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JPRS L/9898 7 August 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 27/81)



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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FARUQ QADDUMI INTERVIEW ON PLO STRATEGY

DW 301351 Hamburg STERN in German 30 Jul 81 pp 112-113

[Interview with Faruq Qaddumi, director of the PLO Political Department, by Wibke Bruhns--date and place not specified]

[Text] STERN: Menahem Begin...

Qaddumi: ...Terrorist Begin....

STERN: ...justifies his attack on Lebanon by their success. For more than a year, until the outbreak of this missile war, there have been no Palestinian attacks on Israel.

Qaddumi: That's right.

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STERN: Begin argues that if there were not such frequent and heavy attacks on Palestinian targets in Lebanon, then additional and more successful commandos could possibly cross the border.

Qaddumi: Does he say this?

STERN: At the moment it does not appear as though any Arab or any other country is ready to wage war with you against Israel. If these sporadic commando operations provoke such terrible preventive or retaliation strikes by Israel, why then do you continue them?

Qaddumi: We must continue our military operations in the occupied territories. It is better to hold a small candle in one's hand than to constantly curse the darkness.

STERN: This does not change anything militarily, and in the political field it does not make you any friends, for instance in Europe. What then is your objective?

Qaddumi: A counterquestion: How does a pearl develop? A foreign object enters the oyster. It disturbs the animal, which rubs against it and is hurt. This is exactly what we are doing. In the end we will find the pearl in the oyster.

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STERN: As long as they are not opened, oysters survive such irritation.

Qaddumi: We will never allow Israel to live in peace. We will never allow Israel to enjoy absolute security. Every Israeli will feel that a guerrilla could be hiding behind every wall who might fire at him.

STERN: You cannot expect Israel to sit idly by.

Qaddumi: The most important thing is that Israel has started it. Israel is responsible for the dead on both sides. We do not have any alternative except to give up. And the operations in the occupied territories demonstrate that we are not giving up.

STERN: Another possibility would be to talk with the Israel Government.

Qaddumi: With the Zionists? No, because Zionism means the colonialization of Palestine.

STERN: Then you are acting like the Israelis who say that recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians is out of the question. How, actually, are things supposed to proceed?

Qaddumi: Israel has occupied our country for 33 years now. The first requirement is for it to withdraw from the occupied territories. Then we will be ready to hold negotiations on a solution to the Mideast crisis in the framework of an international conference.

STERN: What do you mean by "occupied territories?"

Oaddumi: First of all, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

STERN: This actually means: first withdrawal, then there can be talks.

Qaddumi: Unconditional withdrawal first. We have a vested right to part of Palestine. In 1947 there was a UN division plan, which envisaged two states.

STERN: A plan which the Arabs rejected.

Qaddumi: We acted like the mother, who had fought with another woman, for her child before King Solomon. He proposed to cut the child in two. But the real mother said: Let it live; it must not be cut in two.

STERN: This is why the real mother gave the child to the other woman. In Palestine there was war instead. If you were to get an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, what would then happen with regard to the remainder, that is, Israel with the borders of 1948?

Qaddumi: We will never recognize Israel and will never accept the usurper, the colonialist and imperialist.

STERN: But what else?

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Qaddumi: We will fight for our rights, for our return to our homeland.

STERN: In this way you are tying the hands of your friends.

Qaddumi: How?

STERN: You idea spells the destruction of the State of Israel.

Qaddumi: Yes. I want to destroy the enemy who continues to occupy my homeland, who murdered my parents, my brothers and my sisters. But we are not murderers. We do not want to throw the Israelis in jail, as they did with us. We welcomed and sheltered thousands of them during and after World War II.

STERN: That's not quite correct. There have been enormous tensions and terrible armed clashes.

Qaddumi: We are ready to live together with Jews in a democratic state.

STERN: A state which would be governed by you because you would be in the majority.

Qaddumi: Naturally.

STERN: There is a difference between realpolitik and dreaming.

Qaddumi: Dreams sometimes come true.

STERN: You have denounced the United States as an aggressor and said that the Soviet Union is your most reliable friend. One of the arguments, with which Menahem Begin seeks to ward off any potential support for you, is the assertion that a future Palestinian state would necessarily become a Soviet satellite.

Qaddumi: We are a national movement. We welcome anybody who assists us in this. We are being helped by the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Libyans, the Chinese....

STERN: With weapons?

Qaddumi: The Chinese were the first. They gave us training and weapons. The Soviets, like the other socialist states, assist us with political and military aid.

STERN: What are they asking for in return?

Qaddumi: What do the Palestinians actually have to offer?

STERN: Maybe they will have something in the future.

Qaddumi: But we are talking about the present. Who can known about the state of our relations with the Soviet Union in the future?

STERN: Your Arab friends are somewhat more reserved vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

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Qaddumi: This may hold true for Saudi Arabia. But King Husayn of Jordan, for instance, was in Moscow recently and he got along quite well with his hosts.

STERN: But when things start getting serious, he will not be very likely to side with the Soviet Union.

Qaddumi: If a large-scale war really were to break out, then the Soviet Union would be our ally because we prefer to be the friends of communists rather than falling victim to the Zionist and imperialist occupation power.

STERN: Communists, too, as we know, can be an occupation power.

Qaddumi: This is not the case with them in the Arab world.

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IRAN

ARTICLE ACCUSES IRP FOLLOWING SAVAK FOOTSTEPS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul 81 pp 10-12

[Article by Hedi Dhoukar: "Bloody Intolerance"--passage within slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] The 28 June explosion which ravaged the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) in Tehran no doubt constitutes an event of capital importance for the Iranian revolution after the fall of the shah, the hostage incident at the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. raid in Tabas and the war with Iraq.

Attributed by the regime—without any proof—to the Mojahedin—e Khalq, this spectacular attack literally decapitated the sole governing power in Iran, which lost 73 of its leaders, including its chairman, Mohammad Hoseyn Beheshti. To be sure, he was rapidly replaced by Bahonar, former minister of education, as well as by Ayatollah Abdol Karim Ardabili at the Supreme Court (who gave up his post as chief prosecutor), but the party is in no condition to recover from this "hecatomb," which took place after a scattering of the forces which had previously gathered around it.

The elimination of Bani-Sadr, Beheshti's last act, coupled with the systematic repression of genuinely progressive popular forces, has notably resulted in leading the IRP, vis-a-vis those forces, toward an isolation as absolute as the power to which it aspires.

"The most fragile residences are those of the spider." This saying from the Koran, which is also found in one of the pamphlets of the Mojahedin antedating the explosion at the IRP headquarters, is all the more appropriate at this time. Indeed, had not Beheshti, the founder and ideologue of the IRP, spun a veritable spider web in the country by basing himself in the Parliament as well as in a formidable propaganda apparatus?

More importantly, in order to carry out this enterprise that certain political forces—often acting in good faith—initially supported, Beheshti behaved as a genuine product of the... shah's school. Just like the latter, he attended to the task of creating a political vacuum around himself. The most absurd and significant action he took was undoubtedly the closing of the university, an institution which has always been, in Iran, the vanguard of anti—imperialism. Tens of thousands of students, instinctively perceived by the retrogressive—and minority—wing of the clergy as potential enemies, have thus been forced to leave

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for abroad at enormous cost. Those who have remained have been confined in university cities deprived of water and electricity and have been exposed to the attacks of the Hezbollahi. It was not enough, for the leaders of the IRP, to consider a priori any "westernized" intellectual as a potential enemy of the regime: They had to throw thousands of them into the arms of the West!

Another SAVAK

This is a striking example of the general behavior of the IRP since its access to power. Its anti-imperialist slogans have solely served to objectively aid and comfort U.S. positions in Iran. It is not fortuitous to note, on the other hand, that the only action and expanding sector in the country has been and still is the import-export field. This sector is, by definition, advantageous to the Western business partners who supply Iran with basic staples, as well as to the big "bazaris" who have earned 120 billion tomans from this trade under the reign of Beheshti. One is also moved to ask what has become of the millions of SAVAK agents who were raging during the era of the shah. It is perhaps easier to understand now why only their leaders were summarily executed, thus depriving the people of their precious testimony. As for the archives of this criminal organization of sinister memory, one can well ask where they have ended up...! The Iranian people, at any rate, have never found out. In return, after the SAVAK, they were rapidly compensated with the IRP creation: the SAVAMA.

If one is to believe only the testimony--often written in the guise of letters addressed to the "leader of the revolution" -- of a number of respectible Shi'a dignitaries such as 'Ali Karimi, a member of the Qom clergy close to Khomeyni, or 'Ali Tehrani and others of a more modest rank, it will be seen that all agree in saying that the IRP regime has gone much farther in the repression of the leftist forces than the shah's government. Karimi even affirms that six leftist militants "were executed while they were still imprisoned from the time of the former regime!" Sheikh 'Ali Tehrani, one of the most important religious dignitaries of Iran, has himself told newsmen that he "considers the IRP as another SAVAK. Everything it does, both within and without Iran, 1 is done with the money of the people. Its budget is larger than that of the SAVAK. Soon, the crimes it commits will be more numerous than those of the SAVAK. The same will be true of corruption. The IRP has its own private prisons, where torture is practiced. Many people have died in them." Wasn't an Iranian nurse executed some time ago because she had reported to Western newsmen the way in which wounded Kurds were treated in her hospital?

^{1.} Among the IRP operations conducted outside of Iran, we cite the Saturday, 4 July, attack perpetrated at the Paris university city by a group of non-resident "hezbollahis" against leftist Iranian students. Armed with knives, sticks and razor blades, the "hezbollahi," dressed in shrouds, wounded numerous students before being repulsed. The operation came a few days after leftist Iranians organized a protest demonstration in front of their own embassy, which refused to receive a delegation from the PSU, the PS and the OEDETIM protesting the dismissal of the legitimate Iranian president as well as repression.

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While the repression practiced by the shah was mostly aimed at the university, that launched by the IRP has not even spared schools. Never, even at the height of the resistance against the Pahlavi regime, were minor children executed, as recently happened in Tehran. Justice was never so expeditious as to sentence people to death /without even being aware of their identity in as witnessed by a letter from 'Ali Karimi and another from the Mojahedin-e Khalq addressed to the Imam. In the absence of defense attorneys, every pretext serves the purpose for the execution of dissidents. Thus 'Ali Karimi revealed to the Imam that the notorious "red judge," Khalkhali, prepared "fictitious and falsified lists and called me one day to tell me: 'I will pretend I have found 300 kgs of heroin. You will say that you had them burned.'"

Thus, Soltanpur of Feda'in was accused of "foreign currency violations," a pretext that made it possible to execute him. Alas, examples of these practices abound! They prove the degree to which the demented machine of repression has evolved outside of all the rules of the game, even if it were only juridical, not to say democratic. The accusation of "corruption on earth" or of "crimes against the Islamic Republic"—when it is not "against God"—is enough to be executed. Any debate in this context has become impossible. This was illustrated by Bani-Sadr's ouster. He merely wanted to obtain the right of a debate on television, "only 3 hours," with his adversaries, as he wrote in a letter addressed to the Imam.

The explosion at the IRP headquarters was the culmination of the violence launched by Beheshti's party and fed by hallucinating lies which finally turned against him. Indeed, history teaches us that violence always reaches a point at which it becomes uncontrollable. The first act in the regime's reaction: It is the "great Satan," U.S. imperialism, which was behind the attack. Second act: "It is the Mojahedin, or, in other words, an Islamic opposition to an Islamic regime. Once again, Beheshti's men have attempted to award themselves an anti-imperialist position that no palpable act has ever represented, in order to justify in advance the repression launched against those dissidents who are all the more feared by the powers—that—be because they, for their part, intend to carry out the text of anti-American slogans!

What is one to make, on the other hand, of this enigmatic sentence of Khomeyni's stating that "these so-called Mojahedin of the people have killed 72 persons who were actually serving the people. They proclaimed themselves hostile to Ayatollah Beheshti and they killed him. But they also killed, in the process, 71 innocent people." Was Beheshti, therefore, not innocent? At any rate, the Imam could not be ignorant of the fact that, unlike Raja'i, for instance, Beheshti had never opposed the former regime, from whose largesse he even profited, to the extent that he was appointed by the shah as counselor to the education minister and grand imam of the Hamburg mosque.

The Iranian people's revolution having been everyone's revolution, how can one be surprised that an increasingly larger majority of the people is revolting against the one and only group which has harvested—with at least debatable methods—the fruits of this revolution? Despoiling Islam of all significance, the IRP only maneuvered to grab power, while land ownership, riches and privileges survived

^{1.} Italics ours.

intact and unshared in a context of absolute lack of freedom. Everything took place as if the IRP's real objective were to prepare the grounds for a civil war by reviving unsolved internal conflicts, by giving free vent to underground struggles and by developing a demented campaign of bloody liquidations.

This is why Beheshti's brutal disappearance and that of dozens of members of his political apparatus have left Iran divided by an important schism separating two violently opposed camps. Two camps that are not even divided by their belonging to what is, after all, the same class, even if the IRP purports to be the mouthpiece of the "mostaz'afin," who are only good enough to come out and demonstrate in its favor, while the mass of the unemployed is reaching alarming proportions. As for the distinction between the clergy and the laity, it does not withstand analysis, since it is so summary and surresptitious. Indeed, religious and civilian personalities, parties and associations can be found in both camps. One has only to note the support—prudent, of course—given by the Tudeh Communist Party to Khomeyni's policies. The latter appears today as the only force still capable, by virtue of his great charisma, of averting a coup d'etat by the armed forces.

This eventuality being, for the moment, put aside—thanks notably to the "showra" (the grassroots military committees which have contributed in denouncing several plots within the army)—it is nevertheless undeniable that the IRP's political bases are shrinking, while the popularity of the forces of the anti-imperialist left continues to grow in spite of the violent repression directed against them.

The election to be held on 24 July to replace President Bani-Sadr will be significant in this respect. Raja'i and some other candidates chosen exclusively by the IRP will be the only contenders for the presidency. In this case, the weakness of the popular mobilization will be such that Beheshti's party's prestige will not be enhanced, especially if Raja'i's election is credited with receiving more than 90 percent of the vote, an eventuality that is not unlikely. This will seal the fate of a revolution whose greatness was derived from the vast hope it had created in a third world mostly dominated at the time by 99.99 percent of dictatorships.

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IRAN

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ SEEN AS EVENTUAL VICTOR OVER IRP

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul 81 p 12

[Article by Ghazi Sarhane: "Mojahedin: Gun in Hand"]

[Text] Are the Mojahedin-e Khalq responsible for the 28 June attack against the beadquarters of the Islamic Republican Party? Their adversaries say so. They even declare that the man who set the bomb has been identified as a member of this organization. However, in the absence of concrete proof—which the IRP leaders generally lack to shore up their allegations—or without a statement by the Mojahedin—e Khalq claiming responsibility for the attack, the only tangible fact is the will of the powers—that—be to eliminate Mas'ud Rajavi's organization.

Even though the Mojahedin have never kept secret their will to fight the IRP, whose leaders have been called "petty bourgeois in Islamic garb, men thirsting for power, who use machiavellian policies and for whom the end justifies the means," numerous diplomatic observers in Tehran believe that the 28 June incident was the pretext sought by the ultra-reactionary elements of the clergy to unleash a witch hunt. Many diplomats go as far as to affirm that this was a settling of accounts within the IRP itself.

Established in the sixties, the movement of the Mojahedin-e Khalq is indeed, in the view of all observers, the strongest and best implanted organization in the country. It has gained in popularity and been strengthened since the revolution thanks to the very IRP, which has branded it as its number one enemy. Above all, the weakening of the other forces of opposition such as the Mos'addeq followers, who had no time to structure themselves, resulted in direct gains for the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization; for it was able to broaden its field of alliances, notably after the dismissal of Bani-Sadr, the legitimate president elected with over 10 million votes.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq, an armed organization believed to number nearly 100,000 militants, has nevertheless always avoided engaging its adversaries in combat. Its leader, Mas'ud Rajavi, even agreed not to run for the presidency when the IRP leaders became fearful that he would be the beneficiary of the totality of the minorities' votes, with whom he had clearly sided by pronouncing himself in favor of decentralization.

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Wishing to avoid the struggle of the centers of power, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, nevertheless, vainly attempted to muster a political debate on the projects, ideas and programs for the reconstruction of the country. Such a debate, of course, required at least minimal democratic guarantees.

The least that can be said is that the IRP was far from being in favor of a debate of this kind, rather giving in to the temptation of totalitarian power. The Mojahedin were therefore fearing a fate similar to that of the Tupamaros in Uruguay: Indeed, before the access to power of the fascists in that country, the Tupamaros were like "fish swimming in water," but when the fascists gained the upper hand, the Uruguayan guerrillas' organization was smashed by the bureaucratic machine, by torture, imprisonment and mass murders.

In this respect, it is interesting to note--even if all comparisons sin by excess--that since the arrival of the IRP and besides a number of corrupted cadre from the former regime, it is the Mojahedin who have suffered the most casualties within their ranks. To be sure, there are the executions, which followed the attack against the headquarters of Beheshti's party, where the victims have been mostly Mojahedin. However, the phenomenon started a long time ago, when the "hezbollahi" stormed Tehran University, killing many members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq. They then attacked the offices of this organization in all the cities of the country: Hamadan, Resht, Tabriz, Mashhad, Qom, Ahvaz, etc., where numerous militants of the movement lost their lives.

An Alternative Force

At any rate, one week before the attack which took Beheshti's life, the Mojahedin demonstrated the extent of their power by organizing a demonstration in Tehran which mobilized more than 500,000 people. It was bloodily represented at Ferdowsi Square by the Revoution Guards. Had it not been peaceful and had the angry masses not been unarmed, the demonstration would not have been stopped at Ferdowsi Square and would not have been dispersed. It would have swept the reactionary bands and groups right into the garbage dump of history," a pamphlet of this organization mentioned.

However, the Mojahedin-e Khalq discards such an eventuality. It seems to concentrate its stakes on the increase of the revolutionary potential of the Iranian people, whose memories are fresh and whom it behooves to identify and sweep away dictators.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq is basing its entire policy on this prospect, hoping to present itself as an eventual alternative.

In the view of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, by reversing the goals of the revolution in order to serve its own interests, the dominant party is contributing to the sharpening of the political conscience of the Iranian people, whose vast potential for struggle has remained intact. This fact alone, which explains the nature of the ongoing repression, constitutes a victory in itself.

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IRAN

ARTICLE LAMENTS RECENT MASS LIQUIDATIONS BY IRP

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Bouzid Kouza: "Iran: The Tragic Paradox"]

[Text] All popular revolutions must defend themselves. This is how it must be. On the basis of this assumption, the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) are attempting to project—a tragic paradox—an image of revolutionary authenticity and of anti-imperialism to the bloody purges and summary executions being carried out for the past year in successive waves in the cities and villages of Iran. However, nothing could be farther from the truth.

What is taking place in Iran is actually a well-considered project for the liquidation of a formidable mass movement rarely seen in history. And not as "impartial and objective observers," but as defenders of this revolution, which is greeted with fervor by hundreds of millions of people around the world, we have been led to this painful conclusion: Muslim sons of the people are being muzzled, tracked down and murdered under the name of "law."

The official religious discourse emanating from Qom and Tehran reeks of such caricatural manicheism that in the eyes of international and Muslim opinion, it is the reflection of an intolerant, repressive and fanatical Islamic faith.

To retain of Islam but the letter and ignore the spirit, to banish all "ejtehad"—this conscious effort to understand society and remain faithful to the liberating message of the Koran—is undoubtedly the biggest crime that certain Iranian leaders can commit against Islam.

Iranian patriots are aware of this, and this is why they are paying for it today with their blood, the blood they freely shed to overthrow the shah. It is not by coincidence that the reactionary wing of the Iranian religious establishment, which succeeded in co-opting the revolutionary movement and subsequently neutralizing it while still preserving an anti-imperialist parlance, is concentrating its hardest blows against an organization such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which represent precisely this liberating current expressing a different Islamic vision of the world: a progressive one.

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The Mojahedin, therefore, constitute a real danger for the reaction and for imperialism, because they are at the very heart of the Islamic equation and are thus able--as they have already proved--to mobilize huge popular masses for the purpose of engaging in genuine transformations that would ensure the preservation and the triumph of the revolutionary process.

To defend them and to support them is equivalent to helping them preserve the revolutionary fire in Iran as well as to repulse the liquidators.

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ISRAEL

'CREEPING' ANNEXATION SEEN IN WEST BANK

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Jun 81 pp 16-20, 48

[Article by Danny Rubinstein]

[Text]

In June 1981, just before the elections, it is 14 years since the West Bank and the Gaza Strip came under Israeli rule. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis and hundreds of thousands of Arabs who were of elementary school age in 1967 barely remember that once there was a "green line" dividing Palestine. 19 years of a divided Palestine (1948-1967) are gradually becoming an episode in history receeding in time. In the last three election campaigns (1969, 1973, 1977) the political movements and parties in Israel took clearly defined positions on the occupied territories and their Palestinian-Arab population. This problem was and continues to be a constant topic of political debate wherein each side knows the strengths and weaknesses of the others. Little is known about the dramatic changes that have taken place in the occupied territories during the 14 years since 1967. These changes should have brought about a shift in the positions and political programs of the various parties. And that is not the case. The Israeli debate on the occupied territories will run along the same lines as it has since 1967, without taking into account that the situation has long since

For the coming elections, Meron Benvenisti, former deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and currently running on the Citizens Rights List, has prepared a report on the West Bank with a data-sheet appended. When one studies the data and sees their trend since the Six Day War one comes to the conclusion that the party programs we're familiar with are meaningless. The parties in Israel are adopting positions on the West Bank that are delusions because they are not based on a correct reading of reality.

The reality is that over a 14 year period a process of annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel has taken place. Mostly this annexation is total and complete, but in some instances it is partial. There was a time in previous elections when one spoke of "creeping annexation". Now, in the spring of 1981, the creeping is coming to an end and has a special character.

Economic Annexation

The integration of the economies of Israel and the occupied territories was completed several years ago. About a million and a quarter Arabs are "captive consumers" of Israeli merchandise. They have no choice but to buy Israeli products since the customs and tax barriers of Israel also apply to the occupied territories. In 1979 Israel sold 300 million dollars worth of goods to the occupied territories-this is more than the total that Israel exports to France. The occupied territories serve not only as a protected market for Israeli goods but also as a source of cheap labor for Israel's economy: more than half of

the wage earners work in Israel and they constitute a third of the total Arab work force. Employment in Israel brings in 30% of the total income of West Bank and Gaza Arabs. Most of the Arabs who work in Israel come from the villages; according to the figures, Arab peasants have reduced the area of cultivated land by 35% as of 1967. The number of Arabs engaged in agriculture on the West Bank is rapidly and steadily declining. Thousands of village families have in recent years become urban working families. Many of them were relocated to the fringes of the cities-primarily Jerusalem-in order to be near the centers of employment. This is a clear case of proletarianization which is of tremendous importance.

The full integration of the economies of Israel and the occupied territories manifests itself in the almost complete unification of all the basic economic systems. The water supply system, the communications system, the roads, the tour industry, the monetary system, the banking system, and most of the electric power system operate as a single unit within the framework of Israeli laws, regulations and taxes. In one area however, there is no full economic integration: the social benefits of Israel do not apply to these areas. If the Israeli social welfare system were to be extended to the occupied territories it would put a heavy strain on the State Treasury. Of course the residents of the West Bank don't pay Israeli income tax, but even if they were to come under Israeli income tax law it wouldn't ease the financial burden of the State. This is because Arab families have many children and the tax exemption credits they would receive would cancel out any income tax payments. On the other hand, the National Insurance Institute of Israel would have to pay these families child-support allocations (the ex-soldier's allocation of course would not apply) and this would amount to a very large sum of money. Someone in the military administration calculated that if Israel were to extend all its socioeconomic legislation to the occupied territories there would be almost no gain in income for Israel; but on the other hand, a

fortune would have to be paid to the Arabs thereby doubling the GNP of the occupied territories.

economies in a very special way. The economic systems were unified in a manner designed primarily to benefit Israel. Of course the standard of living is rising steadily in the occupied territories, but nothing is being done to extend the Israel social welfare laws in order to prevent financial harm to Israel. Two years ago the Begin government did adopt a resolution regarding the "equalization of services" between Israel and the occupied territories. This resolution was widely publicized but was evidently used for propaganda purposes only. In actual practice no services were equalized. The various social services in the occupied territories are provided by Church groups, UNRRA, and Moslem charitable organizations. There are no payments on the West Bank such as the allocations made by the National Insurance Institute. Hence the Israeli economic annexation is one-sided. It is not applied when it is not worthwhile for Israel. However when it is worthwhile it becomes total and complete.

No Jordanian Law on the West Bank

The military government has issued hundreds of directives on the West Bank since 1967. These directives have radically altered the judicial and governing systems that prevailed in 1967 and which functioned under Jordanian Law. In effect, Jordanian Law has been eliminated from the West Bank. In its place we see a very sophisticated judicial system that has adapted the governing system of the West Bank to that of Israel. This system bears traces of Jordanian Law which the military government utilizes when it suits it (for limiting political activities and chiefly for banning meetings, etc.). Almost all of the Israeli directives which changed the law on the West Bank were issued to serve the interests of Israel rather the interests of the Arab population.

True, the residents of the occupied territories can appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel. They rarely do this and only in recent years have they turned to the Court in mat-

ters of land disputes, expulsions, (the electric company case, etc.). With the exception of appeals to the Supreme Court, the entire legislative process (posting of directives) and the entire Israeli military-civilian administrative apparatus in the occupied territories are not subject to parliamentary. public or judicial scrutiny. In other words, from a legalistic point of view, the annexation has been accomplished in a manner most convenient for Israel. When Israeli interests are to be served, directives are issued that completely change the Jordanian Law and adapt it to the Israeli system. But the Arab residents have no rights of supervision and criticism as do the residents of Israel. As far as the Arabs are concerned the military occupation still exists except for the fact that Israeli directives have completely changed the legal situation. Examples are abundant: the military government determines by directives which books are forbidden, which newspapers can be published and where they can be distributed (in Jerusalem or the West Bank). Limitations are imposed on Arab construction by means of directives on the protection of the environment. But when it comes to settlements or army bases, there is almost no interest in the environment or its protection. Because Israel is trying to gain control of West Bank land, directives have been posted that make it impossible to sue the Israeli authorities in local Arab courts in cases of land disputes. The jurisdiction of the local Arab courts is, therefore, limited in matters of land and property in keeping with the interests of Israel. By the way, the Israeli corporation Himenuta is allowed to buy land in the occupied territories. Israeli law on the West Bank is very one-sided. It has succeeded in penetrating all walks of life with one proviso: to prevent Arab rights and to serve the needs of Israel.

This legalistic form of sophisticated annexation puts the Israeli doves in a bind. From their point of view it might be preferable to have real annexation, thereby extending Israeli Law into the West Bank. If that were done the Arabs would have the same rights as Israelis and could demonstrate and organize politically. Obviously the Israeli doves can't ask for annexation.

The Gush Emunim settlers have joined the enforcers of "law and order". These units are officially organized within the territorial defense system of the West Bank and constitute an armed militia whose purposes are not concealed. Recently, after some Arab boys threw rocks at a settlers' bus near Ramallah, unidentified persons attacked the Ramallah bus station at night and wrecked ten buses. One can easily surmise that this was a settlers' operation. The military government helps the settlers in all matters.

After the bus station incident, a senior officer in the military government stated that all avenues were being investigated, including the possibility that this incident was the result of internal dissension among the Arabs. Until now there have been very few cases where settlers have been brought to court for attacking Arabs. The few that were brought to court received light sentences or were acquitted. The perpetrators of the attacks on the Arab Mayors have not been apprehended.

A Third of West Bank Land in Israeli Hands

More than a million and half dunams of West Bank land, out of a total of 5.5 million dunams, come under Israeli control, i.e., almost a third. Seven hundred and fifty thousand dunams are State lands, i.e., under the authority of the State of Israel and not that of the Arab population. About a half million dunams of West Bank land is abandoned (absentee) property which the Israeli government can acquire any time it wants simply because the registered owners are in Jordan or elsewhere. More than one hundred thousand dunams were bought by Jews and by Israeli institutions (e.g., the Land Registry and the Jewish National Fund). Another two hundred thousand dunams were expropriated for military and public needs, etc. These lands include areas with restrictions (such as the ban on building within 150 meters of certain roads, or certain distances from army camps or training grounds).

Land expropriation and Israeli settlements have become extensive mainly in the following three regions: the outskirts of Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and its slopes, and West Samaria. In the Jerusalem and West Samaria

regions the settlements are not necessarily founded for ideological reasons. In accordance with present government policy, families with housing problems turn to settlements beyond the green line. In Maale Adumim, Ariel and Karnei Shomron they can get low-cost housing subsidized by the government. Families from the urban centers of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv apply for the conveniently located cheap housing, even when they have no political motivation.

Last year, in addition to large scale settling involving huge capital investment, large tracts of land in many locations were expropriated by the army for military purposes. Bases, depots, maintenance and training grounds that used to be located in Israel or the Sinai have been moved to the West Bunk. This involves many thousands of dunams, and if we ever have to withdraw from the West Bank it is doubtful that we would find substitute locations for these facilities inside the green line. The military system in the West Bank (installations, communications, roads) is such that it is difficult to see how the State of Israel can get along without it.

These facts in effect preclude the possibility of giving back most of the West Bank territory to a Palestinian-Jordanian state. The realities of annexation and settlements in 1981 not only negate the feasibility of a West Bank partition plan (geographic or functional), but make the partition lines between Israel and Jordan a total contradiction to the principles of the Alignment. In the broad metropolitan area of Jerusalem, the stretches from Ramallah to the approaches to Hebron, there are today approximately a quarter of a million Arab residents. The Alignment plan which includes greater Jerusalem in the area of Israel would incorporate a large number of Arabs into the Jewish State from this region alone. And if we add the West Samaria Bloc, which the Alignment agrees to incorporate into Israel, then all the Alignment talk about avoiding annexation because of demographic dangers is invalid. Even the Alignment's minimal plan - whereby the areas of Jerusalem, Kalkiliah, and Tul-Karm would remain in Israel — wuld take in about 40% of the West Bank Arabs (including Jerusalem) into the Jewish State. The Alignment's claim that it doesn't want to rule over an Arab population is futile and incorrect. Considering the present reality of annexation and settlements, which the Alignment agrees to in part, one could return to Arab control only small areas around Nablus, and perhaps a few other small enclaves. Such a plan is meaningless and doesn't stand a chance.

Eliminating the Chances for Autonomy

The present situation in the West Bank and Gaza doesn't give the autonomy plan any chance of success. Ever since the Camp David accords, the Begin government has done everything possible to make even the most minimal-autonomy plan unworkable. Since 1978 the Israeli military government has restricted any form of Arab political activity. Meetings and rallies are forbidden. books are banned, shows are stopped, exhibits and galleries are shut down, peole are confined to their homes, leaders can't get permits to travel abroad, etc. As soon as the Begin government signed the plan for autonomy for the inhabitants, it began to systematically take away the authority still left in the hands of local Arab institutions. Directives were issued limiting higher education, restrictions were imposed on the local courts and on money transfers, and the race to take as much land as possible away from the Arabs began. Sometimes it looks as though instead of negotiating for autonomy. Israel could simply cancel the hundreds of military directives issued by the administration, and then the local Arab bodies would have enough authority to lay the foundations for autonomy.

Of all the impossible options for the West Bank and Gaza, the one that stands out is Dayan's "Unilateral Autonomy". In the document prepared by Benvenisti, it is made clear that unilateral autonomy might curtail the Israeli conquest but in its place would arise a permanent regime of subjugation. According to the unilateral autonomy plan there will be settlements and there will be

Israeli army security zones interspersed among which will be enclaves of autonomous Arabs, something like the Indian reservations or the Soweto Quarter of Johannesburg. In these enclaves the Arabs would be free to go to bed having returned from a day's work for the Jews. They would have no influence on their lives, their economy, their future. From time to time they would rebel and then the army would restore order.

The Alignment's option is not realistic in today's terms, but the autonomy option is bad and demoralizing.

A Palestinian State?

The changes that have taken place since 1967 have completely erased the green line, so that in 1981 it is unrealistic to talk about restoring it and establishing a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. The concensus in Israel totally rejects establishing such a State and the Israeli left that periodically talks about such a possibility doesn't realize that it no longer exists.

The economic integration, the proletarianization of the Arab villages, the security and settlement arrangements, and above all the new reality of a united Jerusalem make it impossible to reinstate the green line as a boundary between two sovereign states-one Jewish and one Arab.

Not the green line, not autonomy, and not the Jordanian-Palestinian option — what can the new reality in the occupied territories lead to?

The Terrible Price

In actuality the option of annexation has been exercised. The price that Israel has paid and is paying is terrible. The Begin government can boast that it has prevented the possibility of dividing Eretz Yisrael. The participants in Sharon's tours to the settlements come back excited about the new Zionism they saw in Kadum and Alon Moreh. But the truth is that annexation is entangling Israel in complications that will endanger its very existence. We have swallowed the Arab population and it is stuck in the throat of the State and choking it. There is no way one

can absorb over 40% Arabs in a Jewish State while continuing to rule over them at the price of moral deterioration, international isolation and obstacles to peace. Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture, took advantage of a weak and embroiled government to channel funds to the West Bank settlements. The magnitude of Israeli investment beyond the green line in recent years has reached the point where it has distorted the Israeli economy. The entire social system of Israel, as well as the national order of priorities, have been mortgaged to the huge payments for the settlements. Spiralling inflation, fluctuating between 100 and 200 percent, stems in great part from the unlimited channeling of funds to the settlements. From their inception all these settlements earn their keep via government funds. For example, 400 out of the 600 families in Kiryat Arba maintain themselves from public funds or government jobs: salaried yeshiva students, Rabbis, local municipality workers, local Ministry of Religion workers, army yeshiva, sports camps, field schools, Talmud Torah, etc. The Jewish employers don't have to withold income tax (for this purpose Jordanian Law is valid) from their workers. Gush Emunim members of the local municipality state openly that they have never had any budgetary problems.

Continuing the annexation and the rule over the Arabs is destructive to Israel. Are there other options?

A Five Year Israeli Trusteeship

After studying the various options and all the conditions, Meron Benvenisti tried to work up a plan for gradual disengagement and Jewish Arab reconciliation so that in the future a confederative solution would be a viable option. Benvenisti recommends freedom of political action for the Arabs repatriating those expelled, rescinding curbs on academic freedom, holding municipa elections, relieving the army of its ad ministrative duties in the occupied territorie and turning them over to a special cabine minister, returning the authority taken awa from Arab administrators, developing a

Arab economic infrastructure that wi become self sufficient, equalizing the socia welfare benefits between Arabs and Jew disbanding the para-military units of Gus. Emunim, establishing parliamentary and public oversight of the occupied territories. and most important of all - proclaiming that the State of Israel sees itself as a temporary trustee for a limited number of years.

Taking these steps would calm things down and enable the formulation of permanent solutions in the future which would take into account the national rights of Jews and Arabs. These could be incorporated in the Camp David peace process in cooperation with Egypt. Benvenisti believes that this is the only way out as opposed to other options

which are destructive or unrealistic.

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ISRAEL

RIGHT-WING ACTIVISM GROWS AT UNIVERSITIES

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Jun 81 pp 38-39

[Article by Danny Shapiro]

[Text]

In universities all over the world, the confluence of political sentiments apparent in the surrounding society are often magnified through a lens of idealism, energy and zeal characteristic of youth. Paris 1968, Teheran 1979, America in the late 1960's and countless other instances testify to the universality of this phenomenon. Such student revolutions, directed against the ruling establishment, have succeeded, or nearly succeeded, in bringing about revolutionary changes in governments and their policies.

In Israel we see a strange mutation of this normal and healthy process. The past few years have witnessed the emergence of extremist politics on Israeli campuses. These politics seem motivated less by idealism or an intellectual critique of the establishment, and more by sheer power-hunger often nurtured by fascistic ideological tendencies.

Anti-Democratic Tendencies

The ruling groups in the various Israeli student organizations have exhibited less and less tolerance for the democratic processes still respected in other areas of Israeli political life. In Tel Aviv University, for example, a board of inquiry invalidated the results of the February student elections on the basis of clear evidence of gross irregularities, such as ballot stuffing and other similar procedures. The university ordered new elections, and when the student union refused to comply, the administration rescinded its recognition of the union.

In the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, similar battles are waged between the student union and the university, not for the usual purpose of advancing the students' interests, but rather to perpetuate a power struggle designed to gain publicity for the student leaders and to enhance their political futures.

Such is the nature of the recent controversy surrounding Yisrael Katz, the chairman of the Hebrew University's student union and head of Kastel, an extreme rightwing student faction. In March, Katz and about twenty Kastel members tried to chainshut the door of Rector Raphael Mechoulam in protest against his decision to extend classes into part of the scheduled Passover vacation to make up for time lost as a result of a lecturers' strike earlier that month. No attempt was made to redress the union's grievances through normal channels such as negotiation. Rather, violence and intimidation were the first reactions. Nor was any effort made to gain student support for the union's demands. This reflected not only disdain for democratic mobilization but also the realization by katz and his followers that there was, in fact, little support for their demands. It seems that many Hebrew University students actually welcomed the extension of studies, and such a revelation would have put a serious crimp in Katz's headlinegrabbing antics.

The coup de grace of the whole affair was the demonstration organized by Kastel to protest disciplinary action being considered

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by the university against Katz. On Saturday night, April 4, about 50 protesters (in what was billed as a "mass demonstration") appeared gruesomely in Ku Klux Klan outfits on the university's Givat Ram campus and raved about the curtailment of student rights. Once again, the result was little student support, and a lot of headlines. That, after all, was the whole point.

Anti-Arab Activities

Aside from showy power campaigns that bear little relation to the interests of Israeli students, the main preoccupation of these right-wing groups seems to be the harrassment and intimidation of Arab and left-wing Jewish students. On one occasion in February, a gang of "Yesh" (the Hebrew acronym for "Our Israel" and Kastel's equivalent in Haifa's Technion University) members broke into a dormitory and attacked three Arab students peacefully sleeping in their beds. The Arabs sustained various injuries, but despite cries of protest from various groups, the aggressors have not been punished. Meanwhile, one of the Arab victims who managed to inflict some minor wounds on one of the attackers spent more time in jail than any of the Jewish suspects.

Unfortunately, this was not simply an isolated incident. In the past two years, there have been periodic incidents of right-wing Jewish attacks on Arab and Jewish targets, such as one last spring in Jerusalem when Tzachi Hanegbi (the Kastel leader, now chairman of the National Students Union and son of extremist MK Geula Cohen) led a chain-wielding gang against a peaceful gathering of Arab and Jewish students. This made clear the fact that the right is not satisfied in attacking only Arabs. As a Hebrew University philosophy student put it, "... it is the extreme right which is doing all the attacking, and they are not attacking 'extremists' but Arab students per se, and Jews who support any of the leftist parties."

An Ugly Mixture: Fascism

"Fascist" is an epithet at times randomly hurled by leftists at their opponents. But there is nothing flippant about applying such a label to these right wing student groups. Their contempt for democratic processes, their cynical power-grabbing, their dispensing with any effort to struggle for (or even inquire into) the interests of the students they represent, and their national-chauvinist outlook manifested in violence against Arabs and leftist Jews, put them squarely in the foscist camp.

Where Do They Gain Their Legitimacy?

The student right is at least tacitly aided and lent legitimacy from two sources: the student body at large, and the "establishment", i.e., the university administrations, local police and the larger political establishment.

It is true that Israeli academic rigor is very demanding, and that most Israeli students are in their 20's (having had to complete their army service before enrolling) and must often work to support themselves while studying. Nevertheless, there is no excuse for the extent of apathy on the part of most Israeli students towards campus politics. The least they can do, as the Jerusalem Post pointed out in an editorial on April 14, is exercise their basic political right once a year and vote the extremists out in student union elections. In the Hebrew University, less than one-third of the students exercised this right last June, leaving the field open for the small but tightly organized Kastel group to dominate the student union.

As for the authorities, it is only very recently that university administrators have awoken to the threat of the extreme right in their midst, as evidenced by the stands taken against the unions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in the past few months. Still, not enough is being done to ensure fair electoral practices, to protect Arab and Jewish students from attacks, and to punish the criminals responsible for this violence. The police and government, too, bear their share of responsibility for these outrages by their "see-no-evil" attitude towards campus fascism.

The author, Danny Shapiro, is a student of political science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and lives on Kibbuz Harel. He is a former member of Hashomer Hatzair Socialist-Zionist youth movement in North America, and edited that movement's magazine, Youth and Nation. in 1976-77.

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LIBYA

MISRATAH INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX CONTRACTS LET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81 p 1764

[Text] The West German firm of Brown Boveri und Co AG (BBC) in Mannheim announced on 23 June that Libya had ordered a cold rolling mill for the Misratah industrial complex. The order was addressed to a group of firms headed by Voest Alpine (Austria). Companies in the Brown Boveri group in Mannheim (Federal Republic of Germany) as well as Baden (Switzerland) will be responsible for all electrical facilities. The BBC's share amounts to 200 million Deutsche marks (\$90 million), out of an overall contract for the rolling mill costing 1 billion marks (\$450 million). In addition to the firms mentioned, another West German company, Dillinger Stahlbau GmbH, and a South Korean firm, Daewo Development Company, will participate in the project. We briefly announced the contract in MARCHES TROPICAUX on 6 February 1981 (p 305).

The cold rolling mill, the order for which was issued by the Libyan Office of Secretary of Heavy Industries (Iron and Steel Projects Heavy Industries, Tripoli), will have an annual capacity of 140,000 tons of cold rolled sheet metal and 100,000 tons of undipped sheet metal.

Contracts for the future Misratah industrial complex, a gigantic undertaking, have thus been let little by little. It should be recalled that in addition to the firms mentioned for the cold rolling mill, contracts have already been made with: the Japanese firm Kobe Steel (rolling mill for iron bars, wire and sections); an Austro-German consortium including Krupp, Mannesmann, Brown Boveri, Thoste Bau and Voest Alpine (electric steelmills); the German firm Korf Engineering (iron ore reducing plant); and with the Italian companies Technint and Fiat Engineering.

It should also be recalled that the entire Misratah project, of which we have spoken several times, represents an investment on the order of 16 billion French francs. The complex will include: two direct reducing plants producing 600,000 tons a year; a steelmill that will produce 610,000 tons of billets and 650.000 tons of sheet metal a year; a rolling mill producing 400,000 tons of iron bars and wire a year; a rolling mill producing sections (120,000 tons a year); two lines producing 580,000 tons of steel strip a year (hot rolling mill) and 140,000 tons by the cold rolling method; plus 100,000 tons of sheet metal.

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MOROCCO

USFP LEADER BLAMES GOVERNMENT FOR JUNE RIOT

PM140934 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Jul 81 p 17

[Interview with Abderahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Morocco's Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP] by Mohamed Selhami and Francois Soudan: "Instigators Must Be Sought on the Government Side"—date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: You knew very well that by starting a general strike now the Democratic Labour Confederation [CDT] made disturbances unavoidable. Were you not playing with fire?

Abderrahim Bouabid: Any instigators must be sought on the side of that panicstricken and irresponsible government. Law and order must be based primarily on negotiations. However, the authorities have continually refused to discuss the question of exorbitant price increases with the CDT,

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Would you have been able to control strike action on that day?

Abderrahim Bouabid: Certainly, but as soon as the police started shooting without warning, everything became uncontrollable.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Since they took place on the eve of the OAU summit in Nairobi, the riots weakened the Moroccan position. Has this not embarrassed you?

Abderrahim Bouabid: If anyone should be embarrassed by this, it should be the government. It was up to it to ensure that the Nairobi summit was treated as a matter of priority.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: It has been reported that the king personally asked you to accompany him to the OAU summit....

Abderrahim Bouabid: Yes, but I refused because I had been informed neither about the developments in the Sahara affair nor about the government's plans. The national security committee, which is supposed to deal with these matters and of which the USFP is a member, has not been convened for months. As for the king's celebrated peace plan, I know nothing about it. (JEUNE AFRIQUE note: Nonetheless Abdelwahed Radi, chairman of the USFP group in the Chamber of Representatives, accompanied Hassan II to Nairobi.)

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JEUNE AFRIQUE: Would you agree this time to discuss matters with Hassan II as you did following the March 1965 riots?

Abderrahim Bouabid: I do not know. If the question were to arise, I would discuss it with my comrades. \cdot

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What do you demand--a change of government?

Abderrahim Bouabid: As far as the immediate future is concerned, we demand the release of the imprisoned activists, the repeal of price increase and the restoration of freedoms, not to forget compensation for the families of victims of repression. As for the rest, to change individuals is not sufficient. It is necessary to change the orientation.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: This means that you want to participate in government.

Abderrahim Bouabid: Maybe, but on certain terms. We want to receive certain guarantees.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What sort of guarantees?

Abderrahim Bouabid: We will define them at an opportune moment. You see, we are a well-behaved opposition.

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SUDAN

BRIEFS

IRRIGATION PROJECTS--In June, the French firm SOGREAH [Grenoble Hydraulics Studies and Applications Company] will submit its technical and economic report on the feasibility of projects to be carried out on the 'Atbarah and Satit rivers. These projects involve the development of 25,000 hectares of land and the construction of a dam on the 'Atbarah River. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1857, 12 Jun 81 p 1588] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981] 11,464

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS WITH EGYPT—Within the framework of the Egyptian—Sudanese protocol signed in April, it has been decided to increase the capital of the Sudanese—Egyptian Agricultural Company from 10 million to 16 million Sudanese pounds. There are also plans for building an agricultural equipment assembly plant. Finally, it was confirmed that this company will grow some 26,000 hectares of different types of grain in Damazin next season. It should be recalled that the Egyptian—Sudanese protocol defining commercial trade involved some \$124 million. It provides for the following: Egyptian exports to Sudan including textiles, building materials, chemical products, rice and other goods; Sudanese exports to Egypt including meat, camels, sesame, melon seeds, leather and hides, scrap iron and scrap copper.

[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981] 11,464

TRANSPORT STUDY--Renault is now conducting a feasibility study on new projects for the Gezira Transport Company in Sudan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-RANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981] 11,464

FRENCH PRINTING PROJECT—An agreement between the Sudan Development Corporation and a group of French and Sudanese firms was concluded in April to ensure the establishment and organization of a printing plant costing a total of \$10 million. Participants in the project are mainly the French firm Mame and the president of Sharaf Company, Fath El Rahman El Bechir. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-RANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981] 11,464

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