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2 December 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 44/81)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

CALLS FOR ASSASSINATION OF 'ARAFAT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 243, 9-15 Oct 81 pp 27-30

[Article: "The Question Is Dangerous and the Destiny of the Resistance Is up in the Air; Who Put out Contract on 'Arafat?"]

[Text] There is no other explanation for what is happening in west Beirut. There is a contract out on the head of the Palestinian Resistance. The number of cars that were blown up by explosives between Tyre and Sabra exceeded 10 in less than 2 weeks, and the number of innocent Lebanese and Palestinian civilians who were victims of these incidents is now approaching 1,000 dead and wounded. Every street in the Lebanese capital has been seized by a phobia, until further notice.

Information available to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI from well-informed sources indicates that there is a contract out on Yasir 'Arafat himself. This is because, first, he symbolizes the Palestinian Revolution; second, he symbolizes the independence of the Palestinian decision; and because he is not sufficiently "restrained" in dealing with a few Arab parties.

The major attack with explosives on the offices and leaders of the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement came at a time when the so-called "autonomy" talks were being resumed in Cairo. They came at a time when Tel Aviv was launching a new trial balloon around a formula for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. What is actually being prepared for the PLO, and who is behind these preparations?

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI asked Abu Jihad, the military official in the organization, this question. It was presenting the possibilities that were being presented and discussed in diplomatic and political circles, besides an interview with al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese forces. In that interview al-Jumayyil discussed a Syrian position, a Palestinian position, a variety of government positions and possibilities for the future.

For several months political observers in Beirut and Damascus have been relaying reports about lukewarm Syrian and Palestinian relations. In some cases these relations reached the point of a confrontation in general and a

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confrontation between President Hafiz al-Asad and Abu 'Ammar, the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. Some sources of the Lebanese National Movement affirm that the Soviets informed a number of movement leaders that they were extremely anxious over what they called "the deterioration in Syrian-Palestinian relations" and "the existence of plans in a few Syrian agencies to settle their accounts with Fatah in general and with Abu 'Ammar in particular." "It is inevitable that in return there be Palestinian precautions to ensure an appropriate series of reactions." On the whole the matter was quickly approaching "the brink of calamity."

It is noteworthy that throughout the past period this information was being circulated in whispers behind the scenes. However, about 3 weeks ago, especially after the assassination of Louis Delamare, the French ambassador in Lebanon, the information was made public and brought out in the open. Louis Delamare, was the one who played a principal role in arranging the meeting between Claude Cheysson, France's minister of foreign affairs, and Yasir 'Arafat. The meeting took place in the home of Shafiq al-Wazzan in Beirut, and it was followed by a series of car explosions in the western area of the Lebanese capital, especially near the offices of Fatah. These incidents had been veiled in mystery, raising numerous questions comprising everything conceivable about relations between these explosions and the leadership of the deterrent forces and some of the influential positions within that leadership as well. The leadership of the deterrent forces are controlled by the special forces (the Red Knights), and they are immediately subordinate to Rif'at al-Asad, commander of the defense companies.

## The Independent Decision

Observers concur that the central point of the struggle is concentrated on the extent of what is called "the independent Palestinian decision" upon which Yasir 'Arafat insists on both the Arab and international scene.

The struggle is taking place between two specific positions: the Syrian position which is based on the premise that its relative power in the negotiating process, currently underway behind the scenes and revealed by Philip Habib, President Reagan's envoy to the area, is based on the fact that Hafiz al-Asad controls both the Lebanese and Palestinian hands [in the game] for bargaining purposes. Accordingly, the liberation organization would have to exercise strategic and tactical restraint in any action it takes on the Lebanese, Arab and international scenes in the context of what Damascus decides, considering the fact that Damascus is "actually in command and has the final word." The [other position], the Palestinian position, which was articulated by Yasir 'Arafat, either in statements he made or actions he took, is supported by most of the principal Palestinian leaders. That position states that the Palestinian decision cannot be dictated to the organization by outsiders whose interests are not those of the Palestinian people and their revolution. It is imperative that a Palestinian decision take the Lebanese equations into primary consideration and that this be done in a comprehensive, national Arab context, not just in the context of Syria's view, apart from the view of the rest of the Arab

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forces. Second, Syria has no right "to veto" the PLO's relations with any other Arab country or the organization's right to take political and diplomatic action on the world scene.

Witnesses who took part in some of the recent meetings of the Follow-Up Committee in Beirut relate that the Syrian-Palestinian dispute broke out between 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syria's deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, and Yasir 'Arafat. The two exchanged angry words after "the veiled threats that Khaddam made in the course of his discussion." The point that brought the dispute out in the open revolved around the question of who was to bear the responsibility for the lax security in Beirut in general and in the national areas in particular and for the rising transgressions and violations.

Each party held the other party responsible. However, the matter did not stop there: Khaddam hinted that the leadership of the liberation organization was exceeding its political boundaries and capabilities and risking the entire cause."

'Arafat replied, "The Palestinian Revolution makes its independent decisions by itself. It does not take risks because risks are not part of the revolution's nature. The revolution is daring, and it challenges others via direct and indirect procedures so as to attain its rights."

Witnesses explained this argument by saying that it was actually about the organization's direct dealing with the matter of the cease-fire in the recent Palestinian-Israeli war last July. The organization had dealt directly without consulting with Syria and with UN Secretary General Waldheim on the one hand, and with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the other. Provoked by Abu 'Ammar's statements Khaddam exclaimed angrily as he left the meeting, "We shall see, Abu 'Ammar, how these procedures will let you attain these rights."

The New Tune

Observers notice that government circles in Damascus and circles in Beirut that are loyal to them are now strongly harping on the tune that "Abu 'Ammar is leading the organization into a settlement with Washington via Saudi Arabia." They are saying that "Abu 'Ammar must be stopped and the organization must be delivered from his dictatorial grip." Some leaders of the Lebanese National Movement have affirmed that Damascus is measuring "the patriotism and nationalism of every active movement in Lebanon" by the amount of its "public criticism" of Abu 'Ammar.

It seems that events which have been piling up in the context of Syrian-Palestinian relations have led these relations into a crisis that cannot be resolved unless the organization, under the leadership of Abu 'Ammar, accepts the Syrian conditions. These conditions insist that President al-Asad have the freedom to act on the Palestinian question on both the Arab and international scenes. Since this is impossible, the Syrian plan requires that Abu 'Ammar be separated from the organization. That step

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would constitute a preliminary threat to Fatah. If it does not succeed, the plan would proceed with an attempt to destroy Fatah from the inside, even if that were to lead to the physical liquidation of a few leaders.

Observers report that the events began with what is known as "the Syrian missiles crisis in Lebanon." It was later established that this operation was merely a deceptive operation intended to distract attention away from the principal operation of bombing the nuclear reactor for which Israel was making preparations. When the Palestinian-Israeli war broke out afterwards and the Palestinian Resistance displayed superb courage and ability in resisting the Israeli attack from the sea and from the air, causing the Israelis to turn back and inflicting heavy losses on them in the field and inside Israel itself, Israel turned to the use of its superiority in the air in intense air raids [against the Palestinians]. The Palestinian Resistance asked Damascus for help; it asked Damascus to use the missiles it had set up in Lebanon. But Damascus said that it would not be able to use the missiles so as not to expand the range of the war at a time when it was not prepared for such an expansion. Damascus also said that it was working through its negotiations with Philip Habib on getting Washington to apply pressure on Israel to stop the raids.

When the Resistance urged Damascus [to deploy the missiles], the reply that came from Damascus was this: "The Soviets are tying our hands as far as the missiles are concerned." The Resistance turned to the Kremlin on this matter, and its reply was, "Syria is the only country that makes the decision whether or not to use the missiles." One of the leaders of the Resistance described this situation as "a new Tal al-Za'tar" with a few differences. "In the first Tal al-Za'tar," he said, "we were surrounded by Phalangists who were protected by Syrians. In the second Tal al-Za'tar the Israelis are bombing us from the air after they failed to shell us from the sea and the land. [Meanwhile], the Syrians stand by and watch even though their missile batteries were set up under the pretext of protecting the Lebanese and the Palestinian people from the wanton aggression of the Israeli air force."

## The Advice of Damascus

The cease fire resolution reached by the liberation organization and Israel in the context of the war that had broken out between them on Lebanese territory followed. Both Kurt Waldheim, UN secretary general and Saudi Arabian diplomacy exercised directly in the United States directly and through U.S. envoy Philip Habib played an active part in bringing about this cease fire.

The cease fire proposal had come about under the pressure of the losses which the Palestinian Resistance had inflicted on the Israeli side. These losses led to the evacuation of residents from 37 settlements in the northern part of occupied Palestine for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The number of evacuees amounted to 11,000 Israelis. The liberation organization, under the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat, began considering the cease fire proposal. Damascus advised the organization to

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reject the proposal, but the organization declined to take the advice, seeing that the cease fire was limited to the direct war on Lebanese territory. The organization thought that the will and the interests of the Lebanese people, as expressed by the Lebanese National Movement, must be taken into consideration. The cease fire did not mean that the Palestinian Resistance would suspend its actions inside occupied Palestine. The fact that for the first time Israel was seeking a cease fire was considered a victory for the liberation organization and for the entire Arab nation, strengthening the organization's position on the international scene.

When Syrian authorities learned that the organization was likely to accept the cease fire, it urgently requested that Abu 'Ammar come to Damascus, even for a few hours of meetings and deliberations with President Hafiz al-Asad, before making the announcement.

However, Abu 'Ammar was quick to announce on behalf of the organization that "If the enemy honors the cease fire and declares it," he would comply with the appeal for a cease fire which was made by the UN secretary general. It was reported that 'Arafat made a point of taking the initiative and announcing the decision from his office in Beirut to emphasize that "the Palestinian decision is independent." Therefore, he did not comply with the request to delay the announcement until after he had met with President al-Asad. He did that to refute entirely [any charges] that the "Palestinian decision was subject to the wishes of Damascus."

President Hafiz al-Asad strongly rebuked Abu 'Ammar later when he met him. Al-Asad told Abu 'Ammar, "You are going way over your head." Abu 'Ammar replied, "My acceptance of the cease fire signifies in practical terms that I know precisely what my capabilities are and what the capabilities of my allies are. In general, we have all won with this decision."

The major political victory that the organization won in the international community as a result of its accomplishments in combat, which forced a cease fire on Israel, caused as much irritation and anger in Damascus especially after Damascus tried to prod some factions of the Resistance to violate the cease fire. The forces of the organization and of the Lebanese National Movement fiercely opposed Damascus and forced it to abide by the independent resolution of the Palestinian leadership. Ever since that time "the new crisis of confidence" between the organization and Syria became deeper, and Syria felt that it was no longer capable of manipulating the Palestinian hand at will. This was the prevalent impression at international gatherings.

The Saudi Hand

The crisis worsened as a result of a feeling in Damascus that Saudi Arabia had succeeded through quiet diplomacy in opening an "invisible" channel of communication between the liberation organization and the United States of America. There were two principal indications of that.

The first [indication] was in the fact that for the first time Prince Fahd announced a peace initiative in the area. It is based on the reformulation

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of a few UN resolutions, and it rests on two central points: the first is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Arab Jerusalem as its capital; and the second is a guarantee of security and peace for all the countries of the area. This means actual if not official recognition of Israel. The organization, especially the leadership of Fatah, represented by Abu 'Ammar and Abu Jihad, welcomed what was called some of "the positive aspects" of that initiative.

The second [indication] was evident in a documentary presented by the well-known American NBC Network. It was a documentary about the PLO, and it showed the organization for the first time objectively and sympathetically, affirming by visual evidence that the prevailing U.S. view that the PLO is a terrorist organization is not accurate. The PLO is an organization that is striving for legitimate national rights. It brings together the integrated economics, cultural, educational, health, administrative and civil service agencies of the state that is being established. In addition, it has its own security forces; all that it lacks is the land.

The straw that broke the camel's back came recently, according to one of the ambassadors of the socialist countries in Lebanon. That was the meeting that took place in Beirut between 'Arafat and Cheysson, France's minister of foreign affairs. Syrian authorities had urged Yasir 'Arafat after the first signs of a French-Palestinian crisis had loomed on the horizon regarding the protocol for this meeting--whether it should take place in the home of the French ambassador in Beirut or in the office of the general commander of the PLO's revolutionary forces--to hold the meeting in Damascus during the visit of the chief of French diplomacy to that city. However, Abu 'Ammar, supported by Louis Delamare, the French ambassador in Lebanon, insisted that a compromise over the crisis that had developed over the location of the meeting be found so that the meeting would take place in Beirut and not in Damascus. Syrian circles viewed this as a ploy to undermine Syrian clout in the area, a ploy in which both Abu 'Ammar and the French ambassador, who lost his life a few days later in a premeditated attack that was attributed to unknown persons, were participating.

## Closing the Sea

Observers are holding a close watch on Syrian reactions to Abu 'Ammar's statements and actions in which he insists on "the independence of the Palestinian decision" and on his freedom to act [independently] throughout the Lebanese scene and throughout the Arab and international scene as well. So far observers are watching a number of these actions that are marked by extreme candor.

The first among these reactions was Damascus's sudden change of heart about the measures it had previously agreed to in the meetings of the Arab Follow-Up Committee. The measures had been proposed to achieve security and stability in Lebanon as a first step toward getting out of the crisis of the fighting and the civil war and relieving the PLO of the burdens of this fighting. Syria's representative in the Arab Follow-Up Committee had

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accepted the declaration made by al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil to President Sarkis that dealings with Israel had ceased. He considered that declaration satisfactory. But Damascus raised this issue again on the basis of the fact that "it was a mere verbal statement that did not give adequate assurances that relations with Israel had been cut." Instead, Syria asked that the ports and the shores which were under the control of the Phalangist party be watched to ascertain that the relationship had been cut and that Israeli weapons were not reaching Juniyah.

Observers say that the Syrian regime knew beforehand that this demand could not be met unless the observation included the entire coastline of Lebanon. This is exactly what the Follow-Up Committee had concluded in its resolutions. Damascus intended to close entirely the sea route by which Palestinian weapons were directly imported so that the liberation organization would have no other recourse but to import weapons through Syria. Damascus would thereby regain its hold on the organization "whose clout had grown beyond what was necessary." Damascus would regain control over Palestinian decisions; it would determine their directions and the scope of their actions.

The second Syrian reaction was manifested in thrusting the Palestinians into a difficult situation that would cause new conflicts to develop between them and the public wishes of the Lebanese people regarding security and getting out of the maelstrom of war and its destruction. That reaction was manifested in Damascus putting its clout behind the resolution of the Follow-Up Committee to form a committee that would monitor and prevent the importation of weapons to Lebanon by any Lebanese or non-Lebanese group other than the legal forces of the state. This forced the Resistance--and that was the purpose of this reaction--to declare its opposition to that resolution and to ask that it be exempted from implementing it because it was a liberation revolution and because its battle with Israel required that it confront Israel continuously and reinforce its weapons constantly. Lebanon's president was also forced to reject the resolution because its implementation would mean in this case no more than the formation of an Arab committee to watch over the arming of the Phalangist party.

The third Syrian reaction was manifested in the fact that Damascus set out to hurt the Palestinian faction that supported the independence of the liberation organization within al-Sa'iqah and to replace the leaders of this organization with others who had been subdued. That followed the arrest of Mr Majid Hasan and his placement under house arrest.

The fourth Syrian reaction manifested itself in making the Syrian military organization, which was operating in Lebanon under the name of the National Confrontation Front, the military alternative to al-Sa'iqah Organization after changing its name to Arab Knights. This military organization would be furnished with modern weapons and well-trained military personnel. Mr Rif'at al-Asad, the brother of the Syrian president and commander of the defense companies would be charged with the task of overseeing, directing and planning the operations for this organization. This organization with

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its distinctive uniforms has recently been deployed in sensitive areas of west Beirut. Its members were well armed with heavy weapons, and they were stationed behind strong fortifications. One concludes from statements made by some members of this organization that it is making preparations for playing a major role on both the Lebanese and Palestinian scenes. They say that work is underway to turn this organization into a powerful "rival" for Fatah to fight against Fatah and other organizations of the Palestinian Revolution when that becomes necessary. The purpose of that would be to put the Revolution in its place and to force it not to go too far in playing the game of "the independent Palestinian decision."

The fifth Syrian reaction which is currently being implemented by more than one means is the attempt to pull the Lebanese rug from under the feet of the liberation organization in Lebanon. A number of leaders of the Lebanese National Movement told Abu 'Ammar and other leaders of Fatah in confidence that they were being subjected to severe pressures from Damascus to support its position on the question of the independent Palestinian decision and what is called "Abu 'Ammar's dictatorship" and "his playing with fire with Saudi Arabia and with the Americans."

It is in this menacing and volatile atmosphere that cars headed for the buildings and offices of the liberation organization and Fatah in the western area of Beirut are exploding one right after the other in an alarming, unprecedented manner.

Although Israel is being blamed for this, observers--even though they are not exonerating Israel--are raising numerous questions about the fact that car explosions are confined to the centers and locations of the deterrent forces and Red Knights and to Palestinian locations which are believed to be the locations of those supporting the liberation organization.

In a discussion that took place last week in the capital of Lebanon between a number of local diplomats and politicians, the ambassador of a European country that has close relations with the PLO said, "My government has information that there is a contract out on Abu 'Ammar."

A Lebanese politician commented, "What is new about that? Israel has been trying to get Abu 'Ammar and his colleagues since 1965."

The ambassador smiled wryly and said, "Yes, but what is new here is that Israel is no longer the only country that is calling for Abu 'Ammar's death today."

Those who were assembled asked, "Who other than Israel is calling for the death of Abu 'Ammar?"

The ambassador was silent for a moment, and then he replied, "That is the question. Look for an answer to that question on the Arab side. Don't confine your search to the Israeli side."

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The question is a serious question, and the answer is even more serious. Not only is it serious for Abu 'Ammar in person, but it is also serious for the existence and the destiny of the entire Palestinian Revolution.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

REPORT ON ARAB ECONOMY PUBLISHED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 239, 11-17 Sep 81 pp 60, 61

[Article: "A Dismal Situation Despite Slogans and Exaggeration: the Arab Economy Reflects Deepening Fragmentation and Development of a Sense of Provincial Loyalty"]

[Text] Inter-Arab trade accounts for only 6 percent of total Arab exports and 10 percent of total imports.

Trade statistics and trends in economic cooperation do not reflect the Arab political zeal and slogans expressed in the exaggerations uttered by Arabs. In the 1970's, industries were established within a narrow provincial structure. The gap between the progress of the oil-producing countries and the backwardness of those that do not have oil is increasing. All suffer from inflation and decreasing agricultural production.

A report by Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Zalzal, secretary general of the Council of Arab Economic Unity, on economic progress and development in the Arab Nation during the 1970's, is marked by optimism with regard to development. It says that the past decade saw a tangible and fundamental correction in the price of the region's natural resource, oil, which resulted in the emergence of the Arabs' economic clout throughout the world.

According to the report, the decade of the 1970's afforded the Arab economy an excellent opportunity to consolidate great accomplishments in development and to achieve a measure of self-reliance through improved productivity and technical capabilities, increasing control over resources and putting them to good use locally.

The Arab view of the dimensions and nature of development problems and challenges crystallized during the decade of the 1970's into priorities and goals for local and pan-Arab development to put the Arab economy on the right path toward curing development problems. During the past decade, the most important challenges which still must be confronted in the 1980's were defined.

Nevertheless, the accomplishments in development which were realized during the 1970's were not in keeping with the efforts that were made, the options available, nor pan-Arab aspirations. The Arab economy still suffers from fundamental

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problems. Preeminent among these problems are those brought about by the fragmentation of the Arab Nation which has led to economic fragmentation.

Despite abundant conditions conducive to achieving an integrated Arab economy, the results of efforts that have been made in this direction are still small. The Arab economy still suffers from slow progress toward an integrated economy and scant attention to the achievement of Arab economic unity. This makes it imperative for the Arab political will to enter as a decisive impetus to increase attention to these goals.

A summary of the report of the secretariat general of the Council of Arab Economic Unity, which was published in the latest issue of the organ of OAPEC, presents the features of Arab economic progress and the accomplishments of Arab development. It includes the following indications on the Arab economy.

The Arab countries achieved a real growth rate in local gross national product of only 7.3 percent in 1979, as well as in 1980. However, these growth rates include the large discrepancy between the oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries.

The relative weight of the GNPs of the oil-producing countries to the GNP of the Arab Nation as a whole rose from 71.6 percent in 1978 to about 76 percent in 1979, and to approximately 82 percent in 1980. This reflects the emergency of the Arab oil countries as an important influence in Arab and international affairs.

The relative importance of the Arab mining sector in the GNP rose from about 48.6 percent in 1978 to about 53.7 percent in 1979, and 60 percent in 1980. The share of the manufacturing sector in the GNP fell from 8.8 percent in 1978 to about 8.1 percent in 1980.

The share of the agricultural sector in the GNP fell from 8.6 percent in 1978 to about 7.1 percent in 1979, to less than 7 percent in 1980.

Arab foreign trade has been marked by a decreasing proportion of inter-Arab trade compared with total foreign trade with the non-Arab world. This reflects the tenuousness of inter-Arab economic ties.

The statistics indicate that the value of Arab exports to Arab countries was only 6 percent of total Arab exports in 1980, while the percentage of Arab imports from Arab countries was only 10 percent of total imports by the Arab nation as a whole in the same year. This is in addition to the rise in oil revenue which made up about 88 percent of the value of Arab exports in 1980.

The balance of trade for the Arab countries as a whole showed a surplus of \$56 billion in 1979 and \$90 billion in 1980, compared with \$22 billion in 1978. This increase is attributable to the large surplus in the trade balances of the Arab oil-producing countries, which amounted to \$66.6 billion in 1979 and is estimated at \$105 billion in 1980.

The Arab countries showed a balance of trade surplus in 1979 estimated at about \$49 billion, compared with \$9 billion in 1978. The non-oil-producing Arab

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countries showed some improvement in their total balance of trade inasmuch as the deficit fell from \$9 billion in 1978 to about \$8 billion in 1979 due to increased remittances sent home by citizens working abroad.

The level of Arab agricultural production has decreased in comparison with worldwide agricultural production. While average world grain production yields 1.9 tons per hectare, the average Arab yield is only 1.1 tons per hectare. With regard to wheat in particular, average yield in the Arab world is 1 ton per hectare, while the average worldwide yield is 1.7 tons.

In 1980, the shortfall in grain production amounted to about 3.6 million tons, despite the fact that the Arab world includes areas considered to be some of the finest soil in the world for agriculture and grain production. The wheat shortfall is a disappointment to the hopes for plugging the gap in Arab food security. This shortfall amounted to about 8.8 million tons in 1975 and will rise to 19.2 million tons in the year 2000 unless the Arab countries take upon themselves the task of financing huge wheat and grain production projects in the Sudan, Syria, Morocco, and Algeria.

Arab industry is characterized by a local outlook. The industrial framework is, to a great extent, devoted to the consumer industries which still comprise more than 50 percent of the total Arab manufacturing industry. Intermediate industries make up about 25 to 30 percent of total Arab manufacturing production, while industries which manufacture finished products comprise about 5 to 15 percent of Arab manufacturing production.

One result of this industrial situation is the low Arab share of world industrial output. Arab manufactured goods account for only 8 percent of all Arab exports, while there is a clear increase in the Arab world's importation of manufactured goods, amounting to 65 percent of total imports.

All the Arab countries suffer from periods of inflation, the effects of which have hit the least developed Arab countries the hardest because of the rising costs of imported goods and because of other economic difficulties from which they suffer.

The inflation rate in the oil-producing countries was about 11 percent in 1979, while it was about 16.8 percent in the non-oil-producing Arab countries.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PRO-PALESTINIAN RADIO--The question of a pro-Palestinian "independent radio" [transmitting station] in France has come up. Some emissaries of [Libyan chief-of-state] Qadhafi are said to have offered 200,000 francs to the anti-Zionist leftists who are ready to use it to "counter" Radio J, the Jewish community's transmitter. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 23 Oct 81 p 100] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express]

PLAN TO ASSASSINATE 'ARAFAT--Non-Palestinian sources have confirmed that prior to his departure for the Far East, 'Arafat told the Fatah Revolutionary Council that he had reliable information about a plan supported by the Syrian security organs, particularly the defense squads headed by Rif'at al-Asad, to assassinate Fatah leaders. The assassinations to be perpetrated by Abu Nidal. 'Arafat was quoted as saying: If I am to be assassinated, the responsibility will rest on the shoulders of the Syrian. He added: The so-called Front for the Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners, which recently carried out several bombings in Lebanon against Palestinian offices and leaders, is receiving direct military and financial aid from the Syrian intelligence (?). [Question mark as published]. [Text] [JN281056 Paris AL-WATAN AL ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Oct 81 p 21] /COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL WATAN AL ARABI/

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ALGERIA

EUROPEAN AID STRESSES RESEARCH, EDUCATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No1875, 16 Oct 81 pp 2615, 2616

[Text] Early in October, the EEC member states decided in favor of a commitment to finance two programs with Algeria as the beneficiary.

1) A Program of Scientific Cooperation with the ONRS [National Office for Scientific Research] and a Teacher's Training Program (a grant of 4.3 million ECUs [European currency unit] or some 26.2 million French francs)--The Algerian Government considers that access to science and technology is a basic factor in the process of economic liberation. The national policy in the field of research, already formulated in the early 1970's, is based on three pivotal points: the Algerianization of research, the integration of research activities into the economic development, and the planning of research to achieve the highest degree of cohesion between the objectives of research and those of the economic and social plan.

The National Organization for Scientific Research (ONRS) was created in 1973 and since then efforts have been intensified in that field particularly in three directions--energy, agriculture and housing. In the sphere of energy, the ultimate purpose is to master nuclear technology, to study renewable sources of energy (particularly solar energy), to develop and process hydrocarbons. In the sphere of agriculture, the aim is to secure a scientific base for the process of agricultural development mostly by means of studies on arid zones. With regard to housing, the priority goes to rural and urban planning, programs of "socialist villages," and so on.

The project is thus intended to increase the country's potential in scientific research and to train higher education teachers following an integrated action which envisages scholarships in Europe to train research workers and teachers for higher education (for the latter, there are provisions for 24 scholarships at postgraduate level); exchange of research workers involving Algerian and European research centers and dispatch of experts; supply of scientific equipment such as fluorometers, ionization chambers, measuring and analyzing equipment for hydraulic laboratories, for water treatment or for soil analysis, thermodynamic engines and so on.

Five research centers will be the recipients of the EEC's cooperation: the Nuclear Science and Technology Center, the Center of Agricultural Studies and Research, the National Center for Research on the Arid Zones, the University Center for Research, Studies and Achievements and the Solar Energy Station. Three-month research scholarships will be granted to some 160 trainees from these five centers. The purpose of

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exchanging researchers is to achieve mutual participation in the research work done in the countries of the Community and in Algeria thus laying the foundation for a genuine scientific cooperation. As for the purpose of sending experts, it is to encourage field activities, mainly activities involving new research, and to organize training seminars.

Since the supply of equipment requires that this equipment be adapted to local conditions (as in the case of the multichannel analyzer), there will be an international call for bids in the EEC but the supplementary equipment will be the object of restricted discussions.

2) Training of Agricultural Managers (a grant of 4 million ECUs or 24.4 million French francs)--The purpose of this program is to train managerial cadres for the state-controlled agricultural sector (self-managed farms). This program is part of the reorganization of Algeria's agricultural sector which the government decided to carry out to boost production. The 2,000 existing holdings will be regrouped to create 4,500 new farms, each managed by an agronomist. Under this program, the Algerian authorities will be provided with educators and technical means required to train these managers.

The future managers will be recruited primarily among agricultural engineers recently graduated from the Mostaganem Institute of Agricultural Technology. Prior to being assigned to the production units, these engineers will attend a 5-month training program: 4 months devoted to theoretical and practical studies and 1 month of practical work in a farm. The training program has already been tested on a 6-month experimental basis since December 1980. The outlined program focusses on a management and includes management of personnel and equipment, of supplies and buildings, preparation and implementation of the farm's development plan, financing and accounting.

The basic training will take place at the centers of Skikda and El Khemis in two annual sessions, each for a group of 200 engineers. The training program requires the recruiting of experts in the fields of agronomy and management and these experts will be Algerians as well as Europeans. The project also involves the supply of copying machines and documentary materials which will be purchased after restricted consultation.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

JAPANESE LOAN--The Export-Import Bank of Japan has signed a contract with the Algerian company SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] regarding a loan of 13.36 billion yen granted to that company to purchase Japanese goods and services for a project to improve a natural gas field in the district of Zarzaitine near the Libyan border. The project is intended to improve productivity in the Zarzaitine oil fields by recovering the gas to extract the heavy hydrocarbons, processing 4 million cubic meters of gas daily. Most of the money will be used to purchase gas separators and compressors from Japan. No interest rate has been given but, according to the Export-Import Bank, it falls within the limits set by the OECD. The Export-Import Bank will provide 60 percent of total amount of this loan and the rest will be supplied by seven commercial banks (Mitsubishi Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Sanwa Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Taiyo Kobe Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2615] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

CEMENT PLANT CONTRACT--The National Building Materials Company (SNMC) and the GDR company Sket Export-Import signed a contract on 24 September this year to build a cement plant in Ain Touta, governorate of Batna, capable of producing 1 million tons of cement (with two production lines of 500,000 tons each) using the dry process. The contract is part of the agreements between the Algerian and East German governments and in particular the agreement signed in October 1977. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2615] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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EGYPT

INTERVIEWS WITH EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION FIGURES

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 26 Oct 81 pp 97-103

[Two of several interviews published under general heading "After Sadat": Interview with Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, president of the National Progressive Union Party, and Rif'at Sa'id, theorist of the Party: "After Sadat/2: Moubarak Is Pro-USA, But..." by Giovanni Porzio. Interview with Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, former Egyptian Army chief of staff: "After Sadat/3: We Will Kill Him Too" by Robert Fox. Places of interviews: Cairo and Tripoli, respectively; dates not given]

[Text] After the death of Sadat, he is the only survivor of the historic group called the "Secret Organization of Free Officers," the group of military men who, in July 1952, toppled Farouk's monarchy. At age 68, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, former right-hand man of Nasser, is the charismatic leader of the Egyptian Left. President of the National Progressive Union Party, the only semilegal opposition party that the repressive measures imposed by the late rais did not succeed in crushing, has undergone many arrests during the last several years for "subversive activity."

Rif'at Sa'id, 49, theorist of the Progressive Union, which he helped found in April 1976, was working as a reporter with Cairo's leading daily AL-AHRAM. Involved in the September wave of arrests, he was compelled to leave his newspaper. He, too, is thoroughly familiar with Cairo's prisons: 2 months in August 1979, 6 months in 1977--accused of having taken part in the riots that shook the Egyptian capital in January of that year--and 14 consecutive years during Nasser's presidency.

PANORAMA discussed with the two leaders of the Progressive Union the post-Sadat outlook.

[Question] In your opinion, what will be the immediate political consequences of the assassination of the rais?

[Answer] Internally, an abrupt turn-on of the screws, with a reinforcement of the police and the security forces. In the 2 days following the assassination, 60 of our cadres were arrested in Cairo. The regime fears that the Left will try to take advantage of the power vacuum. This is why the succession process was

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accelerated, after which the government, having decreed a national emergency, was able to order the Armed Forces to maintain internal security. But repression, weapons and indiscriminate arrests cannot create a consensus, which is the only true guarantee of stability. The coldness with which the people received the news of the assassination, and the lack of participation in the funeral rites, show that it takes more than mere silencing of the mass media and the press to dull the awareness of the Egyptians.

[Question] Who are the killers and what motivated them to kill the president?

[Answer] Sadat signed his own death warrant with the September repression. Among the 1,500 persons arrested, there were members of our party, of the WAFD [expansion unknown], of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the Coptic Church, as well as lawyers, journalists, university professors, communists and liberals. He shut the door in everyone's face and in so doing he cleared the way for the violent groups and the extremists. This is what gave birth to his assassination. For a religious fanatic, the important thing is to act, to eliminate the person who represents evil, and thus to gain entry to Paradise. It will take time now to learn, going beyond the identities of the actual executors, whether there was also a plot. There are questions to be clarified: Where have the munitions come from? How was it possible to place two civilians in uniform among the troops that took part in the parade? But what really counts is the result: The \$25 million spent by the United States for Sadat's security actually served no purpose. Above all, they did nothing to change the sentiments of a people ideologically confused by the turnabout in propaganda and slogans: The American and Israeli "enemies" have become Egypt's best friends, while the Arabic "brotherhood" and the Palestinians have broken off their relations with Cairo.

[Question] How could Sadat possibly have made the same error as the shah of Iran, alienating the goodwill of the religious circles?

[Answer] In 1972, when he realized that in the universities the youth were being attracted by the Marxists and the Nasserites, Sadat began to encourage openly the more extremist Islamic groups. But the most fanatically religious among them began to challenge the pro-Western change in policy and became dangerous: the rais responded with the repression, extending it to the Copts as well to vest it with an appearance of even-handedness. And this was another serious mistake: The Copts are a discriminated-against minority in Egypt. But there are 7 million of them, their Church is well organized and their spiritual head, Shenouda III, whom Sadat tried to exile, is a man of action, highly intelligent, cultured and very popular.

[Question] What is currently the extent of the influence of the Islamic extremist groups in Egypt? A figure of 10 percent is quoted as representing their active sympathizers in the universities.

[Answer] They are unquestionably stronger in the universities than elsewhere. In general, I think their number is overestimated: The authorities consider it fully in their interest to label the opposition as Muslim fanatics. But they are

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definitely well armed, well organized and extremely effective. Somewhat similar to the Italian Red Brigades, with the difference that the Red Brigades are isolated from the masses.

[Question] Are they also active in the Armed Forces?

[Answer] Yes. All the persuasions and ideologies are reflected in the Egyptian Armed Forces. Here, too, Sadat made a mistake. It was he who decided to politicize the Armed Forces, appointing military officers to the top posts in his party and his government.

[Question] What is likely to change in Egypt with the new president?

[Answer] Moubarek is tied to the United States, to its strategy in this region. But no one can actually say he will be another Sadat. We do not know his thinking as yet; and in Egypt, the rais is the rais; he governs according to his own personal leanings. Moubarek, however, has never gone to Israel. Was this a personal decision on his part or a concerted maneuver with Sadat? Until the complete evacuation of the Sinai in April 1982, Egypt's policy will continue along a previously laid track. But thereafter? Camp David has definitely been torpedoed and Moubarek could seek a rapprochement with the other Arabic countries.

[Question] And would the United States allow that?

[Answer] That is precisely the problem. The United States is more involved in Egypt's internal affairs than we, as Egyptians, can accept. The alliance with Washington is a threat to Egypt's independence. This is the very basis of our opposition.

[Question] What will be your party's course of action in the coming months?

[Answer] We have won the battle for the legalization of our party, even though it is less dangerous to operate clandestinely in Egypt today. Now we say: We have had enough of repressions and referendums.

[End of interview with National Progressive Union Party leaders, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din and Rif'at Sa'id; interview with Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili follows]:

In this interview, Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army, declares himself responsible for the assassination and predicts for Egypt a wave of anti-regime violence.

In Tripoli, PANORAMA met with Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, 60, former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army. General al-Shadhili claims to be "the real head of the Egyptian opposition." Backed by Mu'amar Qadhafi and by the countries of the Resolute Front, the general expects to return to Egypt soon and is convinced that much is due to happen in the next few weeks. Here are the thoughts of the man who toasted the assassination of Sadat.

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[Question] You have said that Moubarek must change everything on pain of being overthrown in the very near future...

[Answer] Sadat was a dictator. What we want instead is a democracy. How could Moubarek have gone into a referendum without having liberated the 5,000 political prisoners, without having abolished martial law, after having actually instituted new repressive measures against the officers and against the leading figures of the opposition? What, in these circumstances, is a plebiscitary worth? Under these conditions we cannot allow Moubarek a respite. We will oppose him in every way.

[Question] A struggle of short or long duration?

[Answer] We shall begin immediately and will finish it when we have achieved our victory.

[Question] In that case, do you intend to run for president?

[Answer] We shall decide together with the other opposition leaders what is to be done. When democracy has been restored, we will select a candidate.

[Question] What is your model of a democracy?

[Answer] It is the Western type of pluralistic democracy, with a parliament in which all the parties are represented and with a president having little power.

[Question] In whom then would the most power reside?

[Answer] In a head of the government to be agreed by the majority of the parties. As you can see, this is far from being the Nasser model or the Sadat model.

[Question] And far from that of Qadhafi as well. Yet you live in Libya and you obtain help from Tripoli. Such backing seems to be incompatible with your Western democratic ideas...

[Answer] I am not interested in Libya. My only concern is Egypt.

[Question] Do you believe you have a following among the Egyptian people?

[Answer] I am convinced the vast majority of the Egyptian people would vote for me if they had the chance.

[Question] What methods of struggle do you intend to use against Moubarek's regime?

[Answer] That is the problem. The only way to bring down an autocratic regime is through violence. I hate the use of violence. But first Sadat's regime, and now Moubarek's regime, have closed all avenues to a peaceful policy. Violence in these circumstances thus becomes inevitable.

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[Question] Do you consider yourself, then, the responsible political head of every violent action that is taking place in Egypt at this moment?

[Answer] Every form of rebellion is under our control.

[Question] Are you the commander-in-chief of the entire operation?

[Answer] I cannot reveal such details. Let me simply say that the struggle against the regime is spreading among the people.

[Question] You are considered to be an anti-Western figure. Is that true?

[Answer] I am not against the West and I did not criticize Sadat on that score. But the West must understand that it cannot want a democracy in its own house and at the same time back the autocratic dictatorships of the Third World. This is why the presence of so many Western leaders at the funeral services surprised me so. They were mourning a servile agent and certainly not a champion of democracy. For us, Sadat was nothing more than a traitor to his people.

[Question] How, in your view, do the socialist countries of Eastern Europe act with respect to the Third World? They too back dictatorships. Do you not think so?

[Answer] I do not wish to talk at this time about the socialist bloc. I want to talk only about the Western powers. They backed Sadat and upheld an autocratic political system, and were thus guilty of inconsistency.

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IRAN

KHOMAYNI EXPECTED TO FALL IN MONTHS OR EVEN WEEKS

PM290859 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Oct 81 pp 34-36

[Report by Bouzid Kouza: "Just Before the Curtain Rises"]

[Excerpts] Iran has just been given a new president. A "free and democratic" election, the Tehran authorities claim after reducing the voting age to 15 and mobilizing large forces to ensure 'Ali Khamene'i's "victory." It was an illegal and rigged election according to the national resistance council which maintains that the new president is not representative and which has just announced the drafting of a government program applicable as soon as a government is formed in Iran following the collapse of the regime--forecast by Mojahedin circles for the next few months or even weeks.

The democratic opposition led by the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which is gaining grounds thanks to growing awareness and a determination which the summary executions are not destroying, is confronting inside the country a regime which has bludgeoned its way into undivided power.

Better still, it has the initiative. Mojahedin organization leader Mas'ud Rajavi told us recently: "After destroying the Khomeyni myth, the present phase of the resistance movement is to develop the mass movement by occupying the streets and not allowing the reactionaries any chance of remaining there. Moreover they have realized that it is no longer possible for them to mobilize, even by force and corruption, the tens of thousands of supporters which the Islamic Republican Party [IRP] could once bring onto the streets at any time. It is a joke to suggest that a speech by Khomeyni can now mobilize 1 million people in Tehran. The famous pictures shown by Iranian television during Raja'i's funeral are from the archives: it was the demonstration staged after Bani-Sadr's election. Pictures of the president of the republic could be seen."

What will the next stage be? Rajavi replied: "To use strikes to completely paralyze the economic and administrative apparatus, which is already seriously undermined by the incompetence, intrigue and deliberate sabotage of the IRP's men." And he added: "The mass movement will be swelled by demonstrations, strikes and finally the people's rising until the regime falls. And rest assured that it will fall soon."

The Mojahedin leader said that he thinks that "the Khomeyni regime's efforts to emerge from isolation are doomed to failure. The reports which we have received indicate that Khomeyni's foreign minister has not had a good reception. I think that the steadfastness front leaders have expressed their disagreement and have shown that they cannot be taken in...."

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH NIGERIA--Israel has concluded a contract with Nigeria to build three hotels, a mill, an aluminum plant, and two water stations in this African country. The value of the contract is \$190 million. This deal is another indication of the resumption of Israel's trade, economic, and technical activity in Africa, thereby penetrating the Arab wall built in the 1970's to strengthen the boycott of the Zionist state in Africa. These projects will be implemented by Solel Boneh International, which is owned by the Israeli trade union federation, Histadrut. It is strange that, although Nigeria is the largest Islamic country in Africa, it did not prevent the conclusion of this deal with Israel. And this is despite the fact that Nigeria participated in the Islamic summit conference held earlier in Saudi Arabia, which issued recommendations calling on the Islamic countries to sever diplomatic and economic relations with the Zionist entity. Sixty-eight percent of the sum will be provided by 50 Israeli and foreign banks as a loan to finance these projects with the Nigerian government paying the rest. The entire loan will be guaranteed by the Italian government with the proviso that the Israeli company purchase the necessary industrial materials from Italy. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 239, 11-17 Sep 81 p 60] /COPYRIGHT: 1981, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI/ 9123

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LEBANON

TENSIONS IN CEASE FIRE PERIOD DESCRIBED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 241, 25 Sep-1 Oct 81 pp 28, 29

/Article: "They Are Terrorizing Lebanon from North to South To Sabotage Arab Solutions and Shut Life down: The Massacres during the Cease Fire"/

/Text/ Who makes up the Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners which is setting up booby-trapped cars and bombs from north to south, passing through Beirut, in the course of the Lebanese cease fire? Why has this front become active now that the "Arab Followup Committee" has managed to come up with limited security steps that have given promise of tangible relief in the political context? Who is harmed by the calm in Lebanon? Who is anxious to thwart efforts to restore tranquility, whether Arab or non-Arab, through the kidnappings, killing and terrorization?

The capital of Lebanon was experiencing attempts to engender optimism in the middle of last week, and the newspapers were talking, even if with some caution, about "subsequent security steps along the avenue," after one of the main thoroughfares between western and eastern Beirut, Museum Avenue, was opened up. Some observers went so far as to imagine a long integrated timetable of political steps to prepare the way for security steps, and vice versa, and to enumerate the priorities in the schedules, which the Lebanese have learned by heart because of the frequency with which they have read or heard them over the 7 years.

Then suddenly the first explosion broke out.

Thirty kilograms of TNT exploded at 0640 hours in the morning last Thursday in the Lebanese Cement Company in Shaka. The targets were the company, the workers and truck drivers who arrive early to get a turn in the rush of customer applications. The area that witnessed the explosion lies within the area of influence of former President Sulayman Franjiyeh and the Maradah Brigade of al-Zaghartah. The result: a few dozen killed and wounded. The signature: the Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners.

On the morning of the same day, in Sayda, the capital of southern Lebanon, a Mercedes-200 automobile parked in front of the headquarters of the joint forces command in the center of the city. It was rigged with more than 100 kilograms of TNT. At 0915 hours in the morning, 45 minutes before the hour for the meeting the command was intending to hold, which was to consist of about 40 security and political officials, a terrifying explosion broke out, bringing down the six-story

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command building; adjacent buildings within a radius of 300 meters collapsed or were damaged. The result: more than 200 killed and wounded. The signature: the Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners.

The al-Silm section of al-Shiyah (the southern suburb of Beirut) was the third victim: explosives were laid in a car parked on a residential street, as Shaka and Sayda were declaring mourning for the victims of the first two explosions, less than 24 hours after they occurred. The result: six children dead or wounded. The signature: The Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners.

The fourth victim, and perhaps not the last, was a movie theater in western Beirut (the Salwa Theater), in a congested common section. The bomb exploded in the theater, 35 people were killed or wounded, fire broke out, and the end of the bloody week was "crowned" by the signature: The Front to Liberate Lebanon.

The fifth explosion was observed in Tripoli at the beginning of this week. It had as its target a gas tank in a crowded residential area. As luck would have it, the charge was set off before the tank was filled and its losses were restricted to the depot.

Thus the series of events encompassed Lebanon, from south to north, in less than 5 days; meanwhile news of the state of terror western Beirut is going through has increased, following the discovery of other charges on al-Hamra' Street.

It has become clear that a single thread connects the five explosions and that their purpose, and the purpose behind the slaughter that could follow them, is to undermine the state of optimism that had started to appear on the Lebanese horizon, to thwart the efforts of the Arab Followup Committee and to keep Lebanon in the vortex of infernal violence it is going through, as if life was forbidden, and calm was prohibited for the ordinary exhausted citizen.

Is, and Are?

But who makes up the Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners that has launched all these explosions in the areas of Syrian-Palestinian concentration? Is it a group that is cooperating with the "Lebanese Front?" Is it an Israeli puppet front that does not necessarily go through the Lebanese Front? Or is it the offspring of well-known disputes among certain armed detachments in western Beirut and the areas that are clients of the Palestinians and the Lebanese National Movement, hiding behind a "separatist" name in order to camouflage their real identity?

Whatever this front may be, the Lebanese consider it criminal, because it has innocent persons as its target, and, beyond the innocents, the destiny of Lebanon. This is not the first time that roads in Lebanon have been opening up and that Lebanese, Christian and Moslem, have resumed meeting one another--and now the "fifth columns" have intervened to spoil the "melange" here, there and everywhere. Lebanon today has more than 80 movements, armed groups and armies; that is, it is a diminutive League of Nations meeting in permanent fashion in order to trigger the local, regional and international contradictions in the midst of the Lebanese people.

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Does this mean that a symbol for Lebanese solutions has not yet appeared?

Perhaps. The resolutions of the Arab Followup Committee, and all the Arab resolutions that have been taken since 1976, remain /mere/ ink on paper. Whenever circumstances are propitious for an Arab meeting on Lebanon, contrary circumstances emerge which eliminate them or dispel their positive effects. In this regard, a former prime minister says, "Lebanon needs resolutions that can be carried out at once. Do not be amazed to see any step in the execution stage failing when this execution is delayed for more than 3 days."

Reassurances or Fantasies?

A review of the various resolutions that have been issued to deal with the Lebanese crisis, but have not found their way to actual application, will in fact confirm the truth of the former premier's conclusion in his analysis of the reason why the resolutions that are adopted are not executed. Perhaps the best method officials are following to arrive at actual application of their resolutions consists of carrying them out swiftly and instantly. The proliferation of parties that are active on Lebanese territory, their diverse orientations and inclinations, and the growing number of people benefiting from the country's continued political, civil and economic collapse call for strong authorities that know how to adopt decisions and proceed to carry them out at once, before any group can catch its breath or try to violate what has been already agreed upon.

The former premier's statement would not have been made had the wave of optimism about relief that was unleashed by the reassurances of the opening of the thoroughfares between the two segments of the capital not started to dissipate. After Museum Avenue was opened up, officials discovered that attempts were being made to close it up again. They concentrated their efforts on strengthening security in its immediate surroundings, considering that it was more important to manage to keep that open than proceed to open other thoroughfares, especially since these thoroughfares would close with the first attempt to shut them down. Therefore the "Followup Committee" ambassadors concentrated their attention on ensuring an adequate cover to maintain a constant guarantee for traffic through the Museum gateway, acknowledging, as one of them stated, that keeping a given gateway open would be more difficult than opening other ones (since one security agency official was unhappy with the obstacles that stood in the way of the continued execution of the Followup Committee's resolutions and the opening of the other thoroughfares) and pointing out that if the Museum gateway had not been opened up at the time, it would not have been possible to open it up later, and the Followup Committee's resolutions would have remained mere ink on paper.

For this reason, observers believe that opening the other thoroughfares should be postponed until after the Arab Followup Committee meeting scheduled for 7 November, and that it will be of no use for the government and the cabinet to insist on carrying out the execution of the resolutions before the date of this meeting. On top of that, officials will face difficulty in their attempt to convince the parties to the conflict to facilitate the process of applying the resolutions. The issue of acceptance or nonacceptance devolves now upon the army, which constitutes an obstacle to all attempts to end the difficulty that has arisen. One fears that

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this issue will become a thorny problem threatening to thwart the efforts underway, and will not stop with the mere failure to carry out the resolutions but will produce sudden lapses in the security situation.

It is well known that the national government is demanding that the army withdraw from its concentrated positions in Sodeco and the al-Sham Road extending up to the museum and that the Lebanese forces are demanding that the Palestine Liberation Army which is concentrated in the same area be withdrawn, claiming that the two armies took part in the fighting in the course of the incidents that started last 2 April. However, President Sarkis sees no benefit in withdrawing the Lebanese army from its locations and insists that it remain where it is, considering that there is no way to set matters straight and restore confidence to the citizens' spirits except through recourse to the legitimate authorities' forces, foremost among which is the army. Although some parties are demanding that it not be brought in, it is not logical to demand that it be withdrawn from the centers it occupies.

## Conditions and Further Conditions

Therefore, political circles are afraid that matters will become increasingly complex through concentration on the question of whether to keep the army in its positions or withdraw it from them. This causes these circles to wonder what positive elements the Followup Committee built its evaluations on when it reassured people that broad steps had been taken toward relief. In this context the Saudi ambassador, 'Ali al-Sha'ir, says that he observed, in the course of his meetings with Col Muhammad Ghanim, the chief of the Syrian intelligence forces operating in Lebanon, and the higher coordination committee that includes the National Movement, the Palestinian resistance, the AMAL movement and the commander of the Lebanese Forces, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, that everyone agreed that the roads and thoroughfares between the two segments of the capital should be opened and were prepared to carry out all the committee's resolutions. However, this agreement and readiness remained mere talk, since the conditions and the counter-conditions that each group set forth obstructed the opening of these thoroughfares, and could stymie the resolutions in light of what the committee had in mind and the people anticipated.

It was no secret to anyone that the National Movement set out a number of conditions for execution of the resolutions, most important of which were:

First, withdrawal of the Lebanese army from its centers in Sodeco, al-Barimu and al-Barjawi, to be replaced by the domestic security forces.

Second, removal of all armed persons from lines of contact and thoroughfares.

Third, assumption by the Arab Deterrent Forces of the task of maintaining order in the thoroughfares and lines of contact.

Fourth, rejection of the opening of the thoroughfares in stages, demanding that they be opened at one stroke.

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When these conditions were presented to the commander of the Lebanese Forces, Pierre al-Jumayyil, he expressed a number of reservations toward them, most important being the reservation on handing over to the Deterrent Forces the security tasks along the lines of contact and the reservation on the issue of the Lebanese army's withdrawal from the points in which it is concentrated.

These conditions and counterconditions only added to the Followup Committee's insistence on eliminating all the obstacles that might stand in the way of execution. The premier, Shafiq al-Wazzan, joined in emphasizing the committee's resolution by saying "The government is determined to continue carrying out these measures, since opening the thoroughfares is to be considered an initial step which will be followed by the attainment of other resolutions related to oversight of the illegal harbors along the Lebanese coastline."

While an atmosphere of pessimism on the subject of the opening of the thoroughfares and hopes that the area of relief would broaden has spread in the past few days, an official source has been quoted as saying that the government is determined to follow up on the security steps in preparation for the expected reconciliation this time and that it will not hesitate to eliminate every type of obstacle, that arises to prevent that--be it political, geographical or civil. This security source went on to say, "Ask about the people who are obstructing the execution, and the people who are causing the public to feel fear, restoring the atmosphere of pessimism and narrowing the room for hope for solutions. What are needed are withdrawals in the field from all areas around the lines of contact, because the proof lies not in opening a given road but in protecting it and preventing people with grievances from closing it back up. This will require that a military force take the place of the forces that are still shooting and creating problems to prevent the attainment of the desired relief."

## A Mutual Rigidity

It has become clear that the bombardment, sniping and provocation the al-Sudiku area has recently been experiencing proves that the two conflicting parties have not abandoned their positions and ultimately an approach may prevail that will require that the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Army remain where they are until units of the domestic security forces assume the task of preserving security in the main transit points.

Whatever the situation may be, the approach that prevails now is that of ensuring that conditions on the lines of contact are restored to their state as of 2 April. This will have the effect of bringing people back into their homes and enabling them to get their children to school, especially since a radical solution to the problems that have been raised is not possible at the present time.

On this basis, every group is remaining in its position, and a joint army-domestic security force under the prime minister's command is taking over the lines of contact. While official Lebanese sources are insisting that there will be no solution unless the army assumes its tasks, sooner or later, Damascus is announcing by means of its representatives that its refusal to let the Lebanese army assume these tasks is not a Syrian position but a Lebanese one, because it is the Lebanese National

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Movement that rejects it and not Syria. However, the recent declaration by the secretary general of the Ba'th Party organization in Lebanon, Eng 'Asim Qansuwah, that he refused to have the army assume any tasks sheds some light on the Syrian position on the conflict that has arisen on this matter.

Adding to the observers' pessimism, and inhibiting them from expecting miraculous solutions, is the insistence on the part of the people fanning the fire of the Lebanese crisis on continuing to stir up disputes among Lebanese and on continuing to interfere in Lebanese affairs. The political solutions to the Lebanese crisis are in constant conflict with the military ones. While the United States of America prefers, through its "moderate Arab" allies, to convince the extremists on the Lebanese stage to be moderate, to offer concessions, and consequently to arrive at a national reconciliation, and while it also prefers that Israel understand that it is not feasible to extend its hand to the Christians in Lebanon and interfere in that country's affairs, that does not mean that it will renounce the military card in its approach to dealing with the crisis. In the event the extremists, headed by Syria, refused to let the crisis end politically, Washington, as some sources have pointed out lately, will agree to an Israeli incursion into numerous areas of southern Lebanon, since this position, in the view of the United States will have imposed itself and no one will be able to oppose it. Will the people who are active on Lebanese territory draw the lesson before it is too late, or will they sustain their petty disputes at all times and will the massacres, large and small, go on without end?

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LIBYA

OPPOSITIONIST EXILES PLAN TRIAL OF AL-QADHDHAFI

PM061449 London THE GUARDIAN in English 6 Nov 81 p 6

[Report by Ian Black: "Libyans Want To Try al-Qadhdhafi"]

[Text] A group of Libyan exiles plans to bring "the world's most notorious international terrorist"--Colonel al-Qadhdhafi--to trial in person or in absentia, with the help of the Sudanese Government, it was announced in London yesterday.

Dr Mohammad al-Mughariaf, spokesman for the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, told a press conference that the "Afro-Arab International Committee Against al-Qadhdhafi," to which his organisation is affiliated, is to request Sudan to host the trial.

The committee, Dr Mughariaf said, is controlled by no foreign country or organisation, and raises its funds "solely through exile groups." But it clearly owes a considerable debt to the Sudanese authorities: the formation of the national front was announced in Khartoum last month, and bulky press releases cataloguing Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's activities were distributed yesterday by the London public relations firm which acts for the Sudanese Government.

"We as Libyans have a responsibility to see that the crimes al-Qadhdhafi commits in the name of Libya are punished, and that his evil shadow is removed from the world stage," Dr Mughariaf said. The committee, he said, supported armed struggle against al-Qadhdhafi in Libya and in Chad. He announced the formation of a supreme council for coordination between the national forces of Libya and Chad.

A personal representative of the Chad rebel leader, Hissene Habre, Mr Mohammad Gibeir El Nour, said yesterday that the verdict of the proposed trial of al-Qadhdhafi could not be predicted. "It will be up to the commission which examines the charges to determine the judgment," he said.

Dr Mughariaf, a former Libyan ambassador to India, was hazy about the form of regime with which he and other exiles hoped would replace Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's rule. "It will be sensible, reasonable, and principally for justice," he said.

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The danger faced by opponents of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi were underlined by a discreet police presence at yesterday's press conference. But Dr Mughariaf, who refused to reveal where he lives, said he did not fear for his personal safety. "I believe in God. No force on earth will put an end to my life before the time specified for me and in the place specified for me," he said.

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SYRIA

LATEST OVERTURES TO SOVIETS REVIEWED

Paris AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 242, 2-8 Oct 81 p 37

/Article: "Talas Visited Moscow at the Appropriate Time"

/Text/ The visit to the Soviet Union by Gen Mustafa Talas, the Syrian defense minister who headed a large Syrian military delegation, came to an end last 23 November. That visit occurred at the time of the convening of the Benghazi conference of perseverance and steadfastness countries, and in the course of it talks took place between Talas and Soviet defense minister Dmitri Ustinov.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that these discussions did not involve any of the political aspects related to the situation in the area. Rather, they were confined to a study of new arms requests that Damascus had presented to Moscow and the discussion of a number of "technical problems" related to the upkeep of Soviet arms now present in Syria.

The same information had it that the talks were restricted to these aspects as a result of Syria's desire to postpone the "exchange of views" on politics with Moscow at the present time, in view of a number of considerations. The most conspicuous of these considerations became apparent through Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's recommendation at the Benghazi conference that a joint perseverance and steadfastness country force be formed. That would mean setting aside a joint budget for military expenses to which Libya would contribute. It was al-Asad's contention that acceptance of this recommendation would have the effect of increasing the relative financial and military weight of the Syrian party in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The second consideration was also apparent when, in the minutes of the meetings of the Benghazi conference, al-Asad frankly requested that the "strategic cooperation" with the Soviet Union be given a new forward thrust as what he described as the "political price" for the arms deals Talas was negotiating with Ustinov in Moscow.

Observers say that the Syrian president considered that the movement was opportune for acquiring more Soviet aid. The expulsion of the Soviet diplomats and experts from Cairo was going on full steam, along with a broad hostile propaganda campaign against Moscow in Egypt, while the United States was signing a strategic aid agreement with Tel Aviv and the parties to the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front were preparing to hold their latest meetings in Benghazi.

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From comments on Talas' visit by the Soviet and Syrian media, one can infer that the Syrians have actually succeeded in acquiring Soviet terms related to new arms transactions in exchange for continuing to promote the Arab-Soviet strategic cooperation plan.

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TUNISIA

SIXTH AGRICULTURAL PLAN SEES GROWTH IN FARM REVENUE, AMPLE SEED SUPPLY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 pp 2616, 2617

[Text] The Sixth Development Plan envisages a 5 percent growth of the nation's farm revenue. Investments in that sector will amount to 1.3 billion dinars which is 800 million dinars more than under the Fifth Plan and represents 17 percent of the overall investments. The purpose is to achieve food self-sufficiency by the time the Sixth Plan is completed.

Under the Sixth Plan, 1.5 million hectares of land are expected to be cultivated every year. During the current year, the planted areas are estimated to cover 1.563 million hectares distributed as follows: 860,000 hectares in the north and 692,900 hectares in the center and south. The estimated figures for the center and south regions are still tentative since the acreage of planted areas will depend on the amount of rainfall during a 3-month period from September to November. Forecasts made by the Regional Development Offices indicate that, compared to the estimates of the Sixth Plan, there will be a shortfall of 135,000 hectares for hard wheat (56,000 hectares in the north) and an excess of 85,000 hectares of soft wheat (49,000 hectares in the north).

Net available supplies of certified seeds total 180,000 quintals, enough to amply meet the season's requirements. The total supplies of fertilizers required stand as follows: 60,000 tons of 45 percent superphosphates, 60,000 tons of 16 percent superphosphates, 100,000 tons of 33.5 percent ammonium nitrate.

Widespread use of chemical weed-killers was not introduced until last year when they were used on 130,000 hectares. During the 1981-1982 agricultural year, they will be used over an area of 270,000 hectares--250,000 hectares of grain crops and 20,000 hectares of pulse crops.

The Ministry of Agriculture has encouraged farmers to purchase modern equipment. Financing sources for the purchase of that equipment increased in 1981 with the introduction of the supplier credit formula. Moreover, as a result of the higher cost of fertilizers and the higher agricultural guaranteed minimum wage paid during this past agricultural year, the departments of the Ministry of Agriculture are studying the possibility of readjusting the scale of charges for farm credits.

During the Sixth Plan period, the Ministry of Agriculture will pay particular attention to three types of crops connected with the harmonious development of grain farming. These crops are triticale, feverole and medicago. A popularization campaign

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will be carried out in the subhumid zone to plant from 1000 to 1500 hectares of triticale. The Directorate of Plant Production intends to start a medicago program during the 1981-1982 farming season. Finally, the Directorate of Livestock Production is studying a formula of concentrated feed for livestock and will ask manufacturers of concentrated animal feed to use feverole rather than imported oilcakes.

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