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9 November 1981

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 58/81)



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### CONTENTS

#### THEATER FORCES

##### FRANCE

Modernization of Nuclear Weapons Planned  
(Pierre Mauroy; AIR & COSMOS, 19 Sep 81) ..... 1

#### POLITICAL

##### FRANCE

Detailed Analysis of Presidential, Legislative Elections  
(Alain Lancelot; PROJECT, Sept-Oct 81) ..... 4

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANNED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 19 Sep 81 pp 40, 64

[Report on Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy's speech to the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies in Paris; date not specified]

[Text] Pierre Mauroy, prime minister of the French Government formed this June, spoke at the opening session of the 34th class of the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies (IHEDN). He outlined, for the institute's civilian and military auditors, the principal points of France's defense policy.

Recourse to a Genuine People's Mobilization

The prime minister opened his remarks by stating that "for a government, defense is, like the threat, a comprehensive matter and cannot be examined solely from the military viewpoint....

"A divided country is a weak country. To have Frenchmen take active responsibility for their security, they must feel themselves bolstered and protected by the fact of being part of the nation....

"Before being able to ask citizens to assume their responsibilities to society, the latter should guarantee their rights, and foremost of all their right to work.

"Extended and more thorough deliberation on national compulsory military service, its substance and its length, must incorporate particularly these established principles. Beyond the fact that our nuclear deterrent force cannot be the sole guarantee of our defense and that it is essential for our three traditional military services to have sufficient well-trained and well-equipped personnel, national compulsory military service is one of the expressions of national solidarity. It is through such service that the unity of the French people can and must show itself, unity that is indispensable to the effectiveness of our defense policy.

"Although the present conjuncture precludes our reducing the length of compulsory military service in the immediate future, there is still a need to make such service more efficient. This term of service, during which each citizen fulfills, of course, a duty but also exercises his right to learn the profession of arms, must be a period of genuine instruction and training. And inasmuch as this is a right vested in each citizen, there is no reason for women to be excluded therefrom in the name of a historical tradition. Hence the women's voluntary service should be encouraged.

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"A more substantial military service of truly operational character would make it possible to face the problem of territorial defense dynamically by having recourse to a genuine people's mobilization."

Independent Military Policy

After having emphasized that "France intends to remain loyal to its allies, the foremost of which is the United States of America," and that it also "abides by all of the treaties which produced the Western European Union," the prime minister reminded his audience that "France's policy is by no means neutralist," that "any isolation is impracticable," and that "aggression against France does not begin when the enemy penetrates into our national territory."

He did point out, however, that "France intends to retain its independence in making military choices and decisions. The instrumentality of this decision-making independence is the nuclear deterrent. If General de Gaulle was able to follow an independent military policy which resulted in making France withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty's integrated military organization, it is because he chose to give the country a nuclear capability. It is true that research in this field had been initiated much before General de Gaulle came to power.

"The government assumes full responsibility for continued implementation of that choice. In fact, the country's military posture gives it no other means of recourse.

"Induced to seek an independent military defense system, our country has established a powerful nuclear force for which it is indebted to no one. This gives it a specific role in the world and particularly in Europe...."

Anticities Strategy

Prime Minister Mauroy added: "French strategy remains, therefore, a strategy whereby the weak deters the strong, in other words a strategy which can only be anticities. It is essentially based on the capability of inflicting upon even the most powerful aggressor damage deemed greater than the stake which the country's vital interests represent to him. This strategy is made possible by what is called the equalizing power of the atom. Yet this deterrence must also be credible, that is to say actuated in the highest degree by an unshakable political will buttressed with a clear and averred doctrine as well as with the existence of sufficient forces and weapons to compel the adversary to so reckon with them that he forgoes his attack.

"A strategy is not immutable, however, and must adapt itself to changes in threats and technologies. It is certainly quite out of the question for France to adopt, like the United States, a strategy of deterrence comprising a varied and complete range of responses that could be adapted, according to the situation, to different possible levels of aggression....

Complementary Tactical Nuclear Weapons

"Despite continuous adaptations and modernization, the strategic nuclear deterrent may prove to be inadequate by itself alone or may be circumvented. To avoid this circumvention, conventional forces enhanced by tactical nuclear weapons now complement the strategic nuclear deterrent. Tactical nuclear weaponry's role is to

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restore deterrence at the strategic level. Its employment would serve notice of the President of the Republic's determination to take extreme measures and resort, if need be, to antipopulation nuclear weapons.

"Hence it is not a question of using tactical nuclear weapons to win a battle, but of credibly brandishing, through them, the strategic nuclear threat in the event the aggressor, were, in spite of everything, to start an armed conflict in the European theater. In addition, the presence of these weapons in our conventional forces compels the enemy to disperse his forces to reduce their vulnerability to nuclear attack, thus reducing his offensive capability.

"For 7 years now, the army has been equipped with Pluton [surface-to-surface missiles] for which a successor will soon have to be found. The navy, with its carrier-based Super Etendard aircraft, and the air force, with its Jaguar aircraft, and soon its Mirage 2000's armed with the medium-range air-to-surface missile, also have a tactical nuclear capability.

"As is the case with our strategic forces, we should keep abreast of technical advances by periodically adapting and modernizing the weapons and delivery vehicles of our tactical nuclear arsenal."

Continued Study of Neutron Weapons

Mauroy recalled that "the United States recently decided to arm itself with enhanced radiation weapons, the so-called neutron bombs. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, according to its very own statements, is thoroughly capable of producing such weapons. These developments must alert us. Neutron weapons are tactical nuclear weapons for the same reason as the others. They pose, therefore, a threat of employment on a battlefield that could extend to Western Europe. As far as we are concerned, it would not be rational to renounce a priori acquiring a weapon that could increase our deterrent capability. This capability still has to be given more thorough study. That is why the government has decided to continue the studies on this subject."

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Paris PROJET in French Sept-Oct 81 pp 915-939

[Article by Alain Lancelot, Center for Studying French Contemporary Life of the National Political Science Foundation]

[Text] Just as after each election\*, A. Lancelot analyzes here in detail the results of the presidential and legislative elections: 7 weeks of elections threw political France in confusion. After that "calm revolution," the socialists have many trump cards in their hands, but they also have to face up to considerable risks.

On 21 June 1981, the French people entered summer after having upset from top to bottom their leadership and their political representation by a revolution as calm as the one governing the change of seasons. Who would have believed, 2 months earlier, that Mitterrand would make a fool of Marchais in the first round, would beat Giscard d'Estaing in the second, would elect to the Assembly an absolute majority of socialist deputies and would finally admit communist ministers in the government without causing this prodigious series to give rise in the nation to anything other than congenial enthusiasm or genuine uneasiness? Who would have said that Fiterman would sit very naturally in D'Ornano's chair without giving rise to anything other than curiosity, without the slightest appearance of the shadow of the smallest "chaos"? French democracy is definitely more adult than was thought. The political myths on which we have lived grew terribly old overnight during the last few weeks. A great administration is asserting itself.

Without losing our reason for all that and falling from one mythology into another, on hearing the new ministers bring up for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all the 10 May "liberation" and condemn the "old regime," we find the same irritation as we found in the face of "CRS = SS" [State Security Police = Schutzstaffel] in May 1968. In order to arrive at a more fair evaluation of the situation, we shall do our best to observe some scientific detachment. The exact extent of the change that came out of the ballot boxes can be derived only by an

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\* For the last important elections, see PROJET Number 88 (September-October 1974), Number 126 (June 1978) and Number 138 (September-October 1979).

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impartial analysis of the fluctuations in the voters during the 7 weeks of recurrent elections through which France has just gone.

First Round: 26 April

The 1981 presidential election is the first one occurring at its normal time since 1965. That is to say that it was preceded by an interminable campaign. Since the 1978 legislative election--in spite of the apparent distraction of the 1979 European election--preparation for the presidential election polarized France's entire political activity. On the right, announcement of the first serious candidacy, Michel Debre, it is true, only dates from 30 June 1980. But then a Chirac candidacy aimed at taking on speed. It had been predictable since the "Cochin call" in December 1978, if not since establishment of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] in December 1976, although it was not to become official until 3 February 1981. Meanwhile, Marie-France Garaud also entered the ring as a candidate on 23 October 1980, undoubtedly without giving rise to as many illusions as as Debre on the deterrent effect of this decision on Chirac's candidacy. With regard to Giscard d'Estaing, he announced his candidacy officially on 2 March 1981, but no one never seriously doubted his desire, at the age of 55 years, to renew his term in office.

On the left, the candidacy of Marchais, announced on 12 October 1980, had been foreseen as long as Chirac's candidacy on the right. The same logic applies: attempt to restrain, if not to upset, the restoration of balance that occurred to the benefit of the party most in the center in each of the two large coalitions contending for the government of France. On the other hand, more uncertainties surrounded the noncommunist and the extreme left candidacies.

With regard to the noncommunist left, the problem was less that of a radical left candidacy--finally settled on 28 February 1981 by the nomination of Crepeau--than a problem of identity of the socialist candidate: Michel Rocard or Francois Mitterrand? Rocard dates from the evening of the second round of the 1978 legislative election and constantly held the field captivating interest of the media and prancing at the head of opinion polls, but he pledged, in the Metz Congress, not to seek the party's nomination against Francois Mitterrand. Mitterrand maneuvered without declaring himself. He had opening of the nomination procedure within his party delayed until autumn 1980, allowing his young competitor to put himself forward on 18 October by means of the unfortunate "Conflans call," in order better to make a fool of him a few days later by seeming to respond to the requests of friendly federations. Francois Mitterrand, who announced his candidacy on 8 November and who was nominated on 24 January 1981 by a unanimous special congress of his party, regained abundantly the image of a 'winner' in the eyes of public opinion by replacing Michel Rocard, who had forbidden himself from opposing him. The old fighter won a decisive "primary" without striking a blow, giving him new political youth as if he had taken over the youth of the discarded challenger.

On the extreme left, division between the formations still raised the same problems. Ariette Laguiller and Alain Krivine wanted to represent their separate Trotskyite families. Huguette Bouchardeau intended to speak for the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] and Roget Garaudy had become spokesman of the new "social movements" a long time ago, close to the ecologist movement in which there were a number of candidates for nomination: Brice Lalonde, selected by the 15 June 1980 "primaries,"



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Jean-Claude Delarue, and even Jacques-Yves Cousteau. But all those candidacies ran up against the new provisions governing presidential elections since 18 June 1976, stipulating that no one can be a candidate, if he has not obtained the signature of 500 elected officials (members of Parliament, departmental councilmen, mayors) belonging to at least 30 departments or overseas territories. These strict regulations rejected A. Krivine in the far right and the two extreme left candidates who announced their candidacy on the same day, 11 November 1979: Jean-Marie Le Pen, nominated by the National Front, and Pascal Gauchon, nominated by the New Forces Party. In addition, it dissuaded Roger Garaudy, Jean-Claude Delarue and even--if we believe the press--about 60 other more or less freakish candidates from having a chance to present their ideas during the great April-May 1981 election meet.

## A Negative Campaign

Four features of the election campaign of the 10 candidates finally approved by the Constitutional Council merit being pointed out: 1. this campaign contributed practically nothing: everything had been said and repeated since 1978; 2. it was dominated by unemployment and inflation: all the outgoing president's adversaries claimed to do better than he and he himself promised to make the struggle against unemployment the first of his priorities; 3. consequently, the campaign was more negative than positive: the nine "anti-Giscard" candidates criticized the economic and social policy of the Barre government, which they accused of having made the crisis worse, and Giscard d'Estaing assured that the policy of his successors would be still worse; 4. aside from the "little" candidates who often contributed a certain amount of freshness, the campaign prize list gave the advantage to Chirac and Mitterrand over Giscard d'Estaing and Marchais. Chirac's campaign was definitely the more dynamic and the most inventive one, although this invention consisted in importing the topic of less central government authority dear to Reagan. Mitterrand's campaign had effective discretion. Under the sign of "the calm force," the socialist candidate was careful not to put himself forward too much and he carefully smoothed out all his personal or political rough spots. Giscard d'Estaing's campaign, condemned to repeat presidential or governmental speeches, lacked a little wind and conviction, disillusioning those who expected miracles from entrance in the race by the office-holder. With regard to the campaign of Marchais, it was content to repeat a well-worn "act" in which irony was mixed with brutality on a background of simplistic demagoguery that was beginning to tire.

Apparently, nothing very new, consequently, when destiny gave the three traditional knocks and the curtain was raised on 26 April on the first tableau of an "election drama" about which it was not yet known whether it would involve two or four acts. But as early as the evening of the first round, surprise was in the contest. Something budged, as is shown by the results given in table 1 [next page].

If we adhere to great trends, the change was certainly limited in comparison with the three previous elections:

<u>Metropolitan</u> <u>France</u>	<u>Presidential</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>Legislative</u> <u>1978</u>	<u>European</u> <u>1979</u>	<u>Presidential</u> <u>1981</u>
Participation	84.9	83.3	61.1	81.7
Left	46.1	49.8	47.5	47.3
Ecologists	1.3	2.2	4.4	3.9
Center and right	52.6	48.0	48.1	48.8

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Table 1: Presidential Election, First Round, 26 April 1981

	Metropolis		Overseas		Abroad	Total
(1) Inscrits	35 458 985	100	807 815	100	132 059	36 398 859
(2) Votants	28 972 114	81,70	444 474	55,32	99 494	29 516 082
Abstentions	6 486 871	18,29	363 341	44,97	32 565	6 882 777
(3) Blancs et nuls	467 479	1,31	9 747	1,20	739	477 965
(4) Exprimés	28 504 635	100	434 727	100	98 755	29 038 117
Laguiller	661 119	2,31	6 046	1,39	892	668 057
Bouchardeau	318 113	1,11	1 446	0,33	1 794	321 353
Marchais	4 412 949	15,48	42 293	9,72	1 680	4 456 922
Mitterrand	7 437 282	26,09	50 566	11,63	18 112	7 505 960
Crépeau	638 944	2,24	2 369	0,54	1 534	642 847
(5) Total gauche	13 468 407	47,25	102 720	23,62	24 012	13 595 139
Lalonde	1 118 232	3,92	3 919	0,90	4 103	1 126 254
Giscard d'Estaing	7 929 850	27,81	247 656	56,96	44 926	8 222 432
Chirac	5 138 569	18,02	65 491	15,06	21 788	5 225 848
Debré	468 780	1,64	11 588	2,66	1 453	481 821
Garaud	380 797	1,33	3 353	0,77	2 473	386 623
(6) Total droite	13 917 996	48,82	328 088	75,46	70 640	14 316 724
						49,30

Key:

1. Registered
2. Voters
3. Blank and void
4. Valid votes
5. Total left
6. Total right

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The participation, just honorable and nothing more, expresses rather well the boredom produced by the campaign. The left was outclassed, on the whole, by the majority just as in 1979 and 1974, while it had the advantage in the first round in 1978. The ecologists confirmed their foothold. Even if we abided by these great trends, these results, however, make it possible to foresee the defeat of Giscard d'Estaing who won by only 1.3 percent in the second round in 1974, while he had a much more comfortable potential. The left, which gained 1.2 points in 7 years, while the right lost 3.8, entered the election with a certain advantage.

This advantage is still more evident when we go into detail on the distribution of votes between the various candidates and especially when we take into account the strength relationships within each coalition.

## Division of the "Majority"

The first round was very disappointing to Valery Giscard d'Estaing. With 27.8 percent in metropolitan France, the outgoing president barely did better than Veil's ticket in the European election (27.4 percent). A fortiori, he did not pick up the sum of the percentages of the Veil and Servan-Schreiber tickets in that same election (29.3 percent), or his own percentage in 1974 (32.9 percent).

From a geographic point of view, if we disregard two departments, one exceptionally favorable (Bas-Rhin) and one unfavorable (Correze), the distribution of Giscard votes is rather spreadout. Giscard d'Estaing exceeded 25 percent in 74 departments. The 22 rebellious departments included--in addition to Haute Corse, Nièvre, Belfort and five departments in the Paris suburbs--14 contiguous departments in the southwestern quarter of the country. In comparison with 1974, this geography is definitely less in contrast. The "low spots" corresponding to the strength areas of J. Chaban-Delmas in the southwest and of J. Royer in Touraine were filled in and the "high spots" in the Breton and Lower Normandy west, the Lorraine, France-Comte and Savoyard east and the Massif Central were mostly worn down. The lost votes were undoubtedly given to the Gaullist movement and to the noncommunist left.

Altogether, the strength relationship within the majority was definitely less favorable to Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 than in 1974 and 1979:

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>
Giscard d'Estaing	32.9	Veil 27.4	Giscard d'Estaing 27.8
Chaban-Delmas	14.6	Chirac- 16.1	Chirac 18.0
		Debre	
Royer	3.2		Debre 1.6
			Garaud 1.3

Does J. Chirac have grounds for being satisfied for all that? It all depends on what he was looking for and I admit total ignorance on this point. If he wanted primarily to weaken the outgoing president, as he incessantly did everything possible since the winter of 1978, on 26 April he must have felt that he had attained his objective, even if Francois Mitterrand was better placed for pulling the chestnuts out of the fire. If he wanted to win over Valery Giscard d'Estaing or at least to appear in the second round as he claimed to be capable of doing, the failure measures up to his aspirations. Obviously Chirac could not

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replace Giscard d'Estaing within the majority. Was he a victim of his dreams? Did he believe for a moment that he could force destiny or was he resigned to sabotaging the Majority, expecting to float to the surface and represent the re-course? It is impossible to decide and perhaps the question makes no sense. Chirac, who is neither so naive or so perverse, might very well have been satisfied to obey an impulsive temperament that only takes the present moment into account. Be that as it may, his results were far from negligible. Chirac, who reached 41.4 percent in Correze, exceeded 25 percent of the votes cast in six departments and no where fell below 13 percent (Nievre: 13.6). His strength areas were still located in the western half of the country, but they expanded in comparison with the European election. The Limoges stronghold spread toward the south and the north. The western stronghold was strengthened in Western Normandy. The Parisian stronghold expanded to the west of the capital and a few high spots showed up in the Alpine southeast. On the other hand, the north and the east, once so Gaullist, are hardly recognized in Chirac.

The scores of Michel Debre and Marie-France Garaud are so low that they call for no comment. Lumped together, they were still lower than Royer's score in 1974. In Indre-et-Loire, the mayor of Amboise obtained 4.3 percent, while the mayor of Tours obtained 33.8 percent. In Amboise itself, Debre beat Chirac by only 22 votes and was 361 votes behind Giscard d'Estaing. The presidential election definitely likes only large battalions.

## Reorganization of the Left

On the whole, the left did a little better in 1981 than in 1974: 47.3 percent, compared with 46.1 percent, or a gain of 1.2 point. That minimum gain is due to small thrust by the extreme left, which went from 2.7 to 3.4 percent (+0.7) and to the good overall result of the parties supporting Francois Mitterrand in 1974. At that time, he obtained 43.3 percent as the single candidate of the left. The communist, socialist and radical left candidates totaled 43.8 percent (+0.5) in 1981.

But this overall stability conceals a formidable upset within the voters of the old "union of the left," which was the decisive factor in the first round and without doubt in the whole election series analyzed here. The number of communist voters declined sharply, while the number of socialist voters increased in the same proportions. Ten years after the Epinay Congress, F. Mitterrand seems to have won his bet to edge out the PC[F], which is the sole key to power for the left:

<u>Party</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1981</u>
PC[F]	21.4	20.6	20.6	15.5
PS-MRG [Radical Left Movement]	20.8	24.9	23.7	28.3

The setback took on historic proportions for Georges Marchais. The Communist Party was brought back to its 1936 level. It obtained a million fewer votes than in November 1946, while it had 10 million more voters. Just as in 1958, at the time of General de Gaulle's return to power, the party suddenly lost one-fourth of its votes.

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
PCF Percentage in Total Votes Cast <sup>1</sup>															
L	C	C	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	P	L	L	E	P	
1936	1945	1946	1946	1951	1956	1958	1962	1967	1968	1969	1973	1978	1979	1981	
15.2	26.2	26.0	28.3	26.9	25.9	19.2	21.8	22.5	20.0	21.5	21.4	20.6	20.6	15.5	

The communist setback is striking not only because of its size but also because of its relative uniformity. Areas of strength and areas of weakness of the party are struck in rather comparable proportions. A few examples taken at various levels of communist establishment show this well:

Maps 1 to 4: Presidential election, first round, 26 April 1981.  
Strength areas of the four leading candidates (departments in which they exceeded their national average).

1 - Giscard d'Estaing  
2 - Chirac

3 - Mitterrand  
4 - Marchais



<sup>1</sup> L = legislative election; C = constituent election; P = presidential election; E = European election.

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<u>Department</u>	<u>March 1978</u>	<u>April 1981</u>	<u>Setback proportion</u>
Seine-Saint Denis	38.0	27.3	28%
Haute-Vienne	33.8	24.3	28%
Pyrenees-Orientales	30.2	20.9	31%
Lot-et-Garonne	23.3	18.1	22%
Seine-et-Marne	20.9	15.4	26%
Doubs	15.1	11.3	25%
Maine-et-Loire	10.1	7.0	31%
Bas-Rhin	6.6	4.6	30%

Therefore, communist geography was hardly changed. The 1981 map gives only a very reduced picture of the 1978 map.

What is the explanation of this sharp drop in the number of communist voters? Undoubtedly, first of all, it should be determined who benefited from it. Based on national statistics, the answer seems simple. The votes lost by the PCF seemed to go primarily to F. Mitterrand and secondarily to abstentionism and to the extreme left. Analysis by department does not contradict this impression, but confuses it somewhat. The map of socialist gains is only partly covered by the map of communist losses. In the Parisian basin, agreement is rather good, just as it is in some departments in the center-west and the southwest. But in the north, the northeast, the west, Limoges and the Mediterranean coast the correlation is less evident. Abstention, the extreme left or ecology benefited here or there from the communist setback. Elsewhere, a transfer toward the center or the right is not unlikely (especially in the Parisian suburbs).

Existence of a preferential transfer toward the noncommunist left can be explained by three reasons, which are not mutually exclusive. The first one lies in the nature of the presidential election and its stake. Polls showed a number of times that the French people were much less numerous in wanting a communist president of the Republic than in voting for communist candidates for the legislative election. Undoubtedly, the 21.5 percent obtained by Jacques Duclos in the 1969 presidential election will be brought up as an objection. But that score is explained in part by the circumstances prevailing at that time. Because the crumbled non-communist left seemed to be incapable of competing with Poher, a number of his voters undoubtedly increased the number of votes for Duclos, in order to try to ensure the presence of a leftist candidate in the second round. The same reverse reasoning unlies the second explanation of the communist setback in 1981. This time, some communist voters probably "voted useful" in the first round to ensure the presence of the left in the second round and to contradict the Chirac deception campaign. This vote was all the more natural at the time, because the socialist candidate was the common candidate in 1965 and 1974 and the permanent spokesman of the union of the left. Here we touch on the third reason that gives their real depth to the two foregoing reasons. By voting socialist in the first round, a good million communist voters without doubt wanted to condemn the sectarian line of G. Marchais, his campaign of disparagement against his former partners, his extreme left Poujadism and his unconditional alignment on Moscow. After the presidential election, the lack of communist recovery in the legislative election confirms this interpretation rather amply. Moreover, a sign might have begun to suggest this before 26 April. It is a question of the poor results obtained by the PCF in the partial cantonal elections since the 1979 replacement. From May

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1979 to March 1980, the PCF lost 6.4 percent of its votes in comparison with previous elections in a total of 37 partial elections<sup>2</sup>. From April 1980 to April 1981, it lost 16.9 percent in a total of 48 cases. This is still far from the 25-percent amputation undergone on 26 April, but the decline seems to have started.

This decline was Francois Mitterrand's historic chance, the first "green light" on the road to his election and total victory. F. Mitterrand, who made socialist influence progress in 75 out of 96 departments, has a personal establishment almost as strong as that of the outgoing president. The gap was only 1.7 point in metropolitan France. His two large strength areas were the southwest and the east, from Moselle to Saone-et-Loire. But he also exceeded the national average in some departments in the Alpine and Rhone southeast, the center-west and western France (Haute Normandie and Bretagne). In comparison with 1978, socialist progress was especially noticeable in the Parisian basin, the Alpine southeast and some departments in the Aquitanian southwest and Cmaurentais. On the other hand, socialism dropped back in 21 departments, some old eroded fiefs (Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Haute-Vienne) and some young mission territory (Mayenne, Cantal or Laute-Loire).

In order to evaluate more accurately the influence of democratic socialism, it would, without doubt, be necessary to add the votes for Michel Crepeau to the votes for F. Mitterrand. The president of the left radicals came in sixth, just behind A. Laguiller. His results are quite uneven all over France. They exceeded 3 percent of the votes cast in 10 department: five in the center-west sensitive to the influence of the mayor of La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime: 11.9 percent, Charente, Vendee, Deux-Sevres and Vienne) and five traditional fiefs of Left Radicals (Haute-Corse, Tarn-et-Garonne, Lot, Indre-et-Loire, Eure-et-Loir; but Fabre's Aveyron was cool toward his successor at the head of the MRG [Left Radicals]). Elsewhere, Crepeau obtained a very small success, a little more marked in the highly urbanized departments, perhaps because of his ecologist options.

The extreme left, represented by two candidates, Arlette Laguiller and Huguette Bouchardeau, obtained, with 3.4 percent, a score slightly higher than in the four previous national elections, without recovering the exceptional results of the immediate "after May 1968" (4.7 percent in 1969). In comparison with that period, the PSU was edged out by Trotskyism:

<u>Party</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1981</u>
PSU : Rocard	3.6	Bouchardeau : 1.1
Trotskyism : Krivine	1.1	Laguiller : 2.3

Together the two candidates exceeded 4 percent in eight departments distributed very significantly in two traditionally protest or self-management regions: Brittany (Finistere, Ille-et-Vilaine, Cotes-du -Nord, Loire-Atlantique) and the Jura and Vosges east (Belfort, Jura, Doubs and Vosges). Elsewhere, the best scores were obtained in the Rhone-Alpes region and the Parisian region.

In those regions, the extreme left, in its PSU component especially, suffered, however, from ecologist competition. With 3.9 percent of the votes, Brice Lalonde

<sup>2</sup> Index calculated in accordance with the statistics of R. Barrillon, LE MONDE, 18 April 1980.

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actually obtained rather fine success, slightly below the 4.4 percent of the Fernex ticket in the 1979 European election, in which the green vote had hardly any consequences, but definitely higher than the 1.3 percent of Rene Dumont in 1974 and the 2.2 percent of the ecologist movement in the 1978 legislative election. In spite of the strictness of the majority system, the ecologist movement, therefore, succeeded in forcing its vote among the country's permanent political movements. Its influence exceeded 2 percent in 93 departments and 4 percent in 32. Its strong points were the Rhone-Alpes region, Jura, Alsace, the Parisian region and some departments involved in the nucleoelectric program (Manche, Finistere, Loire-Atlantique especially).

Because the left obtained 47.3 percent and the "majority" 48.8, the 3.9 percent of ecologists were apparently in a situation of arbiters, just as the center parties were formerly. But the left is better placed with regard to this new third party. In the political rainbow, green is closer to red and to blue.

Francois Mitterrand's Victory: 10 May

The left, freed from the communist possibility and showing a small amount of progress in comparison with 1974, seemed in a position to win as early as the evening of 26 April. The action of withdrawals, the climate in which they were made and the development of the campaign turned this probability into certainty well before the end of the 2 weeks between the two rounds. Withdrawals occurred very quickly on the left. On 28 April, G. Marchais, A. Laguiller, M. Crepeau and H. Bouchardeau all called on their voters to vote for F. Mitterrand. Without illusions for some, but with no reservations. And if Marchais still let himself be carried away to say on television "Have you already seen me roll without cause?", he inspired less fear than pity and the PCF refrained from the slightest provocation. On the right, we had to wait until 5 May for Debré to call especially for votes for the outgoing president and Garaud could not decide to do that. On 7 May, she announced that she was going to cast a blank ballot. On 27 April, Chirac believed that there were no grounds for withdrawal. On 10 May, he said that each one should vote according to his conscience," adding, nevertheless, that "personally ... I can vote only for Giscard d'Estaing." On 6 May, he took note of the outgoing president's statements made in the direction of his own points of view and concluded that "I hope that, like me, (the French people) will be aware of the dangers that the election of Mitterrand would make France incur." This new appeal did not cancel out the disastrous effect caused by a first week of delays and demobilization on the voters for the majority.

In that campaign between the two rounds, Giscard d'Estaing refused, mistakenly without doubt, to dramatize what was at stake in the election and to warn that he ran a strong risk of being beaten, while all the forecasts still continued to regard him as elected, contrary to all logic and contrary to the polls. He was undoubtedly also mistaken to stake so much on his televised debate with Mitterrand, going so far as to request two at the outset. This kind of meeting has little effect on voters. On the other hand, he cannot be blamed for putting forward the "socialist project," in order to force Mitterrand to come out of the vagueness in which he was bathing his campaign. The manner in which the socialist candidate eluded his party's project and held to the small list of his "proposals" smacked a little of a clever trick. But he had to remain consistent with the initial bet that he made very rightly to hold out just to the end: to show himself



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as little as possible, to uncover himself as little as possible and to play the lamb up to the eve of the election. Consequently, an outgoing president who wears himself out asking questions of the sphynx is regarded as an impotent challenger.

Table 2: Presidential Election, Second Round, 10 May 1981

	<u>Metropolitan</u> <u>France</u>		<u>Overseas</u>	<u>Abroad</u>	<u>Total</u>
(1) Inscrits	35 459 328	100	807 293	100	36 390 762
(2) Votants	30 648 932	86,43	496 508	61,50	31 249 552
(3) Abstentions	4 810 396	13,56	310 785	38,49	5 149 210
(4) Blancs et nuls	887 976	2,50	9 103	1,12	898 984
Exprimes	29 760 956	100	487 405	100	30 350 568
Mitterrand	15 541 905	52,22	135 374	27,77	15 708 262
Giscard d'Estaing	14 219 051	47,77	353 031	72,22	14 642 306

## Key:

- |               |                   |
|---------------|-------------------|
| 1. Registered | 3. Blank and void |
| 2. Voters     | 4. Valid votes    |

The 10 May results (table 2) show that this strategy paid off. F. Mitterrand, who was beaten by 344,399 votes in metropolitan France in 1974, won this time over V. Giscard d'Estaing with a lead of 1,322,854 votes. In number of votes, each of the two candidates exceeded, in the second round, his potential in the first. V. Giscard d'Estaing obtained 301,055 votes more than the total for the right and F. Mitterrand 2,073,498 more than the total for the left. Therefore, the some 1,118,000 ecologists were not the only ones to arbitrate. Mobilization of abstentionists also played a part. In fact, abstentionism dropped by 1,676,475 units. But, in view of the duplication--easily explainable--of blank and void ballots, the number of votes cast increased only by 1,256,591. By adding the number of these new votes cast and the number of ecologist voters, we obtain a total of 2,374,823 votes theoretically available to each of the two camps. According to national statistics, 87 percent of these potential voters seem to have chosen the left.

This calculation shows up very well the size of F. Mitterrand's victory, even though it is naturally unrealistic. In fact, it would assume that discipline was perfect in each camp and that all the voters in the first round also voted in the second. Both conditions are false.

The increase in participation certainly does not facilitate analysis of the election discipline by often masking all or part of the bad reports. Often, but not always, at least on the right. While F. Mitterrand obtained, in votes and in percentages, better results than all the left in every department, the situation was much less uniformly favorable for V. Giscard d'Estaing.

Giscard in the Second Round, Compared With Total for the Right in the First Round


<u>In %</u>	<u>In votes</u>	
Setback	Setback	16 departments
Setback	Progress	78 departments
Progress	Progress	2 departments

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
As might be expected, the 16 unfaithful departments all belong to J. Chirac's strength areas, especially in the Limoges region. La Correze is almost caricatural in this respect, because V. Giscard d'Estaing did not even get the number of votes in the second round that J. Chirac obtained in the first. In order to detect signs of infidelity on the left, it is necessary to drop down to the communal level and carefully select among the communes with a strong communist implantation. Thus, traces of discontent are found in Ivry, Villejuif or Arcueil. But only traces. Essentially, discipline worked well on the left and F. Mitterrand owes his success, in the following order, to communist discipline, an increase in participation, a transfer of Chirac voters and the carryover of the majority of ecologist voters. The postelectoral poll taken by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] confirms these conclusions and makes it possible to make a credible appraisal of the transfers from one round to the other.

<u>First Round Vote</u>	<u>Second Round Vote</u>		<u>Abstentions</u>
	<u>Mitterrand</u>	<u>Giscard</u>	<u>or no reply</u>
Marchais = 100%	92	2	6
Lalonde = 100%	53	26	21
Chirac = 100%	16	73	11

Map 5: Presidential election: second round, 10 May 1981, departments in which V. Giscard d'Estaing had a majority



Map 6: Departments in which V. Giscard d'Estaing did not obtain, on 10 May, the total number of rightist votes on 26 April



Owing to these contributions, Francois Mitterrand brought the total number of left-ist votes up to a level never attained since the establishment of the Fifth Republic. How is that explained? First of all, the modification of the body of voters must not be overlooked. From 1978 to 1981, there were an additional 1,056,102 registrations in metropolitan France. But, in that same period, mortality struck around 1,515,000 persons of voting age. Therefore, new registration amount to around 2.57 million persons, mostly young persons about whom polls show us that almost two-thirds of them voted for the socialist candidate. Even if we agree that these new registered voters may have abstained more than than their elders (on the order of a fourth), they did not contribute less than 1.2 million votes to F. Mitterrand compared with only 700,000 to his opponent, hit, on the other hand, more than proportionally by the death of elderly voters.

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Added to that is the effect of the mobilization of abstentionists. Almost 88 percent of the registered voters voted on 19 May 1974 and over 83 percent on 12 March 1978, while only 81.7 percent voted on 26 April 1981. Therefore, there was undeniably a reserve of potential leftist voters, in view of the second round within abstention. On the basis of the second round in 1974, this reserve might amount to 1.9 million voters, approximately. At least<sup>3</sup> 1.6 million were undoubtedly mobilized to ensure F. Mitterrand's victory on 10 May.

There remains the transfer of voters who voted for Chirac, Debre or Garaud in the first round. Apparently, a conversion more difficult to explain is involved. Neither J. Chirac's "para-Reaganism," nor M. Debre's historical De Gaullism, nor M. F. Garaud's antisovietism leads to a choice of F. Mitterrand rather than V. Giscard d'Estaing. But political space is not one-dimensional. Many voters who voted for the three archeo- or neo-Gaullist candidates in the first round essentially expressed rejection of the outgoing president, accompanied by a preference for replacement rather than for rotation. When replacement failed, a considerable part of those favoring replacement chose a change when faced with a choice between continuity and change. Because aspiration to a change was very strong in the spring of 1981. The prospects of seeing the same man and, without doubt, basically the same team, stay in office 7 more years, that is to say a total of 14 years, seemed truly intolerable to many. De Gaulle himself was able to remain in office only 11 years and his supports dropped, during that period, from 79.2 percent to 46.8 percent.

Moreover, the French people ended up by believing that the crisis was made worse rather than attenuated by the policy of the Barre government. This opinion is not shared by most of the foreign experts, but the voters do not search for their reasons in economic periodicals. When the RPR joined in the concert of critics of the opposition, the government's economic policy appeared to the majority of the people to be an inadmissible failure. Under those conditions, reelection of V. Giscard d'Estaing promised to be difficult. Deterioration of his personal image resulting from unworthy campaigns, but also owing to the accentuation of certain defects (taste for political "gadgets," inability to open himself up to question, selection of a flattering following) were to do the rest. Seven years ago, the article that I wrote for PROJET ended as follows: "If the new team fails, there is no longer any other solution than rotation and opening up--so desired and so feared--of a socialist experiment. For V. Giscard d'Estaing, replacement time is also time for surcease."<sup>4</sup>

Worsening of the crisis, abandonment of the reform prospects at the beginning of the 7-year term to the benefit of an ultraconservative orientation centered on security, the mortal split kept up by the ambition of Jacques Chirac and his friends prevented this surcease, extended by a miracle in 1978 by the suicidal division of the opposition, from being renewed for 7 years. But, all in all, history might well be more merciful than politics toward Giscard d'Estaing.


<sup>3</sup> At least, because the new 10 May voters were still more numerous than it seemed, owing to the fact that some 26 April voters abstained in the second round.

<sup>4</sup> A. Lancelot, "Replacement and Surcease, Analysis of the Results of the May 1974 Presidential Election," PROJET, No. 88, September-October 1974, pp. 941-958.

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Maps 7 to 10: Legislative elections. Voter movements from the first 1978 round to the first 1981 round.

7. Pressure of abstentions and void ballots greater than 11 points.
8. Falloff of the PCF greater than 5 points.
9. PS-MRG gains greater than 13 points.
10. Falloff of the right greater than 6 points.



Upsurge of Socialism in the 14 June Legislative Election

The election of Francois Mitterrand changed the facts of the electoral situation from top to bottom. It is an understatement to say that hope changed sides. From then on, legitimacy has been illuminating the socialist movement with its incomparable light and this movement has been benefiting fully, from then on, with the majority logic of the institutions of the Fifth Republic.

When he was inaugurated on 21 May, in the rejoicing of a youth that was hardly recognized in the previous administration, F. Mitterrand became "president of the Republic." On that same day, he appointed P. Mauroy prime minister. On the next day, the National Assembly was dissolved and an almost exclusively socialist

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government was formed. The content may change; the forms remain. An experiment is starting, but the Republic goes on and the logic of stability works, as always, in favor of the presidential trend. A socialist vote means giving the president the means for fulfilling the mandate with which he has just been entrusted. It means loyally trying the experiment. A vote for the outgoing majority, means killing change before it has hatched and immediately bringing a political crisis to the heart of the institutions.

Now, the change immediately proved to be positive for the greatest number. If the stock market collapsed and if the franc was threatened, that did not affect the French people immediately. The same does not apply to the distributive measures adopted by the ministerial cabinet on 3 June. The increase in the SMIC [Inter-occupational Minimum Growth Wage], the minimum old-age benefit, family allowances, the housing allowance seemed to be the pledge of the government's desire to implement another economic and social policy and they gave the poorest fraction of the population the impression of a real oxygen flask. In the belief that only "the rich will pay," the French people were discovering the good side of the restart. A good side that is all the more sensible since the rotation was accomplished without the slightest crisis, the slightest street movement, the slightest false note. The "chaos" always announced, the "May '68" calmly predicted by the right, did not show up. The socialists were bathed in a state of grace. The right was legalistic and the PCF was trying to save its assets in the legislative election.

The prospects of the election evidently dominated the period. The Socialist Party approached them with a communicative faith that was barely tarnished by a few inclinations toward anti-Rocard pettiness in the investitures. It played up fully the presence of the socialist government. In my district, the socialist candidate and his alternate pledged, in a profession of faith of the purest Radical-UDR [Union of Democrats for the Republic] style, "to be the interpreters of the aspirations (of the voters) and of the vital needs of our region with our minister friends, several of whom came recently to discuss with you." The PCF, in turn, was constantly putting itself before the eyes of all in the new majority. The time when Marchais threatened, in a high-pitched voice, not to "go along for a free ride" seemed very remote! Jospin, who replaced Mitterrand as first secretary of the PS when Mitterrand announced his candidacy, took note, not without irony, of this new attitude at the opening of negotiations between the two parties. He said: "We appreciate the new tone that you have adopted, the prudence of your remarks, at times even the quality of your silence." On 4 June, an agreement was concluded that stressed the convergences, confirmed the automatic desistance needed for "establishment of a coherent, lasting majority," but it says nothing about participation by communists in the future government. "Starting at that time (victory of a leftist majority), a new meeting will be necessary." Marchais asked for no other commitment and his candidates almost forgot to indicate their party's name on their posters on which they presented themselves first of all as candidates of the left union majority.

On the right, the election strategy was played in the few days following F. Mitterrand's victory. On 11 May, Giscard d'Estaing, forgetting that he had Chirac's name applauded the week before when he needed his rallying, denounced "the premeditated treasonable acts" that led to his defeat, and Lecanuel seemed to echo him by advocating generalized primaries within the outgoing majority, contrary to Chirac who proposed, on the other hand, a single candidacy. The initial

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position of the Giscard followers was undoubtedly not very realistic. It underestimated the discredit suffered from the 10 May defeat and the desire for unification on the part of the outgoing UDF [French Democratic Union] members who were not very anxious to fight on two fronts. Very quickly, the need for union overrode resentment. Chirac and Lecanuel signed a pact "of union for the new majority" on 15 May, calling attention of the two parties of the outgoing majority to the common principles and announcing a unified campaign. The primaries will continue to be the exception, 86 officially, or in less than one out of five districts in metropolitan France.

This decision, together with the conditions of consultation that left little time for the small parties to seek out spokesmen and little hope for the irregulars because it was so obvious that the PS was well favored, contributed to reducing the total number of candidates: 2,648 in metropolitan France compared with 4,184 in 1978. This lack of spirit of competition also characterized the campaign. Everything had been said and no one paid any attention any longer to party speeches. In the field, on the other hand, a number of socialist candidates felt inclined to stir up enthusiastic interest.

## The PS More Alone Than Dominant

The 14 June results (table 3 [next page]) show that they were not mistaken.

In spite of an increase in abstentions, the socialist victory is impressive. In comparison with 1978, the PS-MRG [Socialist Party-Left Radical Movement] progressed 12.8 points to the detriment of all the other parties and movements. The right lost 4.9 points, the Communist Party 4.5, the extreme left 1.9, the ecologists 1.1 and miscellaneous left 0.4. No need for comment on the setback of the small parties. It is explained in part by the decrease in the number of candidates, which declined from 1,034 to 498 for the far left and from 241 to 172 for the ecologists. On the other hand, let us review the principal movements.

The upsurge in abstentionism puts it at a level that it has exceeded only twice in legislative elections since 1875: in November 1962 and exactly 100 years ago, in August 1881. This reminder suggests two explanations. In 1962, the legislative election took place after a dissolution in the aftermath of the referendum on election of the president by universal suffrage. The increase in abstention expressed both in some a feeling that the essential act had been raised in the referendum and in others the difficulty of choosing between the deputies of their traditional parties, who continued their "no" campaign and the Gaullists who asked them to have their "yes" respected. Taking into account the respective differences, the same motivations may have been brought into play in 1981, with the vote for F. Mitterrand taking the place of the "yes" vote in 1962. The 1881 precedent brings up another situation, the situation described by Andre Siegfried as "appeasement," when the demoralized right no longer even dared oppose the republicans. Is it not possible that this was the case 100 years later and does the victory of the left not express still more the demobilization of the right rather than its rallying to the president's party?

To tell the truth, it is very difficult to answer without proceeding to make a very detailed analysis. A study by department shows, in fact, that no simple explanation takes into account the great increase in abstentions. This did not affect

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Table 3: Legislative Election: First Round, 14 June 1981 (21 June in 3 Overseas Departments)

	Metropolitan France		Overseas (14+21 June)		Total
(1) Inscrits	35 536 041	100	806 796	100	36 342 827
(2) Votants	25 182 262	70,86	376 871	46,71	25 559 133
Abstentions	10 353 779	29,13	429 915	53,27	10 783 594
(3) Blancs et nuls	359 197	1,01	8 895	1,10	368 092
(4) Exprimés	24 823 065	100	367 976	100	25 191 041
	Number of Candidates		Number of Candidates		
(5) Extrême gauche	498	1,33	5	1,17	503
PC	330 344	16,12	9	16,98	483
PS + MRG	4 003 025	37,77	11	15,13	533
(6) Divers gauche	522	0,57	25	16,40	141
(7) Total gauche	1 610	55,80	50	49,70	1 660
(8) Ecologistes	172	270 792	1,09	0,24	174
UDF	273	4 756 503	19,16	20,22	283
RPR	289	5 192 894	20,91	15,42	302
(9) Divers droite	135	660 990	2,66	14,29	153
(10) Extrême droite	169	90 026	0,36	0,10	170
(11) Total droite	866	10 700 413	43,10	50,05	908
	2,648	94	2,742	2,742	

Key:

1. Registered
2. Voters
3. Blank and void
4. Valid votes
5. Far left
6. Miscellaneous left
7. Total left
8. Ecologists
9. Miscellaneous right
10. Far right
11. Total right

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especially those departments in which Giscard d'Estaing did not receive the full number of rightist votes. On the contrary, it was probably less pronounced there. Therefore, the assumption concerning the difficulty of the moderates who probably voted for Mitterrand does not seem to be verified, at least at this analysis level. The same is true of the hypothesis of a massive transfer of the right. The map of abstention gains only partly confirms the hypothesis of losses by the right. Just as it only partly confirms the hypothesis of communist losses. The votes lost by the right and PCF seem to have been distributed in variable proportions between the socialist vote and abstention, in accordance with a logic that eludes an analysis by department.

The communist setback confirms the breakup of the presidential election. It even aggravates it, in fact, because national statistics on voting are more misleading for legislative elections than for a presidential election. In legislative elections, account must be taken, in fact, of the local implantation of the candidates. As was predictable, the 86 communist deputies recovered part of the votes lost by G. Marchais, especially in the Parisian region. Moreover, the deterioration continued in votes and in percentages.

	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>G. Marchais</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>PCF</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Index</u>
27 PCF seats Paris region	1,836,617	429,781	23.4	1,543,366	532,400	34.5	147
59 PCF seats provinces	3,736,089	973,681	26.1	3,227,838	1,102,605	34.1	131
388 other districts	22,931,929	3,009,487	13.1	20,051,861	23,680,020	11.8	90

Outside the districts well-covered by the PCF and its elected candidates, the setback was, therefore, considerable in comparison with 1978. One-third of the communist voters defected and a good part of them voted for the socialist candidates. Because they were bearers of "real change" and because the presidential election revealed that the communist king was naked, his voters felt freed from a faithfulness of habit more than of conviction.

The setback of the UNM [New Majority Union] did not reach the same proportions as the PCF setback, but it was severe. The UDF and the RPR together obtained 43.9 percent in 1978. In 1980, they totaled 40.1 percent, or a 9-percent loss. The game of single candidacies, favoring the outgoing ones, solidified the strength relationship between the two formations. The RPR represented 52.1 percent of the total, compared with 51.3 in 1978.

The single candidacies were blamed for preventing the outgoing majority from obtaining all its votes--owing to resentment between its two components--and from spreading over its frontiers. This process was hardly justified in view of the results. The calculation of votes that I made in the 86 districts in which primaries were held shows that this formula does not necessarily make it possible to "rake wider":



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## Primaries and Single Candidacies on the Right

	1978			1981			
	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>UDF + RPR</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Votes cast</u>	<u>UDF + RPR</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Index</u>
86 primaries	5,128,019	2,173,346	42.4	4,684,817	1,738,256	37.1	87.5
Altogether	28,105,239	12,337,301	43.9	24,323,065	9,948,397	40.1	91.3

In addition, single candidacy enabled the UNM to have 99 deputies elected as early as the first round in metropolitan France (and 1 overseas) or almost two-thirds of its 156 deputies. Directly hit by the wave of change and caught on the wrong foot by the logic of the majority institutions of the Fifth Republic, the outgoing majority could hardly expect better.

The socialist upsurge remains. It was absolutely general in comparison with 1978, although unequal in extent depending on the department:

Socialist Upsurge in Percent of Votes Cast  
Number of Departments

Gain less than 5%	2
Gain from 5 to 9%	17
Gain from 10 to 14.9%	59
Gain from 15 to 20%	18

The gains were especially massive south of the Loire (16 departments out of the 18 in which the gains exceeded 15 percent), especially in the southwestern quarter (9 departments). On the other hand, they were generally a little less strong in the traditional strength areas of the right, in the west and in the east, or of the PCF, in the Parisian Basin. There, undoubtedly, the PS ran up against abstention. Altogether, the Socialist Party was more alone than dominant. The PCF and the right had been, at least temporarily, discredited and demoralized by the presidential election and the PS was in a position to embody both change and stability. It had become, if not the wheels of the institutions, at least the "fluid" needed for their operation, just like the Gaullist movement after 1962.

The Socialist Victory in the Second Round: 21 June

The last act of the 1981 "election drama," the second round of the legislative election, confirmed the movements of the first round and gave the PS alone an absolute majority of seats in the Assembly. Because 156 deputies had been elected in the first round (154 in metropolitan France and 2 overseas), the second round involved 332 districts on 21 June. On that same day, they voted for the first round in three overseas districts.<sup>5</sup> Altogether, the results of the second round appear in table 4<sup>6</sup> [next page].

<sup>5</sup> One was filled in the first round, two others are disputed. They would vote on 28 June for one and on 5 July for the other.

<sup>6</sup> Save for error or omission, because I calculated them myself on the basis of the results published in the press. In this table (just as in table 3), I put deputy from Polynesia 1st under miscellaneous left. He belonged to the UDF in the previous legislature, but he seemed to draw close to the PS between the two rounds.

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Table 4: Second Round

	<u>Metropolitan</u>		<u>Overseas</u>		<u>Overseas</u>		<u>Total (334)</u>	
	<u>France (320)</u>		<u>(12)</u>		<u>(2)</u>			
			<u>21 June</u>		<u>28 June and 5 July</u>			
(1) Inscrits	25 082 269	100	648 307	100	59 215	100	25 789 791	100
(2) Votants	18 836 491		341 831		35 690		19 214 012	
Abstentions	6 245 778	24,90	306 476	47,27	23 525	39,72	6 575 779	25,49
(3) Blancs et nuls	502 323	2,00	10 077	1,55	609	1,02	513 009	1,99
(4) Exprimés	18 334 168	100	331 754	100	35 081	100	18 701 003	100
PC	1 228 551	6,70	75 369	22,71			1 303 920	6,97
PS - MRG	9 073 314	49,48	78 768	23,74			9 152 082	48,93
(5) Divers gauche	122 385	0,67	17 075	5,14	15 415	43,94	154 875	0,83
UDF	3 753 607	20,47	44 498	13,41	2 486	7,08	3 800 591	20,32
RPR	4 100 732	22,36	83 591	25,19	17 180	48,97	4 201 503	22,46
(6) Divers droite	55 579	0,30	32 453	9,78			88 032	0,47

## Comparison with the First Round in the Same Districts

	<u>Metropolitan</u>		<u>France (320)</u>		<u>Total (334)</u>			
	<u>First Round</u>		<u>Runoff</u>		<u>First Round</u>		<u>Runoff</u>	
(1) Inscrits	25 102 670	100	25 082 269	100	25 813 250	100	25 789 691	100
(2) Votants	17 730 039		18 836 491		18 050 584		19 214 012	
Abstentions	7 372 631	29,36	6 245 778	24,90	7 762 666	30,07	6 575 779	25,49
(3) Blancs et nuls	244 776	0,97	502 323	2,00	252 536	0,97	513 009	1,99
(4) Exprimés	17 485 263	100	18 334 168	100	17 798 048	100	18 701 003	100
(7) Extrême gauche	231 911	1,32	-	-	236 241	1,32	-	-
PC	3 176 686	18,16	1 228 551	6,70	3 239 201	18,20	1 303 920	6,97
PS - MRG	6 509 942	37,23	9 073 314	49,48	6 557 909	36,84	9 152 082	48,93
(5) Divers gauche	128 469	0,73	122 385	0,67	176 610	0,99	154 875	0,83
(8) Ecologistes	207 300	1,18	-	-	208 196	1,16	-	-
UDF	3 282 912	18,77	3 753 607	20,47	3 350 189	18,82	3 800 591	20,32
RPR	3 509 253	20,06	4 100 732	22,36	3 539 554	19,88	4 201 503	22,46
(6) Divers droite	381 876	2,18	55 579	0,30	423 838	2,43	88 032	0,47
(9) Extrême droite	56 914	0,32	-	-	57 310	0,32	-	-

## Key:

- |                       |                        |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Registered         | 6. Miscellaneous right |
| 2. Voters             | 7. Far left            |
| 3. Blank and void     | 8. Ecologists          |
| 4. Votes cast         | 9. Far right           |
| 5. Miscellaneous left |                        |

In order to interpret them suitably, account must be taken of the distribution of candidacies and of desistance agreements. I shall do this by confining myself to metropolitan France. In 10 districts, one single candidate remained in the race (6 PS, 1 Left Radical, 3 PCF). The evolution of votes was uninteresting there and it is better to discard them to examine the remaining 310. These included 309 duels and 1 triangular election (CDS-RPR-PS, Bas-Rhin 4th district). In the duels, the PS entered 263 candidates, the MRG 12 and the PCF 34. The RPR entered 164 and the UDF and the miscellaneous "majority" 145. That explains the very uneven results of the various parties in table 4. If we regroup by major political divisions, the evolution of votes between the two rounds (310 districts) is as follows:

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	<u>Second</u> <u>Round</u>		<u>Second</u> <u>Round</u>		<u>Differ-</u> <u>ence</u>
Registered	24,334,742		24,314,383		
Abstentions	7,138,276	29.33	5,922,142	24.35	- 4.98
Blank and void	236,351	0.97	370,137	1.52	+ 0.55
Left	9,681,030	57.08	10,112,185	56.11	- 0.97
Ecologists	205,749	1.21	--		- 1.21
Right	7,072,826	41.71	7,909,918	43.89	+ 2.18

Overall, the decrease in abstention--comparable with the decrease observed between the two rounds of the 1962 legislative election--benefited the right very slightly more than the left. Actually, 255 of the 309 single candidates of the UNM improved the total percentage obtained by the right in the first round.

But the left showed that it was very disciplined, although a distinction must be made depending on the label of the candidate remaining in the race for the runoff:

	<u>Total % Left</u> <u>1st Round</u>	<u>% Left Candidate</u> <u>2nd Round</u>	<u>Index</u>
276 PS-MRG	55.96	55.69	99.5
34 PCF	65.99	59.58	90.3

The socialists practically filled up the left and hardly suffered at all from the greater participation, while the communists lost in both areas. But those losses were light. The socialist voters had the graciousness not to penalize the PCF still more.

That kind of discipline led to the election of a new unequalled chamber in which the PS has, all by itself, an absolute majority, like the UDR in 1968. The following is actually the result in seats:

	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Elected</u> <u>Metropolitan</u> <u>France</u>	<u>Overseas</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Difference</u>
PCF	86	43	1	44	- 42
PS-MRG	117	282	6	285	+168
Miscellaneous left (NI [expansion unknown])	2	3	2	5	+ 3
RPR	155	83	5	88	- 67
UDF	119	60	2	62	- 57
Miscellaneous right (NI)	12	6	1	7	- 5
	<u>491</u>	<u>474</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>491</u>	

The changeover, foreseeable on 26 April as a consequence of the double setback of the Communist Party and of the outgoing president, achieved on 10 May by the election of F. Mitterrand and accelerated on 14 June by the socialist upsurge, was confirmed resoundingly on 21 June. The majority logic of the institutions of the Fifth Republic entrusted all powers in those who had fought most bitterly.

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That kind of victory gave the socialists considerable assets. The most obvious ones pertain to those institutions guaranteeing the authority and stability of the new government. But there are others pertaining to the sociology of the voters and to the renewal of the persons elected. With regard to the sociology of the voters, Mitterrand stated, very rightly on the day of his inauguration, that "the political majority of the French people have just identified themselves with their social majority." In fact, the majority of France has been on the left for several years, owing the deep-seated changes undergone by French society in the last 25 years: urban development, placement on a steady wage, development of the tertiary, or service, sector, massive entrance of women on the labor market, together with a school population explosion in secondary and higher education, de-Christianization and diffusion of antiauthority ideology in every cell of society, have led to decisive blows at the traditional social and moral bases of the authority of the right. To tell the truth, the left probably would have won as early as 1974, if the haste of the campaign and the changing of the guard within the majority had not been able to create a belief in change by the center. It would have won in 1978, if the communist blocking had not prevented it once more.<sup>7</sup> The PS, which gathered 44 percent of the blue-collar votes, 45 percent of the votes of the white-collar workers and middle level executives and 38 percent of the votes of upper level executives, became, by far, the dominant party of active France and can base itself on its representative organization. It is also the party of the youth. Forty-five percent of persons under 35 years old voted for it on 14 June and the massive entrance of its deputies in the National Assembly made the Assembly's age drop. We can bet that these young men and these young women will be able to make a new voice heard there, the voice of their generation.

In contrast with these assets, the risks are also considerable. The vote by the French people did not make the restraints of the international economic situation disappear. By promising them the early end of unemployment and the high cost of living by means of a political change, Candidate Mitterrand certainly did not make the spirit of responsibility progress much and he did not make a decisive contribution to democratic education. Undoubtedly, it was good election warfare.

But perhaps there is something more serious. The socialists, who had been excluded from government authority for too many years, are approaching realities with the distorted point of view of an ideology and a good conscience not very favorable for calling into question, for fertile doubt, or even for real pluralism. By wrongly interpreting the approval vote of the French people as ratification of a program that does not have its counterpart in any developed country, they are running the risk of legislating beyond what is demanded and of setting up a system too heavy for the nation's vitality. In this connection, the "sociology" of the newly elected persons may raise a problem. Roland Cayrol estimated that 58.7 percent of the socialist deputies are educators. The education and profession

<sup>7</sup> See the collective book of the CEVIPOF [expansion unknown] on the 1978 election: J. Capdevielle and others, "France de gauche, vote a droite" [Leftist France Votes for the Right], Presses of the National Political Science Foundation, 1981

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of these teachers predispose them still more, unfortunately, to giving precedence to the system spirit, strengthened by a morality very short of good intentions, over taking realities into account.<sup>8</sup> If these realities oppose the "immortal principles," there will always be some heir of "great ancestors" on the socialist bench who will advocate flight forward, a break with capitalism and a hunt for scapegoats. Still deeper than that, France risks going from the disadvantages of an excessive liberalism to the disadvantages of an equally excessive egalitarianism. A country that sacrifices equality to freedom for too long loses its morality. A country that sacrifices freedom to equality for too long loses its morale and its vitality. The only protection against these contradictory risks is alternation, or rotation, whose principle is never to be stopped definitively. Necessary yesterday, it will without doubt still be necessary tomorrow.

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<sup>8</sup> With regard, at least, to those who are not experienced in administering local affairs.