FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9955

2 September 1981

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 10/81)

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
[] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 10/81)

CONTENTS

WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

ARMED FORCES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: WARSAW PACT DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

Moscow ORGANIZATSIYA VARSHAVSKOGO DOGOVORA. DOKUMENTY I MATERIALY 1955-1980 in Russian 1980 (signed to press 24 Nov 80) pp 1-5, 290-296

[Table of contents and foreword from book "The Warsaw Pact Organization. Documents and Materials 1955-1980 ", edited by V. F. Mal'tsev (Editor in Chief), A. P. Bondarenko, G. S. Golovenkov, V. F. Grubyakov, M. M. Deyev, P. P. Sevost'yanov, and S. L. Tikhvinskiy, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Politizdat, 20,000 copies, 296 pages]

[Text] Table of Contents   Page

1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Foreword

On 14 May 1955 the European socialist states signed the Warsaw Pact of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. It was a response to formation of the NATO
bloc, to intensification of the danger of war in Europe, and to the threat to the
national security of peace-loving states, especially in connection with the
course being followed by the ruling circles of this military bloc toward re-
militarization of West Germany.

In their document, the parties to the pact solemnly expressed their will to develop
full political, economic, and defensive cooperation. They also declared their
preparedness to participate in all international efforts having the objective of
safeguarding peace and collective security, and "achieving adoption, on consent with
other states wishing to cooperate in this matter, of effective measures for universal
limitation of arms and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other forms of mass de-
struction weapons."

Since the first days, the Warsaw Pact states have been persistently and harmoniously
fighting for their declared goals, and consistently satisfying their adopted obliga-
tions.

Fraternal friendship among the participants of the pact is constantly growing, and
extensive and multifaceted mutual cooperation, based on the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, on respect of equality, independence and national sovereignty, on non-
interference in foreign affairs, comradely mutual assistance and international
solidarity, is developing successfully. The unity of the socialist alliance is
constantly growing stronger, its power and might are rising, and the mechanism of
interaction that has evolved and demonstrated its value is improving. The Warsaw

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Pact is dependably protecting the security and the socialist achievements of the fraternal countries.

The Warsaw Pact is an important and weighty factor of peace. Through its collective actions and through a consistent peace-loving policy, its members are confidently and effectively working to eliminate the threat of war in Europe, and doing everything they can to promote consolidation of peace, weakening of international tension, and development of peaceful cooperation between states.

The fraternal union of sovereign and equal socialist states, brought together by the common bond of social structure and communist ideals, is an effective instrument for joint development of their foreign policy strategy, and for coordination of their practical actions in the international arena. In the two and a half decades of the Warsaw Pact's existence, the countries participating in it have proposed a number of major initiatives aimed at safeguarding peace and curbing the arms race, and deepening political and military relaxation. Many of their proposals were placed at the basis of decisions adopted at international forums, and they have been reflected in a series of bilateral and multilateral international documents.

Under the guidance of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the CPSU Central Committee is making an outstanding contribution to the development and enactment of the coordinated peace policy of the Warsaw Pact states.

Assessing the most important result of their joint activity, the Warsaw Pact states emphasize the following in a declaration adopted in May 1980 at the Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee: "The greatest success of the past decades is that we were able to break the vicious circle in which peace was only a breather between world wars, and initiate , on the broadest scale, the struggle to exclude war from the life of human society forever."

* * *

The 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization was celebrated broadly and triumphantly in countries of the socialist fraternity.

It is in connection with this anniversary that this collection is published. It was compiled with the cooperation of the foreign affairs ministers of the Warsaw Pact states. It includes declarations, statements, and communiques on conferences of the Political Consultative Committee, communiques and reports on meetings of the Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Committee of Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states, and other important documents and materials from 1955 to 1980.

A similar collection was published in 1975 in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, and it included materials for 1955-1975. All of these are in the present publication.

The documents in the collection are arranged in chronological order, in accordance with the date of their signing, adoption, or publication; publication dates are indicated with an asterisk. The protocol part of the documents is omitted.

The sources from which the documents in the collection are reprinted are indicated below the texts of the documents.

As a rule the documents in this collection have their own titles; press reports are published under editorial titles.

The Editorial Board

COPYRIGHT: POLITIZDAT, 1980

11004
CSO: 1801/302

8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ARMED FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: RECONNAISSANCE IN COMBAT

Moscow RAZVEDKA V BOYU in Russian 1980 (signed to press 10 Mar 80) pp 1-5, 186-208

[Annotation, table of contents, introduction, excerpt from Chapter 1, and Chapter 3 from book "Reconnaissance in Combat", by R. G. Simonyan and S. V. Grishin, Voyenizdat, 30,000 copies, 208 pages]

[Text] Annotation

This book describes the role and place of reconnaissance in modern combat, its division into its components, and the requirements imposed on it; the goal, missions, and objectives of reconnaissance; the forms, forces, resources and methods of reconnaissance. The principles of organizing and performing reconnaissance in the basic forms of combat are revealed.

Problems associated with collecting and processing intelligence are examined.

This book is intended for sergeants and officers of the Soviet Army.

Table of Contents   Page

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction

Reconnaissance is one of the most important forms of support. It is intended to provide all levels of command and staff with information on the enemy, the terrain, and the area of forthcoming actions, necessary for successful preparation and conduct of combat actions.

The many centuries of the history of wars, and especially the experiences of World War II, demonstrate that wherever adequate attention has been devoted to reconnaissance, the troops have been able to anticipate the enemy's strikes, impose their will upon him, and thrash him soundly. And on the other hand, poorly organized reconnaissance has been the primary cause of many unsuccessful battles, and even operations.

The conditions of modern combat, which are typified by high maneuverability and swift and abrupt changes in the situation, have increased the role and significance of reconnaissance even more. Moreover a duel fought today between two sides possessing approximately equal weapons in terms of quantity and quality is mainly a fight to achieve superiority in battlefield reconnaissance, since victory would belong to that side which manages to be the first to reveal, and consequently destroy, the enemy's most important objectives. In other words to beat the enemy, we need to not only possess the weapons with which to destroy him, but we must also know exactly where he is, what he is doing, the nature of his engineer structures, and what he intends to undertake. It is only on this condition that we can correctly determine where, with what, and how to strike him. Without dependable data on the enemy, it is impossible to count on victory in either offense or defense.

All of this information is accumulated through meticulously organized, actively conducted reconnaissance, and through careful study of, on occasion, the most insignificant facts (acquired intelligence). This in turn makes constant improvement of the resources and methods of reconnaissance necessary.

Today, the Soviet Army and Navy possess modern, highly effective reconnaissance resources making it possible to quickly detect enemy objectives (targets), to identify them unmistakeably, and to determine their location (coordinates) with high precision.

In and of themselves, however, reconnaissance resources cannot solve the problem of acquiring the needed intelligence. If reconnaissance is to fulfill the complex and diverse missions facing it, commanders and staffs of all levels must also know how

to correctly and promptly organize, and continually and actively perform reconnaissance in all situations, as well as competently and quickly collect and process intelligence and promptly bring it to the awareness of interested entities.

This book presents the theoretical premises and some practical recommendations on organizing and performing reconnaissance in the basic forms of combat.

Chapter 1. [Excerpt] General Premises

The Role and Place of Reconnaissance in Combat

Reconnaissance is perfu.r-᠎ in support of combat on the ground, in the air or at sea by the men and equipment of subunits, units, and formations directly participating in the given combat; moreover information acquired by the reconnaissance organs of neighboring, interacting and, especially, higher units of command is also broadly employed. In other words to one extent or another, all forms of military reconnaissance contribute to the preparation and successful conduct of combat. Therefore to correctly understand the role and place of reconnaissance in combat, we must first of all consider its system in its entirety, and know its components, the areas of their action, and their interaction and interdependence.

Military reconnaissance is defined as the aggregate of measures implemented by all levels of military command to acquire and analyze information on an existing or probable enemy. It is also involved in the collection and analysis of political, economic, and scientific-technical information.

In accordance with the scale of its activities and the nature of its missions, military reconnaissance is divided into three components--strategic, operational, and tactical. Each of them supports a particular area of military art (strategy, operational art, and tactics).

Strategic reconnaissance is performed with the goals of ensuring the protection of the socialist state, and promoting preparation and the conduct of strategic operations and the war as a whole, in the event it is unleashed by the imperialists. This goal has its source in the domain of strategy which, as we know, deals with the theory and practice of preparing and conducting strategic operations and a war as a whole.

Operational reconnaissance supports operational art, which deals with the development of the theory and practice of preparing and conducting modern operations by the forces of major operational formations representing different armed services, both independently and jointly. The goal of operational reconnaissance is to acquire intelligence in support of the preparation and conduct of operations.

Tactical reconnaissance supports the combat activities of the troops at the tactical level. The intelligence acquired by it is used in the preparation and successful conduct of combat.

All of the components of military reconnaissance--strategic, operational and tactical--are closely interrelated and mutually dependent. They acquire and analyze, at their particular scale, information on an existing or probable enemy, and on

11

the locality and region of actual or suggested combat activities. Information obtained by one component is supplemented by others, assisting in the execution of the overall mission facing military reconnaissance as a whole. Thus intelligence required for operational and even for strategic purposes is broadly utilized in the interests of combat, and tactical intelligence has great significance to operational and strategic reconnaissance organs. Certain items of information, for example numerical designations of opposing enemy units and formations and the tactical and technical data of his new models of armament are identically important both to tactical and to operational and strategic reconnaissance. Certain items of information may be of only negligible interest to tactical reconnaissance while concurrently having great significance to operational and, especially, strategic reconnaissance organs. Such information may include, for example, that of political and economic nature obtained through interrogation of prisoners and interview of local inhabitants.

Requirements Imposed on Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance must satisfy the following basic requirements: It must be purposeful, continuous, active, timely, covert, and reliable and accurate in acquisition of intelligence and in determination of the coordinates of reconnoitered objectives.

Purposefulness

The essence of this most important requirement lies in strict subordination of all reconnaissance measures to the interests of supporting preparation and successful conduct of combat, and execution of concrete missions facing the troops in one phase of combat or another, as well as concentration of reconnaissance efforts in the main sector and on revealing the most important objectives. Information acquired by reconnaissance must first of all satisfy the needs of the commander organizing combat. It is only in this case that it can have practical value. As an example if a subunit or unit is preparing to surmount an enemy security zone, for it to complete its mission successfully it would need information about this zone: the enemy forces and equipment deployed within in, the way they are grouped, the fire plan, and the engineering equipment. Preparation of a subunit or unit for an airborne assault requires intelligence concerning the enemy and the terrain in the intended drop zone, and at its approaches. In the last case the enemy's security zone holds no interest.

The Great Patriotic War is abundant with examples of deeply thought-out and purposeful work by commanders and staffs to organize reconnaissance, work making the actions of reconnaissance forces and resources highly effective. We know for example that in the Vistula-Oder operation the total zone of advance of the 1st Belorussian Front was 230 km, and that the defenses of the fascist German troops were penetrated in three sectors with a total front of 34 km. Ninety percent of all artillery reconnaissance forces and resources were concentrated in the breakthrough sectors. This made it possible to determine with high accuracy, in coordination with operational and engineer reconnaissance, that the enemy had 130 artillery and mortar batteries, 57 antiaircraft batteries, 1,480 direct fire positions, 245 covered fire positions (earth-and-timber emplacements), 406 covered trenches, and 154 observation posts in the area. The effectiveness of the actions of reconnaissance made it possible for it to complete its missions fully.

The Great Patriotic War also shows that attempts by some commanders and staffs to illuminate all aspects of the enemy's activities and all objectives in all sectors with identical completeness resulted in the dispersal of reconnaissance forces and resources and failure of their missions.

Today, when combat activities are conducted in dispersed formations and when the number of objectives subject to reconnaissance is so dramatically larger, compliance with the principle of purposefulness acquires even more important significance. Purposefulness is achieved through correct determination of the missions, objectives, and areas of reconnaissance, through the performance of reconnaissance according to a single plan and with concentration of efforts on the main missions, and through collection of all intelligence at a single center--the staff. The purposefulness of reconnaissance also depends in many ways on its flexibility--that is, on the capability of reconnaissance organs for promptly reacting to changes in the situation and quickly transferring their efforts to those objectives in which the commander is most interested at the given moment.

Continuity

Reconnaissance must be performed not only purposefully but also continuously: at all times of the year and day, in all weather, in all situations, and in all forms of troop combat activity, until the total defeat of the enemy.

Wherever this requirement is not observed, it is difficult to attain victory. Here is an example from an exercise. At dawn, following a fire strike on the simulated enemy, the subunits of one of the sides rushed forward, firing on the move. The attack was swift and coordinated. It would have seemed that the success of the battle was predestined. But what is this? There was no one in the first trench, or in the second: The "enemy" had withdrawn earlier. The fire strike had been made on vacant ground.

"Where is the 'enemy'?" the exercise leader asked the subunit commander. But this turn of events was a complete surprise to the subunit commander. He knew from reconnaissance that the "enemy" was defending on the slopes of the hill he was attacking, and he knew his strength, composition, and grouping. In the evening just before the offensive he personally observed the defenses, and was unable to discover anything suspicious in the "enemy's" behavior.

The unexpectedly vanished "enemy" opened intense fire on the attackers, forcing them to dig in. The attack was foiled because the attackers forgot the need for continuous reconnaissance by all possible means. Instead, they limited themselves to periodic observation which, incidentally, was reduced significantly in its intensity at night, such that the defender was able to covertly withdraw his men and equipment, gain protection for them from the fire strike, and cause the other side to act in a way necessitating abandonment of the offensive.

Experience shows that we cannot limit ourselves to organizing reconnaissance only for some particular period of preparations or conduct of combat. Commanders and staffs are obligated to perform continuous reconnaissance throughout the entire depth of the enemy's disposition, and throughout the entire time of combat, uniting for this purpose the efforts of all reconnaissance forces and resources, and coordinating these efforts in relation to time and objectives, for the purposes of supplementing one form of reconnaissance by another.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Aggressiveness

The experience of former wars demonstrates quite obviously that under otherwise equal conditions, reconnaissance is successful when it is performed aggressively and resolutely. The process of acquiring intelligence on the battlefield always involves a struggle with the enemy, who uses all means to try to create various interference in the path of our reconnaissance effort, so as to keep reconnaissance from performing its mission and create a false impression as to the position, status, nature of actions, and intentions of his troops.

In a struggle between two sides pursuing opposite interests, reconnaissance may fulfill its mission only in the event that it is highly aggressive, and that it surmounts the enemy's countermeasures.

Aggressiveness is attained in reconnaissance through competent use of its various forces and resources, and through widespread manifestation of initiative, boldness and resourcefulness, resoluteness, and audacity by subunits performing reconnaissance.

Timeliness

One of the most important requirements imposed on reconnaissance is its timeliness. The necessary intelligence must be brought to the awareness of the commander within a certain period of time, such that he would have the possibility to foresee the nature of the enemy's forthcoming actions, promptly make (tailor) a decision , and effectively utilize nuclear and fire weapons and electronic jamming resources. The most valuable information would end up useless if the commander receives it late.

The time factor has acquired decisiveness significance in reconnaissance today. The reason for this is that the situation of combat may change extremely quickly, and information acquired a few hours and sometimes even a few minutes previously may turn out to be obsolete, having no correspondence with the actual situation at the moment a decision is made.

In one exercise a reconnaissance group commanded by Senior Lieutenant Khalikov revealed a concentration of tanks in the "enemy's" disposition. The officer reported this to his chief. But when artillery opened fire on this area, the tanks were not there. A mistake had not been made--the target coordinates were determined correctly, and the fire strike was accurate. It turned out that too much time was spent on transmitting the intelligence and on its evaluation and reporting to the commander. During this time the "enemy" managed to withdraw his tanks to another area. As a result artillery wasted its ammunition and the "enemy" suffered no losses at all. Thus in modern combat, it is not enough to organize and perform continuous, aggressive, and purposeful reconnaissance; the time spent on reconnaissance missions and on transmitting and processing acquired information must be reduced.

Covertness

Covertness means maintenance of strict secrecy over all measures to organize and conduct reconnaissance and to concentrate its main efforts. The reason for this is that the nature itself of reconnaissance activity is one of the important clues providing the enemy a possibility for revealing the plan of action of the forces

14

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in behalf of which it is performed. This is why the reconnaissance forces and re-
sources of our troops are viewed by the enemy as a priority objective that must be
fought continuously. This premise is reflected in the manuals and regulations of
the armies of all principal NATO countries.

Consequently in order that the opposing sides would not be able to use the activities
of our reconnaissance as a clue revealing the plan of action of our troops, and
in order to protect reconnaissance forces and resources from unjustified losses,
we need to strictly comply with the covertness principle, which means maintaining
secrecy over the following in the course of organizing reconnaissance: movement of
reconnaissance forces and resources into their deployment area; actions in the
vicinity of the objective of reconnaissance; communication of information from
reconnaissance forces and resources. What is important to conceal in this case is
not the fact itself of reconnaissance, which is almost impossible, but rather its
scale, its concrete missions, objectives, and methods, the sectors in which the
main efforts are concentrated and the areas of deployment (action).

Reliability of Intelligence and Objective (Target) Coordinate Determination Accuracy

One very important qualitative indicator of reconnaissance is reliability. Unreli-
ability of acquired information has always led either to the loss of a battle, or
in the best case to unjustified losses and the need for more time to defeat the
enemy. A correct decision leading to success in combat can be made only on the
basis of reliable information.

Today, the enemy implements a number of the most diverse reconnaissance counter-
measures, camouflage, and deception in order to mislead our reconnaissance concerning
the true disposition of his men and equipment and his plan of action; these efforts
must be deduced.

The reliability of intelligence is ensured by meticulously analyzing, comparing
and rechecking information obtained from different sources, and when necessary by
performing additional reconnaissance so as to uncover the enemy's measures aimed at
deception and camouflage.

If the available weapons are to be used effectively, there must be accurate data on
the coordinates of enemy objectives within the entire range of these weapons. In
the absence of such data, either the fire strike would hit vacant ground, or it
would take large amounts of ammunition to destroy the targets.

The accuracy with which objective coordinates are determined depends on the training
level of personnel in reconnaissance subunits and on the use of the most sophisti-
cated reconnaissance resources and methods.

Emergence of new weapons and the connected changes in the nature of combat activities
impose higher requirements on reconnaissance, make its performance more difficult,
and elicit the need for employing sizeable quantities of diverse reconnaissance
forces and resources to fulfill the missions facing it.

The Goal, Missions, and Objectives of Reconnaissance

The goal of reconnaissance is the end result which it must achieve through the
actions taken by its forces and resources in support of its missions. The goal of
reconnaissance is a product of the nature of combat, the content of the missions of
the troops and the conditions under which they are executed, and the amount of
knowledge possessed about the composition and grouping of the enemy's men and equip-
ment, and the probable plan for his forthcoming actions. Information acquired by
reconnaissance allows us, on one hand, to eliminate surprise from the enemy's actions
and, on the other hand, to ensure timely and effective use of friendly men and equip-
ment to fulfill their mission in short time.

In its effort to attain this goal, reconnaissance must execute a number of complex
and diverse missions, and acquire reliable information on numerous enemy objectives.
First of all it must establish the location and nature of the enemy's actions, his
strength and composition, the numerical designations of the units and subunits, and
their fighting efficiency and intentions.

We know that of the modern resources of armed conflict, nuclear weapons are the most
powerful. Their effective use on the battlefield permits us to quickly inflict major
losses in manpower and combat equipment upon the enemy, suppress strongpoints, destroy
engineer structures and other objectives, and have an intense moral influence upon
the troops.

This circumstance has forced the dueling sides to face two identically important
problems: first, preventing the enemy from effectively using his nuclear weapons,
and second, using one's own nuclear weapons against the most important objectives,
annihilation of which would cause the defeat of the opposing enemy in short time.
Solution of the first and, in part, the second problem depends mainly on prompt
revelation and annihilation of the enemy's nuclear weapons.

Therefore the most important and primary mission of reconnaissance in modern combat
is prompt revelation of the enemy's nuclear weapons and maintenance of continuous
observation of them, until their annihilation. The efforts of all forms of re-
connaissance forces and resources are concentrated on this mission. Reconnaissance
of nuclear weapons involves revealing the nuclear weapon delivery systems, missile
and nuclear artillery guidance systems (resources), and nuclear ammunition dumps
and assembly points. Nuclear weapons must be revealed and annihilated before they
are put into action.

However, despite all of their importance, the enemy's nuclear strike resources are
not the sole objectives of fire strikes. To neutralize the effectiveness of enemy
fire, we would need to also reveal the regions in which other weapons are deployed--
field and antiaircraft artillery, mortars, antitank guided missiles, antitank guns,
dug-in tanks and, moreover, at the subunit level, machineguns, grenade throwers,
and infantry weapons.

A typical feature of the modern battlefield is its high saturation by electronic
resources. While, for example, a division in the fascist German army of World War II
had about 150 radio stations of all types within its composition, today's motorized
infantry division of the FRG contains more than three and a half thousand radio
stations, contained within the composition of all troop entities without exception,

from the size of a detachment (crew) and larger, as command and control resources. Prompt detection and annihilation (suppression) of these resources may deprive the enemy of his possibility for using nuclear and other weapons, and it would promote fuller revelation of the disposition of the enemy's men and equipment on the battle-field, and determination of the unit (subunit) and weapon control systems.

In the past, revealing the enemy's air bases, establishing the number and types of airplanes, and maintaining continuous observation of air force activities were con-cerns mainly of operational and strategic reconnaissance. Participation of tactical reconnaissance in this mission was limited to visual observation of flight of enemy airplanes above the disposition of our troops, and performance of specific assign-ments for the operational command, associated with revealing and annihilating the enemy's airplanes at his nearest airfields.

Today, in connection with extensive introduction of army aviation into all of the combined-arms formations and even the units of foreign armies, the situation has changed fundamentally. Revealing the air bases and the number and types of airplanes and helicopters has become one of the most important missions of tactical reconnais-sance.

Striving to preserve their units and subunits, both sides will implement various measures to protect their troops from nuclear weapons. Therefore revealing the content of these measures, and the time and place of their implementation, is one of the priority missions of all forms of reconnaissance.

Broad use of nuclear weapons by both sides will fundamentally change the entire situation on the battlefield. Besides knocking out troop groupings and other ob-jectives, nuclear weapons will inevitably cause tremendous havoc, formation of ex-tensive fires, flooding, and creation of vast zones of radioactive contamination, which will have a great influence on the nature and methods of action of the units and subunits.

This imposes additional missions on reconnaissance, associated with getting informa-tion on the radiation situation, on the basic parameters of nuclear bursts, and on the zones of destruction and contamination. Without such information we cannot make a correct decision on how to detour and surmount these zones.

Reconnaissance must also reveal the enemy's new weapons and combat tactics. In this case it would be performing its missions in the presence of extremely fluid combat activities, frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, dispersal of the enemy's combat formation over a large area, and his broad use of modern camouflage and deception resources.

In each individual case, these missions of reconnaissance will be specified more concretely by the commander on the basis of the evolved situation, the nature of the subunit's (unit's) missions, the actions of the enemy, and the amount of informa-tion possessed about him. Completely new missions may arise in the course of combat, fulfillment of which would require not only allocation of additional reconnaissance forces and resources, but also the transfer of its main efforts to new directions.

In execution of its missions on the battlefield, reconnaissance acquires information on specific enemy objectives, and establishes their coordinates with the required accuracy, so that they could be struck by artillery.

The term "objectives of reconnaissance" is usually defined as the enemy's men and equipment, his engineer structures, and terrain features harboring some danger to our troops or having certain military significance. An objective may consist of one or several important elements, annihilation of which would completely or partially put the objective out of commission. Thus an artillery battalion has four elements-- three gun batteries and a fire control post, while a dug-in tank or a radar station consists of just a single element.

Depending on the dimensions and nature of their deployment on the terrain, all objectives may be divided into point, area, and linear.

Point objectives are ones consisting of one or several elements located compactly at a single point (an artillery system at a fire position, a radar post, a dug-in tank, a ship, a bridge across a water obstacle of average size, and so on). To permit destruction of these objectives, reconnaissance must determine their point coordinates.

Area objectives usually consist of several elements located within a certain area and spread out from each other in a certain way. To permit destruction of area objectives, reconnaissance establishes the configuration and dimensions of the objective, its composition, its main elements and their coordinates, the way the elements of the objective are distributed over the terrain, and the degree of their concealment and cover.

Linear objectives include columns of troops on the march or columns of troops deployed along traffic routes, pipelines, communication lines, bridges across large water obstacles, and so on. For their effective destruction, reconnaissance must establish the location of the most important elements of these objectives, and their vulnerable points.

Objectives are divided into three groups depending on the degree of their mobility-- mobile, low-mobility, and permanent.

The first group includes objectives capable of changing their location in a few hours or minutes (subunits and units of the missile, tank, and mechanized troops, artillery, and so on). Such objectives require continuous observation, and last-minute reconnaissance before fire strikes against them.

The second and third groups include objectives that remain in the same position for a significant period of time, or which do not change their position at all. They include dumps, airfields, permanent radar installations and navigation aids, communication centers, bridges, and so on. Objectives of this sort are reconnoitered ahead of time, and they may be subjected to fire strikes without last-minute reconnaissance.

For the objectives above to be struck effectively, they must be detected and identified, and their locations must be determined. Detection is defined as

establishing the very fact of the presence of the objective (target), identification means to determine the nature and dimensions of the objective (target), and location means to determine the coordinates of the objective or its orientation relative to a known reference point.

The Forms, Forces, and Resources of Reconnaissance

A particular form of reconnaissance is a component of military reconnaissance which possesses basically its own sphere of activities and its own forces and resources.

Reconnaissance forces and resources are organic reconnaissance subunits and the subunits of branches of troops, special troops and services allocated for reconnaissance purposes, and the reconnaissance and combat equipment and vehicles with the help of which these subunits perform their missions.

Today, military reconnaissance is divided into the following forms: ground, air, naval, and special. The U.S. Army also distinguishes space reconnaissance.

Chapter 3. Collection and Processing of Intelligence, and Its Reporting

The concluding stage of the reconnaissance activity of all levels of command and staff is the collection and processing of reconnaissance information to permit adoption (refinement) of an optimum decision for combat, preparation, on its basis, of reports to higher command, and transmission of necessary intelligence to the commanders and staffs of subordinated, supporting, and interacting subunits and units.

Reconnaissance information includes all information describing, to one extent or another, an existing or probable enemy, and the terrain and weather in an area of forthcoming (possible) actions.

Reconnaissance information does not always provide a complete picture of the enemy, his composition, his disposition, and the nature of expected actions and the most important objectives. Reconnaissance information obtained on the same objective by different reconnaissance organs or acquired from different sources at the same point in time may often be contradictory or insufficiently reliable, and sometimes doubtful or false. Therefore all reconnaissance information is brought together in one place, and mandatorily processed by the commander and his staff.

Processed reconnaissance information is commonly referred to as intelligence. In other words intelligence is analyzed information based on collected, evaluated, and properly interpreted facts, presented in a particular order (written or oral) and providing a clear impression in regard to some concrete item. Intelligence may pertain to a narrow item, for example appearance of a new weapon model in the enemy's hands, or a broad item such as, for example, the overall composition and grouping of the enemy within the entire zone of advance of a subunit (unit) and the possible nature of his actions.

In addition to the terms "reconnaissance information" [razvedyvatel'nyye svedeniya] and "intelligence" [razvedyvatel'nyye dannyye], there exists the concept "intelligence information" [razvedyvatel'naya informatsiya] which embraces both of the

above terms--that is, it may be used to mean "reconnaissance information" and "intelligence".

The effort to select and process reconnaissance information essentially involves collecting, analyzing, and comparing individual unassociated facts, comparing them with the intelligence available to the commander and staff, and making grounded conclusions revealing the entire true picture of the situation, and the content of the particular measures being implemented by the enemy. In other words the effort to collect and process reconnaissance information boils down to transforming "raw" material from gathering organs into a finished product that would satisfy the needs and interests of the commander, and permit him to make the most suitable decision and use his combat resources effectively.

However, sometimes there is no possibility for checking acquired information and comparing it with other data. As an example information on enemy nuclear weapons that pose an immediate threat is reported to the commander immediately after it is decoded, plotted on a map, and briefly analyzed. In such cases the principle followed is that it is better to report not quite accurate information in time than absolutely accurate information late.

The time factor has priority significance not only in relation to the acquisition of reconnaissance information but also to its processing and reporting.

Thus acquisition of reconnaissance information is only one, though very important, aspect of the reconnaissance activities of commanders and staffs at all levels. Another, no less important and laborious part of this activity is the collection and processing of reconnaissance information.

Collection and processing of reconnaissance information was a very difficult area of reconnaissance activity in past wars; in modern warfare, on the other hand, now that combat activities are highly dynamic, with frequent and abrupt changes in the situation, this work has become even more complex.

But the difficulties and complexities faced by commanders and staffs collecting and processing reconnaissance information are not an insurmountable obstacle. Evidence of this can be found in the Great Patriotic War. This evidence tells us, in particular, that wherever the collection and processing of reconnaissance information was properly organized, useful intelligence permitting the commander to make optimum decisions was extracted from even the most meager information. And on the other hand, some commanders and staffs that possessed valuable information were unable to extract the necessary intelligence from it, as a result of which enemy actions caught them by surprise.

Thus intelligence gathering organs of one formation of the Leningrad Front defending in the vicinity of Tosno in November 1941 established the following: Small groups of enemy infantry were approaching and concentrating 2 km south of the forward edge of defense; during the day, artillery conducted sighting fire from fire positions which had not been noticed previously; reconnaissance groups appeared on the forward edge of the enemy defenses; the noise of tank motors was audible at night. Ignorant of enemy tactics, the command incorrectly concluded from a superficial assessment of the gathered information that a new unit had arrived in this sector of the front to

replace the one that had been there before. In fact, however, the enemy was preparing for a counterattack, and in the morning he made this counterattack with a strength of up to two infantry battalions and 15 tanks, with artillery support. As a result of the surprise attack the enemy managed to significantly improve his position.

The efforts of all commanders and staff aimed at acquiring information on the enemy would provide positive results only in the event that all information gathered by reconnaissance organs and acquired from other sources is transmitted to the staff promptly and continuously, if it is deeply analyzed and generalized, and if grounded conclusions on the enemy's grouping and plan are reported to the commander.

Information that is acquired late or that is reported late may not only lose its value, but it may also have a detrimental effect on the course and outcome of troop combat activities. In order to avoid this, the collection of reconnaissance information must be organized simultaneously with its gathering, and processing should be done immediately as it arrives.

Modern combat, typified by a complex and rapidly changing situation, imposes high requirements on the collection and processing of reconnaissance information, and on its gathering. The main ones are: purposefulness, timeliness, and effectiveness in the collection and processing of reconnaissance information; reporting of the necessary intelligence to the command, the troops, and staffs; objective evaluation and meticulous analysis of gathered information; organization, continuity, and aggressiveness.

The work of collecting, and especially of processing reconnaissance information must proceed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles of analysis, according to which all phenomena are examined in their mutual dependence, and in their continuous motion and change.

Collection of Reconnaissance Information

Collection of reconnaissance information requires its prompt acquisition from different sources. This promptness is achieved through clear organization of collection at all levels of the military organism, and particularly through the persistence, aggressiveness, and initiative of commanders and staffs in their effort to promptly obtain reconnaissance information from numerous sources.

The term "source" has two meanings in reconnaissance.

In the first interpretation it refers to objects from which acquisition of reconnaissance information is possible. Such sources include: enemy personnel and their actions, which may be observed by our reconnaissance organs, and prisoners, defectors, and captured documents; operating electronic resources; pieces of enemy armament and combat equipment, shell, bomb, and missile fragments, craters; regions contaminated by radioactive materials and war gases, and so on.

In the second interpretation, sources are reconnaissance organs sent out by the commander, subordinates, interacting and neighboring subunits, and a higher staff, from which reconnaissance information is transmitted to the commander of the subunit

and unit. Such sources also include local residents and the personnel of one's own troops who had been on enemy territory and had visual contact with him or heard something about him.

Prisoners, defectors, local residents, captured documents, and items of enemy combat equipment, armament, and gear are sources of information not only in relation to the intelligence gathering organs but also directly in relation to the commanders of subunits (units) and staffs. A staff has a better possibility than an operational reconnaissance organ to interrogate prisoners, interview defectors and local residents, determine the reliability of their testimony, and study captured documents and items of equipment and gear; consequently a staff can also acquire valuable information which intelligence gathering organs cannot.

Subunit and unit commanders, staff officers at all levels, and mainly officers involved in the collection and processing of reconnaissance information, must have a deep knowledge of the possibilities and the strong and weak points of each source, and they must organize their work on this basis. After all, every source possesses certain objective and subjective properties. These properties define the possibilities of the source--the swiftness of its actions, the reliability of its actions, the reliability of the information it acquires, the accuracy with which objective (target) coordinates are determined, and the source's vulnerability to enemy countermeasures depending on time of day, weather, and other factors.

The possibilities gathering organs have and the methods of their action were examined in the previous chapter. Therefore we will limit ourselves here to those sources of reconnaissance information that had not been discussed previously.

Prisoners of war are one of the important sources of reconnaissance information. By interrogating them, we can obtain information on the numerical designations, grouping, fighting efficiency, and political and moral state of the enemy troops, their armament, and their intended actions, as well as information on their combat experience, the personal qualities of commanders, the engineer structures, and other important information of military, political, and economic nature. Prisoners of war often carry personal and sometimes official documents which, when compared with other documents, may produce new information on the enemy or confirm information obtained earlier.

Defectors can provide the same sort of reconnaissance information that prisoners of war do. When reporting information obtained from defectors, the source must be cited, and troop organs recording interviews of defectors must add the note "defector's statement" to the record. The reason for this is that defectors may express opinions which are not typical of the bulk of the enemy personnel. Moreover defectors may include persons sent intentionally by the enemy.

Captured documents are any documents that had been in the hands of the enemy. They mainly include documents certifying the individual to be a member of the enemy's army (personal documents) and combat documents (orders, instructions, messages, and so on). They may contain information on the combat and numerical composition of the enemy's troops, his nuclear weapons, his plans for combat, his technical status and so on.

Despite its great reliability, information obtained from captured documents must be meticulously analyzed, compared with information obtained from other sources, and updated, since the enemy may change his actions, especially if he finds out that his plans are known to us. Moreover, documents may be prepared for purposes of disinformation.

Documents confiscated from prisoners of war are sent to higher levels of authority together with the prisoners of war, so that the content of the documents may be checked through further interrogation. Documents obtained by other means and transmitted to higher staffs must be accompanied by a statement as to when and under what circumstances they were captured (acquired).

Documents captured by subunits and units on the battlefield must remain with them for only enough time to acquire reconnaissance information (intelligence) of direct interest to the given unit (subunit). Local residents who have left enemy-occupied territory may provide valuable reconnaissance information on the enemy grouping, the enemy objectives, and the terrain. However, information obtained from local residents must be carefully checked out in all cases. The reason for this is that first of all, local residents, who do not possess the professional habits of observation, are usually incapable of providing accurate information on the disposition of enemy troops and on the time of their observations; second, as the experience of the past war showed, there may be enemy agents among persons crossing the front line.

Local residents are subjected to their initial interview by the subunits and by the staffs of units responsible for the sectors in which they were detained; the purpose of such interview is to acquire reconnaissance information to support units in combat or preparing for combat.

Local residents are subjected to further interview, as necessary, by the appropriate staff organs at higher levels of the troops.

Enemy armament and combat equipment captured on the battlefield is a source of reconnaissance information on the tactical and technical characteristics of the corresponding forms of weapons and combat equipment.

Shells, missiles, and bombs or their fragments are also sources of information on the types and caliber of weapons used by the enemy.

Captured armament and combat equipment is studied by qualified specialists of the appropriate branches of troops, special troops and services with the purposes of developing effective resources and methods for combating them. Subunits and units study the enemy's captured armament and combat equipment mainly with an eye on using this equipment in combat.

This description of the sources of reconnaissance information shows that not one of them, taken separately, is in a position to answer all questions in the commander's mind. Therefore the main principle of collection of reconnaissance information is integrated use of all sources from which the necessary information may be acquired in one situation or another.

Subunit commanders and staffs receive reconnaissance information in the form of oral reports, radio messages, in written or graphic form, and by means of various communication resources.

A platoon commander receives information on the strength and actions of the enemy and on his manpower and equipment losses from his own observer and from detachment (crew) commanders, in reports on their missions. The platoon commander checks out the collected information and updates it through personal observation from his own observation post, and then he communicates this information to the company commander in a mission progress report, or whenever required by the latter.

Reconnaissance information is transmitted to the company commander from platoon commanders, reconnaissance patrols, observers, the observation posts of senior chiefs, forward artillery observers, the observation posts of the commanders of artillery and mortar subunits within the combat formations and on the flanks of the company, and prisoners captured by the company. Moreover as with platoon commanders, the company commander maintains observation of the enemy himself.

As we can see, there is a possibility as low down as at the company level for collecting reconnaissance information from many diverse sources, for evaluating and generalizing this information, and for reporting it to the battalion commander (chief of staff).

Company commanders are closer to the enemy than a battalion commander or staff officers, they personally observe the enemy, and therefore the information obtained from them is highly valuable. Therefore the great importance of transmitting information on the enemy, including on his losses, to senior chiefs must be systematically explained to company commanders.

Special documents for keeping track of reconnaissance information are not maintained in the platoon and in the company. All reconnaissance information is plotted onto the commander's battle map. In cases where subunits are in contact with the enemy at the same line (position) for a long period of time, in defense for example, where information becomes obsolete more slowly, it may be entered into the notebooks of subunit commanders.

The chief of staff is responsible for collection of reconnaissance information in the battalion. By order of the commander he organizes acquisition of information from battalion observation posts and from combat patrols, from subunits (groups) conducting searches and organizing ambushes, from commanders of subordinate, attached and supporting subunits and neighbors, from higher staff, and from the senior chief's reconnaissance organs operating within the battalion's combat formations. Important information may be obtained from prisoners interrogated on the battlefield immediately after capture. While right on the terrain, they would be able to show the area in which their subunits are located, and the positions of fire weapons and other objectives. After brief interrogation of prisoners in the battalion (company), they are quickly evacuated to the rear, so as to reduce the time between the moment of their capture and the beginning of their interrogation by experienced officers.

The chief of staff plots all of the information he receives on a battle map, evaluates it, and generalizes and reports it to the battalion commander, who makes the final assessment of this information. Important information is reported to the battalion command and to the unit staff immediately, after which it is checked out.

The chief of staff and the battalion commander check out this reconnaissance information mainly by personal observation from their observation posts, by questioning subunit commanders and the unit staff, and by comparing the information with available intelligence and with intelligence obtained from other sources. Because the battalion receives reconnaissance information from many sources and because it must be updated, its reliability must be determined, and it needs to be generalized, it would be suitable to maintain a log book for this information.

Generalized information on the enemy, his losses and combat equipment is reported personally by the battalion commander in each of his mission progress reports or as demanded by the senior chief, while important information is reported immediately as well.

Important reconnaissance information may be reflected in the wrap-up reports and briefings of subordinate commanders and staffs. In order that reconnaissance information would arrive continuously and on time, reconnaissance missions must be assigned promptly; transmission of reconnaissance information and presentation of briefings by subordinates must be systematically monitored to make sure that this is done on time; the necessary assistance must be provided to reconnaissance organs and subordinated commanders (staffs); stable and uninterrupted communication must be organized and maintained with observation posts, subunits, and groups performing reconnaissance, with subordinate, neighboring, and interacting commanders (staffs), and with the higher staff; reconnaissance information transmitted from airplanes and helicopters must be received; mutual exchange of information on the situation must proceed constantly.

Special procedure charts and coded maps are worked out for the purposes of obtaining information from reconnaissance subunits. Procedure charts must be easy to use in all situations, day and night, they must be resistant to moisture, and they should allow radio conversation when it is raining.

Stable direct communication must be organized with all intelligence gathering organs. In particular such communication must be established with observation posts, reconnaissance patrols, and other reconnaissance organs. Organic wire and radio resources are used for this purpose; visual signals may also be organized as a back-up. The radio network and radio links of the commander and staff are used to acquire reconnaissance information from subordinate, interacting, and neighboring staffs (subunit commanders).

The collection of reconnaissance information occupies a significant amount of time in the work of the commander and staff, especially in the course of combat, when the situation quickly changes and messages arrive from the sources more frequently.

Processing Reconnaissance Information

Reconnaissance information obtained from many sources usually varies in reliability, accuracy, and completeness, it is often fragmentary and unsystematized, and sometimes it is even contradictory. It must be meticulously processed and verified. Otherwise the most important information may often lose its value, providing no benefit at the needed moment.

When the information is processed its significance is determined, intelligent ideas about events occurring on the battlefield are developed, and the appropriate conclusions are made on the composition, disposition, nature of actions, and intentions of the enemy. Estimation of the enemy is the final goal of processing. The estimate is used as the basis for conclusions that are reported to the commander and higher sta _, and information to be transmitted to subordinate and interacting subunits and neighbors is compiled.

The processing of reconnaissance information entails its study, recording, analysis, and generalization, and formulation of conclusions. Information is processed by a commander and staff usually in the following sequence: They acquaint themselves with the content of the information and determine its urgency and value; they apply the information to a battle map, indicating the source and the time of its acquisition; they record incoming information in a log book; they systematize (classify) information in terms of content or objectives (nuclear weapons, tanks and motorized infantry groupings, control posts and so on); they keep track of everything new the information may contain; they analyze the systematized reconnaissance information, compare it with intelligence on the given objective from other sources, and determine its reliability; they generalize the information and formulate, on its basis, conclusions to be reported to the command and higher staff, and to subordinate subunits and neighbors; they determine which information is subject to verification or updating.

However, the sequence and order of processing intelligence information may change depending on the relationship between its importance and its urgency. If after plotting the information on a map and studying it briefly an officer determines that it is important and urgent, he must immediately report it to the commander and bring it to the awareness of all interested officials and staffs. After this the information is logged in and subjected to complete processing.

As an example imagine that the commander of a combat reconnaissance patrol radios this message to headquarters: "1530 hours, 20.8, missile battery deploying at launcher position on western edge of forest (315721)." This information must be reported immediately to the commander.

Starting our study of the information, we must know the time at which it was acquired, when it was received by the staff, the reliability of the source, the situation within which it was obtained, and its correspondence with the evolved situation. Not knowing the answers to these questions, it would be impossible to correctly evaluate the reconnaissance information, compare it with other intelligence, and determine its reliability and value.

Let us examine the content of reconnaissance information processing in greater detail.

Initial study of reconnaissance information: Initial study of reconnaissance information begins with acquaintance with its content, in the course of which the importance of the incoming information is determined and the order of further work with it is established correspondingly. The importance of incoming information depends in turn both on the nature of the enemy objective or actions and especially on the influence it has on the missions facing our subunit or unit.

We know that information on the enemy's nuclear strike resources is more important than, for example, information on artillery using conventional ammunition only. But this premise, which is correct in general, is not always our guide for action. It all depends on the conditions of the concrete situation. Assume that the commander or staff received a message that a concentration of enemy guided or unguided missile batteries was discovered 100-120 km from the front line. Another message received at the same time stated that a battery of 155-mm howitzers was deploying at fire positions in direct proximity to the line of contact. Quite understandably, under these conditions the information on the enemy's artillery is more important than the message about his missile launchers to the commander of a subunit (unit) leading the offensive.

We can make a conclusion as to the urgency of information only after determining its importance.

All reconnaissance information is subject to processing, including incomplete information. The Great Patriotic War showed that it is many times better to act on conclusions about the enemy based on scattered bits of information to make a prompt decision rather than to wait for exhaustive data, since such waiting may mean a period of inactivity. This premise is even more important in relation to modern warfare, which is distinguished by the high fluidity of combat activities. In the course of such combat, information on the enemy, and especially on his mobile objectives, becomes obsolete quickly, and this in turn requires high efficiency in its initial study and further processing.

Recording reconnaissance information: Recording reconnaissance information is a phase of processing in which collected information is recorded, in a certain order, graphically on a map or as written notes in a log book, and appropriately classified by subject matter. Information, sometimes acquired through considerable effort, must not be allowed to avoid processing. Therefore information, including that which in the initial study appears low in value, repetitive, or obsolete, must be recorded. It is required not only for subsequent processing but also for assessment of the reliability of the sources themselves.

The Great Patriotic War showed that well organized recording makes it possible to prepare information for commander's briefings most fully and quickly, and to draw up accounting and reference documents on the enemy when necessary. And on the other hand, a careless attitude toward recording reconnaissance information leads to undesirable consequences. Because of poor recording, some commanders and staffs possessing certain information on the enemy forgot the latter, and were unable to promptly bring it to the awareness of interested commanders and units (subunits), which was detrimental to the effectiveness with which our forces and resources were used on the battlefield.

Reconnaissance information is recorded with battle maps, reconnaissance information log books, and reconnaissance information classification journals.

The battle map is the main document that graphically represents all reconnaissance information arriving at headquarters.

If certain information such as the noise of engines, tracks left by enemy combat equipment, personal articles, and other items cannot be represented graphically, it is recorded in the form of explanatory notes.

After all reconnaissance information is processed, the battle map should portray the enemy grouping, especially nuclear resources, artillery, and tanks; other information required for the commander's briefing should also be displayed.

The location and status of enemy troops are reflected on the battle map to one degree of detail or another, basically depending on the size of the troop unit (company, battalion), the form of combat activities, and the quantity and completeness of the reconnaissance information.

During preparations for an offensive, machineguns, antitank guns and antitank guided missiles, mortars, tanks, nuclear artillery pieces, and the enemy's defense system as high up as platoon strongpoints inclusively, revealed on the forward edge and in depth, are entered on the battle map.

Deep within the defenses, the enemy troop grouping is shown in units as large as companies and artillery and mortar batteries (platoons); nuclear weapons are shown as individual guns (launchers); reserves are shown as companies and battalions; command (command and observation) posts are shown at levels from company and battery to division inclusively.

Besides enemy subunits, the map shows the outlines of the positions, the engineer equipment of the strongpoints, the antitank and antipersonnel minefields, and the locations of nuclear mines.

Information on the enemy facing neighbors on the right and left is shown across their entire front.

The battle map is updated continuously with the use of conventional symbols. It is replaced as necessary, when further representation of change in the situation makes the map difficult to read. This can happen when the combat activities of the sides proceed for a long period of time in the same locality, and the map becomes cluttered with obsolete, no longer necessary information. When a map is replaced, information on the enemy and on friendly reconnaissance organs that has not lost its significance is transferred to the new map.

If the troops travel outside the locality shown on the battle map as they move forward in the course of an offensive or when they receive a new mission, new sheets may be glued to it.

The reconnaissance information log book is a working notebook with appropriately drawn columns. All reconnaissance information coming in from friendly reconnaissance organs is entered into the log book in chronological order: from air reconnaissance, from the commanders of subordinate, attached, and supporting subunits, from higher staff, from neighbors, and from other sources. The serial number of the information (message), the date and time (in hours and minutes) of its arrival, the content of the message, the time at which this information was obtained by the source, and the name of the source are recorded in the appropriate columns of the log book.

During preparation for an offensive and in periods of defense when active combat operations are not conducted, the reporting of reconnaissance information may be limited quite sufficiently to logging it in and plotting it on the battle map. When new information is processed, previously logged information about any enemy objective can easily be found, compared with other information, and evaluated.

When an offensive begins or in the course of repulsion of enemy attacks in defense, information will start coming in more frequently. Even in the course of just a few hours of combat, a large quantity of reconnaissance information may come in. In this case information about the same objectives may arrive from different sources. As an example information indicating the presence of enemy reserves in a certain region, their composition, and initiation of their movement may be acquired from combat reconnaissance patrols, from artillery subunit commanders, from neighboring units, and from other sources. In order to make the processing of such a large amount of information convenient and quick, it must be classified in terms of content or objectives. This makes it possible to reveal its completeness, reliability and accuracy, determine which information is contradictory, and take notice of all new information. For this reason we maintain, besides a log book, a reconnaissance information classification journal.

The format of the reconnaissance information classification journal may be the same as that of the log book. It is maintained similarly as the latter, except that items of information pertaining to specific objectives are recorded not sequentially but in the appropriate sections. Depending on the nature of the combat activities and the sort of objectives present in the enemy disposition, such a journal may have the following sections: nuclear weapons; artillery and mortars; tanks; reserves; command posts; enemy defensive engineer equipment; terrain features; new enemy tactics; camouflage, and so on. Each section of the reconnaissance information classification journal has the same columns as in the log book. Moreover there is one more column containing the serial number assigned to the given item of information in the log book. This makes it possible to find the full text of a message when the time comes to process the information.

While the entire content of messages (information about several objectives) from one source is recorded in the log book in the same place, in the classification journal it is entered in different sections, each containing information only about a given objective. Obsolete and unimportant information is not recorded in this journal.

The original copies of all messages from reconnaissance organs must be stored until the end of the mission.

Well organized recording of reconnaissance information will promote its swift and comprehensive analysis, and preparation of grounded conclusions about each objective and about the enemy in general.

Analysis of reconnaissance information: The next phase of processing is analysis of reconnaissance information, which is performed with the goal of reaching correct and grounded conclusions about the composition of the enemy's forces, his grouping, and his actions and intentions. Analysis involves: study of the content of the information and the conditions under which it was acquired; comparison of this information with other intelligence having a bearing on the given objective or enemy action; assessment of the information's reliability, importance, urgency, and value. In this case the importance of the analyzed information depends on its significance

to revealing or updating the composition, position, and status of the opposing enemy and the nature of his actions, and on the influence this information may have on the performance of missions by our troop subunits. The immediacy with which information is processed is directly associated with its importance, and it depends upon the swiftness with which the commander and staff can react to the obtained information.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and postwar exercises shows that the results and quality of analysis of reconnaissance information are directly dependent on the training level of the officer and on his personal habits.

In order that he could comprehensively and deeply analyze reconnaissance information, the officer must have mastery over the Marxist dialectical method of cognition, and he must firmly know: the nature of modern combined-arms combat; the organization, armament, and logistical support of enemy troops; the tactical and technical characteristics of the enemy's armament, and the tactics used by subunits and units in different forms of combat activities; the training level of the enemy troops, their nationality breakdown and their morale in the given period of combat activities; the possibilities of friendly reconnaissance organs and their experience; the location of the forward edge (the front line); the nature of actions being taken by the enemy and his troops at the moment information is received from a source.

An officer analyzing reconnaissance information must consider the reliability of the source and the objective conditions under which it was obtained (the nature of enemy actions, the terrain, the time of year and day, the weather in the operating region of the reconnaissance organs).

Analyzing reconnaissance information, we should avoid haste or snatching isolated facts from messages with the purposes of making general conclusions on their basis. Incoming information is studied and compared with intelligence obtained at different times or simultaneously from other sources. This order of analyzing reconnaissance information affords a possibility for distinguishing new information from that previously acquired, and confirming the correctness of new information and establishing the reliability and importance of the latter.

We may encounter a situation in which the staff (commander) receives information from a source on a new objective about which no reconnaissance information had been available previously. As an example, assume it becomes known that there is a missile battery at a launcher position in a certain region. There is no time to have another reconnaissance organ check or update the obtained information, since the battery could launch its missiles and move to another region. Consequently the final conclusion as to the true presence or absence of the missile battery in this region must be made on the basis of an analysis of just this information alone. Such cases may occur very frequently in modern combat.

To determine the reliability of obtained information, we would need to consider the reliability of the source and the information available on the enemy and the situation: which unit (formation) is operating in the given sector of the front, does it possess such missiles, and if it does, are they intended as reinforcements; how far away from the forward edge (front line) and from other formerly revealed objectives was the launcher position discovered; what is the nature of the combat activities of the

sides, and might the enemy locate a missile battery at a launcher position in the given region in the situation existing at the given time? Of course, the decisive factors here would be the reliability to the source, and its capacity for obtaining such information and for distinguishing dummy objectives (mock-ups) from real ones.

All of our reconnaissance forces and resources as well as the reconnaissance organs created from them are fully reliable. However, their possibilities for gathering reconnaissance information depend in many ways on the level of combat and political training, the combat experience of the commanders in charge of the reconnaissance organ, and other conditions.

Reliable sources include aerial photographs and the orders, plans, and other combat documents of the enemy, captured from defeated staffs or by scouts attacking signal-men and staff officers.

An officer analyzing reconnaissance information obtained from any source must consider the conditions under which this information was obtained. Thus for a number of reasons even a well trained helicopter or airplane crew may not always be able to distinguish a dummy objective (for example mock-ups of missiles, launchers, tanks, artillery) from a real one. The enemy camouflages his objectives artfully and plausibly, and he implements measures to mislead our reconnaissance. Aerial photographs and combat documents may not always provide a true picture. It is difficult to distinguish dummy from real combat equipment on aerial photography, and documents may be false, written specially for the purposes of causing misconceptions.

Moreover in a number of cases even authentic documents may not reflect the grouping and intention of the enemy at the given moment, since following their publication, the particular decision may have been updated, altered, and transmitted to the troops by other means, and thus their grouping and actions would no longer correspond to the information in the previously published authentic document.

As we can see, information on the enemy acquired by reliable sources may not always be reliable. Owing to this we cannot always make a final conclusion on a question of interest to the staff, or on the enemy grouping and the nature of its actions in general. At the same time, careful study of all information coming into headquarters and deep analysis of the situation permits an experienced officer to make hypotheses that are based on facts and figures and which are rather close to the truth. Such hypotheses (conclusions) are made in an effort to determine the possible actions of the enemy in the immediate period of time.

An objective approach to evaluating reconnaissance information is one of the most important requirements imposed on officers collecting and processing such information.

All information for which the reliability is doubted must be checked by all available means in the course of its processing.

Thus at the end of 1944, in the Sokal' sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front, for several days aerial reconnaissance observed small columns of seven or eight tanks approaching the front line and concentrating and camouflaging themselves within a certain region. After a while, radio reconnaissance noticed, in this region, radio stations which normally supported the German army's tank division. The information of both sources

could have been said to be reliable--both sources noted what at first glance were real enemy objectives. Moreover radio reconnaissance essentially confirmed the aerial reconnaissance data. However, officers processing this information were doubtful. They could not understand how the Germans had accumulated such a quantity of tanks in this sector of the front: Former reconnaissance in depth had not revealed tank units and formations anywhere around.

The staff of one of the formations was given the mission of checking the aerial and radio reconnaissance data. When troop scouts penetrated into the region of concentration of the supposed enemy tank division, they discovered a large number of wooden tank mock-ups. Thus they revealed a false concentration area of a tank division. Somewhat later the higher staff managed to establish that tank mock-ups were being manufactured at a furniture factory in the city of Rava-Russkaya. These mock-ups were joined together by a cable in groups of seven or eight with a spacing of 30-40 meters, and towed during daylight hours by a real tank to the planned concentration area; the crews of the reconnaissance airplanes were unable to determine this.

Reconnaissance information may be classified in terms of its reliability as reliable, probable, doubtful, and false.

Reliable information is that which is confirmed by several sources, or several times by the same reliable source, and documents acquired from the enemy and corresponding fully with the previous and present situation, and not eliciting any doubts.

Probable information is that which corresponds to the evolved situation and to available data that had been obtained from just one other source or several sources; this information requires checking.

Doubtful information is that which contradicts formerly existing data obtained by other sources. Such information requires additional checking, updating, and confirmation.

False information is that which does not correspond to the evolved situation and which contradicts data obtained from other sources, and if irrefutable evidence as to its falseness is available. Nevertheless even false information must be recorded and studied for the purposes of revealing the methods of deception employed by the enemy.

Conclusions as to the reliability of reconnaissance information are made without haste, and extremely consciously, with a consideration for the following questions:

From what source was the information obtained, and what is the source's reliability?

Is the given fact or event generally possible?

Is the message contradictory in and of itself?

Is the information confirmed by data from other sources?

To what degree does the obtained information correspond to the evolved situation and the existing data?

If the obtained information does not correspond to the situation and to data from other sources, which information can be said to be the most reliable?

Reliability is also determined by comparing certain items of reconnaissance information with others. In this case the compared reconnaissance information must come from different sources, from different intelligence gathering organs. But it may also happen that reconnaissance information from the same source may come to the staff by different channels. In this case we would need to analyze and clarify how and why the same information was transmitted to the staff by different means.

No matter what the source, the reliability of reconnaissance information must be checked. A higher staff has more sources at its disposal and it can check the reliability of reconnaissance information better than a lower staff having fewer sources at its disposal. As a rule a higher commander (staff) also considers the training level and experience of the commander (staff) providing him the data.

The reliability of reconnaissance information is designated by numbers in the following order: 1--confirmed (by other sources or organs); 2--fully reliable; 3--possibly reliable; 4--reliability doubtful; 5--reliability improbable; 6--reliability cannot be established.

When evaluating reconnaissance information, we indicate the reliability of the source and the reliability of the information. The designations of reconnaissance information are applied to the battle map (diagram), and they are indicated in reconnaissance messages, summaries, and briefings. As an example if information is evaluated as C-2, everyone will understand that it was acquired by a reliable source, and that it is fully reliable.

Although it does lead to stereotypy, this system for evaluating reconnaissance information allows all officers and staff to interpret its reliability identically.

The reliability of incoming information is determined and it is analyzed not from case to case or periodically, but continuously from the moment of its arrival. A comprehensive and deep analysis of reconnaissance information must provide the commander and staff a possibility for revealing the enemy's intent and for determining his strong and weak sides. This permits adoption of a grounded decision, and prediction of the possible development of events in the course of combat activities.

Generalization of reconnaissance information: Analysis and evaluation of each item of information or fact taken separately provide an impression predominantly about individual objectives, and reveal the meaning only behind the given fact , or in the best case of facts associated with it. In other words at this stage of reconnaissance information processing, we do not yet have a complete and clear picture of the situation or of the nature of the enemy's probable actions in general. This can be achieved only in the concluding stage of processing--that of generalizing the reconnaissance information. It entails bringing together all information on the nature of the enemy's actions, on his grouping and on his most important objectives. The staff uses the summarized information to make conclusions on the enemy and makes the necessary calculations in preparation for the commander's briefing, in which the following information is related: the intent of the enemy's

actions, especially in relation to the use of nuclear weapons; the strong and weak sides of the opposing enemy; important objectives, annihilation of which might significantly reduce the enemy's fighting capabilities.

Reporting Reconnaissance Information

Generalized reconnaissance information and the conclusions are reported to the commander and chief of staff. The report is made orally with the battle map; conclusions on and evaluation of the enemy are presented briefly and clearly, accompanied by the necessary facts and figures.

The map for the briefing must be prepared carefully. The most important enemy objectives would thus be penciled in darker than all others. Principal population centers, terrain features, and hills which will be referred to more often than others during the briefing would best be enhanced, though without blacking out parts of the map.

Depending on the situation, the amount of information and the availability of time, the briefing may be expanded (detailed) or short. Generalized data obtained as a result of processing information coming into headquarters from different sources are presented in an expanded briefing.

The presentation must be succinct, clear, and distinct, and it must be supported by the appropriate facts and figures. Irrespective of the completeness of the report, it must reflect concrete conclusions from the enemy's evaluation.

An expanded briefing must include four sections, presented in about the following order.

I. The overall composition and nature of actions of the enemy before the front of the subunit (unit) and its neighbors. The overall composition of the enemy's forces and resources before the front of the subunit (unit) and its neighbors is indicated, and brief conclusions concerning the enemy's recent actions are presented. The quantity and power of nuclear ammunition used by the enemy (if it had been used) are indicated.

II. The order of battle, grouping, fighting efficiency, and nature of actions of the enemy within the zone of the given subunit (unit). Generalized data on the enemy operating directly before the front of the subunit (unit) are provided in this section.

III. The probable nature of the enemy's actions. Here the briefer indicates the goal of forthcoming combat activities, the general intent of the enemy's actions, the probable missions and the order of use of his forces and resources in support of his plan, the time of their deployment, and other questions.

IV. The principal missions of reconnaissance and measures implemented in support of these missions. The main missions of reconnaissance and the measures implemented in support of these missions are examined in this section.

All information in the briefing must be confirmed by the necessary figures, and the sources should be cited. When doubtful and false information is reported to the commander, it is accompanied by the appropriate qualifications, and the time and source from which it was obtained are indicated.

When making an oral briefing, the officer should avoid referring to the locations of objects by the map's coordinate grid. It would be better to make the references in relation to highlighted and well-known population centers, hills, forests, and other terrain features, indicating the distance from them in kilometers and the compass bearing. As an example: "Up to a company of tanks are concentrated at the edge of the forest 3 km west of Podguzha; there is a battery of 155-mm howitzers at fire positions on the western slope of hill 180.3." The objects must be indicated with a special pointer, or with the sharpened end of a pencil in the former's absence.

The fuller and more reliably the information is provided in the briefing, the easier it will be for the commander to make a grounded decision, to predict the possible development of the battle, and to organize firm control over the subunits.

When time is short, especially during combat, the briefing may be short rather than expanded. The following is indicated in a short briefing: the numbers of nuclear weapons, artillery, and mortars, and how they are used by the enemy; innovations in the grouping and order of battle of enemy troops, and the direction of the main efforts; revealed nuclear strike resources, and the possibilities for their use; the composition and location of reserves, and the probable nature of enemy actions in the immediate future.

In a number of cases the commander may simply require answers to specific questions of interest to him from the briefer.

Some information must be reported to the commander and chief of staff immediately. This includes:

on preparations of the enemy for an attack;

on revelation of enemy nuclear weapons and on their location;

on nuclear strikes or the enemy's use of other weapons of mass destruction;

on appearance of the enemy where he had not been noticed previously;

on abrupt change in the nature of the enemy's actions (the beginning of an offensive, counterattack, withdrawal, and so on).

Intelligence is reported to higher staffs by technical communication resources, by hand-carried written (graphical) messages, and orally. Intelligence reported to higher staff and transmitted to subordinate and interacting subunits personally or by communication resources is mandatorily recorded in the orders and message log.

COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1980

11004
CSO: 1801/301

.

ARMED FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: TEXTBOOK FOR POLITICAL WORK IN HIGHER SCHOOLS

Moscow PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKOY ARMII I FLOTA--UCHEBNOYE POSOBIYE DLYA VYSSHIKH VOYENNYKH UCHILISHCH in Russian 1979 (signed to press 30 Oct 79) pp 1-11, 380-383

[Author information, annotation, table of contents, and introduction from book "Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy--Textbook for Higher Military Schools", edited by Colonel General M. G. Sabolev and Major General I. S. Mareyev, Voyenizdat, 100,000 copies, 383 pages]

[Text] Author Collective

Captain lst Rank T. K. Belashchenko (chapters 24, 25); Colonel I. M. Butskiy, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 1, 10, §3 of Chapter 20); Colonel P. V. Galochkin, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 5, 7, 23); Major General P. I. Karpenko, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 4, 18, 19); Major General I. S. Mareyev, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 9, 14, 15, 17, §1 of Chapter 20, Chapter 21); Colonel A. S. Skachkov, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (Introduction, Chapter 2, §2 of Chapter 20); Major General N. I. Smorigo, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 8, 12); Captain lst Rank F. I. Tatarinov, professor, doctor of historical sciences (Chapter 6, §4 of Chapter 20); Colonel M. N. Timofeyechev, assistant professor, candidate of historical sciences (chapters 3, 11, 13, 16); Colonel L. A. Ushakov, candidate of historical sciences (Chapter 22).

Annotation

This manual was prepared in conjunction with the program of courses in party-political work for military institutions of higher education. It demonstrates the CPSU's leadership in strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces and raising their combat readiness, and it illuminates the objectives, content, form, and methods of educational work in the company, the battery, and other equivalent subunits. The authors reveal the objectives and role of commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations in the political, military, and moral indoctrination of Soviet soldiers, and in formation of high moral, political, and fighting qualities within them.

The book is intended for students of military institutions of higher education, as well as for young officers and active party and Komsomol members of subunits, units, and ships.

—◄

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction. Course Subject Matter and Objectives

    1. Essence and Significance of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces

Led by their tested vanguard--the Leninist party, the Soviet people are confidently
implementing the program of communist development. In the years since the Great
October Socialist Revolution our country has traveled a hard and glorious road
equivalent to centuries of development. A developed socialist society has been
built in the USSR. This world-historic victory is now documented in the new
Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are firmly and persistently imple-
menting Lenin's foreign policy, aimed at creating the most favorable conditions
for development of communism in our country and consolidating the international
positions of socialism, so as to avert the threat of a new world war.

It is namely owing to the greater power of the Soviet Union and other countries of
the socialist fraternity, and their consistent peace-loving foreign policy, that
the immediate threat of a new world war has been postponed and certain successes
have been achieved in the struggle for relaxation of international tension.

But at the same time the Communist Party recognizes that the aggressive nature of
imperialism has not changed. As before, we continue to live in a restless world,
in a time of aggravation of the class struggle in the international arena. Having
subjected the international situation to scientific analysis, the 25th CPSU Congress
noted: "Although the possibilities imperialism has for aggressive actions have now
been significantly diminished, its nature continues to be the same. Therefore peace-
loving forces must display high vigilance."* Reckoning with the vital interests of
our motherland and the entire socialist fraternity, the CPSU and Soviet government
are devoting unweakening attention to improving the country's defenses, strengthening
the USSR Armed Forces, raising their combat readiness, and training and indoctrinating
personnel of the troops and naval forces.

The USSR Constitution declares defense of the socialist fatherland to be the sacred
duty of every citizen of the USSR, and military service to be an honorable obligation
of the Soviet people.

The USSR Armed Forces are the offspring of the Soviet people. They were created and
are now developing under the guidance of the Communist Party. This is the basis of
their power, and the source of their glorious victories over enemies of our mother-
land.

The CPSU exercises leadership over military development in various areas of its
activities, to include theoretical, political, scientific-technical, organizational,
and ideological indoctrination. One of the most important areas of this leadership
is party-political work in the army and navy--that is, the ideological and organiza-
tional activity of the CPSU within the military masses aimed at explaining and
implementing party policy and decisions, at communist indoctrination of troop per-
sonnel, and at mobilizing the soldiers to perform the missions facing the subunits,
units, and ships.

Party-political work is one of the inviolable foundations of Soviet military develop-
ment, and a powerful means for shaping the communist philosophy of soldiers and en-
suring high combat proficiency, organization, discipline, and constant combat readi-
ness of the troops and naval forces, guaranteeing an immediate annihilatory repulse
to any aggressor. "Party-political work with the personnel," said Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, "and their ideological seasoning have always been and continue to be

---

*"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976,
p 24.

powerful weapons in our army. The strength of these weapons has been tested in the fire of battle. Even today they strike fear in the hearts of our enemies."*

The purpose of party-political work is to indoctrinate personnel of the army and navy in the spirit of communist ideology, and to achieve implementation of the policy and decisions of the CPSU and Soviet government and exemplary fulfillment, by the soldiers, of the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, military oaths and military regulations, orders and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs.

The essence of party-political work is defined by the very nature and missions of the Soviet Armed Forces, created by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party to protect the revolutionary achievements of the laborers. Since the first days of their existence, our armed forces have been indoctrinated by the party in the spirit of communism, selfless devotion to the CPSU, the people, and the motherland, Soviet patriotism, friendship among peoples, and socialist internationalism.

The entire life and activities of the Soviet Army and Navy are based on conscious fulfillment of military duty to the motherland by servicemen. Through explanation and persuasion, the party makes sure that every soldier deeply recognizes that the responsibilities entrusted to him are extremely important to the Soviet state, that his military labor is needed by the people, the party, and the country, and that his honorable, selfless service is a concrete contribution to the whole-people's struggle for implementation of the program for communist development of the society, and for reinforcement of the defense capabilities of our fatherland and of the entire world socialist fraternity.

Describing the significance of party-political work to raising the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces, V. I. Lenin emphasized the following in his letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), "Everything For the Fight Against Denikin!": "Wherever discipline is the firmest of all, wherever the greatest concern is shown in political work in the troops and in the work of commissars..., there you will find no laxity in the army, there the army's structure and its spirit will be better, and there the victories will be more in number."**

In a number of his works, letters, and telegrams, Vladimir Il'ich persistently demanded that party-political work in the troops be performed continuously, and he inquired as to the sorts of steps being taken to "improve political work and to strengthen alertness and consciousness," and he stated: "...be mindful of political work," "do not weaken political work."***

The historic experience of the civil and Great Patriotic wars persuasively confirmed the tremendous role played by party-political work in nurturing high moral, political, and fighting qualities in the soldiers and ensuring victory over the enemies of the Soviet motherland.

*"KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1969, p 39.
**Lenin, V. I. "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 56.
***Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 50, pp 271, 328, 348.

In a letter of greeting of the CPSU Central Committee to political organs, commanders, and political workers of the Soviet Army and Navy in connection with the 60th anniversary of the Political Directorate of the Republic's Revolutionary Military Council, it is said that in the trying years of war, "political workers and army and navy communists were in the forward ranks of the motherland's defenders. They inspired bravery, valor, and an undiminishable desire for victory in the soldiers, and led them to immortal acts of heroism in behalf of the liberty and independence of the socialist fatherland."*

Today the significance of party-political work is growing even more. This can be explained by growth in the volume and complexity of the missions of the army and navy, by fundamental transformations in all areas of military affairs, by qualitative changes in the personnel of the units and ships, by the worldwide aggravation of the struggle between the two ideologies--communist and bourgeoisie--in the world arena, by the danger that imperialism's aggressive forces might unleash a new war, and by growth in the role of the moral-political factor in attaining victory over the enemy.

Were it to be unleashed by imperialists, a new world war would harbor the danger of the use of nuclear missiles and other resources of tremendous destructive power. The war would require unprecedented exertion of physical and spiritual strengths by Soviet soldiers. Therefore moral-political and psychological training of the personnel, and development of their high moral, political, and fighting qualities are acquiring especially great significance.

"The core of ideological work and political indoctrination," emphasizes the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination" (1979), "was and continues to be formation, in the Soviet people, of a scientific philosophy, selfless devotion to the affairs of the party and to communist ideals, love for the socialist fatherland, and proletarian internationalism."

The Communist Party is constantly concerned to see that the activities of military personnel, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations would be raised to the level of today's requirements. As a result of the unweakening attention of the party and its Leninist Central Committee toward the army and navy party and Komsomol organizations, the effectiveness of their ideological indoctrination efforts is rising, their ties with the soldier masses are broadening, and their authority is growing stronger. Making up the absolute majority of the personnel, communists and Komsomol members are the firm foundation upon which the high political state and morale of the troops and naval forces rest.

Party-political work is purposeful and effective because it proceeds in the spirit of CPSU policy and of the all-conquering teaching of Marxism-Leninism, which makes up its ideological and theoretical base. Marxism-Leninism arms our military personnel, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations with a scientific methodology and with the most effective principles of ideological-political influence upon the personnel.

KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 12, 1979, p 3.

The fundamental principle of party-political work is that it proceeds on strictly party, class positions, in the spirit of communist ideology. This principle always requires all of us to evaluate all facts and phenomena of life in the army and navy on the basis of the theory and policy of the Communist Party in the interests of the Soviet people, to maintain a clear ideological position, to decisively fight against all manifestations of bourgeois and revisionist ideology, and to display concern for raising the ideological level of all educational, agitational-propaganda, mass-cultural, and other indoctrination measures.

Another important principle is close ties of party-political work with the practice of communist development, with the life of the party and country, and with the missions of the troops. The soldiers' deep understanding of their place and role in the whole people's struggle for development of communist society, of their consti-tutional responsibilities, and of their personal duty to defend the motherland is a necessary prerequisite of high and stable indicators in combat and political training, of strengthening discipline, and of raising the alertness and combat readiness of subunits, units, and ships.

Another important principle of party-political work is its purposefulness and concreteness. Organizing the effort purposefully and concretely means to consider the present objectives of the party and people, and the army and navy, and to attentively consider the unique features of the present stage in development of the armed forces, the situation in which the troops must operate, the organizational structure of the subunits, units, and ships, their manning level, the age and nationality composition of the servicemen, the degree of their ideological maturity, their training level, and other factors.

Continuity, efficiency, and aggressiveness are also indestructible principles of party-political work. The more complex and tense the situation is, the stronger must be the political influence exerted by commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations upon the personnel. This is achieved through prompt ex-planation of the tasks of political work, through creative use of its most effective forms and methods, through systematic and comprehensive political briefings, through proper placement of personnel, elected party officials, and all communists, and through their daily political and moral influence upon servicemen, laborers, and white collar workers.

One of the distinguishing traits of Marxism-Leninism is the unity of theory and practice, of word and of deed. Hence follows the principle of the unity of ideological and organizational work. Persuasion, indoctrination of the soldiers, and their mobilization to solve practical problems lie at the basis of the activity of all military and political personnel, political organs, and party and Komsomol organiza-tions.

A deep understanding of the Leninist principles of party-political work, in their dialectical unity, and their creative use promotes effective attainment of the ob-jective of an integrated approach to troop training and indoctrination, and to strengthening party influence upon all aspects of the life and activities of the troops and naval forces.

The requirements of the party toward party-political work are clearly spelled out in decisions of party congresses and Central Committee plenums, in the CPSU Central

Committee degree "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" (1967), in subsequent decisions of the party Central Committee on ideological issues, in the books "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Pressing Problems in the CPSU's Ideological Work], "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Standing Guard Over Peace and Socialism], "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], "Tselina" [Virgin Soil], and other works and speeches by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in the Statute on Political Organs, in instructions to CPSU organizations and to Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, in orders and directives from the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate, and in other documents.

The effectiveness of party-political work is assured through the joint efforts of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. The one-man commander firmly and successively implements the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, manages the training and indoctrination of subordinates, and maintains high military discipline in the unit and aboard ship. Organizing combat and political training, he relies perpetually on the political machinery and on the party and Komsomol organizations.

Political organs and the political workers of the units, ships, and subunits are the immediate organizers of party-political work. Together with commanders and party and Komsomol organizations, they indoctrinate the Soviet soldiers in the spirit of communism, selfless devotion to the socialist motherland, and in the spirit of the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions of our party, people, and army.

The success of training and of political, military, and moral indoctrination of the personnel, the level of combat training, discipline, and the combat readiness of subunits, units, and ships depend to a significant degree on the officers. The Soviet officer is an embodiment of the better qualities of our people and their armed forces. The Communist Party and the Soviet government have provided our officers with considerable rights, and they have imposed extremely important responsibilities on each of them. It is the duty of the officer to justify this high trust, to persistently implement party policy, to spare neither effort nor time to raise the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, and to be a good teacher, indoctrinator, and organizer of the soldiers.

The Communist Party devotes constant attention to the training of officers--ideologically persuaded patriots, experts in military affairs capable of competently organizing and conducting training and party-political work in the subunits, units, and ships. The party teaches commanders, political workers, engineers, and technicians to structure all of their activity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and the CPSU's policies and decisions, to guide themselves in troop training and indoctrination by the conclusions of Soviet military science and military pedagogics and psychology, to maintain an integrated approach to indoctrinating the motherland's defenders, to rely in their work on the collective experience and knowledge of the masses, to heed the demands and needs of subordinates, to critically evaluate attained successes, and to boldly reveal and efficiently correct mistakes and shortcomings.

It is the job of the military school to arm the future officer with the complex art of communist indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and with the ability to purposefully organize their combat training, service, and personal lives. The course in party-political work is designed to solve this important problem.

2. Course Content, the Order of Its Study

The course "Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces" is an independent training discipline. It consists of three parts: "Principles of Party Structure. Commanders, Political Organs, Party and Komsomol Organizations of the Army and Navy," "Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces. Organization of Political and Military Indoctrination of Personnel in the Subunits," and "Party-Political Work in the Subunit, Unit (Ship) in Support of Fulfilling Training Missions and Raising Combat Readiness." Taking this course, students acquaint themselves thoroughly with the activities of the Communist Party aimed at guiding the construction and reinforcement of the armed forces, and they master the theory and practice of political and military indoctrination of the personnel of subunits, units, and ships. The concrete content of the course may be stated as comprehensive, profound explanation of the principles of party structure to the students; explanation of Lenin's norms of party life and the principles of party leadership; explanation of the tasks, forms, and methods of ideological and organizational work done by commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in support of communist indoctrination of soldiers, and their mobilization for exemplary performance of their duty to the motherland.

The main sources of knowledge in party-political work are the works of V. I. Lenin, the Program, the Charter, and decisions of the party, the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the Statute on Political Organs, Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and other party documents. The course in party-political work is structured in accordance with the requirements of Soviet military science toward troop organization and toward personnel training and indoctrination. It makes broad use of data from military pedagogics, psychology, and other sciences, and it also considers the best experience of commanders, political workers, and party organizations.

The course "Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces" is studied in military schools for the following basic reasons:

to help students study Lenin's ideological and organizational principles of party structure, the norms of party life and the principles of party leadership, and the laws governing the leading role of the Communist Party and its growth in the life and activities of the Soviet Armed Forces, in solution of the problems of military development, and reinforcement of the fighting power of the socialist state; to clarify the practical means for ensuring that the party would have an ideological and organizational influence upon the military masses, and the role and place of regular officers, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in raising the combat readiness of troops and naval forces;

to promote indoctrination of the students in the spirit of communist ideology, adherence to party principles, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and devotion to the people, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government; to develop the students' awareness of their military duty and military honor, their love for the military profession, a spirit of collectivism and troop comradeship, high political alertness and discipline, and an untiring desire to improve their political and military knowledge and their practical skills;

to arm the students with a knowledge of the content, form, and methods of ideological-political, military, moral, and legal indoctrination of the personnel, and to mobilize them for successful completion of their combat and political training tasks;

to help the future officers master Lenin's style of leadership and acquire the practical habits of organizing political indoctrination in the subunit, both in peacetime and in a combat situation.

This course cannot be reduced to just assimilating a certain sum of knowledge and indoctrination techniques. There are no ready-made recipes for each concrete case encountered in practice. Therefore the main task of each student is to deeply master the methods and resources of party-political work, to conceptualize its rich experience, and to develop his own ability to independently and creatively solve the problems of troop communist indoctrination.

This course provides future officers with a possibility for obtaining not only theoretical knowledge but also practical habits in party-political work. It is with this purpose that in addition to lectures and seminars, students undergo apprenticeship in the units and aboard ships. They are asked to complete several assignments, to include conducting political lessons, discussions, and political briefings. The habits of the students are broadened through daily participation in mass political work in the military school, in units, and aboard ships, as well as at local enterprises, in institutions, and in schools. Commanders, political workers, military lawyers, engineers and technicians, and the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations of units, ships, and subunits regularly speak to the students on the pressing problems of personnel communist indoctrination.

In order that the essence of party-political work would be deeply assimilated by the students, special attention must be turned to independent study of the primary sources and the textbooks recommended by the course program, the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, military manuals, and materials published in military journals, newspapers, and anthologies on the experience of party-political work; also important is systematic reading of the military-historical, military-memoir, and popular literature.

Study of the course in party-political work and preparation for practical activity in the subunits aimed at training and indoctrinating the personnel require the students to continually improve their personal qualities, their positive traits of character, and their ability to command. The school's party and Komsomol organizations and the collectives of the training departments, courses, and faculties play an important role in this. They are called upon to help the command, the political department, the instructors, and all officers of the military schools to shape the future Soviet officer as an ideologically persuaded individual, as a willful, energetic, knowledgeable person, one who loves his military profession, a disciplined and morally enduring individual--a true indoctrinator of the motherland's defenders. "...the indoctrinator," said M. I. Kalinin, "influences his subjects not only by imparting certain knowledge to them but also through his own behavior, his way of life, and his attitude toward commonplace phenomena."* Communist conviction, party principles, honor, faithfulness to military duty and to the combat traditions of the

---

*Kalinin, M. 1., "O vospitanii sovetskikh voinov" [Indoctrination of Soviet Soldiers], Moscow, 1975, pp 156-157.

army and navy, persistence in attainment of goals, diligence, initiative, self-criticism, a feeling for the new, tactfulness and concern toward people, physical maturity, perseverance, bravery and courage, and modesty in social and personal life are all qualities vitally necessary to the Soviet officer.

Studying in a military institution of higher education, students enjoy all of the conditions for becoming comprehensively educated Soviet officers, avid patriots, zealous propagandists of the ideals of the Communist Party, willful chiefs and experienced indoctrinators capable of training ideologically persuaded, competent, disciplined and courageous defenders of the Soviet motherland. Among others, the course in party-political work actively promotes attainment of this goal.

COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1979

11004
CSO: 1801/304

ARMED FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: TEXTBOOK FOR POLITICAL WORKERS OF RESERVE

Moscow PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V SOVETSKIKH VOORUZHENNYKH SILAKH--UCHEBNOYE POSOBIYE DLYA POLITRABOTNIKOV ZAPASA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 28 Aug 80) pp 1-6, 247-255

[Author collective, editorial board, annotation, table of contents, introduction and conclusion from book "Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces--Textbook for Political Workers of the Reserve", edited by Admiral A. I. Sorokin, Voyenizdat, 35,000 copies, 255 pages]

[Text] Author Collective

This textbook was prepared by the following collective of authors: Captain 1st Rank T. K. Belashchenko; Colonel L. A. Bublik, doctor of historical sciences, professor; Colonel B. N. Voskresenkiy; Major General N. I. Gusev, candidate of philosophical sciences; Colonel M. A. Kopylov; Major General V. K. Luzherenko, candidate of historical sciences, assistant professor; Colonel M. S. Pletushkov, candidate of historical sciences, assistant professor; Colonel N. P. Sautov; Lieutenant Colonel V. G. Sidorik; Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) A. S. Skachkov, candidate of historical sciences, assistant professor; Admiral A. I. Sorokin; Colonel L. A. Ushakov, candidate of historical sciences (leader of the author collective); Captain 1st Rank V. G. Kharin; Colonel V. P. Khrobostov, candidate of historical sciences.

Editorial Board

Admiral A. I. Sorokin, Major General V. K. Luzherenko, Colonel L. A. Ushakov.

Annotation

This textbook illuminates the basic problems of party construction in the Soviet Army and Navy, the ideological and organizational activities of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations, and the moral, political, and psychological training of Soviet soldiers, and it reveals the ways for raising the effectiveness of party-political work today, and its content in a combat situation.

The textbook is intended for political workers of the reserve.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table of Contents

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Introduction

All of the outstanding victories and achievements of the Soviet people are inseparably
associated with the activity of the Communist Party as the leading and guiding force
of our society. "Traveling the road indicated by Lenin," states the CPSU Central
Committee decree "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin",
"under the leadership of the Communist Party the Soviet people have successfully
achieved the country's socialist industrialization, collectivization of agriculture,
and a cultural revolution, and they have provided the world with a model of just
solution of the nationalities issue. Within an extremely short time, our motherland
was transformed into a mighty socialist power. The Soviet people defended the
achievements of October in the fight against internal counterrevolution and inter-
vention. The victory of the Soviet people over fascism in the Great Patriotic War
had a tremendous revolutionizing influence upon the fate of all mankind.

"Achievement of a developed socialist society, in which the creative efforts of the
new structure and its truly humanitarian essence are revealing themselves more and
more fully, was a world-historic result of the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet
people aimed at implementing Lenin's ideas."*

---

*"On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," CPSU Central
Committee Decree dated 13 December 1979, Moscow, 1980.

The modern era is characterized by further growth in the party's leading role. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted: "The dynamic development of Soviet society, the growing scale of communist development, and our activity in the international arena persistently demand that we continually raise the level of party leadership over development of the economy and culture and indoctrination of the people, and that we improve organizational and political work in the masses."*

A knowledge of the theory and practice of party development is an aid to a correct understanding of the essence of party leadership.

Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is an inseparable component of party development in general. Party-political work is scientifically grounded ideological and organizational activity aimed at implementing Communist Party policy in the army and navy, indoctrinating the personnel with the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and mobilizing the soldiers for fulfillment of the missions facing them.

Party-political work has a special place among the factors promoting the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the cruel and bloody wars imposed upon our country by imperialism.

Basing himself on the experience of managing the country's defenses during the Civil War, V. I. Lenin came to the conclusion: "...wherever the greatest concern is shown in political work in the troops..., there you will find no laxity in the army, there the army's structure and its spirit will be better, and there the victories will be more in number."**

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who had participated from the beginning to the end of the past Great Patriotic War as an executive in army and frontal political organs, writes that it is hard to overstate the significance of party-political work, that it hardened the spirits and hearts of the soldiers, and that it was "the sharpest weapon of the war years."***

The high evaluation given to the educational role of our army by the 25th CPSU Congress and in the party Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination" obligates us to structure party-political work in such a way that it would ensure continual growth in the ideological and moral maturity of the soldiers, and so that it would be directed mainly at maintaining the armed forces in constant combat readiness. "We must make it our goal," said CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov at a scientific-practical conference of army and navy political organ executives, "to see that every commander and political worker organizing personnel training and indoctrination clearly understands the sort of new moral, physical, and psychological trials our soldier will encounter in real combat, were the imperialists to unleash a war, and the reserve of strengths--

---

*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1976, Vol 5, p 523.
**Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 56.
***Brezhnev, L. I., "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], Moscow, 1978, p 24.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

combat, ideological, moral--that must be prepared for the motherland's defenders while still at peace."*

A scientific approach to completing these tasks presupposes a creative search for the new and progressive, and the ability of military personnel to competently control personnel training and indoctrination, unify military collectives, and organically unite, within themselves, adherence to party principles with deep competency and a knowledge of military affairs. Successful leadership of a unit and subunit would be unimaginable without constantly raising the ideological-theoretical level of the officers, without active participation in party-political work, and without mastery of all aspects of the art of organizing and indoctrinating servicemen, and army and navy youth.

The subject matter of a course in party-political work, viewed as a scientific and study discipline, includes the fundamentals of party development in the army and navy, Lenin's principles of party leadership, the principles of the structure and form of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations, the content and methods of their ideological and organizational activities, and the system and basic elements of political training, mass agitation, and cultural education in the armed forces.

The main goal of this course is to arm political workers in the reserve with a knowledge of the theory and practice of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy, and to develop, within them, the high moral-political qualities of a political worker, one capable of competently implementing CPSU policy in the Soviet Armed Forces and complete, in mature fashion, the tasks of intensifying the educational role of the armed forces and getting the soldiers to deeply recognize their duty of safeguarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the cause of peace and socialism.

The principal forms of training used in the study of the course in party-political work by reserve political workers include lectures, seminars, independent literature study, and speeches by commanders and political workers from the troops.

The main literature for the course includes the works of V. I. Lenin, the CPSU Program and Charter, materials and decisions of party congresses and conferences and of party Central Committee Plenums, decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, documents of the international communist and workers' movement, the Statute on Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Instructions to Organizations of the CPSU and Komsomol in the Soviet Army and Navy, general service regulations, orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Political Directorate, and the proceedings of all-army conferences.

Monographs, books, special collections, pamphlets, and periodicals illuminating pressing problems of the ideological and organizational work of commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy may be of certain benefit to the course.

Study of party theory and policy and of the fundamentals of the party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy produces the greatest impact when it proceeds in

*Ustinov, D. F., "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, p 287.

organic unity with study of the experience of communist development, the CPSU's international activities, and its ideological struggle. There is special significance in this connection to assimilating the inexhaustible theoretical wealth and the noble models of Lenin's approach to organizational tasks and ideological indoctrination, contained within the works and speeches of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and of other executives of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

Conclusion

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our country is completing the great and complex tasks of creating the material-technical base of communism, improving social relations and forming the new man. The party is untiringly fighting to ensure peaceful conditions favoring communist development, and it is pursuing a persistent and purposeful policy aimed at relaxing international tension and consolidating peace in all the world. In this regard the CPSU constantly devotes great attention to strengthening the country's defense capabilities, to leading the armed forces, and to improving the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces for defense of socialism's achievements. "The Soviet Union," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech to voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district on 22 February 1980, "cannot be frightened by anyone. Our strengths and possibilities are enormous. We and our allies will always manage to stand up for ourselves and offer a repulse to any hostile attacks."*

Party-political work and the ideological and organizational activities of army and navy commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations have tremendous significance to fulfillment of all of the missions imposed on the Soviet soldiers.

In the same way that satisfying the requirements of our party concerned with raising quality and effectiveness is of primary concern to the whole country, it has priority significance to party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces.

In a broad sense of the term, effectiveness presupposes achievement of the best results at the least outlay of labor and time. However, this concept cannot be extended adequately from economics to political work. Party-political work is effective when it makes significant changes in the consciousness and acts of Soviet soldiers. Therefore the effectiveness of party-political work is defined as the extent to which the set goals are achieved through optimum utilization of the possibilities available for achieving these goals.** Raising the effectiveness of party-political work means strengthening party influence upon all basic processes occurring in the Soviet Armed Forces, and mainly on strengthening the fighting power and raising the combat readiness of the troops and the communist ideological maturity of the personnel.*** These are precisely the fundamental, main criterion expressing the primarily aggregate results of party-political work performed within a relatively long interval of time.

---

*PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
**See Yepishev, A. A., "Nekotoryye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Some Problems of Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1975, p 45.
***See "Praktika partiynoy raboty v armii i flote" [The Practice of Party Work in the Army and Navy], Moscow, 1977, p 20.

The criteria of the effectiveness of party-political work are the distinguishing traits by which we can assess what has been achieved in shaping a communist philosophy and indoctrinating the Soviet troops, and raising their social and political activity.

The effectiveness of party-political work is manifested in the consciousness and behavior of both individual servicemen and large military collectives. In correspondence with this, it would also be correct to refer to groups of the criteria and indicators of the effectiveness of party-political work--spiritual and practical (behavioral).

The spiritual criteria include new knowledge, cognitive activity, communist conviction, competency in ideology and theory, class maturity, and psychosocial status and orientation. The main indicators of the spiritual criteria of effectiveness are: the depth of understanding of the premises of Marxist-Leninist theory and CPSU policy, and of the missions of the armed forces; the aspiration of Soviet soldiers toward intellectual perfection; the level of formation, in the servicemen, of diversified, persistent, and active class interests, and of their intolerance of foreign ideology and of unscientific viewpoints, ideas, and theories; the public mood and public opinion.

The principal criteria of the effectiveness of party-political work associated with its practical or behavioral side are military work, sociopolitical activity, and the morality of the behavior of Soviet soldiers, mainly communists and Komsomol members. Indicators of this group of criteria include: unity of viewpoints and deeds, an active life position, and conscientiousness in performing one's official and public reponsibilities; a high quality of military labor, and the desire to understand military affairs more deeply and to raise the level of combat proficiency, combat readiness, and military discipline; the function of communists and Komsomol members as models in combat and political training; intolerance of shortcomings; a capability for working as a volunteer; a creative attitude toward assigned work, and display of initiative; purity of moral countenance, honesty, responsibility, the preparedness and capacity for comradely mutual assistance, and so on. Other indicators of this group of criteria could also rightfully include the preparedness and competency of political organs, commanders, political workers, and elected party officials for conducting extensive organizational and ideological activity among servicemen in support of the missions facing the units and ships.

The criteria of the effectiveness of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces are very diverse. Their broadness is a product of the typical traits of the Soviet way of life and of the spiritual countenance of Soviet soldiers. The effectiveness of political work is based on the consciousness of the servicemen, on their communist ideology, which L. I. Brezhnev referred to figuratively as an alloy of knowledge, conviction, and practical actions. It is in concrete actions that the party finds the yardstick of the success of political indoctrination of the masses.*

A deep knowledge of the theory and practice of party development and of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces permits political organs, commanders, political workers, and party organizations to determine scientifically justified,

---

*See Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Vol 5, p 535.

time-tested ways for raising its effectiveness in the units and aboard ships, ways which satisfy the party requirements.

A scientific approach to organizing party-political work in the army and navy is one of the fundamentally important ways for improving all party-political work and making it highly effective. What this means is that all party-political work with the personnel should be organized in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory, with the principles of party development, and with CPSU policy, on the basis of scientific methods for analyzing the life and activities of military collectives, with a consideration for new phenomena being born by development of military affairs and the concrete conditions for the activities of the unit or ship.

One of the decisive prerequisites for raising the effectiveness of political work in general is constant improvement of the moral, political, and professional qualities of commanders and political personnel, raising their competency and responsibility for their assigned areas, improving their ability to concentrate efforts of subordinates upon the main, fundamental issues associated with improving the quality of combat and political training and with the tasks of combat training and military discipline, and improving their capability for self-critically and objectively evaluating their achievements and revealing shortcomings.

Socialist competition has an important place in the struggle to upgrade quality and raise the intensity of combat training. It is the task of commanders, political workers, and party organizations to thoroughly develop the creativity and initiative of the personnel, to maintain strict compliance with Lenin's principles of organizing socialist competition, and to see that broad use is made of effective forms of competition, such as in relation to tasks and standards, phases of tactical exercises, and performance of combat vehicle driving, gunnery, and other forms of exercises.

Raising the effectiveness of party-political work presupposes daily improvement of ideological work in the army and navy, and qualitative improvement of the ideological maturity of the Soviet soldiers.

As was noted by the 25th CPSU Congress and in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination", an integrated approach must be maintained toward the entire indoctrination effort. In application to the conditions offered by the army and navy, such an approach permits effective formation of high moral, political, and fighting qualities in the soldiers, organic unification of raising the military proficiency of servicemen and their political and moral indoctrination, development of high discipline and respect for Soviet laws, and assurance of compliance with the norms of socialist morality.

Communists are the recognized vanguard of the USSR Armed Forces. It is upon their active participation in the work of army and navy party organizations, on competent placement of communists in the decisive areas, and on further reinforcement of the subunit party organizations that the effectiveness of party-political work depends in many ways. Its effectiveness also gains from mastery, by commanders, political organs, and elected party officials, of the modern methods for planning ideological and organizational work with the personnel and improving the style of work and the system for monitoring and inspecting execution of adopted decisions.

The task of upgrading the quality and effectiveness of party-political work in the army and navy has one of the central places in the activities of military personnel. A deep knowledge of the theory of party development and of the scientific fundamentals, laws, and Leninist principles of party-political work, and competent use of the rich arsenal of the forms, methods, and resources of ideological influence upon the personnel permit us to solve the problems of raising their ideological and organizational efforts aimed at implementing CPSU policy in the army and navy, indoctrinating the Soviet soldiers in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and mobilizing servicemen to complete the complex tasks facing the USSR armed forces.

COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1980

11004
CSO: 1801/303   END