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28 July 1981

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 732



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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ANGOLA

FRENCH TV REPORTAGE ON UNITA FORCES DERIDED

Reportage Derided

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243 6-19 Jul 81 pp 29-30

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "In the Bush of French Television..."]

[Excerpts] Nothing could be more favorable to the U.S. strategy of destabilization in Angola than the documentary shown on French television on 18 June. The public of this country had vainly hoped that the information professionals, irrevocably faithful to yesterday's Giscardian power, would introduce into the powerful media they still control more objective criteria and that they would investigate more seriously before pronouncing judgement. Incorrigibly, they ignore the most elementary notions of professional deontology. Unconcerned about inducing the public in error, the director of the televised magazine of the first network, Jean-Marie Cavada, presented a documentary on the "Guerrillas in Angola," affirming that Jonas Savimbi's UNITA controlled a territory as large as France. According to him, the traitor in Pretoria's pay is supposedly conducting one of these "new anti-colonial wars" whose importance is still largely neglected.

He naturally specified that these "free world" fighters were struggling against the Soviet-Cuban occupation and kept in check the Luanda forces they support. For over a month and many a kilometer, two reporters, Michel Badaire and Jean Lugo, reportedly lived in the "liberated zones" of UNITA. From this long and exhilarating experience, they claim, they brought back slightly repetitive images of an UNITA "base" in Angola where life goes on in an idyllic way. To the sound of traditional welcoming songs in Umbundu, some tens of "regular soldiers" parade with a martial air. About the same number of civilians, well organized--and even better fed and clothed--warmly support them.

"Brigadier General" N'Zau Puna goes through the military arsenal, notably numerous trucks and other military vehicles right out in the open, adding in French that these are weapons captured from the enemy, "our sole source of supply."

Savimbi's right arm insists that UNITA controls, if you please, the provinces of Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Bie, Huambo, Beneguella and Moxico. And if everything is like in this base--as it is stressed--it would indeed be paradise: we are shown schools for children and adults, physicians and nurses and even a field hospital where the slightest case of appendicitis is treated; without forgetting, of course, musical interludes and a soccer game played according to the rules. In sum, an enviable situation...

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Moreover, since UNITA says it controls three-fourths of the territory, precautions are minimal, almost symbolic. Of course, the newsmen do not specify the name of the region or the border they had to cross to get there... Their film is remarkable for the absence of all geographic reference that could prove that this is indeed Angola. Nevertheless, any traveler going through hundreds of miles of Angolan territory must cross rivers, get a glimpse of a mountain or come across a railroad line. No trace of any "enemy," and still less of the population, but only a look at two unfortunate Soviet prisoners, civilian pilots for Aeroflot, whose plane had been downed near the Namibian border...

Finally, for all those like me, who had been able to see the miserable condition of the people who had had the misfortune to follow UNITA in the forests of the central and southern parts of the country while most of Savimbi's forces recruited on a tribal basis were departing in the baggage of the South African invaders down to Namibia, Badaire's reportage is hard to swallow.

In successive waves, these isolated peasants, victims of hunger and poverty, returned to their villages and asked for the protection of the Angolan authorities. The year 1978 saw a mass return of many thousands of starving peasants, sick, practically naked and above all else, frustrated because they had been cheated by UNITA, which had promised them a "happy life."

Thus, wherever they can still operate, in the border zones, UNITA bands are intensifying their reprisals against the villages that "betrayed" them. Here is a terrorist escalation: if the people detach themselves from us, they say, so much the worse for them.

With the dismantling of clandestine networks by the Angola authorities and the guerrillas reduced to impotence for lack of popular support, UNITA can only continue its war from the South African bases in Namibia.

The few pockets of resistance still existing within Angola have been re-supplied with weapons and field radios. South African places sometimes attempt to make drops of arms, foodstuffs and medicines.

This will continue as long as the war in Namibia and the South African occupation will last, until the FAPLA, with the support of the people's militia--ever more prepared and ready to finish with this war--take them by surprise. This is almost what happened to Savimbi himself--remarkably absent from the reportage--when in November 1978, encircled by the FAPLA, he was saved in extremis by South African helicopters who came to his assistance during the night. It is this same N'Zau Puna who had prepared and signed the radio message found by the Angolan forces who captured some of the rebels. In the S.O.S., he had said he could hold out no longer and that a helicopter should be dispatched to bring back Savimbi and a "French friend" to a more secure area. The Angolans had suspected the latter of being a French secret agent. However, one must acknowledge that he, at least, had wanted to see reality for himself. His compatriots and colleagues of today seem, for their part, to have been a lot more prudent...

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Angolan Ambassador's Protest

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243, 6-19 Jul 81 p 30

[Excerpt] On 18 June last, the TF 1 network of the French television presented a film titled "In the Angolan Bush." If the producer of this film, Jean-Marie Cavada is to be believed, this film constitutes a challenge to Soviet power in Africa. The ambassador of the People's Republic of Angola, Luis de Almeida, regrets that a taste for sensationalism and the appalling naivete of Messrs Badaire and Lugo have induced to French people in error by presenting to them a film portraying the so-called "UNITA guerrillas." The ambassador also deplores the large publicity that preceded this reportage, notably in the LE MONDE newspaper, a publication known for its seriousness, but whose "specialist" in African affairs, Jean-Claude Pomonti, loses no opportunity to tarnish Angola's reputation and its people's efforts to build a more humane and just society.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

MORE ON FRENCH AMBASSADOR--This was the reaction of French Ambassador Jacques Posier in Luanda to the election of Francois Mitterrand in front of many Western diplomats: "What I can say is that Francois Mitterrand will only remain in the Elysee for a few months. He will plunge the country in a catastrophic situation and the French people will revolt against him..." What is the Quai d'Orsay waiting for, then, is the question often asked around Luanda, to recall this personage whose disdain for Angola and for his own government is vying with the hostility he shows towards both? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243, 6-19 Jul 81 p 33] [COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981]

MORE OIL CONTRACTS--As we go to press, Angola is near to signing contracts covering ten offshore drilling blocks which span the Angolan coast from its present oilfields in the north down the border with Namibia. Local soundings have indicated that the area of coast of Kwanza Sul in the centre of the country is particularly rich in oil deposits. Marathon Oil is one big US concern favoured to carry some of the plum jobs. Drilling is expected to start in 1983 says SONANGOL, the Angolan state oil set-up. [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 116 Apr 81 p 99]

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CAPE VERDE

## BRIEFS

RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, GUINEA-BISSAU--On 5 June, Aristides Pereira, president of the Republic of Cape Verde, labeled the 5-day visit he made to Portugal as "very positive." Pereira said that his visit was mainly of a "political nature." "The results were very positive and exceeded the objectives we had initially set," he said. Pereira added that no military cooperation agreement was signed during his visit, but he did not exclude the possibility that in the future, Portuguese soldiers might help with the reorganization of his country's armed forces. "All problems concerning possible bilateral cooperation agreements in different fields will be studied at a coming meeting of the Portuguese-Cape Verdian joint commission," he stated. On 4 June, Col Silvino da Luz, Cape Verdian minister of foreign affairs, joined with his Portuguese counterpart, Andre Goncalves Pereira, in signing an agreement providing that half of the repair and expansion work on the port of Praia will be financed by the former mother country. When questioned about the future of relations between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, broken off following the November 1980 coup d'etat that ousted President Luis Cabral in Bissau, Pereira said: "It is up to history to say who is responsible for the break. Nevertheless, we believe that it will be possible in the future to establish cooperation between the two nations." Pereira called the statements made by Maj Nino Vieira, president of the Council of the Revolution of Guinea-Bissau, at the recent summit conference of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Freetown as "very positive." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1857, 12 Jun 81 p 1592] /COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981, 7 11,464

DEFENSE PROTOCOL--In a statement made before his 12 June departure for the OAU ministerial meeting in Nairobi, Silvino Da Luz, minister of foreign affairs of Cape Verde, said that his country would support a proposed defense protocol within the Organization of African Unity. Da Luz added that Cape Verde would give its backing to such a proposal because it is in keeping with the aspirations of African peoples to freedom and because it could constitute support for countries bordering on South Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1650] /COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981, 7 11,464

NAGUICAVE SURVIVAL IN DOUBT--NAGUICAVE, a joint shipping company owned by Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, may not survive the deterioration in political relations between the two countries following the 14 November coup d'etat in Bissau. Meeting in a general assembly on 16 June in Mindelo (Cape Verde) to examine the company's future, the Guinean and Cape Verdian delegations decided to call a special general assembly meeting in 45 days for the sole purpose of discussing the dissolution and manner of liquidating NAGUICAVE. NAGUICAVE had a capital of 25 million escudos

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(Cape Verdian currency worth 11 French centimes). The Guinean and Cape Verdian governments both hold 48 percent and the rest is held by private parties in Cape Verde. The company operated two vessels costing 165 million Cape Verdian escudos. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1650] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 11,464

FRG CASH DONATION--On 10 June, the Federal Republic of Germany made a gift of 39 million German marks to Cape Verde to finance a 2-year cooperation program mainly involving rural development projects, road construction and ship repair. Ten million marks will be used to buy a ship to go back and forth between the islands. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1650] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 11,464

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CHAD

ACYL AHMAT DISCUSSES FRENCH-CHADIAN RELATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jun 81 pp 1635-1636

[Report on interview with Acyl Ahmat, minister of foreign affairs of Chad, by correspondent Jacques Tremoliere: "Acyl Ahmat in Paris"; date of interview not given]

[Text] He is about 35 years old. He has an open face. Despite his innate elegance, he has a silhouette better adapted to the cavalcades on the steppes of the Sahel area than to quiet discussions in a salon of a Paris hotel. This is how Acyl Ahmat appears, or more properly said, Acyl Ouled Ahmat, of the Djatne tribe of Bedouins and minister of foreign affairs of the GUNT (Transitional Government of National Union) in Chad. The warmth of his greeting reflects his attachment to the values of his country, which some know but others do not. In his eyes it is naturally preferable to be on the right side.

A French administrator once noted his intelligence--a period in the past, as they say in Arabic stories--and pushed him forward in his studies. He likes to recall it. He has not forgotten. Whenever he can, he telephones this spiritual teacher. Through him it is also to a certain France dominated by the shadow of General De Gaulle that he says he remains faithful. This is a France, we must agree, which is a little elitist and resolutely anti-Philistine, which would surprise many French. Socialism does not appear to have any particular attraction for him, although he is pleased to introduce frequent references to "the Chad revolution" in socialist terms. If he has come to Paris, he tells us that it is simply because Giscard disappointed the Chadians. He therefore hopes that Mitterrand will understand them better, which would make it possible to establish normal relations between France and Chad.

[Question] Rightly or wrongly, Minister, among the cabinet ministers in Chad you are considered the most convinced supporter of Libya.

[Answer] I am not unaware of that reputation, but I would certainly not lower myself to deny it before President Mitterrand or Jean-Pierre Cot. France is badly

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informed about Chad. It no longer has any representative in N'Djamena and is living on the issuance of old information, military in origin, reflecting the "pro-Habre" inclinations of those who spread it about. It has been more than 25 years since a nazara has followed the daine. Since that time there has been no one down there who has understood anything about our affairs.

What I know best about Libya is its prisons, where I have spent time on several occasions. Like all the Arabs of the Batha I only joined the revolution rather late. We are supporters of law and order. We cannot live without order. I was a government official loyal to Tombalbaye, who sent me to the UN, where I prepared the first resolution of protest against the occupation of the Aouzou strip by Libya. Wasn't this on the recommendation of Qadhdhafi? I was later contracted by the MRA, which wanted to have done with Tombalbaye, because he had shown himself incapable of resolving the Claustre affair. Malloum did not succeed in resolving it, either. That is how I joined the side of Goukouni and of Hissein Habre, who were together at first, then separated from each other, then joined together again. In the Batha area I recruited a small army of 500 soldiers, because I thought that it was not healthy to leave a monopoly of the fighting to the people of the north. Today these soldiers only number 80. The liberation of Faya and of Ati is due to them.

My real objective was to unify the various political tendencies. At one time there were no more than 10 in N'Djamena. I sought to unify the various tendencies and keep Chad united. When Hissein Habre and Goukouni marched on the south in the spring of 1978, I went to Kamougue to push them back. In the Pala affair, at Mayo-Kebbi, my troops played the principal role--one could say the only one. At the time your press said that it was Libyans and Cubans on the side of Kamougue. We were the Cubans.

[Question] You say that you are for union in all its forms. Why did you think it was impossible later on to have any understanding with Hissein Habre? Acyl looked at me with irony.

[Answer] Hissein knows how to fight and is a good organizer, but such an understanding is impossible. Against everyone's will, for more than 2 years he badly treated one of your women. You are free to consider that that is of no importance. That is your affair. However, as he committed comparable or worse actions, to the detriment of our Chadian brothers, we consider him as an outlaw, as outside our law. In our country, you do not come back under the law after you have become an outlaw. /I thought that you knew that./ [in italics]

At the end of 1979 Hissein Habre really had our backs to the wall. Why hide that fact? If no one would help us, we were lost. We first of all addressed ourselves to France, which had largely equipped our enemies, in order to obtain arms and ammunition. France didn't even want to hear our request. Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria also dodged us. I was in Iraq to ask for help from Saddam Hussein, when war with Iran broke out. Saddam Hussein then evidently had other concerns than Chad. The only recourse was Qadhdhafi. He promised to act, and he did so. Perhaps for you he is the devil, but that devil brought us peace which we had been waiting for since 1964. That is why, although we don't want Libyan troops to stay a long time in our country, we will not order them to leave. You should know that also.

[Question] The presence of the Libyans in Chad has been a matter of concern to many African states which are our allies. If we re-establish normal relations with the GUNT, whose period of authority, moreover, has expired, we would lose their consideration.

[Answer] That argument is only valid outside of Africa. Those countries are all capable of resolving their differences with Qadhafi themselves. Some of them have a common frontier with him. Why would it be necessary to have this difference resolved in Chad? They have only adopted this attitude because France inspired them to do so. They would never have thought of it without France.

However, that is not the real question. Qadhafi, the devil? I could ask you just what he has done, apart from having had your embassy in Tripoli burned--just a matter of a few bricks--to justify that opinion of him. Moreover, you had this opinion of him already before the affair of your embassy. Tunisia, Egypt, yes, I understand their attitude, but you? Remember that he is a devil with whom you know how to come to terms on occasion, as the matter of the aircraft and the racing cars and Libyan air space demonstrate.

However, I accept your conclusion. When you have a friend engaged in a fight with the devil, you can let him deal with it himself, but he is then in a rightful position to doubt your friendship. You can also show him this friendship in a positive way. If Mitterrand chooses the first solution, as Giscard did, everything will be clear, and we will know what we are dealing with. If, as we hope, it is the second course which is to be followed, it will be for you to explain the reasons yourselves to your African allies, and even to encourage them to send ambassadors to us. Note, moreover, that several of them, like Nigeria and the Central African Republic, never withdrew their ambassadors.

[Question] Ambassadors to be sent to a government which has no legal existence? Is this the time?

[Answer] Let us be serious. Everyone wants a real government in Chad, resulting from the clearly expressed will of the Chadians. President Goukouni wants it like everyone else. However, if you simply mail a letter to Abeche in N'Djamena, the letter will never arrive, because there are no more mailboxes, stamps, personnel to transport it, or a mailman to deliver it. You do not organize an election in a country which has reached this degree of disorganization. The people no longer even know in what district they live. The Americans, after the liberation of France, expressed the same idea as you have, and you know what General De Gaulle said to them. The provisional must remain until the permanent solution can really be established. However, you often find that what is good for others is bad for you.

For us, the essential matter is peace regained, peace maintained, and peace constructed. Peace only, aafia beus [Hassaniya Arabic translation of "peace only"]. Couldn't France help us?

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Christian, in a Moslem country. By extension a European.
2. Pastoral people on the march.
3. French Administration Reorganization Mission in Chad. We naturally leave to Aycl Ahmat the responsibility for making this statement.

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## EQUATORIAL GUINEA

## PRESIDENT HAS 'DIFFICULT TASK' IN IMPROVING REGIME'S IMAGE

London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 pp 26, 27

[Text]

**N**EARLY two years after the military take-over in the West African state of Equatorial Guinea, the scars of the 11 years of the dictatorial regime of the late President Macias Nguema on the economy and life of the people are still visible as ever. Even in Malabo, the capital, many houses and shops belonging to foreign nationals — Spaniards, Nigerians and Cameroonians — who were forced to flee the country, remain empty. Very few shops have been reopened.

Influential politicians and businessmen who successfully escaped the long arm of Nguema's security forces and went into exile have still not returned, while many who came back have quietly slipped out of the country. However, the ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed by Lt. Col. Teodor Nguema Mbasogo has placed no restriction on anyone. There have been no political arrests, nor has anyone been detained without trial, and no one has gone 'missing'.

But despite the many efforts of the SMC to return the country to normality many Guineans still see the present regime as new wine in an old bottle, and the so-called military coup of 3 August 1979 as merely a Cabinet reshuffle in which the principal corrupt actor was removed. Apart from Capt. Riquesson Ela Eulogio, second Vice-President of the SMC who was imprisoned under Nguema, virtually the

rest of the Cabinet played various roles under Nguema's tyrannical regime.

It is, perhaps, part of the SMC's strategy to improve its public relations that President Mbasogo took the first step to fulfilling his promise to reduce the role of the military in his Government by the appointment of the first civilian member of the Cabinet in late March. Emiliano Buale, an agricultural engineer, was made Minister of Agriculture. A month before the appointment President Mbasogo told Guineans that his Government was drafting a constitution and intended to diminish the role of the armed forces, gradually.

One of the measures to that end was a decree, published in early March, which obliges military men holding Government posts to declare whether they prefer to return to strictly military duties or retain their jobs in the administration. In the latter case, according to one journalist, they must accept an extended leave of absence from the armed forces.

To many Guineans, however, the SMC's reforms are simply cosmetic. For instance, although the Government has announced its intention to broaden the leadership base away from the military, President Mbasogo has extraordinary powers. He is the *de facto* Minister of Defence, as well as the Minister of Information and Culture although the portfolios are held by his aides. He also has the final say on foreign affairs and finance.

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Meanwhile the Spaniards, Equatorial Guinea's former colonial masters are back in business although they were expelled in large numbers by Macias Nguema. One of the President Mbasogo's first acts when he came to power was to issue urgent appeals for aid from Spain. There are currently about 120 Spanish advisers in the country, ostensibly helping the Government to 'organize' the administration.

It is an indication of the trust and confidence the President has in his fellow Guineans that there are over 500 Moroccan troops in the country who form the inner core of his personal guard. While his predecessor made use of Russians and Cubans and to a certain extent the Chinese, President Mbasogo is using Moroccans and it is generally held in Malabo that their presence is crucial if the new regime is to continue in power under him. SMC has abrogated the fishing treaty with the Russians and reduced the diplomatic personnel in their mission in Malabo.

In the past, Equatorial Guinea has been isolated and has neither been a member of ECOWAS or UDEAC to which its French-speaking neighbours belong. Recently, however, there have been suggestions in Yaounde by the first Vice-President, Florencio Éla, of his country trying to seek entry into the UDEAC which may perhaps improve the rate of the *Ekuele* which was devalued by 50 per cent not long ago.

Equatorial Guinea's relationship with its neighbours, all of them oil producers, will be of importance. Both Elf and Hispaniol are likely to continue their prospecting on the borders of Gabon. If oil is found in commercial

quantities, a priority issue for the Government would be to mend fences with its neighbours and work out permanent borders on land and sea.

Already there have been indications from Malabo that it is genuinely anxious to repair its tarnished image. Guinean delegations are now frequently seen at African and other international forums; and Mbasogo also made official visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Spain. Ambassadors of western and eastern countries are being accredited to the country.

The President Mbasogo has a difficult task ahead in his 'house cleaning' exercise; for this to succeed his regime must convince Equatorial Guineans in exile in more positive ways that his administration is a 'new wine in a new bottle', that the ghost of the late President Nguema has been exorcised, and that there is a place for them in the Government's efforts to rebuild the country. Also the momentum of aid flow must continue under the 'open door policy' as this would be a catalyst in motivating the foreign investors into further investment and participation in the nation's development ■

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GABON

FIGURES PROVIDED ON EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1857, 12 Jun 81. p 1601

[Excerpts] Gabon's mining production includes oil, manganese, uranium and secondarily, gold and diamonds.

In 1980, the search for oil was very active. A total of 26 companies participated in exploration in Gabon. There were 20 exploratory drillings representing 37,453 meters and three yielded commercial discoveries. In addition, there were 24 development drillings compared with 16 in 1979. However, oil production is down 9 percent compared with the previous year, with 8,895,000 tons.

The two refineries in Port-Gentil, SOGARA [Gabonese Refining Company] and COGER [presumably General Refining Company], processed 1,292,193 tons of crude oil combined. Crude oil exports amounted to 7,687,118 tons, 9.2 percent less than in 1979. The main customers were France, the United States, Brazil, Chile, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain.

In 1980, manganese ore exports reached a relatively high level compared with the average for recent years: 2,136,452 tons, but they were down compared with 1979, which had a record with 2,308,077 tons. The year's production was 2,163,380 tons compared with 2,300,094 in 1979. The average price per ton FOB was, in current francs, about 10 percent higher than the previous year.

At the end of 1980, the still delicate situation of the world iron and steel industry pointed to serious difficulties in selling metal ore during the first half of 1981 and COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company) announced a rather sharp reduction in production for 1981.

Production of uranium concentrate amounted to 1,381 tons, containing 1,033 tons of uranium metal, for 1980. It was slightly lower than in 1979, when the figure was 1,100 tons of uranium metal. The Franceville Uranium Mining Company (COMUF), the only uranium producer in Gabon, will be able to produce 1,500 tons of uranium metal a year starting in 1982. However, the slump in the market that began at the end of 1979 grew worse in 1980 and one can already predict a rather substantial drop in sales in 1981.



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Gold production was negligible in 1980 with 17.2 kilograms of fine gold. Diamond production was 556.95 carats with exports of 696.25 carats worth 14.7 million CFA francs. In 1980, mining research involved uranium, lead, zinc, copper, molybdenum, barytes, talc, gold and diamonds.

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GABON

COMMENTS ON CENSUS FIGURES DISCREPANCY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1070, 8 Jul 81 p 39

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Gabonese Surplus"]

[Text] Just how many are they, from Bitam to Mayumba? It is impossible to know, and it is, doubtlessly, one of the subjects that are taboo in Gabon--which has a few others as well: between the official numbers published in Libreville and those estimated by the international financial institutions and organizations, there is a veritable gap of at least 500,000 "makaya," (middle-class Gabonese).

They really and truly exist, according to Gabonese authorities, who claim a total population of 1,300,000. No doubt they have been confused with the trees, the World Bank and the UN seem to retort: they only acknowledge, respectively, 645,000 and 800,000 Gabonese (preliminary results of the 1980 census).

Moreover, it was a funny kind of census. Conducted by a group of UN experts assisted by 60 Gabonese, it was held in August 1980 and the results were submitted to the Ministry of Planning in December. The census takers had counted 800,000 inhabitants, or 150,000 more than the last estimates of the World Bank, but half a million less than the figures presented by the government. That caused a polite but firm expression of regret from Minister of Planning Pascal Nze: "You made a mistake," he told the experts. "We are more numerous; you must count again." And he insisted on the "inefficiency" of censuses in Gabon, which neglect certain populations scattered in the bush. The UN team then left Gabon in a fury...

How can this discrepancy be explained? It is quite simple, if one is to believe World Bank analysts: if Gabonese indeed number 600 to 800,000, this gives Gabon an annual per capita income of \$3,280, which puts Gabon in second place in Africa after Libya. It is indeed a flattering sum. However, Libreville would find it difficult, in this case, to ask for priority aid and preferential loans granted to less well-endowed countries. To be sure, the government is contesting this explanation. In its estimation, the "makaya" are 1,300,000, and nothing less...

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GABON

## BRIEFS

IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS REQUESTED--Meeting on 10 June in Libreville with President Bongo, secretary general and founder of the PDG (Gabonese Democratic Party), the Political Bureau of the party examined a situation characterized by "vexatious attitudes with regard to nationals or (...) reprehensible forms of conduct such as armed robberies, murders, and so on." According to the communique issued following the meeting, "in the face of this situation, the Political Bureau, while welcoming the decision recently made by the president of the republic to set up a Ministry of Public Security, has asked the government to: "do everything possible so that that ministry will very rapidly become operational; exert more control over immigration which, as everyone knows, may, when it exceeds a certain limit, create conflicts between nationals and non-nationals. Furthermore, the Political Bureau calls on members of the party and all the people to demonstrate more vigilance, civic spirit and patriotism by systematically reporting to security forces any suspicious presence on national soil and any subversive activities. In this action that is demanded of each one of us, we must not lose sight of our will and that of our leader to live in harmony and perfect understanding with all countries enamored of peace in general and in particular, with the countries of Central Africa." [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1660] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 11,464

IRON ORE MINING VIEWED--Presided over by Gabonese Minister of Mining M'Bouy Boutzit, the board of directors of the Mekambo Iron Mining Company (SOMIFER), which halted all activities 3 years ago, has just decided to restructure its capital in order to permit the launching of a study program aimed at developing the major Belinga iron deposit in Gabon. The company recalls that this project already has proven reserves of over 500 million tons of ore with 65 percent iron, 300 of which contain under .1 percent phosphorus and 200 between .1 and .2 percent. At the board of directors meeting in Libreville, Gabonese Mining Director Ampamba presented the regional program to search for additional reserves in a radius of 100 kilometers around Belinga in Gabon and the Congo. The Gabonese mining minister, who is president of SOMIFER, also reviewed the construction of the Trans-Gabonese Railroad, which is now 200 kilometers long and which could in the future carry the ore to world markets. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1660] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 11,464

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GHANA

## BRIEFS

BLACK STAR RECOVERY--Ghana's state-owned Black Star Shipping Line is to have its debts paid off by the Government and it can now look forward to the modernization of its fleet of merchant ships. Minister of Transport, Harry Sawyer, said that the move to erase the Black Star's 150 million cedis debts would end the line's immediate problems and enable it to get back into full operation. The Black Star has put six of its ships up for sale, four of which have already been bid for by a Greek line. The refurbishing of the fleet with modern, multi-purpose vessels is taking place in view of changes in the shipping industry. The latest 'combi' vessels need less back-up facilities when they arrive in ports. The Black Star's new ships are built by Hyundai of South Korea which supplied Nigeria's shipping line with several ships. It is not known for certain when Ghana's new ships will be delivered as the Korean company has a three-year list of orders to meet. One interesting disclosure made by Sawyer was that between July 1970 and February 1981 the Black Star Line earned a total of 106 million cedis. [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 p 81] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd]

POSSIBLE FRENCH INVESTMENT--The French are among the first to respond to the Ghanaian plea for more outside investment in its gold industry. The recent seminar held in Accra, which attracted 50 experts and some 100 representatives from international mining and financial institutions from the US, Canada and Europe, underlined the untapped rich deposits in the country. It is understood that the French are to send a team of experts to inspect investment prospects in Ghana. [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 p 84] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd]

'FAVORABLE' OIL INVESTMENT CLIMATE--As part of its new programme to extend a more welcoming hand to outside oil companies, Ghana has announced that its Keta Basin lagoon is to be surveyed later this year by Texaco. It is part of the plan also to extend exploration work to onshore areas for which Ghana will offer "a fair and favourable climate." [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 116 Apr 81 p 99] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd]

HIGHER CACAO PRICE--On 5 June, the Ghana National Farmers Union sent a petition to the government asking it to raise the purchase price of cacao paid to the producer from the current 120 cedis per load to 500 cedis. The petition, signed by Kusi Amfofo, secretary general of the union, also opposes the proposed creation of the National Farmers Council, which would replace the union in its activities of distributing agricultural products. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1655] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]  
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IVORY COAST

PROBLEMS, DIFFERENCES AFFECT COCOA PRICE AGREEMENT

Ivorian Refusal

London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 pp 81-82

[Text]

THERE have been fresh hopes that the Ivory Coast would after all join the new International Cocoa Agreement which was negotiated in Geneva last November. At a meeting of the International Cocoa Council in London, which ended on 4 March, the Ivory Coast requested that a committee be established to review the price range of the cocoa pact. This has been interpreted by some observers to mean that the Ivorians have had a change of heart about not joining the agreement.

The Ivory Coast has said all along that it was not prepared to join a cocoa pact where the minimum price has been set at \$1.10 per pound, arguing that this was too low. The United States, on the other hand, is refusing to join, regarding the minimum price as too high.

Although it was possible to envision a cocoa pact functioning without the US, which was not a member of the previous pact, many believe that without the Ivory Coast, which exports 22% of the world's cocoa, there would be little chance of a new agreement working effectively. Hence the importance being attached to that country's request at the London meeting.

Since November Ivory Coast has attempted to improve cocoa prices by building up stocks. When the cocoa

agreement broke down in March the producers unsuccessfully tried to go it alone. In June the Ivory Coast was forced to sell its 100,000 tonne stockpile at well below the minimum \$1.20 per pound which the producers were seeking. With a cocoa surplus of over 100,000 tonnes being predicted this year prices might remain below the \$1.00 mark for some time yet.

This may well be the reason for the apparent shift in attitude of the Ivory Coast which has not shared the view of other producers that it is better to settle for a new agreement which would guarantee a minimum price of \$1.10 per pound. By a system of export levies producers in the previous agreement have built up a \$230 million buffer stock fund. Ivory Coast's share of this fund comes to \$50 million — a sizeable chunk which other producers would sorely miss were they to attempt to operate a new agreement without the Ivory Coast.

It is still not yet clear whether this money can be transferred to a new pact if the Ivory Coast insists that the fund be liquidated and its share returned. The feeling among other members is that should the Ivory Coast decide not to join there would be little point in attempting to get a new pact off the ground. Despite the Cocoa Agreement being opened for signature since 1, January, not many members among those who negotiated

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it have signed it.

For the first time since November, however, the Ivory Coast has begun to indicate that it may be ready to sign an agreement which would, at least, guarantee a minimum price for its cocoa, even though the price may be lower than is desirable. ■

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Ivorian Intransigence

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 29 Jun 81 p 8

[Article by Lionel Zinsou: "The Ivorian Logic"]

[Text] The cocoa futures market is becoming crazy. Prices, which have been at their most depressed level for 5 years, jumped up last week just on the strength of the news that the German Federal Republic would adhere to the principle of an international agreement. However, there is no prospect in sight that this German initiative will affect the negative will of the two main actors: the Ivory Coast and the United States.

On the contrary, what can one expect of the market within the next few weeks? There are three basic factors: consumption is sluggish as a result of the financial crisis in the consumer countries. Speculators are removing capital from the cocoa market to obtain no-risk profits of up to 20 percent on the financial markets. No producing country can agree to unilaterally suspend deliveries and to carry alone the burden of regulating the market.

Therefore, price can only dip. Under such circumstances, there is general amazement at the intransigence of the Ivory Coast, which refuses an agreement that would guarantee it 110 cents for 1 pound of cocoa at a time when it sells it for 75 cents.

Ivorian firmness, however, follows a logic that consumers pretend to ignore. This country has the financial means to wait it out and its goal is to achieve a truly regulatory agreement taking into account production prices, instead of signing an agreement that would only mirror the market's catastrophic state. Thus, it intends to prove to all these partners, and mainly to the EEC, the irrationality of futures markets. Ruinous for Western industrialists 4 years ago, when prices were triple those today, cocoa transactions are ruinous today for the peasant masses of Africa and Latin America. Therefore, the Ivory Coast is making an excellent political bet by letting the market itself prove that it constitutes an obstacle for all involved.

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MOZAMBIQUE

SOUTH AFRICAN RAID SEEN CONTRIBUTING TO LEFTIST SLIDE

London AFRICA in English No 116, Apr 81 pp 38-39

[Excerpts] The South African commando attack on Maputo has provoked Mozambique into a new and very hard line against the South African Government. For the first time, President Samora Machel has declared explicitly that 'the Boers are the enemy'. He threw his support firmly behind the ANC (African National Congress) (see page 35) and called on the Soviet Union for support.

The militancy surprised some diplomats in Pretoria and Maputo. But Mozambique believes the commando raid is not an isolated event and that South Africa has raised the level of the conflict and further attacks are inevitable. So Mozambique is now preparing for war. Newspaper headlines and banners declare 'We are not afraid of war' and 'Let them come--no one will leave alive'. Security is being tightened at the airport and other key installations. But the stress is being put on popular mobilization.

The reason for the stress on popular mobilization is not that the Government really believes that Mozambicans can beat South African arms with picks and hoes. Rather, the experience of the Rhodesian war suggests that the biggest threat, in the near future, is sabotage.

A higher degree of popular mobilization is the only effective way to combat sabotage. Nevertheless, the Government also believes that further attacks are inevitable, and that air attacks on Maputo are possible.

Confrontation

An important aspect of this confrontation, and one which has clearly pushed Mozambique into its harder position, is that South Africa has taken up the support of the National Resistance Movement. This group of anti-Frelimo Mozambicans was created, trained, armed and supplied by Ian Smith's Special Branch. After Lancaster House South Africa took up their support and training.

Important as the South African commando raid and Pretoria's involvement in Mozambique may have been, the key element which even provoked Mozambique's militant reaction, appears to be Frelimo's view of the changing situation inside South Africa and internationally. The Frelimo Government had always shown a curious faith in White liberals and the White opposition inside South Africa. Mozambique continued to stress that some Whites opposed the Government in Pretoria and so it

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wanted good relations with its southern neighbour even though it abhors its apartheid policies. But the unanimous White support for the commando attack on the ANC even by the supposedly liberal RAND DAILY MAIL, brought a quick end to that attitude. For the first time, Machel in his speech singled out the White minority as the enemy.

Whereas Mozambique used to stress that South Africa was a sovereign state, now it repeatedly refers to it as the 'Nazi, fascist, illegal regime'.

Solidarity

These changes are linked to a much more public and outspoken support for the ANC.

Finally, the international situation plays a part. Mozambique sees the western countries increasingly siding with South Africa. Mozambique had expected a stronger reaction from the West to the commando attack. For example, shortly after the attacks, at a Mozambican Heroes Day ceremony, the President saw the US ambassador and called him over to ask 'Have you told your President about the attack?'

Thus what the Maputo raid by South African terrorist squad achieved is that it has pushed Mozambique further toward the socialist bloc. In his speech, Machel said that the commando raid was also 'an attack on the socialist camp of which we are a part.' The Soviet Union responded. Within a week of the speech Russian warships sailed into Maputo and Beira harbours. In an unusual press conference, the Soviet Ambassador, Valentin Petrovich Vdovin, said the visit was under the terms of the 1977 Friendship Treaty.

So the battle lines have been drawn, much more firmly and quicker than most people expected. And as President Machel spelled out: 'we will not allow our country to be transformed into a firing range. We do not permit our territory to be a transit corridor for every mob of murders. We do not permit them to transfer their internal contradictions into our country.'

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MOZAMBIQUE

DETAILS ON CAHORA BASSA OPERATIONS, FUTURE EXPANSION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1671

[Text] The largest dam in Africa, the Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, has not supplied South Africa with electricity for two and one-half months, following the April attack by guerrilla soldiers from the National Resistance Movement (MNR) opposed to the Maputo regime.

AFP has just devoted a short study to the subject. It indicates that the halting of the turbines of the enormous project built on the Zambeze in the band of Mozambican territory enclosed by Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe is the result of sabotage on the high-tension line that carries current for over 1,000 kilometers to South Africa. Four 18-meter pylons were blown up in the Espungabera region in Manica Province, near the border with Zimbabwe.

The pylons have still not been repaired. According to Mozambican leaders, repair work is made difficult by the rugged terrain and by security problems. Very mountainous and wooded, sparsely populated, the Espungabera region is the MRN "sanctuary." The 200-kilometer section of the line crossing that sanctuary is practically impossible to watch.

Although deprived of power from Cahora Bassa, Pretoria continues to supply electricity to Maputo and its region, located near the border. Paradoxically enough, the power for the Mozambican capital and its vicinity comes from South Africa.

The five turbines buried in the caverns of the Zambeze gorge at Cahora Bassa produce 11,000 gigawatt-hours a year (1 gigawatt = 1 million kilowatts), almost entirely consumed by South Africa alone. At the present time, Mozambique's total electricity consumption is only equal to one-third of the production of one of the turbines because of the embryonic nature of the country's industry.

Within the framework of the "decade of development," the government has launched a program to set up industries using large amounts of electrical power, but the country's needs will long remain under Cahora Bassa's production.

The hydraulic power, Mozambique's asset, must therefore be exported. In the name of commerce, Maputo pragmatically forgets its insurmountable ideological differences with Pretoria and even anticipates increasing its deliveries of cheap electricity to its neighbor, its only customer for the time being.

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Consequently, construction of Cahora Bassa II is already being envisaged. A Mozambican leader says that it would be a project with a capacity of 8,000 to 10,000 gigawatt-hours for Zimbabwe but especially South Africa. Maputo has already told South Africa of the project semi-officially but no response has yet come from Pretoria.

The new project will be built along the same lines as the present Cahora Bassa Dam: Tunnels dug into the wall opposite that of Cahora Bassa in the Zambeze gorge will take in water from the river, which will turn the turbines in the planned powerplant.

At the present time, South Africa pays about \$66 million a year for electricity from Cahora Bassa to an organization controlled by Portuguese and Mozambican interests. Mozambique's participation does not exceed 18 percent and the government recovers only 2 percent of the revenue, the rest being devoted to reimbursement of the dam's construction costs, the fourth largest in the world.

South Africa enjoys a preferential rate in keeping with the terms of the contract signed between Portugal and South Africa before Mozambique's independence 6 years ago. Since that time, Maputo has strictly respected the obligations of this lionine contract it did not sign.

The South Africans agreed to a slight increase in rates after 1975, the year of Mozambique's independence, but the inflation of the escudo, the currency in which payments are made, has canceled out the measure. Consequently, energy from Cahora Bassa is sold to Pretoria at a quarter of the price of electricity produced in South Africa.

Power from Cahora Bass II will obviously be offered to South Africans at a higher price. And yet, it would still be advantageous to Pretoria, in the opinion of one high official who eludes the paradox of commercial relations between Mozambique and South Africa by recalling a phrase of President Samora Machel: "You can choose your friends, but you can never choose your neighbors."

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

FRENCH TOPOGRAPHIC CONTRACT--A French firm will carry out a topographic survey of one-sixth of the Mozambican territory within the framework of the country's agricultural development. The Societe Francaise Stereotopographique has just signed two contracts with the Mozambican COTOP [expansion unknown] and DINAGECA [National Directorate for Geography and Survey] firms amounting to 15 million French francs, to prepare maps and hydrographic surveys through aerial pictures. The first contract with the COTOP concerns surveys of the Tete, Niassa and Gaza provinces for the establishment of rice growing projects. The second agreement with DINAGECA entails photography of one-sixth of the territory with a view to the creation of 38 large agricultural projects. These two contracts will be financed within the framework of the credit agreement amounting to 200 million French francs signed between Mozambique and French banks. A third Franco-Mozambican agreement is under study for the topographic survey of the entire territory by satellite. Teams of French technicians are expected to arrive in Maputo during the summer. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81 p 1786] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

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