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West Europe Report

(FOUO 55/81)



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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FDP'S VERHEUGEN DENIES COALITION BREAKUP IMMINENT

Hamburg STERN in German 3 Sep pp 128-30

[Article: "The CDU Is Mired in a Bog of Intellectual Sloth"]

[Text] FDP secretary Guenter Verheugen tells in an interview with STERN why the Social-Liberal coalition will continue to govern in Bonn despite disagreement on the 1982 budget and other differences of opinion.

STERN: Herr Verheugen, the tug of war over the 1982 budget has poisoned the coalition atmosphere. Is the SPD/FDP alliance breaking up?

Verheugen: I am of a totally different opinion on that point. Never before in the history of the Federal Republic have so many economies been affected at one time as in this round of budget cuts. Nonetheless I would have to say with some self-criticism that the coalition has not been able to present this as a success. Instead, it has managed to talk to death an achievement that it had brought about by joint effort.

STERN: During the budget conferences between the Free and the Social Democrats, basic differences of opinion emerged clearly. Are the coalition parties about to split apart?

Verheugen: I am convinced that the problems that lie ahead of us cannot be solved by any better coalition than the Social-Liberal one.

STERN: Which problems are you thinking of?

Verheugen: For example, the problem of creating a new vision of the future for our younger generation.

STERN: But the common grounds of interest are growing fewer.

Verheugen: Well, of course these common grounds will be eroded when you put together an administration program and then achieve it step by step. But it's up to us to continue to replenish these common grounds. And I see in the new economy package, for example, a new round of mutual interests.

STERN: Isn't more than just a few random mutual interests on policy matters necessary to maintain a coalition?

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Verheugen: It's my opinion that the two great tasks of the Social-Liberal coalition--a policy of peace abroad and reform at home--have not yet been concluded.

STERN: But precisely that peace policy, which until now had been the strongest bond between the FDP and the SPD, seems at this moment not to have a very high priority with your party chairman, Foreign Minister Genscher; even in social and economic policy the FDP appears to be growing closer to the union.

Verheugen: We can hardly grow closer to a vacuum. The CDU is mired in a bog of intellectual sloth and has been for years now. This party no longer has the capacity to take a position on such difficult questions as budget or peace policy. Their motto is: don't rock the boat and do hope that by some miracle the keys to power will suddenly fall into their hands.

STERN: Perhaps this is what will happen.

Verheugen: That can and will never happen.

STERN: Then how do you explain to us what you and the FDP leadership have been doing over the past few weeks? Opinion surveys were circulated according to which a change to coalition with the Union was seen as a possibility without endangering its existence. The coalition was strained to the breaking point by FDP demands. Was all this just tactics?

Verheugen: The operations of the FDP have been misunderstood by many people as maneuvers directed against the SPD. In fact it was we who demanded and pushed through the necessary change of course toward greater economy. That was to create the fiscal basis for any further joint action. As far as this affected the voters, it was directed instead at the Union, because in that way we became the standard bearers of hope for the liberal fraction of the CDU voters. The breach that had been made into the CDU voter potential at the Bundestag elections of 1980 is what we wanted to make permanent. What is at stake for the FDP is whether it reverts to a woebegone parliamentary existence or whether it remains a strong liberal force.

STERN: The shifting of the FDP has been explained in some quarters as rising from the fear of the Green and Alternative groups' becoming a fourth parliamentary force in the federation and in the states, and that the party is trying to link up with the Union before it's too late.

Verheugen: I am convinced that a fourth party cannot be averted by such petty tactical maneuvering as a change in coalition. The real response to the Green and Alternative groups lies not in coalition juggling or blackboard exercises but rather in political substance. Which means that we have to pursue policies which will capture the confidence of these voters in the seriousness of our efforts for a better environment and the struggle for peace and disarmament.

STERN: Do you mean that you have already written off the Green vote and surrendered it to the SPD's efforts at its integration?

Verheugen: The FDP would probably have very little luck if it tried to do two things at once; on the one hand, to compete with the SPD for those marginal voters who tend to the Green group and, on the other hand, to compete with the CDU for

those marginal voters who have settled in the middle. Of course we will continue trying to appeal to those voters sympathetic to the Green cause who are not drawn to the left wing of the SPD. But for the sake of the Social-Liberal coalition, it would make more sense if the FDP were to succeed in making permanent the breach it has driven into the voting potential of the major opposition party. That does not mean that we have taken the bait of the Union's program.

STERN: Would you go along with the Chancellor in saying to the Union, we don't need you?

Verheugen: The SPD and the FDP, naturally, must take account of an unseen third party at the coalition table during their discussions. Because the CDU and the CSU hold a majority in the Bundesrat, we must always ask ourselves what is possible and what is not...

STERN: ...and at the back door to negotiate with this "unseen third party"?

Verheugen: The SPD and the FDP have agreed that neither party will negotiate with the opposition behind the back of the other. We must confront the Union majority in the Bundesrat with a united and firm will and not let one of us be played off against the other.

STERN: The saying goes that after a long marriage the partners grow to look more like each other every year.

Verheugen: It is important to me that in our coalition the partners keep their identities for all to see. The SPD has been attempting to do that for years and, I must say, more consistently than we have. And they are able to do it because they have a party chairman who is able to maneuver rather comfortably outside the constraints of his party.

STERN: That probably irritates you?

Verheugen: I wouldn't say that. The SPD chairman has very often articulated Social Democrat policy quite beyond the everyday policy carried out by the coalition.

STERN: Is that a veiled reproach?

Verheugen: We have never thrown that up as a reproach to him. But by the same token, no one should reproach us for defining our principles outside the bounds of administrative policy. This is how parties remain distinguishable from each other for their voters. What is decisive for the coalition will always be the willingness to come to a compromise.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PRE-ELECTION POLL ANALYSIS: ATTITUDES, EVENTS, CANDIDATES

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 18, 1981 pp 159-174

[Article by Olivier Duhamel and Jean-Luc Parodi: "Chronicle of Public Opinion--the Evolution of Voting Intentions, a Contribution to Analysis of the 1981 Presidential Election"]

[Text] The analyses of Francois Mitterrand's election to the presidency of the republic are only beginning. The election campaign must doubtlessly be included among the explanatory factors, since, 6 months before the second round, Valery Giscard d'Estaing was credited with 60 percent of the intended votes on the assumption of a duel with his future Socialist opponent (see Footnote 14 below). Examination of the pre-election polls therefore makes it possible to evaluate the shifts that occurred among the French voters and to attempt to understand them better. The mass of information in this area is considerable. During the 7-year period, nearly 80 voting-intention polls were published, in addition to which there are many political indicators (expressions of victory hopes, predictions, images of the leaders, policy balance-sheets, candidates' capacities for solving the problems, etc) that could supplement analysis of the changes that came about.

Four innovations characterized this campaign, from the point of view of the public-opinion polls. First of all, its duration, since without even taking into account the various "hypothetical presidential elections" of the first half of the 7-year term, it was in Autumn 1979--that is, a year and a half before the election--that the series of pre-election surveys began.¹ This long duration is unprecedented under the Fifth Republic, since in 1965, pre-election polls were still a novelty, and in 1969, as well as 1974, the unforeseen character of the presidential elections had kept down the number of surveys. This is what explains the appearance, alongside the big polling institutes--IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute], SOFRES [French Opinion Poling Company], Harris-France--of some less big ones--Public SA, Indice Opinion--that were sometimes to attract the attention of the Polls Commission.² The Polls Commission is the third innovation of the campaign, and its action merits a study to itself, though this is ruled out by the size of the present chronicle. Finally, what was done for the first time in France by L. Harris-France for L'EX-PRESS, the panel survey (repeated survey of the same sample), published under the title "L'EXPRESS's Samples,"³ made it possible to follow very closely the voters' shifts and the reasons for their changes.⁴

A previous chronicle devoted to all the "hypothetical presidential elections" of the first 5 years of the 7-year term⁵ brought out the predominance of the central candidates in the first rounds and the slight Giscardian lead in the second rounds, while


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at the same time revealing a greater fluidity of voting choices. In order to understand the final outcome of the election of 10 May 1981, it is thus helpful to determine the major phases of the evolution noted since that time, to examine the ruptures that occurred at a key moment (beginning of 1981), to go into the mobilization of the electorates by the peripheral candidates (Chirac, Marchais) and its limits, and finally, to decipher the second round, which was determined above all by the first.

I. The General Evolution of Voting Intentions for the First Round: from Giscard's Hegemony to Mitterrand's Breakthrough

Three stages in this 1.5-year campaign can be distinguished (Graph 1).



Graph 1--Evolution of voting intentions (IFOP) during the 18 months preceding the presidential election

Key:

1. Results for metropolitan France
2. Ecologists

1--Up to December 1980, Giscard had more than 35 percent of intended votes, and Mitterrand less than 20 percent. The president dominated the first secretary of the Socialist Party, who was always ahead of the peripheral-party candidates: Gaullists and Communists topped out at around 15 percent. Michel Debre ran almost equal with Jacques Chirac.

2--Between December 1980 and February 1981, everything turned topsy-turvy: Giscard d'Estaing fell sharply, Mitterrand went up spectacularly, Chirac collapsed, Debre sank, and only Marchais stagnated.

3--Between February and April 1981, the new power relationships stabilized, though there was a mobilization of the Gaullist electorate by Jacques Chirac. The movements are more complicated to grasp because of the disparity between the voting intentions expressed by poll and the results. However, that may be, no upheaval occurred in the last 2 months except for Chirac's catching up to Marchais. The key to the first round--that is, to the election--seems clearly to be at the beginning of the year.

II. The Turning-Point of the Campaign, the Crisis of the Beginning of 1981

The reversals affected several indicators and expressed the double trend that was to make the Socialist victory possible: the nonrejection of Mitterrand, despite the fact that he enjoyed little popularity at the beginning of the campaign, and the rejection of Giscard d'Estaing, even though he was well-positioned at the outset.


The essential phenomenon occurred as early as February 1981. Let us be specific. The Giscardian hegemony had been weakened earlier, by a normal phenomenon that had already occurred in 1965 for General de Gaulle. As the election approached, /the presidential validity dimmed/, the incumbent president was affected by the competition, became one candidate among others, and tended to fall back on his partisan electorate. Actually, the phenomenon had been quite a bit stronger in 1965, but it did not affect the general's success, because his starting level was particularly high. If one makes a few adjustments⁶ in order to accentuate the parallel, the two voting-intention curves show three periods--or better, a sizable drop preceded and followed by a relative stability.

In the first round in 1965, de Gaulle obtained a result intermediate between his presidential electorate and his parliamentary electorate. Giscard d'Estaing found himself in the same position in 1981.

Starting from a lower position, though (from the near-equilibrium of the left and the right), he could not help but fail. In both cases there was an incapacity to preserve a "legitimist" electorate--that is, one disposed to vote for the president at a given moment--and the obtaining of a first-round result midway between a legitimist electorate and a partisan electorate.


It remains that the Gaullist dropoff resulted from the discovery of the competition with the election campaign of 1965, whereas the entire Giscardian 7-year term was subject to the rhythm of the dual (split) bipolarization. It was therefore normal for its starting-point to be lower, and indispensable to halt the fall in 1981. Inversely, the gradual disintegration became rejection, precisely when Jacques Chirac's campaign began. If this February rupture had to be dated precisely, it

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


Graph 2--The evolution of voting intentions (SOFRES): percentage in relation to
Key: all persons questioned--The Giscardian nonmobilization

1. Undecided



Graph 3--de Gaulle's dropoff in 1965




Graph 4--Giscard's dropoff in 1981

could be pinpointed at the end of the first week of February: just after the announcement of Jacques Chirac's candidacy (2 February) at the time of the RPR Congress that confirmed it (7 February).⁷

Not everything began in February. An initial phase wound up, among the Socialists, on 8 November with the effacement of Michel Rocard in favor of François Mitterrand. The conclusion of this long quarrel⁸ was exceptionally fast and easily digested. After a long stagnation, Mitterrand began his climb from the end of 1980. Thus, just the fact of Michel Rocard's leaving the competition won him 9 points in the indicator of first-round hopes (IFOP, November: 8 percent; IFOP, December: 17 percent). He knew how to let it work as if by itself, with a "tranquil force"⁹ and a strategy of absence or, at least, of discretion, so as to polarize in his direction the rejection of the "outgoing candidate": refusal to participate in the big television broadcasts before mid-March, and his trip to China in February 1981, precisely when he reached his apogee.

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Graph 5--The stages of the Giscardian fall

Key:

1. 2nd-round voting intentions--SOFRES
2. Confidence--SOFRES
3. Satisfied--IFOP
4. 1st-round voting intentions--SOFRES
5. Victory hopes--SOFRES

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's drop between Autumn 1980 and Spring 1981 did not occur uniformly. It was steeper in the most Giscardian social categories--except for the fact that it affected men and women equally. Otherwise, the Giscardian "minorities" remained so (except for young people and workers), whereas the Giscardian "majorities" weakened (except for the elderly and the inactive).

These changes did not come about to the benefit of a single candidate. They were not equitably distributed among those candidates in whose favor the voting intentions went up (Mitterrand and Chirac), except for middle-level managerial personnel and white-collar workers and those in the 25-34 age group. For the rest, the wage-earners went over massively to the Socialist candidate, and the independent producers, to Jacques Chirac.

III. Chirac, Marchais: the Unequal Mobilization of Their Potential Electorate

The Communist setback is the only characteristic of the first round--and the most important one--that deviates considerably from the published voting intentions; the last pre-election polls forecast only a two-point (SOFRES-Harris) or a three-point (IFOP) setback.

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Table 1--The Outgoing President's 1st Round: between the Legitimist Electorate and the Parliamentary Electorate

Parliamentary Electorate	Legitimist Electorate	1st-Round Result
Charles de Gaulle 1965		
18 November 1962 UNR + RI [*] 36%	end-October 1965 Voting intentions: 66%	5 December 1965 de Gaulle %: 44%
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 1981		
12 March 1978 UDF 21.5%	January 1980 ¹ Voting intentions: 40%	26 April 1981 VGE %: 28%

1. IFOP/LE POINT. Another possible reference: voting intentions just after the legislative election of March 1978: VGE, 42% (SOFRES, 20-30 March 1978, "France de Gauche, Vote a Droite" [France of the Left, Voting on the Right], FNSP National Political Sciences Federation] Press, 1981, p 261).

[*] UNR: Union for the New Republic
RI: Independent Republicans

Table 2--The Sociological Diversification of the Giscardian Fall (in %)

(SOFRES)	Oct 1980 1	10-13 April 1981 2	26 April vote (post-election) 3	Gap 1/3
Total	36	28	28	- 8
Categories of most faithful				
18-24 years of age	23	23	23	--
Farmers, farmworkers, workers	23	24	18	- 5
35-49 years of age	32	25	27	- 5
50-64 years of age	36	27	28	- 8
Unfaithful categories				
Small merchants, artisans	46	32	35	- 9
Middle-level managerial, white-collar	26	22	17	- 9
25-34 years of age	27	20	16	-11
65 and older	60	46	48	-12
Upper managerial, industrialists, liberal professions, big merchants	38	27	24	-14
Inactive, retired	56	41	35	-19

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Table 3--The Categories in Which Jacques Chirac Gained Votes during the Campaign (%)

- In the categories not mentioned, there was no significant movement (change of 1 point or less) -

(SOFRES)	1	2	3	1/3
25-34 years of age	12	12	18	+ 6
35-49 " " "	14	18	20	+ 6
50-64 " " "	11	26	24	+13
Socio-occupational class				
Middle management, white-collar	12	15	18	+ 6
Inactive	9	19	16	+ 7
Farmers	23	40	36	+13
Small merchants	13	26	29	+16
Industrialists, upper management	12	20	36	+24

Table 4--The Categories in Which Francois Mitterrand Gained Votes during the Campaign (%)

- In the categories not mentioned, there was no significant movement (change of 3 points or less) -


(SOFRES)	1	2	3	1/3
25-34 years of age	19	34	27	+ 9
65 and older	13	14	28	+15
Socio-occupational class				
Middle management, white-collar	25	27	29	+ 4
Workers	25	26	33	+ 8
Inactive	14	18	25	+11

There is an explanation for this disparity. The customary underestimation of the Communist vote in the pre-election polls leads the public-opinion institutes to make some corrections.¹⁰

But this corrective mechanism is by definition somewhat "conservative," reproducing power relationships from previous elections. Up to the present, this conservative effect of the corrections has improved the quality of the pre-election polls, for the French electorate--and especially the Communist electorate--is very stable. But when a movement of broad scope appears, the corrections can contribute to underestimation of it. In this sense, the Communist setback could have appeared as a "failure" of the polls. But explanation of it and the "success" of the other indications permit the use of the pre-election polls to throw light on the evolution of the Communist electorate in the 1981 presidential election. Examination of the victory hopes (Graph 6) shows the downward trend of Georges Marchais (3 points, on the average, in the final 4 months) and the upward trend of Mitterrand. Moreover, it was possible for the Communist voters' propensity to vote for the latter to be reinforced by belief in the "Chirac effect."

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Graph 6--Intentions and hopes (SOFRES): the indicator hopes complementing the voting intentions
 Key:
 1. Hopes 2. Voting intentions

The "Chirac effect": the expression blossomed in the last week of the first-round campaign. It signified that Jacques Chirac was experiencing a continual ascent, which, according to his warmest supporters, was to get him into the second round. In this first sense, the Chirac effect is easy to register--within its proper limits. Chirac succeeded, during the first 4 months of 1981, in mobilizing /an/ electorate. In 1980 it peaked at around 10 percent (and even earlier, in 1976-1979, was between 10 and 15 percent); but it progressed regularly until 26 April. At no time could any survey suggest that he would get into the second round, even if it was possible for that campaign argument to be used to the advantage of the two central blocs.¹¹

It remains to ask about the other "Chirac effect"--the most important one in effect on the final result. Analysis of the polls does not make it possible to settle everything, but it does force one observation: /Jacques Chirac mobilized voters who refused to vote for V. Giscard d'Estaing/. Here, an instrument for measurement over a 1-year period is available. From October 1979 to October 1980, the uncertainty of the candidacies led the polling institutes to question the voters on several hypotheses in the same survey--some with a Chirac candidacy, the others without. The six IFOP surveys agreed: the total score for the right was always maximal with Chirac, and the total score for the left was maximal without him. The hypotheses with and without Michel Debre even made it possible to establish this law: that the intended-vote total in favor of the right is higher in proportion to the number of candidates of the right.¹² But were these voters picked up in the first round or won over to the right? Could they have been? Chirac indisputably won over voters

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
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who refused to vote for Giscard. But did he attenuate or accentuate this rejection? Was he forced to express it in order to rally this electorate? Might he have mobilized them further in favor of Giscard in the second round? This is a political question that calls for political answers, but it is one on which some light is thrown by study of the vote shifts between the two rounds.

IV. Second Round: the Three Variables of Francois Mitterrand's Success

The second rounds of a presidential election depend on the relationship of forces in the first round, the shifts of votes by those who voted for the eliminated candidates, and mobilization of the undecided voters. The evolution of the Giscard-Mitterrand duels in the course of the campaign results from the combined interaction of these three elements.

From 1974 to 1979, the hypothetical second rounds showed, as we have seen, a slight Giscardian dominance (except at end-1976/beginning-1977) and gaps between victor and vanquished that never exceeded six points. At the end of 1979, though, and throughout 1980, these differences were accentuated, up to a 22-point gap in the IFOP survey of March 1980. Everything indicated that the competition on the left between the two possible Socialist candidates, Michel Rocard and Francois Mitterrand, was dividing or disturbing their potential electorate and was indirectly benefiting Giscard d'Estaing¹³, whose dominance was further strengthened by the number of undecided. In this sense, it was less that the right was strong than that the left was poorly mobilized.



Graph 7--Evolution of second-round voting intentions (IFOP): the Mitterrand mobilization


Key:

1. Percentage of total surveyed

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The ending of the competition and the Giscardian winter of 1980-1981 were to bring about a gradual rebalancing resulting both in a better mobilization on the left and a vote-shift crisis on the right. Systematic comparison of first-round and second-round voting intentions (SOFRES), recalculated in relation to the total number of persons surveyed (thereby making it possible to take the undecided, and therefore the mobilization phenomena, into account), enables us to find again the breakaway produced by the mobilization of February.



Graph 8--Evolution of vote-shift intentions of Georges Marchais's voters: return to the unitary dynamic (IFOP)
 Key: 1. 2nd round 2. Undecided

From September to January, the percentage of second-round responses was, as usual, a little higher than that of the first round: Mitterrand was still getting more votes in the second round than the total of votes for candidates of the left in the first round, and the same was the case on the right for Giscard d'Estaing, with both of them winning over first-round ecologist and undecided voters. The phenomenon reversed in February: the response rate, which grew spectacularly for first-round intentions, did not change for the second round, and the voters who declared themselves only for the second round were not sufficient to counterbalance the hesitant voters for those eliminated in the first round. It was also in February that the "victory hopes" in favor of Mitterrand exceeded those in favor of Giscard d'Estaing for the first time.


In this regard one notes, though, as election day approached, a return to the bipolar logic as expressed by the vote-shift improvement in both camps.

But this spectacular return among Marchais's voters from 56 percent (in December 1980) to 84 percent in April 1981--up to that time they had only oscillated between voting for Mitterrand and being undecided--was far less sharp than with Chirac's

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voters, who went from 54 percent in January 1981 to 71 percent in April, but with nearly as many of them prepared to go over to the left in the second round.



Graph 9--Evolution of vote-shift intentions among Chirac's voters (IFOP): the rise of a Chirac opposition
Key: 1. 2nd round 2. Undecided

Francois Mitterrand's reascent to the point where the second-round voting intentions reversed to his advantage on the eve of the election¹⁴ thus appears to be the result of the three factors mentioned above: gradual mobilization of the Socialist electorate, the slight overall advance by the left in the first round, and the regularly improving shifts from the Communist electorate and the shift nearly maintained once it was won over from Chirac's electorate.

Six principal points emerge from this analysis--which, we should keep in mind, has involved only voting intentions and has scarcely taken the internal structures into account at all:

--The polls, an irreplaceable and imperfect instrument: in the last analysis, the pre-elections polls did evaluate the hierarchy of the candidates correctly, with the equilibrium within the right perceived clearly and the lesser candidates properly gauged, but with the Marchais-Mitterrand relationship measured inexactly. A better indicator of the direction of movements than of their intensity, they proved superior to all the talk based on other indexes (letters to the candidates, participation in meetings, etc): what dimensions would the "Chirac effect" (or the Marchais effect) have taken on without them?

--A three-stage election campaign: the apparent Giscardian preponderance of 1980, which a refined retrospective analysis shows to have been more the indirect and temporary consequence of the Rocard-Mitterrand confrontation; then the de-Giscardization of the beginning of 1981; and finally the campaign proper, with its unequal mobilization of the potential electorates.

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--The Communists' long-standing weakness as regards presidential voting intentions: a complete review of Communist voting intentions since 1974 shows an oscillation that varies between 12 percent and 20 percent but that is always lower, in its best results, than the Communist score for legislative elections. This regular inferiority gives a certain force to the thesis that the specificity of the presidential election would be rather unfavorable to the PCF.

--The Chirac campaign, as a simple expression or aggravation of the rejection of the incumbent president: the first-round Chirac voters who abandoned the right in the second round either by staying away or by voting for Mitterrand indisputably had a strong effect on the final outcome. Did the opposition theme of the Chirac campaign push them toward that shift? Would they have voted for Mitterrand from the first round if Chirac had not been a candidate or if he had shown himself to be more in conformity with the majority tradition? The question deserves to be raised; quantitative analysis is not sufficient for answering it.

--The sanctioning of a policy more than the choosing of a man: to the end, the personal image of Giscard d'Estaing remained, in most of its dimensions (attractiveness, competence, etc), superior to that of Mitterrand. Giscard d'Estaing, a good candidate showing a poor balance-sheet, was to have to yield to Mitterrand, who was not prevented by his less favorable but well-managed image from incarnating moderate change.¹⁵ This outcome is a challenge to the oft-asserted propositions about the personalization of the presidential election.

--In which the event exceeds its immediate causes: in many respects, the presidential decision of 10 May thus appears to be the result of shifting of the splits, with the Giscard/anti-Giscard opposition winning out over the left-right confrontation. It would seem to have been less a victory for Mitterrand than the defeat of Giscard d'Estaing. But what is true of the uncommitted voters who decided the election is no less true for the far more numerous voters who permitted it, and the victory-satisfaction index--the highest for a long time¹⁶--as well as the demonstrations that accompanied the announcement of the outcome show clearly enough that the event of 10 May immediately took on another significance. Giscard's defeat became the victory of the left, which has not finished restructuring French political life.

FOOTNOTES

1. The first of the IFOP/LE POINT pre-election polls was published in December 1979; the Public SA/PARIS-MATCH series began in October; and the SOFRES/FIGARO and Harris/L'EXPRESS series did not begin until later (September 1980).
2. We shall use here only the polls done by the big institutes or those whose results we have been able to check personally. The IFOP published a total of 11 voting-intention surveys before 10 May 1981; SOFRES, 8; L. Harris-France, 6; Public SA, 23; and Indice Opinion, 5.
3. Since the Polls Commission criticized the idea of publication of the voting intentions of this panel because of the size of the sample, the weekly's readers were deprived of the most interesting part of that survey.
4. See in particular Roland Cayrol, "Those Floating Voters," L'EXPRESS, 18 April 1981.

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5. See that chronicle, "Waiting for 1981: the Hypothetical Presidential Elections (1974-1979)," POUVOIRS, No 12, 1st Quarter 1980, pp 180-189.
6. Elimination of differences relating to time: the phenomenon is noted in 5 weeks in 1965, and in 6 months in 1980-1981. Attenuation of the differences relating to the scope of the phenomenon: by doubling the scale of the votes cast for VGE, one obtains two quite symmetrical curves.
7. The IFOP survey carried out from 17 January to 7 February (January in the tables and graphs published here) does not record this rupture. It is, however, grasped by the SOFRES survey of 6-12 February and the Harris survey of 9-14 February.
8. Cf Jean-Luc Parodi and Pascal Perrineau, "F. Mitterrand and M. Rocard: 2 Years of Competition in the Arena of Public Opinion," POUVOIRS, No 12, 2nd Quarter 1980, pp 189 ff, and Olivier Duhamel, "The Socialist Party," ENCYCLOPEDIA UNIVERSALIS, UNIVERSALIA, 1980, pp 26 ff, and 1981, p 226 ff.
9. The slogan of his second series of posters, widely picked up by his partisans and opponents to symbolize his campaign.
10. The mechanism is as follows. The samples are made up of sociological groups (by age, sex, place of residence, socio-occupational category). At the same time as [as published] the persons questions are asked to cast their vote in a ballot box, they reply to a whole series of questions, including one about their vote in the preceding elections, and another on their partisan preference. The breakdown of a survey reveals political biases as between the sample and what is known about the electorate (for example, 10 percent declared they had voted Communist in 1978, whereas the figure was 20 percent). The results should therefore be corrected on the basis of these biases; in the absence of such correction, the polls would be false--and would have been very false in the past.
11. Paradoxically, the rise of Chirac was used by Giscard d'Estaing and by Mitterrand's partisans to appeal for a "useful vote" and not to run the risk of preventing a left-vs-right second round.
12. Table 5--A Chirac Effect: Retention of an Electorate Which, without His Candidacy, Would Vote for a Candidate of the Left (IFOP)

	Oct-Nov 1979		January 1980		April 1980	
	Without Chirac	With Chirac	Without Chirac	With Chirac	Without Chirac	With Chirac
Total of voting intentions:						
for the right	45	51	45	52	46	52
for the left	39	36	36	34	35	32
=====						
	June 1980		August 1980		November 1980	
	Without Chirac	With Chirac	Without Chirac	With Chirac	Without Chirac	With Chirac
Total of voting intentions:						
for the right	47	52	50	53	50	51.5
for the left	35	33	33	31	36	34

One notes, though, that Chirac's gain diminished as the election approached.

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13. See, in this regard, the analysis by Jean Charlot, PS, "The Duel Has Troubled the Voter," LE POINT, 17 November 1980: "Of every 100 Socialist voters in the 1978 legislative elections, about 40 came back under the party's discipline in November 1980 and were ready to vote impartially for either Mitterrand or Rocard. But 12 agreed to vote only for Mitterrand, while 10 would vote only for Rocard; 11 no longer knew which to vote for, and 27 left the Socialist family--either to the right or to the left or to abstention, but in any case, outside it.... Rocard's voters, who were anti-Mitterrand in the first round, presented the risk of cruelly failing the PS first secretary in the second round: only 25 percent would plan to vote for Mitterrand, 34 percent said they would vote for Giscard, and 41 percent "did not know."

14. Table 6--Evolution of Second-Round Voting Intentions

	I 11/1979	I 1/1980	I 4/1980	S 4/1980	I 6/1980	LHF	I 8/1980
VGE	57	60	61	57	60	55	61
FM	43	40	39	43	40	45	39
NSPP [*]	(28)	(30)	(33)	(19)	(32)	(20)	(25)
	S 10/1980	LHF 10/1980	I 10/1980	S 11/1980	LHF	S 12/1980	I 12/1980
VGE	57	53	60	59	58	56	54
FM	43	41 [sic]	40	41	42	44	46
NSPP	(25)	(20)	(30)	(24)	(21)	(20)	(32)
	S 1/1981	LHF 1/1981	I 1/1981	S 2/1981	LHF 2/1981	I 3/1981	S 3/1981
VGE	51	51	53	48	50	51	50
FM	49	49	47	52	50	43 [sic]	50
NSPP	(23)	(22)	(29)	(21)	(20)	(20)	(21)
	LHF 3/1981	S 3/1981	I 4/1981	LHF 4/1981	I 4/1981		
VGE	52	50	48.5	50	48.4		
FM	48	50	51.5	50	51.5		
NSPP	(18)	(19)	(16)	(17)	(16)		

I = IFOP; S = SOFRES; LHF = Louis Harris-France.

[*] [undecided]

15. As is evidenced by the spectacular but late-coming rise in his stock, in the SOFRES barometer, from 32 percent in November (20-26) and 35 percent in December (22-30) to 40 percent in January (23-29), 44 percent in February (20-26), and 55 percent in March (20-24). See Jean-Luc Parodi and Olivier Duhamel, "Profile of the Year (September 1980-August 1981), POUVOIRS, No 19, 4th Quarter 1981 (to be published).

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16. Rather satisfied with result, 53 percent; rather dissatisfied, 30 percent (SOFRES post-election survey, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 1 June 1981). In 1978, rather satisfied, 51 percent; rather dissatisfied, 35 percent. In 1974, rather satisfied, 46 percent; rather dissatisfied, 40 percent.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

ANDREOTTI, FORMIGONI ON DC, CATHOLIC MOVEMENTS

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 14 Sep 81 pp 40-46

[Interviews with Giulio Andreotti, DC [Christian Democratic Party] leader, and Roberto Formigoni, Popular Movement leader, by Claudio Sabelli Fioretti and Chiara Valentini: "God Help Us"; dates and places of interviews not given]

[Text] For its renovation, the DC has opened its doors to the new dissenters of Christian mold. But will the Christian stormers change the DC or the DC the Christian stormers? Giulio Andreotti and Roberto Formigoni express their views.

Guitars, sleeping bags, enthusiasm and new ideas. At Rimini for the great coming together of CL [Communion and Liberation] and its political arm, Popular Movement, 100,000 Catholics celebrated the birth of a new association of the Christian mold. Almost at the same time, at Trento, the old Christian democratic leaders were once again running through the timeworn rites of their Friendship Festival: The same old faces, the same old corridor intrigues, the same old back-stabbings between factional leaders. A couple of hundred or so members, looking as if they were doing their duty, listened listlessly to debates that were unattended by the mass public.

Two quasi-incommunicable worlds suddenly found a point of contact on the morning of Sunday 30 August, when a succinct communique from the DC leadership, meeting at Trento, announced, without any particular emphasis, what was in reality a resounding decision. The DC called upon five outsiders, "bringing with them social and cultural experiences foreign to the DC," to be part of a 15-member committee charged with preparing the party reconstituent assembly. Foremost among those invited was none other than the undisputed leader of Rimini's youth, Roberto Formigoni, 32, head of the Popular Movement. And just as suddenly, the debate was joined: Many Catholics began to look upon the DC, although with notable distrust, as a distinct possibility not foreign to their own world. The more attentive Christian democrats, for their part, sensed the possibility that finally the climate may have changed and that for young Italians the crucifix could become what Mao's little red book meant to them 10 years ago. A golden opportunity for those who, engaged in the difficult operation of restoring the house of the DC, have suddenly sensed the existence of possible new approaches. Gonella showed up

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with a behavioral code for the good Christian democrat. Other leaders pulled letters of accusation, memorandums and plans from desk drawers. The thorniest issue seemed to be the one being brought forward, discreetly and cautiously, by Giulio Andreotti: The crushing defeat of the last congress. Together with some ten university members, Andreotti has drawn up a proposal of his own. Christian democrats and Catholics are therefore now about to meet. Giulio Andreotti and Roberto Formigoni are the two figures through whom PANORAMA has sought to discover what may take place.

Andreotti: Let Them Come To Us

DC Leader Angles Several Baits and Warnings

[Question] Are you convinced, Honorable Andreotti, that the DC can be renovated, that it can be reconstituted?

[Answer] I am strongly opposed to the use of those terms "renovation" and "reconstitution." They seem to me highly presumptuous and misdirected with reference to a party that certainly is not just starting out from scratch. Above all, what the DC needs is updating. It must be brought into alignment with our basic principles which are again being looked up to by many people. Suffice it to cite those of economic pluralism and private initiative, which have been rediscovered today even by Berlinguer.

[Question] In response to the ferment of the new Catholic groups, your party has chosen an approach that they did not expect. You have actually opened the party's doors to them, requesting, at least on paper, their cooperation...

[Answer] In some sectors--in the schools, in the universities and in the factories--cooperation between the CL and the DC has existed for very many years. On the other hand, they are highly attentive youths, very wide-awake, but they do not stand for anything new. With their organized spontaneity, they occupy, though in a different way, the slot in the political spectrum that during the 1950's was filled by a rigid organization like Catholic Action.

[Question] But the co-optation of an outsider like Formigoni into a structure that the party must absolutely "reenvision" seems to go somewhat beyond that.

[Answer] There was a rationale in the collaterality of yesteryear and there is one today, in a different situation. With CL and with the Popular Movement we have basic objectives in common. Until now, we have fought some negative battles together, such as divorce, such as abortion. Today it is important that we fight positive battles, not only with them but also together with other Catholic groups. The CL is not the only one in existence.

[Question] With regard to your party, however, Formigoni and his friends are saying grave things: For example, that the DC has lost its legitimacy as a representative of the Catholics...

[Answer] Some of their criticisms are actually well founded. But it is the entire Catholic body that must undergo a self-critique, not just the DC. For

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example, on the divorce and abortion issues? The percentage of the vote in Parliament was higher than that of the referendum. And why should the DC alone meditate? Let us all meditate.

[Question] They are even accusing your party of not being Christians.

[Answer] We will know in the next world who has behaved like a Christian and who has not. If, however, that is but an invitation to walk a tighter rope, then it is welcome.

[Question] Some are saying it is they who in reality are the true heirs of the spirit of Don Sturzo's old Popular Party.

[Answer] It is an easy thing for these youths, who do not have an exclusively political objective, to breathe a purely idealistic air. The CL's approach is that of a widespread state of mind, that of seeking a haven in a crisis which is more of the nation's society than of the DC. The fact is that I too see in their enthusiasm the spirit of the old Popular Party militants.

[Question] Does it remind you of your youth?

[Answer] Yes, I see my own self in these youths like Formigoni. Their labors resemble ours in the FUCI [expansion unknown], between 1937 and 1944, when I became a delegate of the youth groups. There was a great deal of ferment that flowed from the novelty of being in politics. There was also much humility. No one considered himself demeaned if after having written a handbill he then had to go post it himself. But then the industrialization of the party started. Some of our electoral campaigns that have been put entirely in the hands of advertising agencies have profoundly shamed me.

[Question] Certainly the DC youths of today are something else. At the age of 30, the most recent youthful secretary, Marco Follini, has already changed his persuasion four times, going from the Moro-ists to Cervone to the CUB [Local Unitary Committee] to Bisaglia. A real political professional. As a youth, were you more a Formigoni than a Follini?

[Answer] I was a little of both. Follini is a pure, full-time, professional politician. Formigoni, on the other hand, knows that in the societal structure there is an element of politics, but he takes a broader view of it. I was a bit like Follini and a bit like Formigoni. I was addicted to work, but always with one foot on the ground.

[Question] And among you at that time, who was the Formigoni?

[Answer] Dossetti, of course. But Dossetti was not, as is often thought, solely a theoretician. He also busied himself with practical problems. I recall his long dissertation, in one of our first meetings of the leadership, on the Parmesan cheese crisis in Emilia. It seemed to me an excessively practical issue.

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[Question] And Fanfani?

[Answer] He was an organizer... even when he was among us youths he occupied himself above all with concrete matters... practical questions...

[Question] Hence?

[Answer] Well, yes... he was a Follini.

[Question] In what sort of climate did you live in those days, what issues did you debate amongst yourselves?

[Answer] The first legislature was the most interesting and culturally gripping period. We addressed the major issues, the agrarian reform, the Southern Italy policy, the tax reform. I recall highly stimulating discussions in Piazza del Gesu. The most illustrious university people, intellectuals and men of culture would come there. Rossellini would also come there; he was working on drawing up legislation on entertainment. They were highly fertile years. Then the difficulties began to increase and many things began to lose their glitter.

[Question] To what things in particular do you refer?

[Answer] One who does not bear a concrete responsibility can devote himself to the big theoretical analyses. A governing party, on the other hand, is constrained by its official capacity to devote its efforts to accomplishment within the realm of possibility. And this does not give it much intellectual sparkle. Berlinguer has also said as much: National solidarity has lost for the PCI [Italian Communist Party] its contact with the people. This to an even greater extent has happened to the DC in 30 years of governing. Today, with a non-Christian democrat as prime minister, this research effort has become possible for us.

[Question] A non-Christian democrat who, unlike his predecessors, is not greeted with hissing and booing when he circulates among the people.

[Answer] In my many years in politics, I can recall only two hostile demonstrations. Among those hit by the Friuli earthquake and on the occasion in 1972 when I went to present a gold medal to the Red mayoralty of Sesto San Giovanni. And I have the strong suspicion that the people were booing more their representatives who were receiving the medal than me who was presenting it to them.

[Question] But you are speaking of Giulio Andreotti. What about the other Christian democrats?

[Answer] I am very happy that President Spadolini is not being booed. However, he belongs to a small party; he is not bearing the burden of a major party's force and at the same time its weakness.

[Question] Do you still believe, Honorable Andreotti, in your famous saying that power wears down the one who does not have it?

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[Answer] That depends. A well-executed opposition can recharge one's batteries. We still have a mentality, however, so deeply rooted in being the governing party that even where we are the opposition party, such as in many Regions, we are incapable of taking a hard initiative.

[Question] Excuse me, but by this do you mean to say that after 35 years the DC must now learn the new technique of being the opposition?

[Answer] Physiologically speaking, I believe it would be the healthiest thing for us to do.

[Question] In sum, the Honorable Andreotti has become a convert to rotation of power.

[Answer] Today, the situation is more positive in this respect than it was at one time. Formerly, there were two contraposed worlds, in total disagreement on some fundamental issues, such as the Atlantic Pact and economic pluralism. Conditions then were not such that one of the two worlds could afford to back away and take a quiet rest while the other continued working. Today, it seems to me that we are well along the road to that point.

[Question] Let us get back to the Catholic youth that wants to improve your party. They are critical of the chaos of its factions, the feuds, the scandals...

[Answer] No party's structure succeeds in achieving perfection. Nevertheless, the objective of eliminating the factionalism appears to me highly fitting.

[Question] That is easier said...

[Answer] No. It is an attainable objective. These sections, which at one time were extremely vigorous, must be revived. The internal elective system must be changed: The proportionality system, which has turned out to be a divisive element, must be replaced by the majoritarian system, permitting voting on different lists of candidates as well--what is called panachage.

[Question] Would that be enough?

[Answer] The number of members in the National Council must also be reduced; it has become impossible now to carry on a debate in it. And also the number of those in the party's top management. These ideas and others will be a part of the proposal I am taking to the national party's national congress.

[Question] And the others?

[Answer] I will mention two of them to you in advance having to do with the DC's economic policy: Revival of the cooperatives and modification of the Wage structure. The family allowances for children and for nonworking wives must be increased. They are ridiculously low today. Thought must also be given in the near future to some form of salary for housewives.

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[Question] Some say your party's opening to the new movements also has a secret objective, namely, that of staving off the forming of a second Catholic party.

[Answer] A second Catholic party? What position in the political spectrum could it occupy? I do not believe there is a sufficient body of Catholics to support two parties. Remember, the number of people who attend Mass is smaller than that of those who vote DC. Besides, what would two Christian-based parties do? They would forget the other parties and would devote all their energies to fighting each other. Like what has happened to the socialists after each split.

[Question] Let us engage in a bit of political fantasy. Let us say that at the next congress Formigoni is elected secretary of the DC. What would happen?

[Answer] He too would finally have to come to terms with a far more complex reality than that open, fluid one he has dealt with up to now.

[Question] In sum, the DC would also change Formigoni---

[Answer] I am not saying that alone. The DC would also change; it would resume a certain current of thought that had emerged when Benigno Zaccagnini was secretary. And Formigoni would not be weighed down, as was Zaccagnini, by past experiences.

[Question] That is a very optimistic outlook. Perhaps it overlooks the fact that Formigoni and his friends hold opposite views to those of your party with regard to many fundamental issues, starting with the missiles and the neutron bomb.

[Answer] Peace, however, has always been at the top of our concerns. No one loved peace more than De Gasperi. I remember once when a minister in his government, speaking to a group of young Catholics in the Basilica di Massenzio, extolled before them the virtues of military defense. Di Gasperi gave him a sound going over. More recently, we too have backed in every way Carter's SALT 2 agreement. It is not our fault that the American Congress did not ratify it.

[Question] It would be quite different, however, if Formigoni's youths were to take to the streets and demonstrate against atomic weapons together with the communists.

[Answer] I find it entirely normal that a Catholic movement should be entirely taken up with peace. It is the governing party that has other concerns. I remember one time when British Prime Minister Wilson came to visit the Moro government. Pietro Nenni, who was at that time the vice president, had let himself be drawn into some very harsh public criticism of Western military policy. Wilson took him aside and said to him? "When one is not in agreement with a friend or with an ally, one does not take to the streets shouting. One very quietly whispers his disagreement in the other's ear."

Formigoni: What If We Were To Form Another Party?

Leader of 'New Catholics' Also Has Some Warnings To Offer

[Question] Formigoni, you are not even registered as a member of the DC, yet you are a member of a group that must actually prepare a recovery of the party. Are you happy?

[Answer] It was an important move and a strange one for a party like the DC--a courageous action that can be significant for the body of Catholics in our country. But it must courageous all the way. I have no intention of being just a wallflower.

[Question] Then you are not really all that happy...

[Answer] Unless substantial decisional powers with respect to the party structure are given to the assembly, it will all have been a joke. Besides, I am already being moved to doubt by some of the faces I see on the committee. Men of the party's apparatus like Donat Cattin, Galloni and Mazzotta are fine, as far as I can see, because for some time now they have advocated a renovation of the party. But what does a Follini have to do with all of this?

[Question] Have you gone into this with some exact plan of your own in mind?

[Answer] I am not addressing this problem with a reorganizational plan in mind. I have some firm ideas, however, and I intend to press them. Why was Formigoni called in? Because he represents a certain new breed of young Catholics, which, like so many other Catholic movements has seen its distance from the DC and its disappointment with the DC grow over the past several years. We are people who believe in peace, in justice, in a pluralism that is not mere compromise. We are people who carry on political action at the grass roots of society in the name of ideal principles. We expect the DC also to revert to political action in the name of the same ideals.

[Question] In your opinion, is this going to be an easy thing?

[Answer] The first thing to be done is to totally reconstitute the admissions apparatus so as to block the ballot bosses. Then the internal voting rules must be changed, instituting panachage. Under the list system, the DC party bosses have enormous power. We want to smash the party factionalism to bits. Furthermore an ironbound list of incompatibilities must be drawn up between public office responsibilities and party responsibilities.

[Question] But how will you, who are so idealistic in your views, be able to work elbow to elbow with old, experienced slave-to-routine politicians? How will you find a common language?

[Answer] There are some fundamental values that unite us. But then in practice, we speak two different languages. The problem, however, is theirs, not mine. Many among us do not know either Piccoli or Forlani, but on the other hand they

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do succeed in talking to the people. Let us get one thing clear: The DC is for us only one of our many problems. I, for example, have not joined the party, and this is not out of an affectation. Fully 85 percent of my time is devoted to my people, our schools, our cooperatives, our radio broadcasts. The DC comes after all of this.

[Question] Is there someone in the DC on whom your movement feels it can rely?

[Answer] Certainly: On its grass-roots membership, on its sectional secretaries, on its municipal councillors, particularly if they do not belong to factions led by the charismatic party bosses.

[Question] The Andreotti and Fanfani types of faction?

[Answer] Don't ask me to name names. Of course, factions that can be brought around to changes in ways of thinking are those that are the least difficult to talk with.

[Question] What are the points on which you are not disposed to give in?

[Answer] The DC must become the political household of all Catholics and not continue being the private estate of a leader group. Today, this household is occupied by a restricted number of persons. We want to get them out so as to make room for all those presently being compelled to stand in the courtyard--the labor leaders, the students, the mass media operators.

[Question] And supposing you do not come to an understanding, what will you do with that vast force displayed at Rimini? Will you form a second Catholic party?

[Answer] The second Catholic party is now ready to come into being, made up of all those Catholics who work at the grass roots of society and have seen the gap between them and the DC growing. If the DC does not change, the birth of the new Christian party is in the nature of things.

[Question] To end up as did the various LC's [Continuous Struggle], or the Marxist-Leninists?

[Answer] Oh no! We have learned the lesson of the splinter parties of 1968 very well. The Italian societal structure does not thrive on avant-garde adventurism but rather on action at its grass roots. If we form a party, it will be different from all the others. The time now is for political action by movements. Only the PR [Radical Party] has tried something similar, but failed very quickly.

[Question] A confessionalist party...

[Answer] No. We are not thinking of a confessionalist party. Our relations extend out to the leftist youth, laic movements, and even to members of the PCI--a policy that has won for us, in the high schools, a higher percentage of votes than the DC received on a citizenwide scale.

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[Question] Your movement frequently accuses the DC of not behaving even as Christians? Why will you not name names?

[Answer] The answer is simple: It seems to me that the manner in which the matter of the Christian democrats involved in the P2 scandal was not a very crystalline one. There should have been an impartial but rapid proceeding through to and including expulsion.

[Question] Let us engage with you as well in a bit of political fantasy. Let us say that Formigoni has been selected to designate the secretary of the DC. Whom will you choose? De Gasperi?

[Answer] De Gasperi was fine in his time. Today, something different is needed.

[Question] Someone like Aldo Moro?

[Answer] Of all of them, Moro was the least removed from our ideas.

[Question] But evidently he is not to your entire liking. Then what about a set of identificatory qualifications?

[Answer] A secretary who lives a grass-roots life even shunning the party's liturgical moments. A secretary who has risen through the ranks and not through the corridors of the Palazzo. A secretary able to make himself understood in the streets and in the workplace.

[Question] In sum, the identificatory qualifications of Roberto Formigoni...

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POLITICAL

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PSI'S MANCINI CRITICIZES CRAXI'S POLICIES

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 28 Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Article/interview with Giacomo Mancini, ex-secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, by Pasquale Nonno, place and date not given]

Weren't we supposed to challenge the DC? The former PSI secretary accuses Craxi of restoration, and criticizes his positions on the P2 scandal, on judges, on local governments, on foreign policy...

What is the PSI today?

"It is a party that feels it had struck out along a brand-new road, and which, before announcing that the goal has vanished, wants to stop and think things over. I think that's a good thing. They are doing some thinking in the party, even though what talking they do is done in undertones."

Giacomo Mancini, former secretary of the PSI and today a member of the leadership council, is a little reluctant to raise his own voice in outspoken criticism of Bettino Craxi: ("Everybody has his time," he says, "and I have had mine.")

[Question] Is that touch of reluctance perhaps due to the fact that it can still be said that it was you who wanted Craxi as party secretary back in 1976?

[Answer] In 1976 things went the way they had to go. Craxi has shown a talent for reviving the PSI by polishing its image as a force for renewal. There should have been further developments along that line. But instead the developments have turned toward a restoration policy. And all party discussion has been thwarted.

[Question] Do you feel nostalgia for the old factions?

[Answer] No, and yet there has to be a place and a chance for discussions. Dissent is good for the Socialist Party, and even for the secretary's role. We criticize the Communist Party because it has a Leninist-style centralized structure; we criticize Berlinguer because he does everything himself, and runs the whole show. But for some time

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we have done a whole lot worse. Because inside the PCI, even though very cautiously, at least there is a Napolitano who speaks out. In the Socialist Party these days we don't even have that. Craxi tends to co-opt everybody. To homogenize everybody. And despite formal statements of principle he leaves no room for initiative, not even for the Party's peripheral bodies.

[Question] Are you talking about the business of the local governments?

[Answer] Of course I am. Where is it written that, since we have a five-party coalition in the cabinet, we must try to have one everywhere? This is extraneous to all our lines, alien to all our traditions. Even in the unification charter, when we tried merging with the Social Democrats, Pietro Nenni himself wrote in a paragraph providing that the left-wing local governing juntas would be protected. I remember that Nenni referred specifically to the Party's roots among the people, to which I don't think Craxi attaches much importance.

[Question] There has been some very heavy pressure from the DC.

[Answer] There was pressure back in 1970, too. In the regional elections it was fairly clear that we would get conditions for putting leftist juntas together not only in Emilia, but in Tuscany and Umbria as well. The DC brought tremendous pressure to bear through its secretary, Arnaldo Forlani. Amintore Fanfani talked about an iron-clad center-left alliance. At the time I was PSI secretary, and I flatly refused. We got leftist local governments both in Umbria and in Tuscany, and all the heavy Christian Democrat threats simply fizzled out.

[Question] In Rome, though, Craxi kept his promise to make a deal with the Communists.

[Answer] Not anywhere else, though. We got off to a bad start in Sicily. We had said that we intended to challenge the Christian Democrats' power there, but instead we wound up attacking the PCI: we put a socialist (Salvatore Lauricella) in as president of the regional assembly, instead of a communist. It's simply unbelievable. In Cosenza, my home town, there was a leftist city council, and the PSI chalked up a big win in the elections. Instead of confirming the junta, Craxi sent a commissioner to the Socialist Federation to force a deal with the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. And then the change of course in Liguria, I think, is nothing less than a scandal.

[Question] Doesn't it seem to you that the PCI's slamming the door makes agreements difficult? At the UNITA festival in Turin they even booed Claudio Signorile, who is a spokesman for the Socialist left.

[Answer] I don't believe that heckling was the PCI's doing. And then of course you have to understand that in Turin -- not sometime in the last century, but only 3 years ago -- the Socialist left and the whole PSI was talking alternative. Now all we talk about is the five-party cabinet. There really ought to be some explanation of this switch.

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Not even the Palermo congress voted for so radical a change of course. What are we supposed to do? Make them hold congresses?

[Question] Let's get back to the local juntas.

[Answer] If, instead of waiting (it's 3 months now since the election) we had immediately confirmed the local governments that had won the election, nobody could have been able to accuse us of anything and we would have got the DC between a rock and a hard place.

[Question] The one you would really have made trouble for is Flaminio Piccoli.

[Answer] Piccoli would have had to resign as DC secretary. But instead we were the ones who saved his skin. He ought to erect a monument to Craxi.

[Question] About Genoa: maybe the decision to form a regional government with the DC came because there are some prominent socialists involved in the P2 scandal, who would not have found room with the communists.

[Answer] Maybe so. It looks as though Teardo is actually going to be president of the junta. But we could have told these comrades to be nice and patient for a while, because maybe their hands are not quite so clean as might be.

[Question] Maybe the PSI's aren't either.

[Answer] Certainly the Socialist Party's shiny new youthful image is somehow out of tune with the attitude taken over the P2 scandal. It looks as though the only one in the Socialist Party who is to be made to pay is Vanni Nisticò, who used to run the party's press office. That's a little bit skimpy. But on this count I must say that Giovanni Spadolini is disappointing. His government was formed to clean things up, but instead... Nothing has happened at the Interior ministry, nothing at the Foreign ministry, and in the upper reaches at State Participations everybody is still safely in office.

[Question] But the PSI itself is showing signs of standing up for the men caught in the P2 scandal. Federico Mancini, the socialist candidate for the Constitutional Court, actually refused to print an article in the monthly PAGINA by Ernesto Galli della Loggia, attacking the "P-2-ists." Aren't you, a professional bondsman, in agreement?

[Answer] Federico Mancini is wrong. Going bond has nothing to do with this business. Candidates for high public office are chosen according to political criteria. When there is no political confidence (and I cannot see how that could be the case for the P-2 people), then these persons are removed from office. They are not fired or demoted, but assigned to less important, less delicate functions.

[Question] That particular socialist attitude, though, has generated a lot of good feeling in the sectors that count.

[Answer] Of course. Only this morning I met a Christian Democrat...

[Question] Who?

[Answer] A Christian Democrat who was also involved in the P2 business. He said to me: "Did you see what guts that Craxi's got?" And I said: "Yes, but when he acts that way he is talking to specific sectors of the State apparatus, to the top brass in the military, to the highest levels in the ministries who are all fascinated by a strong man, but these are not the sectors in which the socialist are most interested. I believe, myself, that the PSI ought to be mainly concerned with talking to the abstaining party, which is a lot stronger than Craxi's. Also, if it doesn't Berlinguer will have a tremendous potential for a comeback in the new reaches of society where the people can't seem to find the right chance to express themselves. Craxi's proposal of taking turns was the idea of a new situation which included a major change in relations among the parties and in governments. Now, though, it has become the continuation of an old policy, if not an actual restoration. And so the communist pole is not weakened and the PSI tarts itself up as moderate. There are a lot of signals pointing in that direction.

[Question] For instance?

[Answer] The business of the lower-court judges. It is true that the Communists tend to manipulate judges who are Party members. But our response must not be to join hands with old sectors of the magistracy that have notoriously done the DC's bidding. Most important, there is the risk of being subjected to -- well, not blackmail -- but certainly the dossiers count, and that has happened.

[Question] But doesn't it seem to you that Craxi is looking for legitimacy in the moderate sense, and even using his planned trip to America to that end?

[Answer] I'm not saying that Craxi is going to Washington for an investiture ceremony, but that is the impression abroad, because there is a tradition of that sort of thing. If you ask me, Craxi should have gone to Moscow, rather than to Washington. We have to try to get modifications in the Soviet attitude. And Craxi just might have been the very man to do it.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

NATO ENTRY, ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTED BY VAST MAJORITY, ADVOCATED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 7 Sep 81 p 3

[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "NATO, Right Away"]

[Text] Surprise: most of the national leaders of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] are in favor of Spain's joining NATO. But not now. From clandestinity and from the Peoples Socialist Party of Tierno Galvan, they inherited a vague neutralism which has penetrated easily into the rank-and-file socialists, ill-informed on the country's international political problems, and the party leaders still have not had time to reflect and bring up this debate within the party in order to arrive at the only possible conclusion: NATO is infinitely better than the bilateral treaty with the United States. NATO yes, but not now. Or what amounts to the same thing, "NATO, not right away," which is the ambiguous message which on posters, the leaders of the PSOE are filling the geography of Spain in their campaign against NATO.

Except for the Maltese of Tierno Galvan, the socialist leaders and the great majority of the party do not advocate an unreal neutralism for Spain, which would require a break with the United States. On the contrary, they are advocates of the maintenance of the Franco status quo as the basis for renovating the bilateral treaty with the United States and of postponing entry into NATO until they have time to study the problem and convince their members that the only foreign policy solution, for a free and secure Spain which all of us long for, consists of entering on an equal footing in the defense of the West, leaving behind the semicolonial situation in which we find ourselves today. That is what the leaders of the PSOE need, time. Or rather, that the government of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] do the dirty work for them, join NATO and thus resolve the problem for the PSOE. You join, then we shall see.

If inevitably, the PSOE agrees to Spain's joining NATO, who really opposes this decision of the government? Inevitably and always: the die-hard ultra right, which prefers the Libyan or Bolivian solution to any other, and the die-hard Communists. No one else. What is indeed certain is that a large body of opinion, very poorly informed on international matters due to the enforced isolation suffered by two generations of Spaniards, does not understand the concept of NATO and can be convinced that NATO equals hell. But, if this conviction is arrived at, the socialists will lose as much as the government party, and as much as the entire country. Neutralism is impossible, to maintain

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the status quo with the United States is humiliating and the only viable solution, grand and honorable, is entry with full rights in the pact for the defense of Western democracies.

Under those conditions, the Third World-oriented groups of the UCD who wish to gain merits on the scales of the progressive sectors, threatening to boycott the decision of the government to join NATO, will be of little use to the Socialist Party. There are those who overlook the progressive sectors to such a degree that one has nothing else to do but look in their past for the more or less shameful clues which now propell them to a progressive hysteria lacking moderation or limits. The socialist leadership sees itself obliged to oppose the entry of Spain into NATO "now"; and it seizes the opportunity, tactically, to wear down the government faced with elections which are drawing nearer all the time. Enough, let no one deceive himself, the Socialists are as much in favor of NATO as the government and much more so than the Third World neo-Peronists who still flutter around Suarez circles of the government party.

The best solution, for the PSOE, for the government, and for the country, is to end as soon as possible the gaseous presence of this country in the world, entering NATO this very autumn. The armed forces will benefit immediately from it, the Spanish armament industry will progress, all of us will cease, little by little, to agonize over our navels, in order to concern ourselves with the problems which affect us on the planet we inhabit. NATO, yes, right away, a Maltese is your father, a satellite for your grandfather, and Qadhdhafi is a Libyan, one is more than enough.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

DEFENSE MINISTER DEFENDS NATO ENTRY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Sep 81 pp 24,25

[Interview with Alberto Oliart, Spanish defense minister, in his office at the Ministry of Defense in Madrid; date and name of interviewer not given]

[Text] He works surrounded by the military in the big central office of the Ministry of Defense--formerly of the Army--on Alcala street in Madrid. He took office on 25 February 1981, 2 days before the coup, which he admits was "difficult." If everything goes according to his plans and those of his government, headed by Calvo Sotelo, he will take his seat, within a few months, as Spain's representative in meetings of the defense ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Minister Alberto Oliart believes that this will not be difficult, that by next spring--in April, more or less--the time will have arrived for Spain to occupy its rightful seat in NATO. This is how he explained his thinking in an interview with CAMBIO 16.

[Question] What advantages does NATO offer for Spain's defense?

[Answer] In the first place, the advantage of being in the same defense system as most of the Western democracies. In the second place, it is not that NATO is offering it; it is that Spain, in my opinion, has the right, because of its very essence as a European country, to be a power among the European democracies, something which for one reason or another we have not been able to achieve clearly in these last 150 years since the war for independence. In this sense I believe it is necessary to bring Spain's European dimension to the height to which it must rise.

In the third place, there is the advantage of its being the best of the choices presented in defense policy and in foreign policy. Neutrality is an option which does not depend only upon one's own will, but rather it can be conceded to one. And then fourth, I believe that Spain's entry into NATO is the logical consequence of the very foreign and defense policy that Spain started in 1953 when it signed the first agreement with the United States. These bilateral pacts have served their function, but a function in which--let us not deceive ourselves. In NATO we will be on the same level as countries like Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, England or Belgium.

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[Question] Would the defense of Spanish territories such as the Canaries, Ceuta and Melilla be guaranteed within NATO?

[Answer] The Canaries, of course. The definition of Ceuta and Melilla will enter into the negotiation of the treaty, I imagine. In any case, Ceuta and Melilla are included in the treaty as part of Spanish territory, although clarification of their entry remains to be seen.

[Question] Does the Spanish Government have the will to see that the defense of Ceuta and Melilla are specifically included within the NATO treaty?

[Answer] I would say that there is something much more important than that, and that is the will of the Spanish Government to defend Ceuta and Melilla as an integral part of Spanish territory, in any case.

[Question] Will the entry into the Atlantic Alliance replace Spain's bilateral agreements with the United States?

[Answer] No; the fact is that those agreements will enter a much broader framework if we enter NATO. The logical thing has been to proceed with their extension, because we have petitions in the treaty which will change radically if we enter NATO and which would be granted us if we became a member of the Alliance. A new treaty with the United States must be negotiated, seeking technical and military assistance, which would be the same type of treaty the United States has with other NATO countries, whether through this organization or directly.

[Question] Once Spain joins NATO, will there also be American military bases on Spanish soil?

[Answer] It is not a certainty that if Spain should join NATO those bases would continue to be purely for American use; they could become NATO bases; everything would depend on the negotiations concerning this matter. The United States, as a member of NATO, could use them if we reach that agreement. One must bear in mind that they are joint Spanish-U.S. bases. We can place them at the service of NATO or, in other words, say, "This is our Spanish contribution to NATO."

[Question] Would there be nuclear weapons or missiles in Spain if our country became a part of NATO?

[Answer] The answer is a resounding "no" to the question of missiles. After all, missiles have no practical application in Spain. Missiles, because of their medium range, could only, if they were placed in Spain, reach the forces of NATO itself, and not those of the Warsaw Pact.

Another very different thing is that there might be nuclear weapons in Spain. Spain has not yet signed the treaty for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. That is a freedom which Spain has as a nation and as a state. The Spanish Government is interested in maintaining its freedom. Spain cannot renounce any weapons which are in its interest for the preservation of its sovereignty and independence.

[Question] Is Spain not going to stipulate on its entry into NATO that nuclear weapons may not be installed on Spanish soil?

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[Answer] No. This is being discussed in the cases of England and France. I do not believe it is necessary to discuss it in Spain's case.

[Question] Are there--or have there been--foreign pressures for Spain to enter NATO?

[Answer] No, but we have been invited to join since 1977. It is almost incomprehensible that a country which has been in an indirect alliance--which was created at a given moment because the Spanish political regime at that time did not permit full entry--would refuse to take its place. An expert in Atlantic Alliance matters told me a few days ago that in 1949--when NATO was established--a chair was set in place for Spain to occupy one day. That is, there has always been the conviction that Spain would join.

[Question] What would be the economic cost of Spain's entry into NATO?

[Answer] The study of what it would cost to prepare the Armed Forces to enter NATO is the study of our own budget potential. One of the foremost characteristics of the alliance is that each country brings in its own attributes. We will be able to use our resources in the most rational and adequate manner possible to the defense organization. But we have no reason to do more. As to the budget study for defraying the common costs of NATO--the Spanish contribution to the fixed expenses of the alliance structure--the figure varies between 3.5 and 8.5 billion pesetas per year, depending on the degree of integration negotiated.

[Question] Would Spain's entry into NATO help to resolve the Gibraltar question?

[Answer] One must distinguish between the territory of Gibraltar and the base. The base is a military base under the British NATO command, and as such it is in the service of NATO, although it does not belong to NATO. What we are going to maintain permanently, after our entry into the alliance, is the Spanish NATO command in the Strait of Gibraltar.

With regard to the territory, it appears that the recent report of the British Parliament opens up the possibility of fruitful negotiation for Spain on the future of Gibraltar.

[Question] What do you think of the arguments of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] opposing Spain's entry into NATO?

[Answer] It does not seem to me that any of their arguments have absolute consistency; they can all be contradicted for almost the same reasons they can be affirmed.

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ECONOMIC.

ITALY

AREA STUDY OF UNDERGROUND LABOR FORCE

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 18 Sep 81 p 25

[Article by Bruna Bellonzi: "Tax Evasion: Here Is the Chart of Underground Labor"]

[Text] Barely 60 days of careful checking was required to discover tax evasions totaling 92 billion lire. From 2 May to 30 June the central service of the Labor Ministry's inspection department carried out a special investigation that yielded a rich prize (see Table): 10,000 small businesses were checked (industrial, handicrafts, commercial); 13,000 orders were served on businessmen; almost as many cases were referred to the courts; 92 billion lire were recovered, 20 billion of which represented total tax evasion, that is, in reported payroll taxes, representing a sum that would never have been paid to the empty INPS [National Social Security Institute] coffers.

What methods were used in evading taxes? Ghost workers, overtime and above-minimum noncontractual under-the-table payments, employer-employee relationships masked as consultation (given to retired persons with high professional qualifications and, therefore, enjoying large pensions), minors and foreigners (mainly colored) employed at wages below contractual minimums, apprentices paid as such but used as adult workers, women working at cottage industries with actual piecework contracts and without social security coverage.

Franco Aristòdemo, head of the central service that organized and coordinated the operation, described it as "a panorama of subterfuge, of outrageous acts, of cunning and collusion which spotlight three events: The area of the so-called black or underground labor market is much more extensive and organized than we could have believed; collusion exists between the interests of the plant and those of the worker because of the slowness of fiscal drag, which has a very strong influence on the amounts of marginal income. All this damages the government because tax evasion almost always accompanies fiscal evasion, and therefore men and means are needed to fight evasion and infractions of the law. To bring up the question of cost does not make sense because the activity of repression, in addition to results that can be assessed on a moral plane and therefore within the province of government, also offers appreciable results on the economic level" (see graph).

The exceptional results of this summer hunt (last year, recovery of unpaid taxes over a period of 12 months totaled 267 billion lire, 67 billion of which represented total unpaid taxes) were made possible by two circumstances: The time selected for

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
the investigation and the kind of investigation. Among plants checked many were involved in tourism and in vacation business. While these are handled during the rest of the year by family-run businesses, they need extra personnel during the summer months. In the second place, the targets were businesses and activities where suspicions had existed.

Excluded from the investigation were state participation enterprises or very large businesses where trade union control makes infractions rarer and more difficult, Sicily (due to a lack of regional coordination), and the earthquake-damaged areas. But where are the most flagrant tax evaders and who are they? They are, above all, in service-oriented industries, the construction industry, clothing manufacturing, but also in the metal-mechanical, electro-mechanical and agricultural processing sectors.

Leading the regions on the basis of number of workers involved and infractions ascertained compared with total employment in the same plant is Calabria, with 118 percent (which means there were several infractions per worker), then Molise, Sardinia, Puglia, Lazio, Trentino-Alto Adige, the Friuli, Veneto, and Piedmont. In Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, despite the high number of inspections carried out (respectively 2,252 and 1,491), the percentage of workers involved was sharply lower: respectively 32 percent and 16 percent. In Emilia infractions by workers were lowest on a percentage basis. Valle d'Aosta and Lombardy followed.

Involved in infractions (or charged with them) are retired persons on pensions, youths, minors, women, foreign workers. A considerable number of the latter had neither work nor residence permit. Workers covered by aid programs should be discussed separately. The ministry does not supply data, but reports made by regional inspectors, and the data produced by the investigation, show there is more than a hint that among workers not listed on the payroll (therefore, for whom tax evasion was total) a significant number were participating in aid programs through plants involved in financial difficulty.

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Key:

1. It Pays to Collect Unpaid Taxes
2. Taxes recovered
3. Amount representing tax evasion
4. Cost of administration
5. In billions of lire
6. Share of costs of administration for the entire inspection service (head office and field executives, inspectors and administrative personnel both in the main office and in the field) compared with total amounts recovered from tax evaders progressively decreased from 1976 to date, dropping from 12 percent in 1976 to 8.3 percent in 1980.

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(1) Gli evasori: dove e quanti						
Regioni (2)	Aziende controllate (3)	Lavoratori occupati c/o a. controllate (4)	Lavoratori interessati alle infraz. (in assoluto) (5)	in % (6)	Contributi evasi (in milioni) (7)	Contributi in ritardo (in milioni) (8)
PIEMONTE (9)	1.415	50.080	23.834	47	3.735,5	12.702
VALLE D'AOSTA	79	242	48	20	29,2	58
LOMBARDIA (10)	842	14.735	3.517	24	1.414,1	2.400
TRENTINO-A.A. (11)	21	147	78	53	19,8	—
VENETO	338	11.080	5.040	49	1.636,8	7.258
FRIULI-V. GIULIA (12)	223	2.843	1.345	51	545,4	982
LIGURIA	488	7.941	2.213	28	1.618,2	2.814
EMILIA-ROM.	1.491	22.926	3.838	16	2.212,3	2.502
TOSCANA (13)	2.252	24.687	8.058	32	1.588,2	6.577
UMBRIA	102	718	318	44	92,1	250
MARCHE	344	7.544	2.431	32	270,4	2.324
LAZIO	847	11.421	6.297	55	5.087,0	14.208
MOLISE	116	1.327	1.327	100	44,8	370
ABRUZZI	80	6.522	3.977	40	898,5	7.295
PUGLIA	475	6.662	4.013	60	584,7	2.475
CALABRIA	470	4.417	5.227	118	284,8	6.102
SARDEGNA (14)	513	5.247	3.582	68	243,8	3.453
TOTALI (15)	18.074	178.298	74.921		20.283,0	71.778
* % lavoratori interessati alle infrazioni riscontrate sul totale lavoratori occupati nelle aziende controllate. (16)						

Key:

1. Tax evaders: location and number
2. Regions
3. Businesses investigated
4. Workers employed in businesses investigated
5. Workers committing violations (absolute numbers)
6. Percent
7. Amount of unpaid taxes (in millions of lire)
8. Late tax payments (in millions of lire)
9. Piedmont
10. Lombardy
11. Trentino-Alto Adige
12. Friuli-Venezia Giulia
13. Tuscany
14. Sardinia
15. Totals
16. Percentage of workers involved in infractions of the total number of workers employed in businesses investigated

[NOTE: Periods used in all numbers in table should be changed to commas.]

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

PARTICIPATION IN CONSTRUCTION OF USSR'S GAS PIPELINE

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 25 Sep 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Enrico Nassi: "Siberian Pipeline. Superpipe Comes to Italy."]

[Text] The Italian government has decided to buy from 4 to 8 billion cubic meters of Siberian gas per year beginning in the spring of 1985 over a period of 25 years. In addition, Italy together with other European Community nations, also committed itself, with credit at favorable interest rates and supply of high technology plant, to participate in construction of the pipeline that snakes from eastern Siberia across the Urals, to Paris and Rome. It is to be 4,500 kilometers long and it consists of 2 lines each with 24 pumping stations. It will cost \$14 billion. Minimum annual flow will be 50 billion cubic meters: Four-fifths to Western Europe, the remainder to Moscow's allies in Comecon. A spokesman said, "If necessary, that is in case of a crisis in the supply of petroleum, the Soviets are willing to step up production." In short, it is a good deal despite the political risk of excessive dependency on USSR energy. Until the last moment, this factor weighed heavily in the Italian decision. A foreign office spokesman said, "In fact, the government's agreement was arrived at after long and difficult meetings." The decision was transmitted to the Soviets shortly before Moscow's deadline, which was on midnight Tuesday 15 September after a sudden break in negotiations between the Italian and Soviet delegations, the latter headed by Nicolai Ossipov and Victor Ivanov, hard and able negotiators, "who were delegated to commit the prestige of the USSR with their signature."

The Soviets had given up hope of an Italian agreement and they had already planned to shift the supplies for ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] to increase French and German supplies; and to divert to the British and Japanese, contracts totaling \$3 billion, which had been primarily earmarked for Nuovo Pignone, Italsider [Steel Company] and Fiat. The delegation assigned to negotiate the agreement had left Moscow on the 7th, convinced it could complete its mission by the 10th with a great reception at Villa Abamalek, the Soviet Embassy on Via Aurelia Antica. The optimism was based upon assurances Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo gave to Andrei Gromyko, his Soviet colleague, during a visit to Moscow this winter.

However, some negative signals left Rome: the doubts of Beniamino Andreatta, for example. The treasury minister had two concerns: one technical-political; the other a matter of money. From the analysis of large international organizations (The

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Investment Bank, for example,) it is learned that the eastern nations at the end of 1982 will have a debt of \$100 billion in debts. The tendency to expand is also due to continuous requests to renegotiate debts that fall due in 1981 and 1982 by nations such as Poland, Romania and Hungary. Unlimited growth will reverse the dependency relationships, making the West a prisoner of its own credits. The other consideration (that of funds) is based on the fact that financing supply contracts worth \$3 billion will cost the state 10 percent (8 percent if private firms, following the example of German firms, absorb 2 percent). In any case, it is more than is received by the Soviets in interest (7.8 percent). That is not all. The Atlantic party, with authoritative leaders of the DC [Christian Democratic Party] of the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party], of the PRI [Italian Republican Party], of high officials of the treasury (like Vittorio Barattieri), or of the foreign office (ambassadors such as Rinaldo Petrignani, who is in Washington, and Maurizio Bucci, director general of economic affairs) contributed to Andreatta's doubts. The position of the Atlantic parties stresses the American position on Soviet hegemony. It is this: The strategic objective of the West must be negotiations with Moscow to be conducted on positions of strength: Therefore, every mouthful of oxygen is counterproductive. This led to the pressure to accept only Siberian gas ("even if it can do without, following agreements with Algeria"), without becoming committed on the level of credits and supplies.

However, the personal prestige of the foreign minister was on the line. At Moscow, he had committed himself without reservations. In his counter-argument, the party of detente used this as a lever whose thesis in brief was this: The agreement, using as a model those signed by Holland, Belgium, Germany, and France, should be signed not only because it is advantageous and reduces energy dependency on those nations (Iran and Libya, for example,) which today are centers of alarming crises, but because not doing it would compromise Italy's credibility. It was said, "If they break off negotiations with the USSR, who would again believe the word of an Italian minister of state?"

On the eve of the delegation's arrival, the situation was therefore one of stalemate. Nevertheless, it was open to mediation. The foreign trade minister, the Socialist Nicola Capria, tried it with a certain success, so much so that in his first meeting with Ossipov he could function with the certainty of someone who was willing to close the deal: therefore, he was reassuring. Yet, in simultaneous actions with what was happening in other European capitals, American Ambassador Maxwell Raab said in a semi-official form through diplomatic channels that the White House had received a report from intelligence sources on the USSR economic situation, and that these were such as to dissuade the West from renewing or extending agreements covering new lines of credit and supplies with high technological value. This alarmed the party of detente and gave a further thrust to the Atlantic party. But, above all, it upset the industrial interests involved. Contacts became frenetic even because signals came from Washington that conflicted with those of Raab. Here was one example for all: A giant firm like Caterpillar at the end of August signed a large contract for supplies in the energy plant sector with the Soviet Union. There is more: The president of Exxon, relying on authoritative sources, told the president of ENI that "Ronald Reagan's vetoes are not imperative for the Americans: Therefore, they are much less so for the Europeans." Again: As much as they were inclined to underestimate the negative signals, the Soviets had in any case preestablished certain

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lines of defense. The Moscow technicians for the pipeline want Nuova Pignone's technology. They said, "If we can't get it from Italy, we will try to get it from Japan which produces pumping stations by virtue of a license granted by the Florentine company." The contract is worth \$1,100 million.

The official meeting of 10 September with the Soviet delegation therefore took place in a climate of confusion and uncertainty. Probably in order to gain time in expectation of a clarification, Ambassador Bucci tried to reverse the methodology of the negotiations: Contrary to what the Soviets proposed, he asked (as president of the Italian delegation) that the price of gas be discussed first and then credits and supplies. The result: The negotiations were halted; the Soviets considered them closed and their trip to Rome useless. At this point, however, the foreign trade minister reestablished contacts and convinced the Soviets to halt their course. The Soviets accepted the invitation setting a deadline for the 15th, which for them was the final deadline to conclude plans for purchases. Sufficient to solve all the problems of clarification was a meeting in the office of the prime minister on the basis of a compromise drafted by Capria who later was to report on the negotiations to the government and to parliament. The government's approval was then spelled out in detail by the technicians and finally transmitted to the Soviets, with an offer to share in construction worth \$500 million. This represented a considerable reduction from the \$3 billion in orders proposed by the Soviets, but it almost certainly will be increased.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

SUGAR PRODUCTION AFFECTED BY EEC RULING

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 28 Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Report and interview by Cesare Peruzzi: "A Very Bitter Bounty"]

[Text] Italy's sugar producers will come up 200 billion lire short in the till this year. How come? Well, there are the inflexible EEC regulations, the decline of prices on the world market, and above all global over-production.

That's a 200 billion-lire shortage. It showed up a few weeks ago on the books of Italy's sugar refineries and sugarbeet growers. Within the next few months this maelstrom could swallow up a thick slice of the nation's sugarbeet crop (there is talk of cutbacks ranging to 70,000 hectares out of a current total of 310,000 hectares under cultivation, which lately has meant prosperity for growers and refiners; moreover, at least 15 of the nation's 48 sugar refineries may very well shut down for good. Giuseppe Bartolomei, still bloody from his wine wars with France, has yet another thorny problem to solve. Whatever brought on this sudden and totally unexpected slump in our sugar sector's earnings? And what will its longterm impact be on the refiners and growers who are even now negotiating a price agreement for this year's harvest?

The first symptoms of trouble ahead were visible as early as last spring, while the sector was still savoring the giddy heights of top profits, with better than 1.5 trillion lire in sales. Prices on sugar markets all over the world, which had been steadily climbing for a long time (and thus bringing heady numbers of billions into the accounts of European and Italian producers) began to sink. The decline has been steady ever since: only last week the price of sugar hit an all-time low on the London exchange: 171 pounds sterling per ton. All over the world there is a sudden surplus of sugar. Predictions for 1981 alone set production at 93 million tons, with consumption running at no better than 91 million tons. The main source of the glut is Europe, which does not subscribe to the international price agreement (among various world producers), and this year Europe will have a surplus of at least 50 million quintals to dump on markets outside Europe so as not to hurt EEC producers. The upshot is a going price for sugar worldwide that is 50 percent lower

than the going price in Europe. Exporting has become tantamount to suicide for all European producers, particularly for the Italians. Sugar consumption in Italy is 17 million quintals per year, but the European Community has guaranteed market prices of Italy's output only to cover 13.2 million quintals, and promised to find markets for it within the EEC up to 15.5 million quintals (with a 30-percent penalty for this latter quota). Every grain of sugar produced over and above these 15.5 million quintals must perforce be sold outside the Community. Since Italy's sugar production this year will be 20 million quintals, at least 4.5 million will have to be sold at distress prices on the markets of the Third World and America. Never has such bounty been so bitter. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Brussels agriculture commission had issued contrary advisories, this year all the EEC countries sharply increased their sugarbeet production: 17 percent in France, 61 percent in Greece, 9.6 percent in Belgium, 9.4 percent in Germany, and 9 percent in Italy. "We are the only ones in Europe who had already finished planting when the new Community regulation came out," the Italian sugarbeet growers complain, "and so we couldn't do anything about it. But the others could have. And why didn't the EEC increase Italy's sugar quota enough to make us at least self-sufficient? The truth of the matter is that, once again, we are forced to pay for something that is not our fault..."

When all the sums have been done, exactly 200 billion lire will be missing from the Italian producers' tills, and 60 percent of the shortage will have to be borne by the growers and 40 percent by the refiners. What will that mean? For the growers there are no alternatives: at least 70,000 hectares will have to be converted to other crops. For the other 160,000 farm operations in the sector the outlook is anything but rosy, in view of the fact that this was the very year, after long, lean years of warmups, that sugarbeet growing in Italy had achieved better than good income and yield levels: 65 quintals of sugar per hectare, matching Germany's, as against 69 for France. A step backward, in short. And a lot will hinge on the price agreement for this year's crop.

Not even the refiners have much to rejoice over. Specifically, the Maraldi group, which still supplies 13.3 percent of the market and operates its flagship company, Romana Zuccheri, in receivership. The Ravenna group, after the scare of Romana Zuccheri's declaration of bankruptcy, was just beginning to get its head above water with the good yields of the latest harvests, and had actually begun looking for a buyer who could bring in some liquidity (rumor had it that it was talking to Libya). Another blow of that magnitude could bring down not only Romana, but AFIR and AIE as well, since both of them already have financial problems.

For the refinery group held by Leonardo Montesi, too (it controls 30.7 percent of the domestic market), this is not the best of times: after years of lethargy, venerable (72-year-old) Montesi had just decided to sell off some or all of his appetizing company, Italiana Zuccheri (175 billion lire worth of business, a billion in profits) and had already entered into serious negotiations for it.

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The only outfit that seems to be enjoying sound sleep these nights is Eridania, a member of the Ferruzzi group (see following interview). The only unknown quantity for Eridania is the shareholders' response to the imminent capital increase.

Growers and refiners agree on one score: the price of sugar is going to have to go up by at least 150 lire a kilo. The growers, though, are not stopping there: they are asking Brussels, just this once, to free all sugar produced and consumed in Italy of all taxes and levies, so as to get back a few of those lost billions (at least 60). The ball right now is in Agriculture Minister Bartolomei's court.

'Eridania Is Sweeter,' Says Gardini

What will the impact on Italy of plummeting sugar prices worldwide be? Is there any chance of a joint strategy plotted by the refiners, the growers, and the government? IL MONDO put that question to Raoul Gardini, president of Eridania and vice-president of Beghin-Say, the giant of French sugar. Gardini, who, through the Agricola holding company (of which he is also president), controls an absolute majority package of Eridania stock and, through FINAG and AIFA holds a relative majority interest in Beghin-Say, is certainly the most powerful sugar magnate in Europe today.

Question: The Italian sugar industry is in deep trouble, mainly because of the collapse of prices on foreign markets: What do they say about the outlook at Eridania?

Answer: The present situation in the Italian sugar industry is only partially involved with the worldwide decline in market prices; this decline has brought a sharp falling-off in exports under our C quota which, this year, with total production estimated at around 20 million quintals, amounts to more than 4 million quintals; but the major causes of Italy's troubles lie elsewhere.

Question: Where?

Answer: First of all, in overly severe Community regulation, which does not assign us an adequate amount of quota A sugar at guaranteed prices. The fact is that with a quota of 15 million quintals rather than 13.2 (altogether inadequate to supply our domestic market) the sector could save better than 70 billion lire in penalties right now. The second problem lies in the very serious delay in applying Community standards on prices on the part of the Italian government. Just by way of example, this year government decisions which took effect on 6 April and 1 July 1981 were actually implemented on 1 August, which meant a loss to the sector of at least 25 billion lire. And finally you have the government's insistence on trying to peg sugar prices without reference to Community price machinery, to the results of cost analyses generated by the Interministerial Price Committee itself, not to mention what is going on in the other EEC countries. The result is that Italy has to live with politically fixed prices which have nothing

to do with actual production costs. If the system isn't changed, even the soundest companies in the business will go under.

Question: So the outlook is pretty bleak, then?

Answer: It's no easy thing to make a prediction, but one can safely say that there is still time to set the administration right. The sector is substantially healthy, seriously involved technically and technologically in the vanguard and therefore, if it is not done in by punitive pricing and policies, it will certainly be able to push on with the restructuring process undertaken some time ago, and to achieve its goal of an Italian product that will be competitive with that of the other EEC countries.

Question: Negotiations are under way now for renewal of the overall contract with the sugarbeet growers: what do the refiners want?

Answer: We have to clear up the mystery surrounding the overall contract, which is rapidly approaching mythical proportions. This agreement consists substantially of two components: one economic and the other regulatory. The economic portion (the price of beets, surplus costs, the beetgrowers' fund, etc.) is clearly the more important and is also the one of keenest interest to most growers; well, that part of it is obviously not the business of the refiners, but rather of the government. The regulatory portion (regulations for delivery and sampling of the beets, arrangements for payment, etc.) is of only secondary importance by comparison with the economic portion and would give rise to no major problems if it were not given such emphasis by some of the grower organizations. In conclusion, it should be the government, rather than the refiners, that deals with negotiating the overall agreement. The refining companies, for their part, can resolve the regulatory issues, always providing they are put in an economic position to do so.

Question: Which will the crisis building on the horizon affect more severely: the refiners or the growers? Is any joint strategic approach possible?

Answer: I don't feel there is any need for emphasizing the crisis aspect, inasmuch as the current situation in the sector can and must be settled. It is certainly better, as the behavior of all the other European countries over the past few years has demonstrated, to have to deal with excess production problems rather than with shortages. Besides, bumper crop years always come along in agriculture, but that is no reason to penalize the growers for the efforts they have put into increasing productivity: that would merely discourage them and give rise to a defeatist attitude that would be hard to counter once it spread. And if it turns out that, in order to solve our economic problem, we have to ask the consumer to pay more, you have to bear in mind the fact that of recent years that same consumer, in addition to paying increases far lower than he has paid for all basic commodities, has saved hundreds of billions (at least 300 billion in 1980 alone) by

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reason of the fact that he can get what he needs either from the Italian and Community market or on the world market which, as the statistics of years past show us, sells cheap when there are not very many buyers, but goes up and may well continue to rise to unbelievable levels once European harvests make it necessary -- or might make it necessary -- for consumers to resort to imported sugar. In conclusion, by generating a shrinkage in future investments in sugarbeet growing or refining, the consequent shutdown of a large number of refineries and low sugar production, we shall certainly wind up having to pay other countries -- be they Community countries or outsiders, the prices we refuse to pay our own growers and producers right now.

Question: Are you saying that it would be feasible to put together a common strategy with the growers?

Answer: It would indeed be possible, provided we quit mixing politics with economics, action with propaganda, and practical objectives with demagoguery; it would be feasible only if both sides--- but particularly the refiners' organizations -- can be convinced that improvement for either side must be followed by improvement for the whole sector, rather than by efforts to undermine the other half.

Question: The growers allege that Italian processors failed to manage the sugar agreement for the Community, that they neglected the sugar-quota fight to concentrate on other financial aspects (pegging prices to the then-current exchange rate). If Italy's quota today comes to a scant 13.2 million quintals it is mainly the industry people who are to blame....


Answer: The accusation, which comes to us not from the growers but from certain restricted quarters among the processors' organizations, none of whom admittedly can stake the slightest claim to objectivity, is -- to say the least, both absurd and selfish. It is absurd because the industry people, who are not masochists in any sense of the word, have consistently moved to protect their own legitimate interests, and have never had a moment's doubt that those interests might be better served by a larger quota. It is selfish because it is common knowledge, and should anyone be unaware of it, it can be demonstrated that the refiners have prodigally squandered their efforts and resources everywhere they could think of in order to get higher quotas.

Question: What are Eridania's plans for the future?

Answer: Eridania has only one specific objective: to push ahead with restructuring so as to cut production costs and maintain high return on investments for its shareholders, its workers, and for the growers and the nation's economy as well. Part of our motivation here is to recoup the hundreds of billions of lire invested during the Seventies to bring our structures up to the point where they could meet community standards and comply with the regulations forced upon us. Our plan can be brought to fruition only if it manages to get government support and full collaboration from everybody who, directly or indirectly, has ties to the company. In any case, this is a goal which we can hardly

fail to meet, because even the other European combines, which already enjoy favorable treatment for one reason or another, are increasingly joining forces and are ready by now to move in and replace Italian producers on the market.

Should that come to pass, the Italian market would be totally dependant -- or as near so as no matter -- on imports, with all the adverse impact on our economy such a situation would perforce entail.



The Picture for Eridania (Price performance in 1981)

Legend: Base month January 1981 = 100
 Ordinates: quotations
 Abscissa: dates for monthly quotations 2 January to 11 September 1981
 Broken line: MIB index
 Thin solid line: Food and farm commodities
 Thick solid line: Eridania

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MEDITERRANEAN COAST RADAR NETWORK'S DUTIES DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 81 pp 22-23

[Article by (Air Force) Lt Col Robert Moltes:* "A Radar Station Maintains Surveillance Over the Mediterranean"]

[Text] The Air Force's radar stations form a vigilant network around French airspace.

But our observers no longer man battlements today, and the author shares with us in this article a few moments of their incessant efforts, on which, to a large extent, the effectiveness of our air defense depends.

"An unidentified blip 80 km south of Toulon heading north."

"Toulon?"

"They know nothing about the plane at that location."

"Aix?"

"Nothing either."

Sitting in front of his radar screen, the chief air defense controller brought this exchange with his identification officer to a close. The latter had just notified him of the detection of an unidentified aircraft. Neither the C.C. Mar. [Naval Coordination Center] which coordinates the navy's air operations in the

*An officer of the base defense units, Lt Col Robert Moltes graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1960. A radar station controller in Nice and then instructor and director of studies at the Air Defense Controllers Instruction Center in Dijon, Lt Col Robert Moltes was in command of a control squadron at Mont-de-Marsan. Assigned to Taverny and then to Mont Agel, he trained with the 39th graduating class of the ESGA [Advanced Air Combat School.]

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Mediterranean nor the CCR [Regional Control Center] of Aix which controls all civilian aircraft in southeastern France were able to provide information on this unidentified plane heading toward the French coast from the Mediterranean.

With a sweep of his eye, the lead controller checked the altitude of the blip and then pressed a telephone key, putting him in touch with the controller of the Lyons zone, his immediate supervisor in the operational air defense network. The conversation between them was brief:

"This is the lead controller in Nice. We have an unidentified blip south of Toulon. We have no information about the aircraft involved."

"O.K. I am placing a Mirage F-1 at Orange on maximum alert (within 2 minutes). Have it take off if the blip is not identified."

This scene took place in the operations room of the Center of Detection and Control's radar station in Nice. This facility stands on the plateau of Mont Agel. At 1,150 meters it overlooks the Principality of Monaco.

Established in 1958, this station is part of the permanent air defense detection network which covers the entire French territory and its approaches. Because of its location, this facility is responsible for keeping watch over French airspace along the entire Mediterranean coast.

Entirely renovated and automated in 1977, the station is one of the most modern in Europe.

While the air defense controller of the Lyons region got in touch with the Orange base and ordered the placing on maximum alert of the Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft (in this alert status the pilot is strapped in his plane which stands at the edge of the runway ready to take off), the lead controller in Nice gave his orders with the help of an amplifier which broadcast his words through loudspeakers in the operations room, the recreation room, the technical room, and all the facilities of the station:

"An unidentified blip. Takeoff from the Orange operational facility for the purpose of interception and identification. The alert team is to report to the operations room.*

The heart of the Detection and Control Center consists of an IBM series 370 computer which handles all programs relating to pursuit, transmission, interception, display, and recording of the blips. This computer provides in particular the synthesis of data relating to aircraft (position, direction, altitude, speed, and so on) detected by the station's own radar units as well as by adjacent radar units, military and civilian, to which they are connected.

The synthesis of these data, categorized, compared, and cumulated, continuously represents the air situation within the station's zone of responsibility.

*The alert team consists of an air defense controller and his assistant.

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Each aircraft in flight is displayed on the radar screens of the operators in a simulated form, made up of symbols, letters, and numerals with all the data pertaining to it.

The data, which keep changing constantly, such as the position of aircraft and possibly their direction, speed, or altitude, are constantly and instantaneously updated.

When the unidentified aircraft approached to within a critical distance, the head of the guidance section of the Detection and Control Center got in touch with the operations room of the Orange base:

"This is the chief of the Nice guidance unit. Get ready for immediate takeoff from the operational facility, direction 150 degrees, climb to an altitude of 36,000 feet, retain contact with Nice on frequency A."

This order was immediately transmitted to the pilot on alert waiting in his aircraft at the edge of the runway. Less than 2 minutes later his plane took off, began its climb at full throttle heading for 150 degrees, and a few seconds later the pilot contacted the Nice air defense unit by radio using the coded frequency indicated to him in the takeoff order.

"Nice, this is Charoot 31 climbing and heading for 150 degrees."

"Charoot 31, this is Nice, radar contact, direction 140 degrees left, keep on climbing to 36,000 feet. Unidentified aircraft at 160 degrees from your position, altitude 42,000 feet, speed Mach 0.9. You will check it out at a distance."

"O.K., heading toward 140 degrees left. I am continuing to climb. Roger as regards checking out the aircraft at a distance."

Every movement is analyzed by the station's operators and categorized by an "identification officer," as a function of the criteria specified in advance and according to the degree of threat represented by each in a range of categories running from "friendly aircraft" to "enemy aircraft." The reactions and responses of the air defense network regarding detected aircraft obviously depend on the category into which the latter have been placed.

Movements having special interest are transmitted automatically by digital links to neighboring stations, as well as to the Air Defense Operations Center in Taverny near Paris. The latter thus monitors continually, on the basis of data originating from all stations, the specific air situation over the whole of French territory and its approaches.

Measures adopted in regard to such aircraft may range from discreet surveillance to interdiction of territorial overflight or the obligation to land at a designated French airstrip (for inspection) and, if necessary, destruction.

Without moving his eyes from the two blips getting closer to each other on his radar screen, the air defense controller frequently consulted the results of

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the interception computations effected several times every second by the computer and displayed for him on a screen of his console. He rattled off his instructions calmly and according to a strict sequence which reflected long training.

The guidance of interceptors toward their targets is done by the controllers, assisted in their task by the interception program of the computer, which can calculate several interception strategies simultaneously made at each of the station's guidance facilities.

The projected trajectories of the target aircraft and the pursuing fighter aircraft are displayed on the screens, as is the point where the interception will be reached.

These missions are effected daily over the sea under stringent security conditions with reference to other traffic, while greatly limiting their objectionable effects on the ground.

Most of the interception missions are controlled through difficult simulated radio and radar conditions to supplement the operational training of pilots and controllers.

"Nice, this is Charoot 31. I have made radar contact with the target which is directly ahead and 2,000 feet up."

"Roger, that is your target. Check it out from a distance."

"O.K. I am getting closer. I can visually observe a Mirage 3-C aircraft. What are your instructions?"

"Stand by. Remain in a position to keep that aircraft under surveillance at a distance."

The guidance section chief who followed the interception maneuver on his console had already notified the air defense controller of the Lyons region through the direct connecting line.

"This is the Nice guidance chief. The unidentified aircraft is a Mirage 3-C."

"Affirmative. By way of exercise, carry out an inspection routine with a landing on the Orange airstrip."

The exercise that we had just witnessed makes it possible to test the effectiveness of the identification of aircraft entering French airspace and to train the various air defense units in the transmission of data and reports, decision-making, and the execution of air defense measures.

This is a complete, frequent exercise whose start is naturally unannounced and determined by the general staff of air defense. The routes and altitudes of penetration into French airspace are altered every time.

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On that day as is their custom, the Nice air defense controllers were watching over the Mediterranean and their attention did not waver.

They know that their station is a link in France's air defense chain and that a chain is as strong as its weakest link.

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GENERAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR--Henri Maguer, deputy director of public safety at the Paris prefecture of police, will replace Maurice Paoli as director of the RG [General Intelligence Directorate] in the same prefecture. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12 Oct 81 p 31]

SDECE RECRUITING PLANS--The French intelligence service [SDECE] will be authorized to recruit 25 civilian employees in 1982 so as to set up an "office of general research, analysis and evaluation" directly subordinate to Pierre Marion, the new director of the SDECE. The function of this office will be the publication of daily reports to be delivered every morning to the offices of top government leaders. The reports will involve a new style. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12 Oct 81 p 31]

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GENERAL

ITALY

SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN PCI, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 14 Sep 81 pp 49-52

[Article by Antonio Carlucci and Corrado Incerti: "La Bruna Served the Whiskey"]

[Text] From a memoir by the former officer of the SID [Defense Intelligence Service], who is now in prison as a result of the P2 affair, there emerges a story of highly secret meetings between the communists and counterespionage agents. Here is what they talked about.

On Via del Boccaccio, a noisy street in the historic center of Rome, a few steps from Piazza Barberini, on the fourth floor of an old building, number 22, there is a small apartment: A large living room, two bedrooms, a kitchenette and bath. On the door there is a plate bearing a woman's name. The apartment houses neither a family nor the employees of a company. It is one of the secret offices of the SID's Section D, the counterespionage branch of the Intelligence Services.

Those rooms have one purpose only: To conceal from indiscreet eyes the most highly secret of meetings. One day in April 1975, in the living room, seated facing each other across a large table are two men of widely different backgrounds: Giandelio Maletti, a general, head of military counterespionage, involved in the inquiry into the Piazza Fontana massacre because of the protectiveness of the SID toward the Fascists, and Deputy Arrigo Boldrini, communist, with a glorious past as commander of the 28th Garibaldi Brigade of partisans. Outside the door, guarding the secretness of the meeting, stands a third man, Antonio La Bruna, captain in the SID, Maletti's right-hand man, at the focal point of all the criminal investigations on corruption in the Intelligence Services.

La Bruna enters the room in which the meeting between Maletti and Boldrini is being held just once: To place on the table two glasses of whiskey and withdraw. "I do not know what went on at that meeting. I was at Via Boccaccio only to ensure the secrecy of the meeting. Those were Maletti's orders," the captain stated to Rome's assistant public prosecutor of the Republic, Domenico Sica. Later, the same La Bruna put it all down in black and white in a memoir that for 3 months now has been in the official record of the Rome investigation of Licio Gelli's P2.

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What did Maletti and Boldrini say to each other? But above all, why were the two seated at the same table in a secret office of the SID? This meeting between the Intelligence Services officer and the communist leader certainly was not the only one. Many others took place, before and after. And other important persons on both sides of the talks were also involved. Indeed, those contacts with the Intelligence Services represented one of the keys to the change in relations between a PCI [Italian Communist Party], which for 2 years by then had been working toward the historic compromise, and a military hierarchy that had until then been unable to stand the sight of the communists.

PANORAMA has pieced together the story of those meetings: Why they came about, where they were held, who took part, what was discussed.

The first clamorous indication of the change in PCI-Armed Forces came out of a meeting organized by the communists in Rome in February 1974. The new line was: The Armed Forces can no longer be a separate body from the state, to "prevent the opening of gaps in the barrier against subversive maneuvers and reactionary attempts." Italy's presence in NATO was no longer at issue; military policy must no longer be an exclusive province of the upper hierarchical levels; the democratic system must enter the barracks at all levels.

The newly charted course was signed by the PCI's two top military experts: Besides Boldrini, Ugo Pecchioli, head of the party's State Problems section.

The top military officials were shocked by the new tack. But they did not make a move. It was part of the Intelligence Services, instead, already compromised by the most reactionary sectors of the separate bodies, which immediately sensed in it the chance to change its facial makeup to take on a more leftist look. But the internal struggle (the clash between Gen Vito Miceli, then head of the SID, and General Maletti) blocked every immediate initiative. Only after Maletti remained master of the battlefield did the Services move. The more so since among the men of Section D the net impression was that the PCI might very soon enter the ambit of government (they already knew that Giulio Andreotti was moving in favor of this plan).

In the spring of 1975, it became vital therefore for the SID to start talks with the communists: The Section had ordered the taking of a secret poll by way of the Carabinieri stations throughout Italy, bearing on the imminent administrative elections. The results of this poll were resounding: It showed the PCI winning 34-35 percent of the votes. An unprecedented jump. Maletti brought his own people together and told them the time to make a move had come: That poll on the elections could be the perfect key for opening the door to Botteghe Oscure.

But who should be the one to try for a first meeting? There was a man: Giorgio Angeli, an officer in the Carabinieri, in the Intelligence Services since 1965. Having weathered the SIFAR [Armed Forces Intelligence Service] storm, Angeli had gone on to head two highly sensitive offices: The section that sifted out intelligence on the PCI and on the communists of Eastern Europe, and the Military Police Section, whose mission it was to prevent infiltration of the Armed Forces. Angeli had the standing to contact Boldrini. Among other things, his fiancée (today his wife) was from Ravenna, the communist leader's home town.

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Angeli became the ambassador and the first talk was quickly set up: For the first week in April 1975. Maletti sent his most trusted collaborator, Antonio Viezzer, a colonel of Carabinieri, secretary of Section D, who had always been in the Intelligence Services, out on reconnaissance; Viezzer met with Boldrini at Via Boccaccio. There, a second meeting was set up. At Ravenna, Maletti, Viezzer and Angeli, accompanied by several officers whose job it was to ensure secrecy, met in the home of Angeli's fiancée, having arrived in the Romagnese city by train.

From then, meetings were held regularly: They took place in Rome, not only in the apartment on Via Boccaccio, but also in a house on Via della Vite, a few steps from the Parliament Building (it was a false office-front office that had been fitted out by the Rome Counterespionage Section and inherited by Maletti's men). Toward the end of April, Maletti was joined by Pecchioli. Enrico Berlinguer was regularly informed of everything that went on: This was stated several times at meetings by the two political representatives.

Maletti played almost immediately his election poll card. When the communists examined it they showed disbelief: According to their own calculations, they did not expect to win over 30 percent of the vote. The fact is that the Intelligence Services poll turned out to be exact: In June 1975, the PCI jumped to 34 percent--a fact that favored the continuation of the meetings. The ice now having been broken, Boldrini and Pecchioli threw out on the table two very important issues: The need of an immediate reform of the Intelligence Services that would shield the nation from a repetition of a coup-d'etat plot, and the ending of all discrimination by the Italian military establishment and that of Western Europe against men and ideas of the Left, particularly those of the PCI. And in time (meetings and discussions were long drawn out), increasingly concrete results emerged. A tangible indication of opening was a trip that Boldrini and Pecchioli made personally to the United States (the first communists to be officially invited) to visit the aerospace installations and to expound their party's positions. The PCI's influence in the field of military policy gained ever-growing weight: Their viewpoint was determinative in the creation of new Intelligence Services more subject to the political power. It was even determinative in the appointment of the top military, and even the top Intelligence Services, officials. A mechanism was also devised whereby the PCI would submit its viewpoint on a list of candidates favored by the military. And the executive would take it into account.

Maletti also gained ground. By way of those meetings, his office quickly became the obligatory channel for contacts between the PCI and the top officials of the Armed Forces: It behooved both by now to maintain good relations. Among the military, it became a race to meet with the communists. Foremost among them was the then commander of the Carabinieri, Enrico Mino, who was aiming for renewal of his appointment. And following close behind him was Gen Giuseppe Santovito, who was later named to head the SISMI [Intelligence Service for Military Security] the new military intelligence service. And there were still others.

But the operation Maletti had conceived did not work out as a safe landing for his group. In March 1976, the general and La Bruna ended up in prison by way of the Piazza Fontana inquiry. This was followed by further problems. And then, for

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everyone, there was the P2 inquiry. Maletti, Viezzer, La Bruna, Santovito and other military top brass were all on Gelli's lists. Only one man weathered all the storms unscathed: Giorgio Angeli, who today holds a key position, the First Division of the SISMI, heir to the former Section D of the SID.

Boldrini: Everything in the Open

During World War II, he was a legendary partisan chief operating under the name of Bulow. For the past 33 years, as a PCI parliamentarian, he has been a member of the Defense Committee. In 1974 he was the architect of the new communist tack with respect to the Armed Forces. Arrigo Boldrini is also known as the PCI's "minister of Defense." PANARAMA asked him to talk about the events of 1974 and about relations with the Intelligence Services.

[Question] How did the change come about?

[Answer] There was a need to respond to years of immobility by the left-of-center governments with respect to military policy. Elements favoring reform were already present in the Armed Forces. It was urgent to isolate the most reactionary groups.

[Question] How did the military respond?

[Answer] The results speak for themselves: Today, Parliament has a control function over military policy.

[Question] After the change, did you meet with officials of the Intelligence Services?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Who took the initiative?

[Answer] Some elements of the Services. They were aware that a reform was needed. They took the same initiative with other members of the Defense Committee.

[Question] But specifically who requested the meeting with you?

[Answer] I do not remember. Too much time has gone by.

[Question] Why did some of these talks take place in secret offices of the SID?

[Answer] That is not true. They did not take place in secret places.

[Question] Until when did these meetings continue to take place?

[Answer] I had meetings until the reform of the Services in the spring of 1978.

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ITALY

PROFILES OF NEW PSI SECRETARIES MARTELLI, SPINI

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 25 Sep 81 pp 22-23

[Article by Enrico Nassi: "Precocious, Intellectual and Different"]

[Text] Before the beginning of summer he had asked for an organizational chart covering internal party jobs. Then, because his closest collaborators (including Ministers Rino Formica and Gianni De Michelis) could not agree and even offered different proposals that could not be reconciled, he made the decision himself. And, as if that were not enough, he announced his choice to the newspapers even before he announced them to the party executive. Thus Bettino Craxi, PSI [Italian Socialist Party] secretary, solved the problem of naming party assistant secretaries. He named two because the party bylaws approved at Palermo called for the appointment of one or more assistant secretaries. Those named, Claudio Martelli and Valdo Spini, were the last to know after rumors had already made their way inside and outside the party. Who are they? What training do they have? What ideas do they have? How do they live? What do they read? IL MONDO made a "politoscope" for each.

[Claudio Martelli] Background--The third of three children, Claudio Martelli was born at Gessate, in Milan Province, on 24 September 1943. His father was a white-collar worker and his mother an elementary schoolteacher. The family soon moved to Milan to a house in the suburbs near Piazzale Loreto. There was little money and life was very hard. (Martelli said, "My mother taught in a provincial school. She arose at 6 am and got home at 6 pm. She worked herself to death so that we could have a little bit of education.")

In fact, the very young Claudio was enrolled at the Giosue Carducci Classical High School where he got his first political experience in student associations.

His family's financial condition improved. ("Along with the first symptoms of the economic boom even we were touched by the miracle.") Martelli enrolled in the university, studying philosophy, and he married almost immediately. But the marriage lasted only a year and a half. "The infatuation was over. We separated as friends."

Training--It was his older brother (Antonio, now director of the Confindustria Economic Research Office) who took the high school student Claudio to the PRI [Italian

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Republican Party] meetings. There, for some time, he was involved in politics on the national level in the youth movement. Marriage forced Martelli to take an office job. When his marriage ended, Martelli, who in the meantime had been working on a thesis on the idea of tolerance, quit his job at the PRI and lived on income from temporary jobs. ("At that time political activity was subordinated to my almost total commitment to my studies...The university was one of the things that worked splendidly for me. I studied a lot, even beyond the requirements.") The turning point came in 1966. Martelli joined the socialist party, taking a group of students with him. ("It seemed to me that the new PSI could understand the need for a democratic, lay and modern Left.") His life was changed by a meeting with Bettino Craxi. ("I asked him if he thought I had what it took to make a start as a professional politician. Without wasting words he said yes.")

Principles--Martelli likes the word liberal and those who know him describe his political identity as follows: "He is a liberal socialist with an idea of the Left that strains to live up to the general principles of democratic freedoms, above all with great attention to relations between the individual and society." It was not by chance that in 1977 he was the inspiration for the famous biennial of dissent. And Martelli was one of the most tenacious spokesmen of the so-called humanitarian line during the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, first, and that of Giovanni D'Urso, later. In any case, his fixed idea centers on mass media. Not by chance, as soon as he was elected secretary, Craxi entrusted him with the information sector. Martelli, who as a deputy and member of the education and fine arts committee, presented draft reform legislation to revitalize the cinema, music and theater. The title of his essay, which aroused considerable discussion, is "Information and Power." He also published "Socialists in Confrontation," and "Socialist Renewal."

Choices--When in 1971 Craxi suggested that Martelli dedicate himself entirely to politics, perhaps he did not think his advice would be followed with such determination. In 1974, Martelli was already the secretary of the Milan PSI and in 1977, group leader in the Milan City Council. Considered a moderate hawk, it was he who fought for the creation of the first leftist council at Milan. After 5 years of university teaching, he quit his job in 1975. A year later, the recently-appointed Craxi invited him rather peremptorily to follow him to Rome. When he arrived in the capital, Martelli immediately became a very well-known important person and was accused of trying to play the role of protagonist at any price. Later he confessed: "The important thing is that the external image of political life, the applause, the consensus, be instruments and not an end. I understood this after a short time. At the beginning I may have been momentarily intoxicated. But after I was burned a few times I learned."

Personality--Martelli says, "As a politician, I prefer to be intractable rather than falsely available, soft and condescending." Martelli's personality was the subject of considerable discussion inside and outside the party, even because he was disorderly and did not keep appointments. His friends describe him as "patient and practical;" his enemies as, "detached and cold." Martelli does not yet have an actual staff even though it is to be expected that he would have one soon. So far he has worked by engaging in discussion with his friends who are not necessarily his collaborators: Massimo Longo, member of the SIPRA [advertising agency for stocks] Board of Directors; Vittorio Giacci, head of the party's theater section; Carlo Fontana,

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member of the administrative board of Fonit Cetra; and Pasquale Guadagnolo, head of the PSI Press Office. Martelli loves the movies, and he prefers American action films, even though he pays attention to some great directors such as Ingmar Bergman and Federico Fellini. He likes to travel: This year, with his second wife Annarosa Pedoi and his son Giacomo (age 5), he spent the summer traveling through California in a camper.

[Valdo Spini] Background--Born in Florence on 20 January 1946, Valdo Spini, as some jokingly say of him, is a true son of peace since he was conceived in the spring of 1945. His father Giorgio, history professor at the University of Florence, is the author of the history book studied by almost all Italian high school students. The name Valdo openly declares the Protestant origin of the family. But few know that only the mother of the present Assistant Secretary of the PSI is really Waldensian. Valdo's father is a Methodist, even though this no longer means very much since the two churches are about to reunite.

Young Spini enrolled in the Dante classical high school, from which, following a reading of Claudio Napoleoni's "Economic Thought in the 20th Century," he transferred to the economics and commerce department "where I discovered that there was little economy and much commerce." He received his degree with a thesis on criticism of the theory of enterprise and he became an assistant university professor in political science (he now awaits a permanent post), where he taught the history of economic doctrine.

Training--His first political experience goes back to his high school days when Spini joined the New Resistance group, organized by Alberto Scardone, who later became Enrico Berlinguer's head of the press office. Since his father, Giorgio, a member of the Action Party, was a friend of Tristano Codignola, Valdo became a friend of Codignola's son, Federico, during his experience in New Resistance. When Spini became a member of the Socialist Party in 1961 (when he was favorably impressed by the revitalization of the Youth Federation), he established direct relations also with Federico's father, who in Florence represented the Riccardo Lombardi Left from minority positions.

At the university, Valdo committed himself to the UGI [Italian Student Union]. He became the president of the Florence UGI, and in 1967 became national president. However, he soon resigned because he intuitively recognized that student organizations were on the decline. Always a follower of Lombardi, Spini became known for his non-sectarian positions. He said, "I have never been one of those socialists who is happy to be distinguished from European socialism."

Principles--Spini often showed a "passion for politics not purely technical," but guided by the idea that values can be affirmed through participation.

A disciplinarian like many Protestants, Spini often engaged in discussions with the Waldensian group that worked at Quaderni Rossi [Red Notebooks]. As he himself relates, he was often accused of right-leaning reformism.

His political vision, as well as his student training, created in him a passion for cadre training. He dedicated himself to this work until a short time ago (the last seminar, on the Lucania earthquake, was in February 1981).

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He published several essays, either alone or in collaboration with others: "The PSI Cadres;" "The Tuscan CLN [Committee of National Liberation] and the Reconstruction," (now competing for the Prato prize); "Florence: The Urban Program and Politics," (the latter in collaboration with Mirella Zoppi, who was to become his wife).

He is about to publish an essay on [Law] 675, the law for industrial reconversion.

Choices--In 1974 the Center-Left collapsed at Florence and a leftist council was formed. The 1975 elections carried Spini to the city council, where, for the six socialist representatives, there were five positions available for the post of council advisor. Valdo chose to become head of the group. In 1972 (Genoa Congress) he became alternate member of the central committee. He became a full member in 1976. At the Turin Congress in 1978, Spini fought for the success of the socialist plan developed by his friends of the Left. He became committed to it also in view of European elections and, with seminars set up at a rapid pace ("following the methods of active teaching"), he sought to prepare the party structure for the European campaign. He was elected to the executive in autumn 1980 and took the place of Aldo Aniasi, who in the meantime had become a member of the cabinet.

He considers that one of his most important choices was to refuse to abandon the socialist party at the time of the unification with the social democrats. ("It was an important experience because I learned to accept a minority condition.")

Personality--Reserved and studious, Spini never liked to show off. For this reason, too, his recent appointment surprised everyone who does not know about the work he did for the party. Married, with a 6-year old daughter, Lucilla, Spini dedicates equal shares of his time to his love of the sea and the mountains. Even though he is not a sporting enthusiast, he likes to swim and to walk. His preferred leisure-time activity ("but unfortunately there is too little leisure time"), is the cinema and particularly the new American cinema, "because of its commitment to describing social changes." Among the books he has read most are those on history and politics. He was very entertained when he read the book by Umberto Eco, "The Name of the Rose." His friends are largely inherited from his political work, but often he visits friends of his wife who teaches art in the gardens of the architectural faculty at Florence.

Even though he is willing to fight from minority positions, he does not like violent ruptures and he was undoubtedly the exponent of the Left who most disliked the rupture of the alliance with Craxi after the Turin Congress.

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GENERAL

ITALY

PROFILE OF EMERGING LOCAL PRI LEADER CORONA

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 25 Sep 81 pp 27-29

[Article by Paolo Passarini: "The Little Sardinian Doctor"]

[Text] A physician, a Mason and rich, Corona has tripled PRI support on the island. He is not interested in parliament: "I have too much to do at Cagliari..."

Well, my dear Armandino, ivy doesn't grow in Sardinia, but in compensation at your place..." Ugo Laralfa was in the habit of making that humorous remark after dinner or supper at Armandino Corona's house. He would emerge from the small house in Via dei Punici, in the high section of Cagliari, and turning back, with his back to the small private pool, he would stop and look at the thick mantle of climbing vines that barely left enough room to see out of the little villa's windows. Armandino would smile, a little timidly and a little craftily, while he accompanied the great leader of his party to his hotel. He would look at that strange and friendly man, who for him was both a myth and a friend (a friend he always addressed with the formal "lei"), and he probably thought: "Patience, patience, and ivy will also grow in Sardinia."

And that is what happened. Corona is no longer alone in the regional council. The most recent Sardinian election verdict flanked him with two more republican councillors. The 30,000 votes that the PRI [Italian Republican Party] gathered in the island total 3 percent, equal to the national percentage. If LaMalfa were alive he could no longer have his little joke because in recent years Corona's power increased more than that of the PRI in Sardinia. And his power is not merely local. In order to understand it, it is enough to glance at the composition of the office of the national secretariat of the party that Giovanni Spadolini organized after his rise to Palazzo Chigi. In addition to Spadolini, who has kept the job of secretary, other members are Bruno Visentini, party president; Oddo Biasini, ex-secretary; the two group leaders in the Chamber and the Senate, Oscar Mammi and Libero Gualtieri and, finally Corona, who thus has assumed the role of guarantor of the rank and file of the entire party toward its leaders.

That is no small thing, but it is explainable if one considers the fact that, for many years, Corona worked in the party also as president of the Ethics Committee. The PRI is a small party, but rather turbulent, where serious problems often explode.

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Corona, like the physician he is, would go to the scene and administer first aid. He worked with delicacy and sensitivity, qualities that everyone recognizes in him and which are very necessary in dealing with individualists who are often irritable, as the republicans are. A case in point is the secession guided toward liberal shores by Pietro Bucalossi ("What a coincidence; another doctor," Corona notes in telling the story) on the eve of political elections in 1979. Corona at that time received a double mandate: to contain losses and above all, to tone down the external echoes of the affair. Bucalossi greeted the party in the atmosphere of a "gentleman's agreement," even though he gritted his teeth, and everyone was grateful to the Cagliari doctor.

For the record, Armando Corona was born about 30 kilometers from Cagliari at Villa Putzu, on 3 April 1921. His anarchist father worked as an employee in the tax office; his Catholic mother took care of the large family, 12 children, of whom only 5 survive today ("At that time even influenza resulted in death," Corona recalls). There was considerable poverty in the family. Despite this, Armandino (everyone began to call him that because he was smaller than anyone else on the volleyball [pallone] team on which he played left wing,) succeeded in getting an education and shortly after the war he became a physician. His idol, even during his university years, was Emilio Lussu. Corona's father had a signed photo of Lussu. Armandino began to work in the Sardinian Action Party and in the meantime he took steps to obtain an assignment as municipal doctor which finally arrived. First he was assigned to Senis, between Nuoro and Oristano and then at Ales, the town where Antonio Gramsci was born. He left Ales in 1963 because he was named provincial councillor at Cagliari.

However, a basic disagreement began to develop between Corona and the pro-Sardinian forces who increasingly stressed a separatist tendency. In 1964 the split came and Corona's membership in La Malfa's party coincided with the birth of the PRI in Sardinia. Corona has represented the party in the regional council since 1969. At that point there began the political rise of the little doctor, who in 1977 became vice president of the council and soon after president of the regional assembly in the very important phase of autonomist unity, the form taken in the Sardinian region by democratic solidarity. Until his resignation (submitted in the spring of 1979 when the grand majority began to creak), he functioned as a point of equilibrium in the Sardinian political structure.

In his most recent speech in the regional council last June, Corona said: "The opposition of the large political forces abolishes any area of maneuver for the small parties and suppresses its imagination, originality and creativity. By simple instinct of self-preservation, it pushes them into withdrawing to any kind of a refuge under the protection of the big parties." And he added that autonomist unity "becomes indispensable and necessary above all in the areas that are socially and economically weaker as is our Sardinia." While the region is governed by a leftist council with the external support of the republicans, Corona pushes for the maintenance of the relationship with the Christian Democratic opposition. To a considerable extent, that is what the council does and therefore Corona maintains his position as the linchpin among the parties of the island. It is not by chance that there are whispers that, following one of the frequent crises, he could be the new president of the council.

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To those who ask him how he became so powerful, Corona calmly replies, "My power is a moral power." And that must be true judging by the fact that everyone turns to him to fill the role of arbitrator. In addition to being a great political mediator, the head of the ethics committee of his party, ex-president of a regional assembly, Corona also has the job of president of the Masonic Central Court. In other words, he is the man who is guiding the internal trial of Licio Gelli.

But moral power does not necessarily exclude material power and rather, in some cases, it can be its handmaiden. And, as far as Corona is concerned, the basis of his success can be found in the decade from 1960 to 1970. It was primarily physicians and professionals who, with Corona, built the Republican Party in 1964 and 1965. Armandino always enjoyed good relations with them even as a professional, a professional who in the meantime built himself a clinic which he was to sell later. By carefully administering the income from the sale and income from his job as a doctor (buying and selling land, engaging in construction projects together with his sister, who is the ex-regional leader of the PCI), Corona is well to do. And his little three-floor home where he lives ("One floor per child, we are all together, I am an old patriarch"), he even owns the apartment where the PRI has its headquarters ("Naturally they don't pay rent"). And he claims he supports the party with more than 25 to 30 million lire a year in contributions.

His relationship with doctors and professionals in general is very good. A faithful friend, Salvatore Ghirra, PRI secretary at Cagliari, is also the administrator of the consortium of private clinics, a considerable power if it is considered that in Sardinia public health has an almost unimportant role.

After all it was his doctor friends who around 1960 led the municipal doctor of Ales to the Masonic lodges of the eastern coast. They said, "Here in Sardinia 10 gentlemen together can do a great deal." To him this seemed the natural continuation of the ideals of justice and freedom. In addition, he found quite a few ex-partisans among the freemasons. In the meantime, his relations with Sardinian professionals became increasingly more fraternal, so to speak, in addition to becoming more extensive up to his present position of power over the health structure. But despite the power in the field of health, the Masons, relations with construction contractors, it is very difficult to find someone who could indicate precisely some shady area in Corona's activities. Even among the communists, many openly maintained that the man makes money, but correctly and paying his taxes.

In the meantime, the ramifications of moral power increase. Armando Corona was the man who was the most active in bringing the publisher Carlo Caracciolo to the island, at first supporting the revitalization of NUOVA SARDEGNA, (part of which, it is said, he owns) and then the electronic transmission to Cagliari of LA REPUBBLICA ("Caracciolo could represent a civilized and cultured voice of the continent on the island; he can unite Sardinia"). And again it is Corona, for the love of the red and blue [soccer team], who is becoming involved in solving the problem of the Cagliari property which now, after Nino Rovelli's defeat, belongs to the state. The presidency of Gigi Riva's former team was offered to Corona, but he refused saying: "As Franco Evangelisti showed, sport and politics do not mix."

But how does it happen that a personage of that kind has not yet arrived in parliament? It answers, "It is anticipated that elections will be held earlier than

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- expected in May 1982. Obviously, I have been asked to be a candidate. But I said no, I still have too much to do here." Perhaps, as many in Sardinia say of him, Armandino Corona is indeed a very cagy man.

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