

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9781

10 June 1981

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 724

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9781

10 June 1981

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 724

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Qadhafi's Reasons for Failure To Attend Chad Summit  
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Apr 81)..... 1

Regional Solar Energy Project Funded by IDB, UNDP, FRG, France,  
Others  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Apr 81)..... 2

CEAO Decides on Financial Statement, Industrial Project  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Apr 81)..... 4

UMOA Central Bank Meeting  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Apr 81)..... 6

Fiscal Statement: Foreign Debt Increases, Product Prices Falling  
(MARCHES ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Apr 81)..... 7

Briefs

- Relations With Neighbors 10
- Tazara Fund Transfer System 10
- Regional Transport Cooperation 11
- Diouf Trying To Mediate Rabat-Nouakchott Dispute 11

ANGOLA

Official Stresses Multinationals' Understanding Stance  
(Luis de Almeida Interview; NEW AFRICAN, May 81)..... 12

BENIN

Pragmatism, Not Marxism-Leninism Said To Mark Country's Politics  
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Feb 81)..... 14

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD	
Situation in Country 'More Uncertain Than Ever' (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 May 81).....	17
Briefs	
Minister's Flight	18
Hissein Habre Loses Support	18
Goukouni Seeking Foreign Aid	19
COMORO ISLANDS	
Briefs	
Saudi Aid	20
CONGO	
Briefs	
BADEA Aid	21
Japanese Engineering Donation	21
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	
Briefs	
Vice President's Tour	22
MOZAMBIQUE	
Economic Links With S. Africa Seen Reconsidered (Colm Foy; NEW AFRICAN, May 81).....	23
NIGER	
Briefs	
Canadian Aid	25
Abu Dhabi Loan Ratification	25
NIGERIA	
Developing Relations With Various Countries Described (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Apr 81).....	26
Franco-Nigerian Economic Relations	
Nigerian-British Economic Relations	
Britain's Biggest African Customer	
Nigerian-Brazilian Cooperation	
Petroleum Products Exchange	
Austro-Nigerian Trade Increases	
Economic, Political Situations Analyzed (NEW AFRICAN, Apr 81).....	31

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Briefs		
	Petroleum Production	33
SENEGAL		
States General Meets on Educational Problems		
	(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 May 81).....	34
Anambe Basin Hydroagricultural Development Project		
	(MARCHES TROPICAUX, 24 Apr 81).....	35
Briefs		
	Belgian Senators' Visit	38
	Tax Increase	38
	Electric Power Plant	38
	French Food Donation	38
	Czechoslovak Agreement Concluded	39
TANZANIA		
Briefs		
	Dismissal of Civil Servants	40
	Increasing Criminality	40
	Expanded Italian Cooperation	40
	Carbon Oxide Discoveries	41
ZAIRE		
Revival of Lumumba Movement Described		
	(Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16-29 Mar 81).....	42
Briefs		
	Inga Dam	46
	Aluminum Plant	46
ZAMBIA		
Briefs		
	Decline in Yugoslav Trade	47
	NHA Housing Financing Program	47

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

QADHDHAFI'S REASONS FOR FAILURE TO ATTEND CHAD SUMMIT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 39

[Article: "Chad--Why Qadhdhafi Did Not Come to Lagos"]

[Text] The Algerian president's first big African tour was supposed to culminate in a summit on Chad on 10 April in Lagos, Nigeria (Issue number 1058 of JEUNE AFRIQUE).

Scheduled to come, aside from Chadli Bendjedid and the Nigerian chief of state, Shehu Shagari, were the Libyan leader, Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, the Chadian and Cameroonian presidents, Goukouni Oueddei and Ahmadou Ahidjo, and the president of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens, who currently holds the office of OAU president. But Qadhdhafi withdrew and the summit was cancelled. Anyway President Shagari does not consider himself defeated and is thinking of convening another meeting to which he would invite Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, president of Togo, as well. Meanwhile, Shagari and Chadli had already held talks in Lagos with Goukouni Oueddei when Qadhdhafi's non-appearance was announced. Might it be that things are not going well between the president of GUNT [National Union Transition Government) and his Libyan protector?

What made Qadhdhafi back out like this? He might have been afraid of the new African armed force defined at the end of March in Addis Ababa by OAU ministers and which was meant to be made up of Nigerian, Algerian, Cameroonian and Libyan units. Qadhdhafi preferred the "next-to-the-last" African force decided on in 1980 by the 17th OAU summit--Congo, Benin, Togo and Guinea--troops belonging to small countries not bordering on Chad and without sizable logistical resources. But to agree to having Nigeria, Cameroon and Algeria alongside the Libyan Army is far riskier.

The failure of the 10 April summit also brings out certain differences between Algeria and Libya. The joint Algerian-Nigerian communique takes note of the very intense concern the two chiefs of state have regarding the Chadian crisis. It also reaffirms their conviction that a just and lasting solution can be found on the basis of the arrangement negotiated under the aegis of the OAU and recommended in the Lagos agreement (December 1980). But does not this agreement, which was confirmed by the Lome summit (January 1981), in fact condemn the Libyan presence in Chad?

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981

9631

CSO: 4400/1103

1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL SOLAR ENERGY PROJECT FUNDED BY IDB, UNDP, FRG, FRANCE, OTHERS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 998

[Text] The decision made last October, following the reunion of the financial backers, to begin feasibility studies prior to the creation of the Regional Center of Solar Energy (CRES)--a joint CEAO (Economic Community of West Africa) and CILSS (Inter-Nation Committee Against Drought in the Sahel) project--is already in effect. A committee is currently visiting those countries interested in the creation of this center. The mission's principal objectives are as follows: obtain the viewpoint of involved government members on the purposes and the organization and functioning of the regional center; collect technical and economic data which will serve as the data base for the feasibility study; identify as precisely as possible the sectional distribution of the energy demand, as well as the possibilities offered by energy conservation and the development of renewable energy resources; determine at the regional level, the desired levels of education, research, and production in the renewable energy field.

The CRES, which will cost 8.4 billion CFA francs, will be built in Bamako, Mali. The financing of the feasibility phase, totaling 275 million CFA francs, was acquired and insured by the UNDP (UN Development Program--20 million), the EDF (European Development Fund--30 million), France (100 million), and FRG (125 million). In December 1980, the different partners convened in Brussels at the heart of the European community to decide upon the practical matters involved in the completion of this phase. The importance of this project was acknowledged by many of the countries and institutions which agreed to participate in the fulfillment of the second phase which concerns primarily the industrial sector. The principal participants will be: the EDF representing the Commission of European Communities, the OPEC Fund; FRG; France; the UNDP; the Interim Science and Technology Fund; and the Islamic Development Bank. Also interested in this operational phase are the ADB (African Development Bank), the UNSO (Bureau of Nations United for the Sahel), and the USAID. The level of obligation for each one of these sources will be determined next October in Ouagadougou during a second reunion of the financial backers.

The constant preoccupation of the CEAO is to benefit as rapidly as possible from solar energy, the objective being alimentary self-sufficiency through the provision of water to everyone, most notably the rural class. In other respects, oil prices are daily becoming more disturbing and less bearable for all of the member-states. It has been shown that by pooling their human, financial, scientific and technical assets, the member-states of the CEAO and the CILSS will certainly obtain the most benefit from raw solar materials.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The major functions imposed upon the CRES are as follows: the definition of a global strategy for concerned nations; the conception, production, and commercialization of solar equipment responding to the needs of the Sahel nations; the development of applied research, as much for solar energy as for other energy sources; the training of required personnel; the centralization of information on problems of oil distribution; and the development of regional and international cooperation in the solar energy field.

Finally, among the last projects assigned to the Center, one notes the installation of small centers for providing electricity for 16,000 villages and providing 50,000 water sources with solar pumps for farming and irrigation.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

9745  
CSO: 4400/1144

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CEAO DECIDES ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT, INDUSTRIAL PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1182

[Text] The sixth session of the FOSIDEC's (Foundation of Fellowship and Sponsorship for Community Development) committee of administrative deputies met 8-9 April 1981, at the Foundation's headquarters in Ouagadougou. The session brought together the six member-states of the CEAO (Economic Community of West Africa): Ivory Coast; Upper Volta; Mali; Mauritania; Nigeria, and Senegal. Chaired by the representative from Senegal, the committee of administrative deputies made the following decisions: 1) the approval and distribution of the 1980 fiscal statement which amounts to 519,366,677 CFA francs; and 2) the Council's approval concerning the following projects.

UPPER VOLTA: Manufacturing and Packaging Center for Pharmaceutical and Veterinarian Products

Project Objective: construction of a packaging and manufacturing center in Upper Volta for pharmaceutical and veterinarian products.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: financing of the factory's feasibility study through a reimbursable advance of 10,200,000 CFA francs.

MALI: Poultry-Farming Center in Sotuba

Project Objective: to recommence and develop the Sotuba poultry-farming center with the hope of creating an industrial and commercial firm with private backing.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: financing of the feasibility study for the center's development and rebirth program in the amount of 28 million CFA francs, reimbursable should the project succeed.

MAURITANIA: Association of Alimentary Products (FAMO-Mauritania)

Project Objective: construction of a wheat processing site and a noodles factory in Nouakchott.

Cost of Investment: 547,500,000 CFA francs.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: guaranteed 90 million CFA francs long-term loan from the Mauritanian Bank of Development and Commerce.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MAURITANIA: Bennechab Mineral Water

Project Objective: construction of a bottling factory for Bennichab mineral water. (Project was initially begun by FOSIDEC).

Cost of Investment: 360 million CFA francs.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: guaranteed short and long-term credit of 2.5 million CFA francs from local banks. This project's feasibility study was financed by FOSIDEC.

NIGER: Non-Alcoholic Beverage Factory

Project Objective: construction of the factory.

Cost of Investment: 845 million CFA francs.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: 80 percent financing of the feasibility study's cost.

NIGER: Bakery and Pastry Shop in Diffa

Project Objective: construction of the bakery and pastry shop.

Cost of Investment: 45,600,000 CFA francs.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: a 1/3 discount on the interest rate during the first four years of the 20 million CFA francs short-term loan from the Niger Development Bank.

SENEGAL: Sococim Industries

Project Objective: expansion and reorganization of the Rufisque cement factory.

Cost of Investment: 18.1 billion CFA francs.

FOSIDEC Sponsorship: guaranteed 3 billion CFA francs loan from the European Investment Bank.

In sum, the FOSIDEC commitments for the sixth session of the administrative council are as follows: 3,148 million guaranteed CFA francs; 43.2 million CFA francs for research funding; and 3.06 million CFA francs for interest rate discounts. The total commitment is 3,194.26 million CFA francs.

Thus, in adherence to Article 16 of its statutes, FOSIDEC appropriations were authorized for projects in four of the Community's least industrialized nations (Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), and particularly in Senegal where the Foundation funded many projects with the hope of aiding the rebirth of this country's economic activities.

At the close of this fourth sponsorship session, which corresponds with 23 months of Foundation activity, the FOSIDEC appropriations balance sheet appears as follows: 6.7 billion guaranteed CFA francs; 143 million CFA francs for research funding; and 63 million CFA francs for interest discounts.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UMOA CENTRAL BANK MEETING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1182

[Text] The administrative council of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) met for a scheduled meeting on 30 March 1981, under the chairmanship of Mr Abdoulaye Fadiga, the BCEAO governor and its statutory president. The meeting took place in the BCEAO's main Abidjan office.

The council studied the financial posture of the Central Bank which reflects the difficult crisis that all West African nations with the authority to issue currency are going through, and which requires the upholding of the various measures adopted last December at the request of the West African Monetary Union. In this setting, the council asked the monetary issuing authority to support, notably through provisions allowed under bank regulations, actions allowing the expeditious acquisition of dependable information on the economic and monetary progress of its member-states.

Next, the council proceeded to redistribute central bank assistance in favor of a Union member's public funds, and acceded to a request for assistance proposed under the framework of article 15 of the central bank statutes. In other respects, the council's deliberations concerned the matter of direct access for financial institutions to the monetary issuing authority. The council decided, as well, to propose to the Council of Ministers the circulation of a new 1.000 CFA franc note. It defined, moreover, the conditions by which gold assets in the Central Bank are to be accounted.

The council authorized the Central Bank governor to introduce to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a request granting the BCEAO detainer status of its own special withdrawal account. Finally, the council specified the conditions of availability for certain withdrawals by member-states from the IMF.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

9745  
CSO: 4400/1144

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FISCAL STATEMENT: FOREIGN DEBT INCREASES, PRODUCT PRICES FALLING

Paris MARCHES ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1175

[Article: "Economic Progress in 1979-1980 of the Sub-Saharan African Countries"--  
Passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

[Text] The 1980 fiscal statement of the Arabian Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA), includes among other things an analysis of the economic situation of the 29 Sub-Saharan countries eligible for the bank's assistance.

The progress of the GNP growth rate for all of these countries in 1970 constant dollars from 1977-1979 is thus observed:

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Gross National Product (with cost factors)	4.98	4.48	4.82
Agriculture	1.03	2.46	2.05
Construction	9.56	4.68	7.81
Industrial Production	7.22	7.48	6.70

During 1980, many nations blamed a /serious food shortage/ on the drought which affected the Sahel areas. Generally speaking, the condition of developing Africa was influenced in 1980 by the slowdown in the growth rate of foodstuff production; an estimated 2 percent increase that was actually less than the population growth rate.

Progress in /industrial production/ was also upset by the results of bad harvests in 1979 and 1980, the major portion of African industry being based upon agriculture. A positive industrial growth of 4.1 percent, however, was noted in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1979. In many countries, the trend towards exportation is increasing among industrial concerns.

According to the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the industrial development of Continental Africa was hampered by the lack of capital, the scarcity of markets, the lack of technicians and administrators, inflated exchange

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

rates, the protectionism of industrialized nations, long delays in the delivery of merchandise and equipment which brings about the congestion of transportation substructures, inefficiencies handicapping the exploitation of production capabilities, the energy shortage, high wage levels and negative balance of payments, problems arising from the urgent importation of materials and spare parts. In 1980, moreover, the currency shortfall not only impeded the smooth functioning of African industry but postponed as well or rendered impossible the anticipated construction of new buildings.

In 1979 and 1980, /the financial resources/ of the principal African oil-exporting nations increased considerably. At the same time, the other developing African countries were subjected to an aggravation of their balance of payment deficits. According to estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), /the balance of payment deficit/ of developing non-oil producing African countries will increase from \$8.5 billion in 1979 to \$10.1 billion in 1980. The commercial balance deficit will increase from \$2 billion to \$2.7 billion. Simultaneously, the net deficit of public bond issues and private transactions will increase from \$5.8 billion to \$6.6 billion. Whereas the monetary value of exports went from \$21.7 billion in 1979 to \$25.3 billion in 1980, the monetary value of imports exceeded \$29 billion in 1980 compared to \$24.3 billion in 1979.

According to the ECA, the discouraging results of /intra-African trade/ are due to the inefficiency of the transportation network, the foreign export orientation of commercial institutions and clients, and to the inconvertibility of African currencies.

Besides oil, sugar has benefited in 1980 of a sensible recovery in prices, whereas cotton's progress was only modest. Coffee, cacao and the have experienced a depressed market.

The Ghanaian economy was not only particularly affected by a decrease in cacao production but also by prices, the lowest in 5 years. The Ivory Coast benefited from a record harvest in 1979-1980.

Falling prices and growing /coffee/ inventories have severely hurt African coffee growers.

Because of commitments with the European Economic Community (EEC), the Isle of Maurice acknowledged a serious inability to increase its European /sugar/ deliveries (80 percent of its production). Conversely, the Ivory Coast, which began to export sugar in 1979, benefited from the price increases.

/Cotton/ prices remained satisfactory in 1980, but many African countries suffered production shortfalls, except for Zambia (22 percent increase for 1980-1981). Total African cotton production--5.4 million bales--remained stable.

/Copper/ prices remained stable despite the worldwide economic recession, but their development did not appear encouraging at the end of 1980. Zaire experienced somewhat favorable sales, but Zambia, the other large African copper producer, had to cope with labor problems and was not able, moreover, to overcome transportation problems despite the end of hostilities in Zimbabwe.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Among the /other basic products/ becoming African exports, beef, wood, and peanuts experienced lower prices during the first half of 1980, whereas phosphate prices increased from an average of \$33 a ton in 1979 to \$47 a ton in August 1980.

According to statistics published by the IMF, the /net public transactions/ favoring non-oil producing African countries went from \$2.4 million to \$2.5 million between 1979 and 1980, whereas the /total net financial capital/ during these years went from \$6 million to \$6.2 million in constant dollars. /Public Development Aid/ (PAD) is declining in Africa as a percentage of the total financial capital.

The 1980 World Bank report states that the total foreign debt of the Sub-Saharan African countries increased from \$10.5 million in 1972 to \$37.6 million at the end of 1978. Discrepancies, however, are observed from one country to another. The Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Zambia--in descending order--were responsible in 1978 for one-third of the total regional debt.

The /amortization of the foreign debt/ expressed as a percentage of exports, is generally increasing in Africa, but in certain cases its advance is particularly worrisome. The foreign debt in 1978, for example, was 31.3 percent in Zaire, 17.4 percent in Guinea, 16 percent in Sierra Leone, 15.2 percent in Togo, and 14.9 percent in Senegal. Conversely, the foreign debt ratio in 1978 was only 1.9 percent in Lesotho, 2.5 percent in the Central African Republic, and 3.2 percent in Madagascar.

The /economic decline/ in 1980 of all African countries is particularly serious in the least developed nations. In that respect, the World Bank's development report demonstrates that if the annual economic growth continues at a rate of 2.9 percent for all industrialized nations and 1.1 percent in the low-income Asian countries, it is only increasing by 0.2 percent in the low-income African countries (per capita income equal or less than \$360 a year).

Eighteen African countries are in this category: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central Africa, Comoro, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Upper Volta, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Chad.

The debt of the under-developed nations is rapidly increasing. It has more than quadrupled from 1970 to 1977, reaching \$5.4 billion. In comparison, the ratio of foreign debt amortization to exports has increased from 5.8 percent in 1971 to 7 percent in 1977.

In the index of the BADEA's 1980 fiscal statement, statistical tables are provided on the condition and progress of the population, the GNP, the per capita income, inflation, foreign trade, exchange rates, and the foreign debt and its amortization in each one of the 29 African countries eligible for BADEA assistance.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

9745  
CSO: 4400/1144

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

## BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS--Abdou Diouf, president of the Republic of Senegal, expressed his pleasure on 26 April with the relations of cooperation that exist between Senegal and neighboring countries (Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania). He was speaking to the Council of Ministers. The Senegalese head of state, according to a communique, "stressed the friendly and fraternal nature of those relations, as well as the common desire of the various governments of the neighboring countries and Senegal to everything possible to strengthen and consolidate the relations uniting the respective countries." On the other hand, the "very special importance" Senegal attaches to the harmonious development of its relations with Guinea were emphasized on 25 April by President Abdou Diouf, when he received the credentials of Amirou Diallo, the new ambassador from Guinea. Senegal "will spare no effort to strengthen the ties of fraternal friendship that exist between the two countries," the Senegalese head of state added. He said further that he hoped for an improvement in Guinea-Senegalese cooperation in such a way that it will always be the "most faithful possible reflection of the excellence of the relations existing between the two countries on the political level and the personal relations" between the Guinean and Senegalese heads of state. Abdou Diouf, who said he felt that President Sekou Toure's trip to Senegal in 1979 had given "a new and vigorous impetus" to that cooperation, said he also hoped that the two countries would combine their efforts at the subregional, regional and international levels. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1297] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

TAZARA FUND TRANSFER SYSTEM--Tanzania and Zambia have decided on a new procedure for transferring funds for TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority) from Zambia to Tanzania in order to resolve the financial problems which this company is facing in Tanzania. According to the secretary general of the Tanzanian Ministry for Communications and Transport, Odira Ongara, TAZARA will henceforth deposit monthly to an account in Zambia the sum of one million Zambian kwacha (1 kwacha = \$1.2, approximately) to be transferred to Tanzania. This sum is to be applied essentially to TAZARA's expenses in Tanzania and to various other expenses relating to the operation of the Tanzania-Zambia line in this country. The former procedure required TAZARA of Zambia to obtain a bank authorization, difficult to obtain because of the exchange controls, before being able to make the transfer to Tanzania. The result was an arrearage of transfers on the order of \$6.62 million, while the Tanzanian branch of the company was unable to pay its employees' salaries. It should be remembered that the difficulties which TAZARA has been experiencing led it to interrupt its passenger service starting 15 April. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1202] 9380

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

REGIONAL TRANSPORT COOPERATION--The Zairian Executive Council and the Burundian government should soon ratify the agreement just signed by the Zairian National Railroad Company (SNCZ) and the Burundian Lake Transport Company (ARNOLAC). Under the terms of the agreement the two companies will cooperate toward transport on Lake Tanganyika. From now on, chiefly between July and October, the SNCZ will make lake units available to exporters of Burundian products and importers into Burundi. The agreement chiefly concerns the Goma-Bujumbura line (in both directions). The contribution of the SNCZ to Burundian traffic will make it possible to increase the capacity of the road from or to Dar-es-Salaam. On the other hand, negotiations have recently been going on between the SNCZ and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Corporation (TAZARA) concerning transport of part of the merchandise for export and import from or to Zaire. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1139] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8946

DIOUF TRYING TO MEDIATE RABAT-NOUAKCHOTT DISPUTE--President Abdou Diouf attempted on 11 April to mediate between Rabat and Nouakchott on the occasion of a working visit in Dakar by the Mauritanian chief of state, Khouna Ould Haidalla, which was the first time Haidalla has left the country since the aborted 16 March putsch. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 31] 9631

CSO: 4400/1103



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

OFFICIAL STRESSES MULTINATIONALS' UNDFRSTANDING STANCE

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 p 51

[Interview with Luis de Almeida, by NEW AFRICAN in London; date not given]

[Text] Angola's Ambassador to France, Luis de Almeida, spoke to NEW AFRICAN in London recently. The interview touched on the Clark Amendment, the CIA in Angola, double standards and the SA arms embargo.

Uppermost in Luis de Almeida's mind was the question of the repeal of the Clark Amendment.

Responding to claims that the Reagan Administration did not seek the repeal in order to engage in military intervention in Angola, the ambassador says: "If they don't want to engage in military action against us, why withdraw the amend-ment? The fact is America wants to intervene openly in our affairs and the Clark Amendment specifically prevents it from doing so. It does not do anything else.

The ambassador felt there was more at stake than simply a stepping-up of aid to UNITA. "By supporting UNITA, the United States will be directly reinforcing South Africa."

South Africa, not UNITA, was the real threat. Indeed, the United States had never stopped supporting UNITA secretly through Namibia. All that the repeal of the Clark Amendment would achieve would be that support would be given openly. The whole thing was a sham since South African forces constantly disguised themselves as UNITA fighters and would inevitably be recipients of any aid ostensibly sent to the rebels.

What of the American companies already involved in Angola?

"Our relations with US multi-nationals operating in Angola will not be changed by the new Administration's warlike stance," says the ambassador. "We have a good relationship with them from which both sides benefit."

Some multi-nationals had already told Washington they considered deeper American involvement with South Africa and UNITA to be wrong-headed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"The multi-nationals understand that we won't abandon our country to the UNITA traitors and their South African backers."

On the question of Namibia, Angola's position remains one of support for SWAPO, says the ambassador. He knew of recent Press reports which claimed Angola was secretly negotiating with South Africa over the illegally-held territory. He denied this.

"Angola will continue to support SWAPO until Namibia is free," he says. "At the same time, we shall try to find a peaceful solution."

It was the same with the ANC and South Africa. "Angola will always support the ANC in its struggle for freedom in South Africa, and we will not be intimidated into abandoning either SWAPO or the ANC."

The seminar attended by Ambassador de Almeida was concerned with the UN embargo on the export of arms to South Africa--the most notable evasion of which was the supply of a 155mm Howitzer to the Pretoria regime.

How did the ambassador see the outcome of the wider economic sanctions debate in the United Nations?

This, he feels, is an example of Western hypocrisy and he is not very hopeful of getting sanctions implemented. "The West doesn't want sanctions. They have double standards in this respect. They claim that economic sanctions would be disastrous for their own economies but, when it came to Iran with whom they also had a huge volume of trade, they were able to apply sanctions in order to win the freedom of a handful of Americans. The freedom of 26-million Africans does not concern them so much. Of course, the truth is the West wants the South African regime to survive."

Angola, he says, would support the implementation of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, as much in the interests of South Africans as in its own.

In the context of the Southern African situation, NEW AFRICAN asked Ambassador de Almeida how he saw things developing if the Clark Amendment was withdrawn.

"There has been a misunderstanding about our country" he says. "The CIA in fact has never stopped interfering in our affairs. The Clark Amendment has only made it more difficult for them. The situation in Southern Africa can never be resolved until we are left to work out our own affairs."

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4420

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BENIN

PRAGMATISM, NOT MARXISM-LENINISM SAID TO MARK COUNTRY'S POLITICS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Feb 81 pp 28-29

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Slogans and Reality"]

[Text] Cotonou seems to be coming out of a prolonged lethargy. For many years, Benin's capital had had a backward look, kind of colonial and aged. The slightest sprinkle turns it into a great mess because of its bumpy, badly paved roads. In addition, its population has doubled in 15 years: today it exceeds 200,000 inhabitants.

But for a year things have been changing. To relieve congestion in the city, a second bridge was built over the Oueme, and the old one is being repaired. Other works are under way: they are enlarging the port, lengthening the airport's runway, paving many streets and avenues and building a large stadium; a large Sheraton hotel is expected to open soon.

Except for the stadium, which is being built by the Chinese, all these works have been undertaken by western companies. This is attributable to a long-lasting political stability and a climate of confidence, although the country has adopted the Marxist-Leninist philosophy under the authority of Benin's Revolutionary Party. But the true "religion" of this country seems to be pragmatism more than anything else. An example: economic circles seem to be stunned now by the appreciation of Nigeria's nonconvertible currency, the naira. The increase of its parallel value from 200 to 260 CFA francs in a few weeks has been enough to cause serious worries in Benin.

In fact, the country draws a vital portion of its fiscal and customs revenues from its powerful neighbor, whose gross national product is 40 times larger than Benin's. The naira's increase in value has upset at once a whole series of commercial relations of which trade is an important part.

This does not mean that there are second thoughts, at least not on the surface, about the adoption of Marxism-Leninism and the usage of a complete anthology of watchwords and slogans about the glory of the revolution and socialism. These have the effect of keeping the country in a state of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

increased watchfulness. In the long run, however, these watchwords end up losing their power and their magic.

The "ready for the revolution" which precedes any meeting or discussion is often accompanied by a sly smile. The affliction seems to reach even a good part of the leadership: early in the year some antigovernment propaganda pamphlets were found in a high official's home. Since then, many persons close to the government and Benin's Revolutionary Party have been closely watched and placed under house arrest.

The minicrisis was preceded by two other jolts. The first one, in September 1980, when President Mathieu Kerekou accused labor union and party leaders of plundering state enterprises (JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 1043). The second one, in early October, when Libya announced "Ahmed!" Kerekou's conversion to Islam. This caused friction within the national executive committee.

It took several weeks to calm down the committee members, while at the same time being careful to avoid offending Kaddafi, who nonetheless made out a check at the end of the year for \$10 million and promised his assistance for several joint projects. These "affairs" resulted in increased repression and delayed the release of three former presidents who had been under arrest since the coup of 30 November 1972: Hubert Maga, Sourou Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe.

Kerekou had promised to release them before 31 December 1980. But Maga and Apithy spent December 31 in a Cotonou clinic. They even sipped champagne on this occasion with some close relatives. But there was no release. After that, they were placed under house arrest once more: Maga in Abomey, Apithy in Parakou and Ahomadegbe in Natitingou.

These methods, which went as far as torture in the well-known command posts (PCO) of some military bases, seem to have disappeared today. That does not keep Amnesty International from worrying seriously about prison conditions for some 100 persons in the jails of Cotonou's police headquarters.

While Waiting for Oil

"It is a difficult moment we are going through," say some close to the government, adding that "the excellent climate of confidence which the country enjoys should not be put in question because of this." This confidence is based on the responsibility and credibility of Beninese financiers, who do not fill their mouths with revolutionary slogans and would even want to return to a better balance between words and actions.

They are trying to make theirs a recent statement by Mathieu Kerekou: "Words do not make the revolution, it is actions that count." These financiers have even succeeded in releasing 7 billion CFA francs to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

encourage small- and medium-sized private businesses, provided the national firms are ready to enter into partnership with the state.

But the private companies, who are the real financial power in the trade with Nigeria, are hesitating. To give them confidence, the government has promised to denationalize some 8 to 10 state enterprises soon.

Nevertheless, the economic situation could remain difficult until mid-1983, when the first oil field in Seme, along the Beninese coast, will be exploited. The Norwegian companies who will exploit these fields, Saga Petroleum and Kvaaner Engeneering, have already called for bids for the purchase of drilling platforms. Their installation is expected this year. Recoverable reserves are about 10 million tons, that is about \$2 billion at 1981 prices.

It is precisely oil which has caused most of the increase in Benin's trade deficit. The oil bill was about 12 billion CFA francs in 1979, that is twice the country's exports! That trade deficit is growing each year. Exports, which were 7 billion CFA francs in 1968 and reached their peak in 1971 with 11.6 billion, plunged to 5.7 billion in 1978. This drop resulted mainly from a fall in the prices of agroindustrial products such as cotton and palms. Cacao, with \$1.3 billion, is the second exportable product. But it is mostly smuggled to Nigeria.

Imports, on the contrary, went from 11.1 billion CFA francs in 1968 to 18.8 billion in 1971 and 52.3 billion in 1978; they will surely exceed 60 billion in 1980. But austerity and a certain management of state affairs, despite the plundering of state enterprises, keep the foreign debt within reasonable bounds (about \$200 million at the end of 1980). They are counting on the oil of coming years to erase the deficit.

#### Improving Lifestyles

In the meantime, attitudes are clearly changing. Cotonou is seriously considering eliminating the famous single work session, from 0700 hours to 1400 hours. Its basic objective was to enable citizens to attend party meetings in order to strengthen further their revolutionary convictions.

In fact, the "party-fervor" afternoons are devoted mostly to all sorts of sideline activities aimed at improving lifestyles. Some officials can even be seen dashing in and out of the ministries in order to tend to their private affairs as soon as possible. A recent increase in the number of luxury cars with different tags has been observed. Early in 1981, after a special meeting of ministers devoted to the origin of these cars, police and internal revenue agents were ordered to impose rigorous controls "without favors."

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981

9341  
CSO: 4400/849

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

SITUATION IN COUNTRY 'MORE UNCERTAIN THAN EVER'

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 pp 1308-1309

[Article: "The Meeting of the Cadres Is Postponed"]

[Text] The national meeting of Chadian cadres which was to have been held in Ndjamena on 30 April was postponed until 15 May.

On the other hand, the situation in the country is more uncertain than ever. A Libyan military disengagement that took place at the end of March was followed by a growing Libyan seizure of the country, thanks to the financial generosity of Tripoli, which exercises an irresistible attraction in an impoverished country where everyone is first of all seeking money.

Col Kamougue's authority in the south is thus being contested, without reinforcement of the military pressure on that region. The south is in reality being threatened with internal divisions, under the effects of the corruption intended to obtain individual or collective rallying to the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government], by going over the authority of the groups that make it up, which until now have each been able to control the region assigned to it by the Lagos accords.

No foreign aid is forthcoming to balance that of Libya. It is believed that this country would favor the "Arab" populations in Chad, which would involve removing the "Goranes" (Daza and Teda in the northern part of the country) as well as the nationals in the south who are not Muslims.

In Kanem one might observe a great reluctance to obey Libya, which may be amplified by this policy of marginalizing everything that is not Arab. It is also confirmed that the Libyans had 100 southern soldiers executed in Faya-Largeau, at the time of a visit by Col Qadhdhafi.

President Goukouni himself is in a difficult position. He is attempting to rally to his side the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) by assuring them their pay on the condition that they go to fight in the north against the Hissein Habre rebellion. In this climate, Tripoli, thanks to its financial means and the elimination of the other countries that not long ago intervened in Chad, remains the master of the game.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

8946  
CSO: 4400/1183

17.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

## BRIEFS

MINISTER'S FLIGHT--Moussa Medela, the minister of Public Health of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government) of Chad, fled to Khartoum on 22 April. At a press conference Mr Medela indicated that he had twice handed in his resignation from the Goukouni Oueddei cabinet in protest against the presence of Libyan troops, but that it had been refused. So he has reluctantly remained in the government, awaiting an opportunity to flee the country. The former minister is a member of a group called Western Armed Forces (FAO), which had long supported Hissein Habre and his Northern Armed Forces (FAN). The latter had decided to expel from their movement Mahamat Saleh, the foreign relations commissioner. We recall that in a communique dated 14 April and issued in Lagos, Mahamat Saleh, who was the GUNT's Finance Minister until April 1980, was asserting, jointly with Batram Adoum Idriss and Moustapha Maitchari Alifa, respectively the presidents of the MPLT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad) and the FAO, that he was withdrawing his "confidence and support" from Hissein Habre. In Khartoum the executive committee of the MPLT, however, was saying on 22 April that the position taken by Batram Adoum "carried on for purposes of high treason", would not be binding on the movement, and added that "neither would Moustapha Maitchari Alifa's position be binding on the FAO." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 1981 p 1309] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

HISSEIN HABRE LOSES SUPPORT--In a communique dated 14 April in Lagos and signed by Batran Adoum Idriss, the president of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad (MPLT), Moustapha Maitchari Alifa, the president of the Western Armed Forces (FAO) and Mahamat Saleh Ahmat, the commissar for foreign relations of Hissein Habre's Northern Armed Forces (FAN), these three Chadian trends united within the People's Armed Forces announced that they have decided to "withdraw their trust in and support of Hissein Habre." Elsewhere, Mamadou Affono, the FAN commissar for popular organization and ideology, who was passing through Lagos, indicated to AFP [French Press Agency] that the three Chadian trends also decided, at the end of a meeting in a neighboring country of Chad, to call "on all Chadians wherever they are to engage in national re-evaluation and to transcend of Chadian geopolitics which is essentially dominated by foreign intervention, personal ambitions and regionalist and tribalist considerations." [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1198] 9380

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GOUKOUNI SEEKING FOREIGN AID--Since Libya is balking at the financial bill for Chad, Goukouni Oueddei is turning to other countries in Africa and elsewhere. Therefore, the president of the GUNT (Transition Government of National Union) will soon be going to Sudan, which supports the former "rebel" Hissein Habre's FAN (Northern Armed Forces). Oueddei is thinking about France as well. But Paris is said to have asked him to wait until after the second round of balloting in the presidential election. However, the Chadian minister of economy, Mr Ngangbet Kosnaye, is going to the French capital at the end of April. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 31] 9631

CSO: 4400/1103

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

SAUDI AID--The Saudi Development Fund agreed on 15 May, in Moroni, to loan Comoros 21 million riyals for road transportation. The loan is annexed to a previous loan of 48 million riyals, repayable in 20 years with a 5-year grace period. [Text]  
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1434] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

CSO: 4400/1245

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

BRIEFS

BADEA AID--The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) has just granted the Congo a loan of \$10 million for a project to improve the Brazzaville International airport. The accord was signed in Khartoum by Hilaire Monthault, the minister of Transport and Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of the Congo and Dr Chedly Ayari, the president director general of BADEA. This loan, which is redeemable in 15 years, covers 33 percent of the total cost of the project which will make it possible to enlarge the runway and reinforce it in order to adjust it to the landing standards for Boeing 747's. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1199] 9380

JAPANESE ENGINEERING DONATION--The Japanese government, represented by the Japanese ambassador to the Congo residing in Gabon, recently delivered a gift of civil engineering equipment worth 200 million yens to the Congolese government. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1199] 9380

CSO: 4400/1139

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

VICE PRESIDENT'S TOUR--Vice President Florencio Maye Ela, who is also the minister of Foreign Affairs, made an official visit to Latin America in April, going in succession to Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and then in May was to extend his trip to Venezuela, Panama, Mexico and Cuba. On 23 April Equatorial Guinea and Argentina signed an economic cooperation agreement as a result of the visit in Buenos Aires of Lt [marine] Florencio Maye Ela. The agreement provides in particular for cooperation between the two countries in the fields of mining, petroleum, agriculture, fishing, transportation and communications. Argentina is also granting to Equatorial Guinea a line of credit of \$5 million for the purchase of Argentinian products. The two countries also concluded a cultural agreement and decided to form a joint commission. During Mr Maye Ela's stay in Santiago, Chile and Equatorial Guinea decided to raise their diplomatic relations to ambassadorial level and signed two cooperation agreements, one in the cultural area and in education and the other in the field of science and technology. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1308] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 8946

CSO: 4400/1183

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

ECONOMIC LINKS WITH S. AFRICA SEEN RECONSIDERED

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 p 22

[Article by Colm Foy: "Mozambique Prepares for the SA Terrorists"]

[Excerpts] Facing sabotage, subversion and espionage inspired by the South African Government, Mozambicans are having to adjust to life under the threat of terrorism. [The author] reports on the background of today's tensions.

SINCE INDEPENDENCE five years ago, the People's Republic of Mozambique has been forced to maintain economic links with South Africa.

Odious as the South African connection is, it has been necessary because of Mozambique's peculiar historical circumstances. Mozambique's own economic development and transport infrastructure were subjugated to the purpose of serving British and South African interests.

The severing of the South African connection was unthinkable. FRELIMO is the first to recognise that the revolutionary society they wish to create can only be brought into existence with the support and consent of the people. Bringing about their ruination by destroying the country's economic system would only lead to the collapse of the FRELIMO Government and an end to any hope of constructing a new society.

Accordingly, Mozambique tried to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Botha regime. Economic links would be maintained but, of course, diplomatic relations could not be established. FRELIMO, while supporting the ANC of South Africa, decided not to allow ANC bases or training camps on its territory. A reasonable precaution, considering the proximity of the capital, Maputo, to the South African border.

Now, however, following South Africa's attack on the Maputo suburb of Matola - falsely declared to be an ANC base by Pretoria - ideas in Maputo are beginning to change.

It has become clear that Mozambique's hitherto unavoidable relationship with South Africa does not render it immune to attack. The recent incursion, successfully repelled by Mozambique forces at Ponta de Ouro, has reinforced this view.

Albie Sachs, veteran South African campaigner against apartheid and now lecturing at the law faculty of Maputo's Eduardo Mondlane University, describes the atmosphere in Maputo as "dramatic". Initial dismay and shock at the Matola incident has been replaced by determination, anger and a spirit of resistance.

FRELIMO has responded to the threat by organising itself through work committees and neighbourhood committees into a state of readiness. FRELIMO points out that Mozambique is under attack, not because it harbours ANC bases - which it does not - but because the Mozambican revolution is anathema to South Africa, as true independence of any of South Africa's neighbours threatens the structure of apartheid itself.

Further shocks to the Mozambican people came with the discovery of a CIA cell in Maputo, and its complicity with

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

South African military security. The claims that the cell was only revealed because of Cuban assistance has led to great indignation and anger, since it implies Mozambicans are unable to handle such intrigues themselves.

FRELIMO is organising militia groups, using anything to hand as weapons.

It is too early to say what effect this will have on existing economic links with Pretoria, but Mozambique must obviously be reconsidering its position.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4420

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGER

BRIEFS

CANADIAN AID--The Canadian International Development Agency (ACDI) expects to grant \$60 or \$80 million in aid to Niger during the next 5 years, to aid in developing agriculture and energy. This decision was taken after the Canadian visit of Mr Mahamane, Niger's minister of Planning, who stated, "We are aiming at three goals: first, food self-sufficiency, next development by and for Niger and, lastly, economic independence." Since 1962, the ACDI has supplied Niger with a financial contribution amounting to \$84 million. A Canadian delegation will go to that country in 1982 to reevaluate the five-year aid program. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1301] [COPYRIGHT: - Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

ABU DHABI LOAN RATIFICATION--The Council of Ministers of Niger on 9 April adopted a draft edict authorizing ratification of the loan agreement for 30 million dirhams, or 1.6 billion CFA francs, between the Republic of Niger and the Abu Dhabi Fund for the SONICAR [Anou Araren Nigerien Coal Company] project. Adoption of this text makes possible installation at the Anou Araren plant of a second electric generator, which will supply electricity to the region's uranium mines as well as to Agadez and Arlit consumers. The loan also makes possible the furnishing of social equipment and development services, as well as staffing and the training of Nigerien personnel. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1301] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

CSO: 4400/1183

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGERIA

DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS COUNTRIES DESCRIBED

Franco-Nigerian Economic Relations

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1012

[Text] The French delegation from the Production and Exchange Committee of the National Assembly, which went to Nigeria last February (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 February, p 430), presented the report of its mission at the Bourbon Palace on 2 April.

The delegation, chaired by Pierre Weisenhorn (RPR deputy from the Haut-Rhin), included Messrs Joseph-Henri Maujouan du Gasset (UDF deputy from the Loire-Atlantique), Rene Gaillard (PS deputy from Deux-Sevres), Charles Revet (UDF deputy from Seine-Maritime) and Andre Soury (PCF deputy from Charente).

During their stay they made several visits throughout the country and had many contacts with elected officials and local leaders, as well as with official representation and French private companies.

In Lagos they talked with the deputies from the Federal Chamber of Representatives and were received by the vice president of that assembly, Alhaji Idriss. They also met with the leaders of the Manufacturers Association, which represents Nigerian employers.

In Abuja they visited the site of the future capital and were received by the leaders of the Federal Capital Development Authority. They saw the work being carried out by SAE [expansion unknown] and DUMEZ [expansion unknown].

In Kaduna they presided at French Day at the International Fair and visited the Peugeot plant.

In Warri they visited the ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] installations and the Michelin installations at Port Harcourt.

Thus the delegation was able to appraise the possibilities being offered to French firms and investors to participate further in the economic expansion of the "giant of Africa." In fact, Mr Weisenhorn recalled that Nigeria, with its 80 to 100 million inhabitants, is the most heavily populated country in Africa, and he emphasized that it had become France's largest partner in black Africa and the second largest on the continent (it was its third largest supplier of oil in 1980 and became the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

second largest, after Saudi Arabia, in the early months of 1981). It is therefore, he said, "an extremely important commercial partner of France" which might easily be compared, he added, "to all of the French-speaking countries." He pointed out that bilateral relations were currently evolving very favorably, to the point that the number of French people residing in the federation had doubled in the last 5 years, going from 4,000 in 1975 to 8,000 in 1980. This increase could only be thwarted by internal problems stemming from the very nature of the regime and by certain positions being taken by French policy. Thus, he said, the delegation was able to establish some aggressiveness toward France because of its present attitude vis-a-vis South Africa and the maintaining of its troops in several countries. But for now this aggressiveness is not preventing the French from being very much appreciated and the uncertainty as to the evolution of the situation in Nigeria is not taking on any dramatic character.

On the contrary, the delegation thinks that Nigeria offers a special interest to French investors in the present economic situation, because of its new development plan, and points out that a rather lively foreign competition is already in evidence.

Mr Weisenhorn stressed the necessity of having small and medium-sized French firms participate more fully in the country's economic expansion. The PME's [Small and Medium-Sized Businesses], he said, should receive more support from the administration. This would make it possible to balance and diversify bilateral trade and would also contribute to the development of employment in France itself.

Mr Weisenhorn suggests in his report three measures likely to promote the development of economic relations between the two countries: increase the means for economic expansion positions in Lagos, reevaluate the established procedure for cultural and technical cooperation and pay more marked attention to the French people residing abroad.

The report of the chairman of the French delegation showed the film made by the team from Brittany's FR3 station, which came to Nigeria on the occasion of the Kaduna Fair. The film showed various aspects of the country's development, especially the extremely interesting views of the worksite of the future federal capital, where it was possible to determine that much remains to be done.

## Nigerian-British Economic Relations

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1012

[Text] Visiting London early in April on his way home from a trip to the United States, the Nigerian Federal Foreign Affairs Minister, Alhaji Umaru Dikko, accused British businessmen of being insufficiently aggressive in his country's market. He said he believed they should not appear to be so timorous, and on the other hand should not hesitate to confront certain risks. He recalled that important contracts were going to be concluded for realization of the first phase of a railroad project amounting to 1 billion pounds (\$2.2 billion), which involves connecting Port Harcourt with the future steel complex at Ajaokuta. Of course, he said, a British firm, John Laing, has bid on one section which is to connect Umuahia with Enugu, within the framework of a European consortium. But other companies, European and Japanese in particular, have shown a very firm wish to get the largest contracts. The British firms, the minister continued, on the other hand manifested little interest in the 250-million-pound program for renovation of rolling stock and other equipment of the national railroad company.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Alhaji Umaru Dikko showed that he was in favor of the most important advent of the British in his company, but he emphasized that he hoped to see them come more for the purpose of investing than seeking to increase trade.

He recalled that Nigeria had envisaged building a very important port complex 50 km east of Lagos, capable of receiving 30,000 to 40,000-ton ships (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 March, p 841). But this complex, feasibility studies for which were done by a Japanese company, is likely to interest many others in its realization, all the more so because the investment provided for is extremely high: 305.4 million naira.

The minister listed other interesting prospects for British firms, especially those involving improving river transport and development of the merchant fleet.

On the subject of contracts for arms purchases by Nigeria in Great Britain, which were the subject in the beginning of the conversations of President Shagari during his official visit to London (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 March, p 787). one is scarcely enlightened. The Vickers firm has refused to confirm that it was negotiating some 75 million pounds in sales of equipment, but on the Nigerian side, they were affirmative concerning the existence of bargaining. In any case, it is doubtful that Great Britain is taking on for itself alone 600 million pounds in arms sales, the competition in this market appearing to be very strong.

**Britain's Biggest African Customer**

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1013

[Text] Nigeria in 1980 took its position as Great Britain's biggest African customer, just ahead of South Africa, with purchases, according to the British Department of Commerce, amounting to 1204.3 million pounds. South African purchases, still according to the same source, amounted to 1002 million pounds.

On the other hand, South Africa last year was the biggest African supplier to Great Britain, with 756,397 million pounds, Nigeria being in third place, after Egypt, with 151,563 million pounds.

Thus the surplus in the trade balance for Great Britain is expressed by 1052.8 million pounds in trade with Nigeria and by 245.6 million pounds in its trade with South Africa.

One finds that Egypt, Great Britain's third biggest customer and second biggest supplier on the continent (with 346,688 million pounds in purchases and 336,595 million pounds in sales) is a long way from the other two partners of that country as far as the total value of the trade is concerned, South Africa placing in the lead with 1758.4 million pounds, ahead of Nigeria with 1,356 million pounds.

**Nigerian-Brazilian Cooperation**

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1013

[Text] Nigerian-Brazilian cooperation, begun in January 1979 at the time of the visit of Gen Musa Yar'Adua, the then chief of staff of general headquarters in Nigeria (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 February 1979, p 258), to Brasilia, is about to undergo new development with the signing in Lagos of six draft treaties involving

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

professional training in the industrial sectors and the sectors of transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, commerce and culture. Concerning agriculture, we recall that agreements had previously been signed last year in the Brazilian capital, between the Nigerian minister in charge of that department, Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, and Brazil's Foreign Affairs Minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 July 1980, p 1860).

The texts that were just signed were signed on 26 March by the same Brazilian minister and the Nigerian Federal Planning Minister, Mme Adenike Egun Oyagbola, at the first meeting in Lagos of the joint commission created in January 1979.

It was emphasized that the conversations went from the level of simple commercial exchanges to that of a global cooperation. In this way the two parties went on to conclude an agreement involving NOVACAP in the building of the future federal capital in Abuja, and they went ahead with the study of an approaching fiscal agreement establishing the principle of double taxation. On the cultural level, joining the universities of Sao Paulo and Lagos was envisaged, and should occur soon.

We noted in 1979 that Nigeria had become Brazil's biggest commercial partner in black Africa. And in fact the increase in commercial exchanges between the two countries has been especially impressive during these last 6 months. Whereas in 1970 these exchanges were only \$5 million, they already reached \$12 million in 1973 and then \$50 million in 1974, and they were figured at \$271 million in 1980. But these exchanges are extremely unbalanced. Brazil's sales to its partner last year, in fact, amounted to \$271 million, while its purchases amounted to only \$88 million. The Brazilian sales principally concern vehicles in CKD (Volkswagen) assembled in Lagos (20,000 in 1980, or 12 percent of Brazilian exports). Nigeria's sales principally concern oil (30,000 barrels per day), rubber and palm oil. But, despite its desire to sell more oil to reduce its deficit, a Brazilian source indicates that there is no plan to rapidly increase oil purchases in Nigeria.

Petroleum Products Exchange

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1013

[Text] The African oil-producing countries should imitate the example of Mexico and Venezuela in order to aid the continent's poorest countries, stated Spiff Taribo, Nigeria's ambassador to Venezuela. "Countries such as Nigeria, Libya, Gabon and Algeria should sign, with the non-producing countries of Africa, agreements similar to the San Jose, Costa Rica, Venezuela-Mexican agreement offering advantageous supply conditions to ten Caribbean and Central American countries," Mr Taribo said in Caracas in an interview with the local press agency VENPRESS.

Mr Taribo, the first resident ambassador from Nigeria to Venezuela, stated on the other hand that Nigeria and Venezuela are currently studying the possibility of exchanging petroleum products. Nigeria, he said, would supply light oil in exchange for heavy oil, depending on the needs of both countries (on this subject, see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 February 1980, p 261).

We remind you that Venezuela and Nigeria are both members of OPEC.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

Austro-Nigerian Trade Increases

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1013

[Text] The very strong increase in Austro-Nigerian trade established during the first half of 1980 (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 December, p 3483) continued during the next quarter, so that during the 9 months the exchanges amounted to a total of 2,880 million schillings, with 1,620 million in Austrian exports (+ 183.5 percent over the 9 months of 1979) and 1,260 million in Nigerian exports (+ 116.8 percent).

The increase in Austrian exports, which left Nigeria with a deficit balance of 360 million schillings, was chiefly due to increased deliveries of road vehicles (trucks and special vehicles), automobile accessories, machinery and equipment, paper and cardboard and manufactured products.

As for the increase in sales by Nigeria to Austria, it was basically due to oil deliveries, which climbed to 1,209 million schillings, against 531 million during the same period of the preceding year (+ 127.5 percent).

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

8946  
CSO: 4400/1154

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGERIA

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SITUATIONS ANALYZED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Apr 81 p 65

[Text]

Nigeria's Second Republic was not born easily. The country led by President Shehu Shagari has gone through turbulent elections and an even tougher period of transition from military to civilian rule

THE Shagari government which is firmly set on a course of reconstruction and development, and aided by the oil boom, has thrust Nigeria into the age of the *petro-naira* enabling the country to finance vital sectors in the country's day to day life.

Such strides have put Nigeria in the forefront of African politics giving the muscle to take radical stands on such issues as the problems in southern Africa, Western Sahara, and even to threaten British foreign policy by wielding the oil gun. The British conceded defeat to their own embarrassment on the Zimbabwe question when Margaret Thatcher made a first-of-its-kind U-turn launching Zimbabwe to independence. Shagari was able to bend the English by booting out British Petroleum (BP) because of Lagos's dissatisfaction with independence conditions set to keep out Mugabe from the limelight.

A healthy economy backs national and external programmes. Nigeria had zoomed from a £4,000 million deficit in 1978 to a £10,000 million surplus by the end of the 1979 fiscal year. Foreign trade remains viable, food production is good and the buying power of the average Nigerian remains healthy despite a climbing 15 percent inflation.

#### Take-over

To encourage foreign investment, Shagari during his period as president-elect quickly scrapped the indigenisation practices of the Federal Military Government from which he took over.

The Kainji and Bakolori dams, new road and telephone networks and a rise in the standard of living are evidence of internal development in the country. The dams have encouraged farmers in the respective areas to adhere to government programmes of agricultural diversification and have received incentives which have been coupled with radical changes in the land tenure laws.

A booming industry is supported by the Port Harcourt oil-refinery which accounts for 80 percent of Nigeria's revenue and gave the government £11.5 billion to juggle with in the 1980-81 budget. Nigeria has become an industrial giant in Black Africa.

But all is not a bed of roses. Nigeria's pioneer strides in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) binds it at least to being flexible in areas of customs regulations and immigration laws. But the influx of illegal immigrants has become a serious problem for the government.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

With more than 1,500 aliens making into Nigeria daily in search of work, the Shagari government has begun to feel the burden.

The worst it has felt so far is registered in the aftermath of the December Kano disturbances which left more than 1,000 dead with riot leaders being former deportees and illegal immigrants from Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta. To stall the recurrence of the Kano incident, Shagari has called for a beefing up of security especially at border posts and for a strict adherence to the 90-day visa-free limitation on visits as provided for in the freedom of movement of ECOWAS citizens as agreed in the Community communiques.

On the home front, the government is faced with the remnants of the ethnic affiliation which rocked Nigeria in the last 13 years. Partisan politics remain a serious impediment to the total democratisation of the country's political scene.

Party support runs basically along ethnic lines and though Shagari's National People's Party is multi-ethnic and seems to say all is well, yet there is a dormant ethnic volcano which needs close scrutiny lest it surprises everyone with an eruption.

### **Decades**

Apart from these, the government has other problems with local government. The states are constantly in court with the Federal Government either over revenue allocation or some irregularity in the partisan conduct of the courts or some civil servant, thus bogging down the files with litigation that will take decades to process successfully.

But these form the characteristics of a striving country about to find its feet while calling the shots for a change in its administration. With only two and a half years of achieving that, Nigeria stands true to the name of being an emergent giant●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4420/1014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM PRODUCTION--In January, for the third consecutive month, Nigerian petroleum production remained above 2 million barrels per day, with 2,098,350 barrels. We recall that last November, with 2,061,896 barrels, it almost matched the daily average of the first 8 months of 1980 (2.1 million barrels), which it had lost temporarily afterwards (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 and 30 January, pp 140 and 254). Production by exploiting companies was as follows: Shell, 1,195,000 barrels per day; Gulf, 365,000; Mobil, 215,800; Agip, 178,300; Elf, 88,000; Mobil Tenesse/Sun, 78,000; Texaco, 30,200; Pan-Ocean, 8,700; Ashland, 8,150 and Phillips, 1,400. On the other hand, the producing states are, in descending order, after the states of Rivières and Bendel, which are clearly in the lead with 770,800 and 738,000 barrels per day respectively, the states of Cross River (270,000 barrels), Imo (170,000) and Ondo (6,000). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Apr 81 p 1013] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8946

CSO: 4400/1154

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

STATES GENERAL MEETS ON EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1297

[Article: "Measures in Favor of Teachers"]

[Text] The licensing, revocation and suspension sanctions imposed against the striking teachers of the Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers (SUDES) were lifted by the government. This information was supplied in late April by Kader Fall, the Senegalese minister of education.

The lifting of the sanctions which affected 60 teachers, including the leaders of SUDES, had been requested by the Education States General, a vast meeting on the future of the Senegalese school, which brought together over 2,000 participants last January in Dakar.

The minister indicated that the Senegalese government also followed another of the recommendations of the States General in deciding to abolish the audio-visual method of teaching French which, he said, "has not attained its objectives." A new method will go into effect, pending a revision of the entire Senegalese educational system, which is to be worked out by a reform commission.

Kader Fall indicated that the teaching of the national languages will be introduced during the early primary years and that religious education will be a part of the programs after it has been studied, and taking into account the secular character of the Senegalese school.

We note, on the other hand, that President Abdou Diouf decided in mid-April to grant a housing allowance to secondary teachers. This allowance, which until now has been reserved for elementary teachers, was one of the unions' principal demands.

According to the official communique, extending the allowance to secondary teachers comes within the framework of applying the resolutions of the Education States General.

The States General was the largest meeting organized in Senegal on a precise problem, with free participation by all interested or concerned persons. It was also the first materialization of the political openness announced by Abdou Diouf in his first message to the nation after his accession to the presidency of the Republic, following Leopold Sedar Senghor's retirement.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

8946  
CSO: 4400/1183

34

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

ANAMBE BASIN HYDROAGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX in French 24 Apr 81

[Article: "SODAGRI: the Hydroagricultural Development Project of the Anambe Basin"]

[Text] In its general rural development policy, the Senegalese government is trying to promote not only large hydroagricultural development projects such as the Senegal River project (an OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization] project, in collaboration with Mali and Mauritania; see special issue of MARCHES TROPICAUX of 17 April devoted to "The Senegal River Development Organization"), but also projects which are more limited but of no less interest, such as the Anambe Basin hydroagricultural development project. The Saudi Development Fund has just granted a loan of several billion CFA francs to launch this project.

The Anambe Basin, located in Haute-Casamance, below the eastern end of the Republic of Gambia, near the city of Velingara, covers an area of 1100 square kilometers. It forms a natural depression drained toward the South by the Anambe which then flows into the Kayanga.

In terms of agriculture, the Anambe basin produces millet, sorghum, corn, peanuts, rice and cotton. Of the 37,000 hectares of farm land recorded (of the 110,000 hectares of the basin), only 26,000 hectares are cultivated, the rest lying fallow. The remaining 73,000 hectares are used as pastures for herds (64,000 horned cattle, 55,000 horned cattle and goats, 500 horses and 3,000 donkeys, recorded in this zone).

The population of the basin is estimated at 43,000 inhabitants, 38,000 rural. The active population is approximately 58.5 percent of the resident population, or approximately 20,000 persons to whom should be added close to 5,000 seasonal workers, or a total of 25,000 active persons during winter plowing.

The Ends and Means of the Project

Of the 50 kilograms of rice consumed annually by each Senegalese, only 12 kilograms are produced in Senegal, the rest having to be imported. It is thus necessary to increase local production.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Three zones have been chosen for the development of rice growing: the region of the river under the direction of the Company for Development and Exploitation of the Senegal River Delta (SAED), East Senegal where the Company for Development of Textile Fibers (Sodefitex) is trying to introduce this crop, finally in Casamance, the traditional rice-growing region.

At the stage of full development, the Anambe hydroagricultural development project should make possible production of 102,000 tons of cereals, including 88,500 of paddy rice, 7,000 tons of sorghum and 6,500 tons of corn. This production will meet the requirements of rural farmers and will make it possible to put on the market a surplus of 50,000 tons of processed rice, more than 9,000 tons of corn and sorghum and 4,400 head of fattened cattle, since the project for developing the Anambe valley is an integrated agriculture-cattle rearing-forest project in which select cattle-fattening has an important place.

The small local farmer recruited from among the population of the basin will be the principal beneficiaries of the project, since they will see their annual per capita income double, with debts and water charges deducted. The latters will cover all the operating and maintenance expenses of the project. The Anambe Valley development project will be carried out in several distinct phases from 1980 to 1986.

The first is a pilot phase which will make it possible to draw conclusions from the conditions under which the pilot area is developed and will provide guidelines for managing other phases to come on a larger scale. This first phase of implementation was launched using SODAGRI'S own resources. SODAGRI did not expect external financing to be granted to launch the project.

During the 1979-1980 campaign, SODAGRI cleared and sowed 100 hectares under state management for the production of seed and supervised 1,600 hectares of peasant rice fields. It also supervised and assisted most farmers who devote themselves to growing rice as well as other cereals. The following year SODAGRI developed 240 hectares of rainy season rice crops and supervised some 1,800 hectares of peasant rice fields. In terms of production, in 1979-1980, 3,500 tons of paddy rice were grown by subsistence farmers versus 5,000 tons the following year, with some 500 tons of paddy rice marketed.

Thanks to double crops which will be practiced on the 1,000 first hectares and then on the entire 1,420 hectares which this first phase involves, the production achieved will make it possible to meet completely the rice requirements of the departments of Velingara and Kolda.

The start of the second phase will make it possible to expect production equal to half the total tonnage of the traditional Casamance rice fields in less than 5 years at the level of the Anambe Basin. The most important construction works are in this second phase. They extend over a 3-year period and involve the main reservoir works, the anti-flooding works and the main pumping station.

When these works are completed the construction of the Anambe left bank irrigation network will begin. Between 1985 and 1995 the area will be developed at a more or less steady rate of 1,350 net hectares per year.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The investment necessary for implementing this phase is increasing to 3.7 billion CFA francs. The project's internal rate of profitability is approximately 6 percent, but could be increased.

Provision has been made for the construction of hydraulic works in order to attain these different objectives. The hydraulic works would make it possible to tame the waters of the Kayanga and the Anambe by building three dams which will make possible gross storage of 430 million cubic meters, the distribution of 200 million cubic meters of water annually and the production of 4 million kilowatt hours in an average year with the Niandouba dam.

Rice, the main crop, will be grown on 96 percent of the area cultivated in winter and on 75 percent during the dry season. Integration with agriculture-cattle rearing is envisaged for most of these crops. The important water reservoirs created by the dams will provide the water supply for the cattle, while the subproducts such as rice mill refuse, bran, etc., will make it possible to meet the livestock's food requirements.

The company for Agricultural and Industrial Development of Senegal (SODAGRI) is an intervention firm under the tutelage of the Ministry of Rural Development, for the development of the hydro-agricultural improvement projects of the Anambe Basin in Haute-Casamance and of the irrigated areas in the semi-arid zone (the Louga region) on 145 hectares.

It is a semi-public company with capital of 120 million CFA francs, divided between the Price Standardization and Stabilization Fund, the National Development Bank of Senegal and the Senegalese government.

Of the 60 people employed by SODAGRI, 50 are permanently based in Velingara, three in Dakar for studies and in order to ensure the launching of the Louga projects, and seven persons are serving as liaisons between the projects and the Dakar office. It should be noted, finally, that the construction of SODAGRI headquarters in Velinagara will take place when the credits provided for the first phase of the project are effectively released.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981

9380  
CSO: 4400/1139

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

## BRIEFS

BELGIAN SENATORS' VISIT--A delegation from the foreign relations committee of the Belgian Senate on 28 April concluded a one-week visit to Senegal. The delegation, which was chaired by Jacques Hoyaux, visited the various Belgian cooperation projects in Senegal and met with Louis Alexandrenne, the Senegalese minister of Planning and Cooperation. The group of Belgian senators was also received by Amadou Cisse Dia, the president of the Senegalese National Assembly, and it held a working session with the foreign affairs committee of that assembly. The Belgian senators also took part in the opening of a practical training school, a gift from the kingdom of Belgium to Senegal, at a cost of 50 million CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1297] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 8946

TAX INCREASE--On 28 April the Senegalese Council of Ministers adopted a bill to increase corporation taxes, to improve the revenues of the Public Revenue Department. To this end it was decided to increase the rate of the tax on service benefits (TPS). The income expected from these increases will be around 2.2 billion CFA francs. On the other hand, Minister of Information and Telecommunications Djibo Ka indicated that a government bill will soon be presented to the Senegalese National Assembly providing for monthly retirement payments. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1298] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

ELECTRIC POWER PLANT--The French company, Alsthom Atlantique recently received an important order from Senegal. In fact, Senegal Electricity signed an order for Earth Power Stations Engineering to supply a "turnkey" power plant as stipulated for the city and industrial area of Kaolack. The order concerns manufacture of the complete power plant, administrative buildings, villas for personnel and the urbanization of a 12-hectare area. The station in its first section will be equipped with two SEMT [expansion unknown]-Pielstick 8 PC2-5 in-line engines, with a total power of 7 megawatts. In a second section this power will be brought up to 21 megawatts (in 1984), and in the final stage to 50 megawatts. Delivery of the first section is scheduled for December 1982. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1298] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

FRENCH FOOD DONATION--France has granted Senegal food aid amounting to 4,700 tons of corn, worth 200 million CFA francs. This delivery, which is soon to be augmented by an additional 5,000 tons of corn, was sent to the Senegalese authorities by Michel de Bonnecorse, the head of the French Aid and Cooperation mission in Dakar. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1298] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CZECHOSLOVAK AGREEMENT CONCLUDED--Senegal and Czechoslovakia have concluded a cultural and technical agreement concerning, among other things, cooperation in the fields of education, training, public health, sports, arts and information. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1184] 9380

CSO: 4400/1139

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TANZANIA

BRIEFS

DISMISSAL OF CIVIL SERVANTS--The government of Zanzibar dismissed nine officials of the Ministry for Industries, including the head of the cabinet, Mr. Kankuni, for trafficking in cocoa nut oil and soap. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1201] 9380

INCREASING CRIMINALITY--The Tanzanian government named a five-man Commission to hold an inquiry into the origin of the arms used in armed attacks and other acts of violence, which are clearly on the increase in the country, the Tanzanian minister for home affairs, General Muhidin Kimario, announced on 18 March. According to the minister, from 1975 last year, the number of violent acts in which firearms were used has risen from 125 to 500. He also confirmed that certain of the arms used came from the country's armed forces and that certain of the criminals belonged to the National Security Forces. The minister admitted that the presence of permanent armed patrols in the city of Dar-es-Salaam did not enhance the image of the city, but, he said, "there is nothing else to be done." Patrols have been dismissed in Dar-es-Salaam, Mwanza, Moshi and Arusha where the crime wave has reached alarming proportions. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1201] 9380

EXPANDED ITALIAN COOPERATION--Aristides Gunella, the Italian undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, went to Dar es Salaam in late April to finalize the technical and financial agreements between Tanzania and Italy. This is how it happened that on 2 May in the Tanzanian capital three agreements involving loans amounting to a total of \$53 million granted by Italy to Tanzania were signed. The purpose of the loans is to finance the carrying out of development programs and feasibility studies, the purchase of various products in Italy, as well as the training of Tanzanian students. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1312] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CARBON OXIDE DISCOVERIES--Stephen Lear, general manager of Tanzania Oxygen Ltd (TOL), has announced that installations for exploitation of a natural deposit of carbon dioxide (98 percent pure) situated at Kyejo in the Rungwe district (Mbeya region), are to be shipped from Denmark to Tanzania next September. Exploitation will be provided as a joint venture by TOL and the National Development Corporation (NDC) of Tanzania. The deposit is estimated at several million cubic meters and will be capable to satisfying the local demand. The expected installations will have a treatment capacity of 300 kg of gas per hour. The necessary investment will be about 17 million Tanzanian shillings. Other natural carbon dioxide deposits have been discovered in the same district. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1313] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

CSO: 4400/1183

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

REVIVAL OF LUMUMBA MOVEMENT DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-29 Mar 81 pp 31-32

[Article by Antonia Blis: "The Lumumba Renaissance"]

[Text] By breathing new life into the MNC/L [National Congolese Movement-Lumumba], the children of the assassinated leader intend to show the response of the new generations to the regime of blood and grief now being visited upon the Zairian people by Mobutu and his allies.

A little over 20 years ago, on 17 January 1961, Patrice Lumumba, after a manhunt organized by Mobutu, the then chief of staff of the national army, succumbed to the blows inflicted by his torturers, at the same time as his faithful companions in battle, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito. But that monstrous assassination was obviously not enough to reassure those who, in order to usurp the power, would not hesitate to sell out the new state's fragile independence and surrender their country to the mancuvers and the interests of the former colonial powers. Everything was also done to efface to a mere memory the man who had just entered forever into the history of his people as a hero and a martyr, and who wrote, shortly before his death: "Neither brutalities nor cruelty nor torture have ever led me to ask for pardon, for I prefer to die with my head high, with unshakable faith and profound confidence in my country's destiny, rather than live in submission and distrust of the sacred principles."

But they tried in vain to obliterate every trace of the man who had been able to embody his people's highest aspirations to freedom and dignity. So much so that even today--perhaps more than ever--in Zaire, no one can claim any credibility without laying claim one way or another to Patrice Lumumba's legacy; and so much so that Mobutu himself, the principal architect of the murder of the prime minister of the first national union government of the former Belgian Congo, but a shameless maneuverer, was not afraid to attempt to recover for himself, for purely demagogic and deceitful purposes, the capital of confidence left behind by the assassinated leader.

It was for this reason that in 1966 the "guide" in Kinshasa proclaimed Patrice Lumumba a "national hero," while a year later he was trying to make people believe that the La N'Sele manifesto, announcing the claimed "new fight" of Mobutu, drew its source from the ideals of the founder of the National Congolese Movement (MNC).

This was how, despite the distorting bombardment of Mobutist propaganda, despite a fierce repression that admits no argument, the exemplary fight of Patrice Lumumba and his companions remained undying in the popular memory. All the more so because until

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

now nothing has come to fill the political void that was opened up by the assassination of 17 January 1961; and because for 20 years the frustrations, the suffering, the disillusionments have never stopped accumulating.

## Like Relics

Just as, contrary to what the Kinshasa straw men might have hoped, devotion to the ideals for which the Congolese leader gave his life is far from being the prerogative of opposition students' or intellectuals' circles alone. It is not unusual to find in the countryside old villagers who, despite the risks incurred, kept as relics, hidden in some secret place, their first card of membership in the party of Patrice Lumumba, the MNC, or a photo of its founder. Finally, oral tradition, transmitting to new generations the knowledge of the Lumumbist epic, triumphed over official silence and lies.

That is to say that, 20 years after his disappearance Patrice Lumumba, whose life was merged with the uncompromising fight against colonialism, who knew how to outsmart the prevarications of Brussels and lead his country to independence, has remained, for the popular masses of Zaire, the symbol of their most profound aspirations. In any case it was out of this fact and the necessity, imposed more and more urgently by the present internal crisis, to assemble and organize the country's strong forces around a similar objective--to put an end to the Mobutist dictatorship and 20 years of savage neocolonialism--that last 15 January in Brussels, Zairian patriots announced their determination to breathe new life into the MNC/L, whose "renaissance" they proclaimed.

"This is not a question," the movement's spokesmen emphasize, "of an initiative stirred up from outside by a group of political exiles...On the contrary, the decision to start up again on new foundations the movement founded in October 1958 by Patrice Lumumba is the outcome of a process begun a long time ago, at the request of the militants in the interior. It is the result of a process of investigation, analysis and dialogue that has been conducted in the field for months."

At the same time, to cut short any potential tendentious speculation, the leaders of the movement, whose secretary general is Francois Tolenga Lumumba (the son of Patrice Lumumba) and whose spokesman is Julienne Lumumba (his daughter), deny that they want to make the MNC/L a "family affair." "We are not acting as Lumumba's heirs or guardians of the legitimacy of Lumumbism," Julienne Lumumba stated in this connection last 15 January in Brussels, and she rightly recalled that the assassinated leader "never behaved like a monarch and never had any pretension to founding a dynasty." Consequently, the MNC/L spokesman emphasized, "neither Patrice Lumumba's children nor the members of his tribe have the right to appropriate that legitimacy. On the other hand, as a full son and daughter of our country, we cannot be denied the political rights recognized for all citizens."

## The Armed Struggle

"We had a choice between living peacefully in Europe, making our degrees bear fruit, or engaging in the battle to save our country," Francois Tolenga Lumumba comments, for his part. "The initiative we have just taken is in a way the response of the new generations of whom it was claimed that they knew nothing of Patrice Lumumba's fight, but who on the contrary are affirming their desire to assume their responsibility to history."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The architects of the renaissance of the MNC/L are far from underestimating the magnitude of the task awaiting them. The party is currently in the restructuring and implantation stage throughout the country, but here and now it contains many militants in all strata of the population--as many in the villages as among city-dwellers--and in all regions of the country. Although it does conceal its ambition to be the guarantor of the continuity and integrity of Patrice Lumumba's political legacy, to play the role of catalyst of discontent and revolt, of guide to patriotic and revolutionary action, without prejudging, moreover, potential events that might precipitate the course of affairs, the renewed MNC/L is preparing for a long and difficult struggle.

Although the fight is to be waged without respite on political and social terrain, the movement intends to take into account the lessons of the past, but also the nature of the present regime and the determination of its imperialist allies to perpetuate their domination over the country at all costs. Just as the MNC/L firmly intends to prepare its militants and the people for any eventuality, including armed struggle, a field in which the Zairian opposition, as is well known, has already accumulated a rich experience.

Endowed with a manifesto that actualizes and extends the political thought and desire of the vanished leader, the MNC/L underlines that it does not conceive of "Lumumbism" as a dogma, but as a guide for action; its stated objective is the overthrow of the bloody and corrupt regime of Joseph Desire Mobutu and the establishment of a democratic and progressive society, founded on social justice and economic progress, in which the populations will be in control of their destiny and the national wealth.

Several key principles, which cannot suffer any infringement, underly the strategy and tactics of the restored MNC/L. In this it is faithful to the practice of Patrice Lumumba, whose party at the time it was founded was the only one to bring together the rank and file and the leaders of all regions of the country; and the MNC/L sees itself as an interethnic movement. "For us it is a matter of life or death," its secretary general emphasizes in this connection. The makeup of its leadership, moreover, does not refute this desire, and the movement's program stresses at length the necessity to respect the country's ethno-cultural diversity even while protecting its territorial integrity and forming out of it, throughout the fight for liberation still to be waged, a genuine nation that cannot be threatened at any moment with an explosion that can cause it to cease to exist, as is the case today, except from an administrative point of view alone.

"Our own Forces"

Along the same line, the MNC/L rightly believes that the revolutionary fight for the country's liberation from neocolonial domination could not be the act of one group of men, of an elite. "The miracle will not come from outside, as the abandoned and desperate populations of the Congo still too often imagine it. Nor will it come from an untimely action by a group of conspirators," say the leaders of the MNC/L. To them, in fact, there is no doubt that it is the popular masses themselves, organized and ideologically armed, who must carry out the task to completion. Just as, moreover, the movement's manifesto stresses the truly democratic nature of the new society it proposes. Consequently, it goes without saying that the MNC/L does not intend to be used as a cover or to lend itself to any operation, stirred up from inside or outside, which would consist of changing the men in place at the head of the state even while maintaining the neocolonial regime. "We are not fighting against

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

individuals, but against a system," say the MNC/L leaders. "We are fighting for a radical change that is responsive to the aspirations for well-being, for progress, for freedom and dignity of our people. We can only obtain this by depending on our own forces..."

It is impossible not to recognize that until now and despite many attempts at alliance and regrouping, the scattering of the Zairian opposition forces, too often weakened by ambitions and unquestionable rivalries or even by excessive enmities, has been a factor favorable to maintaining the Mobutu regime, as well as to the maneuvers and batterings on the part of its allies. No doubt every opposition movement on this 20th anniversary of Lumumba's assassination is proclaiming its desire to put an end to these practices. But there is still many a slip, it seems, between the cup and the lip. In this regard the renewed MNC/L, which is in its early stages, is declaring that it has contacts with all the other opposition groups, and is refraining from any criticism or any public name-calling. Among the immediate tasks defined in its manifesto, the MNC/L proposes to work for "re-forming the alliance of the Lumumbist forces."

A Central Nucleus

Although it considers this a "central nucleus of the Congolese opposition movement" and an "essential basis for acceleration of the fall of the Mobutist regime," the MNC/L states, however, that it must itself be the "major piece in the edifice." Finally, it lays down as a preliminary condition for forming the alliance the realization of an agreement around the following principles: "Defense of respect for the national unity and territorial integrity; maintaining the country's independence; the practice of democracy as a basis for the operation of the alliance." The MNC/L is anxious to state further that it rejects any alliance of a tribal nature.

Secondly, and in a broader context, the MNC/L proposes that a platform be drawn up with a view to "finding a basis for agreement with other democratic forces, the objective being to contribute to the overthrow of the present order and to create conditions favorable to the advent of a regime truly responsive to the aspirations of our people."

Will the "renaissance" process of Lumumba's party, as its promoters are asserting, mark a decisive turning point in the patriotic and revolutionary struggle of the populations of the former Belgian Congo? Only the realities, tomorrow, in the field, will make such a judgment possible.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

8946  
CSO: 4400/1155

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

INGA DAM--We mentioned briefly in our 10 April issue the decision of the Zairian Executive Council to create a free industrial zone in Inga. Statute-Law No 81-010 of 2 April 1981 instituted that system for the Inga zone. The importance of this decision will be underlined when it is recalled that the Inga site, when developed, may be one of the world's largest suppliers of hydroelectric power. The Zairians in charge want to begin now to put in place receiving structures capable of enabling the industries that will be consumers of such energy to work within a legal framework and in an encouraging economic and financial environment. The statute-law determines the object, the jurisdiction, the organization and the operation of this free industrial zone, which has been long awaited by all manufacturers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1139] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8946

ALUMINUM PLANT--According to indications from a joint committee made up of members of the Zairian Executive Council and the ALUSUISSE [Swiss Aluminium] group, a consortium has been formed to build an aluminum foundry in Zaire. The project is not a new one, and some time ago negotiations were engaged in with ALUSUISSE in the context of industrial utilization of the energy produced in Inga. But this time the project seems to be taking shape. In addition to Swiss Aluminium, the mother company of ALUSUISSE, the German firm Vereinigte Aluminium Werke [United Aluminium Industries], the Italian government-owned MCS [expansion unknown] and the Yugoslav ENERGOINVEST Company are included. Negotiations are continuing with other potential partners, and the structure of the consortium may be completed before the end of the year. We recall that what is involved is creation in Bas-Zaire of an aluminum foundry with a capacity of 150,000 tons which would absorb a good part of Inga's "surplus" electrical energy. The amount of investment necessary was estimated last year by ALUSUISSE at some \$640 million; 2,000 jobs would be created. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1138] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8946

CSO: 4400/1155

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ZAMBIA

BRIEFS

DECLINE IN YUGOSLAV TRADE--Trade between Yugoslavia and Zambia reached \$50.1 million in 1980, or a reduction of \$4 million below the year before. Yugoslavia exported to Zambia steel products, motor vehicles and spare parts. In return Zambia shipped copper, lead and zinc. Yugoslavian firms have carried out a number of projects in Zambia, through the semi-private Zecco Company in particular. They should also soon be entering into the processing of copper. On the other hand, Yugoslav experts are going to aid Zambia in the area of food crops. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1313] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8946

NHA HOUSING FINANCING PROGRAM--The Zambian National Housing Authority (NHA) will devote 10 million kwachas during the next two years to the financing of new housing and the improvement of old housing. It was the NHA administrator-delegate, David Simonda, who made this statement when presenting his organization's report for fiscal year 1979. The financing will come in particular from the profits realized on current projects. Among subsequent projects, of particular note is the Nyumba Yanga property block for low income populations. In another connection Simonda stated that the NHA recorded profits of 1.45 million kwachas in 1979, resulting from optimal use of Kabwata housing and the "vigorous" Woodlands Zone sales program. In addition, the profits will increase from year to year: in 1978 they were 1.15 million kwachas. For 1980 or 1981 it is estimated that they will reach 2 million. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1202] 9380

CSO: 4400/1139

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY