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25 August 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 41/81)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ENERGY ECONOMICS

TURKEY

NO AGREEMENT REACHED WITH IRAQ ON OIL SUPPLIES

JN132108 London REUTER in English 2057 GMT 13 Aug 81

[Text] Ankara, 13 Aug (REUTER)--Turkey and Iraq ended two days of talks today without agreement on Ankara's requests for increased oil supplies and for higher fees for the transit of Iraqi oil through Turkey, government sources said.

But they said the two sides agreed to a substantial increase in Turkey's exports to Iraq in the talks between Turkish Government leaders and an Iraqi delegation led by First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan.

The sources said Iraq would supply Turkey with 8.5 million tons of oil next year, the same as last year and just under half the country's total needs. The sources said yesterday that Turkey would ask for an increase.

Turkey has also been pressing for an increase in the 38 cents per barrel fee paid by Baghdad for the transit of oil through the Iraqi pipeline from the Kirkuk oilfields to Turkey's Mediterranean terminal at Yumurtalik.

The sources said the issue was discussed by Mr Ramadan and Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu yesterday but no agreements were reached.

They said the two sides discussed a request from Turkey that the flow through the pipeline be increased but no details of the discussions were given.

The pipeline, which has become more important to Iraq since its war with Iran closed its loading terminals in the Gulf, is able to carry 35 million tons of oil a year and is at present working at about 85 per cent capacity.

The sources said the two countries signed an agreement yesterday to develop jointly Turkey's southeastern ports of Mersin and Iskenderun which have carried much of Iraq's imports since the Gulf war began.

They said the two sides agreed that Turkey's exports to Iraq would total about 400 million dollars this year compared with 50 million last year and that they would grow further in 1982.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

REASONS FOR FAILURE OF PUBLIC SPENDING REFORM

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 26 Jun 81 p 16

[Text] Rome--This year for the first time, the report to Parliament by the combined sections of the State Audit Court on the general accounting returns of the state for fiscal year 1980 includes a set of "analytical considerations," the purpose of which is to explain the reasons for the failure of the public spending reform. We publish below the main points of these "analytical considerations."

The final balance sheet for fiscal year 1980 underscores the difficulties that condition the management of public finances, tending to frustrate efforts to attain the principal objective of the budget reform introduced by 1978 Law 468. On the other hand, the need for a tight rein on the operative factors in the public sector is all the more irrenounceable in the current situation of the economy, characterized by an inflation rate that over the past 2 years has approached 20 percent.

Under the rationale of the reform--making the state the sole public body in deficit--the funding needs of the entire public sector load the state budget with incremental levels of spending, especially current spending, that piggyback the effects of the inflationary phenomenon. Fueled mainly by capital transfers, and increasingly burdened--as will be seen--by interest charges, current spending in 1980, in terms of appropriated funds, increased 37.8 percent (+32.2 percent in 1979). Thus, the process of decompartmentalizing spending begun in 1979, when the ratio between investments and current charges dropped from 27.4 percent to 20 percent owing to the decrease in the former, was consolidated; and in this context, very little relevance can be attached to the signs of improvement indicated by the 35.2-percent increase in capital account spending and the 46.1-percent increase in net, unsegregated, newly formed surpluses.

The increased demands are borne out, in the assets portion of the balance, by the unprecedented rise in ultimate revenues (+36.2 percent)--which is even higher in the tax subportion (+37.0 percent)--a rise that for the first time in many years is greater, in relative terms than that of expenditures.

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This increase also appears to outweigh the presumable effects of the fiscal drain and upsets the final estimates, attesting their unstableness. In any case, it diminishes the meaningfulness of the collection of public finance data on which Parliament bases its spending decisions.

Whatever may be the future possibilities of eventually recovering evaded taxes, the system at this point appears to be reaching its point of maximum returns, beyond which the only outlook for the control of public finances must be based on containment of spending.

Basically, the situation described above is borne out by the cash flow figures. From these there emerges, moreover, a seeming tendency (already taking shape with more marked characteristics in 1979) toward circumstantial stemming of the outflow through the slowing down of disbursements from the earmarked-funds account.

Especially symptomatic in this regard is the unusually slow rate of disbursements from the allocated current accounts portion of the budget (74.3 percent) which is decidedly lower than the rather modest one of 1979 and which with respect to 1978 represents a drop of all of 11 percentage points. And a direct consequence of this is the impressive figure of newly formed surpluses under Title I (almost 26,000 billion), enough to offset the speedup of outpayments from the outstanding liabilities account.

The factor that chiefly characterized 1979 management operations--namely, the postponement of outpayments--therefore raised, in 1980, the rate of disbursement of surpluses, but the effects of this speedup were amply reabsorbed by an eventual slowdown in disbursements from the appropriations account.

Residual Liabilities on the Rise

It is difficult to tell at this time whether this phenomenon is a circumstantial one and will therefore exhaust its effects during 1981, or whether it is itself the effect of a knowledgeable maneuver actuated in the decisional area intended by Law 468 to be reserved to Parliament. But in any case, a note of alarm was sounded by the residual liabilities balance, which as a whole increased by 30.3 percent (although the current liabilities balance increased by 42.1 percent) and which at the end of the fiscal year totaled 47,143 billion lire.

It is the picture that emerges from these observations that must provide the basis for evaluating the trend of unused funds in the appropriated funds account with respect to 1979--as regards the growth rate--and also with respect to forecasts. But this trend is in fact so linked to changes in final revenues and to the underestimation of these that it is not easy to draw from it conclusive indications that effective anti-inflationary action was actually carried out in 1980.

The virtual stability of loan repayment expenditures--after last year's upsurge--is reflected in an increase in the net balance to be financed, which in absolute terms is not far different from the increase in resort to the market (from 32,265 billion to 49,178 billion in the first case; from 47,573 billion to 62,384 billion in the second). In terms of percentage, the two balances increased by 39.5 percent and 31.1 percent respectively over 1979 balances.

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The rise in net indebtedness, in absolute figures, was somewhat less (from 30,589 billion to 41,796 billion: 36 percent), after purging the expenditure figures to eliminate financial operations, which increased considerably over 1979. The net unpaid (negative) balance in the current liabilities account rose at a slower rate in 1980 than in the two previous years (43 percent as compared with 73.4 percent in 1979 and 121.9 percent in 1978), going from 18,007 to 25,759 billion.

In terms of cash flow as well, the general management return is dominated by the level of increase in final revenues (+41.2 percent) and by the increase in outpayments (39.2 percent) which, from the standpoint of a comparison with 1979, in fact benefited from the hyped-up dynamic of disbursements in that year. Resort to the funds market, in particular, increased by 36.1 percent (from 40,214 to 54,748 billion), with similar percentage increases for outstanding balances: 35.2 percent for net indebtedness; 38.6 percent for net balance to be financed; and 42.9 percent for the current balance, which rose from 14,395 billion in 1979 to 20,577 billion in 1980.

The amounts of the above balances are--from the standpoint of the desired level of coverage of cash requirements--substantially lower than forecast. But a much more meaningful variance between forecast figures (even as regards appropriations) and actual final figures is found under Title IV receipts, relative to the opening of loan accounts, whose effective agreements and in-payments totaled a little over 13,000 billion.

The meagerness of these amounts as compared with those representing recourse to the money market (the two figures coincide, as can be seen, in the initial forecast) is reflected in a characteristic feature of the 1980 return: The increase of the financial deficit (or variation), which in terms of appropriations is 49,378 million (+81.7 percent over 1979) and which in terms of cash requirements (41,370 billion and +105 percent) quantifies the increasingly uncontrolled recourse to treasury debt for "coverage" of the structural shortfall.

This figure, when considered against the total outpayments (142,924 billion), expresses the level of budgetary dependency on the treasury (29 percent), which inherently compromises the cash budget's ability to function as an effective instrument of cash flow planning. Compared, on the other hand, with that of recourse to the money market, it indicates that the ratio of cash flow requirements covered by budgetary resources (medium- and long-term indebtedness) dropped from 40 percent in 1979 to 25 percent in 1980.

The so-called floating debt--particularly that consisting of treasury short-term notes, total circulation of which reached nearly 74,000 billion lire at the close of the fiscal year--thus now constitutes, in substance, by far the most used form of real and true indebtedness. And the tendency of treasury resources themselves--imposed by market propensities--to further fluidify state indebtedness increased, thanks to the competitiveness of the treasury notes, which tends to constrain the placement of longer-term bonds (and even of certificates of deposit) and is moreover beginning to make inroads on postal savings.

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This complex phenomenology produces two direct effects on the national budget: On the one hand, as has been said, the function of "coverage" now being performed by the floating debt requires that it be considered in the budget, if the latter, as a funding function, is not to be reduced to a mere formal compliance with the provisions of 1978 Law 468; and on the other hand, the burden of interest charges, which is being made heavier by interest on the treasury notes themselves, is having an ever greater impact on the national current spending level.

The increase in current expenditures, as was pointed out in the beginning, was mainly determined by the increase in current transfers (+44.1 percent over 1979 and 55.3 percent in terms of impact on Title I); but the impact of public financing demands on the national budget involves also capital account transfers, which rose 36.4 percent to a total weight of 62.7 percent of investments.

The Transfer Dynamic

The substantial total of transfers reflects, in large measure, the outflows from the national budget to autonomous enterprises, social security agencies, regional and local administrative bodies, and the other bodies of the broadened public sector.

While the bringing together of all other deficits into the national budget by Law 468 has enhanced the transparency of information relating to them, it has not in itself resolved the substantive problems. Absent in 1980 were decisions designed to rebalance internally and tidy up institutionally the major compartments of the public sector (social security, public health, regional and local finance, public enterprises and credit facilities). Thus the increase in transfers under the national budget was offset and at times rendered useless by the continued existence of endogenous phenomena generative of imbalances.

Regional finance was characterized by an expansion of the demand on transfer funds from the national budget, deriving from the indexation (correlated to the course of overall tax revenues) of the Investments Fund, which increased by 43.7 percent in 1980; from expansion of the Public Health Fund, whose current expenditures totaled 17,485 billion representing an increase of 47.3 percent over 1979; and from the mechanisms that feed--and with predetermined sectoral allocations--the Fund for Regional Developmental Plans.

This expansionary flow of revenues into the Regions does not meet with a capacity for expenditures by the Regions, above all, for investments. On the other hand, the state's transfer disbursement process is often characterized by complex coordinative procedures between state and Region that combine to delay its actual translation into payments. The result is a situation characterized by the simultaneous presence of large residuals of assets and growing residuals of liabilities--factors that evidently, far from offsetting each other, attest to a dual malfunction: in the administrative structure of the state and in that of the Regions.

In the institutional configuration realized to date, there is an unsatisfied requirement for effective coordination between national planning and that of the Regions, with the instrumentalities already provided by the reform legislation remaining largely unused.

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As regards local finances, the system adopted for 1980, and substantially repeated for 1981, continues ensuring increased current transfers by the state in line with the inflation rate, while the role assigned to the Savings and Loan Fund offers possibilities for expanding investment expenditures, which already evidenced a particularly strong dynamic in 1980. Even in this sector, however, equilibrium is entrusted to appropriations extended on a year-to-year basis, with no substantial progress being made through Parliament by the structural provisions under discussion in the Chambers with respect to the reform of system of local bodies and to a 3-year plan for rebalancing local finances.

Transfers, participations and grants to enterprises continue to be characterized by an upward trend. Capital account transfers to enterprises (effective commitments totaled 2,723 billion) increased by 64 percent in 1980, and grants to public enterprises (state participations and ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]) more than doubled. These trends reflect a tendency--difficult to stem during periods of crisis and of high inflation--to increase public financial support of the enterprise system. But it is precisely awareness of the medium-to-long-term characteristics of this tendency that makes strict monitoring of efficient use of the resources allocated to the enterprise sector indispensable.

The need emerges as one of major importance, in the field of credit facilities (toward which, for the most part, the resources intended for enterprises gravitate), to define a sharper line of demarcation between the responsibilities of the administrative authorities empowered to disburse public moneys (Ministry of Treasury, Ministry of Industry, and even the Fund for Southern Italy) and the functions of the credit institutions; and of equal importance, in the field of public enterprises, is the need to reconcile overall planning of public enterprise sector operations with entrepreneurial autonomy and operational and management economies.

Disorganization of Contracting

The system of rules and regulations governing contracting continues to be characterized by an incoherent set of norms at the legislative and regulatory levels, that have piled up with time in a process of stratification lacking any unitary rationale.

The result is a manner of proceeding that does not clearly identify a point of balance between the demands the government must satisfy as regards guarantees and impartiality and those placed upon it as regards efficient management of expenditures, and that neglects to consider the contractual instrumentality in planning the implementation of industrial policy and promotion of research.

The uncertainties of the regulatory system generate interpretative difficulties on the part of the government and possible doubts as to the legislative system on which it is required to base any case in point. All of this contributes to slowness of administrative action and may generate a psychological climate of distrust on the part of the private contractor, which in turn does not contribute to proper administration of the contract. The lawmaker has, in many instances, shown awareness of the danger of such slowness and has laid down norms substantially designed to speed up procedures, but so laced with sectoral provisions and provisions for specific programs that they have ended up accelerating the breakdown of the system.

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Despite the large number of laws on the subject, the existing legislation does not provide adequate regulation with respect to certain contractual typologies (for example, as regards high-technology contracts) which are assuming substantial relevance as a result of legal problems to which they give rise as well as from a financial standpoint.

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POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EUROPEAN PACIFISM INCREASING; MARCH ON PARIS, NOT MOSCOW

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 31 Jul - 6 Aug 81 pp 46-48

[Article by Branko Lazitch: "Pandemic Pacifism"]

[Text] Enemy within for Lenin, external ally for Brezhnev, pacifism is gaining ground throughout Western Europe. Except in France.

"Down with NATO nuclear plans!"; "No nuclear weapons in West Germany!" In the main street of Muenster (FRG) pennants are streaming in the wind. It is 12 July, the 21st year of the Peace March for a Denuclearized Europe, organized by the Western pacifistic movements. It left Copenhagen on 12 June, and will arrive in Paris on 6 August, after passing through the FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

That evening, in the course of a huge rally in Muenster's town square, orators take turns at the podium. Their favorite targets: the United States, NATO, Euromissiles. The Soviet Union gets off pretty easy. Its willingness to negotiate is emphasized... A specter haunts the countries of the Atlantic alliance, the specter of pacifism. All of them have been touched by it in turn: Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and above all the Federal Republic of Germany. The lone exception: France. "The French have four communist ministers in their government. Most of the other Atlantic allies have their pacifists and neutralists in the opposition, in the majority, even in the government. Not immediately, but over the medium term, we will be able to tell which of these effects will turn out to be most destructive for the cohesion of the West." These words were spoken by an advisor to the Reagan Administration, at the conclusion of a brief trip to Europe. Everything began on 12 December 1979 with NATO's twofold decision--which did not involve France--to embark on nuclear rearmament and to negotiate with the USSR. With respect to nuclear weapons, the implementation of the program was not to begin until the fall of 1983, with the installation of Pershing-2 rockets and cruise missiles. No date was fixed for negotiations with Moscow.

The Soviet reaction to this "nuclear escalation" was immediate. The USSR guarantees its strategic supremacy with the installation of SS-20 missiles pointed at Europe. It intends to safeguard that supremacy. It also gives out the orders for a massive mobilization in the West against the Atlantic alliance plans. A "peace offensive" is launched, an operation which the Soviets, the Western communist parties, and satellite international organizations have known how to do for a very long time.

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In France, the PCF is in the vanguard of the anti-nuclear armament movement. On 20 December 1979 it organized the first demonstration. As the anti-PS campaign was then at its apogee, it became yet one more means of stigmatizing the "socialist betrayal." Marchais was leading the procession, along with Fiterman and Aragon. He did not hide his satisfaction when the crowd shouted: "Mitterrand, accomplice to NATO!"

At the same time, other European communist parties tried to take action on behalf of the struggle for peace. But an unexpected event destroyed the operation: on 27 December, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and ruined the credibility of the "peace offensive" in Europe.

However, relief was slowly on its way, with the addition of various leftist movements: Christians, social-democrats, liberals, nuclear energy opponents, pacifists, anti-militarists, and ecologists. Their common denominator: opposition to the installation of the Pershing-2's in Europe, support for bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear arms limitation. Soviet leaders immediately seized the importance of this phenomenon: this pacifist movement was working "objectively" to their advantage. It was a break in their favor. It served to reinforce an asymmetry which was increasingly visible on both sides of Europe: in the East, military and ideological rearmament and, in the West, moral and military disarmament. These pacifists-neutralists were not dismissing both the superpowers as non-suited. Reagan was the ideal scapegoat. Was it not he who refused to commit himself when the Soviets repeated throughout the year that they wanted to negotiate?

Neutralist from the desire to detach Europe from America and pacifist in its opposition to any nuclear arms and even to arms per se, the movement is paradoxically more prosperous today where the communist party is weakest and social-democracy strongest: Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, West Germany.

In Great Britain, the Labor Party declared itself in 1980 in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament. This position goes further than simple rejection of the Pershing-2. It throws into question the very presence of the country in the Atlantic alliance. As for negotiations with the USSR, Labor leader Michael Foot considers them urgent, even without reference to the other issue, the installation of the Pershing-2's. In Norway, where the socialists are in power--in a minority government--and where legislative elections will be held on 4 September, the present government team is trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. On the one hand, it does not officially endorse the Soviet position on denuclearization of Northern Europe, a region where in fact NATO has never deployed nuclear arms. On the other hand, the Socialist Party has made denuclearization a part of its long-term program for 1982-1985. And the vice president of the Socialist Party, Forde, went to Moscow in early June to discuss it.

In the Netherlands, since the legislative elections on 26 May, the pacifist parties make up the majority in Parliament. According to a survey, 68 percent of the people are against the stationing of nuclear arms on their territory. "Nothing but tulips," was the PRAVDA headline congratulating the country on its evolution into the vanguard of pacifism in the Atlantic alliance.

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But it is in Germany that the movement is taking on the greatest proportions, both in public at large and within the political parties. And first in line is the SPD, which has been in power for 12 years now. The pacifist tradition goes back a long way in that party, as does hostility to atomic weapons. The antinuclearists of today love to recall the 1958 Bundestag debate and the words of the SPD's military expert at the time: "The decision to equip both parts of our country with atomic weapons will go down in history as a disaster equal to the vote to give Hitler full powers in 1933." That deputy was Helmut Schmidt, who has been chancellor since 1974 and the principal defender of the installation of the Pershing-2's in Germany.

Today, the pacifist and antinuclear tide is inundating all segments of the SPD. First of all the youth, the famous Jusos, who have often been at odds with the leadership of the SPD: their 320,000 members at their congress in late June voted unanimously against the installation of the Pershing and cruise missiles. According to their president, Willi Piecyk, "it is now a question of developing a security policy which will not be dictated by the strategic interests of the United States."

In several Laender, the SPD organizations have embarked on a similar course. Bade Wurtemberg is calling for reconsideration of the twofold Atlantic alliance decision of 1979 at the next SPD congress (spring 1982). The SPD congress of Southern Hesse, by a clear majority of delegates, has proposed re-examining the 1979 decisions and criticized Ronald Reagan for the absence of dialogue with the USSR.

The unionists, closely tied to the SPD, are marching in lock-step. Some, such as Eugen Loderer, president of the federation of metallurgists (2 million members), are expressing reservations about the 1979 decision. Others openly signed a neutralist and anti-American manifesto, the "Krefeld Appeal." Its promoters boast of having already collected a million signatures, an impressive but probably exaggerated figure.

The youth syndicate, with 1,300,000 members the most powerful youth movement in Germany, is calling for immediate negotiations to create a denuclearized zone in Europe.

The two churches, Protestant and Catholic, are involved in the fight. The 19th congress of the Protestant church, held in Hamburg in June, turned into a forceful expression of pacifist and neutralist sentiment. The presence of Chancellor Schmidt at a controversial debate did not discourage his opponents: "Your policy scares me!" was the remark hurled at him by a 17-year-old high school student.

"A Position Immoral in the Extreme"

Msr Hans Otto Weber, the Protestant bishop of Hamburg, organized a monster demonstration which drew more than 100,000 participants on 20 June. With quotations from the 34th Psalm, the Sermon on the Mount, and Bible passages relating to peace, the bishop provided the justification for a movement which is much more political than Christian. The Catholics? Last November, the German section of the organization Pax Christi published a document titled "Disarmament and Security." In the opinion of Bishop Georg Moser, the refusal of the European governments to openly discuss security betrays "a position immoral in the extreme."

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The ecologists also subscribe to this pacifist activity. They have formed an "ecology and peace coordination committee." The tendency even showed up in the Liberal Party at its congress in May: out of 387 delegates, 103 voted against the Atlanticist positions of the minister of foreign affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher.

This cleavage between pacifists and Atlanticists is symbolized by the position of the two principal leaders of the SPD. The pacifist is former chancellor Willy Brandt; the Atlanticist is Helmut Schmidt. The first has long since been calling for detente instead of nuclear rearmament. The second urges an effort on both counts. Schmidt is better received in Washington than Moscow. For Brandt, it is precisely the reverse. In a one-month period, the USSR ostentatiously illustrated its critical attitude toward Schmidt and its preference for Brandt. The present chancellor was accused by PRAVDA of aligning himself with the United States, an unprecedented attack on a sitting SPD chancellor. By contrast, Brandt's arrival in Moscow on 29 June was greeted with unprecedented ceremony.

With good reason. In fact, the Soviet leaders see in Brandt one of those rare European politicians capable of exerting a twofold influence: within the FRG, as president of the SPD, and outside it as president of the Socialist International. In his first role, Brandt can threaten Schmidt, and in the second he can slow down, indeed perhaps block, implementation of the Brussels decisions.

It is obviously impossible to know what conversation transpired in the Kremlin. But one can measure the degree of Soviet satisfaction from certain outward signs. When Brandt made his speech before the Kremlin leadership, PRAVDA published the entire text. A year earlier, Schmidt's speech before the same areopagus had been censored. The difference in treatment is easily explained. Schmidt had challenged Soviet policy in Afghanistan and on nuclear matters: censored. Brandt did not risk that. On 2 July, the day of his departure, Brezhnev accompanied Brandt to the airport, which is not obligatory, even for heads of state. During the ride out to the airport, he confided to him that the Politburo discussed his proposals for detente and peace. And, as if to show that he had only remained in Moscow to meet Brandt, Brezhnev left for vacation the following day.

It is in the context of Soviet military superiority that the Western pacifists have chosen to organize their march through Europe. It is true that they do not seem tormented by that supremacy. Nor by another fact of capital importance: the Soviet system leaves no room for pacifism. It was Lenin himself who vetoed it: "We must struggle against pacifism; it is a platform directed against our revolutionary party." Brezhnev himself has just given the proof that this injunction remains in effect. In conjunction with the Peace March from Copenhagen to Paris, four conservative Danish deputies had thought to send a modest "peace car" from the Danish capital to Moscow. In all some 30 individuals who were supposed to arrive 9 August at Red Square and unfurl a banner bearing a single word against nuclear arms in both East and West: "Nyet!" the official Soviet response to this request was also "nyet!" The bus trip to Red Square will not take place. But the march on Paris continues. On the very first day Brezhnev sent the marchers a friendly message. He was doing what Lenin counselled his foreign affairs minister, Tchitcherin, to do in 1922: make use of pacifism to contribute to the defeat of the enemy, the bourgeoisie.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

COMMUNIST MINISTERS: DUTIES VERSUS PCF PRINCIPLES

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10-16 Jul 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Michel Jacques with Francoise Chirot and Francine Rivaud]

[Text] The four communist ministers of the second Mauroy government are now discovering the realities of power. In opposition, their party had ready-made solutions for every problem. Today, in the real world, they have to take the facts into account, and their actions may end up contradicting positions of principle taken by the PCF. These thoughts are suggested by an examination of the issues with which the new ministers will have to deal.

Transport

Charles Fiterman, minister of state for transport, with a department which stands fourth in terms of budgetary allocations with Fr 39 billion at its disposal, will have no easy task. Like his predecessor, Joel Le Theule, he might well think before long that he has been given "a ministry that is impossible to govern." It is difficult reconciling the conflicting interests of various transport means, talking with the unions, supervising big public enterprises (260,000 wage-earners at SNCF [French National Railroads], 25,000 at Air France), while at the same time protecting the interests of passengers. The first uproar: the increase in tariffs for public transport, which the Socialists want to keep to a "modest level." Unlike other years, the metro fare did not increase on 1 July this time. Who would pay the deficit (Fr 3.4 billion) if the increase were delayed until 1 January 1982? Can one ask the industries, who are paying for 26 percent of RATP's [Independent Parisian Transport System] operating expenses, for an extension at a time when many of them are themselves having problems? There is of course the state, which is already underwriting 70 percent of the deficit, and the general councils of the Ile-de-France, who previously have refused to pay, when they were predominantly communist. But is it fair for the taxpayers to be subjected to still further strain so the users can continue to pay only one-third the real cost of a ticket? He has also inherited a grim situation with respect to the railroads. SNCF has requested tariff hikes for rush-hour runs of the high-speed Paris-Lyon train. The new minister is going to have to respond. Awkward: can one take the risk of subsidies becoming the general rule, while the user will have no other alternative to the high-speed train between Paris and Lyon? Over the network as a whole, SNCF wanted a tariff hike of 13.2 percent for 1981. The Barre government gave it 7 percent in March. If Fiterman does not decide to increase the rates, the state will have to pay Fr 870 million.

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Aviation, finally, will also require decisions. Is the government going to approve Air France's request to buy Boeing 737's? Another sensitive issue: the Airbus A 320 with 150 seats. In this European project, the West Germans are hesitant and the British are only prepared to pay for their own share. Will France therefore underwrite a larger share of its cost?

Fiterman's only consolation: the dockworkers, the fisherman, and the sailors are no longer his concern. They are now the province of his socialist colleague, Louis Le Pensec, the minister of maritime affairs.

Civil Service

Anicet Le Pors, the communist minister in charge of the civil service and administrative reform, is now France's largest employer. Salary levels, careers, and the working conditions of two million employees will ride on his decisions.

Raymond Barre provoked grumbling among the young ladies at the PTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telecommunications], customs inspectors, and other administration employees by treating them as "well-off." Will it be sufficient for the Left to summon them to national solidarity and reestablish their duties to order to make them accept their present salaries, titles, and "privileges"?

This is the poisoned gift that has been given to Anicet Le Pors. Among the various thorny issues is that of salaries. After the 3.4 percent increase of 1 July, the unions still have two demands. Tired of racing after inflation in the cost of living, they are demanding a system that will anticipate inflation. For the lower pay grades, they are demanding a concrete revalorization policy. The ceiling for these remunerations is generally 344 on the index, or Fr 4,694 per month, not to mention housing allowance.

These allowances, scales, indices, grades and premiums of all sorts make the wage system of the civil service a chaotic mess. Negotiations should be started on the revamping of that system, starting from the report produced by Claude Lasry, councillor of state.

If this is actually carried out, will the public employees, that elite class of jobholders, agree to see their benefits eroded by unemployment deductions? Naturally, the unions would agree, but only if everyone pays. "Like for the drought tax," one unionist recalls.

Anicet Le Pors will also have to create the jobs that have been promised and get the 500,000 auxiliaries on the rolls. But his biggest challenge may well be to make the administration less bureaucratic while increasing its size. "A labor worthy of Penelope," predicted his predecessor, Catherine Lalumiere.

Health

Jack Ralite, the communist minister of health, should logically be expected to have a policy diametrically opposed to that of Giscardian Jacques Barrot. In order to re-absorb the social security deficit, the latter made efforts to "control" illness-related expenses. At once he became--in the eyes of Georges Marchais' party--the symbol of "social reaction." But will his successor's actions be as different as one might suppose from PCF slogans?

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The question is inevitable, for the financial equilibrium of the health-insurance system remains fragile. Now that they are in the government, the communists know that any laxity regarding expenditures would lead to deficit, unless welfare assessments were to be augmented even further. And should they be tempted to forget, there is someone there to remind them: Nicole Questiaux, the socialist minister of national solidarity responsible for social security, who holds the purse strings.

Jack Ralite's first responsibility will be administration of the hospital sector, which alone is responsible for more than half the outlays required by the health-insurance system. Barrot was accused, in L'HUMANITE, of "breaking" the hospitals, for having tried to put a lid on the mushrooming budgets, and for having decided to eliminate beds. However, facing the facts, will the new minister unhesitatingly decide to reverse the course of things, at the risk of coming back to the same problems that confronted his predecessor?

Another unknown: relations with the doctors. In order to reduce prescriptions, which are one source of expenditures, Barrot had tried to curb the demographic explosion in the medical corps (100,000 practitioners in 1980, 150,000 in 1985) by getting a law passed which limited the number of medical students. He had also concluded a new protocol between Social Security and the doctors, which instituted a "second sector," in which patients received lesser reimbursement. Socialists and communists are opposed to those reforms. But as economies will certainly have to be made, medical fees might have to be lowered. A test: the integrated health centers. This socialist project disturbs liberal doctors. What position will Jack Ralite take on this point, on which the party does not have a doctrinal position? Curiously, the communists have always been less aggressive on the question of free medical care than have the socialists.

They may, however, show a more hardline position on medications policy. There again, Barrot had tried to keep the lid on costs, but by means of flexible control which allowed laboratories to continue to manage themselves. For the socialists and the communists, this is the very activity of the pharmaceutical industry which needs to be controlled: they are accused of carrying out a policy of super-profits by means of a proliferation of patent medicines, many of which are doing "double duty." Remedies, therefore, could go all the way from strengthened price controls to a refusal to reimburse for certain medications. In any case, the predicted nationalization of the three big pharmaceutical groups should profoundly alter the situation in this sector.

Vocational Training

Marcel Rigout, the minister of vocational training, will not be starting from scratch. For about 10 years, France has been endowed with an impressive arsenal in this domain: continuing education since 1970, job agreements which by various training formulas aimed at the establishment of a bridge connecting youth and industry, and which were replaced in 1980 by a "5-year employment plan." There were, however, serious gaps: 100,000 young people are still leaving school each year with no vocational training.

The Marchais program calls for a million youths, within the next 2 years, to be given training or real apprenticeship. The PCF is still asking for additional resources to be given immediately to technical education and the possibility for skilled workers to qualify. This in turn requires more money and once again poses the crucial question of financing.

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This will predictably cause tensions with industry, if it is implemented, because industry is already making a large financial contribution to training. Especially since the unions, accusing certain employers of "diverting" vocational training funds for their immediate advantage, are calling for joint production committees to exercise the right to audit.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

POLL ON BACKGROUND, ATTITUDES OF PCE MEMBERS ANALYZED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 Jul 81 pp 22-25

[Article by Jose Manuel Arijal]

[Text] The internal struggle between Euro-renovators and pro-Soviets, with the Carrillo people in the middle wanting to embrace both groups, could affect communist voters on the eve of their 10th Congress. PCE [Spanish Communist Party] voters have an acceptable living standard, feel that a person can be a good Catholic and a good Communist both, have abandoned the idea of revolution and are mostly skilled workers and white-collar employees.

Like their party, communist voters are caught between moderation and the old inclinations. Older voters are the hardest-liners: they prefer friendship with Russia and call themselves Communists. In contrast, almost one-fourth of voters under age 50 feel more socialist than communist. This is a worrisome attitude for the party with the general elections coming up, especially if we think about what happened in the French voting.

All of these facts must be taken into account by the 10th PCE Congress, which is going to reelect Santiago Carrillo secretary general for the fifth time this week. He is the country's only political leader who played a prominent role in the Civil War and who has been at the head of a party for more than 20 years.

Along with Carrillo, two persons will become "dauphins" in their new posts as deputy secretaries. The names that have been mentioned the most so far for the posts are Nicolas Sartorius and Jaime Ballesteros. The former will guarantee the CC00 [Workers Commissions] that the party remains labor-oriented, and the latter will strengthen the party machine. Older pro-Soviets, Carrillo loyalists and the Eurocommunist renovators will serve in the remaining leadership organs.

The key struggle will be for the proportions that each of these factions is able to secure.

At the Ninth Congress Santiago Carrillo relied on the cadres of CC00 at the expense of those whom he called "the silver tongues." The silver tongues, intellectuals and professionals, fled in droves from the party. The CC00 people will now bolster their positions. They are young leaders from the interior, as opposed to the old politicians from the outside. But there can be

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no worker party without intellectuals to support it. If Carrillo turned to the labor movement at the previous congress, he will now have to avail himself of the best trained Eurocommunist cadres that he still has left.

Carrillo's ability to make timely shifts and moves is beyond question, but within the party he is criticized for his lack of strategy and his politics. "The party is adrift," say the Eurocommunists, who see their approach stymied "by serious mistakes in running the party, by an alarming propensity for ambiguity and reaction and by an enormous lack of sensitivity to important aspects of the ideological and political struggle in Spain today." The mood of this congress, the 10th for Spanish Communists in 60 years, will be quite different from the ninth.

In April 1978, the enthusiasm over a still recent legalization; the dominance of the CCOO in the labor union sphere; the battalion of intellectuals, artists and famous figures at its disposal; the hope that the 1979 general elections would give the PCE a much higher percentage of the votes because fears at the 1977 voting, which Communist leaders felt justified the party's meager success, had by then been overcome; the understanding with the UCD [Democratic Center Union], and above all, the role in government that they thought was within reach... These dreams dazzled the Ninth Congress, the first legal one since 1932.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party will open its doors in a completely different atmosphere. Almost all of the hopes on which the optimism of the previous 1978 gathering was based have faded like a beautiful summer dream.

In just 3 years, the Communist union's policy is in disarray and it stands equal to the Socialist union in votes; the intellectuals have fled in droves; the 1979 elections have confirmed a disappointing ceiling of 10 percent of the voters; the honeymoon with the UCD shifted surprisingly from bed to divorce; and, alas, the sought-after coalition government has been pitilessly cast into the archives of history.

To top it all off, the newspaper MUNDO OBRERO, forgotten by its readers, has also gone into the archives. Now the Communists are divided amid internal crises, and even the unchallengeable Santiago Carrillo is being run down left and right.

What has happened in the Communist Party?

Baffled, their longstanding leaders and members are unable to explain. The older militants who battled Franco are crushed by the treatment that implacable reality has accorded them. They feel that they do not deserve it. They offer confused explanations of "disillusionment," "fear" or "anticommunism," but all indications are that their own mistakes are most to blame.

Ideologically, there have been chasm-like gaps between pro-Soviets and Eurocommunists; in terms of organization, there have been shortcomings in regional administration, as well as nationalist tensions; and politically, the party has seen the failure of a program that the other parties did not accept and that some of its members criticized. With regard to the loss of membership, the excuse

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can be cited that the same thing has happened to other parties. The departure of dozens of high-level cadres and prominent leaders has taken place only in the PCE, however.

"There are disagreements and differences of opinion; that is obvious," concedes Santiago Carrillo in his party's newspaper. The following is his summary of the strife among the three factions (pro-Soviet, Euro-Carrillistas and Euro-renovators) into which his organization is divided: "There are sectarian and dogmatic positions; there is a Eurocommunist approach, and then I don't know whether within or outside the Eurocommunist approach there is what we call a radical renovating approach."

The seriousness of the problem has convinced Carrillo that once the 10th Congress is over, the PCE must "undertake an Operation Return, that is to say, building the party from the bottom up." With this idea the Communist Party could begin its own "democratic break," a break with the methods and practices of the underground and with the vices that it shouldered over these years and that prevented it from assimilating the new situation and fully understanding its constituency.

With two million voters, the PCE is a large party, the third largest in Spain, as well as the third largest among Western European Communist parties, surpassed only by Italy and France. Unlike Italy, however, it is not the dominant leftist party, and compared to France, it is much weaker in relation to the Socialists.


With a membership that consists overwhelmingly of men (89 percent), industrial workers (61 percent) and older people (28 percent over age 50), the PCE is having a most difficult time getting used to the idea that it is not the party of the working class but rather a party of workers in a developed society in which only one-fourth of wage earners work in industry.

If all too many of its members come from labor, the same concentration can be seen in its constituency. Some 63 percent of communist votes are cast in Catalonia, Andalusia and Madrid. What is more, one of three PCE votes is from the metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona.

"You can see the strength of the PCE," chant the Communists. But not only does its strength lie in just a few regions, but victory for the party hinges on two metropolitan areas as well. This is the PCE's big weakness. This is why the conflicts in the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], the Catalan Communists (who garnered 20 percent of the legislative votes and 31 percent of the municipal votes in the cities ringing Barcelona), are of great significance to Carrillo. If a split were to occur in Catalonia, it would destroy the Communist team at the polls.

According to polls published in the Sociological Report of the FOESSA Foundation, 60 percent of the PCE's voters (working population) are manual laborers, 30 percent are white-collar workers and 4 percent are officials. Some 92 percent belong to the lower-middle and working class and 80 percent are not practicing Catholics, although only 9 percent consider themselves atheists.

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Key:

1. Deputies per province
2. Municipal strength of the PCE
3. Councilmen
 - Total in all municipalities
 - Province capitals
4. Mayors
 - All municipalities
 - Province capitals
 - Municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants

As far as their living standard is concerned, those who vote Communist have a very acceptable level of consumer durables ownership: refrigerators, television sets, homes, cars, etc. According to the above report, the Catalan voters have the highest living standard and are, in addition, more ideologically moderate than the rest of the country's Communist supporters.

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It is odd and contradictory that in the area with the greatest pro-Soviet influence among members of the Communist Party, its constituency is the most moderate. On a 1 to 10 scale, 17 percent of PSUC voters place themselves on the first two rungs of the left, compared to 43 percent among PCE voters (excluding Catalonia).

The moderation of PSUC voters can also be seen in terms of preferred ideology. Some 75 percent of PCE voters outside Catalonia prefer communist ideology, while 17 percent prefer socialist ideology. Astonishingly, 43 percent choose communist ideology in Catalonia, and 39 percent socialist ideology.

In other words, if we go by these data, a pro-Soviet Catalan communism like the one that emerged from its last congress could be looking at empty ballot boxes at the upcoming electoral contest. It goes without saying that some hard-line factions of the PSUC are dogmatically blind to this sociological reality.

It would not even be going too far to suggest that if the Catalans replaced the "S" in their acronym PSUC with a "C" for "Communist," they would lose votes. The FOESSA study comments: "The PCE is clearly to the left of its Catalan branch and is more homogeneous ideologically. Practically no Communist voter today considers himself an ideological revolutionary, an approach he relegates to the parties to the left of the PCE."

If we consider, on the one hand, the numerical importance of the PSUC and, on the other, its pro-Soviet and anti-Eurocommunist zeal, it is no mystery that the shrewd Carrillo has realized the danger that this poses to his party and has gone all out to bring the Catalans back to the Eurocommunist fold. The next general elections will tell whether he made his move in time or whether the bywords "Soviet" and "Afghan" will frighten the voters.

The 10th Congress is going to gather together a PCE that has lost much of its social impact and that is not too sure of its current identity, as it tries not to become a second Socialist Party or the "left wing of the PSOE" [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], as some of the intellectuals and professionals who have left its ranks are saying.

In recent years, people correctly said, the Communists had much more social and political influence than their votes provided them. Today, the opposite is true, and the congress will unquestionably discuss how to reverse the nose-dive in political influence by a party that for the first time in its history is a sincere defender of the democratic system.

Age and Attitude as to Whether a Person Can Be Both a Good Catholic and a Good Communist, Among PCE-PSUC Voters in 1979

| | PCE-PSUC Voters | | |
|--|-----------------|-------|-----|
| | under 29 | 30-49 | 50+ |
| <u>A Catholic can be a good Communist:</u> | | | |
| Yes | 83 | 79 | 71 |
| No | 14 | 18 | 29 |
| Don't know/no response | 3 | 3 | |

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Age and Religiosity of Those Who Voted for the PCE-PSUC in 1979

| | <u>under 29</u> | <u>PCE-PSUC Voters</u> | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------------|
| | | <u>30-49</u> | <u>50+</u> |
| <u>Consider themselves:</u> | | | |
| Very good Catholics | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Practicing | 5 | 10 | 9 |
| Not practicing too often | 20 | 21 | 25 |
| Nonpracticing | 34 | 32 | 41 |
| Indifferent | 29 | 20 | 12 |
| Atheists | 8 | 12 | 9 |
| Another religion | -- | -- | -- |
| No comment | -- | 3 | 1 |

Occupation of PCE Voters (Working Population) at 1979 Legislative Elections

| <u>Occupation</u> | <u>PCE-PSUC</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| Farm workers | 10 |
| Unskilled workers | 18 |
| Skilled workers | 32 |
| Low-level white-collar workers, clerks, foremen | 15 |
| Intermediate-level white-collar workers and technicians | 15 |
| Intermediate-level officials | 2 |
| High-level officials | 2 |
| Businessmen and executives | 1 |
| No information | 3 |

Age and Ideology Among PCE-PSUC Voters in 1979

| | <u>under 29</u> | <u>30-49</u> | <u>50+</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|
| <u>Ideology:</u> | | | |
| Revolutionary | 4 | 3 | -- |
| Communist | 64 | 68 | 75 |
| Socialist | 23 | 22 | 16 |
| Social Democratic | -- | 1 | 2 |
| Christian Democratic | -- | 1 | 1 |
| Other | -- | 2 | 4 |
| None | 4 | 3 | -- |
| Don't know/no comment | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Standard of Living of PCE-PSUC Voters in 1979

| <u>Own:</u> | <u>Potential Voters of</u> | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| | <u>PCE-PSUC</u> | <u>PCE</u> | <u>PSUC</u> |
| Refrigerator | 92 | 91 | 97 |
| TV | 89 | 90 | 86 |

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| | | | |
|-----------------|----|----|----|
| Bath or shower | 87 | 85 | 95 |
| Home | 65 | 69 | 46 |
| Washing machine | 63 | 62 | 68 |
| Car | 49 | 47 | 57 |
| Camera | 39 | 38 | 42 |
| Record player | 35 | 32 | 49 |
| Tape recorder | 30 | 31 | 24 |
| Dishwasher | 6 | 7 | 4 |

Age and Foreign Policy Attitudes of Those Who Voted for the PCE-PSUC in 1979

| | <u>under 29</u> | <u>30-49</u> | <u>50+</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|
| America | 3 | 6 | 6 |
| Russia | 29 | 28 | 37 |
| Both | 38 | 48 | 36 |
| Neither | 17 | 7 | 9 |
| No comment | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| Join Common Market | 84 | 82 | 77 |
| Should not join | 10 | 7 | 16 |
| Undecided, no comment | 7 | 10 | 7 |
| Join NATO | 34 | 24 | 27 |
| Should not join | 51 | 54 | 42 |
| Ambivalent | 1 | 5 | 24 |
| No comment | 15 | 18 | 24 |

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MILITARY

FRANCE

NEW SELF-AIMING 'AD 4A' AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 p 59

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] At the Salon du Bourget, Electronique Marcel Dassault (EMD) introduced its new "AD 4A" active electromagnetic homing head for new generation air-to-air missiles designed to intercept high, low, or very-low altitude air targets. The AD 4A makes it possible to aim the missile at its target in proportional navigation during the last phases of firing, giving the weapons system greater flexibility and the ability to simultaneously engage several targets with several missiles. This solid-state transmitter homing head is characterized by miniaturized electronics and very-high frequency circuits, and by digital data treatment.

A manufacturer of electromagnetic missile homing heads since 1958, EMD has received orders for over 4300 homing heads, of which over 3000 have already been delivered for various missiles in service in 26 countries. Among the homing heads manufactured by EMD are the AD 37 for MATRA's and British Aerospace's Martel air-to-surface missile; the AD 26 for the MATRA 530 air-to-air missile; and the Super AD 26 for the MATRA Super 530 air-to-air missile, as well as the ADAC homing heads in production since 1972 for various versions of Aerospatiale's Exocet anti-naval missiles (MM 38, AM 39, SM 39, MM 40). EMD has already delivered or received orders for nearly 2000 Exocet missiles intended for French and foreign navies.

ADAC is an active electromagnetic homing head equipping the various versions of the Exocet missile (sea-to-sea, air-to-surface, submarine-surface). ADAC provides the missile's final homing guidance during flights at a few meters above the sea. During the first part of the flight, the missile's inertial devices assure directional guidance before the homing head is set on course. During the last part of the flight the homing head searches in distance and bearing to obtain locked-on automatic pursuit of the target. It then provides the information necessary for the missile's proportional navigation until impact or until operation of the proximity fuse, which is of a special type (integrated into the homing head), and which controls the remote triggering of the firing of the military payload. Over 130 firings were performed under operational conditions with a greater than 95 percent guidance success rate.

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The Super AD26 is a semi-active electromagnetic homing head equipping the various versions of the MATRA Super 530 air-to-air missile. The Super AD26 directs the missile to its target according to the rules of proportional navigation. During firing, the homing head formulates the orders necessary to the guidance of the missile to the target. Anti-scramble systems make the homing head practically insensitive to scramblers existing now or in the foreseeable future. A successor to the AD26 which equips the MATRA 530 missile, the Super AD26 is a new generation of semi-active homing head offering excellent performances, particularly on the antenna range and scope, which makes it possible to improve firing possibilities for all sectors and in rough terrain.

EMD has several versions of the Super AD26 (pulse and Doppler versions) for the Super 530 missiles intended for the various weapons systems of the Mirage F1, Mirage 2000 and so on.

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