaucracy? Certainly not. Decisions will have to be adapted to real-life situations, to specific needs, to the various job categories, perhaps in accordance with the various enterprises, because we must make sure to preserve their vitality and their operation; machines, equipment, and factories must work at maximum speed even while the workers in them work a little bit less. We thus need suitable and progressive solutions. Hence the need for direct debates in which the social partners will have the floor and will seek better solutions, while the government would intervene to help bring about or promote effective agreements sometimes through arbitration.

But the desired goal must remain clear and without doubt. Everyone must strongly feel that such a measure--which might appear too cautious or precautionary--is only a start toward the final objective. It is at this price that we will succeed and that we will progressively obtain time for leisure and cultural pursuits for the workers. This will be a social gain, not a sharing of unemployment.

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Most importantly, in 1936, it was not one law or another, paid leave or the 40-hour work week but rather the profound psychological revolution, the feeling of liberation, of popular victory which counted; everybody realized that those who had always run things would not rule eternally; the people at last had a government in which it could believe. But, I emphasize, it is necessary to understand and to get everybody else to understand that, both regarding the working hours and nationalization--the expected effect cannot materialize instantaneously and immediately. We cannot imagine that we are going to replace an enterprise which today is privately owned with another one, a nationalized enterprise, a suddenly dynamic, bold, modernized, and export-oriented enterprise just overnight. That just is not so. The present nationalized enterprises, such as Renault, SNCF [French National Railroads], EDF [French Electric Power Company], etc., were successful only after a certain period of time. The same will be true tomorrow.

Industrial recovery, success in leading economic areas, a free-enterprise economy, a real plan--that sort of thing cannot be improvised in terms of time through a decree or a law. It takes fruitful efforts which must be inspired by popular faith and the latter will sustain the administration because it will be in the service of the country and its future.

That is the usefulness of a real plan. A gradual program, each of whose phases strengthens the chances of the next one. In the government, there has to be a determined and clear will as well as commitments with specific target dates on them.

This also means that we cannot do everything at the same time; therefore, some desires will not be crowned by success until after the success of a more urgent, more necessary priority effort. The essential thing will be to advance stage by stage. Instead of trying everything all at once, instead of short-term improvisation, instead of the continuation of privileges, the country wants to know where it is supposed to be heading. We will have to make choices and we will have to have the courage to make choices. That is the only way we can mobilize the sound but often wasted or misused forces. But then popular support will become a factor in productivity and efficiency.

It is not true that private initiative can do everything better or faster or cheaper. I have just read a survey conducted by business and industry on energy savings. It is rather shocking. Most of the company managers interviewed did not respond or are not doing anything or they say that they are waiting for government decisions and that in any case they expect to get subsidies, tax benefits, etc. During that time, fortunately, the nationalized sector is beginning to do something.

In all fields, the equivocal liberalism of Messrs Giscard d'Estaing, Barre, and Monory or the provocative liberalism of Mrs Thatcher cannot solve the problems that must be faced. It takes a deliberate policy, chosen by the country, so that the country may accept the stages, the discipline, and the necessary time frame. The country will not agree to continue with the injustices, the privileges, the mess, and the ill-gotten gains.

Some of the big business groupings are today content with waiting for the elections before reducing their personnel force even more, dropping a little more ballast, reducing their investment programs. We cannot allow that to happen.

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But the current administration is doing nothing along these lines. It did not even dare to defend the Eighth Plan (or what is supposed to take its place) in the Assembly.

NO: Let us get back to unemployment and the possible remedies. Francois Mitterrand talked about quickly hiring 210,000 civil servants or personnel for local communities; this measure has been criticized as being too "bureaucratic." Do you agree?

Pierre Mendes-France: The more our community life is nationalized, the more people are we going to need to make it work. When they decided to establish the capital of the United States in Washington, in 1800, did you know how many civil servants they had there? Well, they had 120! Here is another example: I have just read a report from a teacher who proudly tells us of the opening, for the first time, of a school in a village in Loiret 100 years ago. He alone handled 70 pupils! Today, the norms have changed.

Everytime you extend social protection, public service, when you create schools, hospitals, libraries, you also increase the need for employees. This is a fact of life in a society that springs from progress. I am not saying that we must accept any number of employees, no matter where; there are certainly places where we can tighten up, places for revisions and priorities to be implemented here or there; but the increase in civil service personnel is inevitable in general terms and it is just plain demagoguery to announce that one is going to make a massive reduction in the number of civil service personnel from one day to the next.

NO: Are there any possible bold steps in foreign policy?

Pierre Mendes-France: In foreign policy, I have one big regret. After the war and since then, we should have concentrated on getting together with the underdeveloped countries, with the Third World. They have been humiliated, injured, and exploited during colonial times and they are still marked by the effects of that. At the same time, they have tremendous problems and we should have helped them face those problems. We should have been the true allies of the newly liberated nations. We could have achieved a historical turning point with them and that would have been a good thing for them and for us. Once we had achieved worldwide prosperity, we could have very easily done a useful job for the entire world by promoting changes that would benefit everybody--a general monetary reform, a reorganization of the basic raw material market, including petroleum, etc. But too often we preferred to defend the little egotistical interests.

NO: Is it not too late now?

Pierre Mendes-France: Today, this is much more difficult. Many Frenchmen and many Europeans above all are concerned with their own immediate interests, in the midst of this crisis, and they do not always see what such a policy could be in line with our ideal and our real interest at the same time--and I do not hesitate to say so. Evidently, our financial resources and our moral authority are reduced today. The situation itself limits our possibilities. But what was true remains true.

The North-South dialogue was an interesting idea; they offered us the Majestic Hotel, they gave us petits-fours, fancy salons, we were a fine thing for the hotel industry

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but France did not make a single proposal during two years of negotiations, not a single basic proposal! And when we talked about allowing the poorest countries to postpone the repayment of their debts, we were still creditors, we were the last to agree to drop certain tough demands. The Americans, the Germans, and the British-- and I am certainly not talking about the Scandinavians--agreed to all that before us and forced our hand!

NO: And what policy would be desirable in the Near East?

Pierre Mendes-France: I am profoundly troubled by the tragedy in Lebanon. Moreover, the most widespread opinion in France, from Chirac to Marchais, is that Israel must be safeguarded while the Palestinians, for their part, have the right to determine their own fate, all the way up to and including independence. The only trouble is that our behavior was brutally provocative toward Israel whereas we complacently sent ministers and the chief of state throughout the petroleum emirates. The inspection of the Israeli plain, from the military viewpoint, from the top of a fortress near Golan, is not a way to promote appeasement and negotiation. There have been too many gestures of this kind.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLVING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Apr 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Paul Granet, a deputy from Aube and member of the UDF [French Democratic Union], and deputy president of the New Social Contract: "The Risks of Dissolution"]

[Text] The French electorate must sense the post-election ambiguities in Francois Mitterrand's strategy. Certainly, the terms currently being used such as "gamble," "leap into the unknown," and "uncontrolled process," are polemical. But it is still a fact that the statements of the socialist leader must be disquieting to citizens worried about the future of France. And it is a fact that the risks being taken appear to be of critical importance not only to the majority, but also to the social democratic voters, who still hesitate between the enticing program of a Francois Mitterrand and the safety of Valery Giscard d'Estaing's planning. Thus, once the presidential elections are over, Francois Mitterrand, if he is elected, will create a homogeneously socialist cabinet and dissolve the national assembly.

One must observe first of all that the cabinet in question, in the absence of any parliamentary ratification, given that the assembly will be dissolved, will be unable to pass a single law. It will necessarily confine its governmental activity to the narrow framework of regulatory authority. As the socialist party [PSF] has always denounced the existence of a regulatory domain, it is hard to imagine that it would use it extensively once in power.

As I would not do Francois Mitterrand the injustice of imagining that he might violate the constitution, I will conclude that the government will do very little, refraining particularly from structural reforms, since that would require a law. In short, President Mitterrand's cabinet will implement the budget passed in December 1980. The legislative elections will thus focus on intentions, not on decisions or actions. They will in fact delay any decision for a couple of months.

It should next be noted that the new assembly would have to be elected under the existing electoral law—majority balloting on a district-by-district basis with a run-off—since the new government will have neither the time (if it wants to hold the elections before summer) nor the majority needed to modify it. Certainly, one might dream of changing the electoral law by referendum: but as this would take place in June, the elections themselves would then be set back to September. Which would mean 6 months of paralysis, along with an increasingly aggressive communist party [PCF].

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Finally, one must emphasize that all these vicissitudes will show a very clear acceleration of the trend in the French system of government of moving toward a presidentialism that Francois Mitterrand condemns, at least in theory. A president of the republic, dissolving the national assembly after consultation with a prime minister who will never be brought before it, and thus in the absence of any dialogue between the executive and legislative branches: this is the presidential system in its extreme form. It is the end of any theory of checks and balances between the branches.

Of the 112 socialist group deputies elected in the country, only 20 would have been elected in 1978 without the communist vote. The other 92 owe their election to the PCF. Only three of the PSF federations (Ariege, Nièvre, and Belfort Territory) can claim to play a decisive role in their department without the PCF. Thus, the legislative elections will unfold with a rope around its neck held and tightened by the PCF. Naturally, we will be told that PCF voters will not necessarily follow their party's instructions. This is true, but that reservation should be qualified in three ways.

In the first place, one must understand that if only half the PCF voters follow any eventual instruction from their party to abstain from the voting, 59 PSF incumbent deputies are already beaten.

In the second place, it must be noted that the PSF's problem, in this instance, would not only be to keep the seats it already has but—in order to obtain a majority in the national assembly—to increase the number. Now the electing of new deputies is more risky than the re-election of incumbents: by the very definition it would mean wresting a seat from another party. If one considers that the PCF has 20 percent of the electorate, the PSF would have to get over the 40 percent mark on its own power in order to free itself of compromising partner. Even in the event of a "groundswell," the chances of this are slim...

In the third place, it should not be forgotten that "character assassination" is much easier in the legislative elections where all manner of skulduggery is possible in the twilight of the 480 electoral districts, than in the presidential elections where all the media are focusing on one national race. This observation remains valid, in case Francois Mitterrand is defeated, for future legislative elections. I wish "fair winds" for socialists who are already contemplating possible revenge in 1983.

In truth, if I were a communist and I wanted to see my party's hold extended, my strategy would be simple: I would facilitate the election of Francois Mitterrand as president of the republic, then I would cause the PSF to lose the legislative elections.

If Francois Mitterrand persists in his strategy—that of dissolving the national assembly without modifying the electoral law—it should be vigorously denounced. It is suicidal, it delivers the PSF into the hands of the PCF. Michel Crepeau calls on the socialist candidate first to modify the electoral law. Michel Rocard, if he had been nominated and elected, envisaged dissolving the assembly only in the event it would not pass his bills. But Francois Mitterrand prefers to flee in advance, without knowing in this gamble what will become of his party, himself, or of France. This is ill-considered action, in the first place. It is also a risk the French can avoid running.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND ON CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENTIAL, MINISTERIAL POWERS

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 9 Mar 81 pp 26-27

[Dialogue with Debre, author of constitution]

[Text] The powers of the head of state and those of the government: Michel Debre and Francois Mitterrand share the same concept of the institutions.

A constitutional debate between Michel Debre and Francois Mitterrand. The following document is an extract from the exchange that occurred on the television magazine "Question of Time" on Antenna 2 on 28 January 1978, 3 months before the legislative elections. The principal author of the 1958 constitution and the head of the socialist party [PSF] which did not vote for it ("I voted more against the context than against the text," he says) share a similar interpretation of the institutions. This document, which was obligingly provided by the review POUVOIRS, sheds light on the campaign being carried out by the candidates and on their intentions, too.

[Question] Are presidents in the Fifth Republic really arbiters above the partisan strife...or on the contrary are they political leaders?

Mr Debre: The three presidents have said that they were arbiters, but that at the same time they were leaders. The idea seems to me to be compatible with what the presidential function should be. The president is in effect an arbiter in the sense that, having to lift himself up higher than he was before, he is not partisan. But at the same time he must continually, and certainly at important moments, take into account the fact that he is a keystone: which is as much to say that he has obligations which are not precisely those of an arbiter. The obligations, in a word, of someone who must embody, at least during trying circumstances, the decision of the country.

[Question] Do you think this is how things work at present?

Mr Mitterrand: For the president of the republic to be a leader is, I am sure you will admit, the bare minimum!

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Mr Debre: It is the most important thing of all!

Mr Mitterrand: If he were not, one would have to ask what he is doing there at all...

The president of the republic, in the three embodiments we have known to date (General De Gaulle, Mr Pompidou, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing), though there were many differences between them in their conception of their role, always conducted themselves like captains of a team, rarely like fair arbiters between two camps. This is a poor conception of the president of the republic's role. Where I agree with Michel Debre is that the president, when all is said and done, is elected by the majority of Frenchmen and from time to time has to speak in the name of France, particularly on the international scene. He makes mistakes sometimes; often I disagree with what he says! But obviously France must have a voice to speak for it in some circumstances, and then the president's task as a leader is to try to interpret the general will.

[Question] Mr Mitterrand, in his speech at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs the president of the republic said: "I do not want to be a silent president..." Do you think it possible for a president to be silent?

Mr Mitterrand: No. But I think that this aspect I described is a part of the institution. The aspect that pushes a president to be the head of a camp.

Mr Debre: The Third and Fourth Republics were weighed down by the fact--which resulted from institutions fashioned in the 19th century when problems were quite different--that it did not have, when facing questions of an international character or the leaders of the great countries, any head, leader, guide, or responsible official who had any legitimacy.

Mr Mitterrand: The powers which presidents since 1958 have secured for themselves have made them into personalities who concentrate all power in themselves.

Mr Debre: I exercised my functions as prime minister under conditions that I believe to be those of a parliamentary prime minister: Simultaneously I led the majority, met the opposition, organized the work of the legislature, and carried out some very important matters, in military, social, and economic affairs! There is no doubt that the president, who was General De Gaulle at the time, wanted (where circumstances permitted) to obtain more direct authority, and it has been found that the presidents of the republic (particularly the current one) have the inclination to deal with matters directly, an inclination which they can carry out because the parliamentary majority sanctions it. But if that majority should change, or the president in office should entertain a different idea of his role, the constitution would still function just as well.

Where we agree is that I am very much a supporter of the existence of a real government, of a prime minister who is truly the majority leader, the head of the executive branch, and at the same time the director of legislative work.

Mr Mitterrand: The president of the republic and the national assembly may be of different and hostile political persuasions...

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In 1978 situation, now, if I had been asked, I would have tried to govern with an eye to avoiding an additional major crisis for the country: in other words, with the president who was actually in office. Up to him, of course, to meet his own responsibilities and show the same prudence. If that had been impossible, then the people would have resolved it. It's that simple, either by the election of a new president or by the election of a new parliament.

Mr Debre: It would be impossible to come up with a better interpretation of the constitution than the one you just gave.

[Question] In this context, what use is a prime minister?

Mr Debre: During the 3 years and several months that I was prime minister (as I was just saying) parliament functioned as I wanted it to. Never has it passed so many important bills, in the fields of agriculture, scientific research, education, or regarding the defense package, or energy.

[Question] And who was the initiator: you yourself, or the president of the republic?

Mr Debre: I was the initiator. But, with respect to important problems in international relations, there was on the part of the president a new orientation, and in this I was his principal collaborator. But with respect to everything involved in the vast field of domestic work...the work of the legislature, the work of the administration, the important economic and financial work, I was a leader with a free hand.

Mr Mitterrand: Certainly the very nature of the office of prime minister within the institutions should be seen in terms of Article 20 of the constitution which says that the administration decides and leads the conduct of the nation's affairs, but in fact the prime minister--and this is the case today--is nothing but the executive agent who carries out decisions made at the Elysee. The proof is that one of Mr Giscard d'Estaing's most frequent statements is "I conduct the affairs of France"... That's not right! It is not he who should conduct them... It is the prime minister!

This means that the Fifth Republic is a fragile system... As long as the president has a secure majority everything goes well... But when there is a dissent from within the majority (that is the situation we are experiencing today), then the position of the president of the republic changes, if there is a government that demands its rights, its constitutional right, to decide and conduct the nation's affairs.

Even more so, you understand, if it were a question of an opposition parliament, since the president could not dismiss the prime minister if he continued to enjoy the confidence of the assembly.

Does that interpretation seem fair to you?

Mr Debre: I am extremely categorical on this point. Every step toward presidentialism, in other words toward the involvement of the president in too many affairs, is a step in the wrong direction. Even in the special case of General

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De Gaulle, I have always considered that our democracy, if it is to endure, requires a prime minister and a government. When the first president of the republic went to international meetings, I always asked to accompany him, and did so.

Mr Mitterrand: That was not the case later on... So, there is a slide toward presidentialism.

Mr Debre: It is a sporadic, circumstantial slide, and one which is not good for the functioning of our institutions. Nor for the president nor for the system. One loses one's authority somewhat when one takes charge of everything. Secondly, the quality of the institutions will be put to the test when we come to a time when the majority in the assembly is of a different persuasion than the chief of state. When that happens, the president's powers will be curbed and those of the parliament increased. It could not be otherwise. But even when the majorities are the same, the prime minister must be the governor: of the cabinet team and of the parliamentary majority.

[Question] In your opinion, who should head the executive branch? The president of the republic or the prime minister?

Mr Debre: The president is the head of the executive branch, I may say in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The word "head" comes to have a varying significance in terms of jurisdiction and powers depending on the composition of the assembly, the circumstances, and, I would add, depending on the temperament of the president of the republic.

In my opinion what must always be avoided (and what has not been avoided sufficiently over the last 20 years) is effacing the government as a separate entity.

And I will come back to a science fiction scenario: Francois Mitterrand as head of state. In such a case, I would hope that he would choose a prime minister who is not simply a mirror image, one who regards him with appropriate deference, but who would tell him, should the case arise: "Mr President, you are wrong."

Mr Mitterrand: I would say the same thing. What is certain is that the national assembly should not exercise the executive power...as was the case under the Fourth Republic. Indeed, the executive powers should be shared. The president has some major executive functions, and the head of government also. And it seems to me that the president is increasingly assuming powers that should belong to Matignon...

This is why I say today that Mr Giscard d'Estaing bears total responsibility, since he even goes so far as to determine the fate of the Les Halles gardens. That is a striking abuse, which shows the institutions' tendency, or how should I say, temptation to move toward monarchy.

Mr Debre: You see that between my interpretation and Francois Mitterrand's there is not so much difference. Both of us understand that there are constitutional provisions (and there must be), but aside from that there is human nature.

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There is also circumstance. And, too, there is the mother of us all, the electorate in its entirety, and the changes it can impose.

Mr Mitterrand: Frenchmen have never confined their history to texts. And they have always believed they could do it.

[PHOTO CAPTION p 27]: M. Michel Debre: "I am strongly in favor of a prime minister who would really be the majority leader." Opposite page, M. Francois Mitterrand: "It is not the president who should conduct France's affairs, it is the prime minister."

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE POWERS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Mar 81 pp 1, 7

[Article by Pierre Thibon: "The Two Readings of the Constitution"]

[Text] If he is elected president of the republic, Francois Mitterrand will dissolve the assembly, and depending on the results of the legislative elections that follow, he will either designate one or another prime minister to head the government on the basis of the majority that the voting tallies produce. This relatively inactive role of the president in the definition and implementation of overall policy apparently breaks with all previous constitutional practice under the Fifth Republic. Since 1962, particularly, when the referendum was held to institute the election of the head of state by universal suffrage, it is obvious that, in reality, the Elysee imposes its will on the prime minister it names and on the government as well.

This trend toward presidentialization has even become stronger over the years: from the rather restricted "privileged domain" of General De Gaulle, we came little by little to the involvement of the president in almost every domain of governmental activity, whether in the form of "letters of instruction" from the head of state to the prime minister, or even by direct contact between the Elysee and a particular ministry, the prime minister thereby being, so to speak, "short-circuited."

Does the interpretation constitute an abuse of the constitution, as members of the opposition maintain? In reality, the provisions in question are poorly adapted to the mutations through which the presidency has gone in the last 19 years from the time when he was chosen by a college of 80,000 leading citizens (municipal councillors and delegates chosen by them), to the present when he is a personage invested with his authority by the entire country. While elected by those 80,000 some-odd notables, he was, in short, only a sort of senior senator, and every deputy elected by direct universal suffrage by a number of voters almost as large could have the feeling that his own legitimacy was at least equal, if not greater, than that enjoyed by the occupant of the Elysee. By the same token, the system remained essentially parliamentary, with allowances for the personal equation of General De Gaulle.

But the election of the head of state by universal suffrage overturned this balance of power: once elected by the whole of the citizenry, while the deputies, as individuals, are only elected from a small portion of the nation's territory, the president can boast of a moral authority greater than that of the parliamentarians.

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This is what has happened. And the actual operation of the institutions has led to transforming them into a presidential system (or even a super-presidential system, since the head of state has the right to dissolve the assembly, which is not the case in the traditional presidential system). Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions, aside from the articles concerning election of the president by universal suffrage, have remained as they were in 1958. Naturally, they give the Elysee powers greater than those that devolved in the Fourth Republic. But these powers are almost exclusively designed to be used under extraordinary conditions: Article 16, which, in case of a crisis that threatens the survival of the nation and its institutions, gives the president the right to do practically whatever he wants, and the right to dissolve the assembly. In ordinary times, by contrast, it is the government that holds the reins of power, and the head of state only has the role of an arbiter so as to assure "the ordinary functioning of public authorities as well as the continuity of the state." The notion of arbitration is rather vague, and in any case does not imply that the Elysee takes Matignon's place in conducting ordinary government activity: the arbiter does not replace the players on the field.

Should one be tempted to conclude that this is an abuse of the constitution? Even if this practice has been going on now for close to 20 years, there would be absolutely no doubt of it but for the fact that the definition of an abuse rests fundamentally on the absence of consent. Now the people have given their sovereign consent--at least tacitly--to the extent that the various elected assemblies have by majority rule acquiesced in the usage made of the constitutional language. This latter has thus been interpreted in a manner which, it could be maintained, does not betray the spirit of the institutions, even if it has not precisely conformed to the letter.

The Voters: The Supreme Judges

What is certain, in any event--and it is after all the most important--is that no interpretation whatsoever can prevail against the will of the general electorate. The present domination of the president of the republic over the government that is accountable to parliament could, in reality, be very rapidly reduced to nothing, whenever the majority of the assembly should really want to do so. It could for example resist the head of state's choice for prime minister by voting a motion of censure. Of course, the head of state has the privilege of exercising his right of dissolution, but he can only do it once a year, and if the general electorate sends back the same majority as obtained in the dissolved assembly, the president--thus disavowed--could only either resign or yield.

In case of conflict between the president and the prime minister, the president, we will betold, could obstruct the system by refusing to sign the decrees made in the council of the ministers and by thus preventing the naming of prefects, generals, rectors, ambassadors, and a certain number of other high officials. Similarly, the administrators of public institutions, public enterprises, and state companies (EDF-GDF [French Electric Company, French Gas Company], SNCF [French National Railroads], television networks, etc.) are chosen by decrees made in the council of ministers which require the signature of the head of state.

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But these recent extensions result only from an organic statute and could be easily eliminated by a vote of parliament. Similarly, one can see that in a test of strength between the president and the government (the latter by definition relying on the national assembly since, if this were not the case, the latter would have passed a vote of no confidence), the government has at its disposal many more high cards than the occupant of the Elysee, and could impose its view of things in the majority of cases. In particular, it could keep the head of state out of the preparation of the texts deliberated in the council of ministers and, even where the Elysee has a veto power, could get around that obstacle: in the most extreme case, one could always for example pass a bill removing the larger part of the power vested in prefects or ambassadors and replace them with other high officials bearing other titles and which consequently are not enumerated on the list of employees for whom the presidential signature is required.

In the speech he made at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs, several months before the legislative elections of 1978 Mr Giscard d'Estaing in fact emphasized that if what at that time was called the union of the left were to obtain the majority, there would be no constitutional way he could stop the implementation of their program. Conversely, it is obvious that a leftist president would not have the resources to impose his will on a rightist legislative chamber: this is in fact the reason why Mr Mitterrand intends, if he is elected, to proceed with the dissolution of the present assembly. But if, hypothetically, the voters should opt for a rightist majority in the Bourbon Palace after having voted a leftist candidate into the Elysee, the problems would be the same.

Said another way, the interpretation of the constitution which has up to now prevailed rests necessarily on harmony between the president and the prime minister, in other words on the parliamentary majority which supports that prime minister. In the absence of this majority one must return to an interpretation that is more in conformity with the letter of the provisions and which gives the prime minister and the government accountable to parliament the lion's share of executive prerogatives in the administration of the country's affairs. So there are, as Michel Debre has said, two possible "readings" of the constitution. Mr Mitterrand, for his part, has from the start upheld the "parliamentary" reading, and he confirmed the other day that he still adheres to it. One might in fact wonder whether in some way a kind of "settling" of presidential pre-eminence will not be required, if only (aside from questions of political opportunism) because the election of the head of state by the whole electorate has by now changed somewhat in nature.

Without their having realized it, those who drew up and voted for these provisions--which require that henceforth aspirants to the Elysee must gather 500 signatures from elected officials in at least 30 departments--have resulted in making those 35,000 or 40,000 notables (parliamentarians, mayors, general and municipal councillors) the real masters of the game: henceforth the voters will be limited, in effect, to exercising a narrow choice among four, five, or six individuals who, in short, will have been preelected. So we come back, by a circuitous route, to a system for electing the president of the republic which comes close to that in force up to 1962 and which had the president chosen by 80,000 local elected officials. Regardless of the results of the voting in May, the less direct nature of the presidential election appears therefore likely to entail a correspondingly less direct manifestation of his authority.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

VIEWPOINTS ON FUTURE PS-PC-RPR GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

PS-PC-RPR Three-Way Coalition

Paris FAIRE in French Feb 81 pp 46-47, 49-50

[Article by Gerard Grunberg: "The PCF, Debre, Chirac and Us"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] With the approach of the presidential elections, the subject of PS-RPR [French Socialist Party-Rally for the Republic Party] convergence has surfaced again. The continuing crisis of the union of the left and the growing crisis in the majority, statements of the RPR and also those of CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education] leaders have given some substance to Jean-Pierre Chevenement's old plan for a national PS-PCF-RPR compromise.

For the moment, tactical aspects are of greater weight than strategy. The PCF [French Communist Party] denounces the rapprochement it thinks it perceives between Gaullists and socialists. The RPR rejects beforehand any alliance with the PCF, and the PS swears its loyalty to the union of the left. The RPR electorate remains fundamentally hostile to communism, and the PCF's to Chirac. In short, if everyone tries, as is normal, to extend his electoral influence on the eve of elections then the national compromise does not appear for the moment to be a credible alternative to the confrontation between the right and the left which remains the fundamental split in French political life.

We would be mistaken, however, to dismiss the CERES plan lightly. Re-examined over the longer term it regains sufficient credibility to merit debate.

Let us look at the communist viewpoint first. When Georges Sarre, in his article of 3 December in LE MONDE calls on the PCF "to recall those recent times when it was in search of national and popular alliances," and to revive "one of the constants of its history," he proclaims two truths and lays down a hypothesis. It is true that at the end of 1978 L'HUMANITE hailed the points of convergence between its own analyses of Europe and those of the RPR, expressing its satisfaction with Chirac's victory over his "Giscardian" adversaries in the Gaullist party, and called for the birth of a great national movement to counter "the decline of France." It is also true that from a certain point of view the PCF was more comfortable in great "antifascist" or "resistance" alliances of the kind in which it participated in 1936-1937 or in 1944-1946 than it is in head-on confrontation with the PS, with which it has never participated alone as a partner in a government.

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At bottom, CERES is beginning to realize that the common program version of the union of the left has long been dead, because the communists no longer want any part of it (1). Thus a strategic alternative to the union of the left is needed, and the only one which both makes it possible to preserve the alliance with the PCF and rejects centrism is a national compromise "like in the resistance," to use the words of Georges Sarre. The unifying theme would be that of national independence in the face of American imperialism. This is behind J.-P. Chevenement's appeal to the Gaullists and in particular to Debre, who symbolizes the voluntarist Jacobinism of the right, which finds a pretty fair counterpart in CERES on the left. Chevenement considers it evident--"Press Club" on Europe 1 on 21 December--"that a union of the left government could be expanded to include all those who, even though they once called themselves rightists, nevertheless have a sense for the national interest, a sense of national independence, and who want profound change for France."

Any strategic design needs historical legitimacy. The legitimizing factor at work here is a "return to the spirit, the alliances, and the programs of the national council of the resistance."

One must show that a three-party government--Gaullism-communism-socialism--has its patents of nobility. At the same time there arises the question of identifying the nation's/excluded/ (2), what under various guises remains always the main enemy, exuding the poison of surrender: the third force, centrism, Giscardism...

Liberties With History

In the face of that continually regenerating hydra, the proud and patriotic French people must cultivate the spirit of the resistance, and, under the leadership of the Jacobins--whether they be communists, Gaullists, or socialists--get back on the honorable path... and the path of structural reform.

Georges Sarre does not hesitate to take a few liberties with history to prove his point. First of all, he makes a disingenuous mistake when he makes the CNR [National Council of the Resistance] the historic expression of the three-party government on which his hopes rest today. At the time of the Liberation, CNR's president was none other than Georges Bidault, a confirmed Christian Democrat and one of the principal founders of the MRP [Popular Republican Movement] in 1945. That movement was going to become the third thief [sic] of a tripartism that did not include a Gaullist party for the simple reason that no such party existed until the creation of the RPF [Rally of the French People] in 1947.

Jean Lecanuet later headed the MRP, which was the predecessor of the CDS [Social Democratic Center] of today. The CNR excluded no one but Petainists and collaborators in the Nazi occupation. Next, "The spirit of the CNR," if spirit there were, did not last long. Even before General De Gaulle's departure in January 1946, it was already moribund (3). Barely surviving that extraordinary period when the Hitlerian enemy was not yet beaten, when our institutions and our economy still needed to be rebuilt, the political alliance born of the resistance was to break up in 1946 and then in 1947 on the two fundamental questions any party must answer: what kind of internal political system, and what external alliances. When he accuses the third force of being alone responsible for that collapse, Georges Sarre omits mention of the fact that in late 1947 the growth of the Gaullist RPF and the PCF's agitation provoked this statement from Leon Blum to the national assembly:

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"The republic is in danger. On one side, international communism has openly declared war on French democracy; on the other side, a party has been established, the RPF, whose object is to dispossess the national sovereignty of its fundamental rights."

It was no accident that De Gaulle was involved in the revival of colonial wars after liberation, and one sees today where the extreme centralization of powers engendered by the new institutions he gave France in 1958-1962 has led us. But let us not, for all that, neglect the possible impact of the "myth" of the spirit of the resistance and the way in which it could serve tomorrow to disguise a plan which seems to me to be diametrically opposed to democratic and self-managing socialism.

A Dangerous Analysis

In effect, the deepening economic crisis, mounting unemployment, the apparent impotence of traditional liberal methods and the aggravation of international rivalries could lend new credibility to the words of those who, in the name of national independence, preach protectionist nationalism as the solution in place of Giscardism, but more widely as an alternative for a social democratic Europe in search of its second wind. From this point of view, the CERES analysis is both mistaken and dangerous. Mistaken because it relies on the idea that Gaullism is the political expression of a national middle class that is ready to fight against American imperialism. In short, it relies on a very questionable analysis of French social and political reality. First of all, this "national middle class" certainly seems difficult to identify in reality. Secondly, De Gaulle himself, perhaps despite his personal preferences, ended up giving priority in the 1960's--which are closer to us than the epoch of the resistance--to improving the competitiveness of our industrial structure rather than to national autonomy. As for Pompidou and Chirac, determined to play the world market game to the hilt, they, like VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing], subjected our economy to international competition. Today it is neither 1945 nor even 1969. One can be permitted to doubt that tomorrow the RPR can become the expression of a national capitalism.

But, even granted that convergences with the RPR and between the RPR and the PCF are possible in terms of some kind of state economic planning, do we want such state planning? Without elaborating here on the risks and problems such a resolutely protectionist policy would have for our economy, we must underline the /"authoritarian"/ aspects that could accompany such a policy. Whether in terms of state centralization, the repression of anti-authoritarian attitudes (which a growing share of the social groups that support us evince), or the abandonment of our proposal for self-management with respect to decision-making in industry. In reality, it is hard to imagine Jacques Chirac or Michel Debre approving schemes--abortion on demand, power for the workers in industry, decentralization--which they have always fought. Will we give in on these basic parts of our program? In addition to these concessions which we would make to the right to obtain its support, any possible PS-PCF-RPR accord based on protectionist and centralized state planning would run the risk of having an international dimension that could only be expressed by a certain complaisance with regard to the USSR. When Georges Sarre calls us to the resistance, he makes clear from the start he is not speaking of resistance to Soviet Russia by dismissing beforehand any "antisoviet grouping." On the contrary, his resistance is totally directed against "atlanticism" and "social democracy."

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But are we not members of the Atlantic alliance? Do we not want to build Europe, and if so, will we be able to build it in opposition to European social democracy? We are back to the socialist outline put together by Jean-Pierre Chevenement, when France's security was linked with Moscow. One finds no mention of Poland in Georges Sarre's article. It is true that what is happening in Poland is somewhat inconsistent with recent CERES analyses according to which the dissenters in the socialist countries are on the fringes of the worker scene.

Benevolent Nationalism

Certainly the RPR's current attitude toward the USSR seems more firm than that of VGE, whose pathetic expedition to Warsaw is still remembered. Certainly it is true that De Gaulle, even if he did use Franco-Soviet rapprochement to increase his freedom of maneuver within the Atlantic alliance, showed his true colors in the big crises (Cuba, Berlin). But all the same, Gaullism--we recall that Debre in 1968 described the Czechoslovakia affair as a passing episode--has from time to time evidenced a certain neutrality toward the USSR. Gaullists, socialists and communists could converge--on the basis of different lines of reasoning--toward a nationalism that would be rather benevolent toward the USSR. Are the majority of us in the PS in agreement with such a policy? Finally, the national compromise seems to me to present two dangers, each as serious as the other. It may be that this is a purely hypothetical plan that cannot result in any realistic alternative compatible with our views. This seems to me most probable. But such a plan, even if it is never put into effect, has a serious drawback. It leads us to stay far away from any serious re-examination of our strategy, avoids the fundamental debate with the PCF, and runs the risk of alienating whole sectors of our electorate. It contributes over time to the weakening of our party, by leading those who believe in us to impasse, instead of causing us to reflect seriously on past failures and draw lessons for the future. On the other hand, it may be that, with the further deepening of the political and/or economic crisis, this plan is taken up again both by the PCF and a part of the RPR.

Then the risks appear even greater. Doubtless there are true Jacobins in CERES, in the RPR, and in the PCF. But is the democratic and open socialism that we want compatible with Jacobinism, whether Marxist or nonmarxist? This is a question that deserves to be widely debated. The answer that flows from such a debate may well determine the course of history. Of our history.

FOOTNOTES

1. On this point, read M. Simon's article in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISM of December 1980: "PCF Strategy and the Communist Candidacy."
2. See Alain Bergounioux and Bernard Manin: "L'Exclu de la Nation." LE DEBAT No 5, October 1980.
3. On this subject see the excellent book by J.-P. Rioux: "The France of the Fourth Republic, Vol I, New History of Contemporary France." Le Seuil. Points. History. 1980. Reviewed in FAIRE No 62.

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PS-RPR Disagreements

Paris FAIRE in French Feb 81 pp 60-62

[Article by Colette Ysmal: "PS-RPR: The Impossible Agreement"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Any whimsical idea of working toward a convergence between the PS and the RPR presupposes the existence, on the part of both the organizations concerned and their active supporters, a certain degree of mutual acceptance, as well as a minimal level of agreement on basic policies. The least one can see is that RPR leaders hardly seem ready for such an adventure.

Let us be blunt: for them, the PS is the enemy. Asked to indicate the degree of sympathy they feel for that party, 40 percent of the [RPR] delegates ⁽¹⁾ gave it a "zero"--total antipathy--and 54 percent a mediocre rating (between 1 and 4). That is scarcely better than the PCF showing (Table 1); and if the PS wanted to get a little more "respect" it would be better advised to turn toward the UDF [French Democratic Union]! Should this be surprising? After all, this judgment corroborates the incessant diatribes of the "Gaullist" movement against the socialist movement, which it accused, notably in "Proposals for France," ⁽²⁾ its the 1978 campaign platform, of being a weak party destined to pave the way for communism (see separate box).

Beyond that, there is considerable political opposition. In fact, the RPR rejects all the values of the worker movement, rejects the essence of the socialist program, and positions itself clearly in the conservative camp. First evidence: the marked antipathy shown by Chirac's militants for the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] labor organizations. These militants defend a class line and a preference for "sensible" labor organizations, indeed for openly paternalistic ones. Thus Workers Force [FO] and FNSEA [National Federation of Unions of Farm Operators] are well regarded by 63 percent of the delegates, and even CFT-CSL [French Confederation of Labor-Confederation of Free Trade Unions] gets a 42 percent positive response! In this field, the RPR shows itself more conservative and more antilabor than the UDF which is less deliberately offended by CFDT, more reserved with respect to the FO and above all with respect to the CFT (Table 1). Here again, the convergence is clear between those attitudes and the texts denouncing "syndical power," which is what the PS would like to establish in industries for the sole benefit of "revolutionary organizations." (See separate box).

Law and Order Talk

This conservatism speaks the language of law and order, and of the tradition which the RPR is constantly invoking. One finds here a continual incantation for a "coming together" which would lead to the negation of all divisions. Not only does one not think in terms of class conflicts--but even generational conflict, demands for regional and cultural identity, or circumstantial differences based on sex are all unanimously judged to be subsidiary expressions of special interests.

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At the same time all political or "cultural" policies are stamped with the seal of defense of the established order. One notes, in fact, that only 49 percent of the party militants are in favor of according /"women the right to decide about abortion for themselves"/ even though this is the law, and, in another area, 67 percent of them describe themselves as /"somewhat supportive of tradition from the religious point of view." /Similarly, 68 percent believe it would be proper to /"reduce public control over industries"/ (where is the language of so-called planning, and where are the critiques of the laissez-faire liberal?); 7.5 percent think we must /"increase defense outlays"/ and 72 percent maintain--the sweet revenge of Cartierism over Gaullism--that we must /"take our own needs more into account in the aid we provide to the Third World."/

In these matters, sometimes the RPR is perfectly aligned with the UDF, and sometimes shows itself to be less "modernist" or less sensitive to the spirit of the times (Table 2), unless one is in favor of a progressivism which results from nationalistic attitudes. What can be noted is the real sensitivity of the RPR cadres to anything that involves the integrity of the nation and its capacity to control "its own destiny." Thus, for example, many more of them than of their UDF counterparts are resolved to increase military appropriations, /"control the activity of the multinationals,"/ (65 percent are in complete agreement, compared to 32 percent)...Above all, they are very opposed to building Europe: only 39 percent of them are in favor of accelerating /"the process of the integration of Europe"/ (90 percent in the UDF) and only 44 percent in November 1978 were in favor of the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage (95 percent in the UDFO).

Having said all that, the questions remain. Is the PS ready, in the name of convergence, to embrace this nationalism which contravenes, in the view of many, its policies? But there is an even more critical point. If it were to do this, and if, in order to attract the RPR or its electorate, a "socio-nationalistic" line were to prevail, how would the socialists handle their desire to transform society? How would they reconcile that desire with the obdurate defense of the status quo waged by Chirac's supporters?

[Table 1 on following page]

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TABLEAU 1					1
SYMPATHIE ACCORDEE AUX PARTIS ET ORGANISATIONS SYNDICALES					
(en %)					
	RPR	UDF		RPR	UDF
Parti communiste			Force ouvrière²		
0	59	77	0	3	2
1 à 4	31	18	1 à 4	35	27
5	4	1	5	25	15
6 à 10	3	—	6 à 10	34	45
Parti socialiste			FNSEA		
0	40	13	0	3	3
1 à 4	54	60	1 à 4	27	22
5	1	11	5	22	15
6 à 10	2	9	6 à 10	41	41
CGT			CFT-CSL		
0	66	57	0	10	17
1 à 4	28	33	1 à 4	36	33
5	1	1	5	17	9
6 à 10	1	1	6 à 10	25	15
CFDT					
0	51	22			
1 à 4	42	53			
5	1	8			
6 à 10	2	7			

3

* Ce qui manque pour arriver au total 100 représente les « sans réponse ».

KEY:

1. Sympathy Felt For Parties and Labor Organizations (Percent)
2. FO--Workers Force.
3. Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of "no opinion" responses.

[Table 2 on following page]

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TABLEAU II		
QUELQUES OPTIONS POLITIQUES ET CULTURELLES (en %) 1		
	RPR	UDF
Liberté de l'avortement 2		
Tout à fait d'accord 3	29	29
D'accord 4	20	19
Opposé 5	16	15
Tout à fait opposé 6	18	17
Du point de vue religieux 7		
Plutôt favorable à la tradition 8	67	42
Plutôt favorable au changement 9	19	41
Réduire le contrôle public sur les entreprises 10		
Tout à fait d'accord 11	29	43
D'accord 12	39	26
Opposé 13	12	10
Tout à fait opposé 14	5	4
Contrôler les multinationales 15		
Tout à fait d'accord 16	65	32
D'accord 17	23	38
Opposé 18	1	10
Tout à fait opposé 19	1	4
Accroître les dépenses militaires 20		
Tout à fait d'accord 21	24	28
D'accord 22	51	24
Opposé 23	7	19
Tout à fait opposé 24	1	11
Accélérer le processus d'intégration européenne 25		
Tout à fait d'accord 26	7	69
D'accord 27	32	21
Opposé 28	23	1
Tout à fait opposé 29	21	—

KEY :

1. Various Political and Cultural Policies (Percent)
2. Freedom of Abortion
3. Completely in agreement
4. In agreement
5. Opposed
6. Completely opposed
7. Religious matters
8. Somewhat favorable to tradition
9. Somewhat favorable to change
10. Reduce public controls over industry
11. Completely in agreement
12. In agreement
13. Opposed
14. Completely opposed
15. Control the multinationals
16. Completely in agreement
17. In agreement
18. Opposed
19. Completely opposed
20. Increase military spending

[Key continued on following page]

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21. Completely in agreement
22. In agreement
23. Opposed
24. Completely opposed
25. Accelerate the process of European integration
26. Completely in agreement
27. In agreement
28. Opposed
29. Completely opposed

FOOTNOTES

1. The data utilized here come from a survey made of delegates to the RPR's special congress held in Paris in 1978. This survey, carried out in France by Roland Cayrol and Colette Ysmal, is part of a research project on political elites in the nine countries of the EEC, the study being financed by the Volkswagen Foundation and the European Communities.
2. Published by Stock.

Impossibility of PS-RPR Coalition

Paris L'UNITE in French 30 Jan 81 p 5

[Article by Georges Sarre, member of the PS executive committee: "Conquer and Succeed"]

[Text] The very idea of a PS-RPR alliance provokes an immense outburst of laughter, but the question before us is one of preparing a new class front for tomorrow.

Tempest in a teapot! The supposed "convergence" with the Gaullists is a flood of texts, speeches, and articles.

The PCF, once again, is making unfounded accusations, and its secretary general castigates the new gang of three. Even within the PS, there are comrades who deem it useful to add their voices to the incantations and ascribe to us the intention of preparing some secret alliance with the RPR.

Jean-Pierre Cot and Robert Chapuis in particular thought it necessary to ascribe such a plan to me, despite all evidence to the contrary (LE MONDE of 3 January 1981).

Let us have done with false accusations and look at the basic questions. The very idea of an alliance between the PS and the RPR is laughable in the extreme. Can you for one second imagine socialist militants coexisting for long in the same meeting hall with the RPR people? Which RPR? That of Chirac, Debre, or Chaban-Delmas? As for talk of a "common program among the PCF, the PS, and the RPR," that truly belongs to the realm of comic strips. And it would be some fun in that respect to see Cot, Chapuis...and Rene Andrieu (who would have the advantage of experience) meeting for such an exercise. L'HUMANITE's editorial writer, perpetually lying in wait for the elusive proof of veering to the right, is finding a

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new pretext for his completely spurious discourse which is totally without foundation. Speculation replaces the facts.

None of all that is very serious, and it is only the determination to distort people's thinking which leads our good authors to make wild conjectures. All the same, if one was determined to take their remarks seriously, one could ponder the analysis Cot and Chapuis draw up, according to which "RPR and UDF deputies can be distinguished from each other, but they can also join hands to represent the right, just as PCF and PS deputies are distinguishable but also join hands to represent the left." In vain one tries to be true to logic or Marxism, so quickly are basic principles forgotten. To reduce the workers movement in this way to an electoral "dance for two" similar to the RPR/UDF rivalry is certainly to evince a marvelous clarity of thought!

Let us instead talk about the realities of France in 1981. Let us put aside one methodology. To assert that alliances must rest on a class basis, without proceeding to the concrete analysis of social classes in today's France is to be condemned to catechism, and to deprive the analysis of any hold on reality.

Now the decisive question is certainly the question of the birth of the class front that will aggregate around the wage-earners in the social strata that want to see the disappearance of the system. These partners are those whose survival as a class is threatened by the growth of an increasingly multinational and integrated capitalism: the peasantry, artisans and small businessmen, the pre-capitalistic sectors doomed to pauperization and proletarianization.

Gaullism served for decades as the ideological glue uniting these social strata to the bloc of classes in power. This is so obvious no one tries to deny it. And the question for us is precisely to put together a recombination, a new crystallization of elements existing today in order to forge a new class front tomorrow. For the present it is a question of dissolving the ideological links to the bloc in power, and of aggregating the middle strata who are on the way to being proletarianized.

One might obviously think the problem resolved. That is too easy. "The Gaullist votes have again found their respective homes," say Cot and Chapuis. Insofar as we are talking about the working class, this is largely true. But the question of the middle strata, whose attachment to the bloc in power is often based on ideology, is still before us. Here again, it is too easy to resort to demagogic expedients to avoid this critical question. To assimilate the social strata that have been influenced by Gaullism, and the "great intellectuals" who emerged from the Resistance, to the RPR apparatus is a way of simply shuffling the cards. But, dear comrades, the sleight-of-hand is just too obvious! To transform the indispensable thought on the broadening of the class front into a vaudeville "Fourth Republic" is a convenient diversion.

It seems to me of more importance to try to understand whether, given the exacerbation of the economic crisis--which signifies the euthanasia of France--, given the disaster and tragedies which unfailingly await us, the tendency of the middle strata under Gaullist influence to join up with the leftist block is going to increase. Indeed, I think that this phenomenon is inevitable, because of the accelerated rate of impoverishment of those classes, and because of the ideological schism which Giscardism has shown.

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With that as a starting point, our role is then to transform that defensive movement, that movement of resistance to apathy and listlessness, into a factor that will aid our victory. It is a question of promoting powerful ideas that will facilitate the mobilization of our people and forcing the lock. Will we be able to get a grip on this phenomenon and give it the freedom it needs, or will we practice "ostrich" politics in order to hide from other choices tomorrow?

What political space is it possible to carve out? This is the problem of the third family, and one which, in all truth, we have never up to now satisfactorily resolved. The radicals of the left constitute more of a regional reality than a representative current of thought at the national level. The organizational ties that were established with them led to an impasse, i.e. to the split with the MRG [Radical Movement of the Left]; the attempts conceived in 1977 to ally with opposition Gaullists fared no better.

Now this question needs to be resolved. In reality, the aim of the left in government is to really change things, to undertake profound structural reform. And this undertaking cannot be carried out against the opposition of 49 percent of the French people. Our objective is not to cut France in half, but to bring our people together. Naturally, if one considers that a government of the left must confine itself to more socially oriented and more convivial management of society, then the problem does not arise. But a strategy of profound transformation of French society needs support or consent that must over time go increasingly beyond 50 percent. Remember the Chile of the Popular Unity; remember the Popular Front! Failure and defeat have in large part been the result of this problem. It may be time to think about this and to shake loose from the mellow complacency of well-meaning assumptions. There can be no question of doing less; rather we must obtain the means to hold to our line and our commitments. In short, we must neither betray the cause nor perish.

Are not those who refuse to consider this urgent need betraying signs that would lead us to entertain serious doubts about their will to engage in a really audacious policy which attacks the very structures? So where do we expect to get support? What is proposed, and what is the deeper plan behind these false accusations?

Putting forward Atlanticist or European themes, making ringing affirmations that we belong in the "camp of freedom and human rights" (since this is how the imperialist system is called currently!), all these themes tend to move us closer to centrism. And that is to opt for being swallowed up, and to close the door to any possibility of profound transformation of the country.

We resolutely reject that path. We must get out of this impasse and formulate proposals to anchor the socialist program in reality.

It is desirable and possible to find people in the Gaullist camp who are disposed to join their efforts with those of the left as a whole to force the locks. On a certain number of big themes: independence to be won, freedoms to expand, the return of the great instruments of production to the nation, democratic planning, the right to a job; the forces that could be brought together could extend beyond the ranks of the left and assure it not only victory, but also the possibility of enduring success.

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Hopes for PS-PCF-RPR Coalition

Paris LE MONDE in French 3-4 May 81 p 5

[Article: "M Defferre Desires a PS-PCF-RPR Coalition Based on a Program"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Mr Gaston Defferre, president of the socialist group in the national assembly, mayor of Marseille, was questioned on 30 April by Journalists and listeners on Radio Monte-Carlo. During the conversation, he was asked to respond to the following question, to which he then replied:

/"Do you think that an accord is possible between the socialists, the communists, and the RPR? That was the case after the liberation (...) with General de Gaulle; and if that coalition is possible that would then give the government that would be constituted--on the basis of the program that we would define together--a foundation, an attraction, which would I think be likely to inspire the confidence of many Frenchmen.

/"I would like to see a coalition on condition that a precise agreement be reached on the program that we ourselves define; in other words that first of all there would be major structural reforms, nationalizations; next, in social terms, an increase in the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage], the lowering of retirement age, in short everything we propose. I am on the other hand completely against any coalition government without a precise program, because if that were to happen we would be where we have been for the last 7 years: impotent; and that would be intolerable, both for the country and for those who want to govern, in other words to take action."/

Mr Defferre said that he had never even spoken with Gaullists or communists about such a proposal, not even as a private individual, but it was rather /"just an idea in my head..."/

That statement stirred up some feeling, for in the initial transcription disseminated on the night of 30 April but amended the following day, the French Press Agency [AFP] had spoken of an /"RPR-PS coalition,"/ omitting the PCF. Mr Defferre published a correction to set forth the precise content of his statements and the management of AFP tendered its apologies for /"the gross error in transmission"/ which had distorted the meaning of his remarks.

L'HUMANITE of 2 May Mr Rene Andrieu commented on the (unabridged) statements of Mr Defferre in these terms:

/"Let us say right away that such a proposal is frivolous for a whole series of reasons any one of which would alone be sufficient.

/"Today, the RPR program is a rightist program distinguished particularly by the rejection of nationalizations and the granting of new subsidies to big business.

/"Moreover, socialist leaders throughout the country have been unsparing in their denunciation of such demagoguery.

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/"Now by just what kind of dark electoral miracle would base lead be transformed instantly into pure gold?

/"If we add to that what Mr Chirac himself had to say--that there could be no question of envisaging a rapprochement between the RPR and the socialists so long as the latter have not publicly repudiated any kind of accord with the PCF--then we are obliged to observe that Gaston Defferre's scheme--as two other socialist leaders noted in connection with a similar profession of faith--is perfectly/ utopian, confusionist, dangerous, and unprincipled,/because/"you don't fight the devil by signing a pact with Mephistopheles."

/"What might be called the moral significance of an alliance with the RPR could lead only to a headlong plunge into the mire. The only solution in accordance with the interests of the workers is the establishment of a government that includes socialist and communist ministers responsible for implementing the new policy.

/"Gaston Defferre's position is all the more disturbing because it goes along with convergent statements by other socialist leaders about the attitude of Francois Mitterrand if he should be elected. Everything leads us to believe that their basic concern was to reassure the right."/

PS-PC Problems

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9-15 Feb 81 p 30

[Article by Georges Mamy--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Upon returning from the voyage he is getting ready to make to China, toward the end of the month of February, Francois Mitterrand will go to Algeria, where he will be received by the leaders of the country. That visit is of course a part of the program the socialist candidate has set up to inform himself more directly on the great world problems. But it assumes a special significance since it is the first time that Mitterrand will be a guest in that young republic.

Moreover, the PCF is going to see one of its favorite arguments unmasked. On 1 February, on "Press Club" on Europe 1, when Lionel Jospin alluded to the strange new treatment immigrants are receiving in communist municipalities, Rene Andrieu replied as usual by talking about the /"war carried out for 7 years against the Algerian people."/ The said people themselves appear more inclined than the PCF to turn the pages of history.

In a more general way, moreover, the PCF is running into more and more difficulties in trying to coordinate its slogans and keep in control of its tactics, despite the aplomb with which it works at supporting contradictory ideas. One sees this clearly on the question of the possible presence of communist ministers in the government that could be established if Francois Mitterrand were elected president of the republic. What up until the beginning of the year was only a casually thrown-out stylistic flourish has become, since Georges Marchais's speech at Orleans at the end of January, a daily hammering: /"For things to change, there must be communist ministers, and we are ready." /The socialists undoubtedly responded to that summation much earlier and much more clearly than the PCF would have liked. Much more candidly, too, than the right had hoped.

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/"This demand for communist ministers, as the communists have formulated it, is for me incompatible with the policy currently being carried out by the leadership of the PCF,"/ Jospin declared, thus starting off his term as first secretary of the PS in an explosive manner. And to demonstrate the /"illogic/ of the communist demand, Lionel Jospin recalled that the PCF calls for a /"union at the base"/ which its cells refuse to practice, that it rejects any /"union at the summit"/ (would not a governmental alliance constitute in the most extreme form one of those "headquarters agreements" which it denounces?), and that it is constantly accusing the PS of /"veering to the right."/ /"It would be absolutely ludicrous, given the current state of our own policy, to consider governing together,"/ he shot back at Rene Andrieu, who during the course of the debate was to interrupt him 37 times. There will therefore be no negotiations /"either before the first round, or after the first round, or on the eve of the second round."/ There will not even be any possibilities in the future--in other words at the time of the new legislative elections--if the PCF sticks with its current position on major questions like Poland, Afghanistan, the SS-20's, the Pershings (nuclear-tipped missiles, the first Russian, the other American, installed to be fired over European territory) and on...immigration.

The PS did not find it hard to discover the "catch" or the trap in this question about communist ministers which was posed in order to embarrass its candidate and arouse fear in a portion of its potential electorate. It was enough for its leaders to recall the tone used by the same Georges Marchais in 1974 to deal with the same subject, when he had really wanted to reassure the voters in order to help the same Mitterrand to win. /"What we have in mind,"/ declared a humble and measured Marchais on 15 March 1974, /"is a real but minority participation of the communists in a broad union whose goal is to commit the country to a path of social, democratic, and national renewal. This is the exact and limited experiment we offer the French people...taking into account the realities of our country."/

That same day, he denied having demanded /"important"/ ministries, such as foreign affairs, interior, and defense. And he described the hypothetical government team as a /"united, well-knit, effective team."/ Exemplary modesty, in order to avoid daunting anyone. Times have certainly changed; but not everyone has forgotten.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION SUPPORTS MITTERRAND

Paris REVOLUTION in French 1-7 May 81 p 6

[Decree of the PCF Central Committee, issued 28 Apr 81]

[Text] From the bottom of our hearts we thank the 4,450,000 voters who on 26 April cast their ballots for the communist candidate, Georges Marchais. They make up an important and lucid force for change and union. This will have to be reckoned with by everyone concerned in all present and future actions.

We thank each and every one of those who gave of their best to fight for the communist candidate. We congratulate and thank with particular warmth the man who led this fight with courage, creative spirit, and combativity: our candidate himself, Georges Marchais. With him, we have made a reality, under difficult conditions, of the political orientation of our 22nd and 23rd Congresses.

The electoral setback of the PCF is explained first of all by the unique difficulties of this presidential election.

Because of the way the election of the president of the republic by universal suffrage has been designed by France's institutions, there is an inherent tendency from the very start to limit the voters to a choice between two candidates. Both general political conditions and the electoral mechanism lead--in contempt of pluralism--to a polarization of the votes of the left around the man who appears to them the only one in a position to defeat the candidate of the right. This phenomenon has been further enhanced by the critical situation of the urgent need to defeat Giscard d'Estaing.

The convergence of other political forces during the campaign further aggravated this problem. The refusal to debate the causes of the crisis, the conditions for full employment and the elimination of injustices, France's international role; the wave of anticommunism; the systematic silence of the news media on our proposals; concerted manipulations to reduce the choice to two candidates taking shots at each other: no effort has been spared, over the months, to put pressure on the voters. This even went so far as that latest and treacherous maneuver that led men and women--many tell us this--to vote in order to thwart the imaginary threat raised by Jacques Chirac on the presence of the left in the second round.

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In October 1980, our party's national congress clearly spelled out our objective in the conditions of this election: it was to give the forces of change the means to show their maximum strength, to be as secure as possible. Those who did the right thing by voting for Georges Marchais understood this well. We are going to continue the fight alongside them, by relying on them.

But, in the special circumstances of this election, some communist voters who approve and support our policy thought it useful to vote for Francois Mitterrand even on the first round. To all of those who left us in this way on the first round, we say with our habitual frankness: you did not fully appreciate the risks entailed by having a PCF with insufficient influence. That is not going to help things. But, we are persuaded that you remain communist voters, and we call on you to take your place with us, without delay, in the struggle for real change and union. We are counting on you, as you can count on us.

For the moment, as Georges Marchais said on Antenna 2 on 23 March, we have decided to do whatever is necessary to defeat Giscard d'Estaing and his policy. There can be no question of us supporting him. And we do not want to abstain from voting. So we call now to all those men and women who voted for Georges Marchais in the first round and say to them: you are hoping for a real change. You want to arm yourself in advance against disappointment. You know well that Francois Mitterrand remains vague about his objectives and the measures he will take to achieve them, that he refuses to have communist ministers, that he rejects any negotiations between the two rounds. You do not want him to be able to govern with the right.

We tell you again--and we say it to all other workers as well: in order to impose change, one must create the conditions by bringing together the great popular forces in the fight for our goals for transformation. It is above all in the struggles of the workers themselves that this unification will be realized and developed.

It is true that the results of the first round do not give us all the strength that would be necessary to move toward change under the best conditions. But there are millions of you: we can, and we want, to get your support to move as quickly as possible, to beat Giscard d'Estaing and capitalist policy.

With the objective of bringing about the best possible conditions for carrying out the struggles to satisfy the great demands, in order to obtain indispensable anti-capitalist and democratic reforms, in order to impose the establishment of a union of the left government in which communists will take the place that is rightfully theirs, we call on you to vote for the socialist candidate, Francois Mitterrand, in the second round.

We ask the party organizations to broadcast news of this position widely. We ask them to hold meetings in the departments and to call meetings in the cities and the suburbs, at and on the job, to acquaint the people with our analysis and our position on the second round, and to appeal for a strengthening of the party.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGIS DEBRAY ON MITTERRAND'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 12 Apr 81 p 6

[Interview with former Latin American guerrilla and Mitterrand election team general staff member Regis Debray, by Arlette Chabrol, in Paris; date not given]

[Excerpts] A former Latin American guerrilla fighter, in the wake of Che Guevara, when he experienced the horror of the Bolivian prisons, and the author not only of many works on revolutionary theory, but also of several novels and more "peaceful" political essays, Regis Debray, 40 years of age, is currently one of the most important people on the general staff of Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist candidate for the presidency of the republic.

Together with Jacques Attali, he works in the candidate's private office, participating directly in the major decisions. He is also a member of the group of advisers who counseled the leading adversary of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. However, the author of "Revolution in the Revolution" and "Essays on Latin America" does not belong to the Socialist Party. Just as during the 1974 campaign, Debray is there in a personal capacity.

In his view (as will be observed in the interview), this presidential battle is in a way the last opportunity for French Socialism. But, Debray assured us, if his candidate wins, there will be many changes in France's Latin American policy. Not only will it cease to follow the path of the United States, but it might even oppose the latter, for example in the case of El Salvador, or the threats of blockading Cuba.

Unlike many others, Regis Debray, an intellectual engaged in the European democratic activity, has not reneged on his former convictions; he still thinks that armed struggle is an acceptable solution in certain countries wherein dictatorship prevails. And he stresses that this type of revolution has never needed the Communist movement in order to develop. He told us that the exporting of the Cuban revolution is a myth without grounds, spread by the United States.

[Question] Why did you accept that responsible position on the general staff for Francois Mitterrand's campaign?

[Answer] In the first place, for a personal reason of friendly association with Mitterrand since 1973, since my return to France. Secondly, because I made an

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analysis which I can summarize in a simple fashion: It will be all or nothing for France. I shall explain what I mean. We are experiencing, if not the last opportunity for the left, at least a crucial period in our country's history.

The return of Giscard will mean an acceleration of the sociological, economic and mental changes that will make the Socialist option something impossible, or else definitely Social Democratic; in other words, with integration into the capitalist system. At the moment, we are caught between the two: the PS [Socialist Party] cannot exactly be described as a Social Democratic Party of the British, Swedish or German type, because the Marxist connotation remains. But, in particular, because the history of France is far more tragic than the history of the other countries; it is more Draconian and more demanding than in the countries wherein the labor movement never chose another type of society.

But, furthermore, Socialism is not our program, it has no way of being such. At the present time, it is merely a means of making this country, which is being stifled by the lack of an alternative, breathe. For the past 30 years, one Frenchman out of two has been excluded from conducting the affairs of France. This has created a state of pressure which at first prompted merely an attempt, and now the establishment of order at home. Because the fact is that things are going very badly in the economic and social areas.

[Question] Then do you expect the resurrection of the defunct Union of the Left?

[Answer] It is inevitable, in time; but at present it is in its most threatening phase. Without looking back very far into the past, one could claim that the responsibility for the break lies largely with the Communist Party. I think that there is a general consensus on this point, even among many Communists. The Communist leaders carried out a policy of deliberate isolation, which created that desperate situation. But the Union will inevitably return, undoubtedly in a different form than previously. But I do not think that a new common program, for example, will be possible.

[Question] In the event of a Mitterrand victory, what will France's policy be with respect to Latin America?

[Answer] What I can say is that France will no longer trail behind the United States. It will have a realistic, courageous position, giving its support to the national liberation movements in Latin America. It will maintain normal relations with the other countries, including those wherein the left is not in power. But unlike the case of Reagan, the human rights policy will be one of the deciding elements. For example, a Socialist government would obviously have an attitude toward Argentina, Chile and Uruguay quite different from its attitude toward such countries as Venezuela or Mexico.

Mitterrand has a real interest in the Third World and Latin America in particular, dating back a dozen years. He established ties during many trips made to the continent. In short, he has today a real sensitivity toward Latin American problems.

[Question] And what will there be in connection with Cuba?

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[Answer] There will unquestionably be good relations with Cuba, based on our respective positions, which are different. In any event, reducing all the North-South conflicts, that is, those of all the opposition or popular insurrection movements of Latin America, to the East-West system will not be accepted. There will, in fact, be recognition of a specific dimension, and not a widespread Haig or Reagan paranoia concerning the Third World as an area for penetration by the Soviet Union.

In this respect also, the Swedish and Danish Socialists, and even the Germans, to some extent, are already aware that they cannot follow the Americans in that area.

[Question] Do you think that, if Mitterrand is elected, a Socialist government might go so far as to break off diplomatic relations with certain countries in which human rights are disdained?

[Answer] It is difficult to reply now. During 1974, in fact, we made the decision to break with Chile. It was obviously a symbolic measure. The question is to ascertain how one can be more useful. At the present time, insofar as I know, there is no plan to break with any country. But it is clear that there will be a considerably firmer diplomacy on the matter of human rights.

And a relationship would be established between arms sales and democratic rights within the countries. In that area, there must be a consistent position on a world-wide scale. If we accept the division of the world into spheres of influence (Yalta agreements, division of the world into two parts), we must also remain impassive toward the possible Soviet intervention in Poland, or the present intervention in Afghanistan.

That is approximately the current policy of the French Government, with a large amount of cynicism: allowing the Americans to do what they wish in their zone of hegemony, and allowing the Soviets to do the same in theirs. That brings Giscard d'Estaing twofold congratulations from Reagan and Brezhnev. In this instance, France has a low profile and does not bother either one.

I think that a Socialist policy will be quite different; it will be considerably more bothersome to the two superpowers. It will be a policy of presence, and the affirmation of principles, accompanied by a concrete policy.

[Question] In this case, what would the economic policy be?

[Answer] It would change drastically. Inasmuch as the present government has based its policy on the economic interests of the multinationals, both foreign and French, it is obvious that Latin America does not offer any essential benefit, with the exception of Mexico, since it was learned that the latter has a large amount of oil.

The other countries are considered to be of secondary rank, except for concluding contracts for weapons or as an export area. Our position would be completely different. Latin America would have a far more important role.

[Question] What is your position regarding the danger of an economic blockade of Cuba which the United States has threatened?

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[Answer] A condemnation, without reservation, of the American attitude, which would consist of taking Cuba hostage for a face-to-face summit negotiation with the Soviet Union. This is impossible. In such an eventuality, our solidarity with Cuba would be reaffirmed.

[Question] Socialism has been in a state of decline in Europe for some years. How do you analyze this phenomenon?

[Answer] It is certainly an effect of the crisis. The end of the expansion phase caused the Keynesian model to experience difficulty supporting itself. The coffers were empty; the nations could no longer redistribute funds. Then there was a resumption, with a kind of savage capitalism, of competition, of the struggle for life, of ferocious productivity and of Draconian social policy. There was a fear reflex, for conserving assets. I think that the end of that phenomenon can now be observed.

Note: Arlette Chabrol is JORNAL DO BRASIL's correspondent in Paris.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EC, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, RELATIONS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Apr 81 p 4

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand by Feliciano Fidalgo, in Paris; date not given]

[Text] After 40 years of political life, Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist candidate for the presidency of the French Republic, is reaching the end of a "long march" that will end in the Elysee palace or in his definitive retirement, after the vote counting of 26 April and 10 May. On this decisive eve of his public activity, he made the following exclusive statements to EL PAIS.

[Question] What do you consider to be the main significance of these elections, both on the national and the international level?

[Answer] The restoration of France's role, and the opportunity offered to a people beset by the crisis, the unemployment, the inequalities and the crushing of liberties. France must be awakened for a mutual plan, making our country an example based on the organization of its social relations; and this must begin by providing a response for the major issues confronting our societies: the control of technologies so that they may serve mankind; the battle against hunger and on behalf of the development of the Third World; and the achievement of an urban civilization and the development of communications among human beings. In short, the restoration to the men and women of our country of control over their lives and their right to responsibility regarding the concentration of economic and political power comprise the goal that I have set for myself. But, first of all, the battle against unemployment and its tragic consequences.

Thus, a moving France will be able to speak aloud and justly on the international scene, wherein the tensions are rising at the instigation of the superpowers, converting the Third World peoples into mere geostrategic pretexts and disdaining their liberties and their future.

[Question] You continue to favor the Union of the Left, despite the repeated, savage attacks from the PCF [French Communist Party] against the Socialists and against you personally. As a result, do you think that the Communists will vote for you in the runoff? And, in the same connection, do you think that the time has come in France to avert that kind of squaring of the circle whereby it is claimed that "nothing can be done with the Communists, nor without them either?"

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[Answer] The Communist voters comprise an appreciable portion of the French who have been suffering from the policy of the right, the loss of employment, the reduction in purchasing power, and the sacrifices that are always asked of the same people, the weakest and most dispossessed ones. Why do you think that these French people want the continuation of the same policy? To them also, 7 years of Giscard is a long time, and 14 would be too long. Insofar as the PCF leaders are concerned, it matters more to me to learn what they can do than what they might want.

'The Socialist Ideas Have Progressed in France'

[Question] Why do you think that you will be elected president this time?

[Answer] For a simple reason: How many people who voted for me in 1974 are interested in voting for Giscard in 1981? And how many people, disappointed by him, are willing to offer him their confidence again?

Moreover, I believe that the Socialist ideas have progressed in France, and that their influence and their capacity to convince and to govern has increased. This counts as well.

[Question] Let us suppose that Francois Mitterrand is elected: What would this mean, essentially, for Europe?

[Answer] There are joint demands of the European labor movement, such as the reduction in the work period. Through this course of action, which everyone admits is the one that would help reduce unemployment, France would favor Europe's advancing in the direction of progress and social justice. Another example: the reform of the common agricultural policy, which I maintain lies in the possibility of benefiting the small and medium-sized farms rather than the large producers of expensive surpluses. The intensification of the regional policy and the attainment of a genuine industrial policy should also help to put Europe in the service of the Europeans, and not the opposite.

On another point, the European convention against terrorism is based on law rather than on the means of repression. In all these matters it is possible, and even essential, for Europe to progress if it wants to avoid being bogged down as a mere free exchange zone.

[Question] In present-day Europe, is it possible to achieve a more advanced policy, from the standpoint of justice and liberty, than that carried out by the Social Democratic countries?

[Answer] In those countries, the notion of justice is based on the distribution of the benefits of growth.

And so long as the latter lasted, impressive results were accrued. The crisis poses new problems which some Socialists, such as the Austrians, are controlling rather easily, but which others are not curbing so readily. In the view of the French Socialists, justice and quality must simultaneously relate to the distribution of benefits, the reduction of inequalities and the increased responsibilities of the workers and citizens. This entails a distribution of power.

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[Question] How would you analyze Giscard the man, and his policy?

[Answer] His assessment is negative; his policy has created injustices and inequalities. France has declined. We might say that what he seems to prefer is power for the sake of power and its privileges, which are at times wrong.

[Question] You often talk about Southern, or Mediterranean Europe. Into what would you convert that notion if you are elected?

[Answer] There is a community of culture and tradition in Southern Europe. That Europe is awaiting a common plan that will unite it around the Mediterranean with the peoples in North Africa who are seeking the path of autonomous development dissociated from the aegis of the big powers, in order to insure true peace. The aspiration of the peoples in the Northern and Southern Mediterranean areas to achieve new international economic relations and new models of development can and should find the builders that they lack today among the Socialists of Southern Europe.

France-Spain: 'A Blend of Friendship and Resentment'

[Question] Do you believe that your possible election would seriously change the spirit and the substance of the relations between France and Spain, most especially with regard to Spain's entry into the EEC?

[Answer] As is often the case between neighbors, there exists between the Spanish and the French a blend of friendship and resentments, which lends our relations salt and pepper, strength and misunderstanding. Since we are close, sometimes we are too much so; and, therefore, there is no distinction between emotion and reason. Spain and France are two important and proud nations, and their independence must be upheld, both in the realm of their mutual relations and with respect to other countries. Hence the bonds of friendship which unite us, as our complementary features do, cannot allow either one to be unconcerned about the other. Spain's entry into the EEC, the source of many of the problems in our present relations, must be dealt with clearly. Insofar as I am concerned, in the political area the issue has been resolved, and only a setback in the difficult democratic process could bring it into question. But the economic problems to be surmounted still remain. And, on this topic, it must be said that, thus far, neither the Community nor Spain has clearly set forth the bases of negotiation and the goals that are being pursued in that negotiation. We French Socialists have cited three prior conditions: the agricultural, the industrial and the one related to regional policy. If it is desired that the entry of Spain (and of Portugal) serve Europe and the populations directly concerned, it is preferable to deal with the difficult issues directly, and not to evade them.

[Question] How does the Spanish political situation strike you?

[Answer] At a time when the Spanish people are undergoing a difficult phase in the battle for democracy, I want it to be known that, to us, that battle is indivisible in Europe. The Spanish people, united, have proven their adherence to democracy. The force of a people cannot be readily ignored by nostalgic troublemakers.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PAST FOREIGN CONTACTS AS PORTENT OF FUTURE POLICY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Suzanne Labin "What Mitterrand is Hiding from You"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The leaders of the majority hit Mitterrand with arguments that are correct but which are confined to the domestic field, though that is of quite secondary importance at a time when western civilization is fighting for its existence; and this implicitly assumes that Mr Mitterrand, once elected, will maintain a normal political system. Whereas in fact his victory would seriously jeopardize domestic tranquility and the whole structure of our society.

To start with, it is rarely mentioned--though it should be hammered home day after day--that his real final goal is still collectivization and the state-planned economy. A formulation that remains inscribed as a fundamental objective in the by-laws of his party, which has not repudiated Marx. Now this formula has chalked up a record of resounding and ignominious defeat in every country without exception where it has been put into operation. Its economically pathological and politically stifling character shine forth most strikingly these days in Poland: empty plates and full prisons, waste and tyranny, an iron curtain and a curtain of lies, censorship and long lines.

The Rooster's Plumage

To be forbidden to hold up to Mitterrand anything more serious than the poor record of liberal regimes in time of crisis is equivalent to being forbidden to mention burnings at the stake in discussing the Inquisition. And experience has shown how vain is the illusion that collectivism can ever have a less repellent appearance. Now socialism has absolutely nothing else to offer, as the foundation for the millenium it ushers in, besides this very collectivism which Mitterrand well knows has become viscerally unpopular. This is why he tries with a thousand contortions to disguise it. By allowing him to stay inside the dead language of his posters, we help him to keep the people asleep.

We help him too in another way, where it would be so easy to unmask him: the field of /foreign policy./ In this field, Mitterrand shows his plumage proudly, I mean that he gives one to understand that he would oppose Soviet hegemonism more firmly than Giscard d'Estaing. This is a real deception, one which he can only sustain by foaming with rage over the coup of Kabul. But on

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his part it was done purely for style, an indulgence of no consequence, done simply to strike his little note in the concert of universal indignation. In reality, the record of the positions he has taken—positions of consequence and commitment—with respect to the Kremlin's international adventures, leans heavily in their favor. Judge them for yourself!

Mr Mitterrand fights against anything that would give the West the power to match an over-armed USSR: the neutron bomb, Pershing missiles to meet the SS-20's already deployed by the Soviets, naval protection for the Persian Gulf, and the growth of nuclear energy.

In a remarkable article in FIGARO, Patrick Wajzman recalled that Francois Mitterrand has embraced and extolled Brezhnev, Castro, Qadhdhafi, Neto, Kadar-- in short all these gulag-masters, emperors and satraps. He did everything possible to help the Sandinistas seize power in Nicaragua, which they turned into communist dictatorship. And he is at it again with El Salvador, where he is doing everything he can to facilitate the triumph of the notoriously communist guerrillas. He called it scandalous when Giscard d'Estaing saved Kolwezi from an invasion concocted in the Soviet colony of Angola, but did not utter a peep when Soviet-loving Libya invaded Chad. He flatters the POLISARIO invented by Boumediene and armed by Moscow. He calls himself a friend of Israel, but cooperates closely with the Socialist International which patronizes the PLO, which has sworn death to Israel and serves the Soviets as a relay station in the Middle East. Before entering the presidential lists, he went to have himself knighted by the most cruel of stalinist despots, North Korea's Kim Il Sung.

Everywhere the Kremlin advances its pawns, he overlooks their allegiance and paints them as champions of the people. Wherever strong resistance rises up against an assault of the Kremlin, he undermines it as "reactionary." The sole target of his opprobrium is the same as that of the communists, which he and they call by the same name: "American imperialism." While with respect to the only imperialism that really does exist--Soviet imperialism--he employs a spectacular connivance and complacency. Concerning this it is most regrettable that the majority does not say a word, for by this fact the people end up seeing as a rampart against the Soviet menace the very man who is paving the way for the danger.

A final point on which the leaders of the majority mince their words to the point of falsifying the image of their challenger: they speculate about the events following his possible election /as if he were going to observe all the rules of proper political conduct./ In particular, they lend credence to that rose-colored fairy-tale Mr Mitterrand is spreading about a /regular legislative election/ that he would call after his accession to the Elysee in order to decide whether to govern from the right or from the left. We forget that Mr Mitterrand would first of all be elected, then immediately watched over, controlled, and spurred on by a powerful communist party whose apparatus already has its tentacles on the sub-structure of our country, and has a thousand eyes even within the bosom of the socialist party.

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The situation will not be at all like that of England, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia, where social democrats were able to exercise power decently because their country was not deafened by the drums and whipped into a frenzy by the zealots of a formidable PCF. The French situation will more closely resemble what happened in Eastern Europe after the last war, when the state fell into the hands of socialists like Fierlinger and Ciriankiewics, to whom Mitterrand bears more resemblance than to Helmut Schmidt of Atlee. Fierlinger and Ciriankiewics were besieged by a communist legion that had sufficient resources to bend the half-consenting regime. Resources which, at the time and in those countries, were furnished above all by the Red Army and which, in the France of Mitterrand in June 1981, will be furnished by the big machinery of agitation, sabotage and control that the PCF has implanted in the subsoil of the nation.

The Real Force of Intolerance

We must hammer in this point, because the French people are living in a dream and do not think about it. In Eastern Europe, between 1945 and 1948, there were elections, but so triturated and constrained that they no longer meant anything. If Francois Mitterrand should be elected, we are running a serious risk that this precedent will be revived. The magnetism of success, dangerous enough in its own right, will be swollen in every way, and especially in disloyal ways. The left, which constitutes the real force of intolerance and hegemony in our time, /will bear down with a heavy hand on the media,/ where it will unscrupulously marginalize the right--which, moreover, given its "worthlessness," will of course have no right to complain! Incessant and vociferous demonstrations will intimidate those who oppose the new regime, and will sabotage their meetings. Grievance committees will rise up at every streetcorner and on every imaginable subject to mislead or inhibit antimarxist factions. Strikes will swirl, sabotage will crackle in the air.

In short, the lava from the totalitarian volcano Mr Mitterrand will have caused to erupt will engulf our plains with such impetuosity that there will be no chance to put a liberal majority together again.

And who can believe that Mr Mitterrand will stop it? Is it conceivable that he is going to send out the bourgeois police against the ranks surging forward in the name of the "people's will"? The very will he will have enthroned and which he never ceases to praise? One often hears it said that electing Francois Mitterrand would be taking a leap into the unknown. What fantastic nonsense! /Nothing is better known/ than precisely what would happen: a rapid slide by France toward the status of a people's democracy, economic ruin united with political subjection.

But of course we could not imagine that such a scenario would be conceivable in an established democracy like our own. /The abyss has always opened under the feet of those who thought "it could never happen to them."/ As soon as they have a sufficiently strong local lever--bayonets or committees--and a Kerensky to pacify the government--the communists can take control in any country, however advanced it may be. Especially when the nearby Soviet presence has become very strong and very offensive. And when Mr Marchais is already acting like a potential regional commissar.

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To sum up: Francois Mitterrand is feverishly working to conjure up as a backdrop to his possible success /the rose-colored picture of an alternation/ [of power], while /the grim reality of catastrophe/ is what will be established. And those who treat him as "just another candidate" are objectively helping to keep alive this fatal mirage.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PAST 'MISTAKES' IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Mar 81 p 8

[Article by Patrick Wajzman: "A Man of the Stage or a Man of State?"]

[Excerpts] The socialist candidate is certainly the last one to be able to give lessons in international politics to his competitors. There is somewhat of a tendency to forget this these days, when listening to Mitterrand discourse authoritatively on the danger hanging over Europe from the SS-20's or the irreplaceable virtues of the Atlantic alliance. But all the same, how can one fail to realize that this lucidity is of quite recent date? How can one forget that Francois Mitterrand over the last 10 years has committed more diplomatic mistakes than all the majority candidates put together?* How can one believe, finally, that a man who has been wrong as often as he on basic matters would be transformed, as if by magic, into a responsible and coherent leader? Let us recall, it was only yesterday...

In November 1971, Mitterrand goes to Chile. After several hours of talks with Salvador Allende, he delivers his professional opinion and proclaims peremptorily that the Chilean government has succeeded in "overthrowing the economic structures while preserving individual liberty." Coming back to Paris, the socialist leader even goes so far as to assert that "the regime established in Chile comes as close as possible to being an example of what could be achieved in France." All who still have before their eyes the heart-rending image of those tearful peasants, dispossessed of their land by the MIR [Revolutionary Leftist Movement] leftists; all who recollect the interminable waiting lines before the bread-shops of Santiago, will appreciate...And above all let us not raise up the specter of Pinochet: he came later.

In October 1974, Francois Mitterrand lands at Havana. Several days later, fascinated by the all-powerful god of that Eldorado, he confides publicly: "Fidel Castro is a modest man desirous of being understood, open, generous, in search of new ethos." Some evil minds will be astonished perhaps that such a great humanist as Francois Mitterrand failed then to give the least thought to the innumerable political prisoners held by the Lider Maximo. They would be doing him an injustice: in 1974, the Castro dictatorship had only been in existence for 15 years, and the PSF's number one probably had not yet had the chance to learn about it...

*On this problem (and on many others) we will refer to the excellent work by Branko Lazitch: "Permanent Defeat," Laffont, 1978. A key book.

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Let us continue our voyage.

In April 1975, Mitterrand comes to the Kremlin at the head of a PSF delegation. Talks, toasts, congratulations: all very natural. Except, however, for the communique jointly signed by the CPSU at the end of the visit. This document, in effect, discusses the "progress made by the USSR on the road to socialism, in accordance with the plans and concepts of the CPSU," and enthusiastically hails the "USSR's constructive contribution to the process of international detente." If, for good measure, one also recalls what Mitterrand told RTL [Radio-Television Luxemborg] before flying off to Moscow--"Leonid Brezhnev's contribution to peace will appear immense in the eyes of history"--one will have a clear enough idea of the realism that subtends the global thinking of the socialist candidate! But let us not be too demanding: in 1975, the Soviet dictatorship had only been in existence for some 60 years, and the PSF number one had probably not had time to learn about it...

In May 1976, it is Hungary which Mitterrand honors with his presence, once again at the head of the PSF delegation. Here again, the communique published following the talks deserves a quick glance. Among other expressions of affection, the representatives of the PSF and the Hungarian PC mention therein their "joint action against the domination of capital," and celebrate their "similar fight for democracy, national independence, and peace." Doubtless it is surprising to learn on this occasion that Francois Mitterrand's idea of democracy coincides on all points with those of Janos Kadar, who came to power 25 years ago in the shadow of Red Army tanks. But what does it matter! The first secretary of the PSF probably had not had time to inform himself...

Perhaps I will be told that the past is the past, and that sometimes one must be willing to turn the page. I am not so sure. Any public man is, whether he wants to or not, the living sum of his successive convictions. In any case, so long as he has not publicly recanted them. And I truly do not see why it should be forbidden to ask Francois Mitterrand if he regrets the euphoric assessments he made in the past of Brezhnev, Allende, Castro, or Kadar.

Having said that, the recent positions taken by the PSF candidate give us more of the same to applaud. One should consult, on this point, the "Socialist Project" which Mitterrand endorses. "American imperialism" and its allies are flogged from top to bottom; Cuba is presented (page 358) as a model of "resistance to the economic colonization" of the United States; Marxist Nicaragua is lyrically described therein as a "liberated country." One even learns that "the foundations of France are more threatened by capitalism than by the USSR," and that Russian tanks should frighten us less than the prospect of a "Santiago coup" (page 78).

Lord! How can a man so prompt to denounce the "Warsaw wage" burden himself without a twitch with so many cunningly Soviet-loving slogans?

The answer is quite simple: Mitterrand is probably not a dangerous revolutionary, but he is a marvelous "politician." An actor who believes that programs never imply commitment; that one promise can replace another; that one can simultaneously join hands with Chevenement and Mauroy, with Brezhnev and Reagan, with the hawks and the doves, with NATO supporters and fellow travelers, with the ecologists and the pollution merchants. In short, Mitterrand believes that to speak is enough to convince, and mere dreams can lead to victory. But this is less certain. For an actor--however clever he may be--does not become a statesman from one day to next.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PCF: CONTRADICTIONS IN SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT, ACTIONS

Paris REVOLUTION in French 27 Mar 81 p 7

[Article by Armand Cerkow and David Sephiha "When Mitterrand Reorganizes, How to Forget the Remarks about the Cold War Which Francois Mitterrand Made on Antenna 2"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] It is almost a tradition: on the eve of every election, the PSF brings together in Paris dignitaries from its brother parties for a short ceremony for which it ensures the greatest possible publicity.

The /"symposium"/ on culture* and the /"conference"/ on security and disarmament organized on 19 and 20 March do not, however, fall strictly into the routine. And not only by virtue of the prestigious list of personalities bedecking the grounds. It was a question, of course, as the socialist candidate himself said, of showing /"that the socialists can win the solidarity of their comrades in Europe and beyond Europe,"/ and of attesting thereby--as LE MONDE put it so hyperbolically--/"the credibility Mr Mitterrand enjoys abroad."/ All without the last bit of meddling, obviously.

But it would be quite wrong to see in this merely a banal prestige operation. Neither the themes nor the figureheads were in fact left to chance. On the one hand, men of culture are invited to discuss the /new international order,/ under the aegis of Leopold Sedar Senghor, who traded the presidency of Senegal for that of the new Socialist Interafrican. On the other hand, Europe's social democratic leaders are to discourse on /detente/ with Willy Brandt, the former West German chancellor and acting president of the Socialist International, but primarily the symbol of /Ost-Politik,/ which won him a Nobel Prize. Thus surrounded, Francois Mitterrand finds himself suddenly a soldier of the /Third World/ and /pacifism,/ the disastrous record of the Common Market rendering inauspicious his traditional image as a /pioneer of Europe./

The garb may be fairly worn out, but that does not alter his need to drape himself in it: the cold war remarks made by Francois Mitterrand in his "Cards on the Table" broadcast of Monday 16 March offended hundreds of thousands of men and women of the left...for whose votes he is panting. He has to win them back, even while going fishing on the right. But coming only 3 days apart, is the contrast between the two vocabularies not perhaps too violent?

*See p. 44, the article by Joel Jouanneau.

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Francois Mitterrand, a Third Worlder? If his speech invokes the aspirations of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for a new international order, it is--like his friend Willy Brandt, whose report on this subject defines that strategy--it is to better lead them down the primrose path, in order to save the old order. It was one year ago in Santo Domingo, in fact, as we recall, that he spilled the beans: it was a question, he said, of /"putting the brakes on the expansion of international communism."/ Such is the obsession that comes through as soon as one gets beyond great general and generous principles and down to concrete problems.

Must we give examples? While at the Mutuality the PSF participates in "Six Hours For El Salvador," it supports the Brandt mediation, in which the U.S. sees /"a possibility of breaking down the unity of the opposition into reformist and revolutionary elements."/* While COMBAT SOCIALISTE extols the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian daily AL CHAAB comments in these terms on the socialist candidate's trip to Israel and the positions he espoused before the Labor Congress in Jerusalem: /"It is astonishing that Mr Mitterrand passed in silence over Palestinian rights...his statements are supportive of the Camp David accords, Israel's refusal to converse with the PLO, and the Jordanian "solution" to the Palestinian problem."/ And if the PSF sends delegates to express its solidarity with the Saharans, it works no less closely with Leopold S. Senghor, whose country is the principal African supporter of Hassan II's annexationism, and which considers POLISARIO /"a racist organization."/

Francois Mitterrand, a pacifist? Let us say it quite clearly: in "Cards on the Table" we saw the socialist candidate, but it sounded like Jacques Chirac imitating Marie-France Garaud: /"As for me, I did not wait 11 days to protest against the invasion of Afghanistan...As for me, it did not take me 17 days to notice that there were American hostages in Iran...Never has Giscard d'Estaing remarked that we were at the mercy of these famous SS-20 rockets...As for me, I will never go under the table,"/ etc.

It is not a whimsical remark on the /"Warsaw wage"/ which is in question, but nothing less than the policy of France in the world. The fact that Giscard d'Estaing aligns Paris with Washington, that he condones the FRG's hegemony in Europe, that he plays policeman in Africa: all this, it seems, is not enough for the socialist candidate.

So we come full circle, as summarized in the statements appearing opposite: from the plea for a strengthening of the Atlantic alliance, to support for the implantation of the Pershing and cruise missiles, from the condemnation of the trip to Warsaw to hostility on the Madrid Conference, Francois Mitterrand's drift has today led him to rival the right in Atlanticism. When we know that, under the headline "Our New Best Friend," the WASHINGTON POST has just described France as /"America's most important ally against Soviet expansionism," while the NEW YORK TIMES uses the image /"cheek to cheek"/ to describe the proceedings of Paris and Washington, and we wonder if Ronald Reagan himself will not soon appear too soft for Francois Mitterrand.

*This was disclosed by the Belgian daily LE SOIR on 8 March following the visit of Ronald Reagan's special envoy, Mr Walters, to Panama where he met with leaders of the Socialist International.

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Peace in the world is too serious a subject to deal with in such a way. And peace is one of the things we are voting to protect on 26 April.

PHOTO CAPTION

"Francois Mitterrand discussed the military threat that grows stronger every day which the Soviet Union holds over Western Europe and especially the danger of the tactical SS-20's... The French Socialist Party [PSF], he said, approves the building of Europe, calls for the strengthening of the defense potential in the countries of Western Europe, and hopes that the government of Ronald Reagan will establish relations as partners with the countries of Western Europe."
(Communique from NEW CHINA at the end of F. Mitterrand's trip to China 17 February 1981).

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MILITARY

FRANCE

AEROSPACE, DEFENSE INDUSTRY PLANS, PROPOSALS

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 May 81 pp 9-13

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand conducted in the period between the first balloting and the runoff election]

[Excerpts] Because Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand pulled ahead of the eight other candidates as a result of the first balloting in the presidential election, they are up before the voters for the second phase of the presidential campaign that will end on 10 May.

The questions that we have asked the two candidates pertain to problems general in scope shown by experience to be handled at the presidential level.

The candidates have been kind enough to hasten to answer the questions of AIR ET COSMOS, for which we thank them very much.

Our readers will find in the following pages our questions followed by the replies by Valery Giscard d'Estaing [not included] and Francois Mitterrand.

Transportation

[Questions] 1. In view of keen international competition, does or does it not seem advisable to you to proceed with a grouping of French regular international air transportation (Air France and UTA [Air Transport Union])?

2. In case of an Air France-UTA merger, what would be the position of Air Inter [Metropolitan Air Transport Company] and TAT [Transcontinental Air Transport]?

3. What policy do you advocate in the field of chartered air transportation?

[Answers] 1. The transportation sector is faced with some serious problems at present that must be tackled. Sixty-five percent of passenger air traffic leaving France is handled by foreign companies.

Internationally, there is an attempt to deregulate tied to a competitive drive in the greatest liberal tradition whose brunt will be borne in the end by companies

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and users alike. Reorganization of the international structure of air transportation should be supported by relying on Third World countries and companies and by promoting real cooperation between European companies.

Likewise, nationally, it is advisable to start restructuring French air transportation by adopting universal personnel guidelines and by improving public control of air transportation activity.

The overall guidelines of the plan on this subject will be determined in liaison with the representatives of every partner concerned: state, French airlines companies, companies or groups directly involved in air transportation.

3. I shall pay particular attention to promoting a charter activity aiming at meeting foreign competition and at fully democratizing air transportation.

Industry Structures

[Questions] 4. The airframe industry includes a large nationalized company (Aerospatiale) and a large private company (Dassault-Breguet). Do you believe that it is advisable to nationalize Dassault-Breguet? In case Dassault-Breguet is nationalized, should it be merged with Aerospatiale?

5. The space and missile industry includes a nationalized company (Aerospatiale) and a private group (MATRA [Aeronautical Equipment and Production]). Do you believe that MATRA should be nationalized? In case MATRA is nationalized, should it be merged with Aerospatiale?

6. Should the nationalized engine builder SNECMA [National Corporation for Aircraft Engine Design and Construction] absorb TURBOMECA [expansion unknown; probably Turbo-engine Company]?

7. Are you in favor of grouping the equipment industry, or even of establishing a national equipment construction company?

[Answers] 4. With regard to nationalizations, I have made a contract with the French people: about 10 industrial groups whose list is well known.

It is quite obvious that the Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aircraft Company appears on it, because it has a monopoly of combat aircraft production in France. This company will retain its orientation and its specificity. There remains the matter of relations with the other large company, already publicly owned, SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company]. I hope that the activities of these two companies will be better coordinated in the sectors of research, of design and of production, so that the present dispersion will be eliminated.

5. All the above reasoning is applicable both to the space industry and to missiles and, therefore, to the Armament/Space branch of the MATRA company.

This nationalization will make it possible to form a public industrial group, better coordinated than at present and, consequently, more efficient and also more suitable for establishing international cooperative relations, especially European relations, well adapted to the characteristics of the various markets.

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Airframes

[Questions] 8. Does not the Airbus series, which made an international breakthrough with the A 300/310 models, seem to you too limited to ensure permanence of European industry as a builder of airliners? What is your position with regard to the plan for a short- and medium-range 150-passenger aircraft (A 320)?

9. What is your stand on the launching of new regional transportation aircraft and on continuation of the effort in the field of business aircraft?

10. Does maintaining the position of French industry as a combat aircraft producer seem indispensable to you?

11. What will your policy be with regard to exportation of aeronautical combat equipment?

12. Do you believe that it is indispensable to maintain a French light aircraft industry?

13. If it is impossible to develop a new Franco-German antitank helicopter, should we start that kind of program on a purely national basis?

[Answers] 8. You are right, the Airbus series is too limited to ensure permanence of European industry as a builder of airliners. In this connection, I call your attention to all the speeches made by our national delegate for Aeronautics and Space, Alex Raymond, in the National Assembly. For 5 years now we have not ceased demanding the launching of a short- and medium-range aircraft with approximately 150 seats that had been announced by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in the 1975 Le Bourget Salon, 6 years ago. How much lost time, but not for everybody, because the American competitor Boeing has been able to launch its 737-300 program.

Industry on the other side of the Atlantic must not be left alone in this slot. My government will consider launching the A 320 program on a priority basis.

10. With regard to the production of combat equipment, I have said that France must have a national defense industry, in order to ensure its defense independently.

In particular, French aerospace industry, one of the world leaders, is one of the main factors in this policy.

11. Exportation of armament equipment must be governed by new criteria, conforming strictly with our foreign policy objectives, especially with regard to the Third World.

We shall refuse any delivery to racist or fascist governments.

13. You are well aware that the Franco-German armament programs are in process of reexamination at the request of the Germans. Therefore, the reality of the situation should be evaluated before deciding possibly on a national program.

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Engines

[Questions] 14. Should the policy of developing the family of CFM 56 engines be continued?

15. Is it necessary to develop a new military engine to equip the generation of combat aircraft of the 1990's?

16. In your opinion, should the effort made by TURBOMECA to develop sophisticated technologies with a view to preparing a new generation of gas turbines be maintained?

[Answers] 14. The policy of developing the CFM 56 family will be continued. Coordination of the two development potentials--civilian aircraft and engines--is a requirement for the full development of the aeronautical industry.

We shall see to it, however, that this cooperation on a civilian engine with the United States will not hinder a European cooperation on military engines or on another series of civilian engines.

15. In the military field, France has always had engines for equipping its products. It is absolutely necessary to adhere to this rule. Therefore, a military engine must be developed for equipping combat aircraft of the 1990's. But this engine must be developed in a European framework.

Defense

[Questions] 17. Are you in favor of modernizing nuclear weapons? In what way? What launching pads? What launch vehicles? What nuclear warheads?

18. Do you believe it necessary to develop a multimission combat aircraft of the F-15 class?

[Answers] 17. France's defense must be ensured and autonomy of our decision must be guaranteed. In this connection, the strategy of national nuclear deterrence is the only one that can be capable, at present, of warding off the dangers of conflict. Nevertheless, our conventional forces must not be neglected.

But a defense, even based on improved equipment, is nothing, if it is not supported, first of all, by the determination of the entire nation.

I have pointed out on several occasions, and especially in my proposals, that modernization of our strategic and tactical forces should be pursued. In the present state of technology, it should be carried out on a priority basis with regard to the ocean component.

18. One of the important matters that should be examined in the next few months pertains to the necessary modernization of our Air Force, which has lagged behind considerably in recent years and some of whose components are going to reach obsolescence.

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Space

[Questions] 19. Beyond the programs designed around the Ariane launch vehicle, do you think that France should take the initiative in the achievement, by Europe, of an automated or manned system of space transportation?

20. What policy do you advocate for France in the field of applied satellites? Should that kind of effort be developed competitively?

[Answers] 19. First of all, Ariane should be a satellite launch vehicle that will enable us to ensure our independence for placing large applied satellites in orbit over a period of at least 15 years. That means that it is absolutely necessary to develop an "Ariane family" by taking advantage of the technologies acquired from the first models, including constantly better performing launch vehicles, well adjusted to the dimensions and weight of satellites of the future that will make it possible to reduce appreciably the per kilogram price of the payload placed in orbit.

But it is obvious that France must not stop there. It must rapidly acquire a certain number of other technologies that it does not yet have and that approach the space shuttle. In fact, by 1990-2000, new utilizations of space means will confirm their importance: manufacture of materials in weightlessness, biology, domestication of new energy sources, direct intervention on devices in orbit. Our country should prepare for this without delay by initiating studies and experimentation on the following promising techniques:

The automated technique, by which entirely automated space devices handled remotely from the earth will perform a large group of missions relatively economically (example: automated station in permanent orbit, visited regularly by likewise automated modules bringing and taking away biology experiments or manufactured materials).

The manned technique, with human presence, that the two large space powers have already been preparing for a number of years now and that will certainly supplement the automated method.

Of course, the magnitude of projects like these leads very naturally to their accomplishment in the European framework. It is up to France to design them and propose them, as a great common ambition, to its partners in Western Europe. French policy in these last few years, here as well as in other sectors, has sacrificed the long-term outlook too much. A leading specialty like space can survive only if, 15 or 20 years before the productions, / utilization can bring about deep-seated modifications in / [words between / apparently misplaced] the state makes a serious, consistent basic technological research effort. It is indispensable for France and Europe to acquire the techniques on which their future depends and that pertain to rendezvous in orbit, reentry into the atmosphere, space robotics or space-borne power.

20. With regard to satellites, when all the major applications of satellites are reviewed (regardless of whether it is a question of telephone transmission, of telex or of data between computers, or else of reproduction of newspapers at a distance, of direct television passing over political borders, of observation of the earth and of administration of earth resources) the future stakes for our country are obviously considerable.

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Our absence from these various sectors would lead us inevitably and rapidly to subordination to those who are there or will be there and whose tolerated subcontractors we would be at best. Therefore, the decade of the 1980's must be for France the decade of operational utilization of systems that will have been produced, either entirely in our country, when the nation's interest so requires, or, more often, in cooperation with our European partners.

These systems must meet the real needs of the national users. Their choice, especially for those involved with information, defense or evolution of French society, will be made democratically, openly and no longer in the secrecy of ministerial offices and technostructures.

Along with these programs of immediate utilization, the indispensable basic technical research effort should be increased considerably. Preparation and development of the new technologies that will be needed for the satellites of the 1990-2000 period, are being carried out now. The Germans and the Japanese are devoting definitely more money to this than we. It is high time for France to react vigorously, if it does not want to be outdistanced in 15 or 20 years.

Naturally, this direct effort by the state to ensure the long-term future must be accompanied by no less sizable an effort on the part of French industrial enterprises, in order to be competitive on the foreign markets. Exports should be developed in this leading technical field, in order to contribute to guaranteeing a favorable balance of our foreign trade, as well as our presence in a certain number of countries desiring to equip themselves with space facilities without having the capability of producing them.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND ON GENERAL ISSUES FACING CONTEMPORARY FRANCE

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 3 Apr 81 pp 46-51

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand by Michel Gonod, date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Francois Mitterrand begins this week the series of interviews PARIS MATCH is going to publish during the electoral campaign. With one month remaining before the first round, the statements of the socialist candidate take on special interest. He bears out the style of his campaign: serenity, calm strength, criticism of the record of the last 7 years, freedom from the communists. He is confident. "The surveys have me running even with Giscard," he explains. "This is very good. This way we are on the same starting line." In actual fact, our new presidential poll confirms that the two candidates are running neck and neck.

[Question] You seem very sure of yourself in this electoral campaign. On television the other night you spoke of serenity. Your new poster describes your "calm strength." In short, it is you who are looking like the office-holder, the incumbent president. How does this come to pass?

[Answer] I represent a great force in the country. This force has been constantly growing for 10 years. Now 7 years ago the incumbent president was a candidate who was able to make promises, create illusions. Today, he is a man who represents a record of failure. The French feel a need for profound change. Who, other than myself, can bring it to them? On 10 May, the choice will be simple. It is a fact that my position is moving up.

[Question] You have indicated your plans: once elected, to dissolve the national assembly, elections, a government reflecting the new assembly. There remain, however, several hazy points, for example: what government will you put in place during this transition period?

[Answer] I think that if the French change presidents, they will also want to change their governmental majority. That would be logical, in any case, since that majority has consistently approved--despite its contentiousness--the legislative proposals put forward by the government, which itself emanated from the president of the republic. If, therefore, the policy of the president is repudiated, those who facilitated the execution of that policy should also be repudiated. As for the

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possibility of a contradiction between the two policies: that of the president and that of the parliament, this is the weak spot in our constitution, which does not offer a very clear solution on this point. Doubtless this problem will have to be faced sometime. One might as well face it squarely in 1981.

[Question] You have thought about this? Do you have a solution?

[Answer] If the assembly were dissolved without a change of president, I assume it would be the government in place that would take charge during the transition period. But next May, after my election, the political situation will be profoundly modified right up to the moment that a new assembly can begin lawmaking. So what we must have, during that interval, is a new government that will also be a transition government.

[Question] Is it your intention to indicate, after the campaign, who will be the prime minister?

[Answer] No one ever did this, except Gaston Defferre with Pierre Mendes-France in 1969. But that never became a normal procedure. I offer myself, such as I am, in the name of the socialists. The socialists with whom I work, and their abilities, are well known. I can count on them. As for the rest, the future will tell.

[Question] With regard to the transition period, you have spoken of a sort of honeymoon that should facilitate the early days of the new president. I would be rather inclined to think that people are going to be, as the expression goes, lying in wait to attack you...

[Answer] An election at this level causes a shock, creates a trend. Many French are very civic-minded, and scarcely is the man they did not want elected, before they instinctively want to help and support him. My election will unleash many forces and give new drive to the very wave of support that made it possible.

[Question] In political terms, perhaps, but what about in economic terms? Do you not fear there will be some sort of immediate backlash that could lead to a deterioration?

[Answer] It will be difficult to do worse than is being done right now! Giscard d'Estaing does not represent hope. After 19 years of managing our economy he is out of breath and out of ideas...Everyone senses that we must try something else. The speculators will be against me. But the workers will be for me, and all those on every level who feel their responsibility and a love of their country.

[Question] And what about an intentional or spontaneous deterioration: flight of capital, collapse of the stock exchange...

[Answer] I will take stock of the situation...

[Question] Is that all you can tell us?

[Answer] I never put myself in fictional political scenarios.

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[Question] To govern is to look ahead...

[Answer] That which must be already is.

[Question] And what will you do in the face of pressure from organized labor?

[Answer] Why do you want to make the arrival of a new president more catastrophic than the continuation of the old, even when no one expects anything of him anymore? Look at the final days of this presidency: sad, pessimistic, morose...I will be elected by the living forces of the country. They will help me.

[Question] I did not use the word "catastrophic"...

[Answer] No, but the whole thrust of your questions leads me to think that. In a very short time you have promised me both flight of capital and labor agitation. I repeat that, between a man new to the presidency, who could only be elected with the help of a powerful popular movement--without which he would not be elected--and a candidate at the end of his resources, I do not see why hope would not rest on the side of the former.

[Question] It does not seem to you that winning the confidence of the business leaders poses an insurmountable obstacle?

[Answer] I sincerely hope not. I am not running after favors from a few business leaders who are identified with all the egoism big business has mobilized over the last 30 years, but great majority of heads of enterprises will find in me someone who will try to get our economy out of the morass it is in today. They must simply understand that this will never be to the detriment of the workers. Quite the opposite.

[Question] To my question on the new majority in the national assembly, you immediately brought up the possibility of a majority that would not be in harmony...

[Answer] I firmly believe that the country will elect an assembly in harmony with my positions.

[Question] And if not?

[Answer] History will answer. I cannot write history in advance. We must have good judgment, wisdom, intuition. Politics is not a collection of pre-arranged returns. Nor is the government of a country.

[Question] If I understood you correctly, you said the other night on "Cards on the Table" that you would not have any communist ministers in your government.

[Answer] I have put questions to the communist leaders; it is up to them to respond to them.

[Question] Do you predict the PCF position will change before 10 May?

[Answer] For the moment, the issue is the election of the president of the republic. Will the leadership of the PCF opt for a president of the right and unemployment? No, I do not think so.

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[Question] You clearly see that this is an important question, calling for a clear answer; all the same it is of utmost importance to know if there will be five, six, or seven communists in your government. That does not depend on a change of position by the PCF but on your own decision as to what you are going to ask Frenchmen to vote for.

[Answer] I answered this question without the least ambiguity during my television broadcast of 16 March on Antenna 2. The future parliamentary majority will be the parties and groups of the assembly that create it. The government can only be composed of people who agree on the basics. Therefore the PCF leadership should desist from its antisocialist campaign, desist from this ambiguous game it is playing with the right, desist from aligning itself, as it did on Afghanistan, with a policy that cannot be the policy of France, in short: return to the union, both in form and in substance. Having said that, I have always hoped to re-integrate the millions of communists into the national effort. I do not disavow this. I still want to see as many people as possible join hands to work for national recovery.

[Question] Georges Marchais on Monday evening clearly showed his colors. If Francois Mitterrand will not take any communist ministers, he said, perhaps we will not vote for him, and if he is elected, demands in the factories--and even occupation of factories will be in full swing.

[Answer] And what will it be like with Giscard, then? I do not think that Georges Marchais meant that the PCF would engage in protests if I were elected and abandon them if Giscard were elected! That would certainly be new evidence of a strange collusion which the workers would certainly take for what it was worth! What can I say, we are rivals. Marchais is a candidate. I am too. This is only one episode among others before the first round.

[Question] Georges Marchais is saying now that you are the candidate of the center left, that you are Edgar Faure. What do you say?

[Answer] That is a part of this electoral background music that one takes with a smile. It is not very serious. I have heard plenty of others! This one is just a little minuet music!

[Question] He means by these remarks to show that you are the reformist candidate.

[Answer] That is your conjecture.

[Question] Does the label "reformist candidate" make you uncomfortable?

[Answer] I have already had the occasion to say that the word "reformism" had connotations which in French politics were rather pejorative, for historical reasons on which it is pointless to dwell. But let us rid ourselves of verbal prestidigitation: yes, I certainly do hope to make reforms.

[Question] If you had been in Giscard d'Estaing's place, would you have sent in French paratroopers to Kolwezi?

[Answer] From the moment it became a question of saving French lives, naturally. But I think that the French policy in Zaire created a situation which imperiled the French in Kolwezi.

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[Question] Is there, then, nothing in Giscard's foreign policy which you find laudable?

[Answer] Some of his ideas on the Third World were good ones. He did not carry them through, but that is not my fault. Yes, the North-South Conference was a good idea. The rapprochement with West Germany is sound politics; it was not his idea, but he did well to follow it. On Europe, some desirable initiatives were taken, notably those that tended to make the council of ministers more responsible, more coherent. The problem with Giscard is that when he has good ideas he abandons them too soon.

[Question] When you find his ideas good, why do you not say so?

[Answers] This might happen...

[Question] Not in a very loud voice!

[Answer] There are enough people to do it!

[Question] Do you not think that ultimately the attitude of not saying anything in favor of good initiatives contributes to making the atmosphere of our democracy unbreathable?

[Answer] If the government did not suffocate the life of the opposition in our democracy, one might see things a little differently. The party in power is a clan that practices the spoils system, it is intolerant, sectarian...

[Question] Which makes any dialogue impossible.

[Answer] Unfortunately. Giscard has sometimes made useful suggestions regarding domestic policy. On the eve of his election in 1974, he wanted to see more understanding and fair play for the opposition, and examined the possibility of a proportional law...None of all that has seen the light of day!

[Question] Efforts were made toward a detente. You went to the Elysee, you were given information...

[Answer] Two or three times in 7 years, and without any follow-up.

[Question] You do not think it could go further than that?

[Answer] I will respect the people, the life of democracy. I will not consider that France belongs to me. I will free the audio-visual media from the political pressure that weighs on them, I will try to let a little fresh air into a system that needs to get uncramped.

[Question] Will you propose some status for the opposition?

[Answer] I have always been hostile to that notion because the status of the opposition is defined by the laws, by custom, by the institutions. A status for the opposition would be a little like apartheid, but I understand what you mean. In reality, some kind of modus vivendi needs to be established between the majority

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and the opposition in which each finds respect for his rights and his dignity.

[Question] When people say that your election would mean societal change, you seem irritated.

[Answer] No, not irritated...I said in a very calm way that I did not want to get mixed up in this kind of casuistry: societal change, societal change... If we nationalize Dassault, or more correctly bomber aviation, this will in effect be a societal change for Dassault, for whom by the way I have only the best wishes. But for the rest of the French, there will only have been a change--for the better as far as they are concerned--in a tiny little part of society... When my term is completed, historians will judge my success in changing society where it needed to be changed. If I am accused--as the right has done--of wanting a collectivist society, I would observe that this has been said of every leftist for a century and a half now. It was said of Blum and Jaures. That is comforting!

[Question] It was Gaston Defferre who said: "We will remain in a free society, in a market economy..."

[Answer] In a society that will be more free than the one of today...since it will be freed of the hold of multinational capitalism and the policies it inspires, such as those of Giscard d'Estaing. There is already a big public sector here. It was created in 1945 by General De Gaulle by a number of major nationalizations: gas, electricity, coal, banks, insurance, Renault, etc. The Popular Front had been content with arms and railroads. Our public sector is still less extensive than the one Italy owes to Christian Democracy, less extensive than Austria's under Social Democracy. I predict, if I obtain a parliamentary majority, the nationalization of ten or so industrial enterprises, which I have named, and which are monopolies or of monopolistic tendency in various sectors of our economy. All that in the context of democratic planning and greatly decentralized institutions.

[Question] The French do not feel the urgency of nationalizing Dassault.

[Answer] In whose name fortunes would be build on the order, manufacture, and sale of war planes?

[Question] I mention Dassault, but the same applies to any of the other nine businesses.

[Answer] It is the state companies that today are bringing growth, that invest, that are in the vanguard of our exports. But I repeat here that we are not talking about nationalizing just anything. The list that I published has the status of a contract between the French people and myself. No more, no less.

[Question] If perchance serious events occurred in Poland--and by that I really mean Soviet intervention--do you think that would be good or bad for you?

[Answer] It is the conventional wisdom that it would be harmful to me. I am against any external interference in Poland, starting with Russia. To see Mr

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Brezhnev again in Warsaw, under those conditions, would be intolerable. I hope that Giscard d'Estaing would not use it as an occasion for returning there. But, in fact, so long as the Polish Communist Party [POUP] is prepared--even through negotiations--to keep the situation in hand, so long as it does not suffer an internal split, as was the case with Czechoslovakia, Moscow will not intervene directly. That would after all be contrary to the latest thrust of Soviet diplomacy.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

SELECTED MITTERRAND PROPOSITIONS REVEALED, ANALYZED

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 9 May 81 pp 82-83

[Article: "Here Are the Propositions"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand does not like the tube, and one understands why. Television is pitiless, transparent: through it, one has to say everything, openly, to the 36 million demanding critics on the lookout for the errors, contradictions, omissions. Face to face with Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Francois Mitterrand knew well that he would be called on to explain a "hole" in his campaign: the almost total absence of declarations about his program, the "Socialist Proposal" (summarized in "110 Propositions for France"). When he talks about his program, Francois Mitterrand prefers to do so behind closed doors, in the Medicis Hall of the Senate, during the weekend of 1 May, going on then to an economic "New Deal." If Francois Mitterrand keeps his proposal carefully concealed under his green loden coat, he has his reasons for doing so: this text, which he recently described as a "grand design" for France, has been drawn up by the leading lights of the CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research, and Education], the Marxist wing of the PS [Socialist Party]. Whereas only 6 years ago, Mitterrand called the ideas of the CERES a "communist-leftist potpourri." Mitterrand also wants to hide his allies as he hides his programs. In November 1980, in his book "Ici et Maintenant" [Here and Now], he wrote: "The decisions made in Paris by the leadership of the PCF usually correspond to the premises of a world strategy whose keynote is sounded by Moscow." But 2 months later, at his party's national convention, he stated: "Our intention is to associate the Communist Party in a policy aimed at transforming French society and opening the way to socialism."

Taxation

Proposition 34--"A tax on the big fortunes per a progressive scale will be instituted. Inheritance taxes will be reformed so as to lighten the taxes on modest inheritances (whether in the direct line or not) and tax big inheritances more heavily."

But Francois Mitterrand is careful not to say what he means by "big inheritances." This fuzzy proposition opens up all possibilities, notably that of despoliation of heirs.

Administration

Proposition 18--"One hundred fifty thousand jobs will be created in the public and social services...60,000 public-service positions will be made available to associations and local collectivities."

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When such a measure is advocated, Francois Mitterrand is not thinking about France but rather about the militants of his party: at the PS congress in Metz in April 1979, 83 percent of those in attendance were wage-earners, and 59 percent of them were in the public sector. The French do not want more civil servants but rather "less paper-pushing."

Economy

Proposition 21--"The public sector will be enlarged by the nationalization of the nine industrial groups specified in the common program and the Socialist program, of the steel industry, of armament and space activities financed by public funds. The nationalization of credit and insurance will be completed."

The plan, authoritarian planning, would become the regulator of the economy. But by suppressing the mechanisms of the market and free enterprise, authoritarian planning will cause the appearance of a black market, smuggling and therefore repression. Socialism denies the natural laws of economics and puts the producers and the consumers under an intolerable constraint.

The Enterprises

Proposition 22--"The trade union's capacity for taking action in the enterprises will be extended and strengthened: facilities for and protection of the elected delegates, time set aside for information and collective expression."

Proposition 60--"The company committee will have available to it all necessary information on the company's progress. With regard to hiring, laying-off, organization of work, training plan, new production techniques, it will be able to exercise a veto, with recourse to a new labor jurisdiction."

Proposition 74--"The young will be eligible...from the age of 16 for occupational preferences."

The PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses], who are already the prisoners of state-controlled credit, authoritarian planning, will be placed under the tutelage of a strengthened trade-unionism, dominated by the powerful organization of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. They will be able to survive only for an initial phase before they die, defeated by the multiplication of action in favor of trade-union demands.

Agriculture

Proposition 43--"The instrument of labor--the land--will be protected against speculation and overexploitation by the creation of cantonal land offices."

In the long run, this idea inevitably results in the setting-up of large collective units and cooperatives on the model of the Soviet kolkhozes.

Family

"Children will have to be involved in real life far more than they are today, with concrete responsibilities and rights in the household" (p 306 of "The Socialist Proposal").

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Francois Mitterrand is even planning for democratization and the development of homes to receive "young people in conflict with their families." This means quite simply the destruction of the family unit: the child would be taken away from parental authority and initiated into "self-management democracy."

Armed Forces

Proposition 76--"Draftees into national service will have freedom of assembly and association."

In other words, young draftees of 18 or 20 will be able to dispute the necessity of a defense policy for France. How can one both pretend to want an effective defense policy and at the same time accept the idea of this policy's being disputed in the barracks?

Everyday Life

"A systematic effort will be undertaken to transform and activate the urban framework, to make it more community-oriented and improve collective housing" (p 177 of "The Socialist Proposal").

Actually, in the Socialist proposal, individual housing of the separated-unit type is disfavored, as is pointed out by Jacques Rougeot in his book "Socialisme a Responsabilite Limitee" [Limited-Liability Socialism] (France-Empire). In effect, the Socialist proposal denounces individual housing as a "great consumer of space and energy." Generally speaking, as regards real estate, private interests will have to be subordinated to the collective interests: "the collective rights of the users will have to be strengthened," notably by means of "development of a trade-unionism of the framework of life" (p 275). For the Socialists, taking the walls is not enough. It is also necessary to assail personal and individual property, since, according to their proposal, consumption will be transformed by the "possibility of joint use of certain household equipment or certain leisure facilities" (p 177).

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GENERAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND ANSWERS PERSONAL, THEORETICAL, POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Paris LE POINT in French 2-10 May 81 pp 60-72

[Article: "Exclusive--The Two Candidates Reply to LE POINT's 38 Original Questions"]

[Excerpts] Here is a double interview-event. The editorial staff of LE POINT put to Valery Giscard d'Estaing and to Francois Mitterrand exactly the same 38 questions previously unasked in this campaign. LE POINT gave each of them the same space for answering them (about 20 typewritten pages). They used this space unequally. The questions, which LE POINT wanted to have an unaccustomed character, were designed to enable the candidates to express their personalities and their views in both a serious and an original way. They have done so. [Following are Mitterrand's replies.]

1. What, in your opinion, qualifies you to be a better president than your opponent for the next 7 years?

It is up to the French people to decide and evaluate whether the same men and the same methods would or would not lead the country to the same disappointments, the same errors, the same setbacks! The best president will be the one who knows how to put life back into the country. Now one cannot call for a national effort while rejecting justice and equity. Energies cannot be mobilized without an ambitious and deliberate proposal.

The perpetuation of serious inequalities and a day-to-day policy prevent all hope of rebirth. I would add that, aided by a team composed of the best experts, I have prepared the solutions of the future for each problem. The takeover team is ready: women and men of great talent will bring a new view of people and events. And this seems to me necessary for the governing of France.

2. Which are the qualities you have that make you more capable of overcoming political and international crises?

Let others praise themselves. Pleading for myself is not my strong point. Everything depends on mastery of self, speed of perception, readiness for decision. There is also, of course, knowledge of history.

Do I have these virtues? My life alone is a sufficient answer.

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3. What historical precedents come to mind when you think about the difficulties that await you?

Analogy is an artificial intellectual exercise. Each epoch presents its particular characteristics.

Since you want an answer to this question, what precedent should I choose? Clemenceau and de Gaulle in the war? Mendes-France and decolonization? Or Roosevelt facing the crisis of 1929? Two policies confronted one another: that of the outgoing President Hoover, that of Roosevelt. Hoover was a specialist, a great economist of his time. He tried hard to herald "prosperity around the corner," but it did not come. None of his technocrat's methods was rooted in reality: neither the restrictive organization of credit nor the restriction of consumption. Franklin Roosevelt, on the other hand, proposed to his country mainly an ideal, a faith, a will. And hope returned. And America was put back on its feet. And the other nations followed.

Here, it seems to me, today, is the historic role of France. To show to the French, first of all, and then to the other nations, the way of rebirth. Only a socialism of responsibility and freedom can get the world out of the crisis.

4. Who are the philosophers, the writers and the politicians who most inspire your thought and your action?

Here you are asking me for an inventory which I often ask myself about. As my life goes on, I sometimes change my opinion. I would have to have a long stretch of serenity before me in order to answer you. The present moment hardly lends itself to this.

5. When you have political and economic decisions to make, do you ask, in addition to your official advisers and collaborators, the advice of private persons? Who?

The insulated walls of ministerial offices make too many officials forget the deeper life of their people. By temperament and by taste, I like to cover the country.

By this I mean the voices of those who labor, those who build, those who hope. Their suggestions nourish my thinking and warm my heart. I draw my most vital inspiration from these often unexpected encounters with the women and men of my country. When elected president of the republic, I will continue to live in synchrony and symbiosis with living France. Thus I will be better-prepared to resist the omnipotence of the technocrats.

The solitude of power becomes dangerous when power takes itself to be an interlocutor and closes itself in an echo chamber, where it no longer hears anything but the remarks of its partisans and its courtesans.

As for private persons, independently of those few close ones whom I need not name, I do not make an important decision without taking a trip to my canton of Montsauche, in the Nièvre, or to Chateau-Chinon. What I hear and observe there is indispensable to me for understanding the movements of the country's opinion. My friends down there will tell you that they see me arrive every week, full of questions, queries.

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6. What is the total income that you declared for the year 1980? How does it break down?

I declared in 1980: 163,000 francs in royalties as an author, 125,000 francs representing my salary as a member of Parliament, and 72,000 francs in noncommercial income. I own no real estate and I do not collect any income from real property.

7. Are you in favor of financial openness for politicians, on the basis of ensuring it by:

- regular publication of the state of their fortunes?
- its being monitored by an organism created for the purpose?

Financial openness of politicians would contribute to the indispensable moralization of public life. Do you know that under the Third Republic, even though it is so disparaged today, it was the custom for a politician, upon going into the government, to transform any portfolio of stocks he had into bonds? Indeed, how could it be tolerated if, for example, the supreme authorities or their close associates could benefit from speculation on the Stock Exchange when, by their information or their decisions, they can predict or influence its fluctuations? Too many officials at the present time intermingle their administrative life and their business life and confuse the public interest with their personal interests. The scandals that break out reveal the corruption of a system.

Regular and controlled publication of the state of wealth of public persons seems to me to be a good measure. For those who hold executive power, the measure should be extended to their closest relatives.

As much as the legal rules, it is the public attitude that must be changed. It is up to the leaders to set the example. It is the state's task to be at the service of not just a few privileged persons anymore, but of all the citizens. A different public ethic has to be established as quickly as possible.

8. Is it inevitable, in your opinion, for a politician to speak some untruths during his career? If so, when has this happened to you? What did you feel about it?

No one, whether in private life or in public life, can say he is beyond involuntary inaccuracy, or falsehood by omission. I try to be extremely cautious in checking my sources of information, but error can sometimes creep deeply into the heart of a reasoning process, to the point of vitiating it. But knowingly to state an untruth seems to me to be, as much as a fault, a stupid thing to do.

9. Do the French have reason to fear the future?

All the candidates in this election, with the exception of the outgoing one, are in agreement on this point at least, that things are going poorly for France, and that without a different policy, it will go from bad to worse. But the virtue of democracy is precisely that it gives the citizens the rights and the means to change direction. I have said, I have said and I will say again that the spiritual, technical and human resources of France are immense and that it makes no sense to doubt its capacity.

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10. Many young people seem indifferent to the idea of having Valery Giscard d'Estaing or Francois Mitterrand as president. If you had one of them in front of you, what would you say to him?

First of all, I do not believe there are so many as some like to say. A disinterest in politics on the part of young people scarcely appears from the voting statistics. The fact remains that it is a time of life when disenchantment is common. This has been true since Romanticism. To the young person you suggest I am talking to, I would simply say that it is dangerous to leave the care of his destiny to chance. At the end of the next 7-year period, your young person will be less young. The broad outlines of his life will have been drawn. Simply within himself, how will he take the idea of not having made his choice?

I would also say to him that I understand his uncertainties. Society as it is bars the road of life to you and steals your youth from you. But take heart. The future holds innumerable opportunities for building.

11. Since the time you took up a political career, have you sometimes thought of changing professions? If yes, when, why, and what other profession?

My trade was that of attorney and--when I felt like it--writer. Why would I change today? Politics is not a profession in the usual sense. It is a combat, it is an engagement with being. As circumstances would have it, it has taken over my life. How can one renounce it without renouncing one's convictions?

12. When was it that you first envisioned becoming president of the republic one day?

The presidency of the republic is neither the beginning nor the end of everything. My ambition is to achieve victory for my ideas more than for myself. I simply have some coherence in ideas, my ideas are making way and their path is ascendant. In 1965, I got 11 million votes in my name in the second round; in 1974, 14 million. It is up to the French to decide about the next phase.

Ideas ripen as do fruits and people. One has to let time decide. No one goes overnight from the sowing to the harvesting, and the scale of history is not that of newspapers. But after patient waiting comes the Spring. It is coming now, I think.

13. In your opinion, does carrying out the duties of president of the republic require:

- special knowledge?
- a broad general culture?

Is this a writing-assignment topic for high-school students? The governing of people is not learned in the universities but in the school of life. This is not to say that the university is not a serious advantage!

14. Should a president propose a collective ideal to his fellow citizens?

Yes. I believe this deeply. One cannot get out of crisis by force of decrees or purely technical measures. There is no change without taking a new breath. Excitement and enthusiasm--these are what is lacking today. How can worn-out officials,

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short on ideas, blase and resigned, wrench the country out of moroseness and languor? How can our people be given new ardor and fervor, and therefore the will to do something and overcome the crisis, if there is not a reversal of the value system and replacement of a policy centered on the profit of a small group by a policy based on respect for man? I say this often. The socialism of liberty is above everything else a cultural project: a choice of life or of survival, or rather a choice of civilization. I propose to the French people that they be with me the inventors of a culture, of an art of living--in brief, of a French model of civilization.

15. In your opinion, are women capable of filling any political office, even that of president? If so, what names come to mind?

Women have been answering this question themselves for a long time. At the top levels of the Socialist Party, women of great talent have made or are making a contribution of the highest quality to our work and our action. I mention, in no particular order, Marie-Therese Eyquem, Yvette Roudy, Edith Cresson, Veronique Neiertz, Marie-Jo Pontillon, Annette Chepy, Catherine Lalumiere, Nicole Questiaux, Anne Tre-gouet, Francoise Gaspard, Colette Audry, Christiane Mora, Irene Charamande, Dinah Caudron, and a great many others. Look also at the list of our European deputies: the highest percentage of women in Europe! It is doubtlessly necessary to go still farther. And my friends will strive to do so! A woman president or prime minister? Yes, obviously! Other countries have opened the way: Israel with Golda Meir, India with Indira Gandhi.

16. Among the qualities attributed to you, which do you think represent the greatest misunderstanding?

Ambition. My ambition is to participate in the forward march of the people of my time and not to betray the hopes that I bear. This enables my opponents to represent me as a Rastignac. These persons, when they say I am capable, imply that I am too capable. My friends, though, know that this is not the case. Have I ever, in my political life, compromised on what is essential to me? I could more easily have made a career. I will never renounce the highest of my ambitions, which is unity of spirit.

17. And as regards your defects?

I have them, to be sure! I am reproached with being distant. It is not because of a liking for secrecy, but rather the need for a certain reserve. I have difficulty in bending to the fashion of saying everything about one's private life, about one's family, one's children, one's friends. This explains to you why I reply briefly to this kind of question.

18. How much sleep do you need per day?

From 7 to 10 hours. I am getting less right now.

19. Do you prefer to speak:

- before a crowd, an assembly, or a small audience?
- on television, or on the radio?
- alone, or in a debate?

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Either to a few friends or to a crowd. I am always improvising. Before a crowd, the exchange, the dialogue, take shape by themselves. I do not like those cold monstrosities, the television cameras, that do not smile at you, that do not respond, that say nothing to you. I do not like to speak to a machine. I like to speak to human beings.

But I know my obligations and I have thought a lot about the way to be and do things on television. I hope I have made progress, during the present campaign, in my approach to this practical matter. I still have to master the rather unreal monologues that are imposed on the candidates, under ridiculous technical conditions. Radio, on the other hand, has not presented any problem to me.

20. To prescind from content, how is your political style distinguished from that of your opponent?

There is quite a radical distinction, it seems to me. First of all, I do not place politics above everything. It does not have the creative value of art, it cannot pretend to anything more--though this is quite a bit--than to be the servant of science and the humble interpreter of society.

I have already had occasion to write somewhere that I believe political action is subject to the necessity of not being cut off from knowledge of everyday life, of remaining close to what constitutes the warp and woof of people's lives. But at the same time, I strive to maintain a certain distance from events, the overview that is needed in order to place them in their context and define their exact proportions. This double view is not a matter of style but of conviction.

21. What quality in your opponent do you have the highest regard for?

A rare gift for exposition, and agility, speed of intelligence.

22. What do you think is his worst fault?

That he appears to care so little about the fact that his words and his acts follow lines so perfectly parallel that they are destined to meet only in infinity. This distance between speech and deeds is, in the literal sense, astronomical. It often gives me the impression that Giscard d'Estaing moves in a sleepwalker's universe.

23. Will you state your most regrettable blunder and that of your opponent during the last 7 years?

Your questionnaire contains at least one blunder: this question.

24. On what occasion do you recall having lost your self-control?

At the risk of appearing presumptuous, no recent recollection comes to mind. Even my fiercest adversaries do not take that tack when they want to criticize me. God knows that life has given me occasions to lose control of myself. The resistance, the war, and later, calumnies and insults have not been spared me. Whether it is a gift from heaven or conquest of oneself, self-control helps one to get through the most perilous storms. Does this mean that events never wound me? Let us say only that time has strengthened my defenses.

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25. What has been your strongest emotion in political combat? When and how?

I have never been without emotions. How is one to establish a hierarchy? Since you want an example, I would like to dig into the wartime period and quote something from myself, which I hardly ever do. But I have to act fast! Here is what I wrote in one of my books: "Through that tragic and sweet night of 25 August 1944, when, with officials of the internal Resistance, I waited at the Police Prefecture for the advance detachments of the Leclerc division, we were there, in small groups, awaiting the arrival of our victorious brothers. By the flowing Seine, the sky, as far as one could see to the west, resembled, with its golden stars on a field of blue, the cloak of Saint Louis. Midnight sounded. I wished there had been another symbol to add to the solemnity of the hour. It seemed to me that the procession of splendors, the procession of sorrows from the depths of our history, were finally going to meet and fuse in the unity of our people. There were no longer any humiliated French people, nor any glory to be gleaned at the expense of one's own brother. The dark grace of the heroic vigils penetrated the heart of Paris." Yes, 25 August 1944.

26. Do you think that your opponent could lose control of himself in the exercise of power?

I reject trials by supposition.

27. When and on what occasion have you discovered signs of intolerance in yourself and in your opponent?

When I was younger, I might have given in to the temptation of intolerance. May I invoke the impetuosity of that age to pardon myself for it? Certainly not. At any age, intolerance is to be banished, and if it were to be reborn, I would immediately try to quench it and contain it. Haven't I shown an example of this within the Socialist Party itself? I have restored proportional voting in it. My party is the only truly democratic French party. It is the only party in which, with complete freedom and without fear or constraint, everyone expresses his opinion, criticizes the leaders, proposes their replacement. Look at this presidential campaign. Every current was involved in it. All the colors of the socialist rainbow shone in unison with all their fires.

Actions here say more than the finest words. Are they flattering to the outgoing candidate? I said it--that a pernicious screen separates words and reality. The words were sometimes noble: from "advanced liberalism" to "reasonable coexistence between majority and opposition," one heard the most agreeable music playing. But alas, the deeds have not come. A calming of the waters? Who, if not the outgoing president, has agitated himself, appropriating the state as if it were his private property? Nothing has escaped his appetite for power: neither the media nor the press nor the administration nor the Parliament. Perhaps he has not encountered the trials that would have corrected this spoiled child's habit. Perhaps then he will find again the natural qualities that I am ready to acknowledge in him.

28. A politician is, in a way, cowardly when he declares he is personally against the death penalty but politically in favor of it. Please, then, answer yes or no to this question: are you for or against the death penalty, and if the latter, will you take initiative to have it abolished?

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You are not wrong. How can one at the same time proclaim his profound aversion to the death penalty and prevent all debate in Parliament about its possible abolition? The conduct of the country's affairs requires courage and character. It is necessary to know sometimes how to hasten the evolution of attitudes. A country is not governed at the pleasure of public-opinion polls.

As I said on television recently, I am opposed to the death penalty. It does not seem to me worthy of a civilized country. It conflicts with my concept of life. Moreover, it is ineffective: its abolition in all the countries of Europe has not brought an increase in criminality. Political prudence and ambiguous responses do not seem appropriate to me in this matter. Obviously, I will not impose my conviction. It will be up to the representatives of the people or to the people themselves to debate and decide.

29. When a prisoner escapes from prison by means of a helicopter, what is your first feeling?

In popular language, a burglar used to be called a "second-storey man." The expression has fallen out of use, it was premonitory. If I am accused of giving a not very serious reply, it will be agreed that the question is hardly more so. To go with the notion of the lesser evil, I would say that I prefer the helicopter to the taking of hostages.

30. Do you believe in human progress?

How can one help but marvel at the movement of creation and invention? By means of the tool--the plow or the pick--man was able to extend his arm. Then the steam engine and the electric motor came to add to his strength. Now today, computer technology is assisting his intelligence and his memory. And with the transistor and the microprocessor, the third industrial revolution is heralded.

Is this fertile ground for new development for our country? It is called, precisely, science, invention, creation. The message of socialism is first of all this: belief in the prodigious potentials of human intelligence. Thus we will give the leading role to those who clear the ground, to the enlighteners, the searchers and the discoverers.

Human progress is not only progress in technologies and sciences. It is also the progress in relations among people. This is the whole meaning of the coming elections: will the time of contempt yield to the time of respect? Will France invent a new project of civilization, or will it be content to live in the intellectual orbit of the great powers?

31. What is the science whose development gives you most fear for the future, and which one makes you most optimistic?

At the head of the orientation document adopted by the last congress of the PS at Metz, I put under the title "Looking Ahead" a preamble devoted to science and technology. It stated in particular: "Rejection of technical progress, fear of the creative act, are characteristics of lost societies. The danger for humanity is not that man invents, but that he does not master what he has created." No science disturbs me in itself. They all gladden me and give me confidence. Only the use made of them raises questions. I borrow Francois Jacob's image for my purpose: "One can

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use a knife to peel an apple or to plunge into a neighbor's ribs." There is only one solution: to govern the future and not to be its plaything. This is the entire difference between Giscard d'Estaing's laissez-faire regime and my proposal.

Take the example of the revolution introduced by computer technology and genetics. Are they going to create a society of solitude, manipulation and dispossession? Or on the contrary, are they going to liberate labor, invent machines that care for us and teach us, save energy and increase the time we have for living and our joy in it? Remember the frightful social regression that resulted from England's mechanization in the 18th century: the labor of children attached to machines, women giving birth on the ground, the shortened lives of prematurely worn-out workers. This is what I would like to avoid in the era of the third industrial revolution: that man should be transformed into a solitary robot, talking with the machine only. On the contrary, I would rather that the new technologies help him to find himself again and form a new and friendly dialogue with other men.

It is also necessary for our country to keep control over its scientific research. Such cannot be the case when credits for research have been stagnating for 7 years. France must put itself in the lead: grey matter is its true resource. That is where our future lies: exploration of the still unsuspected deposits of our intelligence.

32. Are you happy?

I relish life, therefore I relish happiness; all my friends know this--and especially the kind of happiness that gives one the feeling of being in harmony with oneself.

I am helped by a natural rejection of pessimism. I do not believe that happiness is only, as Jules Renard says, "the silence of misfortune." It is the state of a conscience at peace with people, with things. Can I, for all that, call myself happy? Was Montaigne correct to write that "men cannot call themselves happy until the last day of their life has passed"?

33. In your opinion, is the world heading toward war or peace in the long run?

War exists today in a good many places in the world. The overarmament of the great powers is creating a growing danger of explosion. Finally, the inequalities between rich countries and poor countries are multiplying the risks; but in so serious a matter, it is not sufficient to have an opinion, one must put will to work. It is up to France and to the nations of Europe to avoid what is avoidable and to propose a profound transformation of international relations.

34. Which slogan of your opponent horrifies you the most?

The only slogan of his that I have noted is: "France must have a President." On that point, I agree with him.

35. Which line of thinking of his troubles you the most?

Does one call the ability to state an error, a false figure, with aplomb, a "line of reasoning"? I am always disconcerted when I hear my rival state predictions that are by nature chancy, without the least hesitation of eye or voice. Among a thousand examples, remember his proclamation of 8 July 1978: "France will come out of the crisis at the end of the year." Or last week: "France has the leading computer

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industry in Europe," whereas the leading European company is an English one, Siemens is ahead of us in electronic components, and CII-Honeywell-Bull is dominated technologically and financially by its American partner Honeywell. In brief, as you see, what troubles me most about him is precisely his nonreasoning, or art of assertion.

36. Do you believe in the decline of Western Europe?

No, Europe has the means for being the first continent to come out of the crisis. It has the intelligence, the natural resources, the vitality, the industry, the culture. But it lacks a sense of purpose, the will to take up the challenges, the use the means of science and economics in the service of a project for civilization.

My ambition is to help give Europe a second wind and to propose some other mobilizing missions for it: new joint research programs, new joint technological projects, preservation of our cultural patrimonies, control of our intellectual independence in the face of the appearance of new technologies, etc.

It is up to Europe also to be in the vanguard of new relations with the Third World and to carry still farther forward the noble and ambitious work successfully initiated by my friend Claude Cheysson, European commissioner in Brussels.

37. Is democracy a carryover from the past or an idea for the future?

The present system is not unrelated to the Second Empire: the monopolizing of the state by one family, one clan, one caste; the policing of consciences and of hearts; centralization and bureaucratization.

Reread Victor Hugo and his dazzling analyses of the regime of Napoleon the Small and of its social foundations: subordination of the immense mass of the sharecropping peasants, isolated from one another, the mere sum of identical units.

Yes, democracy is an idea for the future. The time has come for the alternation in this lung of democracy. Can it be that the French, creators of the idea of Republic, have let it fade?

The state alone, all alone, decides on the life of our communities. The prefect alone, all alone, governs the department. Men alone, all alone, too often choose for the women. The television directors all by themselves.... The same ones alone decide everything for everyone, and are often mistaken.

My proposal is a different one. I trust life, I believe in the virtues of our shared intelligence, and at each stage of power I want the voice of each person to be heard, and his imaginative or critical contribution solicited.

In brief, there is a democracy to be built: an open administration, free information subject to question, general experience of responsibilities, of the local collectivities freely run at last. Where he lives and works, the citizen should be able to affect his destiny and bend the course of affairs.

None of the liberalization proposals announced with lots of publicity has been really implemented: neither the financing of the parties nor the establishment of proportional representation nor reform of Parliament nor decentralization.... So many commitments not kept make one lose forever the right to promise.

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Along with Thucydides and Montesquieu, I am not ignorant of the fact that every power is led to abuse its power. Thus I will propose, in the first weeks following my election, the passage of great laws of liberty relating to radio and television, decentralization, workers' rights, women's rights, etc.

38. Do you believe that labor ennobles man or enslaves him?

The very reality of labor is still too close today to its etymological sense: an instrument of torture. For many women and men, labor means pain, suffering, humiliation. And yet who, in this period of unemployment, is not anxious about losing it? Labor is the only source of material survival for millions of people. Actually, the fight for an effective right to work and the fight for transformation of the conditions of work are one and the same fight. The crocodile tears of those who plead for a humanization of labor without ever doing any make me indignant. The dissertations for ladies of the world on the benefits of work are no longer tolerable in the mouths of those who deprive the workers of their prime dignity: serving the national community by the exercise of a production activity.

Ennoblement or servitude? Would the choice be solely between aristocracy and slavery? In truth, the function of labor lies elsewhere. Labor is indissolubly linked to the very genius of the human being. It is transformation of the world, recreation of ideas, discovery of the mysteries of the universe. Labor is a natural act: the contribution of each person to the advance of mankind.

As such, it could be a source of joy and plenitude. I will strive with all my strength to give labor again its original significance as an act of creation.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND OUTLINES GOVERNING POLICY, PRIORITIES

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 17-30 Apr 81 pp 5-7, 9

[Article by Jean Boissonnat: "'They Told Me...'"]

[Excerpt] Winning, OK. But governing? With whom? First of all, Francois Mitterrand does not totally exclude the possibility of the PCF's taking a new tack when accounts are settled after the balloting. He reminds me about 1972. At the time of the referendum on Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, the Communists had come out against it; the Socialists abstained. The dispute was a wild one. That did not prevent Georges Marchais from phoning Francois Mitterrand a few days later to propose that he sign a Common Program. With the Communists, anything is always possible. But in the last analysis, this is not the most probable thing, and Francois Mitterrand does not give me the impression of being in a hurry to govern with them. Well, then, the same question again: with whom? Two hypotheses. Either the Socialists and their allies have a majority in the new Assembly, and the problem is solved; or else they do not have one, and it is necessary to risk a minority government based on a solid core of 200 deputies, making up the difference, depending on the vote involved, with support from the left or from the right. This does not seem to frighten this old fox of the Parliamentary chicken-yard. Supported by the institutions of the Fifth Republic on the one hand and by popular enthusiasm on the other, Francois Mitterrand feels he is cut out to bridge the gap. He would not be displeased to show Giscard, who does not seem to have achieved this, that the same president can effectively govern with several majorities.

Here he is in the Elysee, then, managing his Parliamentary credit in the best way possible. In order to do what? Francois Mitterrand is convinced that the first 18 months will be the most difficult. He admits to having been overly sanguine in proclaiming that he would not raise the pressure of taxation and social charges beyond the present 42 percent. At heart, he thinks that France could go up to 47 or 48 percent--that is, below the Scandinavian rates, which are over 50 percent--but on condition, of course, of not doing anything whatsoever. But after Reagan's victory, relayed to France by Chirac's propaganda, it is not possible to go beyond that for the time being. It will therefore be necessary to spread certain social measures out over a period of time. It will be sufficient to explain about this. Likewise, if the situation makes it impossible to aim the repercussions of the raise in the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] (which could fall between 3,000 and 3,300 francs per month, according to certain Socialist experts) at the wages hierarchy, it will be necessary to say so. Francois Mitterrand has confidence in the French: they will bear the truth if one takes the trouble to explain it to them. It seems to me that, in the context of an entirely different view of matters, Raymond Barre thought likewise, without any apparent great success.

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On the other hand, the Socialist candidate intends to go ahead rapidly on the 35-hour week. By means of adaptations on the part of branches of industry, he expects 900,000 jobs from this--a hypothesis based on calculations more than on experience. Jacques Delors has convinced him, he says, that with an average growth rate of 3 percent per year, one can simultaneously reduce the work week without cutting buying power, give capital its share for financing investments, and bring about social transfers in favor of the most disadvantaged.

Isn't Francois Mitterrand afraid that he has not prepared public opinion for a difficult period, giving the impression that one can distribute money to everyone without taking any from anyone? He defends himself against this charge. He will make only a small number of commitments. Not everything will be possible all at once. He knows this. He will say it. But he points out to me that wage costs are higher in the FRG than in France; the employers have some margin (has he thought about the disparities in productivity?).

As regards prices, reestablishment of controls does not seem at all indispensable to him--though this does not conflict at all with his convictions--except in a few special areas. As regards relations beyond the nation's borders, use will be made, if necessary, of the safeguard clause provided for in the Common Market, but only for the most seriously threatened industries, such as textiles. Always optimistic, Francois Mitterrand does not believe that this would weaken France's authority in the Community bodies. As for nationalizations, only those that will be necessary will be done. He will not tell me any more about this. His problem, as far as he is concerned, is the economy.

Francois Mitterrand, though less optimistic than Valery Giscard d'Estaing as regards the international environment, is close to him in its conception of French diplomacy. Both have learned from General de Gaulle the lesson that France can offer a certain neutralism as long as the Americans keep the Russians in check.

This man presents a curious mixture of tactical ability and strategic magnanimity. In the course of the conversation, he made frequent reference to morality and law. His calculation is there to serve his conviction. When he runs up against practical matters, the word can overcome the obstacle. I went into the office of a socialist candidate; I left that of a republican poet.

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