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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OAU SAID TO BE SHOWING ITS MUSCLE

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 90

[Article: "Oau: At Last That 'Paper Tiger' is Showing It Has Teeth"]

[Text] THE ORGANISATION of African Unity (OAU) has often been criticised for its lack of "teeth". It passes thunderous resolutions, the critics say, yet is impotent to implement them. The critics go on to stress that when it comes to inter-African wrangles, the OAU's good intentions mostly flounder on the iron rule of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member-countries.

At 18 years of age, the OAU may be deemed to have come of age – in June in Nairobi. The teeth may not yet be fully grown, but they are there for all to see.

The usual charge against the OAU – being a paper tiger – has in fact never seemed convincing, not even in earlier days. One is reminded of the celebrated question posed by Joseph V. Stalin in the last European war: "How many divisions has the Pope?" People obsessed with physical power tend to underestimate moral influence, which is a force that not only impresses the do-gooders but is also pertinent in terms of *realpolitik*.

## Last-ditch stand

The OAU's moral influence certainly has made its mark on the political map of the continent over the past 18 years: 95 per cent of Africa is now free. We are witnessing the last-ditch resistance in Namibia and South Africa. But because this is taking place in a particularly important, strategic and wealthy region racialism and imperialism cannot be expected to give in easily.

Efforts are being made to persuade the world that whites in South Africa not only have a God-endorsed just cause but also that it is in the self-interest of others to support them, not only in the self-interest of the Americans and Europeans but also black Africans themselves. The African is no longer expected simply to bow to a historical necessity. He must be won over for a crusade against Russia and communism, according to South Africa and the West.

If the resolutions adopted in Nairobi on these matters served no other purpose than to demonstrate that the Africans will not be fooled by such manouevres, they will have been worthwhile. Attempts to create a "fake" independence of Namibia have been condemned. So has "the emerging unholy alliance between Pretoria and Washington." France and Britain, too, were strictured – for vetoing the resolution of the UN Security Council which had called for mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

The quick and angry reaction in the White House to the African consensus voiced in Nairobi, and clumsy attempts to find excuses for American policies in Southern Africa, were proof that the OAU had driven its point home.

Moreover, the OAU called for unilateral sanctions against Pretoria, including a call on all member-states to cease granting landing rights to aircraft flying to and from South Africa. African countries ignoring such calls may find themselves in an embarrassing position at the next OAU meeting.

Indeed, more and more African countries have come to the view that they cannot afford to ignore the opinions of the

OAU when these are expressed forcefully. This was illustrated to some extent by the *volte face* of King Hassan on the Western Sahara issue. Not only that, the king decided to grace the summit personally, which he had not done for many years, and chose the occasion to publicly endorse the African call for a referendum in the region. An implementation committee composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania will now seek to ensure that the people of Western Sahara can give their verdict, under the protection of a peacekeeping force set up by the OAU and UNO.

Entertaining as well as informative was the physical contest between Siad Barre of Somalia and Mengistu of Ethiopia. While the outcome of the fight was a foregone conclusion, had it been allowed to continue – bearing in mind the advanced age of one and youthful agility of the other – this in no way reflected the state of the game over the Ogaden.

## Cordial talks

But the most important event relating to the Horn of Africa conflict took place outside the Kenyatta Conference Centre, as the Presidents of Somalia and Kenya met for what appeared to be a cordial discussion of their bilateral problems. Somalia's assurance of having no claims on Kenya's north-eastern province was received extremely well by the Kenyans and was front-page splash in the Nairobi newspapers next day.

The resolution on Chad required considerable mental acrobatics. The intention was to try and get the Libyans out of the country as soon as possible, replacing them with an OAU force without offending Colonel Gadaffi.

The Libyans, who had been under a barrage of abuse from the local media throughout the conference, had other reasons to be delighted with the outcome of the 18th OAU summit. Only four countries objected to the proposal to hold the next gathering in Tripoli: Ghana, Gabon, Egypt and Sudan.

There was much that was mature, statesmanlike and constructive at this memorable conference. The OAU accepted a proposal for a human and people's rights convention for Africa and moved closer to creating a kind of security council to deal with inter-African conflicts.

In November, it was resolved, a committee will meet to provide a vitally important platform for dialogue between oil-rich Arab states and the needy countries of Black Africa●.



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

'INFRASTRUCTURAL PROBLEMS' HAMPER FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 29]

[Article by Mbalia Wangai and Aluem Izeze]

[Text] Serious infrastructural problems still hamper the implementation of the free movement of persons within the zone, as ratified by nine of the 16 member-states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Heads of the community heard the no-progress report from ECOWAS secretary-general Diaby Ouatarra at the recent meeting of the Community in Freetown.

The Community had set itself a 1989 target to transform West Africa into one free trade zone with more than 170-million consumers. This projection is hampered by protectionist scepticism by the six member-states yet to sign the agreement, and Nigeria and Ivory Coast whose economies compete for the same market.

Hesitation in implementing the free movement arrangement have also been delayed by recent disturbing incidents which included 46 Ghanaians suffocating to death in a gendarmerie cell in the Ivory Coast, the elleged molestation of Nigerian nationals in Liberia, the December 1980 riots in Kano which left 1,000 people dead, and serious border disputes between Nigeria and Benin.

When Liberia asked the Freetown summit for exemption from ratifying the free movement clause for security reasons, Nigeria charged it was part of the continuing harassment of the Nigerian business community in Liberia, and a move to restrict Nigerian immigration in the country.

This tension has cast doubts on the ambitiousness of the three-stage programme which allows community citizens to enter any member-country without visas, providing travel documents are in order. The second stage guarantees rights of residence for five years before which the third stage of permanent residence and the establishment of a business or livelihood become a right.

Several countries have so far experienced a high influx of job seekers, to the point of concern in some cases.

The summit broke new ground in its agreement to establish a framework for a defence association, a step encouraged by some successes in the Community's 1981-1986 programmes in agriculture, industry, transport, telecommunication, and the proposed postal union. Food production, livestock development, fishing, and forestry were reported to be working well within the medium-term programme.

A $35-million telecommunication project was expected off the ground by the middle of the second half of this year, with the additional $69-million pledge from donor sources which also met in Freetown.

The heads of state were told that the highway links between Dakar and Njamena, Lagos and Nouachott were within their 1986 deadline while the railway to link Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, and Mali would come off as planned. The summit ended with the adoption of a short term "survival" energy programme which placed high priority in low cost joint efforts by members.

A three-phase plan will study the energy potentials of West African countries while improving the conventional forms of energy. The third phase will be an in-depth assessment and planning of the survival projects in individual member-states.



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICANS FEEL DOMINATED BY ALIEN RELIGIONS

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 86

[Article by Matthews Ndovi: "Scrap That Communion Bread and Bring On Fufu and Palm Wine"]

[Text] LIBERATION THEOLOGY has come to Black Africa. Its aim: to examine the Western interpretation of the Bible. Many Africans are concerned that the Western approach is drawing Africans away from Christianity.

To remedy the situation, public multi-denominational opinion is being sought at African regional meetings. One was held by the conference and research department of the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in Kitwe, Zambia, recently.

Under the label "The Lord's Supper: Western Importation or African Sacrament?" the conference examined in an ecumenical setting different beliefs and practices concerning the Lord's Supper. It also focussed on the Lord's Supper as an essential element in emerging African liturgical practices.

Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim leaders were invited, and interested outsiders. The Rev Denis M'Passou, who convened the conference, said: "The burning issue is, are we right in Africa to stick to the Western practice of bread and wine for the sacrament of holy communion? Can't we have our *'nshima'* with something that is our staple food?"

## Polygamists

In West Africa the subject has already been widely discussed. Most Africans, it seems, feel they should change to *fufu* (pounded cassava, a root vegetable) and palm wine for their Holy Communion sacrament. They argue it is unreasonable to adhere to the traditional bread and Western wine when these commodities are not universally available in Africa.

Pastor Illunga Mutaka, of the Methodist church in Zaire, said his church had examined the Western interpretation of the Lord's Supper and "we decided to take any of our staple crops – rice, maize, banana or cassave, whichever is available."

The African Theological Conference is also working on a new interpretation of the Bible to suit African culture. One aspect being examined is the exclusion of African polygamists from the church. Liberation theology has it that polygamy is universal in African culture and there is nothing sinful about it. According to the Bible, even the "chosen family of God" included polygamists such as Abraham, David and Solomon.

Dr M'Passou explains: "Nowhere in the Bible does God forbid polygamy. Christianity today rejects polygamy because the people who first interpreted the Bible were opposed to it as they themselves practised monogamy.

"Many other aspects of Bible interpretation have created direct conflict between the Church and African culture, keeping millions of Africans out of the Church. To accommodate these millions, Africans must reinterpret the Bible to suit their beliefs, customs and cultural bias."

Pastor Ronald Diggs, of Liberia, criticises Western church robes in tropical climates. He says: "You can imagine how it feels in those full-length robes in our heat in Liberia. When I first started dressing simply just like anyone else, my bishop was not happy. But everyone is now used to my simple attire and I feel quite comfortable."

For church music, many African countries have changed to local instruments. A Kenyan priest said at a recent church music seminar: "It is madness to think that the piano or organ is more Christian than the African drum."

Conservative African Christians are not quietly standing by. Opposition has come from leaders of both the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches.

On Communion, a Roman Catholic priest had this to say: "To think of using *nshima* and palm wine or *mkhoyo* (local sweet beer) is changing the sacrament of Holy Communion beyond pardon."

If Roman Catholic leaders are the most resistant to change, surprisingly they have been the first to introduce African sex education in the form of initiation ceremonies in the Church.

At a recent regional conference of the World Union of Catholic Women, held in Lusaka and attended by delegates from East, Central and Southern Africa, Zambia formed groups of women to conduct sex initiation of Roman Catholic girls when they reach puberty.

Formation of sex guidance groups came at the suggestion of Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo of Lusaka. He passionately urged Catholic women to make an impact on world legislation against prostitution and abortion to end what he termed the "abuse of women by men."

The Archbishop, encouraging sex education in the Church and condemning the use of contraceptives, asked the World Union of Catholic Women why they did not form organised services to protect young girls from sex abuse.

## Morality

He added: "Now we hear that in England parents may officially present the case of their 13-year-old daughters for the use of contraceptives. Is the responsibility for morality left to tablets, contraceptive pills and other devices?"

New statistics show that more Africans south of the Sahara accept Christ then reject Him. Nevertheless, the number of Christians belonging to independent African churches is close to that of those belonging to Western Roman Catholic and Protestant churches combined.

Independent churches now exist in 33 African countries and command the support of more than seven-million adherents from 270 different tribes in all parts of Africa south of the Sahara. These churches have become divorced from European missionary churches for one reason: strong African traditional and cultural differences.

The strength of the European colonial impact in the Church, and the strength of the missionary impact, make Africans feel still dominated by foreigners, despite political independence.



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RENE DUMONT ON 'STRANGULATION OF AFRICA'

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 pp 42-44

[Interview with Rene Dumont by Michel Leclercq, place and time unspecified]

[Text] **Michel Leclercq: Do, you consider that the black continent is near to catastrophe? Is Africa really being strangled?**

**Rene Dumont:** Absolutely. It was not I who invented this metaphor of a strangled Africa but Edward Sokoine, Prime Minister of Tanzania. When we left him in August 1979, after the long investigation which we helped to carry out in his country, this was his only conclusion: "And, now they are going to strangle us..."

Africa is already in a catastrophic condition. Each year its cereal imports rise, from two million tons in 1960 to 12 million in 1978, and from now on it will have no currency left with which to pay for them. Most of the countries of tropical Africa, with one or two exceptions, are up to their ears in debt, without any hope of ever being able to repay what they owe. Yet despite these imports, malnutrition increasingly ravages people people in the slums and above all in the rural areas.

Twenty years after independence these countries are in reality bankrupt, reduced to a state of permanent beggary. The most obvious case is of course Zaire. There is only one reason why this country has not as yet gone bankrupt: the international banks have already lent it so much money that they go on doing so in the hope of one day salvaging their investments. But how long can this last?

**M.L. How does the Africans' state of bankruptcy concern us? There are surely some people who will think: these people wanted their independence; too bad for them if they couldn't manage it!**

**R.D.** Leaving aside responsibility and international solidarity, after independence very close ties remained and new ones, even closer, were forged between Europe, notably France, and Africa.

Today we would find it difficult to do without all the things supplied by these countries, be it oil from Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, or Gabon; iron-ore from Mauritania (which is more economic to exploit than that of a small mine in Lorraine), bauxite from Guinea, cobalt from Zaire and Zambia, uranium from Niger and the Central African Republic, and so on.

Africa also supplies us with agricultural products: groundnuts from Senegal, coffee, cocoa, bananas and palm oil from Cameroon and especially from Ivory Coast, cotton from Chad and the Central African Republic. And I am not even talking about the African labour force, which does us much service. France could not ignore Africa without suffering from a considerable reduction in its standard of living.

**M.L. Why do you lay emphasis on the great responsibility that the West bears for the state of African bankruptcy?**

**R.D.** We are responsible by virtue of a kind of cultural domination, because the African rulers are our pupils. If they have succeeded in ruining Africa (and we shall see to what extent they have done so) it is because they knew how to do only what we taught them. These people came to Europe and America to study. They went to our universities, our institutes.

At the same time they were attracted by our own model of development and we did everything to encourage them in this. We pushed these countries into a pattern of development which was the exact replica of our own and which, as a result, was not truly adapted to their real, situation.

It was logical that they should at the same time adopt the pattern of a consumer society like ours. But because they had not previously achieved the level of production which such a pattern demands, they could do nothing but go bankrupt.

All this was foreseeable. But no-one was prepared to listen to the few cries of alarm that were raised at the time. As long as oil continued to be cheap, African economies were more or less able to sustain themselves and create the illusion of doing so. But oil became ex.ensive. From then on catastrophe was inevitable.

Tanzania exports cotton, coffee, sisal, tea, tobacco, etc. Well! 60% of these exports will be necessary this year to pay for oil imports. Yet this country only consumes 750,000 tons of oil, which is a ridiculously low amount.

**M.L. Do you think the African heads of state could have acted in any other way?**

**R.D.** Firstly they could have listened to those who tried to warn them 18 years ago against the mirage of developing along Western lines. In March 1980, the President of Senegal, Leopold Sear Senghor, admitted to me eighteen years ago "I did not take you seriously. But we were wrong not to follow your advice."

Today I have an invitation from the Senegalese Prime Minister to his country as soon as possible to see what can be done. But in my opinion, this invitation has come much too late. It is always the same story: you only listen to Casandra when Troy is on fire.

The bad advisers were not necessarily dishonest or malevolent. But they were fundamentally ignorant of African realities, and they also had a blind faith in the universal virtues of the Western model of development. What created the wealth of Europe and America could not make that of Africa.

Those, like me, who were trying to plead for a little more realism, not to say common sense, were rejected as retrograde old fuddy-duddies and enemies of progress. They had to go fast, very fast, cut all corners. No-one wanted to face the fact that it might not work. Today it is the African masses who are suffering from the dramatic consequences of this failure.

**M.L. What about the administrative errors on the part of African heads of state? Even monumental errors, if we are to believe your book!**

**R.D.** That is quite right. Zambia, for example, is perhaps on the brink of collapse. There, they arrested a correspondent because he said that the situation is very bad. In the old days, the bringer of bad news was killed.

After 16 years of independence, this country has succeeded in becoming the champion of bad management – if we exempt Zaire, which really holds the record. It became independent in 1964, three years after Tanzania.

It was then relatively rich owing to copper, of which it is one of the chief producers in the world. The Vietnam war pushed the copper up in price, but with the millions of dollars profit Zambia chose to follow the Western example and build big administrative buildings and even a sumptuous university hospital, comparable to that of London or Paris.

These were huge investments but they were totally non-productive. The worst of it is that today they are not capable even of maintaining the buildings: the cost is too high.

Two magnificent brick factories, entirely automatic, were in operation for only three weeks. Only after building them did the Zambians discover that transporting bricks up to 600 kilometres on bad roads – if there are any! – costs them many times more than the bricks themselves. Hand-made bricks can be produced on the spot.

In Guinea-Bissau the rulers were advised to centralize the husking of rice by building a big factory near the capital. They had forgotten that the country lacked roads and therefore it was impossible to supply the factory! The money should have been spent on a series of local centres.

**M.L. What part has modern education played in the African disaster?**

**R.D.** This brings us to a fundamental cause of all the mistakes. Take the Zambian system of education. Before independence, most schools were run by the missions. They did not have very much money and the pupils helped in the running of the establishment. Often they even helped to build them, cutting the wood, sawing it up to make furniture, desks, chairs, doors, and windows, shaping and baking the bricks, etc.

But in the few other schools for whites, children did not have to do manual work because later on they would go on to secondary and higher studies.

With independence the white schools became the model for all of them. From then on, there was no question of school children working with their hands. After seven years in primary school, they have acquired a literary knowledge which will only prepare them for secondary school which will take in only 20% of them. But they can do precisely nothing with their ten fingers.

Moreover, they have acquired a deep contempt for everything that concerns the village, agriculture, and even manual work. They dream only about doing secondary studies, going to town to be students, and who knows? being sent by the Government to Cambridge or Harvard.

Result? Out of 900,000 young boys and girls who left primary school after 11 years, about 50,000 stayed in their villages, whereas about 350,000 managed to find work in town. All the others, about 550,000, are in town too but unemployed.

Otherwise, if they can't manage to live off casual work – such as shoe-cleaning and odd jobs – they become delinquents – for, they, too, must eat. The rulers refuse to link unemployment with crime, contending themselves with moralising.

But Zambia is only one country.

**M.L. Indeed! The same mistakes can be found in all these countries, whatever their colonial past and whatever system of government they have adopted: capitalist or socialist, one has not fared better than the other.**

**R.D.** This confirms my thesis: the main cause of the African catastrophe is to be sought not in political ideologies or economic options, but quite simply in the false idea of development which our example and advice inculcated in these countries and from which they have never been able to extricate themselves: the town and industry led to a contempt of the village and agriculture which should be the two fundamental bases.

**M.L. One thing strikes me: in a country's development, it is illusory to want to run before you can walk.**

**R.D.** Obviously! What is the use of building a super-sophisticated, automated factory if no-one there really knows how to make it function; if whenever there's a breakdown, you have to stop everything while waiting for technicians to come from Europe or America to repair it and for the spare parts to arrive?

This is even more true of agriculture. What is the use of tractors and modern agricultural machines in these regions which are ill-provided with petrol, lacking in good roads, and without qualified mechanics to supervise maintenance? The machines will soon become the wrecks that we saw almost everywhere in staggering numbers.

When the peasants do not even know about animal traction, the use of the cart, even some sometimes the use of the simple wheelbarrow, isn't it there that one should start? Instead of that, they dream about a tractor that will work (or will not work) a few days a year, while the arduous transport will always be done by women.

The cart, which needs to be drawn by oxen trained for this purpose, marks a fundamental step toward for all agricultural societies. But it is almost unknown in Zambia and Tanzania.

Moreover, it is not enough to provide a village with with one so that the people can start using it! It has to become a standard feature of life, one which is not always easy to obtain. But then again, why change your customs when women are there?

The women work, but not the oxen.

**M.L. Part of the solution to Africa's problems would be to give power to the women. But why so much inertia among the men?**

**R.D.** You have to put it down to colonialism, partly at least, In the past some African peasants were really hard workers, a fact which was underlined by the explorers. Besides the people were then well-fed except in times of drought and other kinds of natural disasters.

Today these people are seriously under-nourished. We hear them complain: they always feel tired. It would be astonishing were it otherwise.

**M.L. One can't help thinking about peoples who were able to extricate themselves. The Chinese are no longer starving today!**

**R.D.** Exactly! But Africans are not Chinese with a secular tradition of hard, well-organised work. A peasant from the Tanzanian plain, for example, is not used to working 320 days a year, 10 hours a day! The peasant woman may do more, but many peasants are content with 100 to 120 days, 6 to 10 hours a day.

**M.L. But in that case there is no solution!**

**R.D.** There is only one solution, the one I have been on and on about for 20 years. What should be done is exactly the opposite of what fashionable economists pretend.

They say: a developing country must first centre itself on exports so that it can get the hard currency it needs to feed and equip itself. But I say: the priority for these countries is to produce their own food and reduce their imports.

Each village, or at least each province, should be able to produce its own staple food. Isn't this the most elementary common sense?

But this common sense is not the order of the day for the elite in power. It is not in the interests of the rulers to have self-sufficient villages. What they want are goods to export because it is the only way for them to get the currency which will allow them to buy not only industrial equipment but, above all, consumer goods, cars or other things, which they believe indispensable to their status.

There are the taxes which the government gets on all exchanges, exports, as well as imports. A self-sufficient village does not bring any taxes in. That is why we have examples, in Zambia and other countries, of villages which have literally been suffocated by the central administration.

The people were happy, had enough to eat thanks to the produce from their fields. But they were not producing enough for export.

Quotas for cotton or groundnuts were imposed on them, regardless of the real potential of this land, and today they are starving like the rest.

**M.L. Suppose that you were given full powers in one of these African countries, where would you start?**

**R.D.** I would start by giving the peasants back their freedom so that they can organize themselves. I would free them from administrative constraint and arbitrary quotas. I would leave them free to grow what they wish. Of course, technicians have to be sent to them – I don't scorn modern techniques – but to help them, not to replace them; and to allow them to organize themselves in their own interests.

We would not supply them with tractors but with very simple tools, hoes and axes, wheelbarrows and carts which are still almost totally lacking●



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ARMING OF CONTINENT EXAMINED

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 pp 16-20

[Article by Nana Humasi]

[Text] AFRICA'S SECURITY and the state of its military capability are increasingly becoming focal points for African organisations and governments. The Freetown summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May adopted protocols for mutual assistance in the defence of the Community. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its conference in Nairobi in June, voted to increase aid money to liberation movements, and to further study the call to establish a continental army. But more significantly, perhaps, Nigeria and Algeria recently agreed to set aside £26-million from oil profits towards the formation of a continental military force.

The idea was born primarily out of the two countries' unease about the presence of Libyan troops in Chad, and Africa's heavy dependence on foreign and United Nations personnel to keep the peace in zones of conflict.

Some quarters welcome the concept as a blueprint for the march on Pretoria, a demand initially made by former Ugandan despot, President Idi Amin in 1976. Several leaders treated the call as stemming from one of Amin's syphillitic whims. But former Presidents Kwame Nkrumah and Modibo Keita were treated with almost equal derision when, in 1963, at the founding of the OAU, they campaigned for the establishment of an African High Command.

## Mind-boggling

Nigeria and Algeria have essentially usurped responsibilities traditional to the OAU Liberation Committee, which co-ordinates funding of liberation operations and acts as the continent's military mentor.

Considering that Somalia, at the bottom of the list of the big African arms buyers, has an annual military budget of about $95-million, the £26-million to be set aside by Nigeria and Algeria almost mocks the concept of setting up an all-African war machine. For that force to guarantee effectiveness as a peacekeeper, to patrol Africa's 30,000 miles of coastline and to bring down apartheid, the cash, armaments and manpower demands on African states would be mind-boggling.

Africa is actively observed by satellite, and by foreign navies on all four fronts – the Atlantic and Indian oceans, the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope. In the Atlantic, British frigates from the Azores and US and French naval patrols criss-cross the length and breadth of the ocean, though they are most active in the North Atlantic.

The Cape of Good Hope remains a strategic trade route for the West and Japan. While there are no guarantees over the Suez Canal as a shipping lane for the West, South Africa has played "keeper of the castle" with a small but fairly sophisticated navy, much of which is equipped with British, German, American and Dutch hardware. The continent is cordoned off by army and navy bases, the most important of which are in the Azores, Morocco, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Namibia, South Africa, Mayotte, Mombassa, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Reunion, Egypt and the far-flung Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, where the US has spent £300-million on a nuclear base.

Such military "quarantine" threatens Africa's security, especially when the continent has in the last 20 years become a centre for Big Power sparring.

## Sore point

While testing each other's durability, the US and Russia have fought on all sides of the conflict in the Horn of Africa, have given and withdrawn aid and personnel according to the dictates of their respective strategic and economic interests. With the Super Powers, South Africa remains a sore point.

American interest in Africa grew rapidly under the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to challenge what they claimed was a Soviet threat to its interests on the continent and in the Middle East. This growth was also intended to contain the spread of communism.

According to the Americans, the alliance of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe – seen within the Henry Kissinger-Zbigniew Brzezinski "domino" principle – forms an intolerable "communist corridor" which the Reagan Government has since sworn to dismantle.

The 1973 OPEC-generated economic problems of the West, the lightning switch of post-Shah Iran from the US camp, the Russian presence in Afghanistan, and the repetitive tensions in the Middle East generally, have largely overshadowed the gravity of Soviet-US contentions in Africa.

## Justification

"They are not looking at Africa," observed Major Robert Elliot of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). "They are looking at each other. Those African bases won't be hit unless there is war elsewhere between the US and Russia. American missiles in the Indian Ocean are more interested in hitting Sverdlovsk, the heart of Soviet military industry, than they are in subduing the east coast of Africa."

However, the US-financed consolidation of the emergent Cairo-Khartoum axis, with Egypt and Sudan struggling to woo Ethiopia from the Soviet umbrella, appears to take the wind out of Elliot's notion. Again, Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State, justifies the £1,072-million military aid earmarked for the axis along the Nile River and the Rift Valley south to Burundi and Tanzania, when he affirmed that his government's Indian Ocean policy regarded East Africa and the Horn, including such states as Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia as the United States' second major area of concentration next to the Gulf.

Crocker emphasised such a strategy was abolutely vital in view of the "aggressive opportunism of Soviet enterprise in the region and the significant growth of the American import dependence on fuel and non-minerals produced in Africa". The situation, which a *New African* analyst (See July 1981) described as the "Sword of Democles", has integral connections with the state of the Cold War, and presents all the ingredients for a super-power confrontation in Africa.

The Indian Ocean teems with Russian, British, Australian, French and American warships. They all claim the right to "protect" the commercial traffic to and from the East. The US has 17 combat ships in the area, two aircraft carriers (the larger of which is the 83,000-ton *Kitty Hawk*), six destroyers, six frigates, three cruisers, plus 15 support ships. The Soviet Union stacks against that 16 support ships, and five combat vessels headed by a cruiser.

The coup mounted by Bob Dennard, a French mercenary, against the socialist government of President Ali Soilih in the Comoros in 1978, and the Israeli raid on Entebbe earlier in the decade point to an insecure continent. France's former President Giscard d'Estaing, apart from stationing 40,000 French troops in Africa, had quickly adopted the role of policeman, deploying 1,400 French and Belgian paratroopers when unrest erupted in Zaire's Shaba province in 1978. France holds the record for crushing popular rebellions in its former territories. Infiltration by US, French and other Western intelligence organisations has fuelled military upheavals in many parts of Africa. Nigeria and Algeria say that this demands an African deterrent.

## Problematic

"In the context of strategy and tactics, the African army would present a wide range of probabilities and difficulties," said Brigadier H.S. Lehman, the South African Defence Force attaché in London. "Guerrilla warfare alone cannot take over an entire country. At some point you will have to fight in the open. That's where the age-old concepts of war weighed against the principles of its actual execution will be problematic for an African force."

Africa's regular armies total about 1.5-million men and women (see attached chart) with Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Morocco boasting the largest units. The collective African navy is 36,620-strong, while its air force stands at 69,950, with Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Lybia and Algeria having the largest forces.

However, troop movement across Africa's 11-million sq.miles of terrain poses overwhelming strategic obstacles: 22 per cent is almost impassable rain forest, 35 per cent is desert, with only three Southern African countries with inter-state railways of any significance, and virtually no inter-connecting road system.

Says Major Elliot of the IISS: "Conventional warfare against South Africa would demand 1,000 tons of food, equipment and spare parts per day per man. The standard preponderance ratio of the attacking force should be three to every one of the enemy. You are talking about 600,000 men in any one attack, and up to six-million men as long as the way may last."

South Africa has 86,500 regular troops and claims it can mobilise up to 404,500 men within a few days. Its annual defence budget is currently $2.56-billion. Its forces have combat experience from offensives into several Frontline States. Its weaponry, apart from what it manufactures, includes 250 Centurion and 40 Sherman tanks, 209 combat aircraft in addition to the latest Mirage fighters, bomber squadrons and flying gun-ships.

The navy is equipped with three Daphne class submarines, 10 British Ton minesweepers and other combat ships. South Africa has nuclear capacity. This was confirmed by the Africa Department of the US Council on Security which reported that the "double-flash" recorded in 1979 was indeed from an exploded nuclear device belonging to South Africa. Its 10,000-strong airforce is undoubtedly the best trained in Africa.

Outside South Africa, Africa's biggest military spenders are Egypt and Libya. Egypt, an arms manufacturer, purchased 600 Maverick air to surface missiles, 350 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, among others totalling $1050-million outside its annual $2,170-million defence expenditure. Libya, with 4,000 men in its navy and air force is spending equal amounts while experimenting with rocket launchers and intercontinental range missiles with the help of OTRAG, the German firm pushed out of Zaire two years ago.

The Egyptian defence adviser in London, Brigadier Farouk Abou-Ellez, said the manpower may be there but Africa must not forget that South Africa is not alone. "The situation will be similar to the Israeli-Arab conflict," he said. "The United States would support South Africa against a larger African force – a force that could not depend on the Soviet Union. The Russians give only defensive support. Spare parts and other supplies would be a major problem. We Egyptians are speaking from experience."

## Confrontation

The experiment at peacekeeping failed in Chad. Nigeria and Congo sent troops to N'Djamena. It was shortlived. Congo withdrew its forces after soldiers of President Goukouni Oueddei badly mauled a Congolese company. Nigeria was left to risk direct confrontation with Oueddei and Libyan forces. Benin and Guinea-Conakry were part of the agreement but did not keep their promise. Now Nigeria is claiming compensation for transporting the troops to and keeping them in Chad.

"I don't see an all-Africa force materialising for a long time, " argued Jacques de Lestapis, editor of the reputable *Africa Defence* magazine in Paris. "It will be lumbered with language and political problems to the point of making it not feasible. NATO has similiar problems, despite the long history of military sophistication of the countries which make it up."

An all-Africa military command would therefore, probably reflect the infrastructural problems of politics & ideology, the primary setback of the OAU. Eleven of the 19 countries of any military significance are inclined toward the West and receive heavy subsidies from the West, and even provide military bases for Western powers. The remainder look to Russia and have enjoyed Soviet backing with hardware and advisers, while the rest of Africa claims non-alignment.

Observes Major Elliot: "Apart from the political aspect, a command operation would achieve little if it did not understand a common language. A way round the language barrier of a multi-ethnic force would be to group contingents in linguistic detachments with specific responsibilities. Zulus take the east, Yorubas the south, and so on. But at the top, strategists and commanders would need to be polylingual and well-trained soldiers, or the force would never move from point A to point B."

A former bushfighter in Ethiopia's Ogaden region believes African governments would put stability at risk if they committed their regular forces to a continental command. "An African force today would be cannon-fodder," he says. "And if we plan it over the next 20 years, South Africa will gear itself for the event."

The immediate answer, the ex-bush fighter said, was protracted guerilla action led by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia. The black pockets of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana would probably be overrun by the guerrilla forces, but this would need to be done without alienating the allegiance of the citizens of those countries.

He adds: "South Africa's main headache in a war with Africa will be the 22-million black faces in its own backyard. The English and the Afrikaners will stick together but they won't trust any blacks. That will be a serious organisational problem for them."

## No chance

Egypt's Brigadier Ellez emphasised that the first signs of seriousness within the OAU in the establishment of an African force would be the founding of a military committee. "Let them bring Africa's military minds in consultation. A military committee is vital before anything else."

A retired African general who led UN forces in the Congo during the Katanga crisis in 1961, told *New African* that Africa lacked the commitment, will and intelligence network to talk about an assault on South Africa. "What is the political orientation of those contributors to this force?" he questioned. "Is South Africa a priority for Egypt, or Morocco? Will the Frontline States be ready to risk devastating raids by the South Africans? We must not forget that South Africa believes in the pre-emptive strike like Israel is using against the Arabs. Black Africa doesn't stand a chance in a conventional war."

The general is, however, convinced that well-trained guerrilla brigades are the answer. "Our best chance is to mobilise the guerrilla factions to make life impossible for the whites in South Africa." On the peacekeeping aspect of a mixed force, the general says: "I see problems worse than we had in the Congo where some 25 nationalities made up the UN force. An efficient intelligence network would be essential. You cannot fight an enemy unless you know a great deal about him. Some African leaders don't even begin to know how devastating the South African military might can be. Israel is a good example of what an African force can face against South Africa."

Consensus is that guerrilla warfare will prove the most effective type of military action against South Africa. One educated estimate is that in the context of guerrilla warfare Africa has a mobilisation potential of more than 25-million men and women. Well-trained guerrilla forces have a sound record in liberating former colonies in Africa.

As the ex-bushfighter says: "This method of warfare is more in line with the relatively low-spending and unsophisticated state of combat groups in Africa. Guerrillas do their job with the minimum amount of equipment. The fight will be long. But that's the way to get at South Africa and apartheid."

## A lesson

How would South Africa react to the ultimate military pressure – for instance, a combination of escalating guerrilla attacks plus the pressures of a conventional war and internal anarchy?

| Country: | Army: | Air Force | Navy: | Reserves: | Total | Arms Exp. (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 90,000 | 7,000 | 4,000 | 10,000 | 111,000 | $705m |
| Egypt | 320,000 | 27,000 | 20,000 | 515,000 | 882,000 | $2170m |
| Libya | 450,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | - | 458,000 | $448m |
| Morocco | 105,000 | 7,000 | 4,000 | 30,000 | 146,000 | $676m |
| Sudan | 65,000 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 35,000 | 103,000 | $442.6m |
| Tunisia | 24,000 | 2,000 | 2,600 | 2,500 | 31,100 | $114m |
| Angola | 30,000 | 1,500 | 1,000 | - | 32,500 | - |
| Ethiopia | 225,000 | 3,000 | 15,000 | 20,000 | 263,000 | $385m |
| Ghana | 14,700 | 1,550 | 1,200 | 4,000 | 21,450 | $155m |
| Kenya | 12,000 | 2,100 | 650 | 1,800 | 16,550 | $168m |
| Mozambique | 22,800 | 800 | 700 | - | 24,300 | $177m |
| Nigeria | 130,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | - | 146,000 | $1700m |
| Somalia | 60,000 | 1,000 | 550 | 29,500 | 91,050 | $65m |
| South Africa | 71,000 | 10,300 | 4,750 | 10,000 | 96,050 | $2560m |
| Tanzania | 50,000 | 1,000 | 850 | 36,400 | 88,250 | $303m |
| Zaire | 18,500 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 35,000 | 55,500 | $50.5m |
| Zambia | 12,800 | 1,500 | - | 1,200 | 15,500 | $387.9m |
| Zimbabwe: | 12,000 | 1,500 | - | 42,500 | 56,000 | $444m |
| | | | | | 2,637,250 | 10,951m |

IISS: The Military Balance 1980-1981

Consensus among strategic experts seems to be that the Afrikaner, together with a section of the English-speaking whites – those who had not already fled the country – would defend the heartland with their lives, having conceded the fringes of the Republic.

Major Elliot of the IISS goes a step further. He says: "If the assaulting forces of this imaginary army, as well as urban guerrilla saboteurs, put on extreme pressure, the whites would rather destroy what they have than give it up. Under the stress of war and impending defeat, if that ever comes, they would say 'It is our country; we built it' – and they will blow everything to dust and die with it."

Henry Kissinger, in justifying America's need to pull out of Vietnam, wrote: "A conventional war that does not win, loses; a guerrilla war that does not lose, wins."

**The right course for Africa, bent as it is on smashing apartheid, might well be contained in this statement●**



CSO: 4700/469

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RURAL AREAS SEEN AS KEY TO GREATER AFFLUENCE

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 48

[Column "In Perspective" by Jimoh Omo-Fadaka]

[Text] A re-definition of Africa's development strategy is called for if the continent is to lift itself from the quagmire of poverty. Strangely, most plans devised by African states over the years for their uplift have skirted around the crucial issue of the plight of rural areas. Now, fresh African minds are beginning to focus on the options which could lead to a re-vitalised Africa

THE CAUSE OF poverty in African countries is not backwardness or lack of resources, but the decay of the rural structure. Most of the plans drawn up in many of the countries over the years have up till now by-passed the rural areas. Between 80-90 per cent of the populations of African countries live and work in the rural areas where most of the poverty is concentrated, although in urban areas deprivation is now also increasing fast.

Economic and social conditions in many countries are unstable and various attempts to superimpose a highly developed, capital-intensive industrial system from *top to bottom* upon such conditions has worsened the problem of poverty. Economic and social development in the rural areas can be fruitful only on the basis of a *bottom to top* development which takes account of indigenous conditions and realities.

African countries have the potential to produce enough food to feed their expanding populations and excess for export. But unfortunately they are not doing so; rather the reverse seems to be the case. The importance of the agricultural base should be recognised. It is only then that agricultural productivity can be brought to the level at which a sustained policy of industrialisation is possible. Therefore the basis of development should be rural *not* urban.

The villagers will need technology to achieve their development goals. Such technology should be cheap and available to everyone in the village or community, rather than to a privileged few. It should be labour-intensive to reverse the trend towards increasing unemployment and rural-urban migration. Finally, such alternative self-help should be capable of being reproduced locally, thereby encouraging indigenous industries.

This emphasis on rural development does not mean that local village activities should prevail in all cases. Certain services may need to be provided at the national, urban, state, provincial or district levels. Transportation networks need national co-ordination. Copper mines, smelters, petroleum refineries, will require massive inputs of energy and labour. They cannot be supplied by a few wind generators.

Equally, however, one does not need a gigawatt power plant to meet the energy demands of farms and villages. In fact, supplying energy needs in such a way inevitably creates and results in feelings of alienation, dependence and helplessness when one has no understanding or control over one's means of survival.

The tendency to make everything huge and heavy and on a large-scale should be avoided as far as possible. Emphasis should, as far as possible and practicable, be on lightness of construction. Urban and rural development should be organised specifically to suit conditions in cities, towns, villages and rural communities.

In the urban centres there may be need for large-scale capital-intensive industry. But within the urban based industry itself, there should be a parallel development of small-scale labour-intensive industry. This economic development should be "dualistic" with, on the one hand, a modern large-scale capital intensive sector and on the other, a traditional labour-intensive sector. This is called "walking on two legs".

The aim is to build a diversified and balanced economy, a balance between industry and agriculture, between light and heavy industry, and the development within each region of a country the energy basis on which industry must rest.

African and other Third World countries have called for the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), to replace the present international socio-economic relations which they regard as unjust. To quote Mr A.A. M. van Agt, Prime Minister of the Netherlands: "The real choice is between sticking to our present system, which is largely guided and manipulated for the benefit of the rich countries and opting for a system directed towards finding solutions to the problems of equitable division of income and prosperity, of scarcity of natural resources and the damage to the environment".

At the national level the present system in many African countries is largely guided and manipulated for the benefit of the rich minority. The existing international economic structures are not only exploitative but also designed to serve the powerful rich minorities, both at the national and international levels. What is required then at both levels is an equitable distribution of the world's resources.

NEIO calls for a "basically new philosophy". In this respect the Swedish economist, Gunner Addler-Karlsson advocates an "inverted utilitarianism" which would mean organising" our societies in such a way as to minimise suffering". He maintains that "increasing the material standard of the already affluent does not have any value so long as suffering still is widespread... Nobody should increase his affluence unless everybody has got his essentials." If this view is accepted as the basis of the NIEO, it will "make fewer demands on the material resources of the globe, but more on our moral resources."●



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EEC POLICY REVIEW TERMED THREAT TO SUGAR GROWERS

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 pp 45-46

[Article by Steve Schifferes]

[Text] THE LIKELIHOOD of major changes to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community has long-term implications for the viability of sugar production in the Third World, especially the ACP countries with guaranteed access to the EEC market through the sugar protocol of the Lome Comvention.

## Major changes

The EEC is engaged in a major review of its policy and funding, pushed on by Britain, which successfully negotiated a reduction of £1,400-million in its net contribution to the EEC. But major changes are inevitable when Britain's "temporary" reduction runs out, as West Germany and the Benelux countries are no longer prepared to be the major EEC contributors on their own. As over 70 per cent of the EEC budget is made up of subsidies to agricultural production the pressure is on for changes to the CAP system.

The budget squeeze will come at a time when EEC beet sugar production has been greatly expanded through the use of the subsidy mechanism. In April the EEC agreed to extend its support of beet sugar production for another five years, and agreed country-wide quotas very similar to those existing previously. The result has been that EEC beet sugar production reached record levels as production exceeded consumption and stocks of 1.65-million tons were built up. In order to reduce this politically embarassing "sugar mountain" the EEC has been mounting a major export drive which has disrupted the world market. Prices have fallen sharply since their November peak and now stand at their lowest level since January 1980.

The EEC's sugar policy squeezes Third World producers in several ways. First, the EEC, which is not a signatory of the International Sugar Agreement, is able to use subsidised sales to depress the market and thus put at risk the expensive investments in expanding production that several African countries, such as Somalia, have recently begun. Secondly, the EEC price support system for its beet sugar has eroded the profitability of cane sugar refining by Tate & Lyle in the United Kingdom, to which the vast bulk of ACP sugar, imported under the Lome Convention, is sent. On 22 April the Liverpool refinery closed, leaving just one major Tate & Lyle facility at Port Greenock, Scotland.

## Reduce burden

The method by which the EEC is likely in the future to reduce the financial burden of agricultural support is unlikely to be of much benefit to Third World producers. The first taste of this came this year when the EEC imposed a two per cent levy on EEC beet sugar to help meet the cost of disposing of the surplus, but refused to pay the same prices to ACP sugar producers, who were also hit by increasing shipping freight rates (EEC intervention price only covers delivered price). Thus ACP producers are being forced to accept lower EEC prices to remain competitive.

The other long-term consequence of the EEC's reluctance to accumulate agricultural surpluses will be continual pressure downwards on the market even without subsidies, due to overcapacity. The EEC *exported* more sugar (3.9-million tons) than was produced in the whole of Africa in 1980, and the EEC is the second largest sugar exporter in the world after Cuba.

Yet sugar still remains crucial to the economy of a number of African and Caribbean countries. Mauritius, which exports nearly all its sugar, depends on its access to the European market through Lome; roughly one-third to one-half of its GNP is made up of sugar production, as are two-thirds of its export earnings. Swaziland earns half of its foreign exchange through sugar which it has been expanding rapidly; the EEC and US are major markets. Likewise Jamaica remains dependent on its status as an ACP producer for a guaranteed market, and the sugar sector is by far the largest employer of labour.

Jamaica's situation also highlights another production problem: while new producers like Swaziland are expanding, the older, more established producers are facing problems and low yields due to soil exhaustion and antiquated equipment. Almost a decade after taking over the sugar plantations from a Tate & Lyle subsidiary, Jamaica under the new right wing Seaga government is now considering taking them back at least in a management consultancy role. Tate & Lyle derives its major profits from trading operations, leaving the more risk-ridden production alone (except for management products).

The future of Third World producers is therefore likely to lie in reducing their dependence on exports to the West. There are two promising areas, in theory. There is the prospect of increasing South-South trade, for sugar consumption per capita is rising in the South at the same time as it has become stagnant in the West. Countries like Nigeria are major importers from the EEC. Second to the diversification of markets is the diversification of products, and already Malawi has followed the example of Brazil in producing ethanol fuel from molasses●



CSO: 4700/469

## BRIEFS

HARD DECISIONS FACE AFRICANS--African delegates attending the July 1-24 meeting of the 54-member United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva have received a tough evaluation of current conditions which calls for some hard decisions. The report, part of a series of regional economic surveys covering Asia, Africa, West Asia and Europe, projects a period of "negative growth" in per capita income among low-income African nations and says the sub-continent is set to remain the least industrialised region of the world for the foreseeable future. The immediate problem, says the report, is food. Emergency projects to promote food production and trade between African nations must be set in motion. "The aim should be to reduce Africa's food imports by 50 per cent by 1985". A regional food plan, it is estimated, would require investments totalling 27-billion dollars. Some of this money would be used to try to overcome poor performance of the agricultural sector, the small size of the domestic market, lack of capital, and shortages of imported raw materials and skilled manpower in an effort to spur industrial growth, particularly in non-oil-exporting countries. However, there are many more obstacles to industrial growth. The report says these include inefficient management, ineffective national industrial development, a weak infrastructure, and the protectionist policies of Western industrialised countries. The report points to specific programmes in some countries which seem to be assisting the struggle for food self-sufficiency. Consolidation of land tenure laws and credit facilities for small farmers in Lesotho and Zambia are noted. Nigeria's efforts to use modern technology in the fishing industry are considered exemplary. Yet the report does not see these moves as capable of raising the dismal conditions of life for those in the 20 least developed African nations, whose per capita income should remain below 100 dollars for the next decade. In these areas the report predicts "possible economic and social collapse". [Text] [London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 47]

ABIDJAN-NIGER RAILWAY EXPANSION--The Abidjan-Niger Railway Administration (RAN), which operates a 1,154-kilometer-long rail system between the Ivorian and Upper Voltan capitals, Abidjan and Ouagadougou, is going to invest some 10 billion CFA francs in the purchase of rolling stock. Work is currently underway to adapt the railroad to the continued growth of traffic. There are plans to double the track along 324 kilometers between Abidjan and Bouake. The improvements will make it possible to increase the current frequency of 36 trains a day up to 68 trains. In addition, in a few years, 400,000 cubic meters of oil products will be hauled as far as the Bouake depot, now under construction. A program to purchase rolling stock costing 10 billion CFA francs is planned for the coming years. French enterprises should participate in the program. It should also be noted that RAN traffic has been partially interrupted in recent days in Upper Volta because of repair work on the track, work made necessary by the heavy rainfall in the Comoe regions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Aug 81 p 2051] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

ANGOLA

## BRIEFS

UNITA COMMUNIQUE--The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which opposes the regime in power in Luanda, states in a communique sent to Paris that it continues to control the city of Mavinga, taken from government forces on 28 May. Mavinga is located in Cuando-Cubango Province, on the border of Namibia and Zambia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2178] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

PROTEST AGAINST MPLA-PCP STATEMENT--The Portuguese Government has just protested to Angolan authorities about statements contained in a communique published jointly by the MPLA and the Portuguese Communist Party, stating that the "government of the Democratic Alliance (Portuguese center right) is practicing a policy of subservience to the imperialism of the United States vis-a-vis the People's Republic of Angola." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2178] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

GENERAL TRANSPORT INVESTMENTS--According to a report from the transport committee to the Angolan People's Assembly, some 4,257,400,000 kwanzas is to be invested in the field of transportation in 1981. The investments will include: Road transport: Angola will buy 1,150 trucks, 550 buses, 4,300 light cars and 1,400 specialized vehicles, along with spare parts, all for some 1.6 billion kwanzas. Rail transport: A study for the construction of railroads between Luanda and Viana is planned. The Luanda-Zenga section will be straightened. In addition, the layout of the north-south transversal railroad will be defined. Also planned is the building and assembly of railroad equipment, all costing some 720 million kwanzas. Maritime transport: Plans include the purchase of 5 mixed freighters with an overall tonnage of some 80,000 tons. In addition, the Luanda port will be asphalted and construction of the Cabinda port begun. Total expenditures will be around 1,128,000,000 kwanzas. Air transport: Freight transport increased 546 percent over 1979 and passenger transport 55.8 percent. Repair of the Benguela, Uige, Lubango, Chitato and Menongue runways is planned. Later, a new international airport for the capital is planned. Quantitative and qualitative improvement of domestic and international service must be relentlessly pursued. The financial effort will amount to 1,367,000,000 kwanzas. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2178] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

OIL PRODUCTION FIGURES--The annual report of Texaco Petroleos de Angola for the 1980 fiscal year indicates that the company's share of crude oil production in the area on land being worked totaled 2,374,374 barrels, or 2.2 percent more than in 1979. A total of 1,340,764 barrels were sold to the Luanda refinery and 751,310 barrels were exported. The company participated in the boring of six development wells. Beginning in June 1980, the General Geophysics Company completed seismic surveys, 342 kilometers of which were done in the concession area, within the framework of the research and development program. After completion of the first phase of the Quinfuquena terminal, which included a maritime loading tower and a 20-inch loading pipe, a contract was signed with the Industrial Enterprise Union to build the second phase, which includes two 400,000-barrel tanks and a pumping station costing $25.5 million. Completion is planned for the middle of next year. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2179] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

## DETAILS OF EMERGENCY PLAN FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 pp 1976-1977

[Report of UN Conference on Least Advanced Countries (Paris, 1-14 September 1981)]

[Text] When this country was still called Ubangi-Shari, it was mainly known abroad by stamp collectors and geographers. The latter actually had a very significant example of geology, "the Ubangi threshold" separating the three major basins in the heart of Africa: the Congo River basin, the Chadian depression and the Bahr al-Ghazal River valley in the east. As part of former AEF [French Equatorial Africa], Ubangi-Shari struggled along, far removed from major economic trends and great changes. In proclaiming the Central African Republic [CAR] in 1958, Barthelemy Boganda, who soon disappeared, tried to make this region the nucleus of a "Latin Africa," but he failed and, with a heavy heart, he had to resign himself to withdrawing into his own sector, that former Ugangi who, without belonging to any group, had to deal with serious problems: few inhabitants, meager resources and above all, an outlet to the sea that was 1,800 km away. Ubangi-Shari became the Central African Republic, isolated at its doorstep, and returned to a certain anonymity.

More than 15 years later, when pine posts were shipped by air from the southwestern part of France to this country of forests so that oriflammes could be hung from them, it became obvious that something was not quite right in the way that government affairs were being handled. The spotlight of current events was then focused on this wedge-shaped piece of land which, because of its strategic location and its uranium reserves, was an important pawn on the political chessboard. Everyone knows what happened following the final convulsions of a dying regime.

### Disturbing Economic Picture

Beginning in 1976-77, it can be said that the trade situation started to deteriorate seriously. Its decline was rapid. The figures also speak for themselves: from 1967 to 1975, average annual growth was 4.7 percent; then it slumped and became negative. Thus for the entire 1967-80 period, the average annual growth rate was only 2.6 percent, i.e., barely higher than the rate of population growth (2.5 percent).

To determine the extent of the decline, only the agricultural production for those final years need be considered. Production of manioc, the principal crop, dropped from 280,000 tons to 256,000 tons, while corn production dropped from 42,000 tons to 33,000 tons; thus it became necessary to import and to keep on importing foodstuffs.

It was not a bright picture for export crops either: cotton: 41,000 tons in 1977, 27,000 tons in 1980; tobacco: 2,400 tons in 1977, 1,800 tons in 1980. On the other hand, coffee production remained stable.

The exploitation of forests, an important part of the country's economy, also declined considerably. In the case of rough timber, for example: 1974: 331,000 $m^3$, exports 131,000 $m^3$; 1979: 250,000 $m^3$, exports 125,000 $m^3$.

Finally, diamond production, which represented roughly 30 percent of export revenues, dropped from 538,000 carats in 1965 to 284,000 carats in 1978.

But even more serious was the disorder which prevailed for years in the administration of transportation systems. Rural roads and highways were not maintained. The Central African Agency for River Transportation (ACCF), the public agency administering river routes, was managed chaotically, resulting in a more than 50-percent drop in trade.

All of this meant an almost strangled economy and very harsh living conditions, especially in isolated villages. The change in the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] is a good indication of that situation: 1977: 115.2 billion CFA francs; 1980: 102 billion CFA francs (at constant prices for 1977); or a decline of 12 percent. Per inhabitant, this same GDP declined 18 percent, dropping from 53,160 CFA francs in 1977 to 43,700 CFA francs in 1980.

Disastrous Financial Situation

The financial situation was only a corollary of the economic situation. It was a classical pattern: the machinery of trade slowed down and financing ground to a halt, but operating expenses continued to pile up, thus it was not long before payments were in arrears ....

The state deficit rose from 1.3 billion CFA francs in 1971 to 9.9 billion in 1980. This decline was mainly due to the rapid increase in the number of public employees (16,000 in 1974 and 26,800 in 1980). The budget's structural imbalance (due to spending) grew considerably worse as a result, since government operating expenses in 1980 accounted for 84.9 percent of all expenditures!

The balance of payments in turn obviously deteriorated, its various components themselves showing negative figures: balance of trade, -19 billion CFA francs in 1980; balance of services for the same year, -21.9 billion. Thus the current balance of payments finally dropped from -9.5 billion in 1977 to -43.4 billion in 1980. Public transfers, due to a massive increase in foreign aid, which were approximately 10 billion CFA francs in 1976-77, then greatly increased: 26.2 billion in 1980. Thus the net balance of payments, which had been positive for so long, dropped to -2.5 billion in 1977 and to -5.1 billion CFA francs in 1980. Subsequent deficits were offset by special financing. It should be noted that public foreign indebtedness was 52 billion CFA francs at the end of 1978 and that domestic indebtedness was 10 billion, totaling practically half of the GNP [Gross National Product]. Under these conditions, it is understandable that the public treasury could no longer provide for government expenditures and amortization of the public debt.

Recovery Plan

The situation was serious enough for the UN General Assembly to issue an appeal in December to governments and specialized institutions "to contribute bilaterally and multilaterally to the reconstruction, recovery and development of the CAR."

The most urgent matters took priority, thus this emergency plan was spread over 2 years and can be considered the guiding force, if not the driving force, for the entire decade. It provides for 45 billion CFA francs in investments. Investments made last year totaled only 9 billion CFA francs, whereas 17 billion had been scheduled. It should be noted that 4.5 billion francs have been earmarked for infrastructures. Recent events have shown, if there was any need for it, that prolonged interruptions of shipping routes, already long and uncertain, quickly result in bringing the country to a standstill. For example, when it was learned that gas and oil once had to be imported by air to prevent the suspension of economic operations, the authorities were determined to make sure that such a situation would not occur again.

Priority was thus given to two projects, which are also underway. The whole structure of the 2-year recovery plan and the 10-year plan depend on them. They are: the reorganization of the Central African Agency for River Transportation (ACCF), which administers Central African river routes, and first of all, the former Bangui-Brazzaville "federal route"; restoration of the Bossembele-Bouar-Garoua-Boulai (Cameroonian border) highway.

To a good extent, the first project will determine the CAR's future. If it fails, everything may well be thrown into disorder again. Actually, the transequatorial route is now the only one that can really be used for foreign trade. It must therefore be reliable and profitable. A new company has been established for this purpose, SOCATRAF (Central African Company for River Transportation), which will be in charge of everything concerned with transportation by water. It is significant to note that 49 percent of its capital is held by a private company, with the remaining stock owned by the Central African Government. This arrangement has also been used for reorganizing other public corporations. SOCATRAF's directors are not faced with a bright picture. Trade declined by more than one-half between 1970 and 1979: from 267,000 tons to 114,000 tons. The length of the journey on the Bangui-Brazzaville route has increased from 220 to 330 hours. SOCATRAF's working capital is in the red, it is in arrears with all its payments, it is overstaffed (650 full-time employees) and its equipment needs to be modernized or replaced. In short, it will have a lot to do to correct the situation.

A reorganization program has been started and investments of 4.3 billion CFA francs are scheduled over a 2-year period. The new company's goal is to quickly bring about regular supplies. The Brazzaville-Pointe-Noire railroad link, on which the CAR depends, obviously remains a factor, but that is another problem.

The second project is the restoration of the Bossembele-Bouar-Garoua-Boulai highway (453 km), which will make it possible to improve communications, now quite precarious, with Cameroon and Douala. The work has already started and will last until 1983. The Bangui-Bossembele highway is also being asphalted at the same time; the route through Cameroon will then be a reality when this work is completed.

Thus if these two projects are successfully completed, it will be a great step forward. The reliability of the two main routes of communication abroad, to Pointe-Noire and Douala, will restore the confidence of investors and it is the most natural thing in the world for them to start "bidding" again for Bangui ....

Of course, the recovery plan and the 10-year plan include a whole series of other projects covering the various sectors of the economy. To complete the road portion, first of all, we should mention that there are 18 other projects in addition to the 2 major projects mentioned, including the construction of an all-weather road, in the distant future, to the "uranium" of Bakouma. In the case of roads, all projects taken together will represent an investment of 119 billion CFA francs. But their completion would be to no avail if maintenance services are not totally reorganized. This is absolutely necessary.

The Bangui-M'Poko airport will be modernized to permit Boeing 747's to land there; the Berberati airport will also be improved. Total cost of these two projects: 2.7 billion CFA francs.

Rural development, together with agriculture, livestock breeding and forestry, represent 51 projects totaling an investment of 108 billion CFA francs. Cottonseed production should reach 76,000 tons by 1985.

Development in the social sector (education, training, health care) also constitutes an important aspect of the plan: 51 billion CFA francs allocated.

Overall, the 1981-90 plan is scheduled to provide an investment of more than 400 billion CFA francs. If such a sum is provided from "abroad," that will only be the first step, so to speak. Such financing actually still needs to have preferential conditions, unless it is desirable to reduce its beneficial effects, i.e.: recurrent project expenses to be assumed by financial backers, loans made without interest or at very low interest rates, renewed moratoria or abolishment for foreign debts, etc. Like other countries, the Central African Republic hopes that such an arrangement is possible. In its case, at least, this procedure would be largely justified.



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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

PROMOTIONS OF OFFICERS--On 30 July, President Dacko promoted a number of officers to higher ranks, while the Central African National Army was invested with all powers with respect to the maintenance of order following the 14 July bombing in Bangui. Gen Andre Kolingba, chief of staff of the Central African Armed Forces, was promoted to the rank of army general, the highest grade possible in the National Army. Promoted to the rank of brigade general were Col Alphonse Mbaikoua, deputy chief of the general staff of the Central Armed Forces, Col Abel Nado (Operational Intervention Regiment), Col Sylvestre Yangongo (Support Regiment) and Col Paul Bangui (Air Force). These promotions were reportedly based on the "loyalism" demonstrated by the Armed Forces during the events following the 14 July attack. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2057] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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CHAD

RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE MUST PRECEDE ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 pp 1975-1976

[Report of UN Conference on Least Advanced Countries (Paris, 1-14 September 1981)]

[Text] The violent contrast between the arid lands of the Sahara and the Shari River's humid savannahs seems to have influenced, as though by osmosis, this unfortunate country's political life, which has been marked by bloody conflicts for several years.

Those who always have ready a good oral or written explanation say that the Arab "lords" of the North, formerly powerful but now only poor, nomadic shepherds, have angrily watched the Christian farmers of the South, already rich from their cotton, acquire control of the government as an added bonus. This is held to be the cause of the tragedy. It is very possible. But external influences must also be considered, in particular one which many people, thinking too much of Libya, have forgotten: the war in the Sudan, which lasted 17 years, from 1955 to 1972.

Moreover, who could claim to draw a clear picture of the Chadian imbroglio, whose confusion has increased from one month to the next? For the time being, however, a relative calm has apparently returned to this country, "which has more of everything than the others, except wealth"....

Limited Possibilities

Located in the heart of the African continent, everything is a problem for Chad. As in 1962, it is enough for Lake Chad to overflow its banks as a result of recurrent rainfall and blockage of the road from Nigeria to interrupt, for several weeks, the shipment of goods routed, at the time, through Lagos and Port Harcourt. The Cameroonian route has since taken over and there is less rainfall ... but the fact remains that Chad is dependent on its neighbors for its trade. With Douala 1,500 km away and Pointe-Noire, the "unattainable," 3,000 km away, what a handicap! Especially since resources for a population of 4.500 million inhabitants are far from adequate. Everything has to be imported, except foodstuffs, which barely cover the country's needs, presently no longer the case. Except for cotton gins and two breweries, there are only small crafts-type companies (leather, textiles, etc.).

These are the most recent official figures, published for the 1976-77 period: millet and sorghum, 540,000 tons; peanuts, 95,000 tons; manioc, 50,000 tons; fish, 110,000 tons, 40,000 tons of which were marketed; livestock: 3.500 million head of cattle. As for cotton, which in 1974 represented more than 70 percent of export revenues, the 1976-77 harvest was 144,000 tons (cottonseed); production dropped to 83,000 tons for the 1980-81 season.

There has also been much talk of uranium and other rich ores discovered in the area of the famous Aozou Strip, in the extreme north, surrounded entirely by desert. Exploitation of that wealth will continue to be a dream for a long time, inasmuch as investments would be enormous because of the distances involved and the environment.

So when two scourges such as drought and war rained down on this very fragile economy, the country could not withstand them. Thus according to IMF estimates, the GDP [Gross Domestic Product], in current value, rose from 162.2 billion CFA francs in 1976 to 179.8 billion in 1977 and to 208.6 billion in 1978. This is equivalent to an annual growth rate of barely 2.5 percent, which is less than population growth. The latest status of the balance of payments is not known, although it had already started to decline in 1977 with -1.1 billion CFA francs as opposed to +5.6 billion 1 year earlier. Imports for the same year amounted to $150 million as opposed to $40 million for exports, which indicates the extent of the deficit.

At the time, Chad had prepared a 4-year development plan for 1978-81, which would have provided for investments of approximately 226 billion CFA francs, including 70 billion for the secondary sector (30 billion for manufacturing industry). As might be suspected, the least effort was never made to implement this plan.

Rebuilding the Ruins

In February 1979, the bloody conflict turned into an actual civil war, which subsided in November but resumed with more intensity in March 1980. Ndjamena was at the center of the fighting. Calm was not restored until 9 months later.

In view of these events, the UN General Assembly proclaimed a kind of state of emergency and Chad has become the focus of concern of various UN agencies. Missions have been sent to the country. In cooperation with the Chadian Government, they are evaluating immediate needs and arrangements for aid may be made immediately. In short, an emergency plan has been set up for the various sectors of the economy.

Infrastructure: It seemed essential to quickly increase the capacity of the Kousseri ferry, the only link between Chad and the outside world. The following measures have been taken: 2 unused ferries, 1 weighing 30 tons and the other 60 tons, will be restored to operating condition, which will require 2 months' work; completing the construction of a 60-ton ferry, which began before the fighting.

The cost of these two operations is approximately $600,000. The umbilical cord represented by this route across the Shari River to Cameroon will thus be reinforced and will make possible a considerable increase in trade.

The Ndjamena airport has suffered extensive damage. The main installations are no longer operable and only the runways have been spared. But without a control tower, without a radio beacon and without essential installations, there is no question of its being used for the time being, inasmuch as ICAO [International Civil

Aviation Organization] standards constitute a decisive obstacle, of course .... In any case, 6 months' work, including the installation of a prefabricated control tower, will be required to make the airport operational. Cost: $5 million.

Food, Agriculture: Ndjamena and certain regions urgently need grain. An initial contribution of 12,000 tons is being provided. In the present situation, logistical problems of shipping, distribution and storage are difficult to solve. Grain elevators must be restored to operating condition and vehicles must be provided. The country is totally without means of transportation.

Seeds are absolutely necessary for the new harvest. They will come from Cameroon and Nigeria: 360 tons of millet, 70 tons of sorghum, 40 tons of rice and 100 tons of peanuts.

There are many boreholes and equipped wells which are no longer operating in rural areas. These water-supply installations must therefore quickly be put back into operation to prevent a disaster for cattle and a mass exodus of the rural population to Ndjamena (which is also without water).

Health Services: Almost all health services and medical installations are no longer operating. They were inadequate before the conflict and are now almost all beyond use. The central hospital has not been seriously damaged, but all the equipment has disappeared and there is a shortage of drugs. Serious cases are treated in Kousseri, Cameroon, at the refugee camp's very well-equipped hospital. WHO has allocated funds of nearly $1 million for the most urgent needs and in particular for the supply of drugs.

Other steps are being taken: restoration of telecommunications, schools, etc., which would be too tedious to mention. They are among the priorities which have been established by the minister of reconstruction.

More generally, the Chadian Government is currently trying to restore confidence in the country. It will soon be necessary for proper restoration of public services. In fact, many people have fled, at least 300,000, including a number of civil servants. And their return will begin as soon as order and safety are really assured. It is under these circumstances that Chad will initially be able to get back on its feet.

Later, when fears have disappeared and rivalries have subsided, Chadian leaders will be able to think about really getting the economy back on the right track. Whether from Abeche or Lere, Toubou or Sara, Chadians profoundly want peace and the term "recovery" has never been as meaningful in this country, in which the North and South must find the points of anchorage for reestablishing the Chadian community.



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CHAD

## BRIEFS

UNDP FINANCING AGREEMENT--A financing agreement to provide new equipment for the Ndjamena airport was signed by the UNDP (UN Development Program) representative in Chad, Placktor, and Chadian Minister of Public Works Facho Balaam, at the end of July in the capital. Total cost of the operation is 707 million CFA francs. Placktor told AFP that the agreement is for the purpose of "helping Chad to restore its means of communication and exchange with the international community." The UNDP representative in Chad also announced that the Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will soon provide equipment and send six experts to undertake repairs on the control tower at the Ndjamena International Airport, which was heavily damaged by fighting. Finally, Placktor said that the WFP (World Food Program) would supply food totaling $2.4 million. According to Placktor, the UN High Commission on Refugees is currently providing Chad with assistance costing some $6.8 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2057] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/287

CONGO

## BRIEFS

LUMBER EXHIBITION--From 13 to 17 October, the Congolese Wood Office will hold the first African Wood Exhibition in Loubomo and Brazzaville, as part of the fourth forestry and wood week. The exhibition, in which all international lumbermen will participate, will include the aspects of tree planting, reforestation, lumbering, industrialization and the important problem of marketing different varieties, especially the so-called "secondary" or "promotional" types. Within this context, special attention will be paid to the presentation of secondary woods in various forms, ranging from logs to furniture and including sawn lumber, plywood, and so on. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2059] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

PRC AGREEMENT--An agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation was signed between China and the People's Republic of the Congo on 30 July in Brazzaville. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2059] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/287

GABON

PROGRESS REPORT ON TRANSGABONESE RAILROAD

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2171

[Text] An activity report from the Ministry of Transport and Merchant Marine for the August 1980-August 1981 period emphasizes that the Transgabonese Railroad Office (OCTRA) is operating under satisfactory conditions. There has been an increase in the activity of rail transport, resulting in regular growth in the number of passengers carried: 68,000 in 1980 leaving from Libreville or N'Djole, and 36,000 for the first half of 1981. Freight traffic has stabilized at 300,000 tons a year. There will be a definite increase in 1982 and especially 1983 when the railroad penetrates the forest area called the "railroad attraction zone." However, it is in the field of major undertakings that the essential activity resides. These mainly involved the N'Djole-Franceville route, while studies actively continued for the Booue-Bongobadouma-Moanda section.

The first section of the Transgabonese, from Libreville to N'Djole, was opened three and a half years ago. The section is 185 kilometers long and cost 64 billion CFA francs. The second phase began with a special project: the opening in 1975 of the Junkville tunnel (kilometer market 230), 286 meters long. Since January 1979, work has continued with the laying of track beyond N'Djole as far as the Lebe station (kilometer marker 192), in order to make it possible to ship out lumber from forestry permits located south of the Ogooue on the left bank.

Between N'Djole and Booue, major earthwork continued. The total now amounts to 28 million cubic meters, in cuts and fills, including 3 million in rocky excavated material. Some 10 kilometers of metal pipe has been laid and 13 engineering works completed, including the bridge over the Ogooue downstream from Booue, 476 meters long. The laying of the track should resume in October 1981 and reach Booue at the end of 1982. The cost of these operations is 65 billion CFA francs.

On the Booue-Franceville section, everything will be done so that work will be spread out from January 1983 to December 1986, the date on which the railroad will finally reach Franceville, which requires the construction of 19 engineering projects and the laying of 310 kilometers of track. It is also important to recall that 30 kilometers of platform have been completed at Franceville. On this section, there remains the assembly and the installation of the metal flooring for the Ogooue VI bridge, 430 meters long, and construction of the bridge over the Lebonbi (over 100 meters).

In order to complete the program of works entrusted to it, the enterprise responsible for the projects had to bring in large amounts of heavy equipment, including 250 earthmovers and some 2,550 employees, including 1,457 Gabonese, or a total of 2,200 Africans.



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GUINEA-BISSAU

PRESENT LEADERSHIP'S REPORTEDLY SUSPECT MOTIVES QUESTIONED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 246, 17-30 Aug 81 pp 14-15

[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "An Appointment on 14 November"]

[Excerpts] On 14 November, the anniversary of the coup d'etat, the extraordinary congress of the PAIGC will be held in Bissau, slated to undertake the "revitalization" of the party. The choice of the date is quite significant. The overthrow of President Luis Cabral and the ascent to power of a council of the revolution headed by Joao Bernardo Vieira (Nino) bore an undeniable anti-party connotation because of the methods used and the positions assumed. The absence of any real alternatives in the coup makers' declarations and the lack of serenity in the criticism addressed to those who were violently overthrown, as well as a mixture of racist and anti-Cape Verdian statements that detracted from the real objectives and the successes achieved by unity, had perplexed all those who had closely followed the PAIGC's history and struggle. Has there been an evolution since those days?

If one is to refer to the resolutions that came out of the party's national committee meeting at the end of May, ambiguity still prevails--at least at the theoretical level--as to the respective roles that must be played, today as well as in the near future, by the party and council of the revolution.

The latter had immediately dissolved all the institutions set up by the PAIGC during the first 7 years in power, but had simultaneously renamed the coup d'etat "a readjustment movement." In a transitioned phase, the party "acknowledges that the council of the revolution has a leading role in society as the supreme organ based on the principles of the PAIGC." There has just been an integration at the summit between these two institutions: the GNG [National Council of Guinea] has co-opted two members of the government, both very active in support of the coup d'etat, and 5 members of the council of the revolution--already admitted into the ranks of the CNC--are entering its permanent committee. Well ahead of the preparations for the congress, the leading organisms of the party have thus been slightly remodeled according to the viewpoints of the council of the revolution. This is a questionable practice when engaging in the democratization of the structures and the redefinition of political action.

Actually, the council of the revolution, which, at any rate, has not planned to abdicate in favor of the party, whose "instrument" it defines itself could not prevent this clarification from falling due. A number of government officials and

PAIGC militants had agreed to cooperate with the new government, hoping to completely re-establish its primacy over all other institutions of the state. This was also eyed favorably by the people who, either directly or indirectly, had supported the PAIGC since the war of liberation.

Narrow Nationalism

Wasn't "Nino" the son of the revolution and one of the very first fighters of the PAIGC? In the eyes of the people, too, the difficulties encountered in daily life because of the country's serious economic situation, could be imputed, finally, to the overthrown leaders. The anti-Cape Verdian campaign, for its part, opened the way for an argument that could be well received by the bulk of the people: narrow nationalism. Following the speech made, a few days after the coup d'etat, by the traitor Rafael Barbosa, it became clear that this aspect would largely determine the actions of the new leaders. While an unconditional overture was made to those counter-revolutionary movements opposed to the PAIGC, such as the FLING [Front for the Struggle for Guinea-Bissau Independence], the UPANG [expansion unknown], etc., these were organizing committees in support of the council of the revolution abroad and were full of praise for the authors of the coup d'etat--maintaining that they even participated in it--stressing, in particular, the common defense of the "authentic sons of Guinea."

Since the "historic 14 November," appeals to reconciliation have abounded; former opponents are returning to Bissau, puppet organizations are dispatching delegations galore to negotiate their official adherence. Returning to Dakar, Vincent Co, president of the committee in support of the coup d'etat in Dakar--and another champion of the struggle against the PAIGC--declared that "the time has come for all the sons of Guinea to return home."

Indeed the time has come, because government posts have already been discreetly entrusted to former opponents. Victor Pan, the new attorney general of the Republic, is well known in the anti-PAIGC circles of the Portuguese capital.

With the exception of their nationality, what do these former militants of the reaction--supported, once upon a time, by France and the United States through Tunisia and Zaire--have in common with the serious PAIGC militants?

This question cannot be evaded. On what and on which projects has it been possible to reach an agreement since, on the one hand, the Bissau officials vigorously proclaim themselves the heirs of Amilcar Cabral and on the other, all these oppositionists have not abandoned their objectives, which run totally counter to those of the PAIGC? Nevertheless, the most ambitious among them are conscious of these differences. Kankoila Mendy Francois, president of the FLING committee that met in Dakar on 30 March, categorically denied the imminent dissolution of the front announced a few days before.

For the moment, this measure has been delayed, because no similarity of viewpoints has been agreed to as yet. And, as Mendy Francois noted, "the FLING is in good health."

This prudence can be explained by the fact that outside the council of the revolution, government officials and former PAIGC leaders enjoying international prestige are tenaciously defending the political plan developed by the PAIGC and initiated during recent years.

The 30 March arrest of Rafael Barbosa on the initiative of Minister of Justice Fidelis de Almada after more than 4 months of freedom during which he had received housing and a pension, as well as the vigilance of Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination Vasco Cabral against discreet and subtle attempts to impose contracts or "solutions" of neo-colonial inspiration, must have contributed toward alerting the puppet groups.

These are spreading the belief that they the support of privileged members of the council of the revolution, but are awaiting a formal invitation to join the government. They are even basing their hopes on economic catastrophe: the drought has aggravated the shortage of food, and the cruel lack of foreign exchange leaves the country at the tender mercies of international assistance, which is often late in coming. They can then appear as saviors, and impose their conditions, as well as, it goes without saying, their international alliances.

Present Vagueness

The counter-revolutionary groups and their allies are seemingly only half-satisfied with the changes that have taken place in Bissau. If, on the one hand, the objective of destroying the unification project between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau with the concomitant weakening of both has been attained, and if the PAIGC's prestige acquired in the course of a courageous and exemplary struggle for liberation has been tarnished, a number of obstacles, even fragile ones, are raised to prevent the selling out of the country.

The hoped-for changes in international policy have not been initiated, for whatever reasons. In the present mood of vagueness due to the lack of decisiveness on the part of those who got hold of the government by force, the initiative of some leaders can still be a determining factor in the leaders      of the state.

President "Nino" himself contributed to this as well. Together with narrowly nationalistic positions and all sorts of accusations hurled against the former leaders--which totally conceal the responsibility of the entire team then in power--he insisted that some leaders about whom he already knew that they would fight against the total recovery of the country, should, nevertheless, become part of the government. In this context, it is difficult to forecast the meaning of the upcoming extraordinary congress.

Even if one of the CNG's self-assigned tasks for the next few months is to conduct an enlightenement campaign on the reasons that brought about the coup d'etat, one can rightfully hope that the party leaders will realize the threat now weighing on the country. Heavily decimated, the leadership of the remnants of the party seem quite heterogeneous. Among historical cadre, one must indeed exclude those who perished during the coup, those who were fired while abroad--many members of the general staff were in fact in Cape Verde at the time--those who have left the country and, finally, those who are still jailed.

It is difficult to predict whether one can hope that the congress will put a stop to the low-key penetration by counter-revolutionaries of leadership positions and admit the legitimacy of the establishment of the PAICV by the Cape Verdians by accepting to renew relations between the two fraternal countries. Finally, it is difficult to know whether the congress will set a definite schedule for the re-establishment of a democratic leadership of the state under the party's control--even if this party is a different one--and whether it will draw an anti-imperialist and coherent economic development policy. Perhaps the resolutions of the congress will satisfy the bulk of these questions; however, this will require such a ratio of forces as to guarantee their application. At any rate, contradictions abound at the present time.

The statements made last February by the members of the council of the revolution about the imminent release of former President Luis Cabral and of other jailed leaders have been subsequently refuted by the vice president of the council of the revolution and minister of foreign affairs, Victor Saude Maria, who did not deem it necessary to provide an explanation. What can one think of those--in the majority for now--who prefer Spinola's agents retrieved by an already moribund Portuguese colonialism when they were on the verge of being stricken from the pages of history, to those leaders who so generously contributed to national independence?

What can one think of this temporary majority, too, when they torpedoed the meeting arranged between Aristides Pereira and Joao Bernardo Vieira in Maputo for last March? Another such meeting is still viewed, and it seems that "Nino" has evidenced a sincere desire to participate in it to provide a concrete impulse toward the normalization of relations between the two countries.

However, the same rumbling opposition to such a meeting is evidenced by certain members and collaborators of the council of the revolution, as well as to the release of Cabral and other leaders, who have been detained for over 9 months; indeed, all of this does not bode well for the future.



CSO: 4718/354

PRESS FREEDOM SEEN AS SET FOR TUMBLE

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 88

[Article by Kazungu Katana]

[Text] THE KENYAN PRESS, once one of the freest media institutions in Black Africa, is running into trouble with the authorities – just three months after the International Press Institute ended its annual general assembly in Nairobi.

The government move to crack down on the Press surprised many Kenyan journalists who immediately after Daniel arap Moi became president enjoyed a new freedom. They were remarkable days. For the first time, Kenyan newspapers were able to reveal scandals and corruption at the highest levels of the private and government sectors.

That honeymoon is now over and the Press is facing its most crucial period in many years.

## Harsh response

The current troubles are largely a result of political developments here: squabbles within the echelons of the ruling KANU Party, the government doctors' strikes and the students' unrest at the University of Nairobi.

It all erupted in April when KANU barred former Vice-President Oginga Odinga from contesting his old Bondo constituency by-election, a seat vacated for him by Hezekiah Ougo.

The *Nation* newspaper wrote a strong editorial questioning the party's decision, noting that the issue had strained the fabric of the country's unity "not merely at the seams but through the cloth."

In the interests of our nation's unity, the paper continued, Oginga Odinga must be allowed to contest the Bondo seat.

The government responded harshly. In a statement, *Nation* newspapers were accused of trying to assume the role of "an opposition party."

Warned the government: "The persistent rebellious attitude of those concerned (*Nation* group of newspapers) cannot be viewed as being in the interest of the State." The statement urged the Press to avoid "inciting" the public over decisions that are "national and collective."

The *Nation* management apologised.

The same month, Nairobi freelance journalist Brian Tetley was arrested at his home by security police officers. In an interview with the Nairobi *Weekly Review* after his release, Tetley said he had spent 15 "agonising" hours in police and Secret Service custody.

The reason for his arrest he said, was connected with the publication of allegedly seditious and libellous material against the government.

Tetley told the *Weekly Review:* "When they picked me up they took practically every piece of paper I had. Some were returned to me after my release."

Late in April, Press freedom in Kenya was tested again, this time by Minister of Tourism Elijah Mwangale, who suggested that Kenyan journalists be "licensed". Such licensing, Mwangale argued, would create personal accountability and responsibility.

Said the *Nation*'s editor-in-chief Joe Rodrigues: "Licensing is not democratic and would denigrate the profession of journalism."

Hilary Ng'weno, editor/publisher of the *Weekly Review:* "Another name for licensing journalists is Press censorship. We don't need it in Kenya."

The independent Kenya Union of Journalists scorned the Minister's suggestion. Said its secretary-general, George Odiko: "We don't think he (the Minister) was serious."

Minister Mwangale had by this time received enough rebuffs for his "unprofessional" suggestion. He has not raised the matter since.

A month later Press freedom was again under attack by the authorities. Once again the *Nation* was the target. This time it was over the report of a KANU statement on doctor's strikes and expelled university students.

The government accused the *Nation* of being "scandalous" in its attitude to the ruling party.

President Moi threatened to ban the newspaper and called for corrective measures be taken against those responsible.

The *Nation*'s Joe Rodrigues, managing editor Joe Kadhi and four others were picked up by police for interrogation.

Has Kenya's reputed Press freedom come to an end?

Not officially. President Moi told a large rally that Press freedom will remain uninterfered with, "so long as it is not misused to disturb the peace in the country"●



CSO: 4700/467

LIBERIA

DOE REPORTED 'FACING UP TO REALITY'

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 pp 28-29

[Article by Alan Rake]

[Text] MASTER SERGEANT DOE attended the recent meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Freetown, Sierra Leone, no longer dressed in battle dress, but in a conventional dark suit. African leaders who had rejected him when he carried a gun, listened politely when he spoke. He made no mention of the "cause" of the people or the "continuing struggle".

## Snags at home

Instead, he was concerned with the common problems of his brother heads of state. It was Liberia which was not keen to carry out ECOWAS policy and open its borders to other Africans from neighbouring countries.

And back at home he was facing problems. Thirteen junior soldiers were on trial for attempting a counter-coup and allegedly planning to murder Sergeant Doe and his associates. They had apparently acted without any ideological motive, simply wanting to taste power for themselves. All 13 were sentenced to death.

Sgt Doe's objective when he took power was to do something for the ordinary people. One of his first moves was to put up the basic salary of all workers to $200 a month. But hardly was this done when economic necessity forced the government to cut top salaries and to take back one month's wages from workers of all ranks.

The economic consequences of the coup had become clear by the time of the budget of September 2. The new government complained that the Tolbert regime had left the cupboard bare. Finance Minister Dr Togba Nah-Tipoteh said that Liberia only had $5-million left in the bank and an overdraft of $25-million with the National Bank. This was challenged by other economists who pointed out that the Tolbert regime had shown no signs of acute cash shortage, though the economy was in difficulties due to depressed iron ore prices.

The situation was already bad, but the coup aggravated it still further. Capital flight led to massive transfers out of the country and a run on the Bank of Liberia which had been shifting funds to the United States. Doe's wage increases had caused inflationary pressures and the prospect of large budgetary deficits. The rapid deterioration in the economy threw the government on the mercy of foreign assistance.

At first, the United States and the international institutions held back. They wanted assurance that the executions would stop and that the government would respect individual rights, before they were prepared to help. Internally the options were similarly limited and the government found itself being drawn into a tighter relationship with the US than ever before. An early flirtation with Cuba has now given way entirely to almost sole dependence on the US.

The People's Redemption Council has done everything possible to reassure foreign investors and get American aid, which was forthcoming to the extent of $23-million last year, an amount matched by West Germany. The US continues to train Liberian troops and has been carrying out the first joint military exercises with the Liberian army since the Second World War.

## Survival

Since the coup, imports have fallen by 40 per cent from 1979 levels, budget deficits have been growing and customs revenue has been falling. At the same time, expenditure has been rising as the new government has improved wages, and foreign exchange reserves are now well into the red.

The government has responded by reassuring foreign investors, promising to preserve the free market system and to keep the American dollar, at parity as currency.

The pressures on Liberia since the coup have all been in one direction – towards adopting a conventional, pro-Western stance and to preserving the social order. And the Liberian Government has shown itself willing to comply. The revolutionary ideas of Dr Togba Nah-Tipoteh's Movement for Justice in Africa, and those of his colleague Baccus Matthews' People's Progressive Party, have been submerged in the struggle for international survival.

Foreign policy and relations with neighbours are much the same as they were before the coup. Recently the government showed its dislike of real change by closing down the People's Bureaux of the Libyans and asking the Russian Embassy to reduce its staff from 15 to six.

So what happened to the revolution? It is now clear that it never happened. A successful coup, yes. But not a revolution. A military government was installed and a shift in personalities took place at the top. Now it is the soldiers who are showing themselves to be the conservative upholders of the system. Radical voices are united.

Many members of the old Tolbert regime are finding their way back to the highest civilian posts. The former head of security under Tolbert, Sumo Jones, was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister and then Information Minister. Jonathan Reffell, once a vocal Tolbert man, is making a film based on the PRC's first year in power.

Perhaps the most promising development, and possibly the only significant leap forward since the coup, is the plan to return Liberia to civilian rule. A 25-man commission headed by Amos Sawyer of the university's political science faculty, is drafting a constitution for the return to civilian rule.

If the soldiers are really serious and not just window-dressing, this may be their most constructive idea so far●



CSO: 4700/468

MADAGASCAR

## BRIEFS

RICE SHORTFALL--Harvesting of paddy began in July in the Lake Alaotra region and due to poor climatic conditions it promises to be a poor year, 30 to 40 percent lower than last year's harvest. Area cultivated by peasants dropped from 77,073 hectares last year to 51,086 hectares and peasant output is expected to drop from 141,000 tons to 90,000 tons. The drought also induced many peasants to turn to dry crops, such as manioc, beans, onions, and potatoes. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2175] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]

CSO: 4719/361



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MOZAMBIQUE

MOVE TO CURB DISEASES FROM UNSUITABLE POWDERED MILK

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 46

[Article by Brian M. Murphy]

[Text] AFTER REPORTS of illness and death caused by the misuse of milk products throughout Africa, Mozambique has moved to control the import and marketing of milk substitutes.

In a deal struck between the Mozambican Ministry of External Trade and the Nutricia company of Holland three powdered milk products will be imported under the watchful eye of the Ministry of Health.

The International Baby Food Action Network has documented instances where some Western milk substitute companies use high-powered advertising campaigns in rural areas encouraging breast feeding mothers to switch to powdered milk, often with disastrous results.

The main problem has been that the milk substitutes are often overdiluted with cold impure water and used in unsterilised feeding bottles.

The Mozambican Ministry of Health says the new Dutch milk products will require pre-boiled warm water to reconstitute them. In addition, the agreement with Nutricia stipulates that Mozambique will approve the name of the products and what appears on the labels.

Eventually three products will be supplied: a modified milk for infants up to six months old; a full cream product, and a cereal food for family use.

The cereal food is a mixture of rice, milk, sugar, vitamins, minerals and vegetable fat.

The three products should be on sale by early 1982. In the meantime supplies from other Western companies will be run down. Mozambique intends to produce its own cereal food within a couple of years and is currently experimenting with various mixes●



CSO: 4700/464

MOZAMBIQUE

SITUATION LEADING TO RECENT BEIRA CHOLERA OUTBREAK REVIEWED

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167, Aug 81 p 89

[Article by Paul Fauvet]

[Text] THE ROAD from Beira airport into the city takes you along a magnificent six-lane highway. But this colonial showpiece suddenly peters out in a mass of potholes and a dismal array of filthy hovels thrown together out of corrugated iron, wooden planks, bits of tin and any other material to hand. You have arrived in the *bairro* (urban neighbourhood) of Munhava.

Munhava must suffer some of the worst urban housing in Mozambique. Many of the shacks are built back to back, with the population of 16,000 crammed densely together – in brutal contrast to the luxury villas and apartment flats that the Portuguese built elsewhere in the city. The modern road runs above the level of Munhava, and lacks any adequate drainage system. So when it rains, water simply pours off the road and into the *bairro*.

There are no latrines in Munhava. The Provincial Director of Health for Sofala, Dr. Rui Bastos, describes sanitation in the area as "precarious, almost non-existent".

During the rainy season Munhava is regularly flooded. Water invades the houses and the inhabitants resignedly sleep on table tops. Under these conditions, with no adequate sanitation or drainage, water-borne diseases are easily spread. The appalling housing situation in Munhava and several other peripheral *bairros* in Beira makes it extremely difficult to break the chain of disease transmission.

It therefore comes as no surprise to find that Munhava was the centre of Beira's cholera outbreak earlier this year. This was the most serious of several outbreaks in various parts of the country.

The first case of cholera in Beira was detected in January, and the disease raged for two months or so. More than 330 positive cases were reported, 50 per cent of them coming from Munhava. Of these, 33 died. This death rate, of around 10 per cent, is considered to be very high. Dr. Bastos attributes it to late detection. If the disease is caught early enough, and the victim sent to hospital immediately, treatment is relatively simple and death can usually be prevented.

The city health authorities took several measures to check the outbreak. The first and most important was an immediate campaign of health education. Brigades were formed of people drawn from the political organisations in the *bairros* – FRELIMO cells, the youth and women's organisations, and the local grassroots structures. Each brigade was directed by a health worker. They worked intensively in each *bairro*, going from house to house, giving advice on basic preventive measures, telling people how to spot cholera symptoms, and persuading anyone who might have the disease to visit hospital at once.

The brigades kept up this work for six weeks, which was as long as the health workers could be spared from their other tasks. Special efforts were concentrated on fishermen and on other groups involved in the handling of foodstuffs.

A mass vaccination campaign was carried out which reached 93 per cent of the city's population. In March, sulphadoxine tablets were distributed on a mass scale in the 13 *bairros* most at risk.

By April the outbreak was under control. New cases did, however, continue to occur, but on a small scale. For every new case detected, the health authorities threw up a *cordon sanitaire*. That is, they immediately contacted the infected person's family, friends and workmates and took potential carriers of the disease to hospital. Dr. Bastos believes that this constant vigilance has been a major factor in checking the spread of the disease.

But the provincial health directorate is well aware that these short-term measures, successful though they may have been, do not really tackle the root of the problem. As long as standards of sanitation are minimal, and water is easily contaminated, then the risk of further outbreaks will remain.

The health authorities are collaborating with the Beira City Council, and with the local delegation of the Ministry of Public Works in efforts to improve housing conditions in Munhava and other slum areas. The priority is to build decent latrines. Unfortunately, the pit latrines normally used in Mozambique are out of the question in Beira, due to the swampy nature of the terrain. Dig 30 centimetres down and you hit water. So sanitation engineers are working on other types of latrine that would be suitable for these conditions.

The project is in its initial stages at the moment. No decision has yet been taken as to whether communal latrines should be provided, or individual latrines for each house. "The problem with communal latrines", explained Dr. Bastos, "is that they must be kept scrupulously clean. Otherwise they merely help the spread of disease."

The remodelling of the *biarros* will not be carried out simply on orders from the authorities. Discussions are to be held with the residents of Munhava and other *bairros* to seek their opinions as to how they would like their districts improved. No final decisions will be taken without hearing what the people most affected have to say.

There will probably be no further deaths from cholera in Beira for the time being. But the threat will re-emerge when the next rainy season floods Munhava again. Only the provision of improved housing and sanitation will finally remove the danger●



CSO: 4700/464

MOZAMBIQUE

IMPROVEMENT OF MAPUTO-MATOLA PORT FACILITIES PLANNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2179

[Text] The capital of Mozambique enjoys particular importance in the southern region because of the strategic location of its port. Divided into two parts: Maputo and Matola, with very different functions, the port was designed to serve its South African and Rhodesian neighbors. The general wharf, which handles 4 million tons of goods a year, now has an infrastructure capable of ensuring the port's profitability.

The Maputo port (commercial) also has its general pier, a container warehouse, special facilities to handle products such as coal, sugar or rough timber for export, and tanks to store molasses.

The Matola port complex (industrial port) is located about 6 kilometers from the Maputo port. It handles tankers and has the necessary equipment to do so, mainly pipes directly connected to fuel dumps. The port also has warehouses to store lumber and specialized, automatic facilities to handle unrefined ores.

Most of the freight traffic of the Maputo port comes from or goes to neighboring South Africa and consequently, any policy to stabilize labor and investments encounters the same difficulty: When they wish to do so, the South Africans can paralyze a considerable share of the port traffic, thereby disturbing the economy of the entire country (on the difficulties of the Maputo port, see MARCHES TROPICAUX, No 1862, 17 July, p 1900).

And yet, projects to reorganize and expand the Maputo port (Maputo and Matola are considered as a whole) are ambitious, AFP notes. Mozambican port and railroad authorities consider the political and economic tendencies of the region as they are expressed within the framework of the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC, to use the English acronym). Leaders therefore follow very closely the evolution of the world market and the technology of maritime transport.

Within the framework of the SADCC, to which nine countries in the region belong (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), prospects for growth in rail and port traffic are considerable, which requires a transformation of the current infrastructure.

An American consulting firm has recently submitted to Mozambican authorities a master plan for development of the Maputo port up until the year 2000. Although the plan has not yet been approved and appeals for funds have not been issued, one can already state that Mozambique is preparing to face up to a considerable increase in its traffic and a modernization of its ocean shipping techniques.

By the end of the century, traffic of nearly 50 million tons a year is expected, while current traffic is some 8 million tons for Maputo and Matola together.

The American project provides for four possibilities of merging the two ports (the industrial port and the commercial port). It also provides for construction of a pier in the extension of the Maputo Bay, which would make it possible to accommodate ships of 300,000 tons.

According to these development plans, the port should cover 11 kilometers and its activities would be multiple: general handling, storage and handling of large containers or liquids, transoceanic traffic, lighterage, passenger traffic, fishing, pleasure boats and careenage. There will be a free trade zone and transport to the interior will be organized.

In short-range terms, a terminal will be built at Matola for coal. The project includes construction of a system for the continuous circulation of railroad cars. An international call for bids was issued last year for the financing of this project and the proposals received are being examined.



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CSO: 4719/344

MOZAMBIQUE

## BRIEFS

STEEL PRODUCTION--The first production of Mozambican steel took place in July at the Industrial Foundry and Rolling Mill Company (CIFEL). This plant plans to produce 6,000 tons of steel ingots next year. The startup of Mozambican steel production should enable Maputo to reduce its economic dependency on Pretoria. It was made possible thanks to aid from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). It should be noted that FIDEL, set up in 1955, belonged to the Portuguese firm Champalimaud before Mozambique's independence. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2179] COP [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

SHIP MAINTENANCE--A unit made up of a floating dock and shop for the repair of lighterage vessels and other boats will arrive in Mozambique in November. It will be set up at Maputo with the assistance of 70 to 80 Soviet technicians, who will also be in charge of ensuring its maintenance. Work connected with the preliminary phase of installation will be finished in March 1982. Investments will total an estimated 450,000 contos. The dock will be able to accommodate ship weighing up to 4,000 tons, on the condition that they are not over 120 meters in length. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2179] 11,464

CSO: 4719/344

SENEGAL

RESULTS OF SGBS ACTIVITY IN 1980 NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2049

[Text] The activity of the General Banking Company of Senegal (SGBS) has been hurt by the serious crisis affecting the Senegalese economy. Growth in business slowed down substantially during the 1979-1980 fiscal year and results showed a tangible decline. The balance sheet on 30 September 1980 totaled 61.6 billion CFA francs, compared with 58.6 billion at the end of September 1979, with the increase amounting to 5 percent.

Concerning customer deposits, efforts nevertheless made it possible to consolidate gains made in 1978-1979, with the volume of call deposits and fixed deposits representing 26.8 billion CFA francs at the end of September 1980, down 2.9 billion compared with September 1979.

Difficulties in the economic situation caused the bank to adopt a restrictive policy on the granting of credits: Overall commitments went from 43.4 to 45.3 billion CFA francs, an increase limited to 4 percent. The share of nationals in bank aid rose from 50 to 54 percent from one fiscal year to the next.

Outside the balance sheet, commitments with security and guarantees and credits opened confirmed for customers total 15.7 billion CFA francs, compared with 16.5 billion on 30 September 1979.

The restrictions: Checking the distribution of credits and an increase in treasury charges affected the working account, with gross results amounting to 4.2 billion CFA francs, an improvement of 13 percent compared with 22 percent the previous fiscal year. Trading results before taking the balance amounted to 1.7 billion CFA francs, down 8 percent compared with those registered at the end of September 1979.

Because of the establishment of substantial funds aimed at covering risks on a clientele affected by the decline in activity and the difficulties of collecting administrative as well as private debts, the net result, after amortizations, deposits and taxes (up 560 million CFA over the previous fiscal year), is 123.1 million CFA francs, substantially lower than in 1979, when the figure was 482.2 million CFA francs.

Because of the decline in results and as a result of the poor economic situation, the general assembly on 24 January 1981 decided not to distribute dividends and to put all profits in reserves, with a sum of 100 million CFA set aside to meet circumstantial risks. The SGBS's capital of 2.2 billion CFA francs is matched by .8 billion in reserves and funds.

The board of directors includes the General Banking Company, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the Bayerische Vereinsbank, the Swiss Credit Bank and the General Company of Belgium.

Idrissa Seydi takes over as chairman of the board, with Ousmane Noel Mbaye acting as general director.



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CSO: 4719/287

SENEGAL

## BRIEFS

LOANS TO SOFISEDIT--In Washington, the World Bank just joined with the Senegalese Financial Company for the Development of Industry and Tourism (SOFISEDIT) in signing two financial agreements totaling some 2.6 billion CFA francs. The first, an IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] loan agreement, will give SOFISEDIT the resources needed for investments in the key sectors of industry, tourism and fishing. The second, an IDA credit agreement involving the granting to the government of a $2.4 million loan, $1 million of which may be reconveyed to SOFISEDIT, is the first endowment from the participation fund reserved for the use of the company in buying into companies benefiting from its aid and controlled by nationals operating in areas deemed to have priority. The aid of the World Bank will also be used to improve SOFISEDIT's expertise, through the granting of a non-repayable subsidy amounting to $500,000 for teams of consultants and experts. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2049] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

FRG AID--The West German Government will provide Senegal with aid amounting to 75 million Deutsche marks (172.5 million French francs) for 1981 and 1982. The agreement was reached in Bonn at the end of July between the Senegalese minister of planning and cooperation, Louis Alexandrenne, and the chief of staff of the ministry in Bonn, Willi Ehmann, following 3 days of negotiations between the two delegations. The aid granted is in two parts: a long-term credit totaling 54 million Deutsche marks (124.2 million French francs) and a nonrepayable subsidy of 21 million marks (48.3 million French francs). The cooperation projects essentially concern the development of Senegalese agriculture and improvements in the water supply systems in regions the hardest hit by the drought. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 pp 2049-2050] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/287

SOUTH AFRICA

## BRIEFS

RAILWAY CARS BIDS--South African railroads have issued calls for bids for the supplying of: 1) 1,000 STLJ-type cars to haul rough timber; 2) 75 tank cars of the XQLJ-3 type. Bids should be addressed to: South African Railways, Chief Stores Superintendent Office, P. O. Box 8617, Johannesburg 2000, before 23 October 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Aug 81 p 2122] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

AUSTRIAN TRACTORS FOR TRANSKEI--Edward Booi, minister of agriculture and forestry of the Transkei, recently told a South African economic weekly that his ministry had ordered 8,000 tractors from the Austrian firm Steyr-Daimier-Puch, which will be delivered at a rate of 500 a year. Already, 450 of the tractors were delivered in 1979 and 500 in 1980. The rest of the order represents a value of over 70 million rand, revenue thus taken away from manufacturers that assemble tractors in South Africa. For the minister, the Austrian order is justified by the fact that previous negotiations with South African manufacturers led nowhere, with the companies contacted refusing to provide free repair service. However, the Austrian company agreed to grant a 30-month guarantee for repairs and spare parts, training programs and the construction of maintenance depots in the Transkei. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 p 2011] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

CSO: 4719/317

TANZANIA

## NATION SAID TO BE UNDERGOING CRITICAL ECONOMIC PHASE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1866, 14 Aug 81 pp 2089-2091

[Text] When, in 1977, President Julius Nyerere drew up the balance sheet of the action he had launched 10 years before at the time of the historic Arusha declaration, he appeared to be somewhat disillusioned[1] and admitted that despite certain achievements, his country was far from having reached socialism and economic independence (self-reliance [sic]). One must add that Tanzania's stability had been hard hit by the oil crisis, which coincided with a long period of drought. In addition to these outside causes, there were those due to what was cautiously called "the lack of production incentives" -- in short, to put it plainly, the lack of efficiency of the entire government apparatus.

In the foreign policy field, however, the *Mwalimu* (teacher), as President Nyerere is fondly called in his country, could boast of some successes. Without exaggeration, his role in southern Africa could be compared with that of the successive Algerian presidents in North Africa. This preeminence, this uncontested leadership, would reach a peak in 1979, when the Tanzanian troops successfully intervened in Uganda and overthrew an unspeakable regime.

Since "the 1977 reflex," the president has not been discouraged in his search for a truly socialist society and the forward march of the *Ujamaa*,[2] the basis of Tanzanian socialism, has not slowed down. In 1979, the Ujamaa village communities destined to promote agricultural cooperation expanded further and now take in 8,000 villages with 13 million persons. But the current situation seems to indicate that this movement did not create an economic springboard strong enough to make the country achieve rapid progress.

In fact, Tanzania is going through a critical phase. The 1979 floods, followed by a recent drought, do not explain everything and economic independence, or better, food independence alone, has never seemed so far off. Economic matters must therefore take precedence over political affairs. Tanzania must live and measures must be taken, some immediately, others in the more distant future. They constitute the plan of action drawn up by the government. Above all, let us look at the current situation closely.

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1 See the brochure "The Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After."

2 The Ujamaa can be defined as the social relationships lived following a pattern of relationships within a large family.

Poor Country, Slow Progress

Aside from the bloody interlude with which we are all familiar, Uganda has always looked rich alongside Tanzania. Here we are in a tropical zone with irregular rainfall, on a plateau with relatively poor soil, an area where the resources of the subsoil have not yet been demonstrated. Consequently, 945,000 square kilometers with 17.5 million inhabitants and a 500-kilometer coastline do not make prosperity, even with an uncommon president who is unanimously respected by the international community.

Was it the attempt by the Laborites in 1947, trying unsuccessfully to give Tanganyika the structure of an African peanut belt with their Groundnut Scheme, that put the evil eye on that country's future prosperity?[1] It is quite possible. At any rate, what is certain is that Tanzania has never given its inhabitants a soil capable of great yields. When, to the natural calamities, drought, floods, grasshoppers and tse-tse fly, one adds a tense international situation: oil crisis, monetary inflation, fluctuating prices for products, it is difficult for a country with mediocre resources to develop without setbacks.

Despite difficulties, the gross national product, which was 3,701,000,000 Tanzanian shillings[2] in 1960, rose to 5,869,000,000 in 1968 and 11.18 billion in 1978, more than double in 10 years. In real terms, this corresponds to an annual growth of 3.6 percent, slightly higher than the population growth. There is one significant figure that must be emphasized: that of the growth of the industrial sector in the GNP. In 1962, it represented 3.4 percent of the GNP, rose to 8 percent 9 years later and 9.3 percent in 1978. Moreover, the second five-year plan (1969-1974) provided for investments on the order of 3.5 billion shillings, including 2 billion for industrial projects, but the latter, as in the case of the future Ketewaka-Mchuchuma coal mining operation and the Ligango iron, did not pan out.

More specifically, in the field of agriculture, what were the variations? When one realizes the importance of the primary sector in the life of the country: 90 percent of the population and 40 percent of all income, it is interesting to know these elements.

Food crops were promoted to the maximum extent: corn, sorgho, wheat, beans, millet, and so on, but they were not enough to meet the needs of the inhabitants. Production of some even dropped (figures in tons):

| | 1975-1976 | 1978-1979 | 1979-1980 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corn | 91,100 | 127,500 | 161,500 |
| Rice | 18,500 | 52,300 | 46,500 |
| Wheat | 25,500 | 28,800 | 26,500 |

Rice is declining, for example. This is mainly due to a lack of fertilizer and a lack of machinery. As for the export crops, the situation is not brilliant.

1 This plan provided for 1.3 million hectares and was a failure. It cost the British Treasury 36 million pounds, "the price of a cruiser at the time."

2 8.2 Tanzanian shillings = $1.00

Sisal, of which Tanzania was the top world producer, saw its prices drop because of the competition from synthetic fibers and production slowed down: 200,000 tons in 1964-1965; 90,000 tons in 1981! Coffee, which totaled 55,000 tons in 1975-1976, dropped to 42,000 tons. Cotton is doing better, if one dares say so: 234,000 bales in 1975-1976 and 357,000 bales in 1979-1980. Finally, tea has improved, going from 13,900 tons in 1974-1975 to 19,000 tons in 1979-1980.

Nevertheless, there is currently a serious deficit with respect to food and Tanzania will in the coming months have to import at least 50,000 tons of corn, 15,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of rice, without counting the fact that manioc, sorgo and millet production is also inadequate.

Already in 1973-1974, the country experienced a serious drought and the authorities were able to face it with foreign exchange reserves. Today, the government's coffers are empty. The war in Uganda and the increase in oil costs particularly explain this troublesome situation.

The trade balance is therefore obviously negative. In 1978, exports amounted to 3,573,000,000 shillings (including coffee, 1,303,000,000) and imports totaled 8,789,000,000 shillings. In 1979, the figures were 4,531,000,000 and 8,941,000,000. As for the current balance of payments, it had a large deficit for the same year.

For the time being, foreign aid is the only remedy to meet the emergency. The Tanzanian Government has asked the EEC and several Western countries for aid. One of those countries is Sweden, which to date has been one of the main backers. Australia and Japan have also been approached.

Plan of Action for 1981-1990

In the course of this decade, planners foresee an increase in the GNP of 6 percent a year. For industry specifically, its share of the GNP should go from 9 to 16 percent during the period. Every sector has been largely provided with projects. Let us point out the most characteristic ones.

Rural sector (agriculture): The goal is to increase food crops in order to achieve that food independence so desired by Tanzanian leaders. By 1985, the following totals should be met: corn, 328,000 tons; rice, 120,000 tons; wheat, 60,000 tons. Sugar, whose marketed tonnage amounts to 119,000 tons, should go to 200,000 in 1990 (reconstruction of the Kagera sugar mill). By the end of the decade, cotton should reach 1 million bales (400,000 at present). The sisal harvest should return to the 1964-1965 figures, or 200,000 tons a year. Exports will be improved.

Irrigated crops will extend over 10,000 hectares a year; the establishment of large state farms; integrated project for the lower Rufiji Valley including 20,000 hectares and covering 130,000 hectares by 1990 (rice, cotton, corn mainly); development of the Usangu Plain; development of the Kilombero Valley, where arable land totals an estimated 400,000 hectares (agriculture, forests, fishing); the "Stiegler gorge" project in the Rufiji Valley (250 kilometers from the mouth of that river), consisting of the construction of a retention dam to irrigate 130,000 hectares, plus the production of energy.

These few examples are part of a total of 52, but it will still be necessary to import rice, wheat and powdered milk until 1990.

Livestock raising: In Tanzania, livestock raising is mainly practiced by the Masai, the once famous warriors, who have always had the greatest scorn for farmers and who, like many Africans, have a social rather than economic view of their herds. We find the same problem as in Uganda. At the present time, it is scarcely possible to impose on them what the English call "mixed farming," that combination of livestock raising and varied crops.

Whatever the case, there are 12.5 million head of cattle, 5.5 million goats and 3.6 million head of sheep, and the main projects principally deal with milk production. The prime objective is to increase milk consumption to 28 liters per person per year (48.51 per person for the urban population; 22.5 for the rural population). The increase in meat production, improved pasture and veterinary care are other objectives.

Industrial sector (industries, mining, energy): One cannot say that there are spectacular projects in this area. Still cited is the Kidatu-Mujindi hydroelectric dam, which is to supply the city of M'Beya (project that should have been completed in 1982). For industries, however, there will be few new units for this decade; rather, there will mainly be projects to be completed (Tanga cement works, 500,000 tons per year, planned for 1982) and the rehabilitation of plants scarcely operating at 50-percent capacity. The lack of credit needed to obtain raw materials that are indispensable to some of the factories is mainly the cause of the poor figure. In 1980, for example, only 35 percent of the credits available for the industrial sector were released. It is anticipated that for the 1981-1982 period, some $302 million in imports will be needed to operate the plants at 70-percent capacity and in order to meet the people's food needs. This sum will increase 10 percent annually until 1985.

For several years, however, the industrial sector has made progress and its share of the GNP has increased substantially, as we have seen. In 1965, it employed 28,179 persons and in 1978, 85,493. It is heavy industry that will receive the favor of investors in the coming years (metallurgy, production of motors). But all the large enterprises that are part of the National Development Corporation should have their management reorganized as it is inefficient in most cases.

Planning of an industrial strategy for Zanzibar (attached in 1964), a long-term strategy to support its industrial zone; increased use of local raw materials; and utilization of agricultural waste products.

These objectives are part of the projects for the sector. It should be noted that the Dar-es-Salaam refinery will have its capacity increased. Connected by an oil pipeline to the Zambian Copperbelt, it is a strategically important enterprise.

As for mining research, it continues at a speed in keeping with the credits -- that is, slowly. There has been talk of uranium and nickel, but for the time being, iron and coal could perhaps be worked in the future. There is also some hope of oil. The Algerians connected with SONATRACH have resumed offshore drilling not far from Mafia Island. It will be necessary to wait and see.

Transportation and infrastructures: A very great effort must be made in this sector. Whether it be a question of the railroads, which are unreliable and poorly managed, the badly maintained roads, ports or airports to be modernized, there is nothing in the transport sector that is satisfactory.

The techncial feat of construction of the Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia Railway) is far away and much work has to be done along the 900 kilometers of the Tanzanian portion, without counting the purchase of new equipment. It will be remembered that the Americans connected with the IDA [International Development Association] had duplicated the work of the Chinese, if one would put it that way, with a road that followed the railroad nearly exactly. It did not have a better fate and its nickname "Hell Run" [sic] is well chosen. Work is planned on several sections of the route.

The chronically congested Dar-es-Salaam port will be expanded. Eight additional berthing piers are planned. The airport of the new administrative capital, Dodoma, is under construction and that in Kilimandjaro will be modernized. Over 152 projects have been worked out, ranging from the purchase of three mobile cranes for the Kigoma port on Lake Tanganyika to repair of the essential roadway: Biharamulo-Kamanga-Mwansa-Nyanguga (200 kilometers). This is a very long-range series of undertakings to complete and continue. Naturally, the main lines have already been worked out, but more than elsewhere, they are quickly lost in time if they are not regularly redrawn. This is the entire problem of the maintenance of transportation infrastructures.

Education, health: These are fields in which "socialist" countries excel, as we have already seen in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia. In Tanzania, a major effort has been made in literacy training and by 1976, 67 percent of the people were no longer illiterate. The official language, Swahili, has greatly contributed to the effort. By 1977, elementary schooling was widespread. The development of education at all levels remains one of the prime concerns of the leaders.

In the health sector, where there are still few hospitals, clinics and doctors, large investments are planned.

Unrestricted Aid

Planned investments have been divided up into major categories and the percentages are as follows: production, 29 percent; economic infrastructures, 33 percent; social infrastructures, 38 percent.

The foreign aid that will be necessary to carry out this program of action has not been specifically calculated. One can state without fear of error that it will amount to a respectable number of millions of dollars, but that is not the real problem, which is currently to be found in the talks of Tanzanian leaders with officials of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It would in fact appear that there are some difficulties between the interlocutors. On the one hand, the financial backers will "execute" only if certain conditions are met, but on the other hand, the beneficiaries do not intend to be limited by outside restrictions. President Nyerere wants to have sole control, along with his aides, over the socialist development of his country, over economic decisions. One can understand his attitude, even if one does not share his ideas.

The fact that Tanzania is one of the least advanced countries does not mean that the option taken by the leaders is erroneous. The failures have never "emptied" ideological causes of their substance, but on a more practical level, the application of a plan, whether or not it is liberal, puts men into action. When they have a heavy and impersonal yoke to bear, the force of the ideological impact tends to be diluted in the direction of statism and bureaucracy and the economy suffers. Some countries have already experienced this. Even in Europe, it would be a good lesson for the future. The ransom of a so-called modern world, Tanzania needs air to breathe, foreign aid in order to get out of the rut, and one can easily understand the reticence of its leaders faced with conditions set forth by donors. However, there are few disinterested moneylenders. Balzac was right.

Tanzania From Day to Day

One cannot recommend too highly the book by Bernard Joinet, "Tanzania, Manger d'Abord" [Tanzania: Eating Comes First].[1] A missionary in that country for 15 years, the author, who in 1977 already published "Le Soleil de Dieu en Tanzanie" [God's Light in Tanzania], has now given us a work devoted, not to Tanzanian socialism, which is so attractive for sociologists, but to the daily life of the Tanzanian people, most of whom are peasants. This book blends, with the simplicity of a conversation, facts and figures, personal memories and general observations of a Catholic priest who is also a man curious about all that surrounds him.

Bernard Joinet analyzes with a great deal of finesse Tanzania's economic difficulties. At the same time, he ruffles the feathers of Rene Dumont (p 190), who in his opinion pays too much attention of the city-country opposition.

The conclusions of this work are not to be sought only in the last pages, as is customary. On page 179, we are told that "Tanzania will only be able to attain food self-sufficiency while industrializing if yields increase." On page 43, it is emphasized that "Tanzania has some 50 years to industrialize. Otherwise, it risks being suffocated." As for the sum of information on current agricultural difficulties, the author emphasizes the enormous distance between theory and practice in a country such as Tanzania: It is too great and is impossible to sum it up. Let us simply advise the reading of a book which mainly talks of men and which also teaches much more than an impeccable but arid economic analysis.

Not all the readers will have Bernard Joinet's sympathy for Tanzania. Nor will they all be sensitive to an unadorned style, but I doubt that one can avoid learning something new from the book. (F. Gaulme)

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1 Bernard Joinet: "Tanzania, Manger d'Abord"; 261 pp (13.5 X 21.5 cm), Editions Karthala, 22-24 Boulevard Arago, 75013 Paris, 1981.



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TOGO

## BRIEFS

REGULATIONS ON EXPORT CARGOES--A notice to shippers recently published in the local press informs them of "the enforcement of effective supervision of the distribution of loads by the limited commission acting as the National Council of Togolese Shippers beginning 1 June 1981. "All bids for export shipping must be submitted for the approval of the commission and presented on a special form required for customs formalities. These forms are available at the commission's headquarters at the Ministry of Commerce and Transport." In addition, "importers are informed that all goods and products imported by sea from countries in the northern and southern COWAC [Continental West Africa Conference] (port of the Bordeaux-Bremen range, Rostock and the Scandinavian ports) are required, in order to pass through customs in Togo, to be accompanied by a reservation or exemption certificate issued by port agents of the Togolese Maritime Shipping Company (SOTONAM) with authority from the CNCT [expansion unknown]. These conditions will be applied gradually and will be enforced by 1 October 1981 at the latest. They will be contained in a notice to importers." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Jul 81 p 1997] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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UPPER VOLTA

## BRIEFS

POURA GOLD MINE PROJECTS--On 27 July in Lome, the West African Development Bank (WADB) granted the Upper Voltan Mining Research and Operations Company a loan of 908 million CFA francs to finance the project to reopen the Poura gold mine. On behalf of the Ministry of Commerce, Industrial Development and Mines, the Council of Ministers of Upper Volta acted on 30 July 1980 to approve an agreement concluded between the government and the Alsatian Machinery Construction Company. The contract involves the supplying of two 300-kilowatt generators for the Poura mine at a cost of nearly 65 million CFA francs. A call for bids (No 1667) has been issued by the Republic of Upper Volta for an infrastructure project to accompany the reopening of the Poura mine (first phase), financed by the EEC and the European Development Fund. The subject is the supplying and startup of four 900-kilowatt generators driven by diesel engines and a 630-kVA transformer, to be used to supply the electrical systems of the Poura mining facilities. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 14 Aug 81 p 2107] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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ZAIRE

PRESIDENT CALLS FOR EXPANDED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2059

[Text] In a speech delivered on 26 March before members of the Central Committee of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), President Mobutu Sese Seko defined the new agricultural strategy of Zaire, which is primarily aimed at achieving self-sufficiency once again by calling upon the private sector. A little later, in June, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development organized a seminar on the definition of the new agricultural policy, held in N'Sele.

Consequently, as emphasized by the state commissioner for agriculture and rural development in a speech given at the International Fair in Kinshasa at the beginning of July, there is now greater awareness and a marked political determination to develop agriculture. It is a new and extremely important element. It will now be a matter of arousing new motivation in rural areas in order to increase production, inasmuch as the system of force employed during colonial times is no longer conceivable today.

In the meantime, production of food crops is insufficient, as shown by imports of corn and wheat. Regarding wheat, imports rose to 166,354 tons in 1980, compared with 150,023 tons in 1979 (up 4 percent) and 64,000 tons during the first 6 months of 1981. Wheat is mainly imported from the United States by MIDEMA [expansion unknown], 40 percent of whose capital is owned by the Zairian Government and 60 percent by Continental Grain in New York.

For their part, corn imports went from 146,047 tons in 1979 to 147,435 tons in 1980 and 64,000 tons during the first 6 months of 1981. It should be noted that in order to cover the entire demand of the region of Shaba, it would be necessary to import a minimum of 200,000 tons annually; corn imports in 1973 had already risen to over 146 tons.

Coffee production has remained around 80,000 tons and exports for the 1979-1980 coffee season amounted, according to OZACAF [Zairian Coffee Office], to 1,065,102 bags (nearly 64,000 tons). In addition to these official exports, some 8,000 tons were smuggled to Sudan and Rwanda. The change in monetary parity on 19 June 1981 should substantially reduce the interest of coffee smugglers.

Palm oil dropped 5.5 percent, going from 98,500 tons in 1979 to 93,150 tons in 1980.

Rubber production dropped from 20,600 tons to 19,500 tons, as a result of the aging hevea plantations. On the other hand, industrial crops showed substantial progress.

Cotton production showed a clear recovery in 1980, with 29,200 tons of cottonseed compared with 18,800 tons in 1979 (up 55.5 percent).

Tobacco continues to improve, going from 1,500 tons in 1979 to 1,700 tons in 1980 (up 13.3 percent) and predictions for the 1980-1981 season now underway are for more than 2,000 tons of dry tobacco.

Production of rough timber is down. On the other hand, exports of finished products, particularly veneer, are clearly up.

The company SIFORZAL [expansion unknown] (number 1 for Zairian wood), whose capital is divided between the German firm Danzer (95.18 percent) and the Finance Company for Development (SOFIDE: 4.82 percent), exported 8,609,421 square meters of veneer in 1980, compared with 6,097,536 square meters in 1979 (up 41.2 percent).

It should be added that wood is one of the prime resources of the Republic of Zaire, and its development is only beginning, considering the fact that the country has 47 percent of all the dense forests in tropical Africa. The African countries have entrusted the duties of secretary general of the African Wood Organization (OAB), located in Libreville, to a Zairian.



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ZAIRE

## BRIEFS

ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION INCREASE--Production of hydroelectric and thermic power in Zaire has risen substantially for the first time since 1977. It rose from 4,068 gigawatt-hours in 1979 to 4,200 gigawatt-hours in 1980 (up 3.2 percent). It would have been even greater if it were not for the rate revisions in October 1979 and January 1980. Sales of high-tension power essentially increased as a result of industrial consumption in the Shaba region. Copper production, which returned to the 460,000-ton level, caused intense activity in metallurgy plants. On the other hand, industrial and domestic consumption in the rest of the country declined because of the rate increases. On 1 July 1981, the installed power of hydroelectric plants in the Republic of Zaire amounted to 1,002 megawatts. This power will be increased to 2,300 megawatts (up 132 percent) with the startup of the Inga II powerplant. The plant, equipped with eight 159-megawatt turbines, or an installed power of 1,272 megawatts, is entirely set up. Testing of the powerplant and the very high tension, continuous current line, 1,820 kilometers long, between Inga and Kolwezi, is planned for January 1982 and will last for about 6 months. Operation of the powerplant and the Inga-Shaba line will begin normally in July 1982. The trade balance with other countries regarding electricity has remained favorable to Zaire, with an operating surplus of 96,787 megawatt-hours in 1980, compared with 92,891 megawatt-hours in 1979 (up 4.2 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1864, 31 Jul 81 p 2004] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

FUEL PRICE INCREASE--According to an order from the state commissioner for economy and industry, fuel prices in Zaire will increase very substantially effective 20 July. A liter of gas (super and for private use), which was 4 zaires (about $1.20), will now cost 5.5 zaires. A liter of oil will henceforth cost 2.5 zaires (compared with 1.5) and diesel fuel will cost 1.8 zaires (compared with 1.2). The order emphasizes that the new oil products sales prices include consumer taxes, entry duties and fiscal taxes, the road tax, taxes for the intervention and stabilization fund, the diversification fund, within the framework of development agreements binding the Zairian Government with oil companies, the security fund and the royalty to be paid to the Zairian Oil Enterprise. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1864, 31 Jul 81 p 2005] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

ZAIRETAIN EXPANSION--The report of the Belgian company GEOMINES [Geological and Mining Company of Belgian Industrial Engineers] for the 1980 fiscal year indicates, with respect to activities of Zairian subsidiaries, that the firm ZAIRETAIN [Zairian Tin Company] recently submitted to the Zairian Government a very important study and investment program appealing for foreign credits, among other things. The program, based on studies underway and begun several years ago, has three phases stretched out over 5 years: The first two phases of the program should gradually lead ZAIRETAIN to produce 2,000 tons of cassiterite a year. Phase 3, which has to do with the operation of the primary deposit of unaltered pegmatites, has caused the Zairian Government to request financing in order to complete studies being done by ZAIRETAIN for three and a half years, with the support of GEOMINES consulting offices. If the pegmatite feasibility study should lead to positive conclusions, then investments could be extremely large, on the order of several billion Belgian francs. The Manono primary deposit is the largest in the world in the hands of a single holder and contains mixed tin and lithium ores. Concerning the program, a question was posed at the recent GEOMINES general assembly with regard to the quarrying of hard rock in Zaire and the major energy potential which such an operation requires. The president responded that the company had an autonomous hydroelectric powerplant in Zaire: "It is an asset of the company that it is normal for us to want to use. The problem of the hard rock is important, but we hope to solve it in the coming years." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1864, 31 Jul 81 p 2005] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

STRIKE STATISTICS--In recent days, Zaire has experienced several strikes: by administrative and paramedical personnel at the Kinshasa university clinics, who resumed work on 28 July after a week-long strike begun for wage demands; by personnel of the Zairian National Posts and Telecommunications Office (ONPTZ), who resumed work on 27 July. ONPTZ employees were demanding an allocation for transportation expenses, housing allowances and regular promotions. The Executive Council renewed contact with social partners in order to seek agreement on the pending demands. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2059] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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ZAMBIA

NEW CROP PRODUCER PRICES SHOULD HELP TO REVITALIZE ECONOMY

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 167 Aug 81 p 38

[Article by Arthur Gottschalk]

[Text]

"Operation Incentive" is Zambia's K400-million booster plan for farmers and aims at making the country a major food producer by the end of the 1980s. *Arthur Gottschalk* reports

IN A MOVE aimed at restoring Zambia's troubled agricultural sector to full productivity, the Zambian Government has lifted the two-year-old ceiling on crop-producer prices for the 1981-82 season.

The new prices, which average 26 per cent over the old ones, are designed to provide farmers with the incentive to produce more food for the national market and to provide Zambia's parastatal food processing industries with raw materials. It is also hoped that the new prices will help create a farm surplus for export.

According to Unia Mwila, Minister of Agriculture and Water Development, the price increases were necessary to provide the Zambian farmer with a reasonable return on his investment after the cost of production was taken into account.

The crops included in the new price structure are maize, sunflower, groundnuts, soya beans, rice, wheat, cotton, and milk. Rice was given the largest increase, from K18.60 for an 80kg. bag to K28. Wheat was raised to K36 from K26 for a 90kg. bag. Cotton, the only crop that Zambia currently produces in surplus, was given the smallest raise to K0.47 from K0.46 a kilo. Maize, Zambia's major food crop, was increased to K18 from K13.50 for a 90kg. bag.

Other incentives offered in the recently announced farm programme include exemptions on the taxation of farm dividends for the coming season and the maintenance of the concessionary tax rate of 25 per cent on accessable farm income. It is hoped that the new incentives will enable the farmer to go all out to increase production.

The new price increases are a further step in "Operation Incentive", Zambia's K400-million agricultural booster plan for the 1980's. The plan forms a central part of the UNIP platform and is designed to make Zambia into a major food producer by the end of the decade.

Put into action in May, 1980, the plan closely links agriculture to industry through comprehensive planning. Included in the plan is the development of large scale agri-industries, the formation of producer marketing co-operatives, and the development of common infrastructure for family, peasant and private commercial farms.

The operation has revised Zambia's farm taxation structure and lowered the cost of fertiliser through government subsidy, which increases the margin of profit. But producer prices have been held to the 1979 level for two years.

Zambia's maize production reached a high in 1975 of 8.3-million bags. Since then, however, a combination of adverse economic and climatic conditions had damaged output, and in drought-stricken 1979 Zambia produced only four-million bags, three-million less than needed for home consumption. The shortfall had to be made up with costly imports paid for with precious foreign exchange.

This year, due to the new scheme and adequate rain, Zambia expects a bumper maize harvest. Estimates for this year's crop range from a conservative 6.8-million bags to 11-million, the best crop in four seasons.

The Zambian Government is hoping that the momentum generated by this year's successful harvest will spread throughout the farm sector and help the country to realise its tremendous agricultural potential. Feed for livestock, in short supply for the past two years, promises to be more plentiful in the coming season. This will boost Zambia's cattle, pork, and chicken industries.

The new prices should create profits for reinvestment in agriculture. The combined effects should go a long way towards revitalising the country's economy●



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END