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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EAST BLOC ECONOMIC-POLITICAL AIMS, ACTIONS IN AFRICA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1082, 30 Sep 81 pp 46-47

[Article by Pierre Voillery: "A Lung for Moscow"]

[Text] Willingly setting ideology aside, in Africa the countries of the Soviet bloc are interested first of all in strategic raw materials.

The military interventions in Africa by the Soviets and their allies have brought to light, in recent years, that continent's importance to the Kremlin. With more discretion but just as much effectiveness, military advisers are officering and training the armed forces of certain countries in accordance with a model characteristic of the Warsaw Pact: the Russian directs, the Bulgarian transmits, the German organizes, and the African...executes. But while these facts are of great importance, they tend to conceal a fundamental reality: the economic and technical relations between Africa and the Soviet bloc.

The USSR and its allies of East Europe, linked to 39 OAU member-countries, have considerably increased the financial volume of their trade with Africa over the last decade: from index 100 in 1970, they have reached 260 today for exports and 232 for imports. Nevertheless, this growth is far lower than the growth of exchanges with the Third World as a whole (OPEC countries included): the proportion for Africa--25 percent of exports and imports in 1970--was in 1980 only 15.5 and 16 percent, respectively.

For certain countries (Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zambia), this growth is synonymous with greater indebtedness; for others (Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire), trade exchange is in balance; and for some, finally (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, Togo), there is a positive balance.

East Europe, as one sees, favors its exchanges with the wealthy countries, suppliers of strategic products, independently of their political options: among its big trade partners, Morocco and Nigeria are close to Algeria and Libya.

Inversely, of the five African countries that the World Bank places among the poorest in the world (Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Upper Volta), only Ethiopia benefits from considerable East European aid.

In a word, investment is being made in the countries capable of furnishing what it needs (or will need). Algeria, Libya and Nigeria will alleviate the energy diffi-

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culties that the USSR may encounter in the coming decade and that certain people's democracies are already experiencing. A few weeks after Colonel Qadhafi, and the Nigerian minister of external affairs, Ishaya Audu, made a tour of the capitals of the socialist bloc, with a matter of oil doubtlessly involved. As for Morocco, its phosphates will enrich East European and Soviet agriculture, which is seriously short of fertilizers. On the other hand, East Europe is in a position to provide certain African countries not only with credits (which are rare) but also with techniques and technologies, and to provide for the training of their cadres.

The USSR is present economically in more than 30 of the continent's countries, Hungary and Romania are proving very dynamic there, and Poland was also until recently. And last July, Bulgaria entered into some 30 bilateral agreements with Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea, the Congo, Ethiopia, Algeria and Nigeria. Multilateral agreements have been made with the African countries of the CEMA [Council for Economic Mutual Assistance]: Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. In certain cases, highly specialized action is involved: from April to July 1980, for example, the CEMA countries sent 79 veterinarians to combat an epidemic of brucellosis, and Bulgaria regularly supplies Algeria and Ethiopia with sizable contingents of doctors.

Speculation

The USSR and its allies are getting established in places where the West is slow to do so, balks at the idea, or is prevented. The credits granted vary from a little to very large amounts, depending on the creditor's interest: in 1978, Morocco obtained a loan for \$2.089 billion, and Mali got only \$1 million.

Specialization is the rule. Thus, Bulgaria works in the agricultural, geological and maritime fields (Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Somalia, Tunisia), and in a secondary way in industry (Tanzania) and building construction (Nigeria). Hungary is involved in mines (Algeria, Sudan, Togo), roads (Libya), and community facilities (Nigeria). East Germany installs factories (Algeria, Angola, Mozambique), as does Poland (Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria), which also does equipment projects (Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal). Czechoslovakia also does them, as well as studies (Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Zambia). As for Romania, which is established in Algeria, Burundi and Mauritania, it builds dams, manufactures engines and organizes agriculture.

Direct investment is not excluded from this cooperation. Romania is present in 31 companies, Poland in 14, Bulgaria in 12. The USSR owns all or part of 8 companies; the number for Hungary is 6, and for Czechoslovakia, 4. East Germany, for its part, declines to export its capital. Out of 75 enterprises and companies whose capital comes from the European countries of the CEMA, 20 are installed in Nigeria, 9 in Libya, 8 in Morocco. In Africa as elsewhere, money attracts money: those who pay well get the investments--and all the more so if they settle their debts in strong currencies, which the countries of the East need for their exchanges with the West.

The number of cooperation personnel and civilian technicians varies significantly: while there are 22,000 in Libya, 11,000 in Algeria and 1,600 in Nigeria, there are only 125 in Sudan, 95 in Ghana, 20 in Sao Tome and Principe, and so on.

But there is a marked difference between the "allies" and the others. In Mozambique, for example, the CEMA has begun development of metallurgy and steelmaking in

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Tete province, as well as development of the Limpopo and Inkomati plains. In Ethiopia, an agricultural improvement plan has been launched.

The desire to get established politically in Africa is linked to the overriding search for an area capable of absorbing know-how and solid technology, of making use of products that are difficult to get into the more demanding Western market, and of procuring strategic raw materials. Little by little, Africa is becoming a lung for East Europe, which, turning to account its political ruptures with Egypt and Somalia, is henceforth accentuating its establishment in the rest of the continent.

The world crisis and the specific problems of the Eastern countries have shown that those countries do not form a bloc free of faults and rivalry.

In certain of them, the desire for independence takes on an economic form. On the occasion of the recent tensions over raw materials prices (oil, coffee, etc), the USSR and Bulgaria did not hesitate to speculate, building up stocks, closing down the domestic market, and reselling raw products, derivatives or processed products to the Western countries at high prices.

In others, African foreign trade constitutes the underpinning of an original political project. Romania for a long time, and Hungary more recently, have been planning to use their African positions to play a role as intermediary favorable to the Third World in the North-South dialogue.

**Profit**

For East Europe, military presence and strategic control are therefore not the only two foundations of its approach to Africa. This approach is above all, of course, a political phenomenon. But the partners never lose sight of the economic-financial interests. Nevertheless, even among faithful allies, the national interest always takes precedence over socialist solidarity. In this sense, the African countries' ties with East Europe are hardly different from those they have with the West: profit and interest outweigh the serious reality of the unequal development of Africa.

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CAMEROON

COCOA SEASON BEGINS; PRODUCERS' PRICE TO INCREASE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 25 Sep 81 p 2449

[Text] The 1981-1982 cocoa season was opened 14 September in all producing areas.

At a meeting of the governors and prefects concerned, the Cameroonian minister for economic affairs and planning, Mr. Youssoufa Daouda, urged the growers on 12 September to "arm themselves with courage and devote themselves faithfully and zealously to cocoa cultivation, so that the next harvest will be a positive response to the ceaselessly repeated appeals of the head of state." The minister of economic affairs and planning asked the administrative authorities in the cocoa areas to give cocoa growers training "sufficient to encompass all aspects of cocoa cultivation particularly the operation of plantations, timely harvesting, fermentation, drying and sorting, in such a way that the product to be marketed is of good quality."

The minister noted the figures on the 1980-1981 season: 117,000 tons, compared to 122,000 tons in 1979-1980. The minister said: "This slight, 5,000-ton decline is basically the result of the phenomenon of letting land rest fallow, and of climatic conditions. In reality, the poor distribution of rainfall, both in time and in place, impeded the progress of the cocoa growers and thus brought about reduced production. It should also be acknowledged that a certain number of irregularities were noted in the geographical distribution of fertilizers and in the provisioning of agricultural supplies to the growers."

For the upcoming season, Mr. Daouda put the accent on the decision by the head of state to raise the price paid to producers per kilogram of Grade 1 and Grade 2 cocoa to Fr CFA 310. The minister noted the particularly difficult international situation. In that connection, he said that "the trend toward decline in world market prices which we have witnessed since 1977 has been aggravated during the 1980-1981 season, which ended with price levels we have not seen in 5 years, while during the same period of time all production costs have considerably increased."

The decision by the head of state to increase the price paid to producers by FR CFA 10 per kilogram of cocoa shows his concern to preserve the real purchasing power of the growers. It is also intended to provide and lay the foundations for harmonious economic development based on agriculture, in order to discourage the rural exodus and move toward a redistribution of income without which "the government's goals with respect to social justice would remain nothing but words."

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The price paid for substandard [cocoa] has been held to FR CFA 100, in order to discourage mixing different grades of cocoa and dirty tricks thereby providing further incentive to improve the quality of the product. In tandem with these measures to improve quality, Minister Daouda said that efforts to provide for a successful restoration of agricultural productivity will be pursued without let-up during the upcoming season. "In that connection," he disclosed, "a sum of approximately FR CFA 4 billion will be devoted to fighting capsids, fighting brown-rot, to setting rural young people up in agriculture, to the creation and maintenance of cocoa roads, and to competition for recognition as the best plantation."

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CONGO

SOVIET ECONOMIC IMPACT IN CONGO 'FAIRLY MINIMAL'

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 30, 31

[Article by Bryan Pearson: "Frustration Lies Behind Contented Brazzaville"]

[Excerpts]

THE RHYTHMIC sound of OK Jazz blares out nightly into the warm Brazzaville air. Socially it appears to be a contented city. But cosmetic gaiety fails to hide completely the economic and political frustrations of the people.

The Congo has seen more than its share of changes in recent years. Yet despite an oil income, the promised rewards have yet to filter through to the people.

### Second conquest

The "revolution" planned by Marien Ngouabi and the National Revolutionary Council in the late 1960s never really took root. The centenary celebrations last year to commemorate the foundation of Brazzaville by the French colonialist Savorgnan de Brazza in 1881, are witness to that. Many called it the "second conquest".

Oil output has risen by 44.6 per cent in the last six months, and figures for the last 18 months have been encouraging. But apart from civil servants receiving their salaries regularly rather than several months in arrears, and a series of skyscrapers now growing daily, little is to be seen of the wealth.

There is an interesting story behind the centenary celebrations. France, anxious that such a landmark in the history of its old colony should not be missed, promised the government of Denis Sassou N'guesso that it would install street

lights and traffic lights throughout the city free of charge, on condition that a great carnival was arranged. The carrot proved too tempting and the government, despite its anti-colonialist Marxist-/Leninist standpoint, agreed to the deal. In one month, imported French manpower, working all hours of the day, installed an impressive array of street lights, and traffic lights around the city. It was a mammoth task, well done, but the political price to the Congo was steep, and it left the people a little confused as to their government's avowed socialist intent.

The Congo today suffers from a north-south divide. President N'guesso heads a predominantly northerner government, whose ascent to power can be traced to the French student unrest in the late 1960s. At that time, the northerners were the "bootboys" in the army of Marien Ngouabi, a southerner. Ngouabi's error was in filling the army with the northerners whose business acumen was not rated.

### Socialist ideals

The consequence was that they slowly grew in power, if not in stature, and eventually many went to France to study. They returned fully inculcated with socialist ideals. Their strength within the army ranks ensured them the leadership, as Ngouabi's socialism stuttered.

Today, the roads to the north of the

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country are good, yet the route from Brazzaville to Pointe Noire – the economic nerve centre of the country – is still in poor shape, unpassable in the rainy season. The southerners, who were just as guilty when they were in power, resent the northern dominance and seem reluctant to throw their weight into national economic development.

A unique aspect of the economy is that employment is not overwhelmingly agriculture-based as is the case in most African countries. Worryingly though, agricultural production is falling and, inevitably, imports are rising. Fresh vegetables are not as easily available in the capital as they were. Only recently have state Marketing Boards begun to pay farmers a reasonable price for their produce.

Previously, uneconomic prices had resulted in a decimation of the agricultural sector, and had heightened the problems of urban over-population as many young, productive workers fled from the rural areas in search of a living.

The government has shown itself to be aware of this and has responded by giving the largest single slice of the national investment budget to the Ministry of Rural Economy. If this is sustained, agricultural production should be seen to rise again, and the seemingly endless

tide of urban immigrants may for once be stemmed.

Central Africa is not a poor region. Indeed, if carefully managed its resources point to it becoming the most wealthy region in Africa. The dilemma is in attracting the right foreign investment and technology.

### **High yields**

At present the oil companies operating in the country and its offshore waters – Elf of France and Agip of Italy – are reportedly yielding some of the highest outright profits per barrel in the world, though the government has recently increased the equity stake of its own company, Hydrocongo.

France remains the dominant trading partner, with Italy, West Germany and the United States following well behind. It is mistakenly believed that the Soviet Union is a powerful economic force in the country. Apart from the size of its embassy compound – probably one of the largest in the world – its economic impact appears to be fairly minimal. N'Guesso is a pragmatist, and he knows that to encourage the Soviets is to ensure a valuable input of Western investment.

He plays their game shrewdly, never overdoing it●

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 28 Sep 81 pp 63, 64

[Interview with Daniel Oyono, former minister of the Macias government and opposition leader in exile, by Gonzalo San Segundo in Paris; date not specified]

[Text] He was an all-powerful man under the Macias dictatorship. He held the posts of minister to the presidency, minister of finance, security, information and tourism. Now, he is in the opposition, heads the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Command Council of Patriots and Guinean Socialist Cadres (CCRCGS) and sees himself as one of the most representative and charismatic leaders among the Guinean people. His name is Daniel Oyono, 36 years of age, married, father of two daughters and he gave an exclusive interview to CAMBIO 16 in Paris.

CAMBIO 16: From being a minister under Macias, you have become the leader of the opposition. That is somewhat unusual.

Daniel Oyono: You are right. But there you have Adolfo Suarez, the man who brought about the political transition in Spain. And if it can happen in Spain, then it should be much more logical to happen in Guinea where we only have a handful of qualified men.

C16: In 1974, you created INFORTURS now integrated into the CCRCGS alongside with the Socialist Front and the Front of Independent Democrats.

D.O.: Yes, this is a movement formed by young cadres from the army, the civil service and the population of Equatorial Guinea. It was set up as an alternative for change. In 1976, it was dismantled and most of its leaders and members were arrested.

C16: Including you?

D.O.: Including me. That is why I was in jail from November 1976 until June 1977. I lost all my posts except for the portfolio of finance.

C16: Being Macias' "heir apparent" as well as his nephew, you were very powerful in Guinea.

D.O.: First of all, I am not Macias' nephew. I was not born in his native village and I am not directed related by blood to him. My grandfather was a member of the

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Sangi tribe which was also Macias' tribe and the tribe to which the current president, Teodoro Obiang, belongs. It is true that there was a time when I was his protege, the reason for that being--and you will excuse me if I sound presumptuous-- that I was one of the few people in my country who knew about finances. That is why under the present regime I became secretary for international economic relations, governor of the World Bank, delegate to the EEC and governor of the African Development Bank until August 1980 when I resigned from all my posts and voluntarily left the country where I have secretly returned on three occasions.

Cl6: It is said that you are one of those responsible for the anti-Spanish campaign launched in Guinea during the Macias period.

D.O.: I am surprised that the Spanish Government remains silent when I am attacked in the Spanish press, unless these slanderous reports originate from the government itself. I was the only member of the Macias Government who kept close relations with the Spanish Embassy in Malabo. I was also the only one who dared to accept an invitation from the Spanish Embassy to attend the celebrations marking the first anniversary of Juan Carlos as King of Spain. At that function, I made a speech calling for normal relations between Spain and Guinea. It cost me to be penalized with a 10-month salary suspension. But I also got my reward in August 1980 when King Juan Carlos congratulated me as he gave an audience to a delegation from my country after Col Teodoro Obiang's military coup. His Majesty told me that he would not forget that I was the only member of the government who came to the Spanish Embassy during the most difficult days in the relations between Spain and Guinea and he publicly spoke out in favor of normalizing relations between our two countries.

Cl6: It is also being said that you are pro-Soviet.

D.O.: I have a Spanish education up to the pre-university level. After that, I went to Milan to study law. I have a degree in International Relations and Public Administration. I have a European education and no liking whatsoever for communism or tyranny.

Cl6: What do you think of the step taken by President Obiang to the effect of banning the reading of three Spanish publications, including CAMBIO 16?

D.O.: It is one of the worst mistakes made by Obiang who is under constant pressure from the men who come from the Mongomo district. Thirty-two of the 35 members of the Military Junta and government are from Mongomo.

Cl6: You were recently in Guinea. How did you find your country?

D.O.: Yes, this last August I entered the country clandestinely and we set up the CCRGS. Virtually, there has been no improvement. I could almost say that things are worse than they were under Macias. There is no specific political program or economic system. The government is bogged down by incompetence and the Equatorial Guinean people are deep in poverty. Neither the president nor his team know the meaning of democracy.

Cl6: And what happened to the Spanish aid of about 6 billion pesetas?

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D.O.: Nobody knows. It has disappeared into thin air. It has gone into the pockets of some members of the Military Council and of some Spaniards who were in charge of channelling that aid to the people of Equatorial Guinea. The leading members of the Military Council have accounts in foreign banks. President Obiang and Vice President Florencio Maye are major shareholders in the country's main enterprises.

Cl6: Some of your compatriots and unofficial sources in the Spanish administration claim that you do not have much popular support in Guinea and that you have lost all your prestige there.

D.O.: In the interior of the country, in Rio Muni (a region which President Teodoro Obiang has never visited and where there are tribes which are not aware of the fact that Macias was overthrown and is now dead) there is no opposition worthy of the name. But the leaders of the MONALIGE [National Movement for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea], the MUNGE [National Union Movement of Equatorial Guinea] and the IGPE [Popular Idea of Equatorial Guinea]--parties created before my country became independent which merged into the Workers' National Single Party (PUNT) in 1973-- are now in exile and they enjoy great prestige in the interior of their own country and because they can mobilize the country. Our CCRCGS is established in every district of the country and enjoys credibility and respect among the various tribes in the interior.

Cl6: And inside the government as well?

D.O.: We know that part of the Military Council and half of the armed forces are opposed to Obiang and in favor of setting up a provisional government of national union as a preliminary step to holding free and democratic elections. And that is our goal.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

REGIME SAID TO BE UNDERGOING PROFOUND DETERIORATION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 28 Sep 81 pp 62, 63

[Article by Gonzalo San Segundo: "Spain to the Rescue"]

[Text] Teodoro Obiang Nguema, president of Equatorial Guinea and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, has agreed to an aid program put forward by the Spanish Government to ease its former colony out of the serious economic and political situation in which it finds itself.

The plan, which will be spelled out later, is a three-step process. The first step is to safeguard the security of Equatorial Guinea through increased cooperation between the two countries in the spheres of security and defense. When that phase is concluded, a similar action will be undertaken in the economic sphere with the help of Spanish advisers. The final step of the plan involves action in the political sphere and envisages setting up a constitutional system of state and government.

Meanwhile, Daniel Oyono, a former minister of the Macias Government now living in exile, has told a CAMBIO 16 special correspondent in Paris that the only way to bring democracy to his country was to set up a provisional government of national union prior to holding free elections.

Spain does not want to lose its advantage, foothold and prominent role in Equatorial Guinea. In recent weeks, and acting through its supporters in the Military Council, the Soviet Union is reported to be trying to drive Teodoro Obiang into a corner and force him to relegate Spain to a position of secondary importance.

But alerted by these schemes and animated by the spirit of representing the mother country, the Madrid Government dispatched Jesus Martinez Pujalte, director of the Office for Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, to Malabo (the capital of that country) and on Monday, 12 September, he met with Colonel Obiang, the president. Nine days later, on 21 September, General Saenz de Santamaria, inspector of the National Police, went to Malabo carrying in his briefcase a plan to organize the security of the former Spanish colony. Meanwhile, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Pedro Perez-Lorca, met in Madrid with his counterpart, Florencio Maye.

The succession of visits to Malabo by Spanish Government officials will reach its peak when a group organized by the Ministry of Economy and headed by Undersecretary of Commerce Agustin Hidalgo de Quintana, arrives there to attend the celebrations to mark the date of 12 October, Hispanic Culture Day. A parliamentary mission is also going to Malabo in the near future.

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Meanwhile, the situation in Equatorial Guinea is rapidly deteriorating. Toward the middle of this month, some 20 people were arrested on charges of "plotting against the state." All of them are considered to be pro-Soviet elements by the Equatorial Guinean Government which has released them all with the exception of Luis Oyono, Daniel's brother.

This development, which seems to be a reaction to the announcement made by Daniel Oyono on 18 September, in Paris, concerning the creation of a single political bloc of the democratic Guinean forces inside the country, followed reports denouncing an "economic coup d'etat" which President Obiang has used to reshuffle his government bringing into it more pro-Soviet elements.

Lt Carmelo Owono, an aeronautical engineer who is commissioner of state for the presidency, falls under that category. The same applies to Lt Isidoro Eyl, commissioner of state for information and tourism, and to Ricardo Elo, technical secretary in that same department and former deputy chief of the Political Police under Macias.

A few days before that, President Obiang took what perhaps amounts to his most serious decision in the 2 years since he took over the leadership of his country by banning Spanish newspapers from coming into the country and being read there. Later on this ban was somewhat relaxed and only applied to three publications--CAMBIO 16, DIARIO 16 and INTERVIU. Spanish diplomatic circles say that Obiang will lift the ban on Hispanic Culture Day--a sort of preannounced amnesty.

Day by day, Colonel Obiang Nguema--who has expressed the wish to meet the king of Spain before the end of this year--finds himself increasingly isolated and under growing pressure, to such a point that he is resorting to methods similar to those used by his predecessor, such as the "economic coup d'etat." According to Daniel Oyono, this was "an attempt to obscure the real situation in the country." It coincides with a profound deterioration of the regime over which he presides.

On Wednesday, 2 September, Obiang threatened to "throw the disturbing elements into the trash can" accusing them of being responsible for the disorder prevailing in the country. Meanwhile, the colony of Spanish nationals, amounting to some 700 people, does not hide its fears and the voices of exiled opposition leaders can be heard again after several months of silence.

For instance, at a press conference held in Madrid on Saturday, 5 September, Adolfo Obiang, president of the FRELIGE [Liberation Front of Equatorial Guinea], said that "God knows what Teodoro and his people have done with the money which they got from the Spanish Government.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SPANISH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES SPANISH AID TO REGIME

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 28 Sep 81 p 64

[Text] Jesus Martínez Pujalte, director of the Office for Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, told CAMBIO 16: "The USSR has already had its chance in Guinea. Now, it is Spain's turn and we will not waste it." And he added: "Spain is not going to engage in any kind of chancy and neocolonialist undertaking in its former colony."

Acknowledging that in Guinea "there is no firmly established center of power," Martínez Pujalte thinks that recent developments in that African country have spurred the Spanish plan of assistance. While it is true that the aid contributed by Spain over the last 2 years (around 6 billion pesetas, half of which is on a non-reimbursable basis and the rest in long-term loans) did not help to get the country back on its feet, the Spanish Government does not want to miss this opportunity which may be its last.

"Spanish aid so far has not been very effective as a result of the huge domestic problems facing the country," the director of the Office for Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea admits. And among those problems he mentioned the lack of an administrative infrastructure, the lack of resolution when decisions need to be taken and the lack of clear ideas regarding the role of the Spanish advisers.

Including doctors and teachers, there are 356 Spanish advisers in Equatorial Guinea of which 32 are policemen, 19 come under the Ministry of Transport, 18 under the Ministry of Defense and 12 under the Ministry of Labor.

The Spanish attitude seems to be firm. "The Spanish Government is prepared to get Guinea back on its feet providing that it is given enough safeguards to effectively carry out its undertaking," Martínez Pujalte pointed out. "We are not going to tolerate any further harassment against Spain and Spanish citizens as happened with Macias," he also said.

But not all aspects are negative ones. Since Macias was ousted, in August 1979, death as a result of measles has almost disappeared although the country's health standard is far lower than it used to be in 1968 when Guinea became independent. Schooling is provided for 90 percent of the population and 500 million pesetas worth of canned meat, milk, sugar, wheat and fish have been distributed among the population.

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There was a need to control this economic aid and in May 1980 the Commission for Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea was created. Its purpose is to put to the best possible use the 1.126 billion pesetas which the state budget has assigned this year to the former Spanish colony on a non-reimbursable basis.

"The money is spent here in Spain and we send to Guinea goods and services which are allocated by the ministries." Martinez Pujalte explained. This sum of over 1 billion pesetas includes 300 million for medical aid, 120 million for education, 80 million for public works, 50 million for the television and a similar amount for the Geographical Institute.

But there has been a drastic change in the criteria previously used by the Spanish Government regarding the needs of Equatorial Guinea in the light of recent developments in its former colony. It is the general opinion that the two fulcrums on which Guinea hinges are security and defense on the one hand, and economic development on the other.

This is why members of the Spanish police and military will be sent to Malabo to act as advisers. About 100 Equatorial Guineans are currently attending courses at military and police academies in Spain.

The immediate purpose of our talks is to have Equatorial Guineans, after being trained in Spain, take over as President Obiang's personal guard under Spanish commanders and officers to replace the Moroccan troops now entrusted with that detail.

In the economic sphere, efforts will be directed toward three essential objectives: to make the bikuele a peseta convertible currency, to bring order into the financial and budget machinery of the Guinean state and to equip the country with the maximum productive capacity.

President Obiang is preparing the ground. To start with, he has already announced a sweeping ministerial reshuffle in the coming weeks, a reshuffle which could affect most of the departments.

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GABON

BRIEFS

SUGGESTED BLUFF--How is he to face his deep feeling that he cannot count any longer on the support of the French military forces in the case of a popular revolt aimed at overthrowing him? This is the question provoking the nightmares of the Gabonese chief of state. One of his advisors has hit upon the answer: when Bokassa realized that Giscard was attempting to get rid of him, he thought of the stratagem of brandishing the threat of resorting to the Soviet Union. Why not act in the same vein? The Gabonese president--fearing that such a maneuver could precipitate the fall of his regime and realizing full well that the USSR leaders would never fall into such an obvious trap--asked his advisor and confidant for time to think it over. This may be why he launched a warning to France 2 weeks ago, accusing it of wishing to destabilize his regime. "Bongo doubtlessly continues to think that the Giscardian regime, which was able to "influence" a certain press, is still in power in Paris," an influential member of the French Socialist Party commented. "It is time for him to wake up...." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12 Oct 81 p 28] .COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

COFFEE, COCOA CAMPAIGNS—On 30 September the Ivorian council of ministers heard an important announcement made by Denis Bra Kanon, minister of agriculture, in relation to the 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 coffee and cocoa campaigns. For the 1980-1981 campaign, the minister noted a record production of 361,000 tons of green coffee and the full operation of all of the 16 pulping machines. The campaign is ending with a stock of 210,000 tons of coffee, a quantity never equaled before. As for cocoa, once again the harvest exceeds 400,000 tons, confirming the Ivory Coast's first place in the world cocoa economy. However, the two main Ivorian products continue to face serious difficulties abroad because of the low prices on the international market on the one hand, and of insufficient export quotas for coffee on the other, despite the government's efforts in this respect. The council of ministers has set the first of October for the opening of the 1981-1982 campaign, and a presidential decree has determined the prices for producers at 150 francs CFA per kilo for coffee-berry (or 300 francs CFA for green coffee) and at 300 francs CFA per kilo for cocoa. Buyers are forbidden from purchasing below these prices. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2565] COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

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SENEGAL

DIOUF DISCUSSES RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL SITUATION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep-11 Oct 81 pp 8-11

[Interview with Abdou Diouf, president of Senegal, by Ginette Cot; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] The situation which has developed since 1 January requires a new approach and concrete and credible proposals and responses to the existing problems in the country, both domestic and foreign. Ginette Cot, who met with the Senegalese president, asked him all these questions.

The establishment of an unlimited, multi-party system is unquestionably one of the most notable events of the last few months in Senegal. This is an event which was watched with attention, if not an astonishment at times not far from disquiet, in the other African capitals. By the end of August, or about 5 months after the "democratic opening" had been put in concrete form by the revision of the constitution, 10 political parties (of which three claim to follow Marxism) were in the Dakar political arena, and the list was certainly not closed. Didn't this run the risk of the country's being swallowed up in a situation of anarchy and of paralyzing confusion, some people asked. Others asked themselves if Senegalese political life was not giving the "staggers" to the observer who tried to find himself in his this new labyrinth.

However, first of all one fact stands out: the majority of the six political movements which have just acquired legal status, alongside the four parties previously existing,<sup>1</sup> in reality already had taken root, even if their activities were necessarily on a reduced scale and their eventual growth was evidently limited by the very fact of their semi-clandestine character. And if their emergence on the official scene tends to overturn the assumptions of the political chess game to which people were accustomed up to now, today it is practically the unanimous estimate in Dakar that this explosion of political tendencies and sensitivities is a natural phenomenon. In this view it is comparable to what you see when you lift the cover from a boiling pot and constitutes an obligatory phase in the movement toward a greater kind of political clarification. This is a clarification which the impact of ideas, styles, and practices; a better and mutual acquaintanceship; and the confrontation with the daily realities and the imperious needs of the country should inevitably be charged with bringing.

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In this shifting scene, where rightly or wrongly reorganizations, remodelings, and even tactical or strategic changes are generally expected, it would no doubt be premature to foresee the possibility of the early establishment of a common action front on the part of the progressive or radical opposition.

Certainly, no one rejects--quite to the contrary--the idea of a need for regrouping and alliances around a specific program, and certain problems may lead here and now to the adoption of collective positions, as has been seen in the time of the military intervention in Gambia. However, for the new parties, it is now time for the tasks of restructuring, establishing themselves, deploying their forces, and expressing their personality. This is also a matter of discovering what brings together and what separates the diverse components of the new Senegalese political skein, to determine their real objectives and concerns, both immediate and long term. Now, like it or not, it is necessary to recognize that the advent of the former prime minister of Leopold Sedar Senghor to the position of chief of state and head of the Socialist Party, as well as the innovations which the new president has unquestionably introduced, has tended to reshuffle the old cards and modify the situation.

No doubt it is too early to measure the real extent of the changes which have been made or planned and even to appreciate the degree of sincerity of the intentions that have been proclaimed. No doubt also the argument of the opposition, which is fundamentally unanimous in estimating that only profound and radical reforms in the government's structures and methods are likely to bring the country out of the economic, social, and cultural depression into which it has fallen, has not lost all its weight. And neither is it possible to refuse to hear those who persist in doubting the capacity of the party in power--now for more than 20 years--to reform itself in depth and to make a change of direction likely to contribute to leading the nation along the path of salvation.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the situation which has developed since 1 January requires a new approach, a deeper reflection on the situation and, more than ever, concrete and credible proposals and responses to the problems which face the country. Lacking this, the democratic struggle which is developing on the foundations of the economic crisis would risk being nothing more than a sterile debate which would not take long to make the general public lose interest in it.

For the moment the new political edifice may still seem to be quite fragile. This should not be surprising when we recall that democracy is a difficult and long-term goal to achieve, if not a kind of apprenticeship without an end. Thus, one could momentarily fear for the survival of the democratic process at the time the Gambian affair occurred, where the violent dispute with the opposition seemed to show that the party in power, or at least its spokesmen, were hardly prepared to hear or to allow to be heard divergent points of view. In the same way one of the first questions which comes to mind is to know if the establishment of the multi-party system should be considered as an irreversible achievement or whether, on the contrary, it is a momentary experiment linked to the prospect of elections in 1983, a date after which this system could be altered.

To this question, as to other questions which will be asked of him during the interview which he has kindly agreed to give us--and all of which try to reflect certain concerns of Dakar political circles--President Abdou Diouf answers, as you will see, without wandering off and without a shadow of complacency. Speaking like a

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chief of state desirous of being "the president of all Senegalese," but also as a party man determined to take up successfully the challenge posed to the political party he leads, the successor to Senghor excused himself at times for the spontaneity and the passionate tone of his conversation. He moves from indignation to an amused smile, having a perfect working knowledge of the Senegalese political game and the concerns which underlie it.

[Answer] Multi-party system? For us this is an irreversible phenomenon (he says with conviction). Our determination is that the Senegalese people should be able to express themselves, in the diversity of their sensitivities and of their opinions, in the framework of parties legally established. That is the conclusion of a normal process, which has appeared after a long period of a de facto single party, followed by a constitutional system with three or four parties.

I also believe that it is possible for parties to group themselves around common but healthy objectives. In effect it would be annoying for any kind of alliance at all, an alliance against nature, to be established. By that I mean a group which would be established on false and unhealthy bases for a purely electoral purpose, with the single objective of defeating the Socialist Party. On the other hand I must make clear that we are aware that the complete pluralism to which we have come, under the specific conditions in Senegal, is our own particular experience. We do not, therefore, intend in any way to pose as an example and still less to seek to drag others along our path.

[Question] If the opposition parties henceforth have access to legal existence on the same basis as the Socialist Party--on the sole condition that they conform to the restrictions set out by the constitution, which prohibits, for legitimate and quite understandable reasons, any identification with a race, a religion, an ethnic group, a sex, a language, or a religion--it is noted, nevertheless, that there is a disparity existing in terms of the means of expressing themselves and of making themselves heard. We have the impression that the state controlled media (radio and television and the daily government newspaper) are not yet adapted to the new situation. We have the impression, in addition, that the circular of 1977, regulating the use of state controlled media by legal political parties, is above all applied to the opposition, which also complains of the censorship to which its communiques are subject. Wouldn't monopolization of the media by the party in power risk reducing considerably the democratic process which has begun?

[Answer] My wish is that the democratic process be carried on loyally at all levels, including the level of state controlled media. However, at the same time we should not confuse the state with the political parties. When the president or cabinet ministers speak in the name of the state, it is not the voice of the Socialist Party which is heard. On the other hand, there is a code of conduct to be observed. On the occasion of statements, communiques, or press conferences, you can criticize as much as you want, but there is a matter of respecting the rules of propriety and courtesy. In the Socialist Party we avoid giving insult and we ask the others to behave in the same way. That being said, the use of the official media is subject to the same regulations for all political parties, whatever they are. Finally, let us note that each political group has the right to have its own newspaper. However, there also it is a matter of avoiding certain defamatory statements, which only pollute the political atmosphere of the country and contribute nothing to the strengthening of democracy.

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[Question] The 1978 elections (presidential and legislative) were very broadly a matter of controversy, and their results were challenged. In the same way, moreover, looking to the next elections in 1983 the opposition is calling for a major modification of the Electoral Code and, in an overall way, for guarantees with a view to holding really free and democratic elections. Do you think you can join with the opposition in the preparation of the new measures proposed?

[Answer] I do not consider that the 1978 elections were not free and democratic. When the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) challenged the results, the Supreme Court was charged with studying the matter and made its decision quite independently.

Having said that, I might add that one can always improve a system, and it is my intention to propose an electoral code in the coming months. I do not reject, of course, any contribution. The PDS has already had the occasion of giving me its opinion on this subject, and if other parties wish to make their contribution, I am entirely at their disposition. The new code will be discussed by the National Assembly--where the PDS is represented, as well, moreover, as the Democratic and Popular Movement (MDP) has been for some time. It has a deputy<sup>2</sup> in the National Assembly, and the Assembly will decide on the matter in full use of its sovereign powers.

[Question] You have announced your intention and spoken of the need to democratize and cleanse the Socialist Party. Such an evolution cannot go on without colliding with strongly established privileges. Do you consider that the balance of forces within the Socialist Party is favorable to the success of this project?

[Answer] Every political party has its unwieldy aspects, its tendencies, its factions. The Socialist Party, a mass party, is not immune from this rule. My predecessor always fought for progress in terms of the methods and procedures within the PS. I have taken up the torch and I intend to continue this work of improvement, which, moreover, has become a necessity in the sense of a permanent task. I will not allow myself to be stopped by any obstacle. My desire is to make the PS the most "open" party, the cleanest, the most democratic party possible. In the same way as I speak in favor of democracy within the country, I intend to establish within the PS the kind of true, internal democracy which will permit the free expression of the will of the members and respect for their choices at the level of ideas and decisions.

[Question] The Socialist Party has succeeded the UPS [Senegalese Progressive Union] under conditions which may seem to be rather informal. Further, it has been in charge of the affairs of the country for more than 20 years. We know that, on this basis alone, it risks having suffered some wear and tear to the credibility of its power. Do you think that the reorganized Socialist Party will be in a position to meet the challenge?

[Answer] For my part I am determined to meet the challenge. I will work in this direction and I will watch in particular to ensure that the Socialist Party does not fall into the sin of self-satisfaction. It is by employing criticism and self-criticism that we will avoid hardening of the arteries and that we will build a healthy and vigorous party.

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[Question] In the same way a law against illicit enrichment has been promulgated, which seems to go in the direction of the proclaimed desire to carry on the struggle against corruption and inequality. However, questions are asked about the real importance of this measure and about the possibility of implementing it.

[Answer] Before the adoption of this law, everyone had said: the president will never dare to approve it. Then, on the eve of the debate on the law before the deputies in the National Assembly, people said: the National Assembly will never vote for such a measure. These two stages have been passed. Then people have whispered that the establishment of the special court charged with making inquiries and ruling on matters of illicit enrichment will be a long time in coming. Today the court has been established and the judges have been named. We are in a country of law, and everyone will do his work in complete independence. I could not do better to express my political wishes.

Having said that, and although there is no reason to fold our arms--far from it--we might remark that Senegal is not among the countries most affected by corruption and injustices.

[Question] We note a cascade of price increases (on gasoline, sugar)--and the people seem to live in fear of new increases. For a growing number of people "making both ends meet," as they say, is becoming an almost insoluble problem. Is it necessary to see in this deterioration in living conditions the consequences of the policy of austerity advocated by the IMF and which would come down to making the mass of the people bear the heaviest burden of the crisis?

[Answer] What government is in a position to halt the increase in prices? Even the most powerful governments do not achieve this. As we have been able to observe, the real proletariat in our country is the mass of farmers. And the first social measures which were taken were in their favor, by wiping out the farmers' debts and by reconsidering the prices paid to producers. That is to say that I am deeply aware of the situation in which my people live and that I will do everything possible to ease their difficulties.

However, when the most developed countries do not succeed in halting inflation, how will we do it in Senegal? I am not an expert in the exchange rate of the dollar. And in order not to risk dragging the country into total bankruptcy, we could not do otherwise than increase the price of gasoline. Regarding the increase in the price of sugar--of which part is produced domestically and the rest imported--the minister of commerce has explained the reason in detail.<sup>3</sup> We could not continue on the path of demagogic policy. There is a time when one is required to face up to the situation. However, if we had not applied the policy of "price verity," we would have seen more increases, and these higher prices would have been much broader. If we didn't go more deeply into the process of price increases, it is because of the political process, based on a clear awareness of the situation of my people, that I have committed myself to fight.

[Question] Regarding the events in Gambia, a certain number of questions remain. For example, the question is asked to what extent the proclamation by the leaders of the coup d'etat in Banjul of their adherence to Marxism was decisive in your decision to intervene militarily in Gambia.

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[Answer] The response stands by itself. I would never have permitted the legal existence of several Marxist parties within my country if I were a declared enemy of Marxism as such. The military intervention by Senegal in Gambia was decided on at the request of the legal government in Banjul and in conformity with the defense agreements signed between the two countries.

[Question] Despite the specific aspects of the Gambian problem, but taking into account several precedents (including the sending of a Senegalese force to Zaire at the time of the Shaba war), aren't you afraid, after the intervention in Banjul, that here and there, particularly in certain neighboring countries, Senegal might be suspected of nourishing expansionist or interventionist tendencies?

[Answer] On this subject we can provide the most formal assurances. Senegal must deal with enough difficulties not to load on itself, in addition, intervening in the affairs of other states. And, above all, we have in this regard principles on which we will not compromise. It was to respond to the appeal of the international community that we sent troops to Lebanon in the framework of the UN International Force in Lebanon. And it is because we considered that there had been external intervention in the affairs of a friendly country that we sent a military contingent to Shaba.

However, I can benefit from the opportunity you give me to provide full assurance, through your publication, to all my neighbors with regard to the intentions of Senegal as far as they are concerned.

[Question] A draft constitution for a confederation of Gambia and Senegal has been announced. Is it possible to know now how this draft will be implemented, in concrete terms?

[Answer] We have agreed with President Diawara on the need, in present circumstances--and it is the minimum which can be done--to establish a confederation of the two countries. The draft is being studied by experts in the ministries of the two countries. It will then be studied by the chiefs of state and subsequently be submitted to public opinion, either through the National Assembly or directly by means of a referendum. It is still too early to be more precise.

[Question] At the same time as changes have been made in the domestic arena, one has the impression of a beginning of change in the field of Senegalese foreign policy. An outline of a rapprochement with Algeria has been noted. Can you tell us what are the main orientations of Senegalese diplomacy today? And on the other hand what is your position regarding the evolution of the problem of the Western Sahara?

[Answer] From the beginning we reaffirmed our intention to strengthen our traditional friendships and to broaden the circle of our friends. We have no quarrels with any country. With Algeria we intend to develop a policy of close cooperation. We are in agreement on all the major problems. Between the two capitals (Algiers and Dakar) there is only one point on which our views differ. It concerns the problem of the Western Sahara--a problem we put aside at the time of our bilateral meetings.

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In a general way Senegal follows a policy of the outstretched hand and of real non-alignment, a policy concerned with contributing to safeguarding peace and security in Africa. We are a beneficiary of all the efforts which work and fight to restore peace rapidly in Northwest Africa and we welcomed with relief the speech of the King of Morocco at the OAU summit meeting in Nairobi. We have been comforted by the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the OAU, and we hope for a rapid application of the measures agreed upon there, in order to bring back peace in this region.

[Question] Anticipating our next question, President Abdou Diouf cut us off.

[Answer] As you have been able to note, we condemned vigorously the latest armed attacks launched by South Africa against Angola, whose existence as a state we recognize. For nothing which involves an African country can leave us indifferent.

[Question] Can one expect that Senegal will take one step more and recognize the government in Luanda?

[Answer] There is a problem of principle for us in that situation. As long as Cuban troops are in Angola, we will have the feeling that there is a doubt as to the real control of the Luanda government over Angolan territory. In our view things would have been clearer if it had been possible to find a basis of agreement with the other political forces. Otherwise, we have the impression that it is the Cuban presence which maintains the Luanda government in power, keeping the other forces at bay. It is true that there is a problem regarding the sequence of events. At the time of the Nairobi summit meeting, I had a conversation with an Angolan leader, the minister of interior, Alexandre Rodrigues. The latter gave me to understand that it was South African and Zairian troops which were the first to begin hostilities in 1975, when the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] was already in Luanda. Of course, the others, like UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], state the contrary view.

[Question] However, UNITA is supported by South Africa. And South Africa is guilty of aggression against Angola. In these circumstances, how could Cuban troops be withdrawn? Isn't this a true vicious circle?

[Answer] That is true. I think that it is necessary to turn toward the future. The Angolan problem is closely linked to the problem of Namibia. All parties should mobilize themselves to impose a solution of the Namibian question. And we are sure that, as from that moment, things will be clearer and that the problem of the legitimacy of the Luanda government will lose much of its importance.

[Question] Since the change of government in France, how are relations between the two countries?

[Answer] We place great hopes in President Francois Mitterrand and his new team. And we are sure that relations between the two countries, already excellent, are going to develop even better. It is certain that there will be further development of cooperation and a broadening and deepening of relations in all fields.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Of course these are the Socialist Party; the Senegalese Democratic Party, whose secretary general is Abdoulaye Wade; the African Party of Independence (PAI), led by Majhemout Diop; and the Senegalese Republic Movement (MRS), created by Boubacar Gueye. The six parties which have recently been recognized, after having deposited their by-laws and received the acknowledgment of their legalization are: the Democratic National Assembly (RND), whose secretary general is Sheikh Anta Diop; the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), whose national general coordinator is Mamadou Dia, former prime minister; And-Jef, the Revolutionary Movement for the New Democracy (AJ - MRDN), led by Landing Savane; the Union for the People's Democracy (UDP), led by Hamedine Racine Guisse; the Independence and Labor Party (PIT), formerly the PAI [African Independence Party] - Senegal, which Seydou Cissoko and Amath Dansokho lead and which held its first constituent congress last August; the Democratic League - Movement for the Working Party (LD - MPT), of which Landing Savane is one of the principal leaders. Two other parties have deposited their by-laws but are waiting for their eventual acknowledgements: the Assembly for National Salvation; and the Senegalese People's Party (PPS), the latter having held its constituent congress last August before having received a response to its request for legalization.
2. This refers to a deputy, Papa Demba Diallo, who had resigned from the PDS.
3. The retail price of sugar on 9 August went from 260 francs CFA to 325 francs CFA per kilogram.

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TANZANIA

UJAMAA SAID TO BE BACKED BY VAST MAJORITY

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 22, 23

[Article by Omar Al-Amoody: 'Myerere Still Believes 'Ujamaa' Is the Greatest']

[Excerpts]

Today, the effects of Nyerere's socialism are beginning to be felt in the country. Attitudes have changed. So have lifestyles. For example, it is now nationally accepted that it is morally wrong for some people to live in luxury while others are destitute. People are no longer impressed by limousines and skyscrapers. They are far more impressed by the development of social services like schools, health centres, water supplies, electricity and transport in the rural areas where 90 per cent of the 18-million Tanzanians live. No longer does the Tanzanian peasant have to walk more than four kilometres in search of his water, dispensary or school. He no longer has to exhaust himself to get his produce to market. Villages now own lorries and buses. Today the peasant determines what he wants and what he does not want. He has, to an extent, become a decision-maker. This he does through village committees.

Seventy per cent of school-age children in Tanzania today attend primary schools. Forty per cent of the villages have clear running water. Thirty-five per cent have dispensaries and over 74 per cent have their own shops.

### **Adverse effect**

Nevertheless, Tanzania has its problems. In part, the government maintains, these are due to outside influences. For instance, a few years ago the International Monetary Fund and the Tanzania Government agreed on financial aid totalling US\$40-million to support Tanzania's balance of payments. Subsequently, official sources claim, pressure from the IMF and the World Bank contributed to a 10 per cent devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling.

Tanzania's liberalisation of foreign exchange control also had an adverse effect. It resulted in a 45 per cent increase in the country's import bill, with a corresponding deficit in the balance of payments to the tune of T Shg 1,768-million. In 1977, Tanzania had a balance of payments surplus of 1,233-million shillings.

Lack of foreign exchange has led to the present under-utilisation of factories, disruption of the transport system and a shortage of consumer goods in shops. Breakdowns in basic services such as electricity and water, coupled with financial indiscipline within parastatal organisations, has resulted in a drop in the

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standard of living for most Tanzanians.

To add to the country's problems, there have been incidents of corruption, racketeering and profiteering.

This, the people say, is a reflection on human nature and the ways of the world, not the system. So *Ujamaa* maintains its popularity as a way of life for the vast majority of Tanzanians●

AFTER ALMOST 15 years of talking hard to his people about the importance to them all of his brand of socialism succeeding in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere is more confident than ever that *Ujamaa* is the answer to the problems inherited from colonialism.

Part of his success, perhaps, is his honest approach to those he rules. He has never tried to cover up the problems faced by Tanzania. Rather he has presented those problems as a challenge. And his people have taken up the challenge.

Nobody, least of all President Nyerere,

pretends that Tanzania is a completely socialist state. But that is the aim.

It was with this in mind that Tanzania recently staged massive countrywide demonstrations to reiterate their commitment to socialism. *Ujamaa*, the people say, is the vehicle by which they can attain their social, cultural and material needs.

### **He was right**

In 1961 Nyerere had in fact promised that his people would do more to develop Tanzania than that done by the colonialists during their 40-year rule. True to his promise, Tanzania raised its social, economic and political standards.

Nyerere believed that his people would be prepared to work harder when they knew that the fruits of their labour would benefit their own country instead of a "foreign" government. He was right.

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ZAIRE

WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE SUPPORT; OPPOSITION LIQUIDATED

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French No 3278, 24 Sep 81 pp 29-31

[Article by Jacques Wiame]

[Text] For more than 10 years now we have been told Mobutu's regime was on the verge of foundering. All the same, it is still afloat, despite economic and financial insolvency, despite the systematic exploitation of the national wealth by the president's clique, despite the poverty of the people and the ruinous condition of the country, despite the rebellions and the opposition.

An unsinkable dictatorship? The incomparable skill of "Kinshasa's great helmsman" in avoiding the reefs? The durability of Mobutuism is basically underwritten by the Western countries who obligingly come to the rescue--militarily and financially--whenever the regime is threatened. And that support is not about to be reconsidered. Mr. Nguza Karl I Bond found this out when he made his recent trip to the United States.

Before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, the former Zairian prime minister made terrible accusations against Mobutu, his family and his entourage. He spoke of the corruption, the diversion of funds, the violations of human rights, the torture. But only a few hours after he made his charges, the United States Government reaffirmed its "full support" for the Zairian regime. Following Paris and Brussels, therefore, Washington thus renewed Mobutu's life insurance policy.

Chancelleries, like religions, secrete doctrine. On the subject of Zaire, the United States, along with the Belgian and French governments, clings to the following analysis: Mobutu is the strong figure in Zaire, the only one capable of maintaining national cohesion. It is in the interest of the West to provide him the economic and military aid he demands, because the country occupies a strategic position in the heart of the African continent and has fabulous mineral wealth (uranium, cobalt, copper, diamonds, etc.) which is so necessary to Western industry. The fact that the general-president and his entourage extract a heavy commission from the nation's resources is a necessary evil. The choice is Mobutu or chaos.

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As a result of that doctrine, the Western camp has always come to Mobutu's rescue. It has sent expeditionary forces there several different times to support the shaky strongman. It has provided numerous financial transfusions to keep this ultra-wealthy but ruined country alive. Since he fled Kinshasa, Mr. Nguza Karl I Bond has been trying to show the West the "error in its calculations."

In Washington, before the House foreign affairs subcommittee, he repeated what he had said many times in Europe:

"Far from being a factor for stability, the Mobutu regime is a destabilizing element. Zaire and the Zairian people are getting poorer and poorer, while the fortunes of the president and his entourage continue to swell. The patience of Zairians is not unlimited, and the limits have been reached. Remember the so-called invincible shah of Iran and the so-called docile people of Iran. If they want to avoid an explosion--a Shaba III or a Kinshasa I--the Western powers must press Mobutu to step down peacefully and support the establishment of a democracy.

A modern-day Cassandra, the former Zairian prime minister's words have been ignored.

Enigmatic

The "realpolitik" being carried out by the United States, French and Belgian administrations is sustained by "bread and butter" considerations, not just fine sentiments. Who stands outlined behind the democratic alternative proposed with such fanfare by Nguza Karl I Bond? Zaire's former number two man is presented to us as a savior, heaven sent. The man himself, however, remains an enigma. A nephew of Moise Tshombe, a jurist educated at Louvain, a Dutch-speaker--which softens the hearts of our northern neighbors--he gets good press. His career in public life, however, has not left an imperishable trace on Zairians. His fame is confined to what was formerly Katanga [province], where his image is not that of a charismatic leader but an honest administrator. In Zaire and in foreign capitals people are surprised that after having been condemned to die and then pardoned he agreed to accept the positions of foreign minister and prime minister. It is found still more surprising that, after having been tortured in Kotakoli prison, he denied the accusations made by Amnesty International and came to the defense of his tormentors. On the other hand, he is indecisive in his political actions, prone to change directions abruptly.

An example: On 16 April, he wrote in his letter of resignation to Mr. Mobutu:

"My most ardent desire is that my stay in Europe, which I hope will be as uneventful as possible, shall not be exploited in any way for any kind of political adventurism."

Two months later, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the republic (1984).

He has also changed his attitude toward Zairian opposition figures in exile in Belgium. His tactics for coming to supreme power have also varied.

"I want neither a declaration of war nor blood on my hands," he said in an interview with a Belgian journalist. But in the African newspaper CONTINENT he announced:

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"If my words are the trigger, I will take full responsibility."

Finally, and this is not the least disquieting fact, behind Nguza Karl I Bond are the movements of a not very tempting potpourri of people. Despite all these dark spots, however, the alternative Nguza offers to the Mobutu regime remains attractive. But is it credible? One democrat is not enough to create a democracy. From what breeding-ground can more be drawn?

**The Internal Opposition**

At first glance, even within Zaire itself, there is no opposition to Mobutuism. And the regime tries to portray the Zairian people as spellbound and docile. In reality, opposition movements do become active from time to time, and rebellions and strikes break out. But these incidents do not easily escape the official censors. The revolt of the peasants of Idiofa--and the massacre which followed--the guerrilla operations carried out in the Fizi Baraka region by Laurent Kabila's PRP [Peoples Revolution Party] and the strikes unleashed by the teachers and students at the university, by the rank and file of unionists--all this has been brought to light by Zairian opponents in exile who have never hesitated to spread tall tales or mix together truth and falsehood. Their claims thus lack credibility.

During the "Kinshasa spring," when the regime relaxed its grip as a result of Western pressure, members of parliament and the political bureau of the MPR [Popular Movement of the Revolution] (Zaire's sole political party) began to criticize the regime, demand an accounting, set up commissions of inquiry. This alternate center of power was nipped in the bud. Kasai's 13 deputies, and also representatives of Kwilu and Shaba, were incarcerated and deprived of their civil rights. The union leaders who dared criticize government institutions, who denounced the special privileges of the oligarchy, were imprisoned. Dissident students were sent to the fields and put into uniform. The army--so often and so savagely purged--has lost the taste for plotting. Messianic rebellions--such as that of Nzambi Mpungu--have been violently suppressed. Nevertheless, if one can believe the Zaire Committee, Mobutu's first is weakening. His authority is disputed. For example, a member of the MPR political bureau, a former senator from Maniema dismissed by the supreme guide, has reportedly been restored to his position by his peers.

**The External Opposition**

Finally, Zaire's dissidents can only express themselves by going into exile. It is the only way they can draw attention to their thoughts and organize. In Western capitals, particularly in Brussels, movements opposed to the regime have proliferated. United fronts have taken the place of disunited fronts. The Congo Liberation Organization founded by Mbeka Makosso, Zaire's former ambassador to Iran, has been eclipsed by the Congo Liberation Council led by Mr. Mungul Diaka, one of Mobutu's ex-ministers. Alongside the FLNC [Congolese National Liberation Front] which was responsible for the two Shaba offensives and was excessively Marxist has appeared a moderate FLNC. In place of the Katangan gendarmes of Mbumba operating from Angola we have Major Mfumu's Katangans based in Zambia. Zairian exiles and dissidents come and go between the various political parties and liberation movements, change camps, and wander aimlessly.

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It is a liquified opposition, one which in the last analysis poses little danger to a regime enjoying the "full support" of the Western countries. Because of this realpolitik under the equatorial sun, Zaire will thus remain an ultra-wealthy country with an impoverished and starving people. But until for how long?

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ZAMBIA

AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESCRIBED AS SUCCESSFUL

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Article by Monika Brenner and Reinhardt Engel: "Zambia: A Couple Who Gave Back a Village its Values"]

[Text]

MTOWE is a little village in eastern Zambia. Several hundred farmers grow their crops on poor soil. They suffer from hunger, sickness and alcoholism. Young men and women leave their village looking for work in urban industries and in the large copper mines. Reasons for this rural exodus are the relatively high wages paid there, and a feeling of resignation in the village, the knowledge of being left behind by the technical development outside Mtowe. The unity of village life is increasingly falling apart.

The education of the young people plays its role too. Traditional culture is regarded as backward and primitive. The agricultural policy of the Zambian government concentrates on "modern farming". Students in agricultural schools are being taught how to use fertilizers, tractors and harvesting machines. A little village like Mtowe could not afford any of these resources.

Besides, schools teach other social values. Instead of cooperation within the family students learn individualism and competition. Having acquired this technical and social knowledge even those young people who intended to stay become resigned and move into the more developed areas.

This was the starting point for an Austrian development project. The Institute for International Cooperation, (IIC), a catholic organisation, which educates and sends development aides to countries all over the world, sent an Austrian couple to Mtowe.

The task of Johannes Rauch and his wife Gertrude was to install an educational system for the young girls and boys of Mtowe to improve their lot by simple means.

"In the beginning the young people were disappointed with us," said Johannes Rauch. "They had another picture of Europeans. They thought a European could solve every problem, that he had machinery and money. We did not even have a car."

Soon the two Austrians succeeded in gaining the confidence of Mtowe's young inhabitants. The most important task was the improvement of the soil. They dunged the fields biologically; they harnessed the knowledge of old people: which water holes could be used and which were dangerous; which trees were homes of harmful monkeys and which of useful birds.

### Simple machinery

They built simple machinery - ploughs, harrows, and other machines. Everything was drawn by oxen; a tractor would have inevitably meant dependence on expensive fuel and central maintenance shops. The village people could repair or even improve the tools themselves.

Gertrude Rauch taught the girls to weave, using self-spun wool, and to sew their own clothes. Becoming independent from outside was the leading principle here as well. The strict division of labour

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between male and female tasks remained unchanged during the project.

The success of the programme was convincing. The few dozen young people who took part harvested more than a third of the crops all the other farmers of Mtowe did. In their carpentry shop they built their own furniture too.

Shortly before the two Austrians left, the young people of Mtowe started to construct more daring projects. They built a windmill to water a vegetable field and improved the supply of vitamin-rich food to the village.

Equally important was the improvement in self confidence of the young people in Mtowe. They now know that they do not have to leave their social surroundings and culture in order to live reasonably well. They do not risk having to live in the slums of the industrial towns.

The educational system which the Rauchs had installed is continuing to work without their help and is still expanding. Young people from Mtowe now teach their colleagues in neighbouring villages●

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ZAMBIA

## BUMPER MAIZE CROP POLITICALLY HELPFUL FOR KAUNDA

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 27, 28

[Article by Guy Arnold: "Zimbabwe's Legacy for K.K."]

[Text]

1981 HAS NOT, so far, been an easy year for Zambia. It began with strikes on the Copperbelt and - almost - a major confrontation between the powerful union movement and the government. This resulted from union opposition to a new UNIP controlled system of local government. In February, President Kaunda made the second reshuffle of two months when he replaced the number two and three men in the state hierarchy: Mainza Chona, long close to Kaunda, gave way to Humphrey Mulemba as UNIP Secretary-General (effectively deputy head of state); while the Prime Minister, Daniel Lisulo, was replaced by a long time politician, Nalumino Mundia.

In June came new rumours of an attempted coup after Zambia had expelled two American diplomats who, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had been engaged in activities inimical to the country's security. Certain names were then advanced as being implicated in the "plot" and included the chairman of the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions, Frederick Chiluba. The use of his name was seen as a preliminary move towards another government-union confrontation.

In July, however, President Kaunda went on a state visit to Zimbabwe. This was regarded as a special tribute to the

part Kaunda and Zambia had played in the Zimbabwe independence struggle. One of Salisbury's main roads was renamed after Zambia's president. In the final years of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia, Kaunda had been the close backer of Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU-PF rather than of Mugabe and his ZANU-PF which from 1975 was based in Mozambique.

### Triumphal tour

Following Zimbabwe independence, both Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere of Tanzania were soon invited to Zimbabwe on state visits; the invitation to Kaunda was, therefore, somewhat belated. Nonetheless he enjoyed a triumphal tour of Zimbabwe which appeared to heal the wounds resulting from the earlier coolness. Speaking in Bulawayo, Kaunda called upon Zimbabweans to unite behind Mugabe and said:

"You stand a test from South Africa. If you are divided the enemy will penetrate your ranks and one day South Africa will be able to bring you to your knees." The two countries concluded an agreement for preferential trade and increased co-operation.

On his return home, however, Kaunda faced further conflict in the form of

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renewed striking on the Copperbelt. As the mineworkers' leader, David Mwila, said: "These strikes are symptoms of the people's growing disenchantment with this government's economic policies."

Part of the discontent stems from the huge differentials between Zambian and expatriate mineworkers for the same job. But as Chiluba said: "I admit the unions are to the right of the party. We are demanding that the government put an end to socialisation and spend its revenue improving the lives of ordinary people." Such a statement perhaps inevitably was seen as a direct political challenge to the government.

A week later Chiluba and three other top trade union officials were detained by Kaunda and the ZCTU met in emergency session to consider what action to take. The crisis on the Copperbelt was sufficiently disturbing to persuade Kaunda to cancel his plans to attend the Royal wedding of Prince Charles in London.

In the event the unions backed away from a direct confrontation with the government - there had been suggestions of a general strike - and appealed to workers to remain calm. The ZCTU did, however, call for a public commission of inquiry with representatives of the OAU and ILO to investigate the strain which has developed between the labour movement and the government.

### Political tool

In announcing the arrests of Chiluba and his colleagues, Kaunda said they had instigated strikes and planned to take over the leadership of the country. This was rejected in a statement by the ZCTU which said the workers were not being used as a political tool by the labour movement and went on: "The Government must not shift the blame for its own

economic and political problems by using the ZCTU as a scapegoat."

Since independence many of Zambia's troubles have been ascribed, rightly, to UDI in Rhodesia and, for example, Zambia often suffered more from the effects of sanctions than did Rhodesia against whom they were aimed. Zambia's exports, particularly of its vital product copper, were severely affected by the cutting off of the Mozambique ports and the closing of the Benguela railway, and its imports of vital food and equipment were likewise severely hampered. Kaunda to his credit, never flinched, but his people paid dearly for his steadfastness.

Ironically, the end of the Smith regime and the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe have in a sense exacerbated Zambia's problems. A sharp divide appears to have developed between Kaunda and a number of his close advisers about the direction of his economic policies. And certainly there are far too many of the most able men in Zambia who have long since departed from politics into private business or other occupations; they are men whose skills the country dearly needs at the political helm rather than some of the old political hacks of the Central Committee.

Kaunda, however, remains one of the most astute politicians in Africa and will no doubt weather this storm as he has survived many others. He will be helped by what appears to be a coming bumper crop - an estimated 11m bags of maize which is the highest output ever - and if the new agricultural policies really are beginning to pay dividends then one of the most difficult and consistent problems - the inability of Zambia to feed itself - will have been solved at least for this year and at a time most helpful to an embattled President Kaunda ●

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