

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9836

9 July 1981

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 7/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9836

9 July 1981

CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 7/81)

CONTENTS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Military Region Political Commissar Defends Policies, Opposes Dissenters (ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Mar 81)	1
Importance of Compulsory Military Service Discussed (ZHANSHI BAO, 7 Jan 81)	6
Joint Regular Forces - Militia Defense Episode Related (Li Sugui, Guo Delong; ZHANSHI BAO, 5 Feb 81)	10
Use of Existing Weapons, Development of New Ones Stressed (Hao Sheng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Jun 79)	11
Need for More Study of Tactics Stressed (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 79)	12
All Fleets Conduct Training for Senior Headquarters Officers (Luo Tongsong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 18 Sep 79)	15
Conscripts Exhorted To Sacrifice Individual Welfare to Revolution (ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Jan 81)	17
Building of Rear Area Logistics Defense Forces Discussed (Chen Yazhou, Liu Shengjun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 79) .	23
Revised Regulations for Army, Airforce Boat Units Issued (Wang Shuchen, Yin Hongjun; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Aug 79) .	27
Good Care of Horses Stressed Pending Ability To Rearm With Modern Equipment (ZHANSHI BAO, 11 Mar 81)	29

- a -

[III - CC - 80 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MILITARY REGION POLITICAL COMMISSAR DEFENDS POLICIES, OPPOSES DISSENTERS

Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 11 Mar 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Correctly Understand the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session As Well As the Line, the Programs and the Policies of the Party Is the Emphasis of a Speech Given at the Military Region Political Work Conference by Political Commissar Xiang Zhonghua [0686 0112 5478]"]

[Text] What is the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, and what is the line, the programs, and the policies of the party? Are the programs and policies put forward in the Central Work Conference convened not long ago synonymous with the spirit of the Third Plenary Session? What is it that stands in the way of some of the comrades in correctly understanding the line, the programs and the policies since the Third Plenary Session? How can the vague understanding and erroneous ideas of some cadres and soldiers toward the party line, programs, and policies be correctly dealt with? For those in military units whose understanding of these problems is not too profound or not too clear, Xiang Zhonghua, political commissar of the military region, provided a systematic explanation in a speech he gave at the Military Region Political Work Conference.

The Spirit of the Third Plenary Session and a Series of Programs, Policies and Major Policy Decisions Since the Third Plenary Session

What is the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, and what is included in the Party's line, programs, and policies since the Third Plenary Session? Political Commissar Xiang said in his speech that the line, programs and policies established by the Third Plenary Session differ entirely from the line, programs, and policies of the "Great Cultural Revolution." The Third Plenary Session revived the fundamental principles of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, provided for emancipation of thought, using one's brains, seeking for truth in facts, and looking ahead united as one, which may be said to be an overall guiding program for seeking truth in facts and correcting leftist errors. This, then, is the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of which we so often speak. Under the guidance of this overall policy, the Third Plenary Session, the Fourth Plenary Session, the Fifth Plenary Session, the Second Central Work Conference, and other major conferences further delineated the party's political line, ideological line, and organizational line, and put forward a series of programs, policies and major policy decisions. Those of relative special consequence included the following: (1) arrived at the strategic policy decision of shifting the focus of work of the entire party to the building of the four modernizations, and established a political

1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

line for mobilizing the people of the entire nation to carry out the four modernizations with one heart and one mind; (2) exposed and criticized the concept of two "whatevers," and established the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth in facts; (3) proposed the strengthening and improvement of party leadership, formulated "Various Regulations on Political Life Within the Party," perfected central leadership organizations, and established the party's organizational line; (4) made a factual analysis of China's class situation in the wake of completion of socialist reform of ownership of the means of production, determining that an exploiting class no longer exists in China, that the class struggle continues to exist, but that it has ceased to be the result of major contradictions in China's society, and deciding to have no further political campaigns, to correctly handle contradictions among the people and contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and to unify the maximum number of the masses to carry out the four modernizations program; (5) examined and resolved some major problems left over from history and some questions of merits and demerits, and rights and wrongs of some major leaders, with rehabilitation including the "Tiananmen Incident," and the unjust, false, and misjudged cases involving major wrongs against comrades Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai, proposing a program for realizing national stability and unity; (6) provided for establishment of a legal system with a high degree of socialist democracy and consummate socialism, promulgated a series of laws, and brought to trial the Lin Biao, Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique; (7) proposed and began an all around summarization of the lessons of experience of socialist revolution and socialist construction since the founding of the People's Republic, including a correct evaluation of Comrade Mao Zedong's merits and demerits, noting that Comrade Mao Zedong's merits were of primary importance while his demerits were of secondary importance, and that the tests of experience have attested to the correctness of Mao Zedong Thought, which continues to be the guiding thought of our party; (8) reiterated that realization of China's four modernizations would require adherence to four ideological and political principles; (9) proposed action to reform the party's and the state's leadership systems to solve real existing evils of life-long leadership cadre tenure, and an excessive centralization of authority; (10) proposed that while adhering to the socialist road, that cadres gradually come to be younger, better educated, and specialized; (11) put forward a program for the "readjustment, consolidation, restructuring, and improvement" of the national economy, institution of reform of the national economic structure and management system, and full arousal of initiative in the central government, all provinces, municipalities, and enterprises; (12) put forward a series of policies and measures for development of agricultural production, readjusted agricultural policies in terms of prices, revenues, credit, procurement of agriculture byproducts, and forms of management; stressed respect for the self-determination of production teams, and development of diversification through adaptation of general methods to specific circumstances; established and improved upon various forms of a system of responsibility for production, expanding limitations on private plots, family sideline occupations and county fair trade; (13) institution of economic policies opening up foreign trade, allowing independent action while retaining the initiative in one's own hands, and practicing self-reliance; (14) provided for further economic readjustment and further political stability as the only correct programs. Additionally, under the guidance of the overall guiding thought, the CCP Central Committee also readjusted and formulated policies pertaining to intellectuals, policies pertaining to education, policies pertaining to literature and art, policies pertaining to races, policies pertaining to a united front, foreign policies, etc. Political Commissar Xiang noted that

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

experience has shown that this series of programs and policies entirely accord with China's circumstances and have been fully supported by the masses of people. The huge changes and progress made in China during the past 2 years, and the presently very good political and economic situation are the result of implementation of the line, programs, and policies since the Third Plenary Session.

The Spirit of the Present Central Work Conference and the Overall Guiding Thought of the Third Plenary Session Are Synonymous

While studying the spirit of the Central Work Conference, some cadres and soldiers supposed that Central Work Conference changes in programs of the Third Plenary Session amounted to correction of "deviations" of some policies since the Third Plenary Session. How should this question be viewed? Political commissar Xiang noted in this speech that it is necessary to affirm, first of all, that since the time of the Third Plenary Session up until the present, there have been no changes in the overall guiding thought of the party's seeking truth in facts, and thoroughly correcting leftist errors. Beginning with the realities of the state of the nation, and hidden dangers currently existing in the economy, this Central Work Conference decided on further readjustment of the national economy, deciding to get rid of tentative plans and subjectively high criteria not geared to actual circumstances, so that the country's economy can gradually divest itself of the fetters of leftist mistakes, and take the path of steady and healthy development. This is precisely what the guiding thought of the Third Plenary Session sought to accomplish, and it is also a continuation of the policy of "readjustment, consolidation, restructuring, and improvement." However, as with everything where changes occur in development, programs and policies since the Third Plenary Session have, in the course of their implementation, been subject to enrichment, to perfection, and to development. Nothing is immutable. We cannot use a static concept to view changes in policies. He said that since the Third Plenary Session, party programs and policies have developed, first of all, under constant eradication of various disturbances. These included the disturbance of the two "whatevers," the disturbance of the liberalization trend of thought, and the sabotage of elements who crave nothing short of nationwide chaos. It was the elimination of these "leftist" right disturbances that tested the correctness of the programs of the Third Plenary Session, and enriched and developed the actual content of the Third Plenary Session's programs. Acting in accordance with current realities, and while emphasizing the surmounting of leftist mistakes, this Central Work Conference, pointed to real planning weaknesses, conducted necessary criticism and struggle against tendencies to cancel out or oppose the party leadership, and struck firm blows against anti-party and anti-socialist activities and against criminal activities. This was only as it should be. This not only signifies no change in the programs of the Third Plenary Session, but also happens to support, as well, the Third Plenary Session's principle of seeking truth in facts, and supports the direction and objectives set by the Third Plenary Session. Second, as a result of changes in development of the objective situation, the party's policies also require commensurate readjustment and augmentation.

The Third Plenary Session's two documents on the development of agriculture, for example, have been shown to be effective in practice. But faced with a developing situation, the Central Committee last year additionally issued document number 75 proposing various forms of a system of responsibility for production, and giving

3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

further impetus to the development of agriculture. Such readjustment and augmentation of policies both accords with realities and maintains the continuity and unity of policies, which is entirely in keeping with the programs of the Third Plenary Session. Third, in order to correct work faults, some changes were necessary in actual policies and measures. Communists are not gods without any mistakes in their work. This further economic readjustment was decided upon only after having recognized faults in economic work during the first 2 years after smashing the "gang of four," and before and after the Third Plenary Session and after having found the crux of the problem. In other words, to suppose that today's specific policies are in all respects the same and not the slightest bit changed from the policies formulated at the time of the Third Plenary Session is not, in fact, the case. However, if upon seeing some change and development, one supposes a change from the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, that is not in accordance with the facts either.

Correct Erroneous Ideology and Correctly Understand and Implement the Party's Line, Programs, and Policies

Why is it that some comrades are unable to properly understand the line, the programs, and the policies of the Third Plenary Session? Political Commissar Xiang said, I agree with the views of many comrades at this political work conference. Looked at in terms of ideological understanding, there are two principal impediments: One is the effects of the erroneous leftist ideology. For the past 20 years, the mistakes our party has made have been largely "leftist" mistakes. For a long time, all of us have lived and worked under the guidance of "leftist" ideology, and have studied and propagandized what is embodied in "leftism" as the correct line. To one degree or another, "leftist" ideology has left an imprint in our brains. Now, some comrades are still filled with misgivings and vacillate in indecision about the Third Plenary Session as the result of the mischief caused by the "leftist" thing. For example, as soon as a shift in work emphasis comes up, some comrades suppose abandonment of class struggle is meant; as soon as talk turns to emancipation of the mentality, they suppose this means the four fundamental principles are not wanted; and as soon as the need for adequate appraisal of the effects of leftist ideology is raised, eradication of the influence of "leftist" mistakes remains an arduous task. Then there is capitalist liberalism, anarchy, and extremism. This is a very powerful centrifugal force and a corrosive. Today there actually exists in the armed forces a minority of people who are wavering politically about the four fundamental principles, and who ideologically believe in "everyman for himself and the devil take the hindmost," and "money is omnipotent," and such capitalist articles of faith. Organizationally, they want only democracy and freedom rather than organizational discipline, and some have even progressed to opportunism and profiteering, corruption and larceny, and smuggling of people out of the country. Such people must inevitably be ideologically incompatible with the party line, its programs, and policies, and their actions must inevitably encroach upon the welfare of the majority of people, and cannot be countenanced by party discipline, military discipline, and the laws of the land. Commissar Xiang noted that those two erroneous ideologies differ in outward form, and they likewise impede our true understanding and implementation of the line, programs, and policies of the party. We must vigorously correct them.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Keep On Enlightening Programs and Guiding Cadres and Soldiers in Solving Ideological Problems

How can the muddled understanding and erroneous ideology toward the party's line, its programs and policies that is reflected by some cadres and soldiers be given help? Commissar Xiang said that the proper way should be to keep up enlightenment about policies, persevere in "three not-ism," let everyone speak what is on his mind and speak what is in his heart, after which he should be led through a point by point solution to problems. When it comes to ideological understanding, people cannot be gagged, cannot be coerced, and can even less be "scared into submission." Nowadays some comrades pit political conformity against democratic expression, and dare not express doubts that are in their minds. It should be realized that ideological conformity is the foundation for political conformity, and so it is necessary to place principal efforts on raising the consciousnesses of cadres and soldiers, and then to do a good job of political ideology. Commissar Xiang noted that gathering from currently reported circumstances, the problems with most comrades are problems of ideological understanding, and those who stand in a position of opposition to the party's line, programs, and policies are extremely few. We must strictly distinguish problems of ideological understanding from political problems, and unite maintenance of unanimity with the CCP Central Committee and carrying forward democracy within the party, so that, through study, everyone will be truly uplifted ideologically. Naturally, statements and actions that evidence real opposition to the party and to socialism, we will not be soft on, and we shall resolutely refute and struggle against them.

9432
CSO: 4005/2081

5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE DISCUSSED

Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Article: "Important Significance of China's Institution of a System of Compulsory Military Service"]

[Excerpt] China's Current Military Service System

With the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, our army was the national armed force. Internally it was responsible for consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for consolidation of the fruits of victory of the people's revolution, and for suppressing resistance by all counterrevolutionary elements. Externally, it was responsible for defense against imperialist aggression and subversion, for safeguarding the socialist revolution and socialist construction, for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation, and for maintaining world peace. Its new duties were at once both formidable and glorious, requiring that we have not only a powerful army, but also a powerful air force and navy, and requiring not only that we have powerful forces on duty, but also powerful forces in reserve. However, because of the lack of a fixed period of recruitment and a retirement system, a voluntary military service system could not meet the requirements of the new era. Since we had built a nation for the people, everyone had responsibility for safeguarding his own country, and everyone should take up this responsibility for safeguarding the motherland. Therefore, when the Chinese People's Republic was founded, it was decided "to make ready for the institution of a system of compulsory military service at the proper time." At the Second Session of the First National People's Congress on 30 July 1955, the "Military Service Law of the Chinese People's Republic" was discussed, promulgated, and put into effect on the same day by the chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. The "Military Service Law of the Chinese People's Republic" was a law for the performance of military service under which the Chinese people could consolidate their own national defense and safeguard their own welfare. It stipulated that all citizens fully 18 years of age have a duty to perform military service. Beginning in 1955, China instituted compulsory military service. The First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee held on 5 March 1978 discussed and approved "Decisions of Problems in the Military Service System" put forward by the State Council, deciding to change China's compulsory military service system into a combined compulsory and volunteer military service system for longterm service in the armed forces. This is China's existing military service system.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The main substance of the compulsory military system are as follows: (1) "All male citizens of the Chinese People's Republic who are a full 18 years of age, regardless of national origins, race, occupation, social background, religious beliefs or extent of education, are liable for compulsory military service in accordance with this law." (2) The stipulated periods of active military service are as follows: army, 3 years; air force, 4 years; navy, 5 years. Also stipulated is that some specialist mainstay cadres become volunteers with a 15 to 20 year period of active duty. It is further stipulated that when some troops have completed their full period of service, they may continue on active duty for an additional period, depending on the needs of the service and their personal wishes. The period of extended service shall be a minimum of 1 year. (3) It is stipulated that the fixed period for call-up nationwide shall be annually from 1 November to the end of February the following year. The required numbers of people to be called up and methods of call-up shall be stipulated by the State Council on the basis of circumstances during the current year. (4) Military people are citizens with full rights. They have the rights and duties of citizens stipulated in the constitution of the Chinese People's Republic. Military persons on active duty and their dependents shall be given preferential treatment by the state.

Why Institute a System of Compulsory Military Service

In the 20-odd years during which a system of compulsory military service has been in effect in China, experience has shown that under prevailing conditions in China, institution of a system of compulsory military service holds numerous advantages and very great significance:

1. Institution of a system of compulsory military service is for the purposes of allowing Chinese youth opportunity to realize their desire to protect the country and for everybody fairly and sensibly to undertake military duties. Ours is a country that belongs to the people themselves. The people are the masters of the country, and the security of the country depends on defense by the people as a whole. However, would it be workable for everyone to be a soldier? No. Our military personnel meet a fixed numerical quota, and were this numerical quota to be exceeded, both the state and the people would bear an unconscionably heavy burden. There are also certain requirements for being a soldier, and if one does not meet these requirements, it would impair fulfillment of missions. Consequently, from among the large numbers of youths who annually rush to register, the state can select only a relatively few outstanding ones to enter military service. Each year a group is inducted, and a group is retired, so that the broad masses of youths who meet age requirements have opportunity to perform their duty. This way is both relatively fair and also relatively sensible. During the period of service, one can both perform one's duty and learn military techniques, improve ideological consciousness and cultural levels, and be severely tempered by life in the armed forces.
2. Compulsory military service can accumulate for the country large numbers of reservists who have undergone training, assuring that such war suddenly break out, our military forces could steadily enlarge and replenish soldiers with the elements of training. There are numerous points of difference between modern warfare and the warfare of the past. One is the large scale and the suddenness

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of the outbreak of fighting, frequently requiring mobilization of several million in the armed forces. Without a large number of reservists, victory in war would be difficult to attain. Second is the suddenness of modern warfare, with hostilities breaking out at once, possibly on any given morning. Unless one is able to assure rapid mobilization of a large number of trained troops, the country may suffer severe destruction, and great losses of people's lives and property may ensue. Third is the large-scale use of all kinds of modern new weapons and equipment, and scientific techniques, things such as new types of aircraft, large guns, tanks, naval vessels, military electronic technology, rocket technology, laser technology, etc. Unless advance training has been given the troops, once war breaks out, it is not possible to master well the use of advanced weapons and technical equipment. In order to meet these characteristics of modern warfare, we must have planned accumulation of large numbers of troops who have undergone training. With compulsory military service, call-ups at fixed times and retirements at fixed times permit annual induction of a certain number of youths into the armed forces where they are given military and political training and readied for combat. Annually, as well, a group of strenuously trained warriors who have completed their periods of military service, retire from active service to become national reservists. In the more than 20 years since institution of compulsory military service, China has accumulated rather abundant reservists. When needed by the country, these reservists can be sent in an endless stream as replacements in military units or be rapidly organized into newly created combat units and local military forces; so that aggressors will sink in a boundless ocean of people's war. For example, during the period of self-defense counterattack on the Sino-Vietnam border, in order to respond to the call of the motherland for call-up of forces in wartime, and to assure full strength of units, in Yulin Prefecture in Guangxi Province alone, 4,267 retired servicemen below 25 years of age registered for induction, permitting units to replenish their strength at once, increase their combat capabilities, and assure completion of combat missions.

3. The system of compulsory military service can also save manpower and material resources in normal times for use in strengthening the building of the national economy. China today is still rather poor, and its economy is insufficiently well developed. We want to hasten the speed of economic construction, and make China a modern agricultural, industrial power with modern national defense, and modern science and technology in this century. This is a glorious mission that history has bestowed upon us. Military expenditures are a very large figure. Military personnel mostly do not create material wealth for society, but rather consume material wealth. If the amount is excessive and military expenditures too great, this holds back the building of the national economy. Therefore, we must correctly handle the relationship between the buildup in national defense and the buildup of the economy, whereby the number of people in the armed forces are at the optimum level so that military spending as a proportion of national disbursements is kept in proper balance. Institution of a system of compulsory military service is a fine way of achieving this. This is because, when the country has such a system, in normal times it can maintain the number of troops at a relatively low level and conserve a certain amount of military expenditures. In this way the country can use the manpower, material and financial resources thus saved in building the economy to hasten the pace of the four modernizations construction, so as to realize the four modernizations at an early time.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In summary, a system of compulsory military service not only enhances China's defense force needs, but also enhances needs for construction of the national economy. It also accords with the longterm interests of the country and the people, and accords with the present interests of the country and the people. Thus, it may be said that a system of compulsory military service is commensurate with the advanced and sensible system of military service of China's current situation, and thus it has been warmly supported by people of all races throughout the country.

9432
CSO: 4005/2079

9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

JOINT REGULAR FORCES - MILITIA DEFENSE EPISODE RELATED

Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 5 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Li Sugui [2621 5685 6311] and Guo Delong [6753 1795 7893]: "Joint Army-Civilian Efforts To Safeguard Power Station"]

[Text] A winter night with a cold wind blowing and silence everywhere. In a grassy thicket of a salient along the Guangxi frontier, more than 10 pairs of eyes flash, keeping watch on everything along the border. This is a concealed joint military-civilian unit sent out by the militia battalion of the Jiebang Brigade, Longbang Commune and the 5th Company of a certain unit of the Guangxi Border Defense carrying out a combat mission to counter a sabotage plot by Vietnamese agents. By now they have been in concealment positions for seven dawns, and they are preparing to pass their eighth night here.

Eight days ago, our guards discovered frequent border activities by Vietnamese secret service units who were vainly attempting to sabotage the Naxi hydroelectric power station on the border. This hydropower station supplies electricity to border defense sentry posts, and meets the needs for electricity in production and daily life of more than 30 communes and brigades and mining areas. How can the enemy be permitted to sabotage it! The 5th Company immediately worked out a combat plan with the militia battalion of the Jiebang Brigade for joint military-civilian defense of the hydropower station.

It is dead of night and it has just begun to rain, dropping temperatures suddenly. Lying concealed in the cold wet grassy thicket, mosquitoes and bugs biting, the rain is soaking and it is extremely hard to bear. However, they continue to hold fast to their concealed position, waiting silently for the arrival of the "unhurried guest." Suddenly, a short burst of machinegun fire is heard from the enemy's position. The enemy fires a burst of tracers in the direction of our concealed position. Our concealed personnel have seen through the enemy's probing trick and continue to wait quietly. Presently, as expected, from the enemy position comes the sound of light footsteps. From 40 meters away from our concealed position, three scoundrels carrying satchel charges rope along stealthily in the direction of the border hydropower station. Our concealed unit suddenly closes the net, encircling them.

Upon discovering that our side has been strongly fortified, the cunning enemy explodes their satchel charges for cover and flee helter-skelter from the border area. The Vietnamese invaders carefully planned plot has been thoroughly smashed.

9432
CSO: 4005/2079

10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

USE OF EXISTING WEAPONS, DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ONES STRESSED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Hao Sheng [6787 6115]: "Atomic Bombs Should Be Made, But Hand Grenades Should Not Be Tossed Aside"]

[Text] A combat training section chief who fought in the Self-defense Counterattack Operation said it this way: "In this fight, hand grenades and satchel charges were used to good effect, but proportionately speaking, what killed and wounded the enemy most was the various kinds of guns and automatic weapons." Therefore, he concluded, "attention to armaments, doing a good job of training, and keeping ones eyes only on hand grenades will not do; it is necessary to look ahead."

Hand grenades have their place. Without going into the war years of the past, they demonstrated their power in the recent Sino-Vietnamese border self-defense counter-attack operations. It would not be fair to ignore the function of hand grenades. However, hand grenades are only hand grenades after all, and to exaggerate their power would be improper as well.

While basing oneself on what one has, look toward developments. Our armed forces are presently in a period of historical transition of millet plus infantry rifles, and aircraft plus large guns to conventional weapons plus special weapons. Our method is: thorough training in the weapons we possess, study of science and culture, and further combine men and weapons in order to create conditions for mastery of newer equipment. If we simply grumble about the modernization of arms and equipment and put aside existing arms and equipment and not train with them, or if we do not study the modern military science that faces us, when the enemy comes what weapons will be used to annihilate him? When new equipment comes into our hands, what skills will we possess to put them to use?

If one bases himself on the equipment in his possession on the one hand while hastening the modernization of weapons and equipment on the other, will that render him unable to make a decision? It will not. The relationship between the two is one of particular things improving as the general situation improves. In handling the development of weapons and equipment, the proper attitude should be firm conviction that victory is entirely attainable through the use of weapons and equipment in ones possession, while resolving gradually to improve weapons and equipment, steadily modernizing them. To use a common saying to express the idea: Atomic bombs should be made, but hand grenades should not be tossed aside.

9432
CSO: 4005/2077

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NEED FOR MORE STUDY OF TACTICS STRESSED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 79 p 1

[Article: "Be a Qualified Commander"]

[Text] People praise Comrade Shan Da [1472 1129] as "a truly outstanding commander and a qualified commander." Comrade Shan Da deserves such praise.

An outstanding and qualified commander must possess at least two qualities: resourcefulness and courage. Resourcefulness and courage on the battlefield are qualities discussed in ancient and modern times in both China and abroad. Sun Zi placed resourcefulness and courage as the two major attributes to be cultivated by commanders. The "Book of History" said, "When a person is valiant and clever, he may act," placing resourcefulness and courage on an equal plain. Marx and Engels said, "There are two kinds of bravery: surpassing bravery, and bravery lacking in intelligence." ("Collected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 6, p 359), which more clearly emphasizes the unity of resourcefulness and courage. To possess courage without resourcefulness is to be a clumsy, death-defying bungler, which we do not need. To possess courage without resourcefulness, when the guns sound, one will be at a loss about what to do. Naturally, if one cannot put his resourcefulness to use, he will sustain defeat. Only with a combination of courage and resourcefulness can one command forces, overcome the enemy, and attain victory. Shan Da advanced bravely, charged and shattered the enemy's positions, judged the hour and sized up the situation, and acted flexibly just as a commander possessed of resourcefulness and courage should. Troops have heartfelt confidence in such a commander and will resolutely obey his commands and listen to his directions with heartfelt admiration. Thus it becomes possible to have confidence from top to bottom, to be of one heart and one mind, and to march together to win victory in battle.

Courage is one thing and resourcefulness is another. Put the two together and only then is victory possible. For many years Lin Biao and the "gang of four" made a mess of this truth. They distorted the spirit of bravery, threw tactical thinking into confusion, and "criticized" the accurate saying that a "superbly skilled person has great courage." This was extremely damaging to the training of our cadres, particularly to improving command skills within the armed forces.

One may often hear the following said among some grassroots level cadres: "When we're fighting, if superiors want us to attack, we attack; if they want us to defend, we defend. All we have to do is obey orders and listen to commands." By

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

this is meant that command is a matter for higher authority, and that it is only listening to commands that is one's responsibility. These comrades forget that it is the job of commanders to command. On the battlefield, commanders at all echelons have their individual command position, command requirements, command responsibilities, and scope of command. "Ingenuity in application is a matter for the person taking action." In the application of tactics, each echelon has its own ingenious ways. If one is not versed in the command techniques of one's own echelon, when higher authorities orders that you attack, you will be unable to strike with irresistible force, and if they order you to defend, you will be hard put to really hold fast. For units as large as regiments or armies, when commands are bad, the mission cannot be accomplished. In the person of a commander, issuing commands and receiving commands have always been closely related. If you cannot command, you may not be able to follow commands reliably, either, and may become like a storeyed house built on a sandy beach. When superior authority commanded Shan Da to lead a dagger platoon in an attack on certain high ground, had he not understood the command or blindly issued a command, the high ground would not have been taken and the combat intentions of superior authority would not be fulfilled. In that case, no matter steadfastly he "listened to commands," would become a hollow phrase, would it not?

Cadre training is the key point, but after many years of saying this, it is still just a point without being the key point. There is a tendency in this that is deserving of attention, namely supposing that techniques are firm guidance but that tactics are soft guidance, and consequently emphasizing techniques while slighting tactics. Techniques are the foundation for tactics. When Shan Da was on the battlefield, because he was able to fire rocket launchers, was able to use walkie-talkies, and could sight targets for the artillery, he was able to handle tactical command with ease and proficiency. In this sense, emphasis on technique cannot be considered wrong. Tactics are the assurance that techniques will play their full role. During this combat, use of small groups against dispersed forces and the searching out of forces in concealment demonstrated the power of correct utilization and variation of tactics. Unless tactics have a built in system for changing as the enemy changes, or changing ahead of the enemy, then even though one may be superior in rifles and guns, not all of them may be able to be used, coordination may be bad, and one may mistakenly injure one's own troops. Therefore, to slight tactics is unreasonable. As far as our own commanders are concerned, a general knowledge of all kinds of weapons, their requirements for use, and their combat capabilities is essential, but the key still lies in the study of tactics and striving to master command techniques for one's own echelon of organization. If one were to say soldiers are "courageous and technical," then commanders must be "courageous and tactical." The problem now is that leadership comrades in some units are a little "partial." They are interested only in things such as the number of points or the number of meters, but are unable to become interested in the tactical training of cadres. Some feel that "the study of formations is not agreeable, and the study of tactics is not something people are good at." Under the influence of such a mentality, even if some tactical training is given, it is, "the squads attack bim bam; platoons attack for 5 minutes; companies attack in a big uproar." Quality is not high. A rapid end to this state of affairs may be said to be an urgent matter of the moment in the reform of training.

Insufficient attention to the study of strategy and tactics, and insufficient attention to improving the standards for command are related to the failure of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

some of our comrades to divorce themselves from the fetters of a single branch of service mental concept, and accustomed attitudes. Fighting armies are presently in a historical stage of change from single branches of service to combined forces. As both the enemy and our own weapons and equipment develop, there will be great changes, as well, in the style of warfare. In order to adapt to these changes, troop training and combat must see great changes. When tables of equipment, education, training, and command organization are shown to be unsuitable, and when new problems appear, they must be rapidly studied and solved. When we speak of being a qualified commander, their term "qualified" means a process of constantly moving forward as circumstances change. Those formerly qualified for combat command may be still qualified for combat command today, or they may not be qualified. Those who went through the recent self-defense counterattack combat can see this problem very clearly can't they? At the 1975 enlarged Military Affairs Committee meeting, deputy chairman Deng Xiaoping spoke very descriptively: To be a company commander today is not the same as being a company commander in the past. The company commander of the past would pick up his Mauser pistol and 'charge'! It's not that easy now, and it is different than it used to be. The company commander's needs for information are much greater than formerly. When war breaks out and you have several tanks and an artillery company attached to your unit, how will you command them! The talk here is about a company commander, and the question is to a company commander. But it would also not hurt for our battalion commanders, regimental commanders, or even our divisional or army commanders to ask themselves: Are my commanders qualified or not? When a new war comes, what kind of an answer will I be able to give?

9432
CSO: 4005/2077

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ALL FLEETS CONDUCT TRAINING FOR SENIOR HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Correspondent Luo Tongsong [5012 0681 2646]: "Navy Intensifies Headquarters Training for All Echelons of Senior Officers To Meet Requirements of Modern Naval War and To Increase Organization and Command Capabilities"]

[Text] Recently the navy conducted an examination and summarization of this year's headquarters training for senior officers, and set forth the future direction and requirements of training.

During recent years substantial transfers of personnel in combat units of various naval forces have taken place, and some staff officers are not well-versed in wartime command work. In a situation of constant development of naval techniques and equipment, in particular, in which electronic confrontation has become a major technique of naval war, and in which guided missiles are gradually becoming major strike weapons, greater demands are placed on headquarters work. Not only to staff personnel urgently require improvement of their professional abilities, but even those staff personnel in position for a rather long period of time who possess rather strong professional skills also require constant understanding of new circumstances and study of new problems in order to meet the requirements of modern naval war.

Beginning this year, senior officers and leadership organizations in the navy will devote strict attention to senior officer headquarters training. Navy leadership organizations have set up professional military training units for the participation of senior naval officers and large unit leadership comrades for the purpose of exploring the characteristics of future naval combat, as well as the guiding combat mentality and the tactical and strategic principles for our own forces. As of now, 10 courses have been set up requiring 72 hours of study. Headquarters is operating three staff officer training classes for the study of general information about naval branches, navigation, and staff functions. During August, two short training courses were organized on the subject of "Military Applications of Overall Planning Methods" in which more than 300 professional cadres were training. At the instigation of naval leadership organizations, all fleets, bases, detachments, and garrison districts are also giving serious attention to senior officers headquarters training. During the first half of the year, units above the division level in the North Sea Fleet ran a total of 10 staff training courses. The South China Sea Fleet organized headquarters at all echelons on several occasions for chart exercises. The East

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

China Sea Fleet convened leadership cadre exercise meetings for above division level in which exercise experiences were summarized and exchanged and chart work done. Units at certain bases of the East China Sea Fleet organized staff personnel for group training more than 40 times, with more than 1,430 people participating in the training.

In the course of the senior officer headquarters training, each echelon was at some pains to closely approximate actual combat. Some units combined the characteristics of their naval area with tasks handed them by superior authorities to conduct diligent study and exercise training. Some units organized airmen, submarines, destroyers, guided missile boats, and other surface craft to participate in combined exercises to train combat units under various complex circumstances, and to put into practice organizational and command capabilities.

In the course of training, all units also lay great stress on major training points. The number one characteristic of modern naval warfare is speed. "Targeting," "calculating," and "commanding" must be done quickly and accurately. This is a masterly skill that staff personnel must prepare. In the training process for each unit, staff personnel were required quickly, accurately, and in a minimum amount of time to plot the foe's position relative to our own. Some units also required rapidly calculating the time, direction, and speed of attack of four or five assault groups.

The serious attention given senior officer headquarters training by the navy made all echelons of headquarters and staff personnel well-versed in combat operations, and increased their combat professional levels. A certain base made spot examination of the chief and deputy chief of staff, and of 35 section chiefs and staff personnel of a division level unit in which the problem was attack on an enemy cruiser formation. Examination results showed overall evaluation of proficiency at better than good. Some comrades said that the correlation of the enemy situation and repeated exercises gave training a quality of realism. A month's concentrated training was better than a year's ordinary professional study.

9432
CSO: 4005/2077

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CONSCRIPTS EXHORTED TO SACRIFICE INDIVIDUAL WELFARE TO REVOLUTION

Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 11 Jan 81 p 4

[Article: "Wholeheartedly Fulfill the Glorious Obligation of Defending the Motherland"]

[Text] The responsibilities we shoulder are lofty; the obligations to the motherland that we fulfill are glorious, and both the motherland and the people hold extremely great expectations of us. Consequently, we must overcome impure motives for entering military service, establish a correct attitude of military service, and wholeheartedly fulfill the glorious obligation of defending the motherland.

In order to defend the motherland, comrades consciously submit to the needs of the motherland, coming from everywhere including cities, rural villages, industrial plants, and schools to join the armed forces. Some comrades give up opportunities to go into industrial plants or attend university, and some give up substantial wage income and comfortable living conditions to enter military units to fulfill obligations amply demonstrating a patriotic awareness, which is praiseworthy. However, as the result of a lack of awareness on the part of some of our comrades about becoming soldiers to fulfill obligations, after they become soldiers, they frequently are unable to handle the interrelationship between individual welfare and fulfillment of obligations to the people, and feel they have suffered as a result of being a soldier. Everyone knows that certain rights and certain obligations are mutually complementary. If in earlier times the people of the entire country had not undertaken an obligation to resist the Japanese and fight the Chiang Kai-shek bandits, what right would the people have today to be masters in their own house. Unless we undertake our obligation to defend the motherland today and safeguard the four modernizations, what right will we have in future to enjoy the well-being of a "comfortable family?" In taking responsibility for the defense of our motherland and the obligation to safeguard the four modernizations, our armed forces are representing the fundamental welfare of the working people, which ramifies to the well-being of posterity. Consequently, from the day that we become soldiers, we should unconditionally subordinate our individual welfares to the welfare of the revolution. During Spring and Autumn Times, Sima Rangju, a general, said: "When you receive orders, forget your families; when you face military regimentation forget your relatives, and when you feel anxious at the sound of the rolling battle drums, forget your own safety." If the ancients could be this way about the country, we should be possessed of an even greater spirit of self-sacrifice.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Establish a Concept of Fulfilling Obligations to the Country and Overcome Impure Motivations for Entering Military Service

Some comrades enter military service to find individual opportunities for themselves. Their way of thinking is, "First year as a soldier, second year in the party, and third year get a discharge and enter a plant." Otherwise they think of driving motor vehicles, becoming a health worker, or learning a technique of some kind to catch hold of an "iron ricebowl." Thus, they become soldiers, not to fulfill obligations, but rather to parlay their situation into going into a city to find a job. Comrades should think that every year the armed forces call up large numbers of youths from rural villages to enter military service, while at the same time a large number of old soldiers retire. In the current situation in which China's productivity is fairly backward, if everyone goes into the city or goes into an industrial plant, how much of an increase of people eating commodity grain will occur in the cities? How can the country stand it? Unless rural youths return to rural villages, on whom will the modernization of agriculture depend for its fulfillment? If everybody in the armed forces would like to do technical work, who will do the non-technical work, and how will combat and other tasks be completed? Therefore, when we become soldiers, we must establish a concept of fulfillment of obligations, and not have as our goal the finding of opportunities for ourselves. Our "opportunity" lies not in going into cities but in remaining in rural villages, and neither does it lie in becoming an industrial worker, but rather in becoming a commune member. Even less does it lie in doing some particular work, but rather in making a contribution to the modernization of the country no matter what work we may do. Some comrades have the right idea when they say that revolutionary work contains all trades and professions, each possessing its own leading authority, and each having a future. So long as during our period of military service we strive to learn the skill of serving the people and improve our competence, no matter where we may go in the future, there will be bright prospects. When productivity decreases, family economic income must inevitably decrease as well, and livelihood becomes somewhat impaired. However, the more wealthy the country becomes, and the more the four modernizations develop, the more our personal welfare can be realized. One cannot suppose on this account that to become a soldier is to get the worst of things. Combat hero Liang Yingrui [2733 5391 3843] said it well: "Without trees, where would fruit come from, and without a country, where would the family come from?" We often speak of "protecting the family and defending the country."

This concisely and clearly explains the inevitable relationship between protecting the country and protecting the family. When we become a soldier today it is not just to protect the millions upon millions of parents, brothers, and sisters, it is also for the purpose of protecting one's own parents, brothers and sisters. It is not only to protect the families of others, but also to protect one's own family. In this sense, how can we get the worst of things when we become soldiers? If one says that we get the worst of things when we become soldiers, the tens of thousands of martyrs who heroically sacrificed their lives got even more of the worst of things, did they? When Dong Cunrui [5516 1317 3843], Huang Jiguang [7806 4949 0342], Luo Guangxie [5012 0342 3610], Yu Qingyang [0060 1987 7122], Liang Yingrui [2733 5391 3843], and Li Chengwen [2621 2052 2429] sacrificed themselves to the common good, they had no thought of getting the worst of things as individuals. Quite the contrary; they were fully prepared mentally for

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

individual sacrifice. After they had sacrificed themselves for the motherland and for the people, the families of numerous martyrs sent the younger brothers and younger sisters of the martyrs to military units to take up the arms left by the martyrs. If one says that to be a soldier is to get the worst of things, why then did they keep on taking the worst of things and go looking for the worst of things? On the contrary, they not only had no sense of getting the worst of things, but felt exalted. We should learn from the revolutionary martyrs, and correctly handle the relationship between the welfare of the revolution and personal welfare. We should also realize that the party and government as well as the broad masses of people are exceptionally solicitous about the livelihood of the families of soldiers, have taken a series of measures, and have exerted very great efforts to look after them and give them preferential treatment. After rural villages implemented the party's economic policies and instituted systems of responsibility for production, the CCP Central Committee and government departments at all echelons adapted to the new situation, adopting various measures to assure that the livelihood of dependents of military martyrs would be no longer than that of local commune members at the medium level. The "CCP Central Committee Decisions on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development" clearly stipulated that once rural villages have instituted systems of responsibility for production, "as the collective economy develops, collective welfare endeavors should gradually be undertaken whereby the old and the infirm, orphans and widows, disabled commune members, and disabled military men, and the families of martyrs receive greater assurance of their livelihoods." Each province, municipality and autonomous regions has done a lot of work in the implementation of party policies on special care for disabled servicemen, and for family members of revolutionary martyrs and servicemen. At the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, numerous delegates referred to the issue of supporting the armed forces and giving special care to their dependents. In the course of discussions, some made speeches saying that "effective measures should be taken to resolve hardships in the families of soldiers, and that just as during the period of the Red Army, the livelihood of the families of soldiers should be no lower than it had been before the soldier entered the armed forces." In actual fact, every jurisdiction is in process of implementing special care policies in accordance with instructions from the Central Committee. Some of our military units have also received numerous notices in the mail of preferential workpoints and cash assistance. Of course, the families of some comrades continue to suffer hardships in their lives and we should believe that on this issue the party and the government will gradually help find solutions.

Some urban comrades who entered military service had formerly intended to enter university or take up an occupation. Now they have answered the call to enter the armed forces. Their thoughts had been "first to college and then to work, but never becoming a soldier." They regarded soldiering as a course of last resort, and this view is also a wrong one. Unless it is corrected, it may easily produce an attitude of simply muddling through in one way or another for the three years of service, or may even produce a mercenary mentality. Going to college and taking up an occupation are all very well and good, of course. There is nothing wrong with them, and they are neither higher nor lower than becoming a soldier. When the period of service for comrades has been completed, they may still take up occupations, and if conditions permit, they may go to college, too.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The question is now that they are soldiers, is that worse than going to college or taking up an occupation. We say that being a soldier is the fulfillment of an obligation and not the selection of a profession. It is different from taking up an occupation or going to college. The people of the motherland have confidence in us, and have handed us the guns. It is incumbent upon us earnestly and conscientiously to fulfill our obligation and take up the heavy burden the people have given us. This glorious position also provides us a fine opportunity to temper ourselves. After several years of tempering, improvement in our ideological consciousness, further strengthening of our will, and increase in our cultural knowledge and some specialized knowledge will create better conditions for our future employment. If you lackadaisically muddle through a few years in the armed forces, neither striving to learn nor assiduously tempering yourself, but rather throwing your youth away for nothing, without making any progress so that you possess no skills to take up future employment, you can only blame your own incorrect attitude.

Still other comrades figure that they will first become soldiers when they go into the armed forces, and then become cadres with some official position, figuring that this is fulfillment of their obligations as soldiers. Nowadays, in order to improve the military and political quality of cadres, our armed forces have changed the system of selecting cadres directly from among company level soldiers, requiring that they undergo training in military schools. Some cadres that their desire to be a cadre is a good one, and that all they have to do is strive to learn military matters, politics and culture and meet other requirements. Then after testing shows them qualified, they will be able to enter a military school for further preparation and become a cadre. But this is a matter of future development. For the moment, most important is fulfillment of obligations, and being a good soldier. This is to say that conscripts do not necessarily have no chance of entering military schools for study to become cadres, but neither does it mean that you will be promoted to cadre simply because you have become a soldier. If one holds to the idea of becoming a soldier in order to become a cadre, it may be very difficult for one to become an "official," because if you are thinking only of yourself, and calculating everything in terms of becoming an official, you cannot consciously fulfill your obligations. And if you cannot do a good job of being a compulsory soldier, how can you expect to be a cadre?

Still other comrades have rather simple ideas. They are not concerned with working or not working, or whether they have a lot of money or little; all they care about is traveling around, seeing everything possible, and hoping with all their hearts to go to a large city. This is, in fact, unrealistic. Where military forces are garrisoned, and the duties they perform are the result of consideration of the overall situation and the needs for combat preparedness. When we become soldiers, we may possibly go to a bustling city, or possibly to somewhat out-of-the-way rural village, or possibly to an uninhabited island or border area. None of this can be changed to suit our individual wills. It must also be realized at the same time that we are carrying out lofty and glorious responsibilities, and we cannot think only of light tasks, but rather must be mentally prepared to sweat a great deal and suffer hardships. For future combat, it is necessary as well to prepare to shed blood in resolute fulfillment of the heavy trust of the people of the motherland. Being a soldier cannot be regarded as something that is nice and relaxed and a lot of fun. Of course, depending on mission requirements, movement to a new place to do guard duty or undergo training, with a chance to see the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

beautiful rivers and mountains of the motherland, may also expand one's horizons. But the "horizon" of hoping to be sent to a large city, is too narrow a one.

Strictly Require Oneself To Be an Outstanding Conscript

It is by no means strange that among comrades who strictly require themselves to be outstanding draftees that there is this or that kind of petty concern. Before they have understood the meaning of fulfilling their obligations as soldiers, it is difficult for some comrades not to have this or that idea. But once we understand the rationale for fulfillment of obligations as soldiers, we should rid ourselves of those petty concerns, and earnestly fulfill our obligations as fully as possible. It must be acknowledged that in the fulfillment of obligations as soldiers, some matters of individual welfare must be temporarily shelved.

In terms of the immediate, one might say this is a hardship. But hardship of this kind is for the fundamental welfare of the people, and is entirely appropriate. The loftiness of responsibility and the glory of duty of a people's soldier lie precisely in making this kind of sacrifice. Moreover, every youth of age must encounter a similar problem. In long range terms, fulfillment of obligations as a soldier, safeguarding the security of the motherland, and defending the building of the four modernizations is, at once, also safeguarding the peaceful work of one's own parents, brothers and sisters. Is it not true that our generation is able to grow up in health because during the past more than 20 years group after group of youths became soldiers and carried out their obligations, guaranteeing the security of the motherland and creating for us a peaceful environment in which smooth growth was possible? Today when we fulfill our obligations, the young children also benefit. As far as our working people are concerned, if we depart from the security of the country, the independence of our people and the prosperity of the motherland, there will be no individual or family well-being, and that will indeed be great suffering. Furthermore, we should also realize that even though everyone fulfills obligations, the government still gives our families needed material care and glorious political treatment. For comrades, all clothing, food and housing needs are provided for, for some better than before they became soldiers. During their period of military service, comrades can also become steeled, can study various techniques, and can increase their knowledge, creating valuable conditions for their future growth. We must not overlook this, being concerned only with hardships and not about benefits.

In summary, we must combine individual welfare and the overall welfare, and unify immediate welfare and the longterm welfare, bearing firmly in mind the great trust of the motherland and the people, never forgetting that one is a glorious soldier of the people being tempered in the great furnace of the revolution, fulfilling one's duty and fulfilling one's responsibilities in standing guard and of doing sentry duty for the motherland, and fulfilling the various missions that the party and the people have handed us. In launching a movement for striving to be an outstanding conscript, some military units proposed the following requirements for evaluating and comparing outstanding conscripts: (1) content to serve with correct handling of the relationship between individual welfare and the welfare of the revolution; (2) resolute implementation of the party line, programs, and policies, and the orders of superior authority; (3) satisfactory completion of education and training assignments; (4) good workstyle, discipline, and moral

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

qualities; (5) respect for leaders, concern for comrades, and a spirit of fraternal unity. Each and every comrade can use this to place severe requirements on himself to become an outstanding military conscript.

Glory will forever belong to the soldiers of the people who contributed their youth to safeguarding the motherland and defending the four modernizations.

9432
CSO: 4005/2079

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BUILDING OF REAR AREA LOGISTICS DEFENSE FORCES DISCUSSED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Chen Yazhou [7115 0068 5297] and Liu Shengjun [0491 0524 0193]: "An Imperative Action; Several Views on Strengthening of Logistics Defense Forces"]

[Text] Victory in war depends on consolidation of the rear, and in modern warfare in particular, reliance on the rear is even greater. Therefore, when waging war, both sides emphasize destruction of the opponent's logistics potential and supply to the front as a major target of attack. In World War II, one of the major reasons for Germany's defeat was that its rear was not consolidated. The German force's battle line was wide and long, and the rear areas were weakly defended with no attention being given to their defense. The Soviet forces used this weakness of the German forces to organize various kinds of small force units to attack the German force's rear supply lines, finally making it impossible for German army logistics to continue to support the war, and being wiped out in the end. Apart from the political reasons for Napoleon's defeat on his distant march into Russia, another reason was a lack of precautionary defense of his supply lines, which consequently sustained attack and destruction at the hands of the Russian forces. From this may be seen that in order to take full and timely advantage of the role of various supply techniques and combat materials in modern warfare, and to assure uninterrupted supply to combat forces by rear area supply, a rather strong logistics defense force is needed.

How can logistics defense forces be strengthened. A look at the situation of China's forces today shows only four ways of doing the job:

Building a logistics defense unit. From the time of founding up until the present time, China's armed forces have never had a specialized logistics defense unit. Along with the need to modernize China's armed forces will come security functions, personnel assignments and an organizational structure on behalf of logistics in the armed forces. Today when we propose the establishment of defense units, platoons, and organizations within the table of organization of logistics, it is because of the changes in our own forces and the situation existing in the armed forces of numerous countries. The United States armed forces, for example, give serious attention to strengthening of logistics defense forces. The United States Army National Guard established the 139 Rear Area Combat Center in Raleigh, North Carolina in 1973. It was organized from among troops of the 30th Armored Infantry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Division. United States Army regulations provide that every military commander and every support group commander in an army combat zone shall have a rear area combat center. When the army is fighting independently, it is required that two rear area combat centers be organized. Each combat center will have 17 officers and 50 enlisted men who have undergone specialized training to be divided into five units. Combat logistics units shall be composed of specialists from different branches of services and will be responsible for guarding and carrying out rear area defense tasks, including intelligence, communications, anti-airdrop, anti-airraid, engineers, military police, "three defenses" and disassembly of explosive devices. Each unit can control from two to four rear area guard platoons. Battalion level and brigade level rear area guard platoons may coordinate discussion of guard matters with reserve units close by the rear area logistical units. When enemy attack or infiltration is on a large scale to the extent that logistics defense platoons lose their capability to guard, combat units may be dispatched to take up specially prescribed guard duties in order to assure smooth execution of rear area logistics security work. Division level rear area defense measures and their methods of execution are identical with those of the battalion and brigade levels.

The American army's National Guard rear area logistics combat center method is deserving of our study and consideration. Can units at the army level and above in our armed forces establish a rear area logistics defense combat command? Is it possible under such a command to establish highly mobile forces, platoons, and organizations composed of various branches of service? During war time, these forces and field combat forces attached to rear areas, local forces, and militia could jointly decide rear defense plans, or else units and organizations subordinate to the command could take direct responsibility for organizing and directing units and militia attached to them in rear areas for unified deployment and use. All echelons of rear area logistics below the army level, could, depending on circumstances, organize a corresponding number of defense units such as a combat logistics regiment (or battalion) by a field combat army, divisional organization of a combat logistics battalion (or company), and organization by regiment of a combat logistics company (or platoon). These units would be the main force of logistics defense at each echelon, and these main forces would play a major role in organizing, at their own echelon, logistics personnel and attached local militia to conduct various security and defense duties for logistics.

Armed rear area logistics personnel. Under modern warfare conditions, use of advanced weapons and equipment to arm rear area logistics personnel to increase logistic's forces (platoon) self-defense capabilities, is a matter to which numerous countries are giving extremely close attention. During recent years, the Soviet armed forces have not only armed their rear area logistics forces with relatively advanced logistics security techniques and equipment, but have also required that each logistics person be equipped with one or two types of combat weapons. The Soviet navy has also established a naval combat logistics defense support squadron able to operate several thousand nautical miles away from its bases. Therefore, perfection of defense combat equipment for rear area logistics personnel is necessary to meet the combat needs of our armed forces' logistics.

Analyzed in terms of realities in our armed forces' logistics forces (platoons), drivers, repair personnel, sanitation personnel, cooks and provisioners, maintenance personnel and communications personnel could all be equipped with light weapons,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

one to each person being best. Some logistics units (platoons) might also be equipped with anti-aircraft machineguns, or rocket launchers and such heavy weapons or new weapons. In the course of the recent self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, a motorcar unit equipped with several anti-aircraft machineguns could handle small groups of attacking enemy. Now, if equipped with a certain number of weapons and given appropriate combat training when other specialized training is given them, our railroad troops, engineers, and linemen could become a strong logistics defense force.

Intensification of defensive combat training of logistics personnel. On the basis of the foregoing, specialized training and rear area logistics defense tactical training for rear area logistics forces (or platoons) is very necessary.

Depending on the work to be done by rear area logistics units, while undergoing rear area logistics tactical and technical training rear area logistics defense forces should undergo diversified special knowledge training, and while undergoing specialized training, logistics personnel should undergo military training in which each person should be required to thoroughly master his own weapon and be able to use terrain features in defensive combat. Logistics personnel training and defense forces training should have a different emphasis, and content of training, courses, and times should be of suitable proportions.

Organizing Militia to Do Defense Work. Countless times during the revolutionary war and during the more recent defensive counterattack combat against Vietnam, militia have supported the front lines and guarded the rear, making great contributions in both and demonstrating the great power of people's war. However, because modern wars of the future will be conducted in three dimensions with battlefield conditions being complex and ever changing, for militia to undertake the arduous task of defending rear area logistics, they must be thoroughly organized and rationally used. The main matters that must be given attention are as follows:

(1) When militia participate in wartime rear area logistics defense, they must be organized sufficiently well in advance with emergency training being given them on top of their regular training, so that they will understand their duties, and be familiar with the organizational structure and personnel. Under ordinary circumstances, militia should not be permitted to carry out their duties alone. The militia organization also should not be made large, for when the military organizations become large, it presents a large target and becomes prone to enemy attack. Most militia organizations should consist of small platoons exercising their duties. These small platoons should operate in conjunction with defense forces or be organized and led by persons from main force units. All militia platoons should operate under the overall organization and command of rear area logistics defense units, platoons (or teams).

(2) Participation of militia in defense work should be permitted only after selection. Depending on the quality of military and political training and the health of common militiamen and grassroots cadre militiamen, militia platoons or teams should be organized to undertake different kinds of defense tasks. Militia platoons (or teams) with fairly strong combat capabilities should accompany main force units in defense of rear area logistics bases, communications hubs, important

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

bridges, and such major rear area installations. At the same time some mainstay militia can be organized to work with defense forces in being responsible for surrounding and annihilating enemy spies and enemy airborne troops in rear areas.

(3) Under modern warfare conditions, militia accompanying rear area logistic defense forces should be fully armed and should enjoy the same emoluments as on-duty troops. All fully armed militia should be thoroughly organized and rigorously trained so that these mainstay militia are thoroughly familiar with their own weapons, and possess specialized knowledge of a series of defense matters such as standing guard, doing sentry duty, and being on the alert to act as a mobile, capable and vigorous defense force possessed of great combat strength.

9432
CSOL 4005/2077

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

] OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REVISED REGULATIONS FOR ARMY, AIRFORCE BOAT UNITS ISSUED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Wang Shuchen [3769 3219 5256] and Yin Hongjun [1438 4767 6511]:
"General Staff, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department
Promulgate Army Boat Regulations. General Logistics Department Run Short
Training Classes for Boat Unit Leadership Cadres, and Study Measures for
Putting Regulations Into Full Effect"]

[Text] In order to accord with the shift in the Party's work focus and build an
army boat unit compatible with the needs of combat forces in island, border
defense, and internal waterway areas, the General Staff, the General Political
Department, and the General Logistics Department have recently promulgated the
"Chinese People's Liberation Army Army Boat Regulations."

Army boat units will conduct communications and transportation, reconnaissance and
patrols, combat training, and special operational tasks from Heilongjiang in the
north to the vast coastal areas and territorial seas of South China Sea islands...
It will be a major force in carrying out various kinds of marine security for the
army and the airforce. Because of the development and renewal of equipment of the
army boat units, the "Army Boat Management System" promulgated by the General
Logistics Department in 1960 is no longer suitable. Following investigation and
study by the three departments, summarization of 30 years of practical experiences
by army boat units, and absorption of advanced experiences of the navy and other
technical branches of service, the "Chinese People's Liberation Army Army boat
Regulations" were promulgated.

The "Regulations" continue and carry forward the fine tradition and work style of
our armed forces, carry out and strengthen combat preparation and war preparedness
programs, and are a fine charter for the building of boat forces. In issuing the
notice about the "Regulations," the three departments strongly noted that "this
regulation is the foundation of technical security for army and airforce boat
units to manage, conduct military training, organize and deploy, dispatch and use."

In order to rapidly implement the "Regulations," between 1 July and 19 August
the General Logistics Department ran two short training classes for boat unit
leadership cadres. Comrades involved in the training conscientiously studied
the "Regulations." Everyone said that the "Regulations" reflect the objective

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

laws of boat equipment, are rules for instituting scientific utilization and management, and are a set of rules and regulations for the various activities of boat units. With them, we have grounds for taking action; work has standards, and combat has objectives. The short training class also took account of the work needs of leadership cadres in studying "Regulations on Avoidance of Collision," formulation and approval of navigation plans, and such special knowledge. Boat units from Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Shenyang military forces gave separate briefings on training experiences in guarding against typhoons and fighting typhoons, three defenses, and navigation in fog.

As a result of their study of the "Regulations," everybody realized more clearly the position and function of army boat units, and had an increased sense of responsibility. All large units also made concentrated study of ways to carry out the "Regulations." Some units are preparing this year to group train all cadres, and some are preparing to train only half at first. Next year, all army boat units will carry out the "Regulations" to the full.

9432

CSO: 4005/2077

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GOOD CARE OF HORSES STRESSED PENDING ABILITY TO REARM WITH MODERN EQUIPMENT

Guangzhou ZHANSHI BAO in Chinese 11 Mar 81 p 2

[Article: "Work Concerning Military Horses Cannot Be Neglected"]

[Text] It is said nowadays that the armed forces will be mechanized and modernized, so mules and horses have become an antiquated means of transportation with little use. Consequently, in some units, mules and horses have not been a matter of concern for a long time; their feeding and care has been careless, and they are without shelter and lack fodder. The incidence of sickness is also comparatively high, resulting in a large number of deaths or early retirements from service, with great losses both for our combat preparations and our economy.

Do mules and horses still have any function in modern warfare? A look at the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam provides the answer. In this combat, which lasted only 28 days and penetrated 80-odd kilometers into Vietnam, in addition to the use of military horses directly involved in combat with combattant units, a large number of civilian horses were used to support the front, transporting material for units. For some units, goods transported by military horses amounted to more than one-third the total amount of goods transported. During fighting in the direction of Caobinh, in particular, as our forces advanced to the Banong area, the enemy put up a life and death struggle, suddenly dynamiting the dam of a reservoir and sending a torrent of water to cover the highways. Motor vehicles could not pass, and under these circumstances, commanders actively organized mules and horses for transport, actually transporting case after case of war material to the front lines to assure victory in the battle. These facts strongly attest to the continuing important function and position of mules and horses in modern warfare. Considering that any future war in our region will be in mountains, hills, and forest areas, and be limited by the topography and the roads, in situations where transportation of materials by motor vehicles would be very difficult, in order to maintain the mobility of forces and supply logistical materials, it would be necessary to make the most of the role of mules and horses. As Deputy Chairman Ye Jianying said: "In future wars, both plains and mountain areas will be battlefields, but in holding out for long periods of time, mountain areas will be important. Consequently, mules and horses cannot be neglected. Motor vehicles, mules and horses are two legs to walk on."

Additionally, it is necessary to realize that China is still very poor, and that science and technology is not developed. In order to further readjust the national economy, it is not possible to allocate more funds to replace the equipment of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

armed forces. Therefore, a process will be required to mechanize and modernize China's armed forces. We must base ourselves upon the use of inferior equipment to win victory over enemies with superior equipment. Mules and horses continue to be a major combat force and cannot be suddenly abolished. In the case of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their possession of the world's most advanced transportation equipment, for the defense of their own soil, they still maintain a certain number of military horses. Therefore, we must keep our eyes on the overall situation on the one hand, think of the future, and actively improve upon our antiquated weapons and equipment. On the other hand, it is also necessary to face current realities and do a better job of military horse work. Every echelon of leadership should take this task firmly in hand, place it on their agendas, discuss it several times each year, make all out efforts several times each year, build up a corps of military pack train drivers, intensify training with military horses, be conscientious about prevention and treatment of military horse illnesses, do a good job of military horse material supply, and assure that every military horse is plump and sturdy, able to pack supplies and fit to travel. In this way, when fighting breaks out, victory will be more secure.

9432
CSO: 4005/2081

END