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# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 20/81)



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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ON POLITICAL STRATEGY OF AFRICAN STATES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION

Moscow FORMIROVANIYE IDEYNG-POLITICHESKOY STRATEGII V AFRIKANSKIKH STRANAKH SOTSIALISTICHESKOY ORIENTATSII in Russian 1980 (signed to press 16 May 80) pp 1-2, 257-260, 261, 262

[Annotation, table of contents and summary of book "Forming the Ideological-Political Strategy in African Countries of Socialist Orientation" by N. D. Kosukhin published under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," Glavanaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1600 copies, 262 pages]

[Text] This book covers the problem of forming revolutionary-democratic thought in countries of socialist orientation in Tropical Africa. The author presents the revolutionary democrats' views on the current stage of revolution and the paths of African countries' social-economic development. The documents of some revolutionary-democratic African parties are given in the appendix.

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NATIONAL

OPPOSITION BY SOVIET WORKERS TODAY

Cologne BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN in German No 1, 1981 pp a-d, 7-109

[Article by Karl Schloegel: "Opposition by Soviet Workers Today"]

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November 1980

I. Introduction

Since the beginning of 1978, the Soviet social system has been confronted with a new phenomenon: with the attempts to establish autonomous organizations representing workers and working people--organizations independent of the CPSU and the

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official trade unions. As early as 1977, a group of both male and female workers, in which the miner Vladimir Aleksandrovich Klebanov played a leading role, had jointly addressed the Soviet authorities and the Western public.<sup>1</sup> The subject of some form of organization was mentioned for the first time in the "Statement Addressed to the International Public" of 28 January 1978; this document was signed by "Members of the Committee of the Free Trade Union of Soviet Unemployed" (Komitet svobodnogo profsoyuza sovetskikh bezrabortnykh).<sup>2</sup> A few days later, on 2 January (sic!) 1978, this group, which had expanded from 12 to 43 signatories, informed the Western correspondents accredited in Moscow of the establishment of the "Association of Free Workers Unions in the Soviet Union" (Assotsiatsiya svobodnykh profsoyuzov trudyashchikhsya v Sovetskom Soyuze),<sup>3</sup> which in the following will be called "Free Trade Union." Even though the Soviet authorities had immediately inflicted harsh reprisals on the founders of the organization and had practically scotched this attempt at organization, a new trade union group was established in the fall of that year. On 28 October 1978, foreign correspondents were presented at a press conference with a statement--signed by eight persons--which announced the establishment of the "Free Interprofessional Association of Working People (SMOT)" (Svobodnoye Mezhproufessional'noye Ob'yedineniye Trudyashchikhsya).<sup>4</sup> In spite of persecution measures on the part of the authorities, SMOT apparently has so far been able to continue its activities, as is indicated by the solidarity declaration that SMOT's Council of Representatives addressed to the striking Polish workers.<sup>5</sup>

## 1. Some Problems

Aside from the short period of the New Economic Policy--during which it had still been possible to engage in controversy or even to launch strikes under the auspices of trade unions<sup>6</sup>--Klebanov's initiative represents the first instance raising the question about independent trade unions in the USSR--theoretically as well as practically. To be sure, in comparison with the advanced development in other East and Central European countries "of the Soviet type," the establishment of independent trade unions in the USSR is still at the embryonic stage. Worker demands were key elements in the revolts in Berlin (1953), in Hungary and Poland (1956), in the "Prague Spring" of 1968, and decidedly so in the rebellion in Poland's coastal cities (1970/71) and in the Polish uprising in the summer of 1980. The fact that in Poland an independent trade union movement was able not only to develop, but even to consolidate has intensified in the USSR the interest in the role of the workers. The questions arising in connection with the disclosure of sporadic worker protests in the USSR are far-reaching and complex:

--Exactly what is the nature of these groups? Whom do they represent? What are the motives underlying their activities? What are their demands and conceptions? What is their social significance?

--Is the establishment of associations such as the "Free Trade Unions" an isolated action or does it reflect a deeper social need and must therefore be considered the "tip of an iceberg"?

--Are worker protests outside the official trade unions possibly the seeds of a legitimization crisis of the Soviet system, which defines itself as the representative of the "basic historic interests of the working class"? How does the ruling elite react to such a development? As regards the Soviet workers, what is the relationship between the establishment of consensus and the use of force?



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--Is the development of a workers' movement in the traditional sense conceivable in the Soviet Union or does the structure of the system preclude such a development from the outset? Could such a development be integrated or can it take place only upon fundamental changes in the social system?

--What are the social and political conditions, under which dissatisfaction, protest and independent representation of interests could be articulated and organized? Can one speak of the formation of a class and of a class-based opposition?

--In the event of a consolidation of workers' organizations or of growing dissent among the workers, what repercussions would this have on the USSR's internal social framework and on its international position as a superpower and as the leading country in the Eastern Bloc?

Considering some of the comments made in the West and by dissidents, one is struck by the fact that while emphasis is placed on the rudimentary form of the attempts at organization made by Soviet independent trade unions, attention is drawn to the principle-related dimension of these attempts. According to these observers, such initiatives call into question "the monopoly (of the CPSU--the author) concerning representation of the working class";<sup>7</sup> irrespective of their affirmation of the Soviet laws and of their declarations of loyalty, their mere existence has "far-reaching and radical implications."<sup>8</sup> These observers claim that the establishment of such organs opens up the prospect of a new coalition of workers and intellectuals in the USSR;<sup>9</sup> that in spite of all reservations regarding the fragility of these groups the Soviet dissidents "enthusiastically" welcomed the establishment of these organs<sup>10</sup> and that in the USSR, too, the development of a workers' movement and of the forms appropriate to it will be irresistible and impervious to any measures of suppression.<sup>11</sup>

First of all, however, the present study will outline certain problems one encounters in recording and analyzing the forms of protest of Soviet workers.

## 2. Problems Concerning Methodology and Classification

A. Kahan points out that research concerning the role of the working class in the Soviet system has been neglected.<sup>12</sup> This observation appears to be well taken, considering the volume of studies concerned with the mode of operation of political institutions, with the dissident movement or with the problems in connection with the nationalities. The deficit noted strikingly contrasts with the actual significance of the Soviet working class. Robert Conquest points out that if it is true that for any developed society the analysis of the "relations between the government and the industrial proletariat" is of special importance, this is all the more true of the Soviet Union, mainly because of its specific social doctrine.<sup>13</sup>

In regard to the problems encountered in dealing with the present subject, one can distinguish between two levels: the first level concerns the continuing shortage of trustworthy empirical data; the second level concerns the development of categories and theories in regard to the Soviet social system. In view of the fact that generally speaking empirical analysis and the development of theoretical concepts are interdependent, the aforementioned deficits are especially aggravating.

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For the most part, the present study draws on three types of sources: firstly, statements and accounts by workers; secondly, accounts by Soviet dissidents in the Soviet Union; thirdly, reports by Soviet emigres.

Even though the results of Soviet empirical social research have been ignored for some time<sup>14</sup> and although this discipline has advanced considerably since the 1960's--mainly on account of objective social processes and tasks such as manpower control, rationalization, the study of "man as the subjective factor" with the objective of increasing labor productivity and insuring control--certain basic objections to its results remain valid. Now as ever, Soviet social research is under explicit orders to show Party spirit--orders that determine the course of research, the subject, the interpretation of data, etc. Critical questions are still largely left out of consideration, with emphasis being placed on more technical problems related to "social engineering"--not to mention censorship and restrictions concerning publication.<sup>15</sup> However, like the trade union press, the social research work indirectly provides important information on sources of social conflict, insofar as it registers--up to a certain limit--signs of latent dissatisfaction, disloyalty and alienation and disputes within the socially tolerated limits.

Thus the most important source undoubtedly is the underground Samizdat, which represents a forum for the authentic--i.e. uncensored--expression of views and interests, however marginal and minority-oriented they may be. Even though here, too, commitment and wishful thinking frequently lead to one-sided positions in regard to the assessment of certain events, the Samizdat press is a valuable source of information. That the Samizdat literature reflects the point of view of the dissidents, i.e. in most cases the viewpoint of the intelligentsia, must be taken into consideration.

Documents which do not provide information about workers, but in which the workers themselves articulate their views are among the most important sources; but they are rarer--for obvious reasons: workers do not belong to the professional classes concerned with the spoken and printed word; they hardly have any access to the media or to foreign journalists. Insofar as in the last 3 to 4 years the share of documents produced by workers has been increasing in the Samizdat literature, one can speak of broadened access to the viewpoint of Soviet workers.

Although one can attempt to produce the most complete possible record of open worker protests in the USSR, such an attempt is unlikely to be successful, because the restrictions are too great. One need only mention the fact that information regarding the insurrection at Novochoerkassk in 1962 circulated--a long time after that event--in the form of unconfirmed rumors, since the entire area affected by the unrest had been hermetically sealed off. V. Belotserkovskiy points out that the publicity accorded in Tsarist Russia to the "Lena Massacre" of 1912 was inconceivable in regard to the events of Novochoerkassk.<sup>16</sup> For this reason, one must proceed from the assumption that there is a certain number of unknown events.

The aforementioned problem concerning sources and materials is at the same time a problem of classification. What forms of resistance can be classified as active or passive resistance, as open or latent resistance? And if the activities in question are not only individual, but also collective operations, can one classify them

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as modes of operation of a social group, stratum or class? These two questions are closely interrelated, since the social structure also determines the modes of operation of its members. It would seem reasonable--depending on the given premises concerning classification--also to assign to different categories the manifestations of worker conduct and worker protest. This consideration focuses on a social theory adequate to the specific conditions in the Soviet Union. For the sake of clarification, we will express this idea in a somewhat stylized and thus simplified manner:

For a Marxist-Leninist of the Soviet type, for whom the nonexistence of antagonistic conflicts is axiomatic, phenomena such as the disproportionately great fluctuation of manpower, violations of work discipline, deliberate tardiness at the work place, conflicts between workers and the plant management can be interpreted differently: as residual forms of "bourgeois consciousness," as instances of friction during a social upheaval such as the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, or as an organizational problem within a process of rationalization.<sup>17</sup> But such phenomena are hardly interpreted as reflections of a possibly antagonistic conflict, as the latent signs of class formation in a clearly dichotomous society. Consequently, the conflict potential manifested in such clashes will most likely be considered from the viewpoint of sociotechnological methodology rather than from that of structural social reform.

Conversely, someone taking a position based on Marx--a position actually taken by Marxist critics of the USSR in the West--could interpret all the aforementioned phenomena as developmental forms of a class struggle. All the elements that within a stratification model are manifested only as divergence in the character of work, of the qualification level, of consumption, etc. would in such a model be described as a reflection of antagonistic class interests. Such an approach would attribute special significance to the latent forms of conflict.<sup>18</sup>

However, the impasses that are apparent in the positions we have briefly described here can be found in other theoretical approaches as well. For example, for all conceptions that focus on the aspect of totalitarian rule, the reconciliation of consensus and coercion in the USSR represents a problem that so far has not been solved.<sup>19</sup> However, since we cannot discuss here the present developmental stage concerning theories of the Soviet social system, we will merely point out three aspects that are relevant for the limited framework of the present study:

Firstly: If the objective is to describe the confrontation of "real workers" and the so-called "workers' state," there arises the question by what terms this conflict is to be defined; this leads us to the question as to whether the USSR represents a "real workers' state," a "socialist society," etc. or whether both these terms are merely a legitimation facade for a specific society characterized by extreme degrees of exploitation and control. Since the necessity of reorganizing the tools for a theoretical analysis of Soviet society has repeatedly been pointed out,<sup>20</sup> we will broach here only two aspects, which concern a normative procedure in regard to the formation of theories concerning the Soviet Union: while no one can deny the interdependence of the Soviet social system and Marxism, it is equally certain that compared with real historical and social interests ideas and ideologies (such as Marxism) are of secondary importance; and while it is true that in the Soviet Union the formerly privately owned means of production have been

nationalized, it is equally obvious that the abolition of private ownership has not brought forth any type of greater productivity of socially useful work and nationalization. Moreover, since the concept of socialism has become rather ambiguous since its worldwide spread and multiregional development and thus has become relatively devalued for analytical purposes, it appears to belong in the realm of colloquial usage. For these reasons, we will speak in the following of the "Soviet social system" that has produced specific forms of social inequality, control and conflict resolution.

Secondly: Equally controversial is the applicability of the "class" category to Soviet conditions. In view of the many facts and analyses that have been advanced in this respect, one cannot speak of the working class as the "ruling" class nor can one simply call it a homogeneously subaltern class.<sup>21</sup> Since class-analytical concepts cannot be discussed here either, we propose of the industrial workers (sic!) who encompass an entire spectrum of--mostly manual--work requiring diverse skills and who on account of their position in the social structure keep themselves apart from the kolkhos farmers "below" and from the scientific-technical workers (ITR) "above."<sup>22</sup>

Thirdly: It does not appear to be correct to declare all signs of latent dissatisfaction and disintegration to be forms of resistance, nor should open protests by workers be isolated from the general social ambience. Here we proceed from the assumption that the Soviet social system has developed specific mechanisms for insuring control and consensus--mechanisms that also largely determine the forms in which the workers articulate their interests. While helping to extend the radius of investigation, this observation does not lose sight of the fundamental difference between "deviance" and "dissent" and thus prevents an inflationary use of the concept of "labor conflicts," which are characteristic of "open societies," not of the Soviet society.<sup>23</sup>

In view of the above observations, it appears to be necessary to exercise restraint in regard to systematic categorization, to place emphasis on the description of current events and to formulate--wherever this is possible--farther-reaching questions, above all questions that are due to the analytical tools' insufficient powers of definition. In conclusion, two qualifying observations:

The present study focuses on the 1970's--not in the sense of a strictly defined time span, but in the sense of a phase distinguished by special characteristics: in terms of domestic policy, the beginning of this period is marked by the implementation of the industrial reform and by the intensified suppression of a growing opposition movement; in terms of foreign policy, it is marked by the military intervention in the CSSR. The ideological atmosphere of this phase has been given various labels such as "reideologization," "restalinization," development of a "new Ouvrierism."<sup>24</sup> The present study deliberately leaves out of consideration the interconnection of worker protests and nationality-related problems; it does so for pragmatic, research-related reasons, not because it considers that interconnection irrelevant. In fact, there appear to be many indications that in regions in which the interests of the workers coincide with those of the non-Russian nationalities working class opposition may develop and consolidate sooner than in the Russian center.<sup>25</sup>

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## II. Manifestations of Worker Resistance in the 1960's and 1970's

As V. Klebanov pointed out in his autobiographical notes, the idea concerning establishment of an independent organization representing the interests of workers had emerged as early as the end of the 1960's.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, a formulation in a comment by SMOT--to the effect that the time now was "ripe" for the establishment of independent trade unions--seems to justify the assumption that there took place a lengthy fermentation process, a transition from idea to execution.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, in many respects the establishment of the "Committee of Free Trade Unions of Soviet Unemployed" and subsequently of the "Association of Free Trade Unions of Working People in the Soviet Union" appears to be an extreme measure of working men and women to attain something that--although rightfully theirs--had been denied them in previous years. V. Klebanov's biography probably is typical of a learning process exceeding the individual concerned.

## 1. An Instructive Biography

V. Klebanov, born in 1932, had as early as 1958 actively opposed the violations of labor laws. He called for strict observance of the 1956 decree concerning the 6-hour day and the 6-day week and he demanded correct payment of wages and publication of industrial accidents; in addition, he insisted on correct determination of the invalid categories, on just compensation in the event of industrial accidents, on punishment of theft of plant property. He also criticized the arbitrariness shown in the allocation of residential housing. Klebanov states that for this reason the plant management had since 1958 repeatedly tried to fire him and that it passed on to the KGB defamatory reports about him. Even though Klebanov in 1959 suffered a facial injury, he was not recognized as disabled. In 1959, he enrolled--as a day student--at the Donetsk Polytechnic Institute. In January 1965, he and his family were to be expelled, but this was prevented by colleagues of his. Not until 23 December 1965--in consequence of his petition to the Mining Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR--was a ruling passed in his favor. Henceforth, the local administration and party organs tried on various occasions to classify him as a "troublemaker" and "abnormal personality" so as to be able to fire him. Attempts to commit him to a mental hospital for observation again failed on account of the solidarity of his colleagues. In the final verdict passed by the Makeyevka Municipal Court, Klebanov was declared "insane" and "paranoid." On 4 March 1967, Klebanov succeeded--by means of an expert opinion furnished by Prof N. Tatarenko--in obtaining recognition of his invalid status. He was advised to work for a club in the capacity of planner or director. In September 1967, Klebanov was assigned a position as a planning engineer. His superiors were not willing to accept this decision and they fabricated charges against him on the basis of Paragraph 187 of the Ukrainian SSR's Penal Code ("Resistance Against the State"). On 12 September 1969, Klebanov was arrested and committed to Donetsk City Prison No. 1. Subsequently, he passed through a number of mental hospitals. On 7 June 1973, he was released by order of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, but this was not the end of his difficulties. The Makeyevka Municipal Court declared him "not responsible for his actions" and denied him and his family participation in the elections to the Supreme Soviet. Not until 19 April 1974 was this decision reversed by the District Court. The Makeyevka Mine Administration refused to compensate Klebanov or to rehire him--the latter with reference to the entry "dismissal due to arrest" in his employment record and to the unavailability of open positions. On 10 February

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1977, Klebanov and V. S. Cheverov were arrested by the KGB on account of an alleged bombing attempt on the Moscow subway; they were first placed in the Moscow Psychiatric Hospital No 7 and subsequently brought to Donetsk; in the meantime, Klebanov's Moscow apartment was searched and during this search, his savings disappeared. To the international public, Klebanov became known on account of his participation in the press conferences in E. Nikolayev's Moscow apartment on 25 November 1977 and 10 and 26 January 1978. However, on 19 December 1977, he was again arrested--in spite of the protest staged by approximately 40 friends at the main entrance of the Moscow Central Telegraph Office on Gor'kiy Street. In the Donetsk Psychiatric Hospital No 1, he was classified as a "paranoid personality." Upon his short-lived release, he was again arrested on 7 February 1978, i.e. after the formal establishment of the "Free Trade Union." In May, Klebanov was transferred to the Dnepropetrovsk Psychiatric Hospital.<sup>3</sup>

A typical element in this biography is the fact that it took nearly 2 decades to progress from the customary moves through prescribed channels (complaints, letters to the editors of newspapers, lawsuits, etc.) to the establishment of an organized representation of interests. One can only conjecture as to how many similar life stories there are.

## 2. Reports on Protest Actions by Workers in the 1960's and 1970's

In the course of the--terroristically conducted--industrialization and collectivization, worker protests as open forms of conflict resolution had been entirely suppressed through Draconian labor legislation and militarization of labor and through destruction of the collective interrelationships within the working class; the means employed were the methods of the so-called "socialist competition," the Stakhanov movement, extreme differences in the rates of pay, but also holding out to many workers the prospect of relatively rapid social advancement. Since the trade unions had been totally subsumed in the Party and the state since the beginning of industrialization and since they were incorporated in a comprehensive mechanism of conflict settlement, there developed--in place of open conflicts and defense of immediate worker interests--the "bureaucratic mass labor conflict."<sup>4</sup>

Since the end of the 1920's, forced industrialization and forcible collectivization as the Soviet form of primary capital accumulation had led to the development--from the vast multitude of expropriated peasants--of the modern Soviet working class that in regard to its skills in the industrial production process and its political experience had hardly anything in common with the proletariat of the October Revolution. It was only at the beginning of the 1960's that this process of formation of the modern Soviet working class came to an end.<sup>5</sup>

Leaving out of consideration the brief incident involving the weavers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk,<sup>6</sup> one can say that the first "working class unrest" coincided with the crisis of late Stalinism, with its forms of forced labor and merely quantitatively oriented growth--which forms had become an obstacle to the transition to more intensive production methods and the requisite increase in the workers' freedom of movement.<sup>7</sup> It was not by accident that the resistance flared up first in the camp zones. While being symptomatic of an increasing disintegration of late Stalinism, these camps accelerated Stalinism's dissolution. Although the revolts probably served as some kind of signal--indirectly affecting the political atmosphere in the country--and although direct contact between camp workers and workers in the "free

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zones" cannot be ruled out, the revolts can hardly be considered the beginning of an organized opposition among the industrial workers. Strikes and revolts by the inmates are documented for the camps in Ekibastus (1951), Peschanyy, Vokhrushevo, Noril'sk (1952), Vorkuta (1953), Dzheskazkan, Kingir and Karaganda (1954).<sup>8</sup> Thus these revolts appear to belong to the "early history" of protest actions localized in the working class milieu. At the beginning of 1959, a strike was organized in the Voronezh Thaelmann Works.<sup>9</sup> In September 1959, drivers in Torzhok reportedly went on strike.<sup>10</sup> In the same year, during the construction of a copper-smelting plant in Temir-Tau, several thousand workers walked out. This strike was triggered by poor housing conditions and an insufficient supply of foodstuffs. Komsomol functionaries reportedly played an initiating and organizing role in this strike. The city and the local army barracks were briefly occupied by the rebels; the soldiers reportedly offered no resistance. Calm was restored by special, airborne military units. The food supply situation was improved, but the presumed "ring-leaders" were brought to trial and convicted.<sup>11</sup>

In 1961, clashes occurred in Aleksandrov, and a year later, in Murom. During his arrest by the militia, an Aleksandrov worker reportedly died on account of a "heart attack." The militia, whose personnel had not been replaced since Stalin's time, was notorious for its brutality. At the request of the workers and management of the plant, in which the worker had been employed, the corpse was exhumed and it turned out that death had been caused by blows. When the militia leader responsible for the death refused to take the consequences, a strike was called with the object of insuring punishment of the culprits. However, the delegation submitting the demands was arrested. During the demonstration in front of the militia building, special KGB units were employed--after some of the regular soldiers had gone over to the side of the people. The city was hermetically sealed off; the plant director and others who had played a leading role were arrested and convicted. In Murom, the clashes had likewise been triggered by an encroachment on the part of the militia.<sup>12</sup>

The increased incidence of unrest and strikes during the period from 1961 to 1963 is obviously related to the implementation of the first great wage reform and to the price hikes and food shortages that were characteristic of the end of the Khrushchev era.

At the beginning of June 1962, the workers of an agricultural machinery plant in Ivanovo went on strike; this strike was joined by the workers of a textile plant. The plant assembly called for the disarming of the militia's special-duty unit. Reportedly, 200 workers were arrested.<sup>13</sup> Disturbances were reported from Groznyy, Krasnodar, Donetsk, Yaroslavl', Zhdanov, Gor'kiy and even from Moscow (in the Moskvich Automobile Plant).<sup>14</sup> In the summer of 1960, street demonstrations and looting reportedly took place in Kemerovo.<sup>15</sup> In the same year, the people of Odessa appear to have demonstrated against the election-related nomination of an official involved in a corruption scandal. The militia dissolved the assembly in front of the court building. In the city, the sale of wine and spirits was discontinued.<sup>16</sup> In the same year, an extraordinary event occurred: several thousand workers of the Novo-Kramatorsk Machine Building Plant signed a complaint.<sup>17</sup>

The best-known disturbance, which assumed the dimensions of an insurrection, occurred in Novochoerkassk in the summer of 1962. Here the unrest was triggered by the increases in the prices of meat and milk and the almost simultaneous

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reduction--on 1 June 1962--of the progressive piece wage rates in the "Budennyi" Electric Locomotive Works. Workers occupied the heavily used railroad tracks near the plant. The plant management evaded negotiation with the strikers. During the night, workers supported by delegations of high school and university students guarded the plant. The following day, workers from several shifts marched to the city center. Instead of regular army and local militia units, the authorities employed special KGB units. Due to the action of the military and the outbreak of a panic, between 80 and 250 people reportedly were killed. On 3 June, the Politburo members Mikoyan and Polyanskiy arrived in the city; they criticized the local administration and the Party organization and promised improvements. Refusing to talk to worker groups, they received only individual workers. For weeks after the disturbances, the city remained under martial law. Reportedly, some KGB members had joined the strikers and demonstrators. Not until several months later did closed court proceedings take place, resulting in convictions. The shock produced by this event was latently felt for years. A. Amal'rik mentioned the "hunger revolt" in his essay "Will the Soviet Union Live to See the Year 1984?"<sup>18</sup> V. Ivanov, a worker who emigrated to the West, reports that the intimidating effect that the government's action in Novocherkassk had produced on the workers persisted for years.<sup>19</sup> And finally, on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the massacre in the summer of 1977, Sakharov and Grigorenko drew up a letter demanding that the dead not be forgotten and the culprits not be forgiven.<sup>20</sup> For the most part, the accounts of this event are in agreement down to the last details.<sup>21</sup>

In connection with the events in Novocherkassk, walkouts reportedly occurred at the coal-pits No 8 and 9 between Donetsk and Kramatorsk and at other enterprises in the Donbass; moreover, the railroad connection between the Donbass and the Caucasus was disrupted in Rostov.<sup>22</sup>

The strike activities continued in 1963, above all in the Donbass. In October, a sit-down strike was organized in Krivoy-Rog in protest against the food shortage. Six months earlier, an incident had occurred, during which a soldier smoking on a bus was shot to death by militia members; when other soldiers--siding with the soldier attacked--in turn killed militia members, the city was placed under martial law.<sup>23</sup> During the same period, strikes broke out in Lugansk; food shortages triggered disturbances at the beginning of 1963 in Zhdanov, and in November 1963, in Zaporozh'e; Odessa dock workers protested against the export of foodstuffs; the workers of a Novgorod furniture plant walked out on several occasions; in Leningrad, there took place several walkouts, above all in the Kirov Works, and disruptions of streetcar service; in Tula, a general strike was staged in the last days of December.<sup>24</sup>

The following occurrence did not take place in the working class milieu; but since the members of the Armed Forces are for the most part recruited from the working class, the present writer believes that this occurrence characterizes the mood of the workers at that time. It appears that in 1964 a mutiny occurred aboard a cruiser of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. This mutiny was triggered by the captain's prohibition to show ideologically "objectionable" films (likewise, journals considered liberal--such as YUNOST' and NOVYY MIR--were at that time not generally available in the army). The sailors voicing a collective protest were arrested. Subsequently, a mutiny developed, in the course of which the mutineers took command of the ship. Confronted with the threat of aerial bombardment, the



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mutineers capitulated; reportedly, they were either executed or banished to uranium mines.<sup>25</sup>

Again, it was food shortages that caused the riots and disturbances that occurred during the visits of Khrushchev to Minsk on 12 January 1962 and to Kuybyshev in the same year.<sup>26</sup>

In 1965, the workers of the Leningrad Chemical Combine halted work for three hours; reportedly, this strike was joined by members of the so-called "Leningrad Commune." The strike was a success for the workers. According to reports, the Leningrad taxi drivers went on strike at the end of May 1966; through the coordinated blocking of several key intersections, they had drawn attention to their demands. Responding to a reduction in performance bonuses at the beginning of 1965, the workers of the Moscow ball bearing plants GPS 1 and GPS 2 went on strike, halting even the main assembly line. A few months later, this action resulted in the dismissal of a number of workers.<sup>27</sup>

In 1967, the assembly workers of the Moscow SIL Automotive Works staged a brief walkout.<sup>28</sup> According to reports from Khar'kov, several thousand workers of the tractor plant went on strike.<sup>29</sup> In Priluki, a small town in the Ukraine, clashes occurred during the festivities on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution from 6 to 8 November 1967. A young worker, who was on the way to attend one of the festive events, got involved in a brawl with militia members and suffered fatal injuries. The workers of the plant, in which the young worker had been employed, disbelieved the official diagnosis ("cardiac arrest") and demonstratively attended the funeral. The militia, by whose building the funeral cortege passed, was greeted with shouts such as "Down with the Soviet SS." Women took the initiative in the subsequent occupation and demolition of the building. The authorities sent in local troops. A three-day general strike was supposed to effect the release of five arrested workers. In a letter to the CPSU Central Committee, the workers demanded that the culprits be punished and the arrestees be released; the workers stated that in the event of nonfulfillment of the demands, the gas pipeline near the city would be blown up and that Brezhnev should be mindful of the fact that the Priluki workers were looking back on a long tradition of antifascist struggle. A General who had come to negotiate with the workers theatrically dissociated himself from the local militia officials, released the arrestees and initiated another investigation of the fatal accident.<sup>30</sup> In May 1969, the workers of the Kiev Hydroelectric Center organized a protest against the poor housing conditions; "All power to the Soviets" was one of the slogans voiced at their meeting. One of the initiators and organizers of this protest was a certain Hrychuk, a reserve officer who had long been working at the plant as an instructor. Hrychuk was maligned by the authorities as a nonworker and parasitic element; and at a protest meeting, the workers were urged to be mindful of their working class roots, to support the workers' state and to oppose any manipulation attempts by nonworkers. Here, too, it was female workers who were especially vociferous in criticizing the representative of the Party. At that time, contact had already been established in Kiev between oppositionist workers and intellectuals and students. Hrychuk--who had been derisively called a "Khlestakov" (an allusion to the figure in Gogol's "Revizor") by the Kiev press, which had passed the events over in silence--was subsequently arrested in Moscow.<sup>31</sup>

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In June 1969, an 8-day strike by the workers of an electrotechnical plant in Chervonograd was crowned with success: they obtained a 10-percent wage increase for the night shift and the dismissal of a few members of the plant management. The strike leaders--among them a foreman who had been with the plant for 24 years--were dismissed for shady reasons (e.g. theft).<sup>32</sup> In the same year, a strike was launched in a plant for technical rubber articles in the Sverdlovsk region. This strike was triggered by wage reductions and a milk shortage--in this branch, milk was needed for the neutralization of noxious agents. The workers succeeded in enforcing their demands.<sup>33</sup>

In the winter of 1969, the workers of the Kishinev Motor Vehicle Depot walked out in protest against the bad working conditions and the low wage rates. In 1970, there reportedly occurred a 2-day strike in Vladimir and walkouts of construction workers in Moscow and Leningrad.<sup>34</sup> In the course of the worker unrest, solidarity rallies reportedly were staged in Kaliningrad, L'vov and some cities of Belorussia.<sup>35</sup>

In 1971, 200 workers of a Baku oil refinery staged a rally, protesting against the bad social conditions; they demanded wage increases and 1 additional week of vacation time; 3 engineers and 10 workers were arrested and subsequently convicted.<sup>36</sup>

It is possible that the disturbances that occurred in 1972 in Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk were interconnected. In September of that year, several thousand workers in Dnepropetrovsk staged a demonstration to protest the low wage rates. The demonstrators were fired at and there were casualties and injuries. No more than 1 month later, the rally was repeated. The key demands were the following: improvement of the food supply situation, raising of the living standard, free choice of the work place instead of its assignment.<sup>37</sup>

In Dneprodzerzhinsk, a riot broke out in consequence of a provocation by the militia: militia men arrested members of a wedding party. The prison van, which held five of the arrestees, caught fire and when the militia men fled instead of setting free the individuals locked in the van, the militia station was stormed by a furious crowd. In this clash, the three militia units deployed fired at the demonstrators.<sup>38</sup>

In December 1972 the workers of an agricultural machinery plant in Kamenets-Podol'skiy organized a 1-day strike in protest against the excessively high production norms and the low wage rates; 30 workers, some of whom had been with the enterprise for over 20 years, were fired for having instigated the strike. Two workers were sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. The demands of the strikers were not met.<sup>39</sup>

In February 1973, the workers of a large-scale enterprise in Vitebsk stopped working for 2 days on account of a reduction in the incentive pay. The outcome was positive in that the old pay rates were retained.<sup>40</sup> At the beginning of the 1970's (the exact date is unknown), a strike was organized in the Kopeysk Kirov Works.<sup>41</sup> In May 1973, thousands of workers of the Kiev Machine Building Plant went on strike to enforce their demand for higher wages. Just a few hours after the beginning of the strike, a member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party arrived at the plant, received a worker delegation and promised fulfillment of the demands. A few hours later, the workers were informed that their wage rates would be raised.<sup>42</sup>

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A strike-like incident at the junction line between the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Baykal-Amur railroad line is reported by a Party functionary: apparently, at kilometer 146/147 a brigade of track layers had halted work for the following reasons: poor work organization, lack of discipline, and loss of faith on the part of the workers, who had to commute over 20 kilometers between their homes and the work place. Work was resumed when at the initiative of the Party shock brigades--made up of workers and party members--were formed.<sup>43</sup>

In May 1976, a strike was organized in Riga on account of the curtailment of the meat rations for the population and the introduction of a so-called "fish day," i.e. a day on which meat was to be replaced by fish. Four workers--identified as Frolov, Varna, Larchenkov and Goldberg--were arrested in consequence of the "fish day strike" and the "circulation of lies."<sup>44</sup> On 14 December 1977, the workers of the "Inkaras" Plant in Kaunas went on strike. In this plant for rubber products, the real wages had been reduced and the rejects rate had been excessively high. Although the demands raised by the workers were met, the putative initiators of the strike were fired.<sup>45</sup>

At the end of May 1977, dock workers in Leningrad, Vyborg, Tallin, Riga, Ventspils and Klaypeda refused to work overtime on import shipments; in justification of this action, they pointed out that these shipments would never reach the common people anyway: they would go to the Moscow specialty stores for the "upper ten thousand." When the meat and fruit shipments were about to spoil, the authorities brought in students and soldiers as strikebreakers to move the goods.<sup>46</sup>

In January 1979, bus drivers staged a demonstration--labeled "disorganization"--in protest against the introduction of a new ticket sale procedure in the Baku public transportation system.<sup>47</sup>

A number of strikes have been reported from the Soviet "automobile cities" of Gor'kiy and Tol'yatti. As early as April 1978, a group of workers from the Tol'yatti Milk Combine had complained--in a "Statement Addressed to Nowhere..."--about the fact that important decisions such as demotions and appointments of superiors were being made behind their backs. The workers also criticized corruption and underhand dealings in regard to the allocation of housing, etc. According to the statement, the workers had been made machine appendages; protests addressed to newspaper editors had been to no avail, and the claim that the trade unions represented the workers was a propaganda lie.<sup>48</sup>

On 10 August 1979, a walkout--initiated by the bus drivers--reportedly took place in Tol'yatti. In the early morning, between 5 and 6 o'clock, an articulated bus ("garmoshka") blocked the access road to the bus depot, thus preventing the approximately 200 buses in the depot from commencing their municipal transport operations. The action was supported by a nucleus of 15 to 20 activists. Fifteen demands were raised, including the demand for a wage raise, the demand for dismissal of an unpopular superior and the demand for assurance that no worker would be fired. Fights broke out between strikers and strikebreakers. The management passed on the demands to extra-plant authorities. Two activists who had been arrested by the militia and the KGB were freed again. Workers employed in the Volga Automotive Works witnessed this walkout, since on account of the great distance between the plant and the city they were dependent on the public transportation system. Reportedly, none of the striking workers were dismissed. All of the

demands raised--wage increase, dismissal of the enterprise's chief accountant, no persecution of the strikers--were met.<sup>49</sup>

In regard to the events that occurred at the beginning of May 1980 in the automobile cities of Tol'yatti and Gor'kiy, the reports have not been fully confirmed. As had been the case in the preceding year, the strike in Tol'yatti was initiated by the bus drivers. They demanded compensation for extra trips and improvement of the working conditions. As a result of the strike, thousands of workers of the Volga Automotive Plant were on 6 May 1980 prevented from reaching their place of work. The production process was partially interrupted and since under normal conditions the assembly lines are to turn out one car per second, the enterprise's losses must have run into billions. The workers either walked to the plant or went home again. The unfavorable situation in regard to food supplies possibly was a contributing factor in this strike.<sup>50</sup>

The cause underlying the strike of 8 and 9 May 1980 in the Gor'kiy Automotive Plant was a shortage of foodstuffs. In the plant, approximately 2,000 privately printed leaflets calling for a walkout had been distributed. This call was followed by several thousand workers. Work was resumed not until meat and other foodstuffs had arrived in the city. Four persons, whose subsequent fate is unknown, were arrested. These strikes have been called the biggest working class protests in the USSR in the last few years.<sup>51</sup> However, walkouts are reported to have occurred in 1980 in other parts of the country as well.

On or about 20 January 1980, the workers of the Leningrad "Leninets" Plant walked out for half a day. They did so, because E. Nilov, foreman of the enterprise's apparatus department, had died upon his arrest by the militia--he had been arrested on account of "convivial drinking of alcoholic beverages in public." It was obvious that he had been maltreated by militia members. Nilov's colleagues called for an investigation of the real cause of death and for punishment of the person responsible. The workers of the plant demonstratively attended the funeral. The militia department, in whose jurisdiction this death had occurred, had been closed for a few days for fear of reprisals by the workers. In reply to the collective complaint of the workers, the head of the militia, Zaykov, stated that the preliminary investigation had disclosed the involvement of two militia members.<sup>52</sup>

In March 1980, the payment of wages in a Minsk tractor plant had been delayed. The workers responded by shutting down two departments of the plant. Within half an hour, representatives of the local party organization and of the KGB arrived; at a general shop meeting, they assured the workers that there had been a misunderstanding. The wages were paid out immediately. A short time later, however, the organizers of the strike were arrested by the KGB. Likewise at the beginning of 1980, the workers of a Minsk radio plant responded with a walkout to a reduction of wage rates. Although in consequence of the protest the old rates were reestablished, they were changed again a week later. After this walkout, three or four persons were arrested.<sup>53</sup>

A short time ago, probably in the summer of 1980, the workers of the Pechenganikel' Metallurgical Combine in the city of Nikel' (Murmansk region) went on strike. They shut down the blast furnaces, thus halting work for a number of days.<sup>54</sup>

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A strike in the Tartu "Katseremonditekhas" Agricultural Machinery Plant on 1 and 2 October 1980 was joined by approximately 1,000 workers. This strike was triggered by increases in the plan quotas, shortcomings in regard to plant supplies, and the city's bad food situation. Accordingly, the workers demanded revision of the plan, elimination of the organizational deficiencies in regard to supplies, payment of bonuses, and sufficient food supplies. Upon the arrival of a commission from Moscow, the demands were partially met: the plan quotas were reduced to the former level and the bonuses were paid as early as 8 October 1980. Of significance in regard to assessment of this strike is the fact that at the same time high school and university student demonstrations were staged in Tartu, which were clearly inspired by national and anti-Russian sentiments. In Tallin, large-scale demonstrations had taken place as early as 22 September 1980; these demonstrations were repeated on 1 and 3 October and on 8 and 9 October 1980 in Tallin and Pyarnu, respectively.<sup>55</sup>

## 3. Some Observations Concerning the Open Forms of Worker Protest

The above-described strikes of the 1960's and 1970's probably can be considered the most radical form of worker protest. They indicate that the customary mechanism of conflict settlement was incapable of keeping demands and contradictions in the prescribed channels. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, these manifestations were only the tip of a much larger movement.

According to A. Pravda, a survey of worker protests during the period from 1956 to 1973 disclosed 61 manifestations, including 58 strikes and 12 cases in which the workers had made public their demands. A. Pravda rightly points out that most likely there were many more cases, since on account of the strict censorship the public gets to know only a small percentage of the incidents.<sup>56</sup>

Nevertheless, a breakdown of the known worker protests can be expected to reveal certain patterns of conflict sources and forms of development.

Regarding protests during the period from 1956 to 1973, A. Pravda presents the following survey:<sup>57</sup>

<u>Motives</u>	<u>1956-59</u>	<u>60-64</u>	<u>65-68</u>	<u>69-73</u>
Changes in Work Norms and Wages	3	4	1	5
Insufficient Wages	--	--	1	2
Actions of the Plant Management	1	1	--	2
Food Prices and Supplies	--	10 <sup>b</sup>	1 (Unrest)	3 <sup>a</sup>
Housing and Living Conditions	2 <sup>a</sup>	4 <sup>c</sup>	--	2
Actions of the Militia and the KGB	--	--	2 (Unrest)	1 (Unrest)
No Data	1	9	--	7

(a: includes a strike that changed into a demonstration; b: this figure appears to be rather low; it comprises at least three cases, in which strikes changed into demonstrations and unrest; c: this figure includes three strikes that turned into demonstrations and unrest.)

Adding to this survey the walkouts during the period from 1974 to 1980, one can discern a definite pattern. However, we must point out that it is problematic to break down the strike causes, which usually form a complex aggregate, by primary

motives. According to the present data, five strikes were triggered by norm changes; two strikes, by insufficient wages; one strike, by the actions of the plant management; two strikes, by food shortages; one strike, by the actions of the militia; for two walkouts, no information is available. As can be seen from the reports, the walkouts usually were very brief; only in exceptional cases did they last longer than 1 to 2 days. As a rule, they were of a spontaneous nature. The strike in the Kiev Machine Building Plant of May 1973 is sometimes adduced as an example of organized and structured strike leadership. It has been suggested that the strike wave in the Donbass in 1962 and 1963 was coordinated at the supra-plant level.<sup>58</sup>

It is difficult to ascertain whether the protest actions were concentrated in certain industrial branches; one could possibly say that miners and construction workers showed a higher rate of participation. It is remarkable that walkouts occurred often in the transportation sector (this may be due to the fact that the transport operations are carried out in full view; it may also be related to the specific weakness of the Soviet service sector). There is much to be said for the thesis that strikes break out more frequently at the periphery than in the center.<sup>59</sup> As is suggested by the relatively high incidence of strikes in the Ukraine, in the Baltic states and in Belorussia, the milieu in the non-Russian national republics appears to exert--at least indirectly--a positive influence on the willingness to strike. As regards the quality of participation of the various factions within the working class, one could possibly say that in several cases--especially when the discontent focused on housing and food problems--it was the women who took the initiative and that young workers and other young people frequently played an especially militant role in the disputes--especially when the events escalated into a confrontation with the authorities.

As regards the causes of the strikes, there appear to be two categories: intra-plant causes and extra-plant causes. A. Pravda's thesis that in the course of 20 years there has taken place a shift from extra-plant to intra-plant conflict sources and conflict forms appears to be valid, even though recent events have shown that conflicts are likely to be triggered again and again by food shortages, lack of adequate housing, or police activities. Especially in conflicts resulting from price hikes and food shortages, there has been apparent a particularly pronounced solidarity effect frequently embracing the entire population of the region in question. Another striking element is the extraordinary militancy manifested in some actions, above all in 1962/63. Such levels of confrontation were reached whenever political and police organs intervened in an initially purely economic conflict. According to M. Holubenko, the concentration of strikes and worker unrest in the early 1960's was related to the extensive crisis of the late Khrushchev period. The new, consumption-oriented Party program of 1961 was bound to intensify the provocative effect of this crisis. Holubenko claims that the decline of the protests was due to the more generous wage policy pursued by the Brezhnev leadership and that the strikes at the beginning of the 1970's reflected the friction ensuing from the implementation of the industrial reform.<sup>60</sup> B. Kravchenko considers the increased activity of the workers in the early 1960's to be more than a temporary, cyclical movement: he views these worker protests as symptoms of the formation of a "massive, homogeneous second worker generation" that conclusively cut its ties with the village.<sup>61</sup> In the view of V. Belotserkovskiy, the Soviet worker opposition is distinguished by the fact that--in contrast to the Central and East European societies--it preceded the crystallization of opposition by the intellectuals; nevertheless, the influence of the worker protest activities on the overall ideological-political climate was negligible.<sup>62</sup>

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III. Origins and Objectives of the "Association of Free Trade Unions of the Working People in the Soviet Union," of the "Free Interprofessional Association of Working People (SMOT)," and of Individual Worker Protests

The fact that this chapter is positioned at this very place is not to suggest that the formation of "Free Trade Unions" and of SMOT resulted from an organic or even logical development; but we do not mean to say that the foundation at this time was purely coincidental. Upon portrayal of the origins, motives, social composition and organizational and programmatic ideas, we will be able more fruitfully to discuss to what extent the foundation of these associations reflects certain learning processes within the working class.

1. The 'Association of Free Trade Unions of the Working People in the Soviet Union'
  - a) Origins

Between 7 and 15 February 1977, i.e. between Klebanov's and his own arrest, E. B. Nikolayev wrote a brief survey entitled "On the Origins of the Free Trade Unions." In this survey, Nikolayev states that while the establishment of the "Free Trade Unions" was a spontaneous act, it had been preceded by important learning processes.<sup>1</sup>

According to Nikolayev, workers from various parts of the Soviet Union had come to Moscow to air their concerns--in the courts of law, in the editorial offices of the big newspapers, in audiences with the complaint-handling departments of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet or of the CPSU Central Committee. This step--the trip to Moscow--had in most cases been preceded by protracted disputes with the local and regional authorities, but the workers felt that in these disputes they had not been able to carry their point. For the most part, the disputes revolved around problems such as dismissal from the enterprise--frequently on account of criticism leveled against management personnel--allocation of housing, pension claims. In Moscow, however, the workers did not fare any better than they had in their home towns: their petitions and complaints were rejected; in many instances, the petitioners were expelled from the city; some were accused of "hooliganism" and committed to mental hospitals. Nikolayev writes:

"In the reception and waiting rooms, the people came to know each other and gradually there emerged in them the realization that nothing could be attained by individuals acting alone, in isolation from each other. Vladimir Klebanov was the most outspoken individual, the man who possessed the requisite organizational skills."<sup>2</sup>

In the summer of 1977, Klebanov and his friends made their first attempt to contact Western correspondents so as to inform them of their difficult situation. The petitioners began jointly to submit their complaints rather than voicing them individually. Western correspondents were given two statements: the first was signed by 33 persons, and the second, by 43 persons. In November 1977, 15 members of this group renounced their Soviet citizenship, but even now the authorities took to steps to solve the problems. On 25 November 1977, the press conference for foreign correspondents was held in E. B. Nikolayev's apartment. At this conference, the correspondents were handed a statement signed by 72 persons. According to Niko Nikolayev, this press conference met with considerable response on the part of the Western news media. Shortly after the press conference, between 20 and 30

individuals of the group of signatories defended themselves before the KGB: affirming their loyalty to the Soviet system, they stated the press conference was not an unlawful act. Contrary to the expectations of the petitioners, they were received one by one instead of being heard as a group. The KGB promised to remedy the problems voiced, provided they refrained from further actions such as press conferences. Trusting this promise would be fulfilled, the petitioners adopted a position of wait and see. When nothing happened, they again formed groups of between 5 and 10 persons each and turned to the KGB. According to Nikolayev, the KGB responded with reprisals against the 72 signatories of the collective complaint; at the Moscow Central Telegraph Office, which the petitioners were using as a communication center and where they also used to pick up general-delivery mail, the KGB carried out the raids in consequence of which some of the signatories were arrested, committed to mental hospitals, sentenced to 15 days imprisonment and expelled from Moscow. Thus Klebanov was arrested as early as 17 December 1977 and committed to the Psychiatric Hospital No 7. Thereafter the petitioners no longer felt committed to the promise given the KGB; consequently, in January 1978 they organized another press conference, which focused above all on the reprisals to which they had been subjected; they reported that the raids against them--people in an alien city, who were without any means of support--had been continued, that the persecution now had concentrated on the 72 signatories of the complaint and that 20 of them had been arrested--in the course of a single raid--at the Moscow Telegraph Office.

According to E. Nikolayev, the petitioners did not consider themselves dissidents in the traditional sense; they merely wanted to return to the ways of normal Soviet life, which they had been forced to leave due to the arbitrary actions of the local authorities; they did not intend to engage in civil rights-oriented activities or to concern themselves with issues concerning state or international politics; however, the arbitrary approach of the authorities impelled them--at the end of January 1978--to establish the "Free Trade Union."<sup>3</sup> It is only with reservations that the individual phases of the protest--the gradual transition from individual to joint petitioning, the tactic of turning to Western correspondents and thus generating a public response--can be considered a spontaneous reaction. It was above all the very intensive learning process in dealing with the authorities that led--in a consistent fashion--to the establishment of the "Free Trade Unions." The individual stages of this development can quite easily be reconstructed.

#### b) Motives and Organizational Beginnings

Even before the first Open Letter of 20 May 1977, which was signed by eight persons, the petitioners had taken various--unsuccessful--steps. At first, the signatories had demanded to be given their rights and to be rehired. Thus, in June 1976, V. Klebanov and V. T. Poplavskiy had met with Deputy Chief Prosecutor A. S. Pankratov; a request for an audience with the Central Committee department in charge of this matter had been turned down. The editorial offices of various newspapers, including PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, refused to consider the complaints. Even the petitioners' renunciation--on 10 November 1977--of their Soviet citizenship did not produce any effect.<sup>4</sup> The Open Letter of 20 May 1977 mentions the failure of the previous endeavors and then vividly describes the workers' personal experience; the letter also contains a list of 35 persons who as a result of their complaints were subjected to psychiatric treatment. About themselves, the signatories stated:



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"We are Soviet citizens from various cities of the Soviet Union, but we are united through our grief. For no reason at all, we have been deprived of our work, of our jobs so that we lack all means of existence. We are constantly put down, but our questions remain for the most part unanswered."

The Open Letter further stated that instead of settlement of their concerns the complaints were passed on precisely to those against whom the complaints had been lodged.

"All this happens only because we--honorable, high-principled people--have opposed nepotism, fraud, theft of socialist property, concealment of industrial accidents and other instances of malpractice on the part of the directors of our enterprises.... We are no renegades; we are honest Soviet citizens who for many years have consciously and responsibly been working in various enterprises of the country. We are forced to appear before the international public, in order to put an end to the lawlessness and arbitrariness of those who have been betraying the interests of the working people. At the Belgrade Conference--attended by those heads of state who signed the Helsinki Agreement--the world is to be informed where the worst violations of human rights are taking place. We must be reinstated in our jobs; we demand that our honor be restored."<sup>5</sup>

It appears that during the interval between this letter and a second letter dated 18 September 1977, there took place a dogged--but likewise unsuccessful--"guerilla war" which was reflected in letters to newspapers, to the state prosecutor's office and to the trade union leadership.<sup>6</sup>

The second letter to the international public--dated 18 September 1977--repeated the aforementioned points, but it did so at greater length and it criticized official Soviet declarations (incidentally, the letter's title refers to the imminent 60th anniversary of the October Revolution). The 25 signatories of this letter emphasize that they come from the most diverse social strata, professions and nationalities and that they met not until the "crossing of their thorny roads." This letter, too, contains a brief self-characterization:

"How many of us are there? We think there are tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of us. We will not make any big statements. We will simply describe our everyday, inhuman suffering and inequality. Today we are suffering--tomorrow any USSR citizen may join our collective and share our outlook.... We are middle-aged people who spent over a dozen years in various production collectives and we were among the best workers in our enterprises. And it is quite natural that we speak for our colleagues as well as for us; if they were in a position publicly to voice criticism, they would join us.... We--that is the vast multitude of Soviet unemployed who on account of having exercised their right to freedom of speech, criticism and complaint were kicked out of their companies."<sup>7</sup>

The line of argumentation of this second letter strictly adheres to the norms set by the "socialist laws," insisting on the rights formulated in the new constitution of 7 October 1977. The letter speaks of "the sacred duty of every Soviet citizen to preserve socialist property and to oppose the serious violations of human rights." In conclusion, it calls for establishment of a commission authorized to examine the work of leading state and party organs. The 33 signatories insist on an audience--such as is constitutionally guaranteed--with party and government representatives.<sup>8</sup>

It appears that the press conference of 25 November 1977 was in fact the crucial step--for the petitioners as well as for the authorities; for in the 2 following months--December 1977 and January 1978--the authorities with attempts at both repression and appeasement.<sup>9</sup> The step from conception to practical organization appears to have been made toward the middle of January 1978. In the appeal of 28 January 1978--issued by 20 of the signatories--there appeared for the first time the label "Committee of the Free Trade Union of Soviet Unemployed."<sup>10</sup> On 30 January and 1 February 1978, the following documents were made public: another Open Letter, an Open Letter to Western correspondents, a letter to the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the individual labor unions of Western countries.<sup>11</sup> Of special significance is the publication of the Statute of Association, which was supposed to be in force from 1 January 1978 to 1 January 1979. The 43 signatories of the letter to the ILO introduced themselves as "members of the Association of the Free Trade Union in the Soviet Union"; enclosed in the letter was a list of 110 candidates for membership in the association.<sup>12</sup>

c) Composition of the 'Free Trade Union'

The founders of the "Free Trade Union" and its sympathizers do in fact come from all parts of the USSR, which is indicative of a unionwide spread of the incidents criticized by them.

In the following, we present a breakdown of the members and candidates by national origin:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Candidates</u>
European Russia	13	35
Belorussia	3	1
Siberia	2	1
Ukraine	10	38
Far East	--	9
Central Asia	5	8
Caucasian republics	2	5
Baltic states	--	2
Unknown	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	43	107

Regarding the candidates from the Ukraine, one notes the local concentration: as many as 10 candidates come from Makeyevka (Klebanov's place of work); 5 candidates come from Donetsk, and 10, from Nikolayev.<sup>13</sup> Of the members, the men number 25, and the women, 18; as regards the candidates, men and women number 61 and 49, respectively.

In regard to the social and professional composition, the breakdown for the group of candidates is as follows: of a total of 110 candidates, 54 are workers; there are 25 office workers, 10 engineers, 8 physicians, teachers and jurists, 6 pensioners, 4 kolkhoz workers or farmers, and 4 housewives.<sup>14</sup>

Of great interest is a survey of the principle reasons underlying the articulation of protests; although the most basic cause is for the most part related to the material situation (low wages, overqualification for the job in question,

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insufficient pension, etc.) the main cause of the acerbic disputes was "suppression of criticism." Twenty-one members of the group led by Klebanov named the following as the main reasons for their complaints: dismissal on account of criticism (13); obstruction of the exercise of rights (1); insistence on the solution of housing problems (1); wage problems and work assignments (4); pensions or pension claims (1); dismissal without any justification (1).<sup>15</sup> We will examine at a later stage, whether such sources of conflict are representative of the Soviet industrial workers as a whole.

## d) Points of Criticism

Even though Klebanov and other signatories of the documents stated they had no intention to become politically active, most of the documents are--at least implicitly--of a political nature; for they contain elements of social criticism from the viewpoint of the working class.

The establishment of the "Free Trade Union" was carried out with reference to Article 23.4 of the General Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to establish trade unions and to join these unions in defense of his or her rights." In the appeal addressed to the ILO the key objectives and points of criticism appear to be the following: unemployment and dismissal on account of criticism of grievances (corruption, violations of labor laws); disfranchisement and persecution of those who try to enforce their claims; aloofness of a leadership passing itself off as "servant of the people"; disregard for the constitution. In their argumentation, Klebanov and his group stay within the constitutional framework. Even in regard to the trade unions, Klebanov merely criticizes that they no longer perform their "proper" function. According to Klebanov, the Soviet Union no longer has any organs representing the interests of the simple working man; the key positions in the trade unions are in the hands of the Party; the trade unions are instruments of the plant managers; the elections are nothing but formalistic procedures; in fact, they are not even that, since strictly speaking the top trade union functionaries are not elected, but appointed and coopted by the respective higher levels; the delegates act as an acclamatory mass and the key personnel decisions are made behind their backs. Klebanov points out that the functionaries promoted and co-opted in this way do not heed the trade union rank and file; they pay attention only to those to whom they are indebted for their "election"; thus the indifference toward the rank and file is accompanied by progressive corruption in the leadership. For all these reasons--states Klebanov--it is necessary to establish a truly independent labor union. In their argumentation, Klebanov and his group keep referring to material published in the official Soviet trade union press.<sup>16</sup>

Again and again, the signatories of the documents emphasize that they are defamed by the authorities as "insane."

## e) By-Laws and Organizational Structure

The articles of association reflect the intention to develop a model "purged" of the shortcomings of the official Soviet trade unions. Above all, the by-laws--which are subdivided into four sections--aim to insure democratic structures and forms; but there are also goal- and policy-oriented provisions.

The by-laws are preceded by Article 1 of the ILO By-Laws. For the time being, the by-laws are to be in effect for only 1 year, whereupon they can be reviewed and revised. The first section contains the provisions concerning membership; emphasis is placed on the voluntariness of membership in the "Free Trade Union." Another objective is to insure that the discussions and all decision-making processes are open to the public eye. The members are obligated to help each other in a spirit of solidarity. A key conception articulated in the by-laws is the commitment to the struggle for peace, to friendship among the nations. In addition, the organization is to help raise the political consciousness of its members.

The second section deals with the organizational structure. A striking element in this section is the adoption of the "principles of democratic centralism" from the Soviet trade union model; however, emphasis is placed on true representation of worker interests within the collective agreements. The members of the "Free Trade Unions" are to consistently oppose all instances of red-tapism, mismanagement, waste and irresponsible handling of state property.

The third section deals with the financial aspects; the organization is to be financed above all through membership fees, but contributions from foreign trade unions are likewise considered acceptable.

The fourth section describes the "Free Trade Unions" as a legal entity which in this capacity seeks recognition by the ILO and other foreign trade union organizations.<sup>17</sup>

From the above-quoted regulations, it is apparent that the "Free Trade Union" model is not really a radically different form of labor union; rather, it represents the consistent implementation of the tasks and structures that are /formally/ [word in slantlines printed in italics] affirmed even by the official Soviet trade unions.

f) The Abolition of the 'Association of Free Trade Unions of the Working People in the Soviet Union'

The massive reprisals to which the signatories and sympathizers were subjected are ample evidence of the fact that the Soviet authorities took a very grave view of this first attempt to establish an independent trade union association. The "Free Trade Unions" were practically smashed. The principal form of repression was the imposition of psychiatric treatment. According to a list compiled by O. Semyanova and V. Haynes, 21 of the 107 candidates were forcibly committed to mental hospitals, while 10 were arrested;<sup>18</sup> in the group of the 43 founding members, the shares were even higher.

It appears that the rapid and probably conclusive abolition of the "Free Trade Unions" was made possible or facilitated by a number of reasons:

Firstly: The organization was an artificial entity insofar as it was established in Moscow, in the Soviet center--a "constitution at the Telegraph Office," as it were--without having the backing and thus the protection by broader segments of the working class; on the other hand, it is remarkable that workers from all parts of the Union were ready to help establish the association.

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Secondly: Whereas the group led by Klebanov could count on the response of the Western public, it was not assured any journalistic backing by Moscow's dissident community, which intervened relatively late in the conflict between the trade union organizers and the state apparatus. Characteristically, in a conversation with the correspondent of the WASHINGTON POST, Klebanov exhibited reserve vis-a-vis the dissidents, who--he felt--"consider themselves better than the workers."<sup>19</sup>

Thirdly: It seems safe to say that this was a case of extreme brutality on the part of the authorities vis-a-vis a rather inexperienced and--to some extent--unsuspecting "opponent."

2. The 'Free Interprofessional Association of Working People (SMOT)'

On 28 October 1978, Western press representatives were informed in M. Morozov's Moscow apartment of the establishment of SMOT. The SMOT representatives issued a statement of association and presented the organizational principles. At the same time, SMOT's Council of Representatives contacted the International League of Free Trade Unions (IBFG) in Brussels. By June/July 1979, five issues of SMOT's INFORMATIONS-BULLETIN had been published.<sup>20</sup>

a) Origins and Activities of SMOT

SMOT's foreign spokesman, Viktor Faynberg (presently in Paris), has presented a brief characterization of the new group, which apparently has been able to remain operative. In this account, Faynberg names both the differences between Klebanov's group and SMOT and the elements they have in common:

According to Faynberg, at the time of its foundation SMOT had approximately 100 members and was divided into 8 different groups. Each group is represented by one delegate, who is elected to SMOT's Council of Representatives. The Council coordinates the activities of the groups, but it can only make recommendations. There is also a commission that examines the various violations of worker rights. The association was established at the initiative of Vladimir Borisov, an old member of the democratic movement. To counteract police control, SMOT--like the "Free Trade Union"--shunned organization on a professional or territorial basis; this was appropriate to the specific conditions in a society subjecting the workers to diverse forms of exploitation and disregarding the principle of equality, with the exception of one aspect: this society indiscriminately deprives all segments of the population of human and civil rights--a policy that draws together the different occupational groups. The Interprofessional Association is made up of industrial workers, office workers, engineers and scientific-technical employees. In contrast to the unemployed members of the "Free Trade Unions," the SMOT members hold a job. The association tries to combine the principles of lawful action with the observation of elementary security rules. With the exception of the official representatives who are selected from the Council of Deputies, the members are anonymous. At the beginning, the following individuals were public spokesmen for SMOT: Vladimir Borisov (presently in the West), Yevgeniy Nikolayev, Lyudmilla Agapova, Lev Volokhonskiy, Vladimir Skvirskiy, Albina Yakoreva, Aleksandr Ivanchenko and Valeriya Novodvorskaya. In this respect, too, SMOT differs from the "Free Trade Union" which published the names of its 43 members and approximately 100 candidates.

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According to Faynberg, SMOT also steers clear of the contradiction found in the by-laws of the "Free Trade Union," namely the contradiction between objectives established and a large number of regulations adopted from the by-laws of the official trade unions. The association did not establish any by-laws, but it did formulate a number of organizational, programmatic and moral principles. According to Faynberg, the association does not try to cultivate in the members a certain "spirit," whatever this may be. Among its members, one encounters the most diverse political views. The association aims to attain total independence from the state and the Party and is bent on defending all of the workers' rights--namely their social, cultural and political rights, not only the work-related rights. In the view of the association, the workers are entitled not only to adequate wages and good working conditions, but also to a cultural life free from censorship. The association feels it should also defend workers who are persecuted for political reasons. The association feels responsible not only for its members, but also for any worker seeking assistance. For this reason, the association set up a study team that was to concern itself with infringements of worker rights. Thus, M. Morozov studied the effects of the Moscow Olympic Games on the situation of the workers (e.g. extension of the workday, forcible eviction from urban housing); L. Agapova concerned herself with problems concerning freedom of movement in the country; V. Novdvorskaya established a library for trade union literature and organized courses in the fields of history and art.

According to Faynberg, the persecution measures against the SMOT members show that the KGB takes SMOT more seriously than do the Western labor unions. Faynberg holds that in spite of the reprisals, SMOT has proved its viability: in December 1978, it comprised 10 groups with 150 to 200 members, thus being the biggest independent and legal organization in the country. According to Faynberg, most of the former members of the "Free Trade Union" who have escaped persecution are presently collaborating with SMOT; thus SMOT can be considered not only the historical, but also the "physical" continuation of the "Free Trade Unions."<sup>21</sup>

Faynberg's above characterization of SMOT can be complemented by documents published by SMOT.

#### b) Positions Taken by SMOT

The declaration made by the eight members of SMOT's Council of Representatives on 28 October 1978 stated that the country presently had no organizations independent of the state organs and representative of the interests of the workers. The representatives pointed out that in most of the conflicts known to them the workers had not been able to enforce their rights. As for the reasons, the declaration stated: "Insufficient information concerning their rights; insufficient ability thoroughly to buttress their claims; no backing by public opinion; fear of legal consequences."<sup>22</sup> According to the representatives, the lonely struggle of the workers is made even more difficult by the formalism and corruption in the bureaucratic apparatus: in most of the conflicts, the official labor unions side with the administrative organs. In trying to protect by any means the economic, social, cultural, conceptional, religious, political and existential interests, SMOT intends to abide by the present constitution and by the international agreements signed by the Soviet Government. A primary objective is the lending of legal aid in the formulation of complaints, etc. SMOT considers itself the perpetuator of the aspirations of the--abolished--"Free Trade Unions"; its existence "is in

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conformity with the interests of the fatherland." According to the declaration, SMOT is not a political organization; it does not request any support from the government and it supports workers not only within, but also outside the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup>

SMOT's Council of Representatives also turned to the IBFG's head-office in Brussels with a request for recognition and admission to the IBFG; indirectly, the letter to the IBFG criticizes the group led by Klebanov: this group had turned to the ILO (head-office in Geneva), even though the ILO did not maintain relations with organizations independent of the Central Council of the Soviet trade unions. SMOT also asked the IBFG for literature and information on the international trade union and workers' movement.<sup>24</sup>

In court, L. Volokhonskiy, a member of SMOT's Council of Representatives, once again pointed out the objectives of his organization:

"SMOT is a trade union organization. It defends the rights of the working people in the broadest sense. SMOT does not pursue any political objectives. In my view--and probably in your view as well (i.e. the court--the author)--the legality of this organization cannot be doubted. According to the constitution of the USSR, it is permissible to organize any type of trade union. I consider the establishment of trade unions of the appropriate type to be long overdue. This is a natural process that reflects the workers' need for mutual support."<sup>25</sup>

On the one hand, SMOT obviously wants to take advantage as much as possible of the existing constitutional guarantees; on the other hand, SMOT articulated far-reaching, radical criticism which was not merely concerned with the condition of disfranchisement, but which showed a Soviet society torn by social conflicts. This is reflected in a declaration by A. Naydenovich and L. Agapova that is signed by 419 persons.

According to this declaration, the Soviet Union is characterized by social contrasts such as have never been observed in any society past or present. These contrasts are reflected in inequality before the law and in disparate standards of living. There is criticism of overtime work, nighttime work, bad working conditions. SMOT demands the right to strike. In view of the arbitrariness of the authorities and superiors in the allocation of bonuses, vacation time, housing and trips, the working class feels increasingly cynical and hopeless. SMOT demands abolition of the passport system and elimination of forced labor in the camps and of the forcible assignation of work by virtue of the law against parasitism ("tuneyadstvo"). While SMOT acknowledges the existence of a labor shortage in the USSR, it points out that this shortage is caused not by the fact that some women do not work, but by the fact that millions of able-bodied men are in the Armed Forces or employed as occupation troops in East Europe or--at the expense of the population--in the surveillance, eavesdropping and censorship apparatus. SMOT also criticizes the ideology of "pseudopatriotism" prevalent in the USSR. SMOT draws attention to the privileges enjoyed by the ruling elite and to the discrimination against women. In spite of the criticism, which for Soviet conditions is quite radical, SMOT affirms its intention to enforce the workers' right to equality and justice within the framework of the existing order.<sup>26</sup>

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## c) SMOT's Organizational Structure

The letter written to the IBFG on 28 October 1978 points out the specific conditions, under which trade union activities can develop in the USSR:

"Under the conditions prevailing in a totalitarian state, the trade union movement is forced to adopt the form of a federation of autonomous trade union groups that delegate their representatives to a coordination center--the Council of Representatives, which represents the executive organ of SMOT."<sup>27</sup>

The "Basic Organizational Principles" published by SMOT reflect an orientation different from that of the by-laws of the "Free Trade Unions." Section I clearly emphasizes the need for structures of democratic representation, maximum decentralization of functions and of the decision-making process, and greater transparency of management functions. Against the model of "democratic centralism" advanced by Klebanov (and--in bureaucratic form--by the official Soviet trade unions), SMOT champions the idea of a federation of autonomous groups. Section II stresses the nonprofessional orientation of the admission criteria. The political conditions are taken into consideration, inasmuch as certain measures are planned concerning the security of the members (e.g. membership information is available only on and within the respective autonomous group). As compared with the "Free Trade Unions," SMOT has the advantage of having set up so-called "functional work groups" that concern themselves with certain historical or sociological problems. The representatives in the Council--which represents the executive power, as it were--are accountable to the autonomous groups, but they have no imperative mandate. The council members can be voted out at any time. Any member of the Council of Representatives that does not agree with the majority opinion can present a counterposition in the SMOT publications. There are also provisions concerning the admission to or expulsion from the autonomous groups. All of the regulations concerning the Council of Representatives reflect the desire on the one hand to guarantee maximum control by the rank and file, i.e. the autonomous groups, and on the other hand to insure maximum work effectiveness. The reference in Section IV of the "Basic Organizational Principles" to the effect that for the time being no by-laws will be established is characteristic of the looseness of structure which probably is attributable to the aversion to rigid forms of organization and to the tendency toward improvisation and experimentation. According to the plans, by-laws will be developed in time, in the course of the practical work. Finally, SMOT emphatically wants to separate the organizational structure from the program-related provisions. Whereas the by-laws of the "Free Trade Unions" clearly defined program-related tasks (educational function of the trade unions, etc.), SMOT merely establishes a general framework allowing articulation of diverse views.<sup>28</sup>

## d) The Composition of SMOT's Leadership

Biographical information is available only on SMOT's founding members and on the members of its Council of Representatives; it is not clear to what extent these data are representative of the membership as a whole. However, comparing merely the leadership of SMOT and that of the "Free Trade Unions," one notes the obvious differences in social composition. The declaration of association had been signed by the following individuals: L. Agapova, V. Borisov, L. Volokhonskiy, A. Ivanchenko, E. Nikolayev, V. Novodvorskaya, V. Skvirskiy, and A. Yakoreva.



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With the exception of V. Borisov (expelled from the USSR in June 1980), who--in addition to other lines of work--was an electrician by trade, none of the members of the Council of Representatives are workers; L. Volokhonskiy studied geography, and V. Novodvorskaya, linguistics; A. Ivanchenko is an engineer, while E. Nikolayev and V. Skvirskiy are geologists by profession; M. Morozov holds the academic degree of Candidate of Mathematics. As regards age, both the middle-aged and the younger generation are represented in the Council of Representatives. M. Morozov and V. Skvirskiy (born 1930) are among the oldest members of the Council, while L. Volokhonskiy (born 1947), V. Novodvorskaya (born 1950) and A. Yakoreva (born 1950) are among the youngest members. However, almost all of them have been active for a long time in the political arena and in the civil rights movement. As early as 1961, V. Borisov (born 1944) initiated a strike in the port of Leningrad and organized a conspiratorial group of young Marxist workers. In 1967, upon his release from a mental hospital, he established contact with P. Grigorenko. All in all, he spent over 10 years in mental hospitals. V. Skvirskiy has likewise been active for a long time in the civil rights movement; he is an internationally known collector of Russian folk songs; in dissident circles, his Moscow apartment was a popular cultural center, the locale of concerts, poetry readings and discussion circles. V. Novodvorskaya had demonstrated--at the young age of 18--against the occupation of the CSSR and had been committed to a mental hospital on account of "schizophrenia."

In view of the Samizdat information concerning the literature seized in residential searches and used as evidence in the trials, it seems safe to conclude that the SMOT leadership maintained close informational and cultural contacts with the dissidents in the Moscow and Leningrad intelligentsia or was itself part of that milieu.

## e) Persecution Measures Against SMOT

Immediately after the press conference held by SMOT representatives in M. Morozov's apartment on 28 October 1978, the Soviet authorities took steps against SMOT. M. Morozov was arrested as early as 1 November 1978; in accordance with Paragraph 70 of the RSFSR Penal Code ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"), he was sentenced to 5 years of exile. L. Volokhonskiy and V. Borisov were temporarily arrested on 2 November 1978. L. Volokhonskiy was again arrested on 20 March 1979, and in accordance with Paragraph 190<sup>1</sup> of the RSFSR Penal Code he was sentenced--on 12 June 1979--to 2 years imprisonment. Toward the middle of 1980, V. Borisov was expelled from the USSR. V. Novodvorskaya was arrested on 24 November 1978; she was committed to Psychiatric Hospital No 15 and released on 6 February 1979. The police searched the homes of almost all of the members (A. Yakoreva's residence was searched on 6 December 1978). Other members, e.g. E. Nikolayev on 30 November 1978, were subjected to continuous harassment on the part of KGB officers.<sup>29</sup>

A. Snizarenko, a witness for the prosecution in the trials of L. Volokhonskiy and V. Skvirskiy, was himself grossly intimidated during his interrogation by the KGB and during his appearance in court.<sup>30</sup> V. Skvirskiy had been arrested as early as 13 October 1978, i.e. before the press conference; in accordance with Paragraph 93, Part 1 of the RSFSR Penal Code ("fraudulent appropriation of state or social property"), he was sentenced--on 14 May 1979--to 5 years of exile; in Skvirskiy's case, some books that were borrowed from a public library but that had not been returned on time served as a pretext for his criminalization.<sup>31</sup>

The course of the proceedings against L. Volokhonskiy and the interrogations of several members of the Council of Representatives indicate that the investigative organs were primarily interested in obtaining information on SMOT's structure, on its organizational and personal contacts and on its membership.<sup>32</sup>

In spite of this persecution, SMOT continued its publishing activities. V. Borisov reported that in the last 2 months before his expulsion (June 1980), three new SMOT groups had been established in Moscow and Leningrad and that these groups were maintaining contact with the Council of Representatives.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, according to L. Volokhonskiy and his friends, the fact that during the proceedings against him SMOT was never called "illegal" or "anti-Soviet" can be interpreted as de facto recognition of SMOT by the court.<sup>34</sup>

Likewise, SMOT's solidarity message to the striking Polish workers and the "Solidarity" Union testifies to the viability of the organization. The message also contains a few new accents: SMOT regards the strikes in Poland and the demands raised by the "Solidarity" Union as a model it wants to follow; SMOT points out that any power risking an intervention in Poland would inevitably be confronted with a domestic crisis and with a catastrophe in the field of foreign policy; in the event of an intervention, Poland would be given moral support; SMOT does not regard the attempts of international trade union associations to help settle the conflicts in Poland as "interference in internal affairs"; SMOT proposes to establish an international trade union commission so as to supervise the trade union elections in Poland--a proposal made obsolete by the developments in Poland.<sup>35</sup> In another letter, SMOT proposed establishment of a "permanent joint commission of free labor unions of the socialist countries"; this commission was to include representatives of the Polish independent labor unions and of the "Committee for the Defense of the Workers" (KOR), representatives of independent trade union groups from Hungary and Yugoslavia, representatives of groups such as "Charter 77," and representatives of the civil rights movements in the GDR, Bulgaria and Romania. From its own ranks, SMOT recommended V. Borisov and V. Faynberg as representatives.<sup>36</sup>

#### f) Some Conclusions

The establishment of SMOT was carried out in critical awareness of the failure of "Free Trade Unions" and SMOT differs from these in regard to a number of important aspects. Almost all of SMOT's members are intellectuals who either have been active for a long time in the civil rights movement or are in close contact with it. On the one hand, one can say that they tend to speak */for/* [word in slantlines printed in italics] the workers; on the other hand, SMOT is conceived as an "inter-professional association of working people" that aims to accommodate */all/* [word in slantlines printed in italics] jobs and positions, irrespective of the status of the worker, office worker or intellectual. The Soviet state apparatus appears to have regarded the composition of SMOT as a "weak spot" of the trade union conception: it was pointed out that the SMOT members were not "real workers" ("ne nastoyashchiye rabochiye").<sup>37</sup> An especially striking element of the organization model is the insistence on democratic structures and the abstention from any ideological or politically normative statement; this conception allows accommodation of a broad spectrum of diverse views. As yet, it is impossible to assess SMOT's strength in regard to membership and backing by the population. Measured against Soviet conditions, SMOT--a rather "nonconformist" organization--has been enjoying

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a relatively long and continuous existence; this circumstance and also the sharp response of the authorities testified to the viability of the SMOT initiative. There is no telling whether the example of the Polish intellectuals, who in 1976 founded the "Worker Defense Committee" (Komitet obrony robotnikow, KOR), exerted an influence on the development of SMOT; undoubtedly, there are certain parallels. However, the present democratic opposition in the Soviet Union would be unthinkable without the advances made by and through SMOT: the problems and concerns of the workers have become an integral part of the movement; they are the ferment in a conceptual and practical process of reorientation, in an opening on the part of the dissidents toward concerns beyond the intellectual milieu.

### 3. Workers as Individual Fighters

As early as the 1960's, there were individual workers who had joined the civil rights movement and fought for its goals. Among them were A. Marchenko, V. Gershuni, V. Dremlyuga, V. Khaustov.<sup>38</sup> In the 1970's, more and more workers of this individualist type came to the fore; in some instances, they became known through their--relatively extensive--correspondence with the Western press and--occasionally--the trade union press; in other cases, they became known through the reports of Soviet dissidents. The best-known cases appear to be the following:

L. M. Seriy, worker at an Odessa fishing industry shipyard; L. M. Sivak, Ukrainian worker, born in 1926; V. M. Pavlov, bus driver from Maykop, born in 1929; V. A. Ivanov, born in 1930, Russian worker (emigrated in 1977; presently plans to return to the USSR<sup>39</sup>); B. Rebryk, born in 1938, Ukrainian worker; N. A. Yevgrafov, born in 1930, worker from the Ukraine; G. A. Bogolyubov, born in 1942, comes from an old working class family; V. Stasiv, Ukrainian worker; O. E. Buzinnikov, born in 1938, locksmith from Svetlogorsk (Belorussia); M. Kukobaka, born in 1936, excavator operator from Bobruysk (Belorussia); E. Kuleshov, approximately 40 years old, lathe operator in a Taganrog combine plant; A. Shutkin, born in 1926, former worker (his last position was that of photo reporter for a local newspaper).

Seriy had written letters to the chairman of the American trade unions AFL-CIO, G. Meany, and to the American workers with the request to support his appeal for emigration.<sup>40</sup> Ivanov, Sivak, Rebryk, Nikolayev and Kukobaka had likewise filed petitions for emigration. Most of the aforementioned workers had been arrested at least once; they had been convicted or committed to mental hospitals: in 1970, Pavlov was convicted in accordance with Paragraph 190<sup>1</sup> of the RSFSR Penal Code ("dissemination of stories known to be untrue that defame the Soviet national and social order"). In 1967, Rebryk was convicted of "nationalism"; subsequently, he was released, and in 1974, he was sentenced--in accordance with Paragraph 62 of the Ukrainian Penal Code (which corresponds to Paragraph 70 of the RSFSR Penal Code: "Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda")--to 7 years of "intensified" internment and 3 years of exile. In 1975, Yevgrafov was sentenced--in accordance with Paragraph 70 of the RSFSR Penal Code ("Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda")--to 10 years correctional work under "intensified conditions." Marchenko presently lives in exile in the Siberian town of Chuma.<sup>41</sup> Buzinnikov was convicted in 1978 of "anti-Soviet defamation" (Paragraph 186<sup>1</sup> of the Belorussian Penal Code, which corresponds to Paragraph 190<sup>1</sup> of the RSFSR Penal Code) and sentenced to 3 years correctional internment. Kukobaka had repeatedly been arrested and forcibly committed to psychiatric treatment; in October 1978, he was again arrested and transferred to the Moscow Serbskiy Institute; in June 1979, he was sentenced--in accordance with

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Paragraph 186<sup>1</sup> of the Belorussian Penal Code--to 3 years of "ordinary" internment. Kuleshov was arrested on 6 December 1978 and indicted on the basis of Paragraph 190<sup>1</sup> of the RSFSR Penal Code; on 4 July 1979, he was sentenced to 3 years of "strict" internment; upon reversal of the judgment due to procedural errors, he was finally sentenced--on 17 May 1980--to 2 years "strict" internment.<sup>42</sup>

a) Positions of the 'Worker Dissidents'

The statements made by the oppositionist workers comprise a wide range of subjects and a broad spectrum of positions. The following are some of the key subjects: portrayal and criticism of the Soviet workers' everyday living conditions; in this respect, special emphasis is placed on the low standard of living and on the overall disfranchisement. There is social criticism in regard to the history of the Soviet Union and the position of the working class in the Soviet system. Occasionally, the workers also ponder the interrelationship between the Soviet Union's domestic situation and its international policy. The documents also provide information on the relations between oppositionist workers and dissidents.

The father of six children, Seriy states that his family is forced to live under conditions of material deprivation, since his wages are insufficient--a 140- to 150-percent fulfillment of the norms notwithstanding. He says that after deduction of taxes, trade union fees and rent, his family's total income amounts to between 180 and 195 rubles. Seriy points out that the 30- to 40-percent increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs is especially disadvantageous for large families.<sup>43</sup> Ivanov recalls that in September 1974 there were several weekends when he had to work 24 hours.<sup>44</sup> In a letter from Chuna, his place of exile, Marchenko presents a kind of study of the living conditions in that town: a Chuna worker makes approximately 160 rubles per month; but whenever there is a deterioration of conditions regarding work organization and material supplies, he himself--says Marchenko--earns only approximately 120 rubles; only by means of overtime work is it possible to meet the plan quotas. Marchenko figures that for his monthly wages a worker can buy 1 and 1/2 suits or 2 tires for a "Moskvich" automobile or he can raise one-third of the price of a black-and-white TV set; foodstuffs are either very expensive or not available at all. Marchenko holds that although there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, the average wage of the Soviet worker falls short of the amount obtained by a Western unemployed person on welfare.<sup>45</sup>

The workers also commented on the political conditions in the Soviet Union. Seriy criticizes the trade unions' subordination to the CPSU and the union and party leadership's disregard for the union rank and file; he says the workers in the USSR lack the right of protest.<sup>46</sup> Ivanov emphasizes--among other things--the bias of the Soviet courts and the brutal treatment of the camp inmates.<sup>47</sup> Marchenko--alluding to the Soviet cant--calls the ruling elite the "more equal ones among equals"; he feels that the principle stating "whoever does not work must not eat" has been perverted in such a way that now it is political loyalty that has become the crucial factor in regard to the granting and the enjoyment of privileges.<sup>48</sup> Kukobaka lashes out against the press monopoly of the Communist Party and he likens the "Soviet Union's totalitarianism" to that of National Socialism. In a programmatic essay, Kukobaka advances the thesis that "without an internal relaxation of tensions in the Soviet Union itself there can be no hope for international detente."<sup>49</sup> Yevgrafov calls the system established in the Soviet Union "Asiatic pseudocommunism"; he claims that to "Soviet totalitarianism" Marxism is no more than a pretext.<sup>50</sup>

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The worker V. Stasiv ponders the historical roots of the Soviet Union's social system. He holds that in Soviet Russia a reactionary form of capitalism has turned into state capitalism; the smashing of the "worker opposition" and of the Kronstadt Revolt were the beginning of this development. According to Stasiv, the CPSU has turned into an overseer controlling the most inhuman exploitation; Plekhanov's and Kropotkin's prognoses have come true--a "protofascist state bourgeoisie" ("fashiziruyushchaya gosudarstvennaya burzhuaziya") has emerged.<sup>51</sup>

Some of the aforementioned workers declared their solidarity with the persecuted members of the dissident movement. Thus Seriy demanded that the authorities discontinue their persecution of Sakharov, Moroz and Dzyuba.<sup>52</sup> Yevgrafov appealed to the socialist and communist parties of West Europe, urging them to stand up for the Soviet dissidents.<sup>53</sup> Kukobaka had tried on several occasions to establish contact with Sakharov and this was held against him during his trial. Kuleshov, Buzinnikov and Kukobaka obviously were well informed--through Western radio broadcasts or the Samizdat press--about the views of the dissidents.

All of these well-known cases are distinguished by a particular circumstance: as many of eight of the workers quoted applied for an emigration permit for themselves and their families. Like the individual protest before, emigration appears to be the last way out.

## b) Some Observations on the Formation of the Type of 'Worker Dissident'

In terms of the type of individual concerned, the above examples differ both from the biographies of the "Free Trade Union" members and from those of the SMOT representatives. As regards their social status, the oppositionists are workers--in this respect, they are close to the group led by Klebanov; but in regard to political socialization, the aforementioned workers are marked by early individual protest actions, by their subjection to the government's persecution measures and by their familiarization with the positions taken by dissidents. It is safe to assume that many of them are distinguished by a high level of autodidactically acquired education (learning of foreign languages, familiarization with political and non-conformist literature, etc.); thus they are quite close to the dissident movement--made up mostly of intellectuals--and to the conceptions of SMOT.

In the statements made by these workers, one does not find any unequivocal, integrated perspective: on the one hand, their utterances reflect the hope for social change; on the other hand, there are the applications for emigration from the USSR. From this, one might conclude that the aforementioned workers do not see any possibilities of social action, that they can only conceive of an individual escape from their situation. For the "worker dissidents," affirmation of their views frequently means not only persecution, but also isolation from their own social milieu. Perhaps one may advance the thesis that the retreat from the collective- and class-oriented way of life represents--albeit in a resigned fashion--/one/ [word in slantlines printed in italics] important form of articulation of worker interests. The association of individual oppositionist workers with the Soviet dissidents still appears to be bound up--at least for now--with the severance of their ties with the working class milieu.<sup>54</sup>

#### IV. Worker Protests, Social Control and the Legitimation Problem in the Soviet Union

Considering merely the quantitative aspect, one can say that the above-described active worker protest is neither a movement enjoying broad support within the Soviet working class nor a serious challenge to the present Soviet system. However, it seems worthwhile to examine whether the above-described worker protest can be considered a qualitative index of latent conflict potentials that under certain conditions (e.g. aggravation of the economic problems) could become manifest and that go far beyond individual worker groups. One may ask further whether the ruling elite of the USSR has recognized the challenge contained in this qualitative aspect and whether it is trying to take preventive measures to control the dynamic forces contained here. In view of the above-described rapid and consistent persecution of worker protests, it is assumed here that the ruling elite is fully aware of the fact that the emergence of a "worker opposition" in a so-called "worker state" touches an extremely sensitive area: the question of the legitimacy and legitimation of its system. In this connection, it has already been pointed out that both the "Free Trade Unions" and SMOT intend to pursue their objectives entirely "within the framework of the existing order."

As regards assessment of the conflict potential of the Soviet working class, opinions differ greatly; the views advanced range from the assumption of a latently explosive situation (M. Holubenko<sup>1</sup>) to the thesis that the Soviet working class is "incorporated" in the sociopolitical system of the Soviet Union (D. Lane<sup>2</sup>). It is difficult to flesh out such assessments, not only because of the lack of empirical information concerning the objective situation and its subjective/conscious analysis by the workers themselves, but also because of the state of development of the requisite analytical tools for ascertaining the objective situation and the subjective mental processes under the specific Soviet conditions (one need only mention here the Soviet concept of "publicity"). If one considers separately or regards as absolute one of the levels--either that of the "objective conditions" or that of the "subjective consciousness" of the working class--it will probably be quite difficult to determine the modes and stages of a realization process that--in Hegelian terms--involves the development of the "class as such" into a "class in itself" (Marx) and that is to be adequate to the Soviet conditions.

But first of all, irrespective of these conceptual problems, we may ask: can we regard as representative the concerns and objectives articulated by the founders of the "Free Trade Unions" and SMOT, by worker dissidents and open worker protests? Is there an interconnection between the criticism voiced by them and the other manifestations of dissatisfaction and spontaneous reaction within the Soviet working class? What interrelationship is there between the forms of conflict and the social structure in the USSR? How does the Soviet ruling class respond to worker protests?

##### 1. Worker Protests and Other Forms of Expression of Dissatisfaction in the Working Class Milieu

The above-described activities--open protest, first attempts by workers to set up and organizational framework, and activities of dissidents--are the absolute exception; they are related to critical conflict situations. As compared to these open-protest forms, what is the significance of less spectacular forms that are all the

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more typical of Soviet everyday life: the labor turnover in plants and regions; the lack of work discipline; the writing of individual and joint letters of protest; excessive consumption of alcohol; theft of state property; the workers' daily acknowledgement that between the plan targets and ideological norms and everyday reality there is a deep gap.

## a) Labor Turnover

Although the Soviet Union's annual labor turnover rate is not atypical of industrialized societies<sup>3</sup> and although even Soviet economists regard as unavoidable and normal--within certain limits--a spontaneous exchange of manpower, the labor turnover in the USSR remains a "true scourge of the production sector."<sup>4</sup> Since the 1956 relaxation of the Draconian labor laws, the annual labor turnover rate has increased to between 19 and 22 percent.<sup>5</sup> The economic losses are estimated to be extremely high:

"During the period from 1968 to 1972, an average of 176 million workdays were lost each year on account of the search for a new job. Assuming an average turnover rate of 20 percent in the national economy and a loss of 30 workdays on the search for a new job, the annual losses equal the work produced by 1.7 million workers. Calculated in terms of the value of the products that were not produced on account of labor turnover, the losses in 1965 amounted to 3 billion rubles, and in 1972, to 4 billion rubles."<sup>6</sup>

In view of the growing labor shortage in the Soviet economy, these losses are especially aggravating. There are various reasons for the turnover; apparently, there is no single primary cause. In the remote, underdeveloped and climatically less favored regions, environmental factors and extra-plant circumstances (climate, housing, services, family situation) play a more important role, as compared to the developed regions. For industrial workers, the key factors are those related to the production process--work organization, wages, working conditions. A. Pravda states that in regard to the workers' readiness to change jobs there is evidence indicating increased weight of the intra-plant factors and decreased importance of the external factors.<sup>7</sup> The primary agents in the labor turnover are young workers, less skilled workers and workers with little work experience. As regards the individual branches of industry, the turnover rates vary: whereas in the construction, food and lumber industries the rate is especially high, it is relatively low in the machine building industry.<sup>8</sup>

The wage rates and the factors that indirectly influence these rates (qualifications, work organization, plant supplies, etc.) are of crucial importance in regard to a worker's readiness to look for a different job; other important factors are the discrepancy between the present type of job and the original professional goal or the training received and the lack of satisfactory prospects for professional advancement.<sup>9</sup> Since the end of the 1960's and in connection with the industrial reforms, measures have been taken to reduce the turnover rate: stabilization of the norms, wage increases, improvement of the working conditions, rationalization of the production methods; in the Shchekino Chemical Combine, which is considered a model plant, the turnover rate was reduced by 50 percent within 1 year.<sup>10</sup>

In W. Teckenberg's study of labor turnover, the following observations are made:

"The high labor turnover rate in the Soviet Union is attributable not only to the workers' opportunities and efforts to attain maximum satisfaction of their needs by exploring the work situation in various enterprises within the framework of legally guaranteed employment. In connection with the large percentage of workers who are dissatisfied with their job, the turnover rates are indicative of a high degree of conflict within the enterprise. The workers prefer to leave an unsatisfactory job they rather face the difficulties involved in finding a new job than stay at their old work place.... In making the decision to leave their enterprise, many Soviet workers, above all the working men and women in the industrial sector, are motivated not by identifiable better prospects in other enterprises, but by unbearable working conditions and/or insufficient wages. Apparently, the wage rates and the material situation are especially apt to give rise to conflict-oriented attitudes and to the final decision to leave the enterprise."<sup>11</sup>

b) Breaches of Work Discipline

Although breaches of work discipline have not reached the scope of the labor turnover, millions of workdays are being lost on account of lack of discipline. In the RSFSR alone, the losses caused in 1973 by absenteeism were estimated at half a billion rubles.<sup>12</sup> In this connection, it should be noted that in comparison with labor turnover, lack of discipline is subject to much greater ideological and social disapproval. The principal form of violation of work discipline--accounting for one-third to one-half of all cases--appears to be absenteeism. Other offenses are: drunkenness or lateness; leaving one's place of work too early or during working hours; drinking at the work place, and insubordination. Male workers account for a larger share of breaches of discipline than do female workers.<sup>13</sup> According to studies made, the typical "undisciplined worker" can be described as follows: male, young, low level of education, irregular family background, low level of social integration, drinking and card-playing the preferred leisure-time activities.<sup>14</sup> It is also pointed out, however, that the extension of schooling has not resulted in any marked reduction of undisciplined conduct at the work place.<sup>15</sup> Among the reasons underlying breaches of discipline, alcoholism ranks first; according to one analysis, termination of alcohol consumption would result in a 10-percent increase in productivity.<sup>16</sup> There are other causes: indifference toward the job, which is apt to turn into disregard for the requirements of the production process; bad working conditions, above all during the period of "shturmovshchina," i.e. within the last 10 to 12 days before the plan-fulfillment deadline, and overtime work.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, there is an interconnection between lack of discipline and labor turnover: since on account of the labor shortage the plant managers must hire new workers, the possibilities concerning imposition of discipline on the job hoppers are very limited.<sup>18</sup> Measures taken by the plant managers frequently prove ineffective; reportedly, admonition is the most frequent form of disciplinary action.<sup>19</sup>

c) Individual and Joint Formulation of Letters of Criticism and Complaint

Submission to the press--above all to the trade union organ TRUD--of criticism, complaints or proposals for improvements is a form of expression of displeasure that is not only recognized, but also promoted by the state and the Party. On the one hand, this form of limited public criticism enables the state to keep



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displeasure and criticism within the prescribed channels; on the other hand, it gives the state access to the general mood in the working class milieu. The news organ TRUD, which is published daily, supplies the trade union leadership with quarterly analyses of the letters of criticism received by the editor.<sup>20</sup> All Soviet newspaper offices receive an extremely large number of letters; TRUD is reported to receive half a million letters a year; of this total, between one-fifth and one-half are of a critical nature.<sup>21</sup>

Reliance on evaluation of the letters published in papers such as TRUD must be considered problematic, since one must assume that not all of the workers who feel called upon to express criticism have the energy or the courage to express themselves in writing or in public; moreover, one may assume that the publication of letters is dependent on a selection process at the hands of the editors who attach great importance to the publication of "constructive" and affirmative criticism. Nevertheless, A. Pravda's study of the letters of criticism and complaint published in TRUD yields a number of interesting data: this analysis evaluates the years 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1974 and 1976, thus allowing comparison of the period after the economic reform of 1965 with the pre-reform period; besides, the analysis includes only letters that in all probability were produced in a nonorganized way, i.e. without any assistance by so-called "worker correspondents" or editors. Approximately four-fifths of the complaints published were concerned with matters directly related to the situation in the plant rather than with general living conditions. Although complaints about insufficient wages did not rank very high (occupying places 5 to 7), which is at variance with other study results,<sup>22</sup> one notes a remarkable change during the period from 1964 to 1974: in 1974, there occurred--in connection with the new wage regulations--an increase in the complaints concerned with wages. All in all, there is a shift of emphasis--from criticism concerning wage-related irregularities in 1964 to criticism of the bonus system in 1974.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, changes occurred in regard to the relative importance of the working conditions and of the intra-plant work organization. While in 1964 the criticism focused above all on the general working conditions (heating, ventilation, sanitation, etc.), in the early 1970's the criticism was concerned above all with the low level of mechanization. In regard to work organization, the critics' emphasis shifted from the irregular work rhythm caused by "shturmovshchina" to the interruptions of the work process caused by insufficient material supplies. Explicit criticism of the conduct of the plant management is voiced in no more than 6 to 7 percent of the letters; but if one includes all complaints concerning violations of the work regulations and of the workers' rights, letters of this orientation account for 20 percent of all critical letters. Over the period observed, more and more emphasis was placed on intra-plant, production process-related sources of conflict.<sup>24</sup>

A breakdown of the letters and complaints by origin shows that approximately 50 percent came from heavy industry, with workers from the machine building industry constituting an especially large share; approximately 10 to 15 percent of the complaints came from the mining sector. About 45 percent of the complaints came from individual workers; approximately 40 percent were produced by groups with up to five members, and up to 15 percent, by larger groups.<sup>25</sup> Likewise, the object of the criticism varied in accordance with the production sector concerned: workers from heavy industry were for the most part concerned with working conditions and work organization; miners criticized primarily the living and working conditions, while workers of the manufacturing, transport and construction industries were for

the most part concerned with shortcomings in the service sector, shortcomings in regard to plant installations, and wage-related problems. Approximately 25 percent of the letters go beyond criticism; they describe in detail unsuccessful efforts toward bringing about improvements; frequently, TRUD is considered the last resort. According to A. Pravda's analysis, only a small percentage of the letter-writers (approximately 7 percent in 1964; approximately 3 percent in 1974) wrote in an "extreme tone"; A. Pravda distinguishes between two categories of letters--the "furious" letters and the "helpless" ones. Especially critical letters are passed on to the "appropriate authorities."<sup>26</sup>

d) Alcoholism

There have been many discussions as to the extent to which the excessive alcohol consumption in the USSR is a legacy of national drinking habits, an element from an agrarian order, which now persists within an industrialized society. However, references to such a tradition or to alcoholism as a "residue of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois consciousness" cannot account for the social conditions underlying the continuous reproduction of this phenomenon. In view of the increase of alcoholism, the philosopher G. Pomeranc spoke of a "civilization of alcoholics."<sup>27</sup> In an essay entitled "Alcoholism in the USSR," B. Vayl, a dissident who emigrated to the West, describes various symptoms that are indicative of the extent of alcoholism: the "Vodka currency," the crowded detoxification cells in the militia stations, the setting up of rehabilitation centers in large-scale enterprises. According to Vayl, 200 workers--all employed in the same enterprise, the Penza Diesel- and Turbocompressor Plant--had to spend a night in detoxification cells; "addicted workers" employed in smelting works, mines and plants in Krivoy Rog do not go home after work, but visit their plant's rehabilitation center. Vayl agrees with R. Medvedev's view concerning the causes of this "national tragedy":

"Alcohol distracts; it soothes the tormenting conscience. The drunkard feels that alcohol turns him into a real man. Alcohol overcomes the feeling of inferiority.... In a country, where the individual person is of no significance, alcohol gives a person the illusion of being important."<sup>28</sup>

According to this interpretation, alcoholism is a safety valve and a form of compensation of a very ambivalent nature: on the one hand, excessive consumption of alcohol is dysfunctional in terms of the criteria of economic efficiency--if one leaves out of consideration the considerable profit the Soviet state derives from its liquor monopoly; on the other hand, it has a dampening effect on potentially acute dissatisfaction.

e) Other Symptoms of 'Socially Deviant Behavior'

Public disturbances, theft of social property and evasion of the official social norms can be considered symptoms of insufficient "moral integration" in the system.<sup>29</sup> It has repeatedly been pointed out that workers and children of workers are overrepresented among the persons who have come into conflict with the law.

The official press keeps publishing articles concerned with theft of "social property." According to these reports, theft of plant property (raw materials, semi-finished and finished goods), which then is diverted to domestic use, illicit work or the Black Market, has assumed the dimensions of an epidemic. According to

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W. D. Connors, this essentially illegal appropriation of plant property is not regarded as a criminal offense proper; rather, it is morally justified according to the motto: "Whoever does not steal from the state steals from his family."<sup>30</sup> Soviet civil-rights advocates have repeatedly drawn attention to the consequences of such mass phenomena in regard to social morals: since large segments of the working population earn hardly enough to survive, the appropriation of plant-owned goods--e.g. butter from the dairy, lumber from the sawmill, etc.--represents a form of additional income the families depend on.<sup>31</sup> V. Chalidze speaks of the formation of a "culture of deception" within the working class. According to Chalidze, the symptoms include dawdling, negligent handling of equipment, composition of fictitious plan figures, evasion of the centrally prescribed norms by means of false reporting so as to obtain the bonuses granted upon fulfillment of the plan quotas; Chalidze points out that in this regard there is some sort of collusion between the workers and their superiors, since the plant managers too can meet their plan targets only if they make allowance from the outset for the workers' indifference and passive resistance. V. Chalidze adduces an example of what R. Bahro has called "the economics of organized irresponsibility":

"For example, in a certain shop a machine has broken down; a mechanic is called so as to get the machine repaired. One hour later, the foreman comes and asks whether the machine is in working order. The mechanics just sit there, smoking. He asks why the machine has not been repaired. They reply: 'We went to the tool room to get a tool, but it was closed; but we need the tool to be able to repair the machine.' The foreman goes to the tool room, gets the tool and gives it to them. One hour later, he comes back and again the mechanics just sit there, smoking; in reply to the question why the machine has not been repaired, they say they need a bolt, but that none is available; they say they went to the lathe hand who could make one, but the lathe hand did not show up for work, and so on. This process is interminable and the workers never consider the possible causes. All of the reasons are perfectly natural. The tool room was in fact closed, because it is open only during certain hours, or the tool needed was not available there. And the workers really needed a bolt; they did go to the lathe hand, and the lathe hand actually had got drunk and had gone home.... But every worker has his own tools and a bolt can be fashioned by any mechanic--he need not wait for a drunk lathe hand. And any experienced foreman knows that in order to make the workers stop smoking, find the tool, make the bolt and repair the machine, one need only write that they repaired two machines. In fact, experienced foremen proceed like this and in their shops, the work gets done."<sup>32</sup>

Obviously, this example, which is called typical, describes a form of routine production sabotage, a deliberate reduction of labor productivity. As is apparent from the reports of H. Smith, frequently there is no clear line dividing dawdling from go-slow strikes.<sup>33</sup>

V. Chalidze describes a kind of "dropping out" from the production routine: a "rather large number of workers" do nothing but part-time or seasonal work. "On all of my trips, I met many workers of this type--workers who on principle do only seasonal work. And these are very interesting people, who are psychologically quite different from the average Soviet worker; many of them have a criminal record; many of them simply do not want to stay in one place and they prefer a free style of life. They accept their difficult living conditions, but they feel that in return they have more freedom than the others."<sup>34</sup>

## 2. Forms of Social and Political Control

It is only within the context of the specifically Soviet forms of resolution of social conflicts that one can answer the question as to what interconnection there is between the extremely rare manifestations of open worker protest in the form of walkouts and strikes and the existence of a broad "gray zone" of barely articulated, diffuse dissatisfaction in the form of job hopping, dawdling and breaches of discipline. According to V. Chalidze, the principal cause underlying the predominance of latent conflicts is the "lack of legal procedures for the defense of worker rights."<sup>35</sup> M. Rakovski points out that in contrast to the bourgeois-democratic systems in the West the Soviet social system lacks institutions distinguished by formal independence. All institutions are

"integrated in a uniform administrative hierarchy that prevents any situation where autonomous organizations would perform the contrary social functions and represent contrary social interests.... In order to be able to function without constant recourse to open force, the institutional system must be capable of channeling the interests of the alienated groups.... The organizations that have some of the characteristics of a movement are mechanisms for upholding the institutional structure of the Soviet type: it is these organizations which prevent the polarization of social interests and the formation of autonomous organizations that would be able to represent special aspirations--aspirations diametrically opposed to the requirements in connection with the functioning of the global hierarchy. The primary function of the Party is to restrict particularist tendencies within the power hierarchy.... It is first and foremost the trade unions which serve to channel the interests of the majority."<sup>36</sup>

According to Rakovski, elimination of formally independent organizations is not enough to prevent spontaneous eruptions of dissatisfaction; but it is sufficient "to prevent organizational consolidation of the results of direct actions and accumulation of real conquests and political experience."<sup>37</sup>

To a certain extent, this structure of Soviet society explains why the right to strike is not expressly articulated in the Soviet constitution and why strikes have not been expressly forbidden;<sup>38</sup> theoretically, strikes are "absurd," since according to the official ideology workers cannot oppose themselves, i.e. their state; but in regard to actual practice, strikes are prohibited. In view of the fact that in the Soviet society all social relations are determined by the state, V. Kravchenko and M. Holubenko hold that in no social system in recorded history were the people so atomized as they are in the present Soviet system: "The apparatus of repression penetrates the society so as to keep it in an amorphous and atomized state and to prevent the individual citizen from associating with others in mutual-support groups; without such solidarity, action of any kind is inconceivable."<sup>39</sup>

A. Zinov'yev likewise points to this aspect: "There may be millions of dissatisfied individuals, but they are dispersed across the entire country and various collectives and thus their dissatisfaction is practically paralyzed. An association of such persons in sufficiently large groups is impossible if only because of the mode of their existence."<sup>40</sup>

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## a) Organized Forms of Integration and Control

There are various organizations and authorities that exert an influence on the workers at their work places and in their everyday life, the most important being the Communist Party, the trade unions, the plant management and the large number of "social institutions" (conflict-settling commissions, peer-group courts, cultural clubs, sports associations, etc.). At first glance the plurality of these organizations appears to be indicative of a relatively large integration capacity; however, the plurality is relativized by the fact that it is the supreme political authority, the Party, which has the final say. For the most part, the aforementioned organizations are not primarily political organizations; nevertheless, they must be considered political, because the Soviet society is a "political society,"<sup>41</sup> i.e. a society that does accept formal autonomy on the part of the economic, cultural and other sectors, subordinating them to the political domain. This relatively broadly conceived, centrally controlled institutional form appears to be the institutionalized form designed to solve the problem concerning integration of consensus formation and coercion. In the following, we can deal only very briefly with the specific role of such organization in connection with the emergence of worker protest; of great significance in this regard is W. Teckenberg's observation that for the Soviet worker the enterprise is of crucial importance, resembling in regard to many of its functions the Western communes.<sup>42</sup>

The Party organization: In 1976, there were over 390,000 CPSU base organizations; of this total, approximately 25 percent were enterprise party organizations, each having an average of 89 members. Generally speaking, unskilled laborers are under-represented in the CPSU, whereas up to 54 percent of the plant management personnel are CPSU members. The CPSU tries to induce especially the active workers, who function as opinion leaders, to join its ranks. In the first half of the 1970's, the Party made a special effort to recruit ordinary workers: 57.6 percent of the new members admitted to the CPSU from 1971 to 1975 were laborers doing manual work.<sup>43</sup> Enterprise party organizations are active not only in the political arena, but also in the economic and cultural sectors. Now as ever, party membership is an essential precondition for social advancement.

The trade unions: With a total membership of 113 million, they are by far the biggest mass organization. D. Lane defines their function as follows: "They try to integrate the worker into the plant and the social life and they consider themselves a crucial element of the social pact between political party, government and industrial enterprises."<sup>44</sup> The trade unions' key tasks are in the production sector, where they are to help improve work organization, work discipline and the psychological atmosphere. Protection of the worker interests implies in the main the task to try to insure better working conditions and observation of the labor law provisions; in practice, the right to veto dismissals in the trade unions' most important privilege.<sup>45</sup> However, the trade unions' range of influence extends far into the workers' private, extra-plant life: they administer the social insurance funds, run sanitariums and allocate housing. In 1972, the trade unions controlled 94,000 clubs, houses of culture and cinemas and 29 sport organizations with over 200,000 athletic facilities.<sup>46</sup> Close to 99 percent of all workers and salaried employees are union members.

The regional employment principle implies that employees of different occupational categories and employees holding different social positions in a particular

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enterprise--e.g. an unskilled worker and a manager--belong to one and the same labor union. The corporative structure and the scope of responsibilities prevent the trade unions from openly articulating conflicts of interest: the trade union representatives cannot entirely meet the management's efficiency-oriented demands, nor can they unreservedly champion the workers' immediate interests. As regards the latter, expansion of output and subordination to the political objectives of the CPSU undoubtedly take precedence. Thus J.-M. Chauvier can say: "Strictly speaking, the trade union remains the 'transmission belt' of power, even though of late it has increasingly been running in two directions: it transmits to the masses the instructions from the authorities' control centers and at the same time it tries to harness the energy and initiative of these masses."<sup>47</sup> In view of the trade unions' corporative structure, G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi point out that "Not a single socialist country has a worker organization."<sup>48</sup>

The plant management: The main criterion of an enterprise's success is the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the economic plan. The director is appointed by the central administrative organs; he is not elected by the workers. W. Teckenberg points to the social distance between workers and managers and to the tendency--increasingly apparent since the economic reform of 1965--toward shifting the conflicts that formerly occurred between the plant managers and the planning agencies to the level of interaction between the management and the workers of the individual enterprise.<sup>49</sup> However, it has repeatedly been pointed out that due to the very limited independence of the Soviet enterprise, the position of the Soviet plant manager cannot be considered equal to that of a "boss."<sup>50</sup>

The triple alliance between the Party, the trade unions and the plant managers has again and again been criticized by Soviet workers. Wherever they crystallize, articulate dissatisfaction and protest are invariably confronted with the integration potential and power monopoly of these organizations.

## b) 'Mild Forms of Political Coercion'

E. Nikolayev, the cofounder of the "free trade unions," named a number of "mild forms" of political and social coercion. According to Nikolayev, this category includes the obligatory participation in social activities: although officially participation in such activities is declared to be voluntary, any refusal to participate compromises and isolates the individual concerned; in fact, it entails ostracism. Nikolayev also mentioned the obligatory participation in political training courses and the organization of seminars aimed at developing political awareness. According to Nikolayev, these forms are significant, because they enable the state to control the degree of subjective identification with the social system.<sup>51</sup> Even official quarters emphasize that in terms of disciplinary action measures such as public criticism at production meetings are more effective than a simple reproach by the superiors or a docking of wages.<sup>52</sup>

Nikolayev also pointed to the so-called "voluntary participation" in the socialist competition: since the plan is based on individual and joint commitments, any refusal to pledge can be persecuted as a violation of the collective or social interests. According to Nikolayev, the communist Subbotniki, which in his view are a form of unpaid overtime work, the participation in all kinds of meetings, and the practically obligatory membership in one of the numerous "social organizations" are other forms of permanent mobilization.<sup>53</sup>

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Nikolayev's account merits attention, if only because of the scope of the activities and organizations mentioned: at present, approximately 90 percent of the workers participate in some form or other in the "socialist competition"; in 1973, approximately 132 million people attended the festivities organized on the occasion of Lenin's birthday.<sup>54</sup> In 1973, the Scientific-Technical Associations (NTO) had subsidiaries in 100,000 enterprises with a membership total of approximately 6 million; the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers (VOIR) had 7.8 million members.<sup>55</sup>

In the opinion of V. Chalidze, even the determination of the "distinctive features," i.e. the evaluation of the worker's professional, personal and moral qualities, is a "police function," since it insures extensive control.<sup>56</sup> Finally, one should mention the fact that the KGB is present in almost all of the key institutions and enterprises ("Department I").<sup>57</sup>

## c) Forms of Ideological Discrimination of 'Deviant Conduct'

Even a brief outline of the conditions affecting the emergence of worker protest in the Soviet Union must make mention of the ideological pressure that is exerted on worker opposition by "public opinion." By virtue of the CPSU's monopoly of definition in regard to what should be considered--and subsequently put into practice--the "historical interest of the working class," the "Nomenklatura" can persecute any worker conduct that does not stay within the social norms and it can ideologically justify punitive measures. Thanks to the centralized structure of the ideological machinery and the exercise of rigorous censorship, the state can prevent--or at least impede--the formation of counter- or subcultures within the working class; on the other hand, the exclusion from the "public domain" of relevant experience and spheres of life actually provokes the development of private cultural and informational systems.

The ruling circles' modes of reaction to worker protests have been revealed above all in the revolts in East and Central Europe; as for worker protests or strikes in the USSR, the Soviet press passes them over in silence or mentions them only indirectly.<sup>58</sup> If the press finds itself involved in a discussion of worker opposition, it usually resorts to the customary clichés: the workers were taken in by provocations and taken advantage of; the "shortcomings of the Party" should be corrected in a "socialist way," etc.

It seems safe to assume that more important than the modification of everyday behavior and the justification of measures against deviations from the social norm are the conceptions--instilled through upbringing, family, school, and work environment--concerning the "ideal worker"--an image that is to suggest combination of sociopolitical conformism with the acceptance of "objective necessities." Thus D. Lane points to specific educational patterns for workers ("Discipline is necessary for work"; "Work is the essence and purpose of life"; "Every type of work is of importance"; "The more a person works and learns, the more he or she accomplishes for the homeland").<sup>59</sup>

Likewise, in the fields of culture and art attempts are made--in accordance with the changing social conditions, to be sure--firmly to establish normative conceptions of the worker "as he should be."<sup>60</sup>

Against this background, it is to be expected that the authorities suspect oppositionist workers of being "renegades"--as in the case of Klebanov--or informers working for a foreign country or radio station--as in the case of Kukobaka. This type of persecution is especially evident in the attempts to stop the contacts that are slowly being established between the worker opposition and the dissidents. The line of argumentation pursued--both vis-a-vis the dissidents and vis-a-vis the oppositionist workers--is characterized by an ouvrierist and anti-intellectual bent. Thus KGB Chairman Yu. Andropov--delivering an address over Moscow Radio on the occasion of F. Dzerzhinskiy's 100th birthday--stated the dissidents would not "dare speak in an industrial plant or in a kolkhoz or sovkhos: they would have to beat a very hasty retreat."<sup>61</sup> And during an interrogation of V. Bukovskiy, a representative of the dissident movement, a prison warden argued as follows: "I have consulted the other comrades and we have arrived at the conclusion that you need a purification bath in the working class milieu. You should live in a really good worker collective so that the workers can ventilate your head."<sup>62</sup>

To a large extent, it is the aforementioned conditions--the comprehensive integration of the worker in a differentiated, but corporatively structured network of political, trade union and social organizations, and the pressure exerted by the dominant public opinion of a system that tries to legitimize itself as a "workers' state"--that account for the specific form worker protest actions take in the Soviet Union.

#### d) Attempt at Typification of Forms of Conflict and Repression

Most of the conflicts between the workers on one side and the plant managers, the trade unions and the Party on the other side appear to be in the form of the "bureaucratic mass labor conflict," i.e. they remain within the mechanisms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution that are set up by the system. It is in these--officially sanctioned--channels that the labor turnover and the criticism articulated in the letters and complaints take place. Other forms--dawdling, lack of discipline, escape into alcohol, theft of plant property--can be ascribed to a "gray zone" between socially deviant behavior and passive resistance.

In the event of failure of the customary integration and conflict resolution organs, other methods of terminating conflicts are brought into play. A few of these methods, which can be considered typical, are presented in the following brief outline:

- Deliberate hushing up of the disturbances: In order to conceal the occurrence of walkouts and strikes, the press keeps silence; on the other hand, methods of strike settlement that could attract public attention--e.g. plant shutdowns or lockouts--cannot be employed and must be ruled out.
- Quick intervention of higher authorities: In most of the cases publicized, the workers themselves turned relatively soon to higher authorities such as regional party committees, since they regarded as ultimately binding the decision of these authorities, not the decision of the plant management; in some instances, the plant managers declared themselves incompetent to settle the conflict and called in administrative or party organs (the best example of this mechanism is Novocharkassk); such interventions frequently result in the replacement of certain individuals.



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- Quick compliance with the workers' demands: In intervening, the higher authorities are obviously motivated by the desire to prevent by any means an extension of the conflict. Consequently, in most cases these authorities are ready immediately to make concessions (as happened most recently in Tartu).
- Identification of "ringleaders" and cores of activists immediately after a disturbance: In order to forestall escalation, the Party, the plant managers and the prosecuting agencies usually dispense with the arrest of workers in connection with the conflict situation at hand. However, in almost all of the cases reported, the arrest of presumed strike leaders took place a few days or weeks /after/ [word in slantlines printed in italics] the disturbance; apparently, the objective was to avoid provoking solidarity actions among the plant employees and to prevent consolidation of oppositionist cores of workers.
- Employment of military means: Apparently, this step was taken whenever the unrest threatened to escape the control of the local authorities; in most cases, such disturbances had been triggered or aggravated by encroachments on the part of the militia. The explosive form of unrest--which is characteristic of systems that lack the framework for legal expression of protest--apparently is seen by the authorities as a threat that justifies the use of any means.
- Legal prosecution: The above-described prosecution of individual workers indicates that for political reasons the authorities want to make worker activities criminal offenses.
- Recourse to psychiatric treatment: On account of their social criticism and their commitment to goals that in their view could well be attained within the framework of the official trade unions and the existing order, many workers have been declared "insane." Apparently, the authorities assume social criticism to be so marginal that treating it as a "mental defect" will make it disappear.

All the aforementioned forms of repression indicate that the Soviet social system reacts extremely sensitively to any independent articulation of worker interests.

### 3. Some Observations Concerning the Problem of Legitimation in Regard to the Worker Protests in the Soviet Union

In the view of many observers, the gravity of the legitimation problem in the USSR derives from the fact that there exists--or appears to be emerging--a sharp contradiction between the official self-legitimation as a "workers' state" and the true rule of the "empirical working class."<sup>63</sup> It is doubtful, however, whether the legitimation problem in so-called "workers' states" can be meaningfully discussed in terms of a confrontation between ideological claims and the real situation. Rather, the Soviet system's ability to legitimize itself as the "best possible social system" probably depends on whether it can make allowance--on the level of the productive forces and production relations--for the society's developmental requirements. Assuming that low productivity is the key problem of the Soviet economic system<sup>64</sup>--especially in the coming decade--and that this problem must be considered to be closely related to the social forms in the USSR, one must ask the following questions: Is the urgently necessary transition to an intensive, technologically advanced mode of production conceivable without a commitment to work, without identification with work--in short, without radically extending the Soviet

workers' opportunities for concrete participation? And secondly: How can effective worker participation in the economic process be implemented, if the present structures allowing merely formal participation are not replaced by forms of real control and codetermination? Does not such a step of necessity call into question the ruling party's monopoly of definition and power?

There are many indications that while the Soviet leadership wants modernization, it does not want reform, and that it pins its hopes--at least temporarily--on other possible solutions: extensive economic development (which even now is impeded, however, on account of the growing labor shortage); further pursuit of a foreign policy, by means of which the USSR can acquire advanced technologies; insuring the primacy of heavy industry and of an undiminished armament program, which promises military--if not economic--hegemony. One hardly can assume that industrial modernization will inevitably result in structural social reforms; thus there may possibly occur an accumulation of conflicts: the conflict between the "democratization of labor" (F. Feher) resulting from industrialization and the preservation of a monolithic political system; the potentiality of increasing dissatisfaction with a system characterized by chronic inability to satisfy elementary requirements (bottlenecks in the food supply); the necessity to counteract instances of disintegration and disloyalty on the one hand and the blocking of opportunities for concrete participation on the other hand; the conflict between the extension of the communication and information system--which is necessary for all modern societies--and the insistence on controlling public opinion, etc. The fact that the Soviet leadership discusses these problems is indicative of the virulence of the conflicts;<sup>65</sup> it is obvious that at best the Soviet leadership will consider an extension of the present system's integration capacity, rather than qualitative reforms. As regards resolution of such conflicts and preservation of the ideological hegemony, two aspects that are characteristic of the Soviet type of legitimation could possibly assume increasing importance:

If it is true that the legitimation of the Soviet Union comes about within the framework of a "substantive rationality"--i.e. via the justification of programmatic objectives rather than via the mere guarantee of formal procedures for the establishment of a social consensus--and if it is true that the economic process is not regulated by the objective authority of the market, but that it is in a very high degree controlled by a centralized planning bureaucracy,<sup>65</sup> then factors that under normal conditions have a stabilizing effect may in periods of crisis turn out to be a big obstacle to the resolution of conflicts: under such conditions, social criticism will primarily be concerned with the "substantive" guiding principles, and economic crises will be attributed to the failure of those bearing political and economic responsibility; economic and social problems are likely to turn into political problems concerning the "foundations of the system"; conflicts and conflict potentials that on account of their quantitative scope must be considered marginal will then be seen as a threat to the system as a whole.

As regards the Soviet working class as a whole, no conflict potential of this type appears to be present or likely to develop in the foreseeable future. In A. Kahan's view, the Soviet workers are realists oriented toward gradual improvements and fully aware of their subordinate social position; Kahan claims that the workers aspire to middle class status, that they want to be anything but proletarians--a status reserved exclusively to the working class women.<sup>66</sup> W. D. Connor takes the view that all the symptoms of dissatisfaction notwithstanding, identification with

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the system is the predominant attitude: the workers hope the USSR will develop into a welfare state without any inflation or unemployment--a state in which they will continue to benefit from the loose application of labor regulations. According to Connor, the workers consider the social norms quite "bearable"; he points out that the political system meets their need for security and order and that Soviet patriotism is an important unifying agent, promoting social consensus. Connor points to other stability-promoting factors: the Soviet worker lacks any standard by which he could compare his country with the Western, more advanced countries, and the regime has been sufficiently sensitive to recognize the threat posed by the food shortages and to forestall new unrest by food imports. In W. D. Connor's view, there is no reason to assume the Soviet working class will become politicized; so far, symptoms of social inequality have not been discussed in terms specifically oriented toward the "working class." Connor claims the fact that up to now the Soviet worker has not developed any class consciousness is a factor decidedly favorable to the regime's stability.<sup>67</sup>

Similarly, in his study on the structure of the Soviet working class, W. Teckenberg arrives at the conclusion that the conflict potential of the Soviet working class must be considered insignificant.<sup>68</sup>

In view of these results, there arises the question how one can account for the Soviet Government's sharp reaction to the formation of "Free Trade Unions," unless one assumes that it subjectively viewed it as a serious challenge to its legitimacy claim. Thus, in place of an assessment based on either/or, we will present in conclusion a few differentiating observations:

Firstly: The establishment of trade union associations marks the transition from a merely spontaneous and reactive representation of interests to an organized representation outside the official trade unions. In the history of the USSR working class, this is an unprecedented phenomenon. The attempts of workers and working people to voice their interests independently and jointly parallels the endeavors of other social groups and currents such as the religious, national or civil-rights movements of the Intelligentsia and of religious communities, women and non-Russian nationalities. Although the backing and the stability of such organizational attempts must be regarded as rather insignificant, the efforts aimed at establishment of trade union associations reflect conflict potentials; they stand for more than merely individual experience.

Secondly: The foundation of the "Free Trade Unions" and SMOT reflects the hope and initiative of individuals who--at least at present--are in the minority; at this time, the authorities can easily deal with these endeavors by declaring them criminal acts. The chances of success of an independent trade union organization will be entirely dependent on the effect that the "democratization of labor" resulting from the modern industrial production process (improvement of skills, autonomy at the work place, increased professional competence) will produce in the large industrial centers, in which direct control can be maintained only with difficulty; in the long run, an independent trade union initiative is likely to succeed only if it can link up to the present forms of passive and diffuse refusal and self-defense.

Thirdly: However much Klebanov and the founders of SMOT may insist that their objectives are of an apolitical nature, under Soviet conditions the foundation of "Free Trade Unions" does represent a political move. "Social questions" are

politicized; the taboo is lifted from the CPSU's (and the official trade unions') claim to exclusive power of representation in the social and political arenas. In view of the specific interrelationship between the political and the economic realms in the Soviet system, restriction to mere "trade unionism" is hardly possible.

#### V. The Soviet Workers and the Worker Opposition from the Viewpoint of the Dissidents

As late as 1976, V. Chalidze discussed the foundation of a trade union in the USSR as a hypothetical possibility. In this connection, he stated: "Such an experiment would be extremely important in regard to the development of a legal framework in society; but the problem is that this necessitates the presence of people who want such a thing; for it goes without saying that this entails the risk of being subjected to illegal reprisals on the part of the authorities."<sup>1</sup>

In many respects, the position of the Soviet dissidents from the camp of the *Intelligentsia* is of great interest: on the one hand, the dissident literature is--now as ever--one of the most important keys for gaining access to Soviet reality; it provides an "inside view" that can hardly be equaled by efforts made on the outside. On the other hand, the interrelationship between the two oppositionist movements largely determines their future and even their chances of survival.

#### 1. Observations Regarding the Historical Background of the Relations Between Dissidents and Oppositionist Workers

As has already been pointed out, individual workers participated at an early stage in the emerging civil-rights movement (Marchenko, Galanskov, Borisov and others); but they participated--to put it pointedly--not as workers, but as democratically committed individuals. Thus, first and foremost we are concerned here with the question to what extent worker problems were /thematically/ [word in slantlines printed in italics] present in the dissident and civil-rights movement.

It appears that a remarkable development has taken place here: simplifying matters, one could distinguish between three phases: the first phase comprises the beginning of the "liberalization" of the late 1950's and early 1960's. During this period, a number of joint actions were undertaken by workers and intellectuals, above all young workers and students; this phase was marked by the destalinization debate and by the discussions--characteristic of that period--concerning "true and false socialism." Frequently, the Party or the Komsomol had knowledge of such initiatives. Apparently, at that time there were many such "truly Leninist" groups and circles, whose orientation was not toward general opposition, but toward reckoning with the Stalinist past and regeneration of socialist theory;<sup>2</sup> accordingly, their mottoes were: "Back to the True Marx" and "Back to True Leninism." Thus K. Lyubarski tells about the "Saratov-Ryazan' Group" and the "Independent Youth League," which was headed by V. Borisov and which was largely made up of young workers.<sup>3</sup> P. Grigorenko, too, reportedly founded--as late as the fall of 1963--a "Union for the Struggle for Restoration of Leninism," whose activities included discussion of Lenin's "State and Revolution" and circulation of leaflets concerning the events in Tbilisi, Novochoerkassk and Temir-Tau.<sup>4</sup> The speeches delivered at A. Kosterin's funeral<sup>5</sup> and Yuriy Galanskov's poem "Workers of the World Unite, Do

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Not Let Me Kill"<sup>6</sup> still echo this "back to Marx" orientation. For various reasons that cannot be discussed here, the phase of a reform movement inspired by a kind of Neo-Marxism came to an end toward the middle of the 1960's;<sup>7</sup> in consequence of the failure of a reform movement that had largely been oriented toward regeneration of socialism, all those initiatives and discussions that had been concerned with the development of the workers' movement disappeared.

The second phase could be said to have begun with the trial of Yu. Daniel' and A. Sinyavskiy in 1966; this period is characterized by the emergence of the democratic human- and civil-rights movement, which focused on the defense of the individual person, irrespective of social status or origin; this movement was primarily and almost exclusively concerned with advocacy of the general human and civil rights, not with representation of specific social concerns and interests; its unity was based on this objective, rather than on an ideological position jointly held or even obligatory for all participants. For the most part, this movement has been supported by members of the Intelligentsia; all the persecution measures notwithstanding, it is now consolidated to such an extent that it can demonstrate its presence: it has practically become an integral part of the intellectual milieu within the Intelligentsia. The key concepts, around which it crystallized, were: freedom of opinion and information, freedom of the press and freedom of religion--demands that brought together representatives of very different camps; most likely, this accounts for the depth and strength of the movement. At that time, the movement subjected itself--explicitly or implicitly--to certain restrictions that prohibited extension of the program catalogue. Thus L. Plyushch reports in his memoirs that on various occasions he had tried to circulate in the Moscow Samizdat network documents concerning worker unrest in Ukrainian cities; he had personally transmitted several accounts, publication of which was refused, however, on the grounds that "this is politics and we are not concerned with politics." Plyushch criticizes the dissidents' underestimation of the significance of the right to strike and he brands the individualism, anarchism and abstract character of the intellectual opposition.<sup>8</sup> (Apparently a similar situation prevails in regard to the Russian civil righters' long-standing reserve vis-a-vis the nationality question, i.e. the problem whether or not the national republics' right to national independence should be included in the civil-rights catalogue.

A. Amal'rik's account probably is typical of the doubts harbored by the Intelligentsia vis-a-vis the workers: fear and skepticism vis-a-vis uncontrollable eruptions of the people combine with the realization that a strike could be more threatening to the system than a protest by intellectuals.<sup>9</sup> Quite remarkable in this regard is a comment made by A. Sakharov shortly after Klebanov's appearance before the Western press. Sakharov stated he had not supported Klebanov, because at that time others would not have understood such a move and because he had distrusted Klebanov's commitment to individual liberties.<sup>10</sup>

Already at this time (December 1977), however, one can detect a kind of reorientation of the dissidents in regard to the socioeconomic problems of the "ordinary people." For this reason, we put the onset of the third phase at the beginning of the 1970's. This phase is characterized by concern for the economic and socio-political problems of the workers, pensioners and kolkhoz farmers and by conscious reflection on the interconnection between the struggle for universal human rights and the struggle for social and economic improvement. Thus, in 1978 and 1979 one notes an increased incidence of documents on these subjects, published above all by the

Helsinki groups. Within a single year, the following documents were published: on 20 January 1979, a statement concerning the persecution of persons aiming to establish independent trade unions;<sup>11</sup> a statement--dated 23 February 1978 [sic!]<sup>12</sup>--in regard to problems concerning social insurance and pensions; a document--dated 21 April 1979--criticizing the violation of socioeconomic rights;<sup>13</sup> a report--published on 22 April 1979--on the abuse of labor laws;<sup>14</sup> extensive information--dated 8 July 1979--on political trials of workers.<sup>15</sup>

In the last 2 years, there have been more and more instances of intervention by prominent figures of the human-rights movement on behalf of persecuted workers. A. Sakharov's report concerning the conviction of M. Kukobaka<sup>16</sup> or V. Nekipelov's intervention on behalf of E. Buzinnikov<sup>17</sup> are good examples of this trend. In regard to the case of M. Kukobaka, V. Nekipelov points to an aspect he considers especially remarkable: "Whereas formerly the moral movement for the defense of human rights in our country, for the liberation of both soul and thought from the mental tyranny of the state and its ideology was based on the fundamental self-image of the Intelligentsia, it now begins to expand, gradually embracing all strata of our society."<sup>18</sup>

A passage from a comment of the Moscow Helsinki group on the conviction of L. Volokhonskiy, one of the founders of SMOT, probably can be considered typical of the new point of view adopted in the last few years; this passage contains the following statement: "The lack of basic human rights and liberties is inseparably linked with socioeconomic injustice. The labor rights, the socioeconomic rights and social justice can be implemented only in the presence of worker associations that--free and independent of the state and the ruling party--can fight for the enforcement of these rights."<sup>19</sup>

In the following, we will present the views--selected on the basis of certain criteria--of a number of dissidents.

## 2. Views of Dissidents Concerning the Role of the Working Class in the Soviet Union

The dissidents' discussions concerning the present role of the working class in the USSR can be said to be based on the statement of the problem that A. Amal'rik formulated as early as 1966: "Is it not conceivable after all that the Democratic Movement receives greater support by the people?"<sup>20</sup>

The following comments were selected on the basis of the following questions: In the view of Soviet dissidents, what are the historical roots of the workers' present situation and what role should the working class play today? How did the dissidents react to the establishment of the "Free Trade Unions" and how do they view the future contacts between dissidents and oppositionist workers? It goes without saying that in the present framework we can present no more than a brief outline.

### a) The Historical Context

L. Plyushch attributes the pronounced difficulties affecting the collaboration between workers and members of the oppositionist Intelligentsia to the fact that the USSR lacks a workers' movement; he feels that this is also what constitutes

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the fundamental difference between the situation in Poland and that in the USSR. According to Plyushch, the principal cause underlying this situation is the smashing of the workers' movement by Stalinism.<sup>21</sup> B. Vayl' likewise emphasizes this aspect--namely that in the Soviet Union there is no continuous workers' movement tradition: "After the revolution, the traditions of the Russian workers' movement died out; generations of people grew up who had never experienced political discussions and who no longer talked about strikes and demonstrations."<sup>22</sup>

A. Solzhenitsyn attached extraordinary importance to the worker revolts of the USSR's recent past, considering them in the context of his country's history: "Without exaggeration, one can say that here (in Novochoerkassk--the author) an important beginning was made in regard to recent Russian history. Aside from the great strike of the Ivanovo textile workers at the beginning of the 1930's (which ended peacefully), Novochoerkassk represents the first action in 41 years (after Kronstadt and Tambov) which originated among the people and which was not prepared, controlled or planned by anybody--an emotional outcry signaling that things cannot go on like this."<sup>23</sup>

In the speech he delivered before the American Trade Union Congress, A. Solzhenitsyn also stated that A. Shlyapnikov rather than Lenin should be considered the key figure in regard to the tradition of the Russian workers' movement.<sup>24</sup> Most of the comments made hardly touch upon the question to what extent the "lack of tradition" criticized could possibly be related to the very belated formation of the modern Russian working class in the course of the industrialization of the 1930's and 1940's.

b) Observations on the Integration of the Workers into the System

B. Vayl' took a skeptical view in regard to independent action on the part of the workers:

"In the plants, there is no organized opposition whatsoever, even though among the workers and farmers there is undoubtedly oppositionist potential. But the indignation of the people is sublimated; at present, it is being sublimated by nostalgia for Stalin. This indignation is also sublimated through alcoholism, the materialized religion of our time. Even though the possibility of spontaneous action on the part of the workers cannot be ruled out, I cannot share the optimism shown by some of my compatriots, who claim that the workers are the most progressive class of our Soviet society. One should not pass off wishful thinking as reality: for all its indignation, the working class is integrated into the system."<sup>25</sup>

B. Vayl' points out other stability-promoting factors: the workers' hope of seeing the USSR develop into a consumer-oriented society; the extensive means of control at the disposal of the apparatus; the Western countries' technological assistance, which helps to eliminate critical deficiencies, and certain opportunities for evasion such as illicit work, theft of plant property, etc., which make life more tolerable. According to Vayl', the saying "Don't run your head against the wall" aptly describes the attitude prevailing among Soviet workers.<sup>26</sup>

V. Nechayev likewise mentions alcoholism and lack of interest in the production process as forms of compensation for social dissatisfaction.<sup>27</sup>

Vl. Bukovskiy points out that the isolation of the Soviet workers and Soviet society from the social reality of Western advanced countries is a factor conducive to insuring stability:

"Upon reading in the Soviet press the many accurate reports on the strikes in the West, many Soviet workers seriously believe that they (the workers in the West--the author) are close to starvation. In the Soviet Union, only someone threatened by starvation would resort to a desperate act such as a strike. The infrequent, desperate strikes in the Soviet Union are not staged for the purpose of obtaining better working conditions or higher wages; they take place only if the workers and their families do not have any food."<sup>28</sup>

Almost all of the comments by dissidents point to the fact that the Soviet constitution does not include the right to strike and that the proscription and suppression of strikes is one of the principal reasons underlying the "quiet restraint" of the Soviet workers. In this connection, the dissidents also mention the role of the Soviet trade unions. According to A. Solzhenitsyn, "Even the smallest strike for higher wages or better living conditions is regarded as counterrevolution."<sup>29</sup> In the view of Vl. Bukovskiy, the Soviet trade unions serve "to prevent the emergence of a workers' movement.... Any complaint by workers is considered an attack on the working masses."<sup>30</sup> In his study on the legal situation of the Soviet worker, V. Chalidze advances the thesis that development of democratic traditions in the working class can result only from "a collective experience accumulating over an extended period."<sup>31</sup> A. Zinov'yev pointedly emphasizes the Soviet worker's total integration into the collectivist social structure: on account of the high degree of institutionalized self-regulation of social conduct by the collective, even striking workers freely accept the punitive measures taken against them. According to Zinov'yev, workers are not "relevant individuals"; rather, they represent the type of the manipulated and manipulable mass man: "Above all, we must introduce the concept of the relevant individual. I cannot precisely define it; I can only illustrate it by examples: A short time ago, the workers of a Moscow plant organized a strike of sorts. Naturally, this is a very serious act. But these workers are not individuals who have to be taken seriously (i.e. individuals who are socially relevant). On the other hand, take a person such as Kapitsa, who has never been politically active; but he is socially relevant."<sup>32</sup>

Thus we can identify the following factors of integration (whose relative weight differs, of course, depending on the observer naming them): the workers' hope of attaining a higher standard of living; the various forms of sublimation and compensation of dissatisfaction; the Soviet workers' inability to compare their way of life with that of the Western countries; the atomization of the individual worker by the state's control apparatus. Views that consider coercion a crucial factor in regard to stabilization and integration (Solzhenitsyn) contrast with views that regard stability and integration as consequences of a collectivist way of life (Zinov'yev). However, among all the assessments made the prevailing view is that the workers are more or less integrated into the system and that there is no reason to expect the emergence of an autonomous workers' movement in the USSR.

c) Responses to the Foundation of Independent Trade Union Associations

Even though B. Vayl' warns against overestimating the conflict and protest potential in the Soviet working class, he holds that the establishment of the "Free



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Trade Unions" marks the beginning of a workers' movement in the USSR.<sup>33</sup> K. Lyubarski points out that the foundation of the "Free Trade Unions" was "enthusiastically" welcomed in dissident circles; he summarizes his assessment of this move as follows:

"The significance of these first attempts should not be overrated. The membership list of this trade union--comprising 43 members and over 100 candidates--appears to be somewhat inflated. The by-laws reveal the legal inexperience of the founders. In view of the fact that the members of the trade union are dispersed across the entire country and that at the time the union was founded all of them were already unemployed, the trade union does not appear to have much of a chance of success. However, the sharp reaction of the authorities indicates...that the move touched a sensitive spot."<sup>34</sup>

In this assessment, too, the prevalent note is a cautioning against overestimation of the founding initiatives. That the Russian--or Soviet--emigres attach great importance to the appearance of oppositionist workers is evident from the marked increase in the number of publications on this subject.<sup>35</sup>

d) Observations Regarding the Interconnection Between the Struggle for Universal Human Rights and the Struggle for Socioeconomic Rights

As a rule, all of the dissidents proceed from the assumption of a perceptible distance between the workers and the dissident movement; but this distance is not regarded as unbridgeable. Rather, the emphasis is on the close contacts and common objectives of the two camps, and the discussions focus on the unifying elements. In very clear terms, L. Plyushch comments on the significance of the right to strike: "To withhold the right to strike--which presently is the case--means to deprive the working class of an important weapon. The right to strike is a kind of guarantee for all other rights. In the Soviet constitution, the right to strike--in contrast to other rights--is not included. As long as we do not have the right to strike, all other rights will remain suspended."<sup>36</sup>

VI. Bukovskiy likewise draws attention to the--in his view infrangible--interconnection between the two rights or currents: "In socialist countries, a special situation prevails in that the problem of work cannot be separated from the problem of civil rights. The arrest of the individuals attending the meetings of the Helsinki groups of Moscow and the Ukraine...is a blow to the emerging workers' movement."<sup>37</sup>

The discussion concerning the interrelationship between the representation of social interests and the struggle for enforcement of democratic rights is likely to be of crucial importance, since this discussion will inevitably broach the official version regarding the priority of the socioeconomic rights (right to work, right to health care, right to education, etc.) over the so-called "formal" rights, which are disparaged as an expression of a bourgeois approach to democracy. In various documents, the Moscow Helsinki Group not only demonstrated that implementation of the "social rights" has not made much headway (it adduced numerous examples of violation of the right to work and examples concerning the frequently inferior quality of medical care, and it pointed out that a sizable percentage of the Soviet population is barely able to make a living<sup>38</sup>); the group also emphasized that effective advocacy of the implementation of social rights will be feasible only if

formal guarantees, i.e. universal human rights (such as freedom of opinion, freedom of the press and the right of association) are respected. Thus Document No 94 of the Moscow Helsinki Group states: "The lack of basic human rights and liberties is inseparably linked with the socioeconomic injustice. Socioeconomic rights, labor rights and social justice can be implemented only in the presence of worker associations that fight for these rights--associations that are independent of the ruling party and the state."<sup>39</sup>

▲ In view of the number of documents (which has been increasing since 1977) calling for solidarity with persecuted workers, one can safely say that both the personal and the issue-oriented contacts between dissidents and workers have been growing increasingly close. Finally, one should mention a special category of documents, namely those in which dissidents address the workers and worker organization in the Western countries, calling up the traditional spirit of worker solidarity. This category includes V. Nekipelov's letter--concerning E. Buzinnikov--to the "workers of the IG-Farben Chemical Concern,"<sup>40</sup> various appeals to the American trade union movement,<sup>41</sup> and the appeal--dated 7 April 1977--by 85 Soviet citizens to the workers of the Renault Automobile Works, urging them to work for the release of political prisoners in the USSR.<sup>42</sup>

### 3. Extension of Social Latitude--the Connecting Link Between Intellectuals and Workers?

As regards elements held in common by uniting the dissidents and the oppositionist workers, one cannot name any specific ideology or any specific interest based on affiliation with a social class or occupational group. A specific ideology must be ruled out as a unifying link, not only because the forces aspiring to independence from the ruling power and ideology actually define themselves as apolitical and nonideological, but also because in regard to the divergent groups, factions and individuals that came to the fore during this period of social awakening, a homogeneous ideology is absolutely inconceivable. The second element--a specific social interest--probably must be ruled out, because the points of conflict are not class-specific in nature. Obviously, the main source of conflict is the fact that free and independent movement of social forces is incompatible with the restrictive political framework of Soviet society; it appears that repression alone has a unifying effect on heterogeneous social forces. The desire to effect the transition from "dispositional" to "transactional" conditions (Konrad/Szelenyi) could provide a concrete foundation for similarly directed activities. To be sure, there are still quite a few obstacles in this regard: the monistic and controlled Soviet public, the concrete segmentation of the social groups, the sociopsychological limitations, etc. It can be assumed that to a limited extent certain instances of individual and organized resistance have become known to larger segments of the population and that these cells of resistance are a factor conducive to changes in the intellectual and cultural atmosphere--even though at present they are no more than marginal countercultures. To the dissidents, the appearance of "real workers" within a system that keeps referring to "the historical interests of the working class" is of great significance, for the working class has always been presented to them as "healthy," "disciplined," etc. However, the above-described tendency toward integration of two different oppositionist forces is not identical with consolidated forms of cooperation or even a practical alliance: at present, the social, educational and interest-related barriers--but also the barriers in regard to communication--are still too high.<sup>43</sup>

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The observation made by the Moscow Helsinki Group--namely that any action on behalf of social and economic concerns will be impossible or endangered as long as the interests and requirements of the people concerned cannot be articulated or even defined--is as valid as the observation that in the long run the civil-rights movement will be supported by the society only if it includes in its program the concrete problems of everyday life--food supply, housing conditions, working conditions, etc. Conversely, the experience of the trade union founders shows that representation of social interests is largely dependent on the development of collective forms of representation and resistance, while on their part such forms can exist only in the presence of greater latitude in the legal realm. Thus now as before, effective representation of economic and social interests presupposes implementation of the objectives of the human- and civil-rights movement.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Accounts of Klebanov's press conference in: FINANCIAL TIMES, 8 Dec 77; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 Dec 77; THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 Dec 77; MATERIALY SAMIZDATA, ARKHIV SAMIZDATA/RADIO SVOBODA, Vypusk No 13/78, AS No 3192 (quoted in the following as AS followed by the respective number).
2. AS No 3193, pp 31-32.
3. AS No 3194, pp 2-3.
4. AS No 3513 and AS No 3514.
5. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 30 Aug 80; RUSSKAYA MYSL', 11 Sep 80, 18 Sep 80.
6. See Sibylle Plogstedt, "Arbeitskaempfe in der sowjetischen Industrie (1917-1933)" [Labor Struggles in Soviet Industry, 1917-1933], Frankfurt, New York, 1980, pp 43-59.
7. Sacha Blumkine in: Olga Semyonova; Victor Haynes, "Syndicalisme et libertés en Union soviétique" [Trade Unionism and Liberties in the Soviet Union], Paris, 1979, p 10.
8. Alex Pravda, "Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union," in: Arcadius Kahn; Blair A. Ruble, eds., "Industrial Labor in the USSR," Special Study of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies No 1, New York, 1979, p 356.
9. Regarding this point of view, see W. D. Connor, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Vol 29, No 1, 1980; Arnold Schwendtko, ed., "Arbeiteropposition in der Sowjetunion, Die Anfaenge autonomer Gewerkschaften, Dokumente und Analysen" [Worker Opposition in the Soviet Union--The Beginnings of Autonomous Trade Unions--Documents and Analyses], Reinbek, 1980, p 8.

10. Cronis Lubarsky, "Social Basis and Scope of the Soviet Dissident Movement," BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN, No 9, 1979, p 20.
11. See Wolfgang Leonhard, in: DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT, 31 Aug 80.
12. Arcadius Kahan, op. cit., p. IX.
13. Robert Conquest, "Industrial Workers in the USSR," New York, 1967, p 7.
14. David Lane; Felicity O'Dell, "The Soviet Industrial Worker--Social Class, Education and Control," Oxford, 1978, p 2.
15. See Walter D. Connor, "Workers, Politics and Class Consciousness," in: A. Kahan; B. A. Ruble, eds., "Industrial Labor in the USSR," p 313; see also the case of the Estonian sociologist Yulo Vooglayd, in: Mark Popovski, "Upravlyaemaya Nauka" [Controlled Science], London, 1978, pp 121-131.
16. Vadim Belotserkovsky, "Workers' Struggles in the USSR in the Early Sixties," CRITIQUE, No 10/11, Glasgow, p 48.
17. Regarding the development of Soviet theoretical positions, see the omnibus volume: Murray Yanowitch; Wesley A. Fisher, eds., "Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR," New York, 1973; Murray Yanowitch, "Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union," New York, 1977, esp. Chapter I ("Soviet Conceptions of Social Structure"); Wolfgang Teckenberg, "Die soziale Struktur der sowjetischen Arbeiterklasse im internationalen Vergleich" [The Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class in Comparison with Other Countries], Munich, 1977, esp. pp 27-39.
18. Regarding attempts of viewing Soviet history in terms of a class struggle, see Charles Bettelheim, "Les Luttes de Classes en URSS" [Class Conflicts in the USSR], Paris, 1974 (Vol 1) and 1977 (Vol 2).
19. See Stephen White, "Political Culture and Soviet Politics, London," 1979, p 4.
20. See Helmut Fleischer, "Exactly Why Materialism?" esp. the section "On the Reorganization of the Concepts of Materialist Analysis of Concrete Conditions," in: Urs Jaeggi; Axel Honneth, "Theorien des Historischen Materialismus," Frankfurt, 1977, p 193; Aleksandr Zinov'ev, "Bez Illyuziy" [Without Illusions], Lausanne, 1979, esp. pp 45 ff.
21. As regards the class concept, see David Lane, "Marxist Class Conflict Analyses of State Socialist Society," in: Richard Scase, ed., "Industrial Society, Class, Cleavage and Control," London, 1978, pp 173-189; Hansgeorg Conert; Wolfgang Eichwede, "Produktionsverhaeltnis und Arbeiterklasse in der UdSSR" [Production Relations and the Working Class in the USSR], Hannover, 1976, pp 82 ff.
22. See A. Kahan, op. cit., p 305.

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23. S. Plogstedt likewise does not sufficiently stress this important distinction; see S. Plogstedt, op. cit., p 9.
24. A phenomenology of the "new Ouvrierism" is presented in: Gyoergy Konrad; Ivan Szelenyi, "Die Intelligenz auf dem Weg zur Klassenmacht" [The Intelligentsia on the Road Toward Class Power], Frankfurt, 1978, esp. pp 336 ff.
25. The interconnection between the social and the national question is broached in the letter written by Ukrainian Communists in December 1964; see "Natsional'nyy vopros v SSSR, Dokumenty" [The National Question in the USSR--Documents], no pl., 1975, pp 133-141.

## Chapter II

1. The biographical data are compiled from: Olga Semyonova; Victor Haynes, "Workers Against the Gulag--The New Opposition in the Soviet Union," London, 1979, pp 38-45 (the English version of this is almost identical with the French version--see footnote I, 7); see also AS No 3191, 3193 and 4130.
2. Statement made by L. Volokhonskiy during the trial, AS No 3720, p 6. Unfortunately, an important document could not be taken into consideration by the present study: Gleb Vysotin; Valentin Sereda, "Vchera, segodnya i zavtra nezavisimogo profsoyuza--Kriticheskie zametki po povodu zhelaemogo i deystvitel'nogo v 'massovom rabochem dvizhenii v SSSR'" [Past, Present and Future of the Independent Trade Union--Critical Observations Concerning Ideal and Reality in the USSR Workers' Movement], May 1980, AS No 4130. In this document, the authors report on an initiative concerning establishment of an independent trade union--after the smashing of the "Free Trade Unions" and prior to the foundation of SMOT. According to the account, in April 1978, V. Kuvakin, Yu. Grimm and A. Ivanchenko submitted a petition to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to the USSR Council of Ministers and to the Central Trade Union Council, requesting permission officially to register their group as "Independent Trade Union of the Working People in the USSR" ["Nezavizimyy profsoyuz trudyashchikhsya SSSR"]; the authorities did not respond, however. It appears that the subsequent discussions concerning establishment of a liberal, trade union-like association led to the foundation of SMOT in October (see AS No 4130, pp 3-5).
3. Biography quoted from O. Semyonova; Victor Haynes, "Workers Against the Gulag," pp 38-45.
4. S. Plogstedt, op. cit., p 86.
5. A. Kahan, op. cit., p 284.
6. S. Plogstedt, op. cit., p 126.
7. See Anne Herbst-Oltmanns, "De-Stalinization--The Individual Again Matters in the Soviet Union," in: R. Medvedev; R. Havemann; J. Steffen et al., "Entstalinisierung--Der XX. Parteitag der KPdSU und seine Folger" [De-Stalinization--The 20th CPSU Party Congress and Its Consequences], Frankfurt, 1977, pp 50-65.

8. See Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Der Archipel GULAG" [The GULAG Archipelago], Vol 3, Reinbek, 1978, pp 235-311; Posev, 10 Apr 60.
9. A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., p 92.
10. Posev, 3 Apr 60.
11. Posev, 10 Apr 60; Isay Averbukh, quoted from A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., pp 92-94; V. Belotserkovsky, op. cit., pp 38-40.
12. A. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p 512; V. Belotserkovsky, op. cit., pp 38-41.
13. Posev, 12 Oct 62.
14. M. Holubenko, "The Soviet Working Class: Discontent and Opposition," CRITIQUE, No 4, Glasgow, 1975, p 12.
15. M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 11; RUSSKAYA MYSL', 26 Oct 62.
16. V. Belotserkovsky, op. cit., p 42.
17. Posev, 15 Jul 62.
18. Andrey Amalrik, "Kann die Sowjetunion das Jahr 1984 erleben? Ein Essay" [Will the Soviet Union Live To See the Year 1984?--An Essay], Zurich, 1970, p 40.
19. Valentin Ivanov, interviewed by V. Belotserkovsky, reprinted in: O. Semyonova; V. Haynes, "Syndicalisme...", op. cit., p 190.
20. AS No 3046.
21. See A. Solzhenitsyn, "Archipel GULAG," Vol 3, pp 505-511; A. Broiter, "When the Kettle Boils Over," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, no 1, 1964, pp 33-43; John Kolasky, quoted from M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 13; V. Belotserkovsky, CRITIQUE, No 10/11, pp 44-46; Yevgeniy Yelin, quoted from A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., pp 94-104.
22. Posev, 15 Jul 62.
23. REUTERS, Vienna, 18 Jul 63; RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 6 Jul 63.
24. Posev, 31 Jan 64.
25. V. Belotserkovsky, CRITIQUE, No 10/11, pp 46-47.
26. Posev, 15 Apr 62; V. Belotserkovsky, op. cit., pp 42-44.
27. E. Kushev, quoted from A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., pp 105-106.
28. E. Kushev, *ibid.*

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29. M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 14.
30. Leonid Pliouchtch, Memoires, "Dans le carnaval de l'Histoire" [In the Carnival of History], Paris, 1977, pp 155-156.
31. L. Pliouchtch, op. cit., p 211; see also AS No 394.
32. AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS, Vol 34, Sep 1979, p 13.
33. Posev, Oct 1973, p 33; Ari Werner, quoted in A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., pp 106-108.
34. Posev, Jul 1974; M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 16.
35. M. Holubenko, ibid.
36. AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS, Sep 1979, p 13.
37. M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 15.
38. M. Holubenko, ibid.; see also V. Belotserkovsky, CRITIQUE, No 10/11, pp 41-42 (here the date differs from that given by Holubenko).
39. AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS, Sep 1979, p 13.
40. Posev, Oct 1973, p 32.
41. Posev, Oct 1973, p 33.
42. M. Holubenko, op. city., p 9; SUCHASNIST', No 12, 1973, p 119.
43. SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 16 Aug 75, quoted in RADIO LIBERTY RESEARCH, No 427, 1975 (RLR).
44. AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS, Aug 1977, p 10.
45. Account in the Lithuanian Samizdat journal AUSHRA, March 1978, quoted in A. Schwendtke, ed., op. cit., p 109.
46. Posev, Jun 1977, p 28.
47. Account in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 9 Feb 79, quoted in RLR No 59, 1979.
48. AS No 3667.
49. As No 4013; account by Mikhail Zotov, in RUSSKAYA MYSL', 6 Jan 80; Posev, Jan 1980.
50. Posev, Jul 1980, p 6.
51. Ibid.

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52. SMOT, Informatsionnyy byulleten' No 3, in VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 34, p 36.
53. Posev, September 1980, p 15.
54. Report by Vl. Borisov in Posev, September 1980, p 15.
55. Bericht von K. Lyubarskiy in RUSSKAYA MYSL', 6 Nov 80; Posev, November 1980; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 25 Nov 80.
56. A. Pravda, op. cit., pp 348-349.
57. A. Pravda, ibid., p 349.
58. A. Pravda, ibid., p 350; M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 9.
59. Bohdan Kravchenko, "Workers' Unrest in the Soviet Union," in: REVUE DES PAYS DE L'EST, Brussels, No 1, 1978, p 40.
60. M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 14.
61. B. Kravchenko, op. cit., p 14.
62. V. Belotserkovsky, CRITIQUE, No 10/11, pp 48-49.

Chapter III

1. AS No 3680.
2. AS No 3680, p 1.
3. AS No 3680, p 4.
4. AS No 3193, pp 3-10.
5. Svobodnyy profsoyuz trudyashchikhsya, in VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 30, pp 9, 17-18.
6. The replies of the respective authorities can be found in As No 3193, pp 11-19.
7. VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 30, p 21.
8. Ibid., p 36.
9. AS No 3193, p 26.
10. As No 3193, pp 31-32.
11. As No 3193, pp 33-43; AS No 3194, pp 1-22.
12. As No 3194, pp 19-22.
13. Based on AS No 3194, pp 19-22.



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14. Ibid.
15. The names are given in AS No 3193, p 30.
16. See VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 30, pp 80-86.
17. AS No 3194, pp 16-18.
18. O. Semyonova; V. Haynes, "Syndicalisme...", op. cit., pp 90-105.
19. WASHINGTON POST, 27 Jan 78.
20. The most important SMOT texts--with the exception of INFORMATIONS-BULLETIN No 2--are published in: VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 34.
21. Victor Fainberg, "The Free Interprofessional Association of Working People," in: O. Semyonova; V. Haynes, "Syndicalisme...", pp 196-200.
22. AS No 3513, p 1.
23. Ibid., p 2.
24. AS No 3514, pp 1-2.
25. AS No 3720, p 4.
26. VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 34, pp 120-124.
27. AS No 3514, p 1.
28. AS No 3512; VOL'NOE SLOVO, Vypusk 34, pp 5-8.
29. This account is based on AS No 3543 and AS No 3669.
30. See AS No 3720, pp 14 and 16.
31. AS No 3670 and 3681.
32. For a telling passage in the trial record, see AS No 3720, pp 17-18.
33. Posev, October 1980, p 15.
34. AS No 3720, p 33.
35. RUSSKAYA MYSL', 11 Sep 80.
36. RUSSKAYA MYSL', 18 Sep 80.
37. G. Vysotin and V. Sereda likewise base their criticism of SMOT on this aspect (see footnote I, 2). They feel that the common Soviet citizen will never join an organization such as SMOT, because it is too removed from the everyday problems of the "common people" and because it is not controlled by workers (AS No 4130, pp 8-11).

38. These names are given in: Valeriy Chalidze, "Lektsii o pravovom polozenii rabochich v SSSR" [Lectures on the Legal Situation of the Workers in the USSR], New York, 1976, p 7.
39. V. Ivanov's letter, in which he criticized his activities as a dissident and emigre, was published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 80, p 15, under the title "Chto byvayet kogda rubikon pereiden."
40. AS No 3223.
41. A. Marchenko's letter from Chuma can be found in AS No 3197.
42. Information on the proceedings against workers in AS No 3543 and AS No 2755.
43. AS No 2755, pp 2-3; AS No 2837.
44. AS No 2755, pp 3-8.
45. AS No 3197, pp 1-7.
46. AS No 2755, pp 2-3.
47. AS No 2755, pp 3-8.
48. AS No 3197.
49. AS No 3033, pp 1-12, esp. p 5.
50. AS No 3239, p 2.
51. AS No 3474.
52. AS No 2837.
53. AS No 3239.
54. In AS No 4130, G. Vysotin and V. Sereda also comment on the prospects of a future trade union movement; above all, they emphasize that such an organization--which incidentally would have to obtain official recognition--will be viable only if it champions concrete improvements in the workers' everyday life.

#### Chapter IV

1. M. Holubenko: "The threat of working class protest has become a dominant fact in the political life of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p 17.
2. David Lane; Felicity O'Dell, op. cit., Chapter 8.
3. This view is taken by A. Pravda, op. cit., p 334; a different view is advanced by Wolfgang Teckenberg: "Labour Turnover and Job Satisfaction: Indicators of Industrial Conflict in the USSR?" SOVIET STUDIES, Vol 30, No 2, April 1978, pp 193-211.

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4. Thus the economist Z. Pruc, quoted in: Bernd Knabe, "Labor Turnover in the USSR," BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE STUDIEN, No 28, 1976, p 15.
5. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 334.
6. Bernd Knabe, op. cit., p 17.
7. Alex Pravda, op. cit., p 335.
8. Alex Pravda, op. cit., p 336; Bernd Knabe, op. cit., p 20.
9. Bernd Knabe, op. cit., p 34.
10. Alex Pravda, op. cit., p 338.
11. Wolfgang Teckenberg, "Labour Turnover and Job Satisfaction...", p 210.
12. Alex Pravda, op. cit., p 338.
13. Alex Pravda, ibid.
14. D. Lane; F. O'Dell, op. cit., p 73.
15. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 340.
16. A. Pravda, ibid.
17. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 341.
18. V. Chalidze, "Lekcii...", op. cit., p 56.
19. A. Pravda, op. cit.,
20. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 343.
21. A. Pravda, ibid.
22. For the most important sources of conflict, see Mary MacAuley, "Labour Disputes in Soviet Russia 1957-1965," Oxford, 1969, esp. pp 181-193.
23. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 345.
24. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 346.
25. A. Pravda, op. cit., pp 346-347.
26. A. Pravda, op. cit., p 347.
27. Quoted in: Boris Weil, "Alcoholism in the USSR," AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, October 1979, p 10. The following passages are based on this study.

28. Boris Weil, op. cit., p 13.
29. W. D. Connor, "Workers, Politics and Class Consciousness," op. cit., p 324.
30. W. D. Connor, op. cit., p 325.
31. AS No 3671, p 2.
32. V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 63.
33. Hedrick Smith, "Die Russen" [The Russians], Bern, pp 293-294.
34. V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 63.
35. V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 60.
36. Marc Rakovski, "Marxism and the Soviet Societies," in: A. Hegedus, M. Vajda et al., "Die Neue Linke in Ungarn" [The New Left in Hungary], Vol 2, Berlin, 1976, pp 145, 149, 150.
37. Marc Rakovski, ibid.
38. This is pointed out by V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 29.
39. B. Kravchenko, op. cit., p 36; see also M. Holubenko, op. cit., p 7.
40. A. Zinov'ev, "Bez Illyuzii," p 58.
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42. W. Teckenberg, "Labour Turnover....," pp 196-198.
43. D. Lane; F. O'Dell, op. cit., p 26.
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47. Jean-Marie Chauvier, "The 'Power of the Workers'--The Working Class and the Trade Unions in the Soviet Enterprise," in: R. Dutschke; M. Wilke, eds., "Die Sowjetunion, Solschenizyn und die westliche Linke" [The Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn and the Western Left], Reinbek, 1975, p 128.

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48. G. Konrad; I. Szelenyi, op. cit., p 266.
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50. Dimitri Mikheiev, "Que peut-il se passer en URSS? Et comment cela arrivera-t-il?" in: EST & OUEST, No 634, November 1979, p 7; see also A. Zinov'yev, op. cit., p 55.
51. AS No 3714.
52. Omitted.
53. AS No 3714.
54. D. Lane; F. O'Dell, op. cit., pp 32-33.
55. Ibid.
56. V. Chalidza, op. cit., p 51.
57. See Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p 345; B. Kravchenko, op. cit., p 36.
58. Exceptions are mentioned by B. Kravchenko (KOMSSOMOL'SKA A PRAVDA, 5 Sep 72) and M. Holubenko (PRAVDA, 9 Jun 62).
59. D. Lane; F. O'Dell, op. cit., p 56.
60. See Vera S. Dunham, "The Waning Theme of the Worker as Hero in Recent Soviet Literature," in: A. Kahan; B. A. Ruble, eds., "Industrial Labor in the USSR," pp 339-412.
61. Radio Moscow on 9 Sep 77, quoted in RLR No 47, 1978.
62. V. Bukovski, "Wind vor dem Eisgang" [Wind Before the Ice-Drift], Berlin, 1978, p 107.
63. This view is advanced by M. Holubenko and B. Kravchenko in the above-mentioned studies.
64. Hans-Hermann Hoehmann; Gertraud Seidenstecher, "The Soviet Economy 1978/1979--Continuing Productivity Problems," BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS..., No 24, 1979: "Labor and capital, the traditional growth factors, are expanding more and more slowly, and in regard to productivity, a turn for the better in the foreseeable future is unlikely" (op. cit., p 28).
65. "On account of the concentration of the public sector (in optimum redistribution enterprises--the author), the apparatus acquires impressive stability, for this concentration impedes the recognition and elimination of the

long-lived socioeconomic contradictions resulting from the structural changes. Thus, these conflicts--which have not been properly dealt with--intensify and erupt in political explosions" (Konrad/Szelenyi, op. cit., p 260). Regarding the recent Soviet debate concerning the public sector, see A. V. Borcke, "Communication and Control in the Soviet Regime," in: "Sowjetunion 1978/79--Ereignisse, Probleme, Perspektiven" [The Soviet Union 1978/79--Events, Problems, Prospects], Munich/Vienna, 1979, pp 77-85.

66. A. Kahan, op. cit., pp 303-305.
67. W. D. Connor, op. cit., pp 326-329.
68. W. Teckenberg, "Die soziale Struktur der sowjetischen Arbeiterklasse...", op. cit., Munich, 1977, p 190.

#### Chapter V

1. V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 50.
2. See Boris Lewytzkyi, "Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion, 1960-1972" [Political Opposition in the Soviet Union, 1960-1972], Munich, 1972, esp. pp 57-67.
3. C. Lubarsky, "Soziale Basis...", pp 21, 24.
4. G. Saunders, "Samizdat, Voices of the Soviet Opposition," New York, 1974, p 256.
5. G. Saunders, op. cit., pp 281 ff.
6. Abraham Brumberg, ed., "In Quest of Justice, Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today," London, 1970, pp 444-446.
7. An interesting interpretation of the crisis of (Marxist) revisionism is advanced by Konrad/Szelenyi, op. cit., pp 371 ff.
8. L. Pliouchtch, op. cit., pp 296-297.
9. A. Amalrik, op. cit., p 20.
10. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 Dec 77.
11. AS No 3543.
12. AS No 3255.
13. AS No 3671.
14. AS No 3370.
15. AS No 3690.

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16. AS No 3688.
17. AS No 3393.
18. AS No 3689, p 8.
19. AS No 3687.
20. A. Amalrik, op. cit., p 38.
21. Quoted in: Bettelheim, Meszaros, Rossanda et al., "Aurueckforderung der Zukunft--Macht und Opposition in den nachrevolutionaeren Gesellschaften" [Reclamation of the Future--Power and Opposition in the Postrevolutionary Societies], Frankfurt, 1979, p 54.
22. Interview with Boris Weil in: INFO DES SOZIALISTISCHEN OSTEUROPA-KOMITES, No 35, June 1979, p 6.
23. A. Solzhenitsyn, "Archipel GULAG," Vol 3, p 505.
24. The speech is reprinted in: AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, July-August 1975, p 4 ff.
25. B. Weil, in: INFO DES SOZIALISTISCHEN OSTEUROPA-KOMITES, No 35, p 6.
26. Ibid.
27. V. Nechayev, in: INFO DES SOZIALISTISCHEN OSTEUROPA-KOMITES, No 37, October 1979, p 28.
28. V. Bukowski's is reprinted in: FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, April 1977.
29. A. Solzhenitsyn, AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, July-August 1975.
30. V. Bukowski, AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, April 1977.
31. V. Chalidze, op. cit., p 55.
32. Alexander Sinovyev, "Lichte Zukunft" [Light Future], Zurich, 1979, p 321.
33. B. Weil, "A propos de la classe ouvriere sovietique," in: "Syndicalisme et libertes...", pp 171-177.
34. C. Lubarsky, "Soziale Basis...", p 19.
35. See the hitherto-published issues of the journal L'ALTERNATIVE, POUR LES DROITS ET LES LIBERTES DEMOCRATIQUES EN EUROPE DE L'EST, Paris, 1979.
36. L. Pliouchtch, quoted from: Bettelheim, Meszaros, Rossanda et al., p 60.
37. AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, April 1977.
38. AS No 3255.

39. AS No 3687.
40. AS No 3393.
41. E.g. the appeal in AFL-CIO FREIGEWERKSCHAFTLICHE NACHRICHTEN, July 1973, p 6.
42. AS No 3051, pp 72-74.
43. In view of this great distance, Peter Huebner holds that the disparities between the dissidents and the common people can be bridged only under exceptional circumstances. "The events in other East European countries (Poland, CSSR, Hungary, GDR, Romania) have shown that the interests of the workers and of the critical Intelligentsia coincided only during national crises, on a higher--i.e. the national--level, and that such coincidence was short-lived. In the USSR, such a coincidence of interests appears to exist--in some degree--in some of the non-Russian nationalities (Lithuania, Ukraine)." SOWJETUNION, 1978/79, p 116.

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REGIONAL

HIGH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES AZERBAIJAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PLANNING

Baku NARODNOYE KHOZYAYSTVO AZERBAYDZHANA in Russian No 3, Mar 81 pp 1-9

Article by Deputy Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Gosplan S. K. Abbasaliyev: "Urgent Problems of National Economic Planning at the Present Stage"

Text Our country is marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of Gosplan and planning organs at a memorable time. This anniversary coincided with the time of the holding of the historic 26th party congress, which established the great tasks of the building of communism at the present stage.

The program of socio-economic development, which was outlined by the congress in conformity with the economic strategy of the party, was established with allowance made for the more complete utilization of the created economic, scientific and technical potential. This places upon planning organs greater responsibility in the matters of seeking and utilizing the deep-seated reserves of the effective increase of social production.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan face the republic Gosplan and its organs locally with the task of the skillful bringing into play of the available potentials of economic growth and the increase of the efficiency and quality of work in the interests of the further increase of the well-being of the workers.

The far-reaching gains in economic and social development, which have been made by the Soviet people, are connected to a decisive extent with the consistent implementation of Lenin's ideas of socialist planning. The planned management of the national economy of the country, which has been carried out for 60 years, has made it possible to ensure the unprecedented growth of productive forces and on this basis to achieve a sharp increase of the level of well-being of the people. In ascending the steps of the five-year plans, our country is steadily moving toward the heights of communism and is becoming more and more powerful and more beautiful.

The Azerbaijan SSR as a component of the national economic complex of the country has covered the same path of development and has gone through the same stages of planning.

With the triumph of Soviet power in April 1920 a new stage in the creation of the foundations of socialist planning began in Azerbaijan.

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The Supreme Economic Council attached to the republic Council of People's Commissars, which played an important role in the organization of the foundations of centralized planned management, was formed in 1921. On 19 October 1921 a general planning commission was organized within the Supreme Economic Council attached to the Azerbaijan SSR Council of People's Commissars. During those years the feasibility of utilizing the water power resources of the Kura and Araks Rivers was substantiated, the prospects of the development of a number of sectors of industry and agriculture, particularly with respect to the petroleum industry, cotton growing, irrigation and cultural construction, were determined, which helped in a short time not only to restore, but also to transform the former remote colonial part of tsarist Russia into one of the flourishing republics of our country.

Especially great gains were made during the 1970's. Soviet Azerbaijan today is a republic of powerful industry, multisectorial highly mechanized agriculture, developed science and great culture. During the years of Soviet power the output of industrial products has increased 156-fold. The electric power stations of the republic now generate sevenfold more power than was generated in all of tsarist Russia. The output of agricultural products has increased by more than 7-fold as compared with the prerevolutionary level, while the output of the products of plant growing has increased nearly 10-fold. The yield of cereals in 60 years increased by 3.5-fold, while the yield of cotton increased more than 8-fold. The area, to which everything except petroleum was delivered prior to the establishment of Soviet power, today ships more than 350 types of its own industrial products to 65 countries of the world.

As a result of much political and organizing work of the party organization of the republic, Soviet Azerbaijan has made a worthy contribution to the implementation of the policy of the party, which was outlined at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses. During the past decade the amount of produced national income of the republic has increased 2.14-fold, the volume of industrial output--2.2-fold, the gross output of agriculture--nearly 2-fold. In all 15.6 billion rubles were channelled into the national economy of the republic, which is 1.8-fold more than during the preceding decade. The efficiency of social production increased considerably. The productivity of national labor increased 1.6-fold, in industry--1.7-fold, the efficiency of fixed production capital increased. During the 10th Five-Year Plan the proportion of the output of the highest quality category in the total amount of the gross output of industry increased from 1.3 to 16.1 percent. The accelerated, dynamic growth of social production was accompanied by a considerable increase in the level of the well-being of the people.

As a whole the gains made in the 1970's ensured a substantial increase of the proportion of the Azerbaijan SSR in the unified national economic complex of the country. As Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Comrade G. A. Aliyev noted in the Accountability Report to the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, "In scale and completeness, in the nature of the changes in the structure of industry and the entire economy, the 10th Five-Year Plan is the best in the creative chronicle of Azerbaijan. It was truly a five-year plan of efficiency and quality." All these achievements convincingly demonstrate the advantages of the socialist planning system and are a result of the scientifically sound economic policy of the party.

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New, more difficult tasks of enlarging the scale of production and accelerating the rate of economic and social development face the country during the 1980's and the 11th Five-Year Plan.

In the Accountability Report of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the 26th CPSU Congress, on the basis of the thorough and comprehensive analysis of the factors of the economic growth of the country a detailed program of the further growth of the economy is given and the main directions of socio-economic progress and the specific means of implementing them are specified.

The accomplishment of the new, more difficult tasks is connected, first of all, with the need for the further improvement of the system of planning and the mechanism of management.

For our country the 1980's will be characterized by a number of features, which should be taken into account when determining the immediate problems which require solution.

In contrast to the demographic situation which has formed throughout the country, in the Azerbaijan SSR favorable circumstances with manpower resources have formed. Estimates show that in the 1980's in the all-union increase of manpower resources the share of Azerbaijan will be nearly sixfold greater as against its proportion in the total size of the population of the country. In the future Azerbaijan should specialize, among the few southern republics, in labor-intensive works, which is in full accord with all-union interests.

In spite of the stabilizing tendency of convergence of the levels of the development of production between the republic and average union indicators, the gap is still significant and is on the average 20-25 percent. One of the tasks of the next decade is to reduce the existing differences to a minimum.

The interests of the increase of the efficiency of social production and the orientation of the economy of the republic toward the increase of the standard of living of the people, which ensue from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, require the gradual solution of a number of most important problems, to which, first of all, there can be assigned:

the further improvement of the national economic proportions and the structure of industry, which is connected with the increase of the industrial potential, the assurance of the more complete utilization of mineral raw material and natural resources with their working into final products; the elimination of the disproportions between the volume of output of agricultural products and the capacities for their processing; between the production of consumer goods and the meeting of consumer demand;

the intensification of production by the acceleration of retooling, the introduction of the achievements of science, the more complete utilization of fixed capital and the increase of product quality, which ensure a high growth rate of labor productivity and the efficiency of social production;

the creation of a firmly balanced republic food complex, without relaxing the attention and efforts toward the development of the sectors of all-union specialization;

the active influencing of the factors, which characterize the increase of the standard of living of the workers, the gradual convergence of the used and produced national income by the accelerated development of the sectors of the social infrastructure and the better utilization of public consumption funds;

the assurance of the preferential increase of employment as compared with the increase of manpower resources for the purpose of involving in the public sector the able-bodied population, especially women, and of improving the social structure of the population; the elimination of the existing disproportion between the demand of the national economy for skilled personnel and the rate of their training;

the more efficient distribution of productive forces, which is aimed at the equalization of the levels of the economic development of the individual regions of the republic, the attachment of manpower resources in these regions and the gradual decrease of the great proportion of the Baku-Sumgait region in industrial production.

During the 11th Five-Year Plan the republic is faced with important and responsible tasks. In conformity with the Main Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR National Economy for 1981-1985 and the Period to 1990, which were approved by the 26th CPSU Congress, during the 11th Five-Year Plan in Azerbaijan it is envisaged to increase the volume of industrial production by 29-32 percent, the average annual output of agricultural products--by 15-17 percent. State capital investments in the amount of 10.5 billion rubles have to be assimilated.

The further enhancement of the role of science, scientific and technical progress and the efficiency of social production is necessary for the successful accomplishment of the economic and social tasks facing the republic during the 11th Five-Year Plan. During the coming period the importance of scientific research and development, which are being performed in the republic, as the starting point of long-term planning should be increased even more.

It is necessary to improve the planning of all spheres of science, ensuring the increase of the efficiency of the use of the scientific potential of the republic.

The improvement of planning and management in the sphere of science, first of all, should be aimed at the elimination of the serious disproportion between the number of scientific jobs which have been completed and have been introduced in production. Thus, on the average about 2,000 scientific jobs are completed annually at scientific institutions and organizations, but only about half are introduced in production.

Particular attention should be devoted to the strengthening of the material base of science and to the construction of pilot enterprises and works, which ensure the materialization of the results of scientific research.

The improvement of the sectorial structure of scientific research is also an important factor of the increase of the efficiency of science. Whereas in the country the network of sectorial institutes, planning and design and pilot experimental bases in such sectors as light, the food, the wood processing and several other sectors is inadequate, in Azerbaijan it is essentially absent.

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The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Increasing Production Efficiency and Work Quality" augments the arsenal of planning with one of the most important components of the long-term state plan--comprehensive goal programs. The elaboration of long-term comprehensive goal programs and, first of all, the goal program of the development of scientific and technical progress, which should constitute the basis of scientific forecasts and long-term national economic plans, has to be expedited with allowance made for the enhancement of the role of science in solving the key problems of the socio-economic development of the republic.

Taking into account the particular importance of the solution of a number of problems for the development of the republic economy, the elaboration of such urgent comprehensive goal programs as the food program, the efficient use of manpower resources, the reduction of manual labor in industry and transportation, nature conservation and the efficient use of natural resources, as well as the meeting of the demands of the population for new industrial goods is acquiring great importance.

At present preprogram operations are already been carried out on the individual goal programs.

The republic comprehensive food program which is called upon to ensure the maximum meeting of the demands of the population for foodstuffs on the basis of the fundamental unity and the balance in development of the sectors of the agro-industrial complex, is the most important and vitally necessary one among the programs being drawn up. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, in this sector of the national economy "...the center of gravity now--and this is a distinctive feature of the agrarian policy in the 1980's--is shifting to the yield from capital investments, the increase of the productivity of agriculture, the extension and improvement of its ties with all the sectors of the agro-industrial complex."

For the successful implementation of the food program the planning organs need to ensure comprehensive planning, the proportionate and balanced development of all sectors of the agro-industrial complex, the considerable strengthening of its material and technical base, the improvement of the economic ties between the sectors and the organization of their efficient cooperation. In this connection the attention toward questions of the assurance of the keeping capacity of agricultural products and the increase of the capacities of the processing industry and procurement organizations, which are called upon to ensure the complete processing of the agricultural products of both the public sector and the private subsidiary sector, should be increased.

At the same time the special-purpose orientation of the food program is advancing the task of the thorough study of the established level of supply of the population with foodstuffs and the scientifically sound determination of the demand of the population of the republic for these goods with allowance made for demand and the identification of the real possibilities of further increasing the output of the products of plant growing and animal husbandry. It is necessary to identify the additional reserves of the maximum increase of the production and procurement of meat, milk, eggs, grain and potatoes for increasing the level of their per capita consumption.

The social transformation of the village will become an integral component of the food program. In this connection serious attention will be devoted to questions of housing construction with allowance made for the creation of private subsidiary farms, the improvement of the working conditions of kolkhoz farmers and the expansion of the network of health, educational and cultural institutions.

The entire system of planning, the scientific, technical and structural policy, as well as the search for and introduction of new efficient forms and methods of managing production and labor should be subordinate to the changeover of the entire national economy primarily to the intensive path of development.

Labor productivity is the most generalizing indicator which characterizes the intensification of the economy and the increase of the efficiency of all the sectors of the national economy. Therefore, in planning policy the deep-seated factors which govern the increase of labor productivity should be actively influenced. It should be persistently endeavored to use efficiently, wisely and with full output the enormous economic, scientific and technical potential which has been created in the republic.

In spite of the positive changes which were achieved during the years of the Ninth and 10th Five-Year Plans in the area of the improvement of the use of manpower resources, the availability of still unemployed able-bodied inhabitants requires the planned solution of the questions of their efficient use. The goal program in this area is called upon to ensure the elaboration of a set of measures which are aimed at the further improvement of the sectorial and territorial structure of employment for the purpose of the maximum possible involvement of the able-bodied population in social production.

The solution of the problem of the efficient use of manpower resources involves the determination of the further means of developing labor-consuming works and, first of all, the advanced sectors of machine building, of rapidly developing the nonproductive sector of the economy in small and medium-sized cities and of intensifying the process of committing the natural and manpower resources of the western and central regions of the republic to the national economic turnover.

It is necessary to pursue more actively the planning policy of further leveling the still existing differences in the development of productive forces and to ensure a systems approach to the problems of the comprehensive economic and social development of each economic region of Azerbaijan by the formation of territorial production complexes and the balanced development of the interconnected sectors, the sphere of application of male and female labor and the social infrastructure.

The establishment in the regions of the republic of branches of large enterprises of machine building, light industry and other sectors will promote the solution of the problem of the more complete utilization of manpower resources and the improvement of the structure of employment of the population. In particular, during the 11th Five-Year Plan it is planned to establish branches of large machine building enterprises in Nakhichevan', Stepanakert, Ali-Bayramly, Lenkoran', Khachmas, Divichi, Fizuli, Shamkhor and Sheki, and branches of light industry enterprises in Geokchay, Vartashen, Khanlar, Agdam, Khaldan, Tauz, Akhsu, Kyurdamir and other cities.

The active involvement of manpower resources in the public sector under the conditions of the republic is a complicated matter which requires the solution of a

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number of problems of a socio-economic, educational nature. Along with the creation of new works and workplaces, the planned training of a skilled regular labor force of the necessary specialties and the improvement of the material and technical base of vocational and technical schools are the most important of them.

The acceleration of the rate of economic growth of the republic governs the further increase of the standard of living of the population. This, first of all, requires the serious study of the questions of consumption in the national income being used. At the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Comrade G. A. Aliyev directed attention to the need for the thorough study of these questions.

For the purposes of the better solution of social problems the leading growth of the national income being used is envisaged during the 11th Five-Year Plan. Here it is planned to change the structural parameters of the consumption fund and to provide for the leading growth rate of the real income and the public consumption funds. During the coming period it is planned to continue the consistent policy of improving the wage mechanism and of increasing the rates and salaries of workers and employees, first of all in the production sectors, with allowance made for the utmost identification and utilization of the reserves for increasing labor productivity.

Among the urgent economic problems connected with the increase of the well-being of the people, which have to be solved in the next few years, the elimination of the existing disproportions between the production of consumer goods and the meeting of the demand of the population for them is acquiring great importance, to which attention was directed with utmost urgency at the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

Our plans are called upon to direct the attention of enterprises to the finding of resources and means for the production of consumer goods in the sectors of heavy industry and, first of all, machine building, the chemical and petrochemical industry and nonferrous metallurgy of Azerbaijan. The enterprises of the republic Ministry of Local Industry, which are obliged to provide for the maximum utilization of local raw material resources for the production of consumer goods, should make a substantial contribution to the solution of this problem.

On the basis of the task of the complete, efficient use of the created production potential, which was set by the 26th CPSU Congress, the questions of the identification of reserves for the improvement of the use of production capacities, the reduction of the downtimes of machines and equipment, the increase of the shift coefficient, the efficient and economical use of raw materials and materials, fuel and power and their full consideration when formulating national economic plans are acquiring particular importance.

The problems of increasing the efficiency of the work of the extractive sectors of republic industry, which are still not ensuring the adequately complete extraction of minerals from the ground, are closely interrelated with their solution. First of all this concerns the oil drilling industry, in which it is necessary to develop extensively the front of operations which are aimed at the introduction of secondary and tertiary methods of the recovery of petroleum.

The years gone by were characterized for our republic by the extremely inadequate development of electric power engineering and its production base. With the high

1.5-fold increase of the consumption of electric power, the increase of power capacities was only 1.25-fold. The formed shortage of electric power, especially in recent years, was covered with a great strain from the Transcaucasian Power System and could not fully meet the needs of the republic.

During the new five-year plan the construction and renovation of a number of large electric power stations have to be completed and the preliminary work on the Yenikendskaya GES has to begin in 1981.

The economical use of fuel is of great importance in the reliable power supply of the republic. At present the specific consumption of conventional fuel at the electric power stations of the republic is nearly 33 grams higher than on the average for the country. This is leading to the great excessive consumption of valuable organic raw materials. The task is to achieve by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan on the basis of renovation and modernization the decrease of the gap between the average sectorial and the republic indicators on the specific consumption of fuel and the losses of electric power in the networks.

In order to speed up the increase of power capacities it is necessary to substantiate and solve the problem of the expansion of the Azerbaydzhanskaya GRES to 2.8 million kW and the construction of a nuclear electric power station, which should be put into operation in the early 1990's.

In the achievement of the tasks advanced by the 26th congress an exceptionally important role is being assigned to capital construction.

The construction workers of Azerbaijan have gained much practical experience in the organization and management of production and in the building of large industrial facilities, agricultural complexes and irrigation structures and unique civil facilities.

At the same time many serious shortcomings continue to occur in capital construction. Brigade cost accounting is being laxly introduced. A disproportion has formed in the development of construction and its material and technical base.

In conformity with the decree of the party and government of 12 July 1979, in order to perform increasing amounts of capital construction the contracting organizations need to expedite the implementation of measures which are aimed at the improvement of the organization of construction, the more extensive introduction of cost accounting and the further increase of labor productivity. Planning at the present stage should promote the utmost concentration of assets and resources at the most important start-up projects in order to achieve a decrease of the amounts of unfinished construction to the level of the standard and to ensure the maximum increase of production capacities in a short period.

In short, the implementation of large-scale plans of economic development will require a substantial increase of the potential of construction in the republic.

During the 11th Five-Year Plan the volumes of shipments by all types of transport will increase considerably. The creation of a highly efficient unified transportation system, by which is meant the economically balanced and technologically interconnected functioning of all types of transportation, is the main task of the



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elaboration of the comprehensive program of the development of transportation. It is necessary to devote particular attention to the elaboration of economic balances of transportation with allowance made for the efficient distribution of shipments among types of transportation.

In connection with the accelerated development of individual sectors of the economy the planning organs should prevent arising disproportions which can cause economic losses in the national economy. In particular, in the Azerbaijan SSR such disproportions have been noted between agriculture and the capacities of the processing sectors.

The gains made by agriculture of Azerbaijan have caused a sharp increase of the output and procurement of the products of plant growing. However, the capacities of the sectors, which process agricultural raw materials, have developed considerably more slowly. As a result a significant disproportion has formed between production and the capacities for the processing of these raw materials, which is leading to losses of the crop and the decrease of the quality of the processed products. The planning organs, the appropriate ministries and departments need to take urgent steps to develop the capacities of the processing industry and to provide it with modern, highly productive equipment.

The increasing scale of the involvement of natural resources in the economic turnover requires the increase of attention to the problems of preventing disturbances of the ecological equilibrium. Under the conditions of the Azerbaijan SSR the re-cultivation of lands, which have been disturbed and polluted by industry, transportation and the wastes of municipal services and other sectors, is one of the important tasks in this area. This is especially important for Apsheron, where more than 30,000 hectares, or more than 5 percent of the territory of the region, have become useless. The ever increasing volumes of water consumption and the low level of the water supply of the republic are creating the need for the efficient use and conservation of water resources. It is planned to perform much work on the purification and reuse of the waste water of industrial enterprises and on the improvement of the reclamation state of lands.

In order to create favorable conditions for the labor, daily life, relaxation and protection of the health of the workers of the republic it is necessary to increase considerably the work on the prevention of the pollution of the air and the water area of the Caspian Sea.

An important role in the effective development of the economy during the 11th Five-Year Plan is being assigned to the measures specified by the party on the improvement of planning and the perfection of the economic mechanism, for effective operation of which, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, "...the proper economic situation and organizational and management relations should be created."

In this connection it is planned to enhance the role of long-range planning, to create an integral system of interconnected and balanced annual, five-year and long-range plans on the basis of the use of goal program, balance and standard methods, and to orient them toward the assurance of the proportionate growth of the economy and the efficient combination of the sectorial and territorial principle of development. Along with this, in the set of measures aimed at the improvement of the

economic mechanism more attention should be devoted to the further strengthening of cost accounting, the increase of the influence of the new evaluation indicators of the plan on the end results of work and the strengthening of material and moral stimuli.

Let us note that in the republic much work has been performed and continues to be performed on the implementation of the measures specified by the decrees of the party and the government, which were adopted in July 1979.

For the purpose of the more objective evaluation of the results of the activity of each labor collective, in a number of economic experiments a new evaluation indicator--the standard net output, which it is planned to use in the majority of sectors as the main indicator in the planning of production, the determination of the labor productivity, the planned wage fund, the profit and others, is being introduced in planning practice.

The thorough study and generalization of the gained experience of work on the introduction of the evaluation indicators of the plan and the strengthening of the influence of the levers of the economic mechanism, so that the enterprises which have not yet begun the work in this direction could effectively use the recommendations of scientists in the process of changing over to the new conditions of management, is an important and urgent task of the scientists of all the economic and scientific research institutes, chairs and laboratories of higher educational institutions.

The responsibility of enterprises for the meeting of contractual obligations on deliveries of products according to a specific list and assortment is now being increased. In this connection the strict adherence to planning and contractual discipline is acquiring particular importance.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, "The party has always regarded the plan as a law. And not just because it is approved by the Supreme Soviet. The plan is a law because only its observance ensures the coordinated working of the national economy. We will say frankly: this obvious truth has begun to be forgotten. The practice of adjusting plans downward has acquired an extensive scale. Such a practice disorganizes the economy, demoralizes personnel and accustoms them to irresponsibility."

Taking into account the increase of the role and responsibility of Gosplan in the matter of the comprehensive solution of long-range problems and the stepping up of the monitoring of the observance of planning discipline, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have adopted a special decree on the improvement of the organization of the work of Gosplan and the enhancement of its role in the system of organs of state government. A corresponding decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers has been adopted with respect to Gosplan of the republic. Particular attention is directed to questions of the comprehensive development of the interconnected sectors and regions of the republic and the overcoming of departmentalism and regionalism when drafting state plans.

It is recognized as expedient to establish in Gosplan of the republic eight intersectorial combined administrations headed by the deputy chairmen, which will coordinate and solve in conjunction all the problems of the development of the interrelated sectors and will bear responsibility for their implementation.

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The means of the further dynamic development of the national economy of Azerbaijan during the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan are specified in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 30th Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. The fulfillment of the five-year plan will make it possible to take a new important step in the solution of major problems, on which the further economic and social progress of the republic depends.

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REGIONAL

ATHEIST INDOCTRINATION IN EASTERN TAJIKISTAN

Dushanbe AGITATOR TADZHIKISTANA in Russian No 9, 1981 pp 23-24

/Article by Sh. Abdulloyev, lecturer of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan: "Educate Atheists"

/Text / "It is very important for propaganda not to avoid pointed themes and not to be afraid to broach so-called difficult questions," /in boldface General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the Accountability Report of the Central Committee to the 26th party congress.

Atheistic training and the struggle against vestiges of the past are exactly the important and difficult question to which it is necessary to devote constant attention.

Guided by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work," the oblast party organization of Gornyy Badakhshan is constantly improving the forms and methods of training, particularly atheistic training, and is persistently seeking the increase of its effectiveness.

A comprehensive approach and the more purposeful use of diverse forms of scientific atheistic propaganda are a distinctive feature of this work at the present stage. Councils on scientific atheism have been established in the Khorog City Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and in the rayon party committees. Methods sections for atheistic training operate at the oblast House of Scientific Atheism.

Questions of the reactionary essence of religion and its attempts to adapt to the new conditions take up much space in lectures and mass scientific atheistic measures. Moreover, much attention is devoted to the theme of the formation and development of the spiritual world of the Soviet individual and to the promotion of the achievements of our country during the years of Soviet power, new Soviet rites and rituals.

Such proven forms as movie lecture bureaus, thematic evenings, question and answer evenings, practical science conferences and schools of elementary knowledge about nature, society and man have undergone development everywhere. In the past year alone six practical science conferences were held in the oblast on the themes: "The 25th CPSU Congress and the Atheistic Training of Workers," "New Soviet Holidays and Rites," "Medicine and Religion," "The Koran and the Woman" and others.

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Twelve question and answer evenings, which more than 2,000 people attended, were held. The schools of elementary knowledge about nature, society and man are acquiring greater and greater popularity among the population of the oblast. In Shugnanskiy, Vanchskiy, Rushanskiy and Ishkashimskiy Rayons 15 schools with a total number of students of 384, of whom 235 are women, have been established.

The students of these schools have, as a rule, an incomplete secondary education, and the instruction promotes the formation among them of scientific views on nature and society and the overcoming of religious views.

The oblast House of Scientific Atheism and its scientific methods councils and sections, which combine in their ranks 22 members, give procedural and practical assistance to lecturers and agitators and take a direct part in the organization and implementation of scientific atheistic measures.

The work on the training and further training of atheist lecturers has improved. Seminars, conferences and other forms of training of the ideological aktiv, in the programs of which themes on Soviet law and legislations, religious cults and the practice of atheistic training are included, are held regularly. Schools for the training of atheist lecturers, in which 43 people are employed, have been organized in the boards of the organizations of the Znaniye Society of Khorog and Shugnanskiy and Rushanskiy Rayons.

For the purpose of stepping up atheistic propaganda, schools of women atheist lecturers have been established in the Khorog City Committee and the rayon committees of the party, while supernumerary departments for scientific atheism have been set up in the editorial board of the oblast newspaper BADAKHSHONI SOVETI and in the committee for television and radio broadcasting.

The oblast council of women, the chairwoman of which is P. D. Dzhumayeva, secretary of the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, is making a great contribution to the atheistic training of the population of the oblast. In accordance with the plan of work seminars and meetings of women are being held, individual and group talks with housewives at the place of residence are being organized.

Much attention is being devoted to the atheistic training of school pupils. Young Atheist groups and movie lecturer bureaus have been organized at secondary schools; there are stands and rooms on atheism. The majority of schools are equipped with movie projectors, which makes it possible to organize showings of movies of an antireligious nature.

The work of the Rushanskiy Rayon Party Committee on the atheistic training of the workers of the rayon, the experience of which was approved of and recommended for dissemination by the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya Oblast Party Committee, should be noted.

The oblast party organization is devoting much attention to Soviet holidays and rites--an integral part of socialist culture. They were brought about by the need to distinguish a memorable event and the stages of life of the individual, the family, the labor collective and society as a whole. The traditional national holidays devoted to labor are celebrated impressively and memorably. For example, the holiday of Navruz, which is of a national nature, has been purged of religious

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content and is now celebrated as a holiday of spring and labor. At the same time it has preserved in national color.

During the holiday of Navruz the workers of the oblast engage in the civic improvement of the city and the planting of gardens in the city and put the place of residence into order. On these days amateur art collectives perform and atheletic competitions are held.

Of course, there are still shortcomings in the atheistic propaganda which is being conducted in the oblast. The activity of clubs, lecture bureaus, theaters, movie theaters and other cultural institutions is not always aimed at the atheistic training of the workers. Scientific atheistic work is carried out irregularly at the place of residence, at dormitories and in small collectives. In the life of the workers of the oblast ugly vestiges of the past such as drunkenness and hooliganism frequently still exist, violations of labor discipline and breaches of the peace occur.

Now, when all the Soviet people are implementing the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, an important place is also being assigned to questions of ideological and political educational work. Therefore the oblast party organization is directing the activity of the political speakers, nonstaff lecturers, agitators, political information officers and lecturers of the Znaniye Society toward the cultivation among the entire population of the oblast of a sense of pride in the socialist homeland, the indissoluble friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the respect of national dignity and culture and intolerance of any manifestations of vestiges of the past.

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