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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CONTENTS

FIGURES FOR 1978, 1979 USSR-AFRICA TRADE GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1231-1233

[Text] The foreign trade of the Soviet Union, as shown in tables USSR-Foreign Trade-A and USSR-Foreign Trade-B, has mainly to do with the SEMA-member nations (51.1 percent of the exports and 52 percent of the total imports in 1979). The developing countries, including Cuba, account for about a fifth of the total volume of the Soviet Union's foreign trade, with Africa maintaining only very limited trade relations with this country.

A great disparity exists among the trade partners of the USSR in Africa. This is what is clearly revealed by tables USSR-Foreign Trade-C and USSR-Foreign Trade-D. It can be seen that the three main African suppliers of the USSR--Egypt, Ghana and Libya--accounted for 59.6 percent of African shipments to the USSR in 1978 and 67.2 percent in 1979. The "outsiders" are the Ivory Coast, Morocco and Algeria.

The range of the USSR's African clients is a little broader, but seven countries occupy the front ranks--Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Angola and Ethoipia--with 84.4 percent of the turnover in 1978 and 83.9 percent in 1979.

The table USSR-Foreign Trade-A also shows that it is in trade with Africa that the rate of coverage of imports by exports is most unfavorable for the USSR. It further deteriorated between 1978 (90.6) and 1979 (73.8).

A. Soviet Imports from Africa

Table USSR-Foreign Trade-E details the Soviet Union's African imports for the years 1978 and 1979. Let us note the overwhelming predominance of food products of farm origin, as well as the growing role played by oil and oil products (table USSR-Foreign Trade-F). We will list here the main suppliers of the USSR in 1979, by product:

1. Farm food products--cacao: In order of importance, Ghana (56,520 tons, 150 million rubles), the Ivory Coast (25,299 tons, 62.2 million rubles), for a total of 89,749 tons imported.

Fresh fruits and vegetables: Morocco led (153,537 tons, 43 million rubles), followed by Egypt (61,163 tons, 22.2 million rubles). The main imports were oranges (208,211 tons), bananas and pineapples.

Wines and rum: The USSR has three suppliers of wine or rum in Africa--Algeria (8,862,000 bottles of fine wine, 5,874,000 rubles, and 109,830 hectoliters of other wines, 21.9 million rubles), Egypt (36,500 hectoliters of rum, 5,115,000 rubles) and Morocco (36,100 hectoliters of wine, 733,000 rubles).

Coffee: The USSR buys from Angola (4,900 tons, 9.5 million rubles), Ethiopia (7,000 tons, 18.4 million rubles), Guinea (250 tons, 500,000 rubles), and Tanzania (160 tons, 800,000 rubles).

Peanuts: The two suppliers of peanuts to the USSR are the Sudan (22,725 tons, 12.5 million rubles) and Senegal (2,820 tons, 1.55 million rubles).

Other oleaginous crops: Olive oil is obtained from Tunisia (2,000 tons, 2 million rubles), and oleaginous grains from Guinea (1,500 tons, 301,000 rubles) and Sudan (681 tons, 418,000 rubles).

2. Oil and oil products--These products come exclusively from Libya (106.8 million rubles).

3. Textile raw materials--These include spun cotton (Egypt, 15,268 tons, 84.3 million rubles) and cotton fiber (Sudan, 9,619 tons, 13.9 million rubles), and sisal hemp (Tanzania, 2.1 million rubles; Angola, 134,000 rubles).

4. Manufactured products--The only African exporter of manufactured products to the USSR is Egypt: carpets (88,033 square meters), knitted goods, linens, shoes (148,000 pair), cotton goods (9,339 meters, 8.5 million rubles in all).

5. Chemical products--This category mainly represents cosmetics imported from Egypt.

6. Ores and metallic concentrates--These products come from Guinea (20.3 million rubles) and Mozambique (642,000 rubles).

7. Timber--Quality woods are supplied by the Ivory Coast (75,537 cubic meters, 7.9 million rubles), Cameroon (41,181 cubic meters, 4.3 million rubles), Congo (11,465 cubic meters, 1.2 million rubles), Liberia (7,732 cubic meters, 750,000 rubles), and Ghana (5,424 cubic meters, 700,000 rubles). Morocco is the main exporter of cork (4.2 million rubles).

9. Ships--The USSR buys ships only from Liberia.

9. Superphosphates--Morocco is the only African supplier of superphosphates to the USSR (63,088 tons, 6.8 million rubles).

B. Soviet Exports to Africa

We do not have details on Soviet exports to Africa except for 85.4 percent of the total in 1978 and 81.8 percent for 1979. The following figures refer to the data for the year 1979. Table USSR-Foreign Trade-F shows that:

1. The greater part of Soviet exports to Africa is accounted for by machines and transportation equipment. The main customers are Libya (146.7 million rubles), Egypt (53.7 million rubles), Algeria (45.4 million rubles), Angola (44.1 million

rubles), Nigeria (24.1 million rubles), Mozambique (14.8 million rubles) and Ethiopia (7.3 million rubles). Table USSR-Foreign Trade-G shows the distribution of this category by sector.

2. Fuels--The leading African importers of Soviet fuels are Morocco (54 million rubles), Egypt (16.3 million rubles), Guinea (15.2 million rubles), Liberia (2.1 million rubles), Algeria (2 million rubles) and Guinea-Bissau (300,000 rubles).

3. Nonedible raw materials, excluding fuels--Sawn resinous timber: Exports to Africa, 42.3 million rubles, to the following clients: Egypt (196,000 cubic meters, 25.5 million rubles), Morocco (68,200 cubic meters, 6.3 million rubles), Algeria (6,700 cubic meters, 500,000 rubles), and Libya (6,200 cubic meters, 600,000 rubles).

Paper: Almost 5 million rubles, with Egypt as the leading client (13,386 tons, 3.6 million rubles).

Cement: The three cement customers of the USSR are Libya (137,000 tons, 3.4 million rubles), Algeria (106,000 tons, 2.8 million rubles) and Tunisia (79,000 tons, 2.1 million rubles).

Slate: 97,000 rubles (1,876,000 standard slabs purchased by Libya).

4. Food products--Fresh and frozen fish: The USSR sells fish to Egypt (29,154 tons, 10.2 million rubles), Mozambique (18,241 tons, 3.3 million rubles), the Ivory Coast (16,987 tons, 3.8 million rubles), Sierra Leone (11,077 tons, 1.7 million rubles), Cameroon (7,052 tons, 1.9 million rubles), and the Congo (6,211 tons, 1.6 million rubles).

Refined sugar: Sugar sales go to Mali (8,454 cubic meters, 2.2 million rubles) and Algeria (5,605 cubic meters, 1.4 million rubles).

Canned milk: Exports to Angola (1,823,000 cans, 335,000 rubles).

5. Manufactured articles, classified mainly by raw material--Textiles: Exports totaling 9.35 million rubles. The main clients for cotton goods are Sudan (3,276,000 meters), Benin (1,020,000 meters), Liberia (633,000 meters) and Algeria (280,000 meters). Spun rayon fabrics are bought by Sudan (2,872,000 meters) and Libya (438,000 meters).

Rolled ferrous metals and ferroalloys: 2.5 million rubles (Egypt).

Sheets of glass: Exports: 331,000 square meters distributed among Tunisia (147,000 rubles), Sierra Leone (53,000 rubles) and Nigeria (50,000 rubles).

6. Chemical Products--The USSR sells 1,503 tons of soap to Africa, including 1,210 tons to Zambia (377,000 rubles) and 55 tons to Algeria (13,000 rubles).

Pharmaceutical products: The main clients of the USSR for pharmaceutical products are Algeria (311,000 rubles), Egypt (300,000 rubles), Morocco (282,000 rubles), Sudan (282,000 rubles) and Guinea (58,000 rubles).

Various other chemical products are sold to Egypt (225,000 rubles).

7. Miscellaneous manufactured articles--The "miscellaneous manufactured articles" category includes articles for everyday use (305,000 rubles), freezers (1,974 units, 191,000 rubles), cameras (2,900 units, 61,000 rubles), sewing machine (500 units, 32,000 rubles), watches (22,200 units, 30,000 rubles) and film.

Before concluding this brief article on the trade between the USSR and the African continent, it should be stressed that in the course of recent decades the number of African countries with which the Soviet Union has established regular trade and economic relations has increased steadily. In 1960 the USSR had trade agreements with 6 African nations. In 1965 it had such agreements with 22, and in 1980 with 39, accounting for approximately 95 percent of the entire population of the developing countries on the continent. Agreements on economic and technical co-operation have been signed with 34 developing countries in Africa.

It should be remembered that the following have been built or are in the process of construction with the participation of Soviet organizations: the Assuan hydro-technical complex in Egypt, the largest in Africa; the Helouan (Egypt), El-Hadjar (Algeria) and Ajaokuta (Nigeria) metallurgical combines and workshops, an oil refinery in Ethiopia, a bauxite complex in Guinea, silos and canning factories in the Sudan, a cement plant in Mali, a large number of higher and secondary educational institutions, as well as a series of other major projects provided with Soviet equipment.

USSR-Foreign Trade-A

USSR Foreign Trade
(In millions of rubles)

1978

	Import	%	Export	%	Export Coverage of Imports (%)
Socialist countries	20,744.2	60	21,254.1	59.6	102.4
Industrial Western countries	10,978.8	31.8	8,701.1	24.4	79.2
Developing countries	2,831	8.2	5,714.8	16	201.9
including: Africa	694.9	2	629.7	1.8	90.6
Total	34,554.1	100	35,670	100	103.2

1979

	Import	%	Export	%	Export Coverage of Imports (%)
Socialist countries	21,438.4	56.6	23,628.5	55.7	110.2
Industrial Western countries	13,255	35	12,506.7	29.5	94.3
Developing countries	3,189.3	8.4	6,291.5	14.8	197.3
including: Africa	939.9	2.5	691.7	1.6	73.8
Total	37,882.7	100	42,426.7	100	112

* The first three quarters of 1980 yield the following figures: 768 million rubles of African imports for the USSR, and 636.8 million rubles for USSR exports to Africa.

** The ruble-dollar conversion rate for 1980: 1 ruble = $1.45.

USSR-Foreign Trade-B

The Leading 20 Suppliers and Customers of the USSR in 1979 (In percentage of total USSR imports and exports)

	Suppliers			Customers	
1.	GDR	10.3	1.	GDR	9.9
2.	Poland	9.8	2.	Poland	9
3.	Czechoslovakia	8.4	3.	Czechoslovakia	7.9
4.	Bulgaria	8.4	4.	Bulgaria	7.8
5.	USA	6.6	5.	Hungary	6.5
6.	Hungary	6.4	6.	FRG	5.2
7.	FRG	6	7.	Cuba	5
8.	Cuba	5.6	8.	Finland	3.5
9.	France	3.2	9.	Yugoslavia	3.5
10.	Japan	3.1	10.	France	3.4
11.	Finland	3	11.	Great Britain	2.6
12.	Romania	2.8	12.	Romania	2.5
13.	Italy	2.8	13.	Japan	2.2
14.	Yugoslavia	2.8	14.	Netherlands	2.1
15.	Great Britain	2.1	15.	Italy	2
16.	India	1.3	16.	Mongolia	1.4
17.	Canada	1.2	17.	Sweden	1.3
18.	Austria	1	18.	India	1.2
19.	Australia	1	19.	Belgium	1.2
20.	Iraq	0.9	20.	Vietnam	1

USSR-Foreign Trade-C

The Leading 20 African Suppliers and Customers of the USSR in 1978 (V = value in millions of rubles; % = percentage of the total value of purchases from or sales to Africa)

	Suppliers	V	%			V	%
1.	Egypt	198.4	28.5	1.	Egypt	147.5	23.4
2.	Ghana	109.4	15.7	2.	Algeria	88.3	14
3.	Libya	106.8	15.4	3.	Nigeria	75.4	12
4.	Ivory Coast	59.5	8.6	4.	Ethiopia	64.2	10.2
5.	Algeria	51.3	7.4	5.	Morocco	56.6	9
6.	Morocco	47.4	6.8	6.	Libya	51.8	8.2
7.	Guinea	26.9	3.9	7.	Angola	47.8	7.6
8.	Cameroon	17.5	2.5	8.	Guinea	20.6	3.3
9.	Nigeria	16.8	2.4	9.	Mozambique	17.4	2.8
10.	Sudan	15.7	2.3	10.	Tunisia	9.6	1.5
11.	Liberia	10.1	1.5	11.	Tanzania	6.2	1
12.	Angola	9.6	1.4	12.	Ivory Coast	6.1	1
13.	Sierra Leone	4.4	0.8	13.	Benin	5.3	0.8
14.	Ethiopia	4.3	0.8	14.	Mali	5.2	0.8
15.	Tunisia	3.8	0.5	15.	Ghana	4.8	0.8
16.	Tanzania	3.4	0.5	16.	Cameroon	3.9	0.6
17.	Congo	2.9	0.4	17.	Guinea-Bissau	3.3	0.5
18.	Togo	1.9	0.3	18.	Sierra Leone	3.3	0.5
19.	Kenya	1.6	0.3	19.	Congo	3.1	0.5
20.	Madagascar	1.4	0.2	20.	Sudan	2.7	0.4

USSR-Foreign Trade-D

The Leading 20 African Suppliers and Customers of the USSR in 1979
(V = value in millions of rubles;
% = percentage of the total value of purchases from or sales to Africa)

Suppliers	V	%	Customers	V	%
1. Libya	280.2	29.9	1. Libya	157.4	22.8
2. Egypt	198.4	21.2	2. Egypt	128.8	18.3
3. Ghana	150.8	16.1	3. Algeria	82.1	11.9
4. Ivory Coast	70.1	7.5	4. Morocco	66.6	9.6
5. Morocco	59.4	6.3	5. Angola	52.4	7.6
6. Algeria	34.2	3.7	6. Nigeria	49.9	7.2
7. Sudan	27	2.9	7. Ethiopia	44.6	6.5
8. Guinea	21.9	2.3	8. Guinea	27.7	4
9. Liberia	19.1	2	9. Mozambique	20.3	2.9
10. Cameroon	13.3	1.4	10. Tunisia	12.4	1.8
11. Angola	11.8	1.3	11. Madagascar	6.7	1
12. Sierra Leone	10.6	1.1	12. Congo	5.7	0.8
13. Tanzania	4.4	0.5	13. Mali	4.8	0.7
14. Togo	3.8	0.4	14. Ivory Coast	4.7	0.7
15. Congo	2.9	0.3	15. Guinea-Bissau	4.1	0.6
16. Tunisia	2.7	0.3	16. Cameroon	3.9	0.6
17. Kenya	2.4	0.3	17. Togo	3.8	0.5
18. Sunegal	2.3	0.2	18. Tanzania	3.4	0.5
19. Madagascar	1.2	0.1	19. Sierra Leone	3.2	0.5
20. Mozambique	0.9	0.1	20. Benin	2.9	0.4

USSR-Foreign Trade-E

Principal Soviet Imports from Africa
(In millions of rubles)

	1978	1979
1. Farm food products	364.7	388.3
including:		
Cacao (beans, butter)	195.7	232.8
Fresh fruits and vegetables	73.7	65.9
Alcohols (wine, rum)	55.6	33.6
Coffee	13.7	28.4
2. Oil and oil products	106.8	280.2
3. Raw textile materials	93.9	100.4
including:		
Cotton fiber and yarn	90.5	98.2
Sisal hemp	3.4	2.2
Manufactured products	36.2	28.4
including:		
Textile products	27	21.6
4. Craft products	7.1	3
Furniture	2.1	3.8
5. Chemical products	34.9	30.9
6. Metallic ores and concentrates	26.3	25.3
7. Wood	22.5	19.3
8. Ships	9.8	18.2
9. Superphosphates	0.7	6.8
10. Various "other"	--	39.7
Total	694.9	936.8

USSR-Foreign Trade-F

Known USSR Exports to Africa
(In millions of rubles)

	1978	1978
1. Machines and transportation equipment	347.2	359.4
2. Fuels and related products	77.6	91.5
3. Nonedible raw materials, excluding fuels	68.9	59
4. Food products	30.8	37
5. Manufactured articles, classified mainly by raw material	7.5	13.3
6. Chemical products	4	4
7. Miscellaneous manufactured articles	1.1	0.6
8. Nonclassified articles	0.8	0.7
Total	537.7	565.7

USSR-Foreign Trade-G

Soviet Exports of Machines and
Transportation Equipment to Africa
(In millions of rubles)

	1978	1978
Industrial vehicles and spare parts	82.9	59.7
Various machine tools	42.8	41.2
Aircraft engines	27.3	19.1
Energy equipment	16.4	11.6
Travel vehicles	9.8	9
Specialized vehicles	3.1	2.6
Tractors	2.2	6.3
Road construction machinery and equipment	0.6	2.3

USSR-Africa Trade in 1979

Imports from Africa
(936.8 million rubles)



Exports to Africa
(691.7 million rubles)



1. Percentage of the total
2. Vegetable food products
3. Miscellaneous
4. Wood
5. Ores and alloys
6. Chemical products
7. Manufactured consumer products
8. Raw textile materials
9. Oil and oil products
10. Transportation equipment and machinery
11. Miscellaneous and unknown
12. Food products
13. Nonedible raw materials (excluding fuels)
14. Fuels and byproducts

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GISCARD'S FORMER POLICIES, MITTERRAND'S NEW DIRECTIONS REVIEWED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 May 81 pp 30-33

[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Mitterrand as candidate already had an Africa policy worthy of Mitterand as president. In our last issue we summarized his party's proposals for changing the relationship between France and Africa. These proposals are not only a counterweight to the policies Giscard has followed the last 7 years. They flow from an analysis of what Africa today means to itself, and how it relates to external intervention. In this issue we publish, as an exclusive, this document which serves as the basis of the Africa policy called for by the PSF.

The first key idea: the rejection of any claim that Africa is a special preserve for other powers. The second key idea: a rejection of the anti-Soviet obsession, as the PSF believes that the USSR, "legalistic" in its interventions, is neither trying to create new conflicts nor to stir up old ones. At least it is not trying to get more than long-term "anchorage points" on Africa's coasts.

Third key idea: some African states are on the way to becoming "regional powers." In North Africa, Libyan expansionism is considered a serious threat, while Algeria's positive role is recognized. In black Africa, Nigeria is urged to claim a predominant position, as to a much lesser extent are Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Tanzania.

Fourth key idea: French cooperation must be extended, particularly to the Front Line countries, and it must become more selective in the future by eliminating aid to notoriously dictatorial regimes.

> From all this analysis, notable for its soundness, one can only draw the conclusion that Mitterrand will remove the French umbrella under which a number of African leaders sheltered themselves the better to exercise their absolute power, on the pretext of denying access to the Soviet Union.

The African continent is at the present time embarked on a phase of change, still underneath the surface, which may be fecund but whose extremely varied manifestations have but a single common point: they are responding to, and at the same time accelerating, the disintegration of most of the statal institutions which resulted from decolonization. This decomposition is not simply the result of the inadequacy of certain leaders, nor of foreign economic and political domination. But this shift in the foundations may be perverted by the manipulations of outside powers.

Very simple in its broad lines, the policy of the former colonial powers, and especially France, was to maintain the status quo, whatever it was, without paying too much attention to ideological facades, so far as there were any, and to preserve the benefits they enjoyed along with the essential mechanisms for economic domination. The United States, which in the 1950's seemed to want to hasten decolonization for its own benefit, was in reality not very involved in the whole process, except for investing in several countries where operations were profitable (particularly in southern Africa) and giving strong support to a few regimes judged to be of strategic importance, such as Kenyatta's Kenya, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and the Portuguese colonial system.

This being the case, we have contributed to keeping injustice alive and maintaining hotbeds for major explosions, southern Africa and Ethiopia in particular, while on the other hand we have provoked or accelerated a process of general political disintegration.

The drought in Ethiopia, the fall of the conservative Portuguese regime, were enough to considerably alter the balance of power on the continent, but the establishment of zones of Soviet preponderance was not an inevitable consequence of these important events: the new leaders of Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola only agreed to accept it under the pressure of circumstances; it was the gross blunders, or the cowardice, of the Western powers that in large part led to it.

Soviet Legalism

It must be admitted that Soviet policy in Africa has been distinguised by its legalism: the USSR has never supported secessionist or rebel movements (except, and one could hardly criticize it for this, in southern Africa), and it has collaborated with the most diverse regimes. While Soviet policy may not thus have created open conflicts on the continent, it has hardly contributed to resolving those which already existed: it could doubtless have hastened the fall of Ian Smith's regime, but did not try, even though it would have been as simple as destabilizing the chrome market; as a big gold-producing country, it could also, doubtless, have created more problems for South Africa.

In the military support it has provided, it has often appeared cautious. Even in Eritrea, where it has provided powerful support to the Ethiopian military, it is not certain that it is aiming for the most rapid possible elimination of the liberation movements.

Not to hasten either the appearance of violent conflicts or the resolution of those which have already broken out seems to be a rule for the Soviets. They aim more to assure themselves,--both in peaceful situations and in conflicts--of anchorage points which will be fully utilized whenever the evolution of social forces and the exacerbation of tensions on the continent or elsewhere makes them truly operational and necessary. In the present situation, /Soviet influence appears to be complete only in a few countries where it is not seriously or honestly rivalled;/ that influence is not, however, in any way irreversible, as is shown by the evolution of Egypt and Somalia.

New Force of Islam

Another spectacular change is the growing weight of the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East on sub-Saharan Africa. Economically, it results from the actions taken by almost all the oil-producing countries, who among themselves carry out a subtle struggle for influence which manifests itself particularly in the Sudan-Sahel states, where Islam is strongly established. Culturally, it has gained new prestige because of its status as a non-colonial civilization, and because of its new oil wealth. Politically, it seems to boil down to a contest between the countries of the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Libya--the object of which is influence on the Sahara, which is apt to become once again what it was in the Middle Ages, a connecting link between the two halves of the continent. The Saharan-Morocco conflict, like the war in Chad, has brought new life to the old roads crossing the desert. They have also brought the ominous threat of a new predominance of the continent's northern countries.

Incontestably, the greatest anxiwty is caused by Libya's presence in sub-Saharan Africa. Its intervention in Chad, and even more the proposed merger between the two states, has given rise to a vigorous move by the governments concerned, which feel themselves directly threatened, to condemn the actions taken.

Finally, one must take into account an additional factor involved in the evolution of disparities between countries, in their economic weight and their political influence. Today we see the assertion of influence by Nigeria, the most populous by far of the countries in tropical Africa, and also the most wealthy. No other state has the resources to exert influence at the continental level, but on a local scale, those which are experiencing fewer problems, or which enjoy political and ideological influence, may be exerting growing influence on their neighbors: this is the case with Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. In a less thense context, this might be a positive factor for the creation of regional solidarities.

Long the private preserve of the former colonial powers, the African continent has thus today become open to influences which are much more varied and are broadly antagonistic. This has not, for the time being, provoked a major crisis. Soviet penetration was not until recently a cause of excessive concern in the United States: for the United States, in fact, and particularly for a man like Andrew Young, the blunders of the Soviets and their inability to understand African societies, as well as the wealth of experience and influence of the Western countries, kept the situation fluid and did not make direct intervention by Washington necessary. One could therefore leave the former colonial powers, and particularly France, a pre-eminent role on the continent. We might for our own part add that the communist countries themselves certainly do not have a perfectly homogenous view of Africa's problems.

Cooperation With Peoples

But the increase in global tensions, then Reagan's accession to power, the interplay of local expansionist policies, have doubtless already more deeply changed the picture than yet appears. Other ambitions are being asserted, particularly with the renewal of United States' interest, which is heightened by the fact that the USSR--discreetly but not ineffectively--is showing its resolve to keep a close watch on the maritime routes all around the continent (naval facilities acquired in Angola and at Sao Tome, sought in Cape Verde). These ambitions will make themselves felt all the more because Africa is no longer a lethargic continent, but a zone from which, if something is not done quickly, a general crisis of very great scope--already manifest in Uganda, Chad, and Zaire--is going to emerge. The general indications are not lacking: stagnation of agricultural production, and in certain very remote regions, almost general food shortfalls, extreme weakness in the growth pace of industrial production, catastrophic indebtedness tied to trade balances whose deficit appears irreparable (the consequence of the increasing weight of oil import costs and the fall of export commodity prices). Fragile from the start, the states now lack the minimum of resources essential to management and control of their territory.

Alas, it is all too easy to paint a very somber picture of the situation in a number of countries 10 years from now: most of the territory will become once again a "tribal reserve," left to itself, feeding manpower to the few growth centers, or at best destined to welcome tourists desperate for exoticism. With this as the foundation, the rapidly swollen cities and a few islets of imported "prosperity" will stand out with their occasional plantations or industrial plants, controlled at least indirectly by foreign powers. Indeed, because of the continually growing indebtedness, the latter will have an iron grip on the public finances and foreign trade: this is already the case for a country like Zaire, which is under the tutelage of the IMF. But this may also be the fate lying ahead for countries that depend on the communist bloc. Wearing different clothes, it will be the ultimate refinement to neocolonialism, or, if one prefers, the realization of one of the most economic forms of colonialism: indirect administration, or the protectorate.

One might try to define Giscard's strategy on the continent as political and economic conservatism, joined with a strategy of expansion beyond the traditional sphere of influence, facilitated for a time by the relative indifference of the other western powers. This policy can be defined in terms of a series of concentric arcs.

In the center, the "hard core," of the former colonial empire. Immediately beyond it is found a "greater French-speaking Africa," part of which may seem to be in the process of being absorbed into the previous zone. It includes the former Belgian colonies and both the isolated Portuguese-speaking and English-speaking enclaves. The cases of Nigeria and Ghana are less open and shut: these are "big mouthfuls" which do not let themselves be absorbed so easily.

Roughly speaking, it is possible to define the criteria for membership in both of these zones. The "central core" is defined by military intervention (and from this point of view Zaire, the largest French-speaking country in the world, already belongs in it), attempts at political manipulation (manipulation of the statesmen in power or attempts to destabilize regimes that are too independent). The second zone is defined by its participation in Franco-African conferences.

Beyond that, one finds Africa "incognita"--basically English-speaking--which is to be approached only with caution, not to say with trepidation (witness, for example, the expectant attitude of the French Government in regard to Zimbabwe). In that respect we are still in the exploratory stage, particularly in the scientific field, and we are not yet ready to take spectacular initiatives.

Blunders and Scandalous Actions

Finally, there remains the unique case of South Africa. Contacts with Pretoria have not been significantly reduced; of course, Giscard was able to say that he respected the embargo on arms...since the granting of French licenses makes it possible for South Africa to make do for itself, but commercial and industrial relations are still solid. France is actively participating in the exploitation of Namibia's wealth, particularly uranium, in defiance of United Nations' resolutions.

In the context of Giscard's policy, the expansion of French influence beyond its special sphere, in other words toward countries that are often extremely wealthy, is inseparable from an extreme conservatism with respect to the central core. It is in fact a question of assuring political stability, or rather of providing complacent leaders with a sort of "life insurance," albeit at the cost of continual intervention. If we are to judge on the basis (certainly debatable) of the stability of leaders (which does not necessarily mean political stability), instability in francophone Africa has been twice as great as in English-speaking Africa, whereas Great Britain intervened only twice in Africa, following the granting of independence to Tanzania and Kenya, to put down revolts with soldiers.

Relations With Pretoria

French intervention has only rarely (Gabon) had the effect of keeping a head of state in power; often the aim has been (as in Central Africa) to replace him with someone else, and we are not even counting the clandestine destabilizing moves in the Comoros and Benin, of which it could not have been unaware, and thus encouraged. The majority of French interventions aimed at dealing with almost hopeless situations, at the origin of which, in various ways, lay considerable French culpability: the ill-considered, even scandalous support of Bokassa, the Chadian imbroglio which in large part is the result of the complacent attitude toward Tombalbaye, followed by the establishment, with the Elysee's blessing, of an incompetent military regime; the "salvage" of Mauritania, which was thrust into a war by French refusal to recognize the rights of the Saharan people. The two French interventions in Zaire resulted from a more complex situation, where more states were compromised, but in two respects French responsibility is apparent; in the encouragement given to the Angolan trouble-makers, and in the continuing support of the Mobutu regime in its most scandalous aspects. The foundations of Giscard's policy are the following axioms: /the weaker a state, the stronger France is within it; the poorer a state, the less costly it is to maintain it under our influence.

A scandalous policy, contemptuous of the right of peoples to peace and development, which sets at naught the courageous efforts of our cooperators, which makes our economic aid--already too parsimoniously measured out and poorly directed--meaningless.

France sets aside for aid to the poorest countries in Africa 0.02 percent of its GNP! A policy which basically is intended to keep a certain number of African governments in a state of vassalage.

However clumsy and scandalous the actions of the French Goverbment, the other powers scarcely do any better: the USSR, for example, shows itself just as hegemonistic and anxious about its own interests, and it only provides extremely limited economic assistance.

Above all, the weakness of the African states is such that they must compromise wisely. They themselves trade too much (often by necessity) with South Africa to be able to call themselves very particular; indeed, they would certainly like France to take a different position, but they must accommodate themselves to France's policy. They disapprove of French intervention in Central Africa because of its modalities, but because they were unable to propose an alternative solution, they had to accept it. France has been a cynical player, not always a clumsy one. Interventionism in the central core and more selective expansion beyond it are two elements in a concerted policy.

Too much history, too many friendships, too many common interests, a different conception of France's place in the world, and simple honor require us to build a different French policy in Africa, with constant dialogue with the Africans themselves.

Progressively more anemic, more and more ineffective and mercantile, France's contribution to the survival, first, and then the development of Africa needs a profound reassessment. What we call cooperation is only one element, albeit an important one, and its functioning needs to be completely recast. It is not a question of using it cold-bloodedly to acquire or maintain "influence," that is to say to satisfy short-term political interests, or to consolidate already acquired and often questionable economic benefits. The cooperative efforts carried out by France (and cooperation in Africa is only a special case) should have two functions. First, to engage the participation of all the creative forces of the country, regardless of the social level where they may be found, in the struggle against want on a continent with which we have many longstanding ties. Second, to establish, within a more manageable short-term context, bilateral relations--or, to the degree possible, relations between the EEC and the associated countries--and new types of relations which prefigure what might become a new international economic order.

For the concept of cooperation by itself, a partial remedy but not a definitive solution, must be transcended, and a leftist government has a duty to struggle actively for the establishment of more equitable relationships on a global scale; this is particularly crucial for a continent which contains almost all of the poorest countries in the world.

Improvement or Neocolonialism

It is indispensable to build our relations on the African continent on a broader spectrum. Determined support for the Front Line countries is politically essential. That does not in any way mean that France should repudiate its special responsibilities toward countries which for nearly three-quarters of a century have been intimately associated with its history, countries which share with France not only the use of the same language for communication, but many ways of experiencing and evaluating the world that go along with it. By increasing its aid to the level of 0.7 percent of its GNP, excluding the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments-Overseas Territories] (compared to the current 0.3 percent), France would have the means to help other countries without abandoning traditional ties.

The possibilities will be wide open. But we would have to exclude from the start both racist regimes (primarily South Africa) and those in which violation of human rights constitutes a sort of governing principle. Unfortunately, of course, as in many other parts of the world, human rights are lightly dismissed in a number of African countries, and on the question of respecting them we have no intention of compromising; but, in a word, there are few countries where the attack on these principles reaches such a level that state-to-state cooperative relations--and even more especially, cooperative relations not just with the leaders, but with the people--are made impossible because they are categorically distorted for other ends.

9516
CSO: 4400/1258

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DACKO ACCUSED OF ELECTORAL FRAUD

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May-8 Jun 81 pp 35-36

[Article by Antonia Blis: "He Who Loses Wins"]

[Text] We have had a hard time in doing and saying and even sometimes hailing the advent of democracy, despite the evidence, in a Central African Republic occupied by the "sharks." And nothing at all of what has happened in Bangui in these recent weeks can change the picture. Quite the contrary. And it is a very sad parody of the multiparty system which the regime of David Dacko is trying to pursue.

In fact, only a caricature could demonstrate how this system, at least as it is conceived by the advisers to the successor of Bokassa, is a mere swindler's game.

As could be expected, the Central African chief of state denies that the four opposition candidates who, as is known, filed a petition for annulment with the supreme court based on the irregularities and the fraud observed during the presidential election, have any right to challenge the results of the balloting on 15 March. According to David Dacko, who is seeking very simply to pose the problem upside down, it is the opposition which, profiting from "material difficulties and irregularities noted," is trying to distort the outcome of the balloting. Based on his strange reasoning, the president of the "sharks" has emphasized that since the organization of the voting was entrusted to a "special commission" in which each candidate was asked to participate, the four petitioners (Abel Goumba, of the FPO [Ubangi People's Patriotic Front]-PT; Henri Maidou, of the PRP [Republican Party for Progress]; Ange Felix Patasse, of the MLPC [Central African People's Liberation Movement]; and independent candidate Francois Pehoua) are "poorly situated" to challenge the results of an election the methods of which they approved.

Unfortunately for David Dacko and for his public image, there is abundant evidence today showing that the electoral process was manipulated and rigged from beginning to end. A list of some of the most spectacular facts amassed in their petition for annulment of the 15 March electoral process by the opposition candidates suffices to persuade one of this fact.

Green and Purple

It was on 13 March, i.e., 48 hours before the voting, that the Dacko government suddenly decided, to the great astonishment of everyone, that the green electoral cards which had been used for the constitutional referendum on 1 February 1981 were no longer valid, and that each voter must have a purple card in order to vote. As can be imagined, tremendous confusion ensued, and it was easy for those in power to profit from it to their own benefit. The more so since an insufficient number of the famous purple cards had been distributed when indeed they were not entirely unavailable, as was the case in some places.

Under these conditions, the anger of the people was in danger of exploding, and it was following a protest made to the chief of state by the four candidates opposing David Dacko that the government made a new decision, which was added to the first, already described. It would be possible to vote on presentation of a national identity card, or failing that, an authorization from the president of a court (which had absolutely to be obtained even if the voter lived 80 km from the nearest court seat), and if, in addition, the individual had previously been registered on the voting list. It must be realized in addition that this last-minute authorization was announced in a statement broadcast the national radio, which is, obviously, not relayed to or heard at all times of day, above all in the provinces. In short, the confusion had reached its peak by 15 March. But this was not enough to guarantee the victory of the candidate of the "sharks." If the majority of the voters no longer knew to which saint to turn and found themselves deprived of the means of carrying out their "duty" as citizens, the members and officials of the government party, the UDC [Central African Democratic Union] did, for their part, have in hand a large number of the purple electoral cards, so hard to find, which they could use at will by visiting the polls to their hearts' content.

In order to reduce, if not cancel out, the chances of the opposition candidates, other maneuvers were also utilized. For example, at some voting places, the ballots for this or that candidate running against David Dacko had not been received in sufficient numbers, or a certain quantity had been "mislaid."

Errors in the Date

Elsewhere, it was discovered at zero hour that the ballots of the PRP candidate were mysteriously dated 22 March 1981, and those of the FPO were dated 30 March. Now, a suddenly issued government communique, of course, had announced that ballots which did not carry the date 15 March 1981 would be considered null and void. This strange "phenomenon" involving an error in the date was observed not only in Bangui but also in the provinces, in particular in Lobaye.

At the same time, pressure had been put on the administrative authorities, the mayors and district or village chiefs in particular. They had been threatened with being stripped of their functions if those under their jurisdiction dared not to vote for the UDC candidate. It was possible to obtain proof of recourse to this method of terror and blackmail in certain districts in Bangui, as well as in Haute-Kotto, Lobaye, Haute-Sangha and Kemo-Gribingui.

But the manipulation was to reach its culmination at the decisive moment, that is to say during the general counting of the votes. In principle, a national commission in which representatives of each candidate in the presidential election would participate was entrusted with this task. And the good faith of this structure, the four opposition candidates made a point of stating, cannot be challenged. However, two tremendous anomalies were reported.

First of all, no representative of the opposition candidates was present either during the dispatch or the receipt of the telegrams or telex messages reporting the results of the ballot scrutiny at each voting site. In addition, instead of going directly to the national general counting commission, these results went first to another commission--this one unofficial--which, it seems, was located at the Ministry of Interior. Needless to say, there was never any comparison of the telex and telegram messages sent and received and the reports of the voting stations.

Smoke Without Fire

It is understandable, under these conditions, that it took the supreme court four days before it was able to make a judgment on the final results. And also that the four candidates opposed to Dacko are entitled to demand the annulment of a more than doubtful election as an act of justice owed to the whole of the Central African people.

One can also understand why, when the curtain had scarcely fallen after this electoral masquerade, David Dacko, who was, however, officially elected with only 50.23 percent of the vote, set out again to govern with an iron hand, waging war on any opposition and relying solely on his party, the UDC, tailored to his measure, and again monopolizing the media entirely, as if the democratic constitution of 1 February 1981 and the promised "multiparty system" had never been anything but illusory smoke without fire.

5157
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COMORO ISLANDS

STRANGE COUP ATTEMPT REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr 81 p 56

[Text] On Wednesday, 4 March, the ambassador of the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros in Paris, Ali Mla Haili, confirmed the report that an attempted coup d'etat launched against his government the night of 14-15 April had been nipped in the bud.

This attempt once again confirms the weakness of the government of President Ahmed Abdallah, who was still denying the existence of any organized opposition to the Comoros. It is, moreover, generally believed that the president wishes to withdraw from national affairs and designate as his successor his eldest son, Said Hassam Said Hachim, the present governor of Greater Comoros, which Martin Koch, President Giscard d'Estaing's councillor for African and Malagasy affairs, was to approve.

The federal army, apprised of the plot by leaks is said to have arrested some 40 to 50 people a week before its launchings. Outstanding among them are the names of Abd Eramane Sidi, former director of Ali Soilih's cabinet and former right-hand man of Nasser Edins, Said Ali Kamal's brother, a non-commissioned officer of the presidential guard who also joined the opposition, as well as post office inspector, army officers and a religious personnage. The main culprit is Mohamed M'Ze, a professor banished to the Moheli island as a disciplinary precaution. M'Ze was the prefect of Greater Comoros under Ali Soilih.

Some students have been found to be in possession of arms coming from the presidential guard's supplies, which, however, are always invaded by Bob Denard's mercenaries.

During their questioning--some confessions, it seems, were obtained under torture--the conspirators were said to have stated that "they wished to put an end to the present government's corruption and to the country's economic slump." They stated that they were acting on their own initiative and aimed at ensuring the responsibility of power.

Ahmed Abdallah's only response, so far, has been to hold a meeting on 12 March at Anjouan. The president there stated: "There is no need for the foreigner who comes to help us gives us any poisonous assistance. It is better to live happily without assistance than to live unhappily with considerable assistance. I greatly respect Communists and I would wish them to respect us in turn. The same holds for every trend of opinion but let them not throw a spanner into our works, or I shall send them off about their business within 48 hours!" The Anjouan deputy, Boursy-Ali, also called attention to the "increasing Communist influence with which neighboring countries are being overrun." What is going to become of the Comoros? For some time now, we have foreseen this deterioration of the situation and considered the possibility of an all-out solution to the problem with the archipelago's reunification. President Abdallah has just repeated that he had the impression that negotiations on this matter are progressing.

French assistance, in any case, is artifically keeping the government alive. Once again, civil servants' salaries could not be paid until mid-February through an emergency grant from the fourth installment of the balanced subsidey budget granted in Paris.

Military assistance is entrusted to about 100 French soldiers and coastal observation to French navy planes which regularly carry out their rounds of supervision.

It was while leaving the Comoros that a Breguet-Atlantic from the French Lann-Bihoue base crashed causing the death of eight crew members. This equipment can pin-point submarines, acoustic buoys and intercept any radar transmission.

8870
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COMORO ISLANDS

PRIME MINISTER SPEAKS ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, in French 8 May 81 pp 1315-1316

[Text] On 24 April, Prime Minister Salim Ben Ali opened the first regular 1981 session of the Federal and Islamic Republic of Comoros with an address in which he highlighted the activities his government had undertaken particularly in the economic and social field. Extensive excerpts from this address follow together with a balance sheet and program:

"We have made every effort, first of all, to ensure development in the agricultural field which, in the near future, will enable us to achieve food self-sufficiency. You voted, at one time, for the law aimed at establishing the Federal Center for the Support of Rural Development, which with the local centers, plans to include the farming world to ensure the encouragement of better cultural techniques and the use of improved varieties for an optimal use of arable surfaces. At the present time, six Cader [agricultural companies] are ensuring heightened interest in more than 120 villages. In 1982 four others will be established. Their activity is concerned with the improvement of market gardening and fruit-bearing trees, the development of small stock farming, and the introduction of maize. All the conclusive results of these operations lead one to believe that the 1.500 billion Comoran francs the government has allocated to this program along with the contribution from the European Development Fund [EDF] and the United Nations Development Program [UNDP] in the amount of 1.152 billion Comoran francs, will prove to be a profitable undertaking.

"The chronic lack of proteins in the Comoros has led us to draw up a plan for improving and developing the small-scale fishing industry; the African Development Fund will finance the equipment needed with a loan of 1.52 billion Comoro francs. The final formalities preceding the releasing of the loan have been completed and before long the operation will enter into an active stage. Regarding industrial fishing, before engaging in it here ourselves, we shall endeavor to regulate it, control it and only allow its practice in our own economic areas with previous authorization and a fair charge.

"We have not overlooked our income sources: there are still the African Development Fund which has lent us 1.480 billion Comoro francs, 200 million to be the government's responsibility, to finance the project called 'Development of Vanilla Plant and Clove Tree.' Regarding our coconut grove restoration and the battle against rats which are destroying a significant part of the crops, it will cost 1.26 billion French francs with a loan from the International Development Association [IDA] (...)

"Another priority sector is public health, which calls for a complex substructure and specialists on every level. There is no lack of assistance to further our work: the United Nations Fund for Activities in Matters of Population, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, the Kuwait Fund, the Swiss Red Cross, WHO [World Health Organization], a private organization, the Friends of Father Damien, who are dedicated to donating to the care of lepers. All of these contribute in various ways to the restoration, equipment, procurement of supplies, functioning, and to the reopening, in case of need, of our hospital units on all levels: reference or regional hospitals, maternity, dispensary centers."

On this subject, the prime minister made a point of mentioning the "especially significant" assistance of Kuwait which, after having sent a mission to the Comoros in November 1980, granted it a $5.0 million gift which enabled it to meet public health needs. The most ambitious among the long-term projects is wiping out malaria which wreaks havoc on the people's health. WHO estimates the cost at 1,100 million Comoro francs for which the government is seeking financial aid.

In the educational field, the number of primary school pupils this year has increased 6.33 percent and the number of teachers, 20 percent. Important reforms are underway both regarding organization and permanent teacher training. The diversification of the various branches of education has encouraged the establishment of the National Institute of Education, the National Teacher Training School, the National Secretarial School, the National Multipurpose Technical School and the M'Vouni School of Higher Education, aimed at training higher education faculties. A proposal to create a National School of Medicine has been presented to the Federal Assembly.

The government, the African Development Fund, the Kuwait Fund, French cooperation, the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency [ACCI] all share in the working, construction and equipment of the school substructure. Thanks to Kuwait, six Islamic colleges, whose work was interrupted for lack of financing, can now be completed and equipped. It will also now be possible to establish the Institute of Teacher Training for teachers of the Arabic-Islamic languages and civiliation.

The prime minister also mentioned that abroad there are 509 Comoro students, 70 of whom are in the medical field and among them, 34 future doctors. The students share 150 national scholarships and 382 scholarships totaling some 180 million.

In short, Mr Salim Ben Ali referred to activities and projects regarding material equipment: The fifth EDF [European Development Fund] projects, in pursuance of the Lome II Convention decision, include the opening up of our islands to the construction of harbors, as also a project for telecommunication development in which the Kuwait Fund is participating. This undertaking is to begin in the coming trimester. In like manner, the development of our electrical production and our water supply are giving rise to studies and, please God, to industries.

"In a word, the road projects under construction in our various islands are opening up the interior of our agricultural regions and our villages, while significant works are going to start on the Hahaya international airfield to make it possible, beginning in July 1981, to welcome heavy transport aircraft (...)

Maritime intercommunication between our islands and the outside world will also be significantly improved, thanks to harbor work for which studies, with FED financing, are already underway for Moroni and Mohell, and for Mutsamdu as soon as the invitation to tender has been launched."

Following the prime minister's address, the Federal Assembly undertook the examination of the numerous draft bills which were on the agenda for the 45-day meeting, in particular:

--Bill on the establishment of a School of Higher Education, the National Teacher Training School, the National Secretarial and Business School, the National Multi-purpose School, the National School of Medicine.

--Bill on the establishment of the Society for the Development of Fishing in Comoro

--Bill on authorizing the government to endorse a loan of 300 million Comoro francs to CCCE for Electricity and Water in the Comoros.

--Bill repealing and replacing the No 80-20 law on the organization and operation of the public establishment named Electricity and Water in the Comoros (EEDC).

--Bill on the ratification of the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros adherence to the 12 August 1974 agreement on the establishment of the Islamic Bank of Development.

--Bill on the establishment of a Road Maintenance Fund and the imposing of taxes on fuel, intended to increase these Funds.

--Bill for the establishment of a Postal Service Office in the Comoros.

8870
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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

COMOROS-MADAGSCAR TOWARD RAPPROCHEMENT--The Comoran prime minister, Salem Ben Ali, accompanied by two other persons, among them, the Comoran roving ambassador, Omar Tamou, on 25 April undertook a private trip to Majunga. On the other hand, some Comoran technicians from the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning and Foreign Trade were to take part, in late April, in a working meeting at Antanarivo for vanilla-producing countries in the Indian Ocean. Some hope for and see in these visits the beginning of rapprochment between Madgascar and the Comoros whose relations broke off in all areas since the lamentable events in Majunga (late 1976) where more than 1,000 Comorans lost their lives and, so it seems, for political reasons relating to different political choices between the two countries. However, normalization for these neighboring countries, whose lot for decades has been linked in every area, is keenly desirable and longed for. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1316] 8870

UN: FINANCING AGREEMENT--Last 24 March, the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] representative resident in the Comoros, Mr Guy Belliard, and Mr Salim Ben Ali, prime minister, signed a financing agreement based on FNUP [National Fund for Progressive Union] resources totaling $1.250 million, for constructing a road to Anjouan (the 3.6 km Sima-Boungoeni road) and a central market in Moroni. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES-TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1316] 8870

BID: LOAN AGREEMENT--On 24 April, the Islamic Bank for Development president, Mr Ahmed Mohamed, arrived in Moroni on an official 4-day visit. He was to discuss with the country's authorities the various economic problems which confront the Comoro Islands. During this visit he was also to sign a loan the Islamic Bank in the Comoros has agreed to for the reconstruction of hydrocarbon storage installations, the building of a new warehouse and the importation of refined oil products. This loan goes as high as 1.8 billion Comoran francs (that is, 36 million French francs). [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES-TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1316] 8870

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CONGO

SASSOU NGUESSO REFUSES TO YIELD MILITARY INDEPENDENCE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 22-23

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Friendship or Alliance?"]

[Text] The president of the People's Republic of the Congo returned to Brazzaville on 18 May following an official 6-day visit to the Soviet Union. He is the third Congolese chief of state, along with Massamba-Debat and Commander Marien Ngouabi, to have visited Moscow. Planned four times since he took office (February 1979) and postponed at the last minute in each case, this visit which took so long to come about aroused anger and suspicion in leading Congolese circles. And it gave rise to the most widely varied commentaries in Brazzaville diplomatic circles.

Since diplomatic relations were established (1964), cooperation between the two countries, based on similar analyses of the major international problems, has developed and diversified. If the dam the Soviets had undertaken to build on the Mpama, in the region of the Bateke plateaus, as of 1966, was finally abandoned, the contribution of the USSR has, on the other hand, been realized in numerous other fields: the Blanche Gomez Maternity Hospital in Brazzaville, polymetal prospecting, research and training institutes, the Hotel Cosmos, etc.

But it is training which is the crowning jewel of this cooperation. Hundreds of Congolese students are pursuing their studies in Soviet universities, institutes and other schools. Numerous cadres trained in this way in the broadest variety of disciplines are today holding leading posts in the administration, technical departments and even the cabinet, to wit, Minister of Water and Forestry Henri Njdombo.

Similarly, Moscow has contributed heavily to the equipping and training of the Congolese army. The tanks, armored vehicles, pursuit and troop transport planes exhibited on holidays in Brazzaville are basically Soviet manufactured. Only the Alouette type helicopters (French) and some tanks and naval patrol vessels of Chinese origin are exceptions to this rule. As to the Congolese army officers, the overwhelming majority of them are graduates of the Moscow, Leningrad, Frunze and other similar military academies.

Fortress

On returning to the Congo after their stay in the USSR, these men are generally staffed by a sizable contingent of Soviet advisers here. To these are added the technicians responsible for the "maintenance" of military equipment, the professors, doctors and other cooperative workers. Thus a visitor strolling the streets of Brazzaville will encounter many Soviet citizens en route between their headquarters at the Cosmos Hotel and the vast edifice built like a fortress not far away where they have installed their embassy beneath the luxuriant foliage overlooking the Congo River.

The importance of Soviet military cooperation does not, however, prevent the Brazzaville leaders from demonstrating a remarkable awareness of reality. The giant portraits of the six heroes in the official hagiography--Marx, Engels, Lenin, Castro, Che Guevara and Ngouabi--dominating the intersections of the main streets of the capital might at first glance cause concern, if not discomfort, in the untutored capitalist. Let him then make contact with the dignitaries of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT, the single party of which the official ideology is Marxism-Leninism), and the higher officials and cadres in the administration. Let him observe the scenes of daily life in Brazzaville. He will soon enough realize that in the tropics, communism has a human aspect worthy of the envy of the inhabitants of the people's democracies of Eastern Europe.

In any case, whether they are party militants or not, the Congolese people lead a happy and active life, far from the terror and the police harassment which often typify the "brotherly countries." This original characteristic is reflected first of all in the structure of trade between the People's Republic of the Congo and the world outside. Their sincere and profound attachment to Marxist doctrine does not in fact prevent the Congolese officials from placing all foreign countries in a competitive position. "We always choose the products of the best quality at the best price," one of them told us.

On the basis of this "eminently objective criterion," it often happens that the Soviet comrades are the losers, to the benefit of Chinese, French, Japanese or German competitors. We then asked our interlocutor if this angers them. "Doubtless it does, but they are in a poor position to hold it against us, since they know that the criterion for our choice is based on the clearly understood interests of our country. And thus it is not our fault if the people often prefer Chinese products to Soviet products," he explained.

Whether the problem is the construction of dams or roads, the building of textile complexes or mining prospecting, and even in the oil sector, an invitation has always been extended to the Soviet Union. But whether because its technology was not yet perfected or because the conditions offered were deemed unacceptable by the Congolese, it has rarely succeeded in effecting such deals.

Anonymity

It is above all foreign policy which reflects the desire of the Congo for independence. While remaining the friend of the Soviet Union, it in no way intends to become an unconditional ally. This was noted shortly after President Sassou Nguesso took office. Observers were betting that his first visit abroad would take him first to Moscow. However, the young chief of state went to Paris (October 1979). It is a fact that despite 17 years of revolution, the former colonial power remains the Congo's leading trade partner. And to add to the fury of the Soviets, nine months after his visit to France, the first secretary of the PCT took off for...Beijing.

Moscow's discontent came further to the fore during the celebration of the centennial anniversary of the founding of Brazzaville (October 1980). The French delegation, assigned the best seats, was treated with special favors, while the delegation from Moscow was left in the most complete anonymity! The tension was to reach its culmination during the debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations on Afghanistan in the month of January 1980. Despite the pressure exerted by the USSR ambassador in Brazzaville, Mr Kuznetsov, the Congolese representative abstained, while his counterparts in Angola and Ethiopia voted in support of the Soviet intervention. A Congolese delegation did indeed travel to Kabul to study the situation in Afghanistan, but their heart was not in it.

Principles

The nonalignment policy of the Brazzaville leaders is still more blindingly manifested in the realm of military cooperation. Despite the importance of the aid provided by the USSR, these leaders categorically refuse to surrender their independence. Deaf to the extreme pressure exerted by the Kremlin, they have been unwilling to date to turn the Pointe Noire military base over to the Soviet navy, any more than they have been willing to sign a defense agreement. In the view of Denis Sassou Nguesso and his team, who see themselves as the faithful heirs of the late president Marien Ngouabi, respect for Marxist ideology should never be translated into automatic allegiance to the Soviet Union.

While developing its bonds of friendship with all other countries, the chief of state likes to recall, each country should bear in mind first of all its realities and its own interests in order to guarantee its independence and sovereignty. Denis Sassou Nguesso undoubtedly invoked this principle before signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation without a related military clause in Moscow on 13 May. It is true that, relying on its excellent geographic situation and above all on its oil income--which will come this year to something like 150 billion CFA francs (3 billion French francs)--the Congo can afford to manifest its independence. Who henceforth would dare to hold a knife to its throat?

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CSO: 4400.1250

GABON

BRIEFS

CENSUS RESULTS--The Council of Ministers which met with President Bongo in Libreville on 8 May studied the results of the census taken in 1980. These results show that the population of Gabon now totals 1,232,000 inhabitants, including 112,000 persons living outside the national territory. The government expressed satisfaction with the development seen in comparison to the 1970 census. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1370] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 5157

CSO: 4400/1233

SHUT-DOWN OF ONLY DIAMOND MINE SEEN LIKELY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1365

[Text] Ghana Consolidated Diamonds (GCD), which is 55 percent owned by the Consolidated African Selection Trust (an affiliate of the Selection Trust of the United Kingdom, which itself is controlled by British Petroleum), is planning to shut down the only diamond mine in the country, located in Akwatia, because of the exhaustion of its reserves and the low profitability of what remains.

It is true that the mine has just been saved once again, in extremis, thanks to an urgent loan of 25 million cedis (4 million pounds), with a government guarantee, arranged early this month. But the Ghanaian minister of lands and natural resources, Mr Yeboah-Acheampong, has no illusions about the future of the mine which only produced a million carats last year, he said, as compared to 2.4 million in the middle of the 1970s.

First exploited in 1924, and with estimates then that the reserves would last until 1983 or 1984, the mine thus seems to have been exhausted a little earlier than expected.

According to the managing director of the GCD, Mr Harry Parker, a profit, although small, was still obtained in 1970-1980. But in view of the increase in exploitation costs and the drop in diamond prices in the world market, it would be very risky to count on a profit in the future without much more substantial financial aid from the state than that which has just been provided, or without a serious devaluation in the local currency.

Mr Parker commented in conclusion that his company has already had to dismiss a quarter of its personnel, totaling 2,100 persons, and that it has had to shorten the work week for the remaining personnel (in which, moreover, skilled workers are lacking) from the previous 6 to 5 days.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

OFFICER VISITS YUGOSLAVIA--Gen Lansane Diane, Guinean minister of the people's army (defense), was welcomed in Belgrade on 8 May by his Yugoslav counterpart, Gen Nikola Ljubicic. The two men discussed the possibilities "for closer relations and promoting cooperation" between the armed forces of the two countries. Gen Lansane Diane, who arrived in Yugoslavia on 8 May on an official visit, toured the Yugoslav military academy center, where his hosts explained the Yugoslav concept of generalized popular defense and the functioning of military training in the Yugoslav Army to him. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1358] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 5157

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PROSPECT OF INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1360

[Excerpt] The American Phillips Petroleum Company, which holds a certain number of offshore prospecting contracts in the Ivory Coast, seems indeed to have decided to establish an office in Abidjan (as we reported earlier; see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 April, p 1005, "Company Life in the Ivory Coast, Opening of an Agency") and to go ahead with a certain number of major investments. This is an indication that the recent discoveries of oil in the Ivory Coast appear full of promise.

Phillips Petroleum has in particular recently leased all of the offices of a major building just recently completed in the heart of Abidjan, which can accommodate nearly 250 persons, and seems prepared to go ahead with costly investments for the exploitation of the Espoir deposit, discovered last year to the west of Abidjan, off Jacqueville. It may also play a generous role in the expansion of the capital city's present refinery, in which about 15 percent of the shares are already held by American companies (Mobil, Esso and Texaco).

However, it is reported in Ivorian oil circles, no final decision has yet been made with regard to investment, and Phillips Petroleum is still awaiting the results of some confirmation drillings before making an increase in its investments.

Phillips currently owns 57.5 percent of the shares of the consortium which controls the Jacqueville deposit. Sedco, another American company, holds 10 percent of the shares and the rest are held by the Italian AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] (22.5 percent) and by the PETROCI [Ivorian Petroleum Company] (10 percent).

This deposit, according to preliminary estimates, not yet confirmed by Phillips Petroleum (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 May, p 1299), may total 500 million tons of reserves, 200 of which can be exploited without too much difficulty. Thus the Ivory Coast might be able to produce 7 to 8 million tons a year in a little less than 3 years, and thus have a heavy export surplus, since it currently consumes about 2 million tons per year. The first drillings, recently confirmed by two others, also revealed the existence of a substantial quantity of gas, with a potential flow estimated by the experts as between 35,000 and 50,000 barrels per day.

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KENYA

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REAWAKEN TRIBAL RIVALRIES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11 May 81 pp 34-36

[Article by Michael Chege]

[Text] Last 19 March, a plot to assassinate President Daniel arap Moi was disclosed by the Kenyan press. Betrayed by an air force captain who had pretended to share the goal of the plotters, two men were being tried by the Nairobi court, one of them a prosperous businessman, Andre Mungu Muthemba, and the other an unemployed man named Kamau Muiruri. The skepticism, if not indifference, with which the news was received in the capital is supposedly explained by the fact that so far no real political motive has been revealed. The affair seems to have more to do with the discovery of an arms trafficking ring in which the captain had gotten involved. But why was it blown up to such an extent? The verdict handed down by the High Court on 4 May should throw some light on the matter.

But the tendency here is to resituate the event, placing it in the context of the ethnic contradictions that grew worse when the new president took power. Moi must cope with an anti-Kikuyu feeling that has become more bitter since the disappearance of Jomo Kenyatta, the "Mzee" of the nation.

The fact is that both defendants are members of that ethnic group, which controls the government and is by far the majority among the richest capitalist entrepreneurs. Does this mark the official beginning of a phase of social instability?

In many respects, however, Kenya appears to be an exception among the East African countries. Since it became politically independent in 1963, Kenya has made important strides in economic growth, and its political stability seems to have reached an unusual level. Although distinguished politicians were assassinated in 1965, 1969, and 1975, there have been no large-scale social disturbances--neither military coups nor civil war. Between 1964 and 1977, the growth rate of the GDP averaged 6 percent per year in real terms. The wealth of the city of Nairobi bears witness to the progress made during that period, and the country's progress has made it a spot frequented by tourists and international businessmen.

In addition, one can see signs almost everywhere of a prosperous new African middle class.

But Kenya is a country that is also experiencing enormous social, economic, and increasingly political problems. A recent study by the ILO entitled "Planning for

Basic Needs in Kenya"* estimates that 25 percent of the population receives only 6 percent of the national income, while 10 percent grabs a good 37 percent. Added to that are sizable regional--and consequently ethnic--disparities. The above-mentioned ILO study gives many examples. For instance, the central and eastern provinces and some parts of the Rift Valley, all densely populated, seem to be clearly favored over Nyanza Province, the western provinces, and the arid zones, which have a low population. Those regional disparities are a potential source of ethnic political friction, since class differences and tribalist ideologies most often go together.

Throughout these years, therefore, Kenyan politics have been characterized by a mixture of retained class privileges and intense ethnic rivalries. So far, however, neither of those two factors has caused a social explosion, as has happened in many other African countries.

When Jomo Kenyatta, the old Kenyan patriarch, died in his bed in August 1978, most observers predicted there would be political disturbances. It did not happen. In only 2 months, the procedure for constitutional transition was completed and Daniel arap Moi, who had been vice president for 12 years, took power.

To understand why that smooth transition was possible, we must take a close look at Kenyan society. The general opinion is that economic and social development under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) was a success story among African countries. Kenya is more or less in the same position as Ivory Coast in West Africa--a model of "peripheral" capitalist development, as it were. But about 1980, the contradictions in that particular form of development began to show up clearly.

Kenya differs from Ivory Coast, however, in that African participation in the economy is much greater in Ivory Coast than it is in Kenya.

"African socialism"

Another difference is that while Ivory Coast did not allow political competition within its single-party structure before 1980, the situation in Kenya is that elections in which leaders within the same single party--KANU--compete with each other have taken place every 4 years since independence. And although Jomo Kenyatta ruled as the undisputed boss of Kenyan politics until his death, his extremely authoritarian regime found itself faced during its last decade with populist opposition on the left and the right. On several occasions between 1965 and 1975, it was compelled to negotiate with that opposition.

Populism found favorable soil in the serious economic disparities between the regions and social classes--the logical result of capitalist development. More than anywhere else in Africa, capitalist development undermined the precapitalist economic groups and replaced the colonial middle class with an African middle class totally supported, both politically and financially, by international capital.

In the beginning, the rising African middle class and the capitalist development structure, encouraged by the Kenyatta government, were attacked by the leftwing of KANU, the dominant party, on the grounds that the party had failed to honor its

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* ILO, 1979.

commitments to the poor peasants and the workers. In particular, the capitalist land policy, which favored only a minority, and primary education, which was very limited, became the objects of protest by the leftist opposition. It demanded the implementation of "African socialism" and of a genuinely nonaligned foreign policy.

That opposition finally crystallized around the person of Oginga Odinga, vice president of the country and deputy chairman of the party, and it sided with the rather amorphous "common people," meaning by that the peasants and the lower middle class, although it also received considerable support from the labor unions.

In 1966, Odinga and his supporters felt that their objectives would be more easily achieved if they formed an opposition party. The Kenya People's Union [KPU] was the only party to have appeared on the Kenyan scene by then with something resembling a socialist platform. A combination of political repression, economic pressures, tribalism, and imprisonment was to weaken the party to such an extent, however, that in 1969 it was bogged down completely in support by the Luo ethnic group, which was Odinga's native community. It was banned in that same year by the government, and that was the final blow, leaving Kenyatta free to pursue his policy without having to cope with the disadvantages of parliamentary opposition.

But that leftist opposition party had scarcely been banned before its members were reactivating populist opposition. Once again, the government was being attacked because it protected the interests of the landowners without concerning itself with poor "ordinary" citizens.

The proposed solution was no longer socialism, but rather an equitable distribution of wealth--among the provinces and among the regions. Capitalism would be acceptable if each region received a "fair" share of what was produced.

The notion of class and of class struggle was totally foreign to that kind of reasoning, which relied on African tribal culture to provide solutions to the problems of the hour. The ideology was vague and devoid of any intellectual content.

It should be remembered that the start of the 1970's coincided with the emergence of the African middle class and the start of a massive transfer of land and capital into African hands. It was a period of massive corruption. People grew rich by pillaging nature and the forests and by smuggling. That provided powerful political arguments for the populists--and Western newspapers as well--in their criticism of the legal and moral laxity of the Kenyatta regime.

Heading a group of determined men that included J.M. Shikuku and M.J. Seroney, a member of Parliament named J.M. Kariuki then became the spokesman in Parliament for the most advanced and courageous criticisms. Using his own funds, Kariuki traveled the length and breadth of the country, distributing funds for self-assistance projects in a practical example of what an equitable regional distribution of resources could mean. In March 1975, his decomposed body was discovered in the bush under circumstances indicating political assassination. The conclusions reached by a parliamentary investigating commission suggested the guilt of certain highly placed individuals. But it was wasted effort. Some time later, on the other hand, Shikuku and Seroney were arrested. Parliament then muted its criticism of Kenyatta's autocratic behavior.

The events of 1975 outlined a cleavage that became perceptible during the political transition that followed Kenyatta's death. For historical and other reasons, the Kikuyu were predominant in Kenya's African middle class. It was in the Kikuyu region that class differences were most marked and that development of the productive forces was most advanced. Around 1978, Kenyatta seemed in many respects to be a guardian of Kikuyu middle-class hegemony, with an obvious partiality toward Kiambu, his native region. The rhetoric of criticism took on a decidedly ethnic character in its form and its objectives. Overthrowing "Kikuyu domination" became the priority goal of political leaders in the economically disadvantaged regions. They were joined by some Kikuyu who felt that they, too, were being kept out of the frantic race for wealth. That was the coalition that grouped itself behind Moi (originally from a very small ethnic group) from 1975 until he took power in 1978, and it can be said that he had both popular support and the support of the movement, becoming in particular their catalyst--something that should be emphasized--in the economically less developed regions, where the lower middle-class leaders had noticed that they had no access either to government power or to the fruits of capitalism.

The privileged Kikuyu class and its allies began to wage a constitutional battle in 1976-1977 to block Moi's rise to power, but with no result.

Biblical Stamp

Moi thus rose to power by fiercely attacking the accumulation of capital, smuggling, and the lack of respect for the "well-being of others." The banner raised in criticism of the accumulation of capital was in fact religious and biblical. Wealth in itself was seen as corrupting and ungodly. Human warmth, simplicity, and concern for the poor, the handicapped, and children became the stamp of the new regime.

But again, anathemas are being hurled at socialism and everything beyond basic Christian principles that resembles intellectualism.

The thrust of populist politics was reduced to abstract ideas, the economic situation not being at all suitable for it. The massive balance of payments deficit led to a devaluation of the currency in February 1981. In 1980, the country even had to import a considerable quantity of wheat to offset ill-advised exports of that same product. Clearly, there were many limits to what the new regime could do with government revenues that were inadequate for meeting the new needs (population growth stands at 4 percent) while also coping with inflation.

At the same time, murmurings of dissatisfaction were beginning to be heard. By about 1981, the government's warnings against dissatisfied individuals likely to cause disturbances had become habitual. And now we have reached the point that two Kikuyu are being tried for treason.

Third-World Version of Capitalist Development

To a large extent, Kenya's colonial history is like that of Zimbabwe and Algeria. Since the start of the century, the country had been dominated by an oligarchy of white colonists employing an oppressive and rapacious system based on racial discrimination. The arrival of European colonists (especially from Great Britain and South Africa) during the first two decades of this century marked the kickoff of a period of land transfers. The most fertile land in upper Kenya was reserved exclusively for white colonization. The result was that by around 1950, some 4.2 million hectares constituted what was called the "White Highlands." Until about the middle of the 1950's, the community of colonists monopolized political and economic power in the country. London intervened only occasionally. The community's untouchable rule was the frenzied exploitation of African labor. The ethnic community most affected by the change in land ownership was the Kikuyu, who lived in Kenya's central highlands north and northwest of Nairobi. They constituted the first urban and rural proletariat as well as a strong class of landless peasants.

When the Mau Mau uprising broke out in 1952, it therefore found most of its supporters among the Kikuyu. From 1952 to 1956, the British colonial government had to reckon with that peasant uprising, whose military defeat required a sizable presence of troops, the imprisonment and repatriation of Kikuyu chiefs, and the establishment of "protected villages" as in Vietnam and Rhodesia.

But the "uprising" was not only a peasant rebellion; it coincided with constitutionalist and middle-class protest. Its contacts with the African Kenyan Union (KAU), headed by Jomo Kenyatta, show that. But for the British, the two movements were the same, and that attitude led to the imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta--from 1952 to 1961--and of his compatriots.

London was determined at the time to train an African middle class to cooperate with British capitalist interests, which had begun to be involved in the Kenyan economy following World War II in particular. At the time, that was considered the only way of insuring a political stability capable of preventing a new uprising of the Mau Mau type. It also meant that in the long run, the colonial government hoped to encourage a coalition between international capitalist interests and those of an African middle class.

Jomo Kenyatta's role was essentially that of consolidating such a relationship, although none of this was very clear at the time of his release from prison in 1961. At the time, however, the Mau Mau based their hope of regaining their stolen lands on the return of Kenyatta. They could not suspect that his arrival in power in 1963 would put an end to the Mau Mau movement. Kenyatta said at the time that it was necessary to forget past antagonisms and that the land should be bought, not distributed free to the poor and landless peasants. The economic development policy was to be based on a partnership between the African middle class and the international capital that had found it profitable to invest in the Kenyan capitalist system. The general effect of those stands was a substantial flow of international capital into Kenya, particularly during the decade from 1965 to 1975. Industrial multinational companies, banks, and farming enterprises found a veritable paradise in the country. They included, among many others, Union Carbide, Del Monte Hilton, General Motors, Lonrho, Sanyo, Philips of Holland, the ICI [Imperial Chemical Industries], Shell, BP [British Petroleum], Bata, and so on.

At the same time, the African middle class in sizable numbers found positions in the civil service and in trade. Trade picked up at the expense of the Asians, who had dominated retail in East Africa for a long time.

The same process occurred in agriculture. One of the anti-insurrectional policies undertaken after the Mau Mau uprising consisted of promoting the development of a well-off middle class of peasants producing approximately the same things as the colonists: coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and dairy products. As the years passed, the development of that type of small farming became one of the Kenyatta regime's successes. In 1964, small farmers accounted for 25 percent of all farm production. In 1979, the figure had risen to 55 percent. Gradually, most of the farms that had once belonged to Europeans fell into the hands of capitalist African farmers, particularly during the 1970's. Around 1972, the ILO mission looking into unemployment in Kenya noted only 295 large farms (covering 400,000 hectares) occupied by Europeans and noncitizens, compared to 1,234 farms (covering 500,000 hectares) that had passed into African hands in one form or another.

The social morphology engendered by that scheme of development is clear: a prosperous native middle class rubbing elbows with internationalist capitalist firms and, underneath, a vast mass of poor peasants and workers. A typical Third-World version of capitalist development.

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KENYA

MOI, STUDENTS CLASH AS RELATIONS DETERIORATE

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 p 37

[Text] Two years ago, when President Moi of Kenya first came to power, students at the University of Nairobi took to the streets with placards and songs of praise, signalling a new era. What went wrong? A Special Correspondent explains.

PRESIDENT MOI, undoubtedly pleased with the new found friendship and expression of loyalty from the students, extended the ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party's membership to them.

But the honeymoon soon ended when the marriage broke up. The president, at a public rally, denounced the students for irresponsibility, drunkenness and lack of academic commitment. He suspended the students body, Nairobi University Students Organisation (NUSO), and promptly withdrew his earlier offer to establish a KANU wing on the campus. "They have not taken the chance, therefore I withdraw the offer," he said.

As it turned out, these were initial signs of souring, sometimes bitter, relations between Moi's administration and the university institutions. Soon afterwards, the president, whose temper is often hot, told a public rally that the University Staff Union and the 75,000 member union of Kenya Civil Servants had been de-registered. He accused both unions of over-involvement in politics, and "failing to deliver the goods".

Scathing Attack

These measures, though thought to be harsh in some quarters, did no more than create communication barriers between the students, the university authorities and the government.

Since then, relations between the government and the students, at the university in particular, have deteriorated. Recently, after a State visit to India, Moi arrived at Nairobi's International Airport and denounced the students. He reserved his most scathing attack for a planned symposium in memory of the late MP for Nyandarua North, J.M. Kariuki, whose slaying five years ago had rocked the Kenya Government. The President dared the students to stage the planned demonstration. Carrying on the attack, Moi the next day invited the rebellious students to a political wrestle "to prove who is more powerful".

But, despite the strong warnings the students were seemingly unmoved and went ahead with their planned symposium, calling the event "peaceful".

In Press statements and distributed leaflets, the students registered their anger at the charges of drunkenness, unbecoming behaviour and tarnishing the image of the country. "The whole society is drinking and highly corrupt", said an irate student.

Accusing Finger

But President Moi seemed more disappointed at the students' attitude. While his government is faced with a faltering economy and high, but necessary oil bills, he has had to drop important government development projects, stop imports of some essential goods, and reserve foreign exchange in favour of the education which the students seem to have taken for granted. The education budget is the largest item, amounting to some two-thirds of annual government spending. A large part of this money goes to the university from which the students receive "allowances". While problems continue to bedevil Kenya's highest institution of learning, critics point an accusing finger at the government, administrative inefficiency. Nepotism and favouritism in the choice of staff is among the more familiar student charges.

Strong Deterrent

On the whole, the education system creates insecurity and discontent. The government needs to realign its attitude towards the students while correcting the ills obtaining in the Kenyan social fabric.

Paradoxically, closure of the university and suspension of some students, though failing to provide lasting solutions, remains the government's strongest deterrent to the "rebellious kids". Early last March, when Moi's government faced its latest confrontation with them, the students woke up to find notices on the walls sending them home. They were given two hours to leave●

CSO: 4700/64

KENYA

KENYA AIRWAYS SHOWS LOSSES

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 pp 53-54

[Text] With a new board of directors, Kenya Airways has made the wise decision of publishing its financial tale of woe. New African takes a look behind the balance sheet.

AFTER A silence of four years, financial reports on Kenya Airways' performance have finally been published in a recent edition of the *Nairobi Times*.

The economic picture presented of the airline, formed at the demise of East African Airways in 1976, is quite a bleak one, confirming old speculation on the state of its finances.

Accumulated losses for the financial year ending March 31 last year exceeded Ks304-million, as against the Kenya Government's share capital subscription of Ks100-million. Although net assets were put at Ks243.5-million net, obligations to creditors exceeded this by over Ks82-million, bringing total liabilities to Ks325.9-million.

Other Borrowing

Compounding the airway's nightmarish tale is the refusal of the auditors to accept responsibility for the verification of valuation of some assets, mainly spare parts. Bank overdrafts more than doubled over the financial year to reach a staggering Ks157-million, while other borrowing was as much as Ks141.7-million.

The more attractive side of the coin was the increase in turnover from around Ks600-million to just over Ks700-million, though this was offset by the huge losses incurred.

Extreme Pressure

Reports tell of closed-door meetings prior to the release of the airways' track record, where subjects are said to have included the redundancy of some staff members and a ban on overtime.

In view of the present situation, however, it seems prospects for the planned purchase of wide-bodied jets are more than slight as the Kenya Government, under extreme pressure for enough foreign exchange to buy essentials such as food and fuel, is unlikely to be able to afford it.

To cater for the profitable high-season tourist traffic, Kenya Airways will most likely continue to wet-lease wide-bodied aircraft for some time. This year a Boeing 747 was hired from KLM for the first time, thus breaking the traditional leasing of similar aircraft from Aer Lingus, which at one time provided management services to East African Airways and then to Kenya Airways.

A new board of directors has taken over the affairs of Kenya Airways following the government re-shuffle of last December. Lord Coles remains managing director, operating under the new chairman, J. Maina Wanjigi, a one-time assistant Minister defeated in the last elections, and a respected businessman in his own right.

Meanwhile, Nigeria Airways and UK's Tradewinds Airways have signed an agreement to promote and develop the operation of cargo services between the UK and Nigeria.

Joint Operations

According to the agreement – concluded during the visit to London in March of President Shehu Shagari, Tradewinds will provide a Boeing 707-320C aircraft for cargo flights to Nigeria while the two companies discuss joint marketing operations for a Boeing 747 "combi" aircraft which is to be introduced on the London-Lagos route.

Tradewinds will be solely responsible for marketing at least one-third of the cargo capacity in this aircraft, and the same amount of belly-hold capcity in the Nigeria Airways DC10 on the UK-Nigeria route. Tradewinds will also be responsible for the operation of supplementary freighter services to Nigeria when required●

CSO: 4700/64

MADAGASCAR

AREMA EFFORTS TO OVERCOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr 81 p 53

[Article by Solofo Rasoarahona]

[Text] After 5 years of revolutionary struggle in Madagascar, the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolutionary (AREMA), whose secretary general is Didier Ratsiraka, is far from considering their task completed. A vanguard party, AREMA's concentrates particularly on vitalizing agricultural production, which is one of the unalterable objectives of its militants. The odds are formidable, no doubt, but the stakes significant at a time when the country's production is going through a criticial period.

Yet, however great the pains and the sacrifices, the militants took the oath during the 22 March 1981 ceremonies for their party's fifth anniversary to continue the struggle to the bitter end. By the thousands, they tackled the bare hills to plant coffee trees on them; they cultivated the plains in order to harvest cassava or changed the valleys by cultivating vanilla plants there.

The head of state, Didier Ratsiraka, spade in hand, insisted on participating in this campaign, in the national challenge, just as did the president of the People's National Assembly, Lucien Xavier Michel Andrianarahinjaka, the prime minister, Desire Rakotoarijaona, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council (CSR). But this long battle, which has to be won, cannot be AREMA's only business. President Ratsiraka, on launching an appeal to all the nation's active forces, highlighted this on 22 March. "The country," he said, "has to import 250,000 tons of rice because of the drought which is ravaging the region from Aloatra Lake onward. And the state has to buy it at 105 FMG [Malagasy francs] a kilo! In fact, whatever efforts have been put forth, i.e. the artificial rains or other technological means, Madagascar will not be able to produce half of its usual crop. It will therefore cost the country a tremendous financial expense to buy rice abroad, whereas exportation will bring in only 108 billion FMG, a very insignificant income compared with the nation's needs. We must also note, moreover, that imported rice bought at 105 FMG per kilo will bring in only 65 FMG to the consumer.

The Nostalgic

However, agricultural production is not the Democratic Republic of Madagascar's only objective. The other springs from development, that is, investing to the utmost in industry while taking into consideration the risks and stress which that involves. In this battle, AREMA has always been in the vanguard regarding decisions. And, indeed, delayed initiatives have not always proved to be to the best interests of a social stratum accustomed to profits and the easy life. Also, the only recourse of these nostalgics of a "beautiful era" is to endeavor to sow dissension. They go so far as to keep some newspapers supplied with tittle-tattle which in turn will earn them nothing but the comtempt expressed by public opinion.

No matter what its ups and downs may be, AREMA assumes full responsibility for this twofold strategy: vitalizing agricultural production and investing to the utmost extent in industry.

"Our party's door is wide open," one in charge told us. "But the exist is also for defeatists. Our mission is not to please. It is, above all else, to have the country emerge safely from the dark tunnel through which it is now passing."

The party is, indeed, aware that the revolution can be victorious only if all the militants perform their duties at every level of responsibility. This is an essential factor in order to consolidate the organization while at the same time steer clear of demagogy, opportunism--taking care that Party membership is not a means of acquiring a priviliged standing, coveted by degenerate members-shilly-shallying and ineptitudes. For the party line is clear. It is known that democratic centralism for social uplifting will not be a pleasure trip and that the enemy is always waiting in the wings. Also the times call for vigilance least one fall into the trap of dissension, evils which proved their mettle during the colonial and neo-colonial period. What self-mastery will not one need to foil and overcome the numerous provocations which have put these last years to the test!

The diversity of the party's component parts is today also the basis of its strength. Didier Ratsiraka wished to open AREMA to all those who agree to work for the country's liberation in keeping with the party's ideological tenets.

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MAURITIUS

LABOR PARTY WORRIES ABOUT OPPOSITION GAINS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr 81 pp 54-55

[Text] While Ramgoolam's government is strengthening its ties with the West, the opposition is regrouping itself into a common front which is already worrying the regime. The Mauritian Government's commitment to the service of Western strategy has recently been expedited, as the $24 million loan granted the island by South Africa testifies. But the outstanding event which is causing a great deal of ink to flow is indisputably the tightening of the bonds between Mauritius and the United States.

Following the visit of some 40 American personnages, both official and private, the Mauritian prime minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, is soon to visit Washington to be received there by President Reagan. Of course, after the attack which the latter has suffered, the White House host's state of health may somewhat delay this trip. But the line is drawn.

What are they going to discuss? Undoubtedly Diego Garcia. We have been given to understand that Washington may afford Mauritius some gratification by committing itself to pay a yearly rent for the base it occupies, by recognizing Mauritian sovereignty on the Chagos archipelago and by agreeing to hire some Mauritians in the military installations.

But, concurrently, some events arrest our attention. For example, last 9 March 24 Mauritian soldiers conducted a search on a Seychelles tuna boat, the "Assomption," which unloaded 100 tons of tuna fish at Port-Louis for a Mauritian cannery. The soldiers were looking for arms. They discovered only two ampules of morphine in the closet at the pharmacy on board!

This annoying incident was the subject of Seychelles President Albert Rene's protest. But observers of the incident remembered that the captain of the accused ship is a personal friend of the leader of the Mauritian opposition (MMM) [Mauritian Military Movement], Paul Beranger, who had dined aboard on the even of the search.

Furthermore, during the ceremonies for the 13th Mauritian independence anniversary, 12 March, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam violently attacked--something which on an occasion such as this had not happened for a long time--the MMM and PSM leaders who, early in March, had signed a joint program. A threat to make public the "explosive" dossiers compiled on these two parties followed this attack.

The signing of a joint governing program between the Mauritian Socialist Party, by Harrish Boodoo, and the Mauritian Military Movement by Paul Berranger, split the island sky like a veritable clap of thunder.

This new alliance will give 60 candidates to future general elections, in 20 electoral districts. It is believed that these elections may be held in mid-1982. It is likely that in the immediate future these events will partly overshadow the differences between the various MMM trends of opinion and curb the parliamentary seepage in the party which in 5 years has lost 20 percent of its deputies, lured by government sirens. The government's joint program, moreover, dedicates a significant part to normalizing Mauritian political life.

In domestic policy, the government's joint program envisions the dissolving of "anti-revolutionary" forces and of the specialized training service connected with it, and the repeal of laws on the state of emergency.

In the economic field, the MMM-PSM program aims at "breaking away from the capitalist system in order to initiate social measures, "to reduce the private sector's overwhelming domination of the country's life," while allowing it "every opportunity" to make jobs available.

The airline company AIR MAURITIUS is to be nationalized. The government is to buy two sugar mills, release 4,000 hectares of land sowed with cane to give way to food crops, establish a Mauritian merchant navy and introduce a minimum standard wage. It is to reorganize the Mauritian diplomatic service and considerably reduce the number of ambassadors: one in Brussels for all Europe; one in India, one in Pakistan, one in China and one in the United States. The MMM-PSM government plans to adopt a neutral line with regard to the superpowers, while strengthening its traditional ties with Great Britain, France, India and the Third World countries. Relations with Austria will be significantly improved at the expense of relations with South Africa. In short, it is to reassert Mauritian territorial integrity on the subject of Chagos, Tromelin and Rodrigues. This last mentioned is to become independent--its powers extremely decentralized--without rupturing its basic ties with Mauritius. Gaetan Duval, whose Mauritian Social-Democratic Party (PMSD) is the majority party on the island, has, as we know, demanded independence with ever increasing persistence. And undoubtedly it is not by mere chance if Duval and Jean-Marie Le Pen, French extremist right leader, have established in Rodrigues their anti-communist front in the Indian Ocean.

The MMM-PSM position in part again merges with that of Serge Clair, leader of the Organization of Rodriguan People, which is very critical of the Port-Louis government. Serge Clair is also known to be extremely critical of Gaetan Duval: "He is always talking about himself, never about the Rodriguan people's responsibility. Duval's solution consitutes a risk for the stability of the Indian Ocean: It is a neo-colonial solution which will enable the great powers to have entry into small countries."

Let us also note a strengthening of Mauritian ties with South Africa, from where the Mauritian minister of planning has just come. Pretoria has agreed to a loan of $24 million.

8870
CSO: 4400/1226

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR'S COMMUNICATION--The ambassador of Sao Tome and Principe to Gabon, Mr Alberto Ferreira Chong, transmitted a message from President Pinto de Costa to President Bongo on 29 April. He explained to the press that the chief of state of Sao Tome and Principe had been invited to pay an official visit to the island by President Bongo and that the authorities in Sao Tome and Principe were seeking the establishment of regular air service between Sao Tome and Libreville, as well as the strengthening of trade links between the two countries. In addition, the ambassador reported that the former minister imprisoned, Mr Miguel Trovoada, was enjoying certain privileges and will be tried when the court authorities so decide. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 p 1370] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 5157

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SENEGAL

NEW GOVERNMENT 'RECTIFYING ERRORS'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May-8 Jun 81 p 36

[Text] The steps involving dismissal, removal and penalties taken against teachers belonging to the Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers (SUDES) have been canceled by the Senegalese government.

These penalties involved some 60 cases, and their revocation was demanded insistently by the assembly of education workers in which more than 2,000 teachers participated in Dakar in January.

Other demands of this assembly, such as the elimination of the audio-visual method of teaching French, which "did not achieve its goals," were accepted.

Thus the new Senegalese government seems to be moving in the direction we urged, with a view to eliminating the vestiges of the past, identifying errors and correcting them.

The draft of the Sixth Plan (1981-1985) has been published in Dakar. In investments, it calls for a 3.5 percent rate of growth and 466 billion CFA francs. The draft includes three innovations: relaunching the economy, an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in food and integration of industrial activity in the African subregional context. It calls for reducing the trade deficit from 16 to 5 percent.

5157
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SENEGAL

SITUATION, PROSPECTS OF COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE VIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 May 81 pp 1356-1358

[Text] Senegal, like almost all of the developing countries, and despite its industrialization efforts, is heavily dependent economically on the work of its peasants (70 percent of the jobs). Agriculture accounts for 35 percent of the gross national product, and 70 percent of the exports, of which peanuts still account for almost three-quarters.

Despite this, mere food needs are far from being covered in a normal year. Here, for example, are the figures for 1980 (in tons):

	Demand	Supply
Millet and sorghum	512,000	482,000
Corn	38,000	34,000
Paddy rice	484,000	98,000
Wheat	101,000	1,000

A third of the grain consumed is imported (above all, rice and wheat) and a half of it is paid for out of income earned from peanuts in an average year. Unfortunately, the 1980-1981 season fell well below the average, endangering the economic recovery effort.

A Catastrophic Season

From the beginning, this season suffered from difficulties. For peanuts, it was difficult to reestablish the seed capital and the quality of the seed was poor. It was, however, distributed on time, in the amount of 124,961 tons, 123,600 tons of which went to the cooperatives. The funds destined for the purchase of fertilizers and fungicides were limited. It was, however, possible to deliver 98,000 tons of fertilizers and 114,700 tons of fungicides.

The rains were long in coming, and did not begin until the second half of July in almost all localities. Precipitation was sufficiently abundant in the Fleuve and Louga regions, but was seriously inadequate everywhere else, above all in Casamance. Because of the inevitable delay in planting, the peanut areas were reduced in comparison to the preceding season, with a decline of 43 percent in Casamance and 20 percent in the Diourbel region, for example. Overall, the average decline was 11.73 percent. The early halt to the rains further decreased the yield.

On the other hand, cereal grains (millet and sorghum) were cultivated on areas exceeding those cultivated the preceding year by 17.5 percent (61 percent in Diourbel). Only in Casamance was the area planted to rice reduced (by 67 percent).

The overall result was one of the lowest yields in recent years, with the exception of 1977-1978. The estimates for peanuts had ranged between 400,000 and 500,000 tons. The harvest proved much worse. The tonnage accumulated by 8 February 1981 by the pertinent bodies totaled 174,462. Once the seed necessary for the next season has been deducted, the oil refineries will be operating at one-tenth their capacity.

The harvest of paddy rice was equally poor, and will probably not reach 70,000 tons

Millet and sorghum are for the most part domestically consumed. Larger areas were planted to these crops, compensating for the low yield due to the inadequate rainfall. Despite this, the quantity sold has been negligible: 4,088 tons as of 8 February. The black market is much better supplied, but at prices much higher than the official rates. The food aid commissariats had to purchase 50,000 tons of sorghum abroad at high prices to establish its reserves.

The cotton harvest came to 21,850 tons (26,800 last year and 33,800 in 1978-1979). The corn harvest of 49,340 tons showed a slight increase.

The basic cause of this drastic decline in the quantities marketed is psychological. It is a fact that the National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development (ONCAD), which had become the peasants' bete noir, has been eliminated. Purchases are made directly by the cooperatives, and where peanuts are concerned, by the National Senegalese Oleagenous Crop Marketing Company (SONACOS), for the supply of the oil refineries, the Baol Electric and Industrial Company (SEIB) in Diourbel, for its own needs, and the National Rural Supply Company (SONAR), for the establishment of the seed capital. But this does not mean that the mistrust has been eliminated. And above all, speculators purchase products at more than the official prices for resale, in particular in neighboring countries, at even higher prices.

It was with these factors clearly in mind that the Senegalese government planned the 1981-1982 season with care.

The Six Priorities

This campaign is the first in the sixth development plan, which calls for the stabiliziation of the areas planted to peanuts at a ceiling of 1.2 million hectares by 1985, to produce an average yield of 900,000 tons. Cereal grains will occupy 1.25 million hectares. Within the same period, market gardening is expected to supply 100,000 tons of produce (goal for 1981, 80,700 tons).

The priority goals of the government's farm policy are six:

1. Self-sufficiency in food. The average annual increase in cereal grain production is 1.6 percent, while the rate of population growth is 2.8 percent. Thus it is a question of encouraging production by remunerative prices, rationalizing the operations which follow the harvest (marketing, storage, processing, distribution), and altering food habits to decrease the need for imported grains (wheat, rice).

2. Raising the rural standard of living, basically through better compensation for production. Rural income has in fact suffered from an annual decrease of 1 percent for 13 years, and 8.5 percent during the fifth plan.

3. Stabilizing agricultural production. It is in particular the "water challenge" which President Abdou Diouf hopes to meet. Water is not lacking: rainfall accounts for 100 to 200 billion cubic meters per year, the rivers (Senegal, Casamance, Gambia), once development has been completed, can supply more than five billion cubic meters per year, and the usable underground water will provide 779 million cubic meters per year. Currently production under irrigation accounts for 24 percent of the total food production. Irrigation pertains to four main crops in connection with which the sixth plan calls for a special effort:

	Present Situation			1984-1985 Estimates		
Product	Area in hectares	Yield in kg per hectare	Production in tons	Area in hectares	Yield in kg per hectare	Production in tons
Paddy rice	79,000	1,420	112,000	103,000	2,140	220,000
Vegetables	5,900	13,700	81,000	7,300	13,700	100,000
Industrial tomatoes	1,100	18,000	20,000	2,300	30,500	70,000
Sugar cane	4,600	108,000	490,000	7,200	114,000	820,000

4. Reduction in regional disparities. The development companies have been confirmed in their local assignments and some have had their goals expanded to the point of assuming an integrated development role.

The Senegal Delta and Valley Land Development and Exploitation Company (SAED) is responsible for the entire valley of the Senegal River. With a view to the implementation of the major projects of the OMVS, it has been allocated 15.539 billion CFA francs out of the total of 65 billion for the entire farm sector which the sixth plan calls for. Instead of the large areas where the peasants are mere wage earners, the SAED will give priority to independent development in close association with the local populations, intensifying rice cultivation through the increasing mastery of water resources. It plans to develop 7,065 hectares, 3,600 of which cannot currently be exploited, in 1981. The main effort will benefit the small village areas in which the yields are the best (4 to 5 tons per hectare). Plans call for the development of 3,630 hectares during the 1981-1982 season, increasing the total to 21,250 hectares. Paddy rice will be planted on 12,000 hectares (planned yield, 39,000 tons) and tomatoes on 1,440 hectares (planned yield, 40,000 tons).

The Textile Fiber Development Company (SODEFITEX) will also develop village areas in Senegal Oriental and in Haute-Casamance. Originally a cotton company, it has become a regional integrated development company. However, cotton remains one of its concerns, in Haute-Casamance in particular.

The Casamance Development Company (SOMIVAC) is implementing two integrated development projects: the Sedhiou rice growing project, where 265 hectares will be developed this year out of a planned total of 1,200 hectares; and the improvement of rain crops in Basse-Casamance with hydroagricultural improvements and the development of traditional techniques. The first antisalt dam at Cuidel, begun in May 1980, should be completed by the end of the year and will make it possible to recover 1,150 hectares. The dams in Affiniam, Baila, Kamobene and Soungrougrou will follow, providing nearly 100,000 hectares of new land.

The Agricultural Development Company (SODAGRI) is concerned with the development of the 16,250 hectares in the Anambe basin in Haute-Casamance (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 April, p 1183). The studies have been completed. The Saudi Development Fund has just approved a 2 billion CFA franc loan for the SOMIVAC and SODAGRI projects.

The New Land Company has seen its role as a national company responsible for settlement operations confirmed. In addition, it has been responsible for the truck gardening sector since September 1980.

The Farm Development and Popularization Company (SODEVA) has a less regional responsibility and supports widely varied activities. In the Niayes and Cap-Vert region, agroindustrial complexes will be organized with peasant farmers centered around a central state-run farm. Individual farms will be staffed by the orchardry and truck gardening companies. To the north of the peanut growing basin, the sinking of wells will supply polyvalent farms (3 hectares of rainy season crops developed with irrigation, 1 hectare of truck gardening and fodder crops, 0.5 hectare of orchard). In the wooded pastoral zone, the drilling of wells will make it possible to rationalize animal production and to engage in intensive livestock breeding, thanks to irrigated fodder crops.

5. Sponsorship of rural participation in the management of its own affairs, in particular through cooperatives. Those in existence are being restructured, mainly through the rehabilitation of their accounts. New cooperatives will be established. There are plans for 2,000, with 1,640 in the peanut growing sector. Responsible already for the marketing of their products, they will gradually take over the marketing of the seed capital. This will make it possible to eliminate the seed credit which accounts for two-thirds of the debt in the rural sector.

The National Community Development Fund (FONADEC), created in July of 1980 with a capital of 2.3 billion CFA francs, has made possible the financing of 30 small rice growing areas in the Fleuve region, 18 truck garden projects in the Thies and Sine Saloum region, farm projects and banana plantations in Casamance and about a hundred craft fishing enterprises in the Louga region.

6. Improvement of the trade balance. This will be achieved by developing production to replace imports (sugar, tomatoes, vegetables) and through the diversification of farm products with a view to export.

Preparations for the 1981-1982 Season

Apart from weather conditions, the success of the coming agricultural season depends in part on winning the confidence of the peasants and incentives to produce. The elimination of the ONCAD and the increasing responsibilities entrusted to the cooperatives are a first step toward confidence.

On 3 April, just prior to the national holiday, the chief of state announced two very important measures. They include, first, the cancellation of back debts for seed and fertilizers, and the suspension of payments on debts on farm equipment pending the rehabilitation of the cooperative accounts.

The other measure is the substantial revaluation of products: the government has substantially increased purchase prices from producers. The price of peanuts was established at 70 CFA francs, with a withholding of 8 CFA francs for seed and 2 CFA francs for fertilizer, providing a net income of 60 CFA francs for the producer instead of the 46 in the preceding season. For cotton, prices are as follows (CFA francs per kg): first choice, 68 (instead of 60); second choice, 62 (instead of 55); and third choice, 35 (instead of 30). Rice goes from 41.5 to 51.5 CFA francs, millet from 40 to 50, corn from 37 to 47, [niebe] from 33 to 43, seed peanuts from 62 to 72, and table peanuts from 70 to 80.

The seed capital will remain at the level for the preceding season, i.e., 120,000 tons. Its replacement is an absolute priority. The seed purchased for this purpose comes to 65,000 tons for the farmers and 55,000 tons for the development companies and seed service. These quantities are subject to stringent control. North of the Mbour-Kaolack line, only the early variety (no 55437) will be distributed up to the amount of 35,350 tons. The total cost of the seed program is estimated at 8.535 billion and it will be implemented thanks to a loan of 6 billion CFA francs from the Central Economic Cooperation Fund, supplemented by an FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] subsidy. In addition to the replacement of the seed capital, the program calls for a study of the reorganization of seed production and the necessary investments.

Fertilizer needs are estimated at 100,000 tons, but the subsidy ceiling was set at 3.4 billion CFA francs. As the delivery price per kilo is 25 CFA francs against a cost of 100, the program was limited to 50,000 tons, to be supplied in large part by the Senegal Industrial Fertilizer Company (SIES) by 15 June, and allocated on a priority basis for food crops and cotton.

The planned areas are as follows:

Industrial peanuts..........	from	1,000,000	to	1,200,000	hectares
Millet and sorghum..........	from	980,000	to	1,100,000	hectares
Rice........................	from	80,000	to	100,000	hectares
Corn........................	from	54,000	to	60,000	hectares
Cotton......................	from	33,000	to	40,000	hectares
Table peanuts...............	from	26,000	to	38,000	hectares

The National Committee for Agricultural Mechanization, created in 1980, called for the establishment in 1982 of a National Committee for Experimentation and Training in Rural Equipment at the Higher Agricultural Research Institute. As of the present, experiments in intermediary motorization (power-driven cultivators, small tractors) are being pursued in Casamance by the Chinese agricultural mission, and in eastern Senegal by the SODEFITEX. The peasants who wish to do so can buy the equipment from the stocks of the ONCAD which are being liquidated.

The reforestation program planned for 1980 was 90 percent implemented, affecting 4,370 hectares, to which must be added the planting along roads. More than 220,000 seedlings were distributed for planting by the peasants. The effort is to be doubled in 1981 to cover 9,240 hectares, involving the planting of 9 million seedlings. The main projects are the reforestation of the wooded pastoral zone and the stabilization of the dunes, in particular to protect Niayes.

The drought in 1980 caused heavy livestock mortality, reaching 60 percent for cattle (403,000 head), 18 percent for horses (44,000 head), and 9 percent for the small ruminants (248,000 head). The overall production of the livestock sector nonetheless reached 30 billion CFA francs in 1980 (6.5 percent of the gross national product). But in order to meet the needs by the year 2000, the herd must quadruple. The production in Senegal in 1980, totaling 28,336 tons (valued at 11.294 billion CFA francs) covered only three-quarters of the meat demand. The country imported dairy products worth 2.5 billion CFA francs, despite its own production of a million hectaliters (valued at 10 billion CFA francs), almost entirely domestically consumed. The urgent livestock feeding program is estimated at 1.3 billion CFA francs. The effort will involve vaccination, the multiplication of water sources, improvement of natural pasturage, in particular through the introduction of varieties resistant to drought such as stylosanthes humilis, the organization of markets for meat and the qualitative improvement of leathers and hides.

The Agroindustrial Prospects

Last 20 March, the chief of state commissioned the new oil refinery of the Baol Electric and Industrial Company (SEIB) (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, no 1846, 27 March 1981, p 836). Its processing capacity (200,000 tons) will compensate for the closing of the Petersen oil refinery in Dakar. The plant will also produce other products ranging from perfumes to beverages.

Fifteen days later, President Abdou Diouf laid the cornerstone for the Senegal Chemical Industries (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 April 1981, p 999), which beginning in 1984 will provide the Senegalese agricultural sector with the phosphate fertilizers it needs.

The Senegalese Sugar Company (CSS) will increase its production thanks to new land preparation techniques. The area harvested has increased from 4,650 hectares in 1978-1979 (360,000 tons of sugar cane, 32,000 tons of sugar) to 5,630 hectares in 1980-1981. Thanks to an improvement in yields (100 tons per hectare on an average) and the extraction rate (from 8 to 9 percent), production reached 52,000 tons of sugar in 1980. In 1981-1982, the area cultivated will stabilize at about 7,420 hectares. The sugar yield of 74,000 tons should almost entirely meet the country's needs.

Tomato concentrate, of which the Senegalese people consume 10,000 tons per year, is produced in two plants: the Senegal Food Canning Company (SOCAS) in Savoigne, with a processing capacity of 20 to 30,000 tons of fresh tomatoes, although it does not operate at full capacity and only produced 1,500 tons of concentrate in 1978-1979, for example, and the National Industrial Tomato Company (SNTI), a mixed economic company in which the state holds 35 percent of the capital, which built a plant in Dagana which began operation in 1979. Its capacity is 5,000 tons of concentrate.

The Saloum Cashew Project (PASA) calls for the planting of 2 million trees on an area of 5,000 hectares. In 1980, 1,300 hectares were planted. The monopoly on the purchase of cashew nuts was granted to the Senegal Cashew Nut Shelling Company (SODENAS), a mixed economic company with capital of 45 million CFA francs. A plant is to be built at Sokone. It will be supplied by Great Britain and will have a capacity of 700 tons, of which 80 percent will be exported. Actual operation should begin in February 1982. However, the SODENAS is already purchasing the raw nuts from producers at a price of 40 CFA francs per kg. It hoped to obtain between 200 and 500 tons in 1980, but was only able to buy 40 tons. However, the prospects are good for this sector, because there is a relatively strong demand on the world market.

It must be hoped that weather conditions will reinforce the economic recovery efforts undertaken by the cabinet headed by Mr Abdou Diouf and that now that he has become president of the republic, he plans to pursue the efforts with the cabinet of Mr Habib Thiam. A good rainy season would be an incomparable advantage for the Senegalese economy.

But the leaders of Senegal have decided not to leave the matter to the heavens. They are determined to develop irrigated crops through the reasonable exploitation of the water resources of the country. The water resources plan demanded by President Abdou Diouf is ready and is scheduled for discussion by the council of ministers soon.

On the other hand, agro-food chains will be developed systematically, both to satisfy the domestic consumption needs and to reduce the trade balance deficit.

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ZAMBIA

GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED UNABLE TO SURVIVE POSSIBLE GENERAL STRIKE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May-8 Jun 81 pp 37-38

[Article by Masautso Masautso: "Party Against Trade Union"]

[Text] The single party system in Zambia has been threatened for some months by the workers' movement, affiliated moreover with the leading party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The conflict between the UNIP and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), in which 18 unions are members, broke out last year, after they had worked together for years.

The most recent point of discord has to do with the new system of local government established toward the end of last year. The ZCTU opposes it, alleging that "taking the power from the people," it allows only a few party leaders to vote for the local administrative officials. In the view of the trade union, this is the same as taking the right to vote away from the people. It adds that the mine workers, who benefited from such advantages as reduced rents, electrical rates and accessible medical care, lost these benefits as soon as the new local authorities took over responsibility for managing their communes.

The opposition to the new system is led by the Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ), the largest union in Zambia, with more than 50,000 members. To demonstrate its displeasure, the MUZ has dismissed a number of union officials who took part in the local government elections, and the ZCTU supports the MUZ leadership. The adoption of this position aroused the anger of the party leadership, which ordered the workers' movement to reinstate the officials dismissed.

The Challenge

As the highest body in the nation, the UNIP expected the workers' movement to carry out its instructions. Seeing that this was not the case, the party, after a hasty meeting of its national council was called, decided to take up the challenge by excluding 17 trade union leaders from its structure, including the influential president of the ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, its secretary general, Newstead Zimba, and the president of the MUZ, David Miwila.

This party decision had disastrous effects for the government. It was in fact adopted at a bad moment, and without taking the state of mind of the miners or the support at the base level the trade union leaders enjoy into account. High party leaders, headed by President Kenneth Kaunda, in particular his second in command, Mainza Chona, hastened to the mining province to explain to the copper miners why their representatives had been ousted and to urge calm. And obviously, to block any strike effort.

But the die had already been cast, and the miners put down their tools, halting the activity of the Zambian mining industry. The strike, which lasted almost a week, cost Zambia several hundreds of thousands of dollars. And the miners declared that until the ousted leaders were reinstated, they would not resume work. For the government and the top levels of the UNIP, this was the most serious threat since independence, almost 17 years earlier.

According to the party bylaws, in fact, any person excluded from the UNIP must also be removed from any public office. In a desperate effort to get the miners to resume work, Minister of Labor Basil Kabwe explained that, although the 17 trade union leaders have been ousted from the UNIP, they could nonetheless retain their trade union posts.

It was thus that total defeat was avoided and the government saved face. A point of historical irony: it was these same trade union leaders who had to make the rounds of the miners to ask them to go back to work. But normality was not achieved again until after a party bureau had been burned, an UNIP official beaten up and a child killed by police fire. These violent incidents had visible effects. One was the removal, to all appearances for mishandling this affair, of the secretary general of the party, Mainza Chona, and the prime minister, Daniel Lisulo.

Now questions arise. What was the source of the error committed? How can nonmembers of the party direct a body affiliated with it?

Poverty Threshold

To say that the leadership of the UNIP has been shaken up is an understatement. The government has accused the trade union leaders of having political conditions and of being pawns used by outside forces seeking to destroy stability in Zambia.

The trade unionists have denied both charges, stating that their sole concern was the defense of the workers against exploitation. They have pointed out in addition that, again in the interests of the people, they had cooperated with the political leadership since the period preceding independence. And that is true, for since the beginning of the 1950s, in what was then North Rhodesia, when the nationalist demands first developed, the conflicts between black and white workers led both to the trade union movement and political activity.

Toward the end of the 1950s, which saw the development of a whole series of strikes in the mines, the leaders of the ZCTU also fought for independence.

Since then, the political and trade union leaders have worked together, to the point that the trade union movement was heavily represented in the national council of the party, and trade union officials took part in party activities on the provincial, regional and precinct levels. The leadership of the trade union, however, has worked to obtain the best working conditions and an increase in wages for its members, and it has pressed the government to define the poverty threshold.

The trade union movement has also, from time to time, criticized the policy of the government and urged the review of economic priorities and strategies such as to insure more productive workers and fewer mouths to feed. Government loans have also been the cause of sharp criticism on the part of the trade unionists, who have pointed out that real long-term measures were necessary in order to resolve the problems of the country.

Thus the trade union leadership emerged as the unofficial opposition to the Zambian single party system of government, after the opposition parties were banned in the months after independence was acquired.

The suspension of the 17 trade union leaders in January in connection with the local government issue was the reaction to a background political study aggravated by the increasing shortages of products of prime necessity and the stagnation of industry which led to the recent attempted coup d'etat, thwarted at the last minute by government troops.

While the presumed plotters still languish in prison and until the case of the trade union leaders is resolved, the only certainty is that discontent is increasing throughout the country.

Necessary Caution

Political observers believe that the government should proceed very cautiously in the matter of the trade union leaders, because in the long range, it is in danger of finding itself in the losing position. The government needs the trade union leaders to help it mobilize the workers, so that they will support the political and development programs. To alienate the trade union leaders completely would be to ignore the fact that they are the reflection of the feelings of the workers they represent, who have already shown their capacity to bring the government to its knees by striking. It is doubtless this which has been realized by one of the UNIP leaders, Kennedy Shepande, in charge of the youth center, who has just issued an appeal for the reinstatement in the party of the 17 trade unionists excluded.

With its economy still lagging, Zambia cannot in effect survive a national strike which would be likely to develop following any further effort to silence the trade union leaders completely.

END

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