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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 752



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ANGOLA

SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2521

[Text] The Soviet military presence in Angola is governed by a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed for 20 years, on 8 October 1976, by Nikolai Podgorny and Agostinho Neto, then the respective presidents of the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola. At the time, Podgorny, now replaced by Leonid Brezhnev at the head of the Soviet state, emphasized the "fundamental importance" of the agreement, without revealing the contents.

Since that time, indirect references made by both sides to the military clauses of the treaty have scarcely provided a more precise idea of the actual Soviet commitment in Angola.

The joint Soviet-Angolan statement published on 22 December 1979 in Moscow, following the visit by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, reaffirmed "the legitimate right" of the Angolan Government "to use every possible means to defend its territory" in the face of the South African aggression.

On 2 September, the American State Department reported the presence of 2,700 Soviets and East Europeans in Angola, adding that the question would be taken up at the meeting of Secretary of State Alexander Haig with his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko.

For his part, the South African minister of foreign affairs, Roelof "Pif" Botha, stated at the same time that the Soviet engagement in Angola was "comparable" to the level of the USSR's engagement in Afghanistan.

However, these claims were denied by Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, who said on 9 September that there "was not a single soldier from East Germany or the USSR in Angola."

On 21 September, the Soviet Government organ IZVESTIA stated that the USSR gives only technical aid to Angola -- including in the military field -- and in no way participates in the fighting, thereby attempting to deny the statements of the South African Government to the effect that Soviet military men are allegedly directly involved in fighting in Angola against Pretoria's forces.

The Soviet newspaper writes: "The USSR supplies multifaceted aid to Angola, in keeping with the agreements signed between the two countries. It is helping to

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strengthen Angola's defense capabilities. But Soviet personnel present in the country provide only technical advice and instruction for Angolan national cadres."

IZVESTIA denounces those who try "to exploit the death of two Soviet military specialists and their wives and the capture of a mechanic by South African forces at the time of their attack on Angola" on 2 September.

On 19 September, the USSR filed a request, through the official agency TASS, for the immediate return of the bodies of the four Soviets killed in the operation and the release of the mechanic held by Pretoria.

Angola is reportedly negotiating military aid with several African countries, according to Mozambican sources. Those countries are presumably Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Mozambique. Their support could take the form of the sending of troops and artillery units in the future. It is stated that these troops do not constitute an "inter-African military force" and would remain under the control of Angolan authorities.

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ANGOLA

## BRIEFS

NEW TOWN--A new town, Lucapa, which will one day become the capital of the Angolan province of Lunda-North, is under construction. A few buildings out of the provincial total of 540 have been built. There are plans for an administrative zone in the south and a residential area in the east. Regarding services, Lucapa will have a supermarket and an industrial bakery. There will be a medical center and a recreation center. The construction area is about 590,000 meters square. The population will be approximately 2,500 inhabitants. Construction of the electrical infrastructure is the task of the Electra Company. Water supply problems have not been solved. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2521] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

INCREASED TRANSPORTATION MEANS--Thirty Daf trucks were to go into service at the beginning of September in southern Angola in order to provide hauling for basic commodities. They will make it possible to improve the distribution system in cities in Benguela Province which do not have enough vehicles. Provinces in the interior will benefit also. Before these new vehicles were to go into service, the domestic commerce transport enterprise had only seven trucks operating out of a total of 124. The others could not be used for lack of maintenance and spare parts, but also "because of their careless use by certain drivers." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2522] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

DETAILS OF OIL FIND--During its first operational drilling on Block 3 off the coast of Angola, "Palanca No 1," ELF-Aquitaine Angola [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] found on an area of 145 meters a pocket of oil at different levels of the lower Pinda. Tests made revealed remarkable productivity. The first, made between 2,725 and 2,735 meters, produced oil with a density of .83 at a rate of 600 cubic meters a day with a pipe 1.9 cm in diameter. The second, made later between 2,646 and 2,656 meters, produced oil of the same quality at a rate of 330 cubic meters a day with a pipe of .95 cm in diameter. One or several more test drillings will be necessary to evaluate the importance of the discovery. ELF-Aquitaine operates on a shared production contract concluded with the National Fuel Company of Angola (SONANGOL), which holds mining rights. This shared production contract on Block 3 was concluded on 1 August 1980 between SONANGOL and a group headed by ELF-Aquitaine, the operator, and including Mobil, AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise], Nafta-Gas and Ina-Naftalin. Exploration expenditures and the cost of future development are borne by the group as follows: 50 percent for ELF, 25 percent for Mobil, 15 percent for AGIP and 5 percent for each of the Yugoslav partners. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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CONGO

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN FRENCH RESIDENTS--Over the last 6 months, the number of French living in Congo has increased by some 50 percent. At the Pointe Noire consulate alone, for example, 1,500 new names have been added to the 2,903 French nationals registered as of 1 January. Attracted by the oil boom, the new expatriates, a large percentage of whom are coming from Gabon, are mostly found in trade, the construction industry and public works. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43]  
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GABON

FULL SPECTRUM OF COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL LIFE REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 pp 2730-2733

[Article by Francois Gaulme: "Gabon in Search of New Impetus"]

[Excerpt] Major Trends in Economy

The Gabonese economy is based on petroleum. While output continues to drop steadily (with the monthly average declining from 714,383 tons for the last 4 months of 1980 to 604,625 tons for the first 4 months of 1981), the dollar rise enables us to look forward to an increase in petroleum revenues which should come to 276 million francs CFA [African Financial Community] for all of 1981 although exports in terms of volume dropped 27 percent with 1.8 million tons during the first half of the year, as compared to the last half of 1980, in a situation of declining demands.

The petroleum companies, headed by Elf Gabon and Shell Gabon, devoted more than 60 billion CFA to prospecting in 1980. While the upper layer of the subsoil is well-known today, the knowledge of the deep layers is only beginning to take shape. The use of robots will perhaps make it possible to exploit marine deposits that cannot be reached with divers. Worthwhile indications point to specific hopeful areas at least in the country's southern part.

The other two activities characterizing the Gabonese economy involve lumber and mining; they did not report good results during the first half of 1980. There has been a crisis in the lumber industry since 1974 and Asian competition as well as stagnation in the construction sector in the developed countries do not promote any recovery. The SNBG (Gabon National Lumber Company), which holds the lumber sale monopoly, is studying recovery measures. The enterprises expect a recovery for the second half on the basis of orders received especially in Africa.

The manganese situation reached a critical point at the beginning of the year; for the first four months of 1981, compared to the last 4 months of 1980, production dropped 50 percent and exports declined 57 percent. In February and March, the output drop was 80 percent (for equipment maintenance). There was no reversal of the trend in April. CFCO [Congo-Ocean Railroad] carried only 161,136 tons of minerals to Pointe-Noire last July, as against 198,354 tons in July 1980.

The crisis on the world uranium market has caused a drop in the exports of COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] since October 1980.

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The economic recovery anticipated at the end of 1980 did not make itself felt in the industrial sector with the expected force. Prospects however are good in the textile industry or in the food industry (in spite of the production cost problems facing the SOSUHO Sugar Refinery). The chemical industry is stable. Ciments du Gabon improved their situation due to a resumption in public works construction projects although the situation here is still rather timid as of the beginning of the year.

Trade, on the other hand, has been growing constantly since 1980. During the first half of 1981, sales increased 17 percent for consumer goods and 18 percent for capital goods. The annual price rise on imported products, on the order of 15 percent, promotes an increase in the business volume of the enterprises.

However, the cost of living in 1981 is expected to reveal a steady increase of between 9 and 12 percent due to a reduction in profit margins and competition. While the job market in general terms reports a certain dip for the first half (down 4 percent compared to 1980), the number of civil service personnel exceeded the estimates by 11 percent last June (23,481 civil servants as against the anticipated 22,259).

The growth of the money supply is reasonable. It is on the order of 12 percent and follows the rate of inflation. We note the constant increase in loans to the economy after June 1980 (12 billions CFA). They reached a maximum of 151 billions in February 1981; this expresses a desire to invest. The determination on the part of the government to get out of debt in February also was expressed by a surplus of 3 billions CFA in the banking system. Net foreign assets again became positive last November and did not drop below 22 billion CFA during the first quarter of 1981.

The imbalance between interest rates at Libreville (10-15 percent) and Paris (20 percent) is the only current monetary problem. It promotes capital flight and should lead to a reversal of the trend toward an increase in domestic loans observed over the past 2 years. Local banks as a matter of fact cannot refinance themselves under current conditions.

Customs statistics for the first half of 1981 show that the value of imports has doubled (126 billions CFA as against 66 billions for the same period of time in 1980); this perhaps is due to a speed up in customs declarations, combined with inflation in the supplier countries. Gabonese exports should be something like 550 billions in 1981 (up 5 percent compared to 1980) and the balance should remain mostly positive.

The government is determined to continue its austerity policy in 1982, as President Bongo recalled recently.

The 1982 budget should be a repetition of the budget for the preceding fiscal year. The estimates for 1981 point to a total spending volume of 404.5 billions CFA, including 135 billions for investment expenditures. During the first half of 1981, there was a tendency toward exceeding the allocations provided for the operating budget (especially the personnel expenditure item). On the other hand,

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in the development budget--which is being carried out at a slower pace--the completion of products for the production sector points to the incomplete utilization of allocations by the end of the year.

## The Future

In this situation, government thinking at Libreville is currently centered on the preparation of the five-year plan. The important thing above all is to continue along current lines.

Priority will be given to the completion of the trans-Gabonese railroad which the chief of state considers to be his major project.

The first section (185 kilometers) between Owendo, the port of Libreville, and Ndjole, on the Ogooue, became operational early in 1979. Since then, 72,000 passengers have taken the trans-Gabonese railroad and 312,000 tons of freight were shipped (including 57,000 tons of lumber and 175,000 tons of clinker) in 1980. At the end of September 1981, figures of 69,000 passengers and 238,000 tons of freight, including 46,000 tons of lumber, were recorded since last January. It is estimated that the total traffic volume for FY 1981 will exceed 80,000 passengers (up 20 percent compared to the estimates), with freight traffic remaining at 300,000 tons. The lumber shipped from Ndjole is still carried by water to Port-Gentile, rather than to Owendo by rail.

Line construction work is currently continuing at such a rate that it is expected that the tracks will reach Ayem (kilometer marker 265) so that, within a few months, it will be possible to ship logs by train from the forest operations in the Otoumbi Region and from Ayem (see map).

The Ndjole--Booue section (140 kilometers), now under construction, is considered the most difficult part of the line. It includes 18 engineering structures and follows along the valley of the Ogooue. The railroad should reach Booue at the end of 1982, with operation possible as of the beginning of 1983. Work will then be continued on the Booue--Franceville section and it is estimated that the railroad will link Libreville to Franceville over a distance of 670 kilometers at the end of 1986.

The transportation sector--whose importance has been underscored by the fact that the minister in charge, Mr Georges Rawiri, had since 1980 also been first vice premier, is not confined in its dynamic development to the construction of the trans-Gabonese railroad. Maritime transportation also reported more satisfactory results than in the past; during the first half of 1981, the "Aldabi" (15,000 tons), chartered by SONATRAM (National Maritime Transport Company), made two profitable round-trips. The company is currently thinking of purchasing ships. CNI (Inland Navigation Company) is carrying 250-400 passengers per week on the Ogooue River and the Fernan-Vaz Lagoon. It has just lost a coaster which used to provide service from Port-Gentil to Mayumba. For urban transportation, SOTRAVIL (Libreville Transportation Company) for the first time is hopeful of creating a real mass transportation system in the capital. Its motor pool consists of 76 buses and is expected to grow further; every day since the start of the 1981 academic year, 18,000 students must be transported.

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Another dynamic area is agriculture. It became a national priority in 1980. Until that year, agriculture's share in the budget was negligible. Today it is 12 billion CFA. A certain number of big projects is being continued, such as the oil palm project near Lambarene (Agrogabon), beef cattle ranches at Tchibanga and Franceville. The rubber cultivation project in Woleu-Ntem is in the financing phase now (see "Gabon" heading). The coconut plantation plan, which the government wants to launch, is still in the study phase.

Rice production, with the Japanese technical assistance, has experienced difficulties regarding water supply and the poultry raising project at Boumango (Upper Ogooue) is getting started slowly. While the fruit tree and food crop program in Franceville, aided by the French FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) is coming along nicely, it is regrettable that the authorities decided to stop the development of the banana plantation at Ntoum which, on 100 hectares of plantains intended for human consumption, constituted a unique experiment in the world. With an output of 300 tons during the first quarter of 1981, SATEC [Technical Aid and Cooperation Company], after many difficulties, attained the planned objectives here, of course at a cost largely exceeding the original estimates. The plantation is to be taken over by SONADECI (National Industrial Crop Development Company).

We are inclined too easily to forget today that Gabon's wealth essentially was agricultural until 1914. The discovery of the properties of okoume and the triumph of lumber after World War I ruined the coffee, cocoa, and vanilla plantations which had looked so promising at the end of the last century. Rice cultivation, as well as sugar cane, cotton, and peanut cultivation were to be developed in Gabon starting 1850. Due to the lack of capital and especially manpower, vast and perfectly viable projects never saw the light of day. Without plunging into the agribusiness field, modest agricultural rum production enterprises as well as citrus fruit plantations and enterprises producing various food crops are quite feasible today with a minimum of encouragement in the coastal area which is currently neglected. Quite a few resources have not yet been exploited. The trans-Gabonese railroad would certainly promote agricultural development to the extent that it would make it possible to overcome one essential obstacle which is the transportation of products. Fishing is also due to develop considering the local potential both in the ocean and in sweet water. (Some population groups in Gabon traditionally produce chewing cane, sugar cane wine, and even distilled alcohol with very simple means. The production of agricultural rum in Gabon was contemplated starting in 1880.)

For several years we have been struck by the great increase in individual initiatives in the agriculture field. The markets of Libreville, in the past offering only a few bunches of bananas, cassava, and pimentos, are now well supplied. Cameroon played an important role in supplying the capital in recent years but local products are increasingly available. There are two factors which permitted this phenomenon; a larger number of Gabonese farmers decided to produce more than just for their own family consumption; citizens were persuaded to sell agricultural products on urban markets. This movement must be developed in secondary population centers.

The government knows that it can only at its own risk ignore the profound aspirations of the people. By emphasizing production investments in the plan draft,

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it made it known that the easy times were over and that a prestige policy designed to boost national pride was not the best response to the country's wishes.

Greatness undoubtedly was necessary and nobody would deny that Air Gabon, a national company, for the first time, today justifies its creation or that the big construction projects in Port-Gentil, especially those designed to restore a town built 1 meter above sea level, were not really useful.

But Gabon must not be a showcase for foreign visitors and a return to the local values is being felt today after the brush with modernism. The young people especially no longer allow themselves to be impressed by big buildings which are not suited to the climate or by easy money. The young people love the traditional life style of a happy country which had hardly any shortages and which had been living a sweet and pleasant life since the beginning of time in a formidable natural environment. The enormous progress made over the past 20 years in the field of education and training produced a generation that knows what it wants, a generation that wants to express itself and to try to achieve as much as it can. One must only fear that there will be too many supervisory personnel very soon and not enough qualified intermediate-level personnel. This new generation, which did not experience colonization, undoubtedly will have objectives as different from those of the preceding generation which, characterized by the opening to the world, differed from the modest aspirations of the men in charge during the first few years of independence. The Gabon of tomorrow will perhaps be reconciled with the Gabon of yesterday in order to guarantee a better future in a harmonious combination of the past and the present.

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GABON

FRENCH GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 1980 REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2637

[Text] French government aid to Gabon in 1980 totaled 670.9 million French francs, distributed as follows: nonrepayable financial aid, 294.1 million; repayable financial aid, 376.8 million. Total: 670.9 million.

The nonrepayable financial assistance essentially includes charges for technical personnel (231.3 million francs) and subsidies from the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) for investment projects (49.3 million).

Repayable financial aid includes loans from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) for a sum of 178 million francs and the increase in the outstanding debt from commercial commitments guaranteed by the French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade (COFACE), amounting to 198.2 million francs.

As counterpart funds, Gabon made a transfer in 1980 of a lump sum of 183.6 million francs, which total includes the Gabonese contribution to spending for technical and medical assistance (113.9 million francs), partial repayment of the postal debt (36.2 million) and the annuity (principal and interest) from loans from the Central Fund (26.2 million).

In 1980, technical assistance in personnel provided by France rose by 2.4 percent in personnel (monthly average of 700 technical assistants) and 11 percent in spending. The Gabonese contribution rose by 16.8 percent.

With the exception of 1975, when substantial aid was granted for the Transgabonese Railroad, FAC subsidies reached a record level in 1980.

Likewise, the CCCE commitments rose sharply because of a loan to the Gabon Power and Water Company (SEEG) for expansion of the Poubara Dam.

The situation of the outstanding commercial debt guaranteed by COFACE registered an increase of over 5 percent. The year was marked by a strong drop in losses (unpaid debts and bankruptcies) and a moderate resumption in guaranteed commercial affairs. Finally, the rehabilitation of the Gabonese commercial debt was begun.

On 31 December 1980, Gabon's postal debt to France was 36.2 million francs.

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Also at the end of December 1981, for loans granted by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and which were the object of repayments in 1980, the remainder due by Gabon amounted to a total of 148.2 million francs.

Finally, the outstanding debt of COFACE for Gabon at the end of December 1980 represented 3.9 billion francs, including risks on repayment annuities not due.

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GABON

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CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH PHILIPPINES--On 17 September in Manila, the Philippines and Gabon signed a cultural cooperation agreement aimed at promoting the exchange of researchers and education between the two countries. The document was initialed by the minister of foreign affairs of the Philippines, Manuel Collantes, and the Gabonese ambassador to Manila, Theophile Issembe. According to the agreement, scholarships will be granted mutually to students from the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2509] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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GHANA

KPONG DAM SCHEDULED TO GO INTO OPERATION IN 1982

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2505

[Text] It is estimated in Ghana that the Kpong hydroelectric complex will go into operation in March 1982, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the country's accession to independence.

On 14 September, President Hilla Limann officially presided over the startup of the first generator at the Akuse powerplant. Startup of the second was planned for the end of the month, while the last two should go into operation before the end of December.

The project, the country's second-largest after that of Akosombo, work on which began in November 1977, is thus on the way to completion, although a little behind schedule. The official opening was originally planned for 1981.

The delay was caused by the increased construction cost and the need to find additional funds. Originally estimated at \$175 million in foreign exchange and 75 million cedis in local money, the project was reappraised last year and another \$20 million and 75 million in credits were added (see MARCHES TROPICAUX, 19 September 1980, p 2297).

It should be recalled that the Kpong complex, built 24 kilometers downstream from Akosombo (912,000 kilowatts), should increase the installed capacity of the Volta River Authority (VRA), which now has a capacity of 160,000 kilowatts. The recipient of different types of international aid, the project, for which the consulting engineers are Acres International of Canada, should also make it possible to develop some 7,000 hectares of land through irrigation.

After Kpong, Ghana is in principle to build a third project: the Bui. This project, designed by the Soviets, like Akosombo, before the 1966 coup d'etat, was put aside for several years and not taken up again until 1976. However, its financing is apparently still uncertain, despite the interest it has aroused in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta and the special attention given to it near the end of last year by the European Economic Community, at the time of the Brussels visit of Dr Amon Nikoi, then minister of finance and economic planning (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 24 October 1980, p 2595). The amount of money to be found at that time was put at over \$630 million for all the work, including the relocation of people living in the area.

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MADAGASCAR

RICE CULTIVATION DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 252, 9-22 Nov 81 p 44

[Text] The ways of progress have their own built-in contradictions. This is particularly true of a peasant society that has too long been left to the forces of the past.

Industrial development of Toliary (ex-Tulear). These words sound rather disagreeable to the ears of certain persons who grabbed the monopoly on "business" in the southern part of Madagascar. But, for the inhabitants of the south, only industrialization could now give their region a different appearance, a region which for so long had been given over to poverty; this is the only way to bring down that barrier which still cuts them off from the evolution of time--something which they truly desire.

Nevertheless, so long as the projects did not materialize, most of the region's people had the idea that these initiatives were nothing but empty words to charm the population preparatory to whatever election campaign was scheduled, as in the days of the old fanjakana (administration).

Indeed, is not conceiving democratic progress apart from the development of wealth --according to the old criteria--a notion that does not jibe with good common sense? How can one uplift a people if one does not eliminate its poverty and if one does not improve its material living conditions? And by what means should one multiply consumer goods without importing them if one does not increase the means of production as such?

To be sure, while industrialization is now well underway in the south, one must not forget that agriculture remains one of the economy's foundations.

The south is a relatively populated region but it periodically suffers terrible droughts. The water problem, rice supply, and the search for new rice cultivation areas are still the main concern of the government here.

The fact is that the province could avoid the drought if several rivers which cut through the region were to be brought under control. But the irrigation systems are insufficient and the canals, made in an entirely too archaic style, leave numerous cultivable areas devoid of the necessary water.

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Each year, canal dredging operations raise countless difficulties. This is rather astonishing because, since the arrival of water is vital for them, the peasants should have understood that it was in their interest to maintain those canals. Since the elimination of the so-called "liter usage" tax in 1960, it is up to each village to maintain a portion of the main canal.

To understand the reasons for these difficulties, we must look at the general context of relations between the administration and the population, we were told by Guy Hanicotte, a graduate of the Madagascar National School of Social Advancement. The definition of tasks, their distribution, and the penalties imposed for failure to perform services sprang from the development decision of the RDM [Democratic Republic of Madagascar] since the villages signed a fokonolona or dina agreement listing a series of prohibitions:

It was agreed, for example, that a person who refuses to work without good reason must pay a fine, that it is forbidden to cultivate up to 4 meters from the canal's banks, that it is forbidden to cross with carts anywhere else except across a bridge, to wash laundry in the canal, etc.

Reluctance

But, in spite of the positive effects of these prohibitions, which were adopted by common agreement among the villagers themselves, persons hostile to the government did not hesitate to put pressure on the peasants to violate these regulations.

But there are also other causes of difficulties in spreading modern agricultural methods in the south. Life-size experiments, permitting the development of better rice cultivation techniques and methods applicable to each area and the determination of the operation's social-economic results it seems were not conducted with sufficient strictness.

The reluctance of the peasants can also be explained by the fact that they are, above all, ranchers, accustomed to engaging in dry crops such as beans (tsaramaso), which is also a cash crop for them, corn (tsako), which is planted on the same soil as beans, and cassava (belahazo) or sweet potatoes.

The first reaction of the villagers thus was to consider rice cultivation as a local subsistence crop, that is to say, a crop designed to meet family needs at the least expenditure in terms of work to be done.

As for the transition from the rancher mentality to the farmer mentality, it is taking place only progressively and there is no use hoping, in this context, for the rapid development of intensive rice cultivation aimed at the market.

But it must also be admitted that this reluctance is due to the people's long-standing distrust of government officials as a consequence of the multiple vexations suffered during the time of the old regime. It is this rancor which persuaded the villagers to refuse to follow the advice of the technicians. The peasants are thus persuaded that the agricultural country agent would make more money for himself if the in-line rice planting areas were to be increased. As a result they decided not to plant rice in-line so as not to increase the salaries of the fanjakana country

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agents. Someone also made them believe that the country agents were only there to give orders. It is therefore useless to improve their wages by following their advice. Even the elimination of the beef cattle tax in 1972 did not help any. The peasants held the long-standing conviction that the fanjakana existed only to collect taxes. If there were to be no more taxes, there would be no more fanjakana. Consequently, there was no reason to fear the sheriff or any government officials. However, many farmers who did not pay their taxes for many long years escaped into the forest or into other regions out of fear of the local police. Some lived from hand to mouth; others left the farmland they owned and the farms were used by those who remained.

The extreme interest of the inhabitants in animal husbandry, to the detriment of agriculture, obviously creates big problems for the current leaders when it comes to food supplies. Distribution continues to be difficult due to the fact that the villages are very far from the major highways. Sometimes products are diverted by troublemakers. But the destination villages are unaware of these activities and the food supply officials are blamed for the situation.

The current administration is stepping up efforts to convince the peasants that their own interest is also the interest of the national as a whole and viceversa. The land must nourish the country and help pay for foreign investments. The practices of yesteryear, the paternalist gifts, can no longer be used in a country which has chosen the socialist way of development. Those who benefit from government aid must be aware of the national importance of what they have received.

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MAURITIUS

ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS PLANNED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 252, 9-22 Nov 81 p 34

[Article by Devi Tolval: "Hurricane Distress"]

[Text] How the current administration seeks a pretext to delay the elections scheduled for December against the background of the weather situation.

"I expect to organize the next general elections before 31 May 1982. I hope that they will be held during a period not troubled by natural cataclysms," Mauritian Premier Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam declared recently. It is known that the National Assembly's mandate ends on 27 December and that observers had expected general elections prior to that date.

In deciding to postpone the election, the Mauritian premier implicitly confirmed that legislative elections, held in the context of the current balance of forces on Mauritius, would mark the end of his rule.

The dean of chiefs of state of the Commonwealth countries does not intend to yield to the current opposition leader--premier in an MMM/PSM [Mauritian Militant Movement/Mauritian Socialist Party]--Aneerood Jugnauth who has returned from a visit to the United States in response to an invitation from the United States State Department.

In a climate of economic and social crisis without precedence--27 percent inflation this year, 55,000 unemployed, in other words, 13 percent of the active population, renewed 20-percent devaluation of the rupee--the Mauritian right, which is divided, would have had to fight a left united around the coalition formed by the MMM and the PSM whose optimism is well known regarding the outcome of the voting.

Certain Western foreign offices favorable to the regime in power at Port-Louis are drawing the same conclusions. But the stakes involved in such an election--which entails the risk of bringing to power yet another progressive regime in the Indian Ocean--makes it necessary to navigate very carefully to avoid the reefs.

It is this line of reasoning which has been adopted by the principal allies of the regime in Port-Louis, specifically, the United States and South Africa whose subversive agencies, the CIA and the BOSS [Bureau of State Security], are particularly active and are permanent parties in this election contest. Against the background

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of an unfavorable balance of forces, the important thing is to play for time, to delay the voting, to gain time in order, if possible, to bring about a climate more favorable to the regime in power, and, as the case may be, to play along with certain emergencies, if necessary invoking emergency measures.

"I am afraid that a climate of fear and violence might take hold in the country as the elections approach. In that case, anything might happen," he said, thus announcing in a barely veiled fashion his intentions as to the coming elections.

The administration in power must create conditions for a psychosis favorable to the postponement of the elections which it cannot win and, by legal means, it must extend the session of parliament which is 5 years, pending the arrival of better days. (During national emergencies, it may be extended for a period of 6 months on two occasions and in case of war it may be extended for a duration of one year on five consecutive occasions.)

As part of a strategy which is aimed at maintaining tension and broadening the election contest from here on in, the roles have been assigned, it is said at Port-Louis. Gaetan Duval will be the orchestra conductor. He gave a hint as to the provocation in September, at Plaine-Verte, when a demonstration, organized through Port-Louis, spilled beyond the boundaries of its initial route and would have deteriorated had it not been for the appeasement efforts made by the Mauritian progressive circles.

Is the current premier's Labor Party conniving with Duval? That cannot be ruled out, emphasized certain Mauritian politicians who recall that Gaetan Duval switched to the opposition on the eve of an election contest, as he had done on the eve of the 1976 elections. It is also noted that this "opposition" tends to develop "commonalist" reflexes that promote splits in Mauritian society, not over a political undertaking or a society project but along ethnic lines. Everything will probably be done to bar the way to the MMM/PSM coalition and the new experiments of independent economic development, social progress, and democracy which it proposes to conduct. That is the real cause of worry, the only reason for postponing the elections under the pretext of worrying about the hurricane.

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MOZAMBIQUE

CONTINUED REPORTS OF INCREASED NRM ACTIVITY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2522

[Text] Kept at a low level until June, the activities of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which is opposed to the Marxist government in power in Maputo, intensified and expanded in September. Mozambican authorities claim that South Africa supports the organization, set up in 1975, and the Ministry of Defense in particular indicates that Pretoria's air force is dropping weapons at fairly regular intervals.

The Mozambican Army has engaged in fighting against the movement in recent weeks in Chicualacuala Province, in the border zone where Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe come together. However, there is no information on how many troops are involved. A little further north, near Chimoio, in Manica Province, along Zimbabwe, six towers that supplied power to the port of Beira were blown up at the beginning of September.

Shortly thereafter, on the eastern coast of the country, NRM saboteurs attacked a powerplant near Beira. Following this sabotage, electricity had to be rationed in Beira, but the activities of the country's second-ranking port were able to continue thanks to backup facilities.

Also in the coastal region, some 200 kilometers south of Beira, the district of Ilancul in Inhambane Province was partially placed off limits to civilians because of the presence of "pockets" controlled by the NRM. Sawmills had to shut down. Road convoys going to or coming from Beira can cross the zone only under military escort.

The insecurity created by the NRM has caused over 1,000 Mozambicans to flee to Zimbabwe, preferring to leave the vicinity of Espungabera (central region), where at night they had to obey the insurgent and during the day, the Mozambican Army.

In order to fight the rebellion, Mozambican authorities are reduced to applying methods tried by the Portuguese before independence: Protected villages are now beginning to make their appearance in Mozambique.

In June, authorities claimed to have confined the movement to its sanctuary of Espungabera, a mountainous and isolated area along the Zimbabwe border. Today, however, the activities of the movement have spread to several regions of the country.

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In the eyes of observers, the NRM is nevertheless far from becoming dangerous to the regime of President Samora Machel. However, it worries authorities, who are sensitive to the impact of the rebel operations on the country's economic activity. Transport is often affected by sabotage at a time when Mozambique is trying to convince its neighbors to use its ports rather than those of South Africa.

Put at some 3,000 men in June by the Mozambicans, the members of the NRM have reportedly increased in number substantially since that time, but no one can give precise figures, although the South Africans estimate the number to be over 10,000.

This increase in personnel of the opposition movement is due, Mozambican sources believe, to the infiltration of elements trained in South Africa. The latter mainly come from the South African transit base of Phalaborwa, an immense military complex located near the ultra modern air base of Nielspruit, close to the Mozambican border.

Quoting prisoners or defectors from the NRM, these sources state that the Mozambicans, Zimbabweans from the former Rhodesian Army, Angolans and Namibians undergo intensive training in a camp near Durban, where they are taught by white Portuguese mercenaries or former Rhodesians. Once their training is finished, they are sent to Mozambique via Phalaborwa.

However, observers believe that the NRM also recruits its members from the population itself, taking advantage of the discontent due to the country's economic difficulties. It has a good propaganda tool with Africa Free Radio, which reportedly broadcasts from a station in South Africa.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

HIGH-QUALITY PRODUCTION--The National Precision Industry (INAL) does not work for the Mozambican market, but for export. This is the only industrial unit specializing in the manufacture of water meters, pendulums and alarm clocks. Its production is of high quality: At an international call for bids recently issued by Zimbabwe for the supplying of water meters, thanks to INAL, Mozambique came in second after the United States and its production was chosen because of the existing transport facilities. The company has also received an order for 15,000 water meters (3 cubic meters per hour) from Angola. At the beginning of September, Iraq stated it was ready to buy all types of pendulums and alarm clocks made by INAL from Mozambique. The order amounts to 1,000 units, to be delivered by December. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

PORTUGUESE HOUSING COOPERATION--Within the framework of cooperation agreements made with Mozambique, Portugal will begin to build 5,000 housing units next year, for technical assistants from all countries working in Mozambique. The housing will be spread throughout the national territory. They will not be prefabricated houses, but rather, traditional structures of brick and cement. Mozambican personnel will be on the Portuguese construction crews. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

COOPERATION WITH FRANCE--French Minister of Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot will go to Maputo before the end of the year to join with the Mozambican Government in signing an economic cooperation agreement. During his visit, Cot is also to tell Mozambican authorities of Paris' desire to establish a new policy in its relations with Maputo. It will be recalled that France was represented by 18 enterprises at the recent International Fair in Maputo. Cooperation between the two countries is already established in aeronautics (UTA [Air Transportation Union] trains Mozambican pilots in Toulouse) and in the automotive field, with Renault Industrial Vehicles training mechanics specializing in the three makes it distributes in Mozambique (Renault, Berliet and Saviem). The two countries recently signed an agreement on cartography. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERREENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2522] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464

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SENEGAL

PDS SECRETARY DISCUSSES PARTY'S PROGRAM

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 18-19, 20

[Interview with PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] Secretary General Abdoulaye Wade, by Sennen Andriamirado, date and place not given]

[Text] The secretary general of the PDS has not returned to Senegal since the accusations were made against his party (J.A. No 1085).

Mr Abdoulaye Wade is in Paris. Relaxed in public, sometimes nervous in private, he has a certain charm. His face gleaming, a man of sweeping gestures, with a malicious laugh, highly articulate, he does not defend himself. The advocate turns into the attorney general, and levels an indictment against President Abdou Diouf's team.

[Question] Sir, why did you not return to Senegal, where your party is accused of threatening the security of the state? Are you afraid?

[Answer] Afraid? Afraid of what. I am not afraid of being arrested.

[Question] But you have not returned to Senegal, contrary to what you announced 28 September in Paris at a press conference.

[Answer] I was actually going to return to Dakar. But on the eve of my departure (scheduled for Thursday 1 October--Editor's Note) the party leadership asked me to stay, and then to remain abroad to tell the international community about this conspiracy being hatched against our party.

[Question] But on Thursday 1 October PDS militants were waiting for you at Dakar-Yoff airport.

[Answer] In fact, the party had initially planned to organize a welcome for me as is customary. But the demonstration was banned and the airport was surrounded by police.

[Question] But your militants came and you were not on the airplane. Also, on 1 October, I was on the phone with the number two man in your party, Fara N'Diaye, who told me he was expecting you that day.

[Answer] That is correct

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[Question] But he did not tell me that the party wanted you to remain in France.

[Answer] The national secretariat, after having discussed it, asked me to launch a campaign of clarification abroad.

[Question] The PDS is facing some very serious accusations. Some militants in your organization have testified they brought arms into Senegal and took courses in urban guerrilla warfare in Libya.

[Answer] That is what the Senegalese Government maintains. But it is false. Neither Amadou Fall (Mr Wade's bodyguard--E.N.) nor Doudou Camara (parliamentary deputy --E.N.) have said they carried out or organized "destabilization training in Libya." I have just learned (15 October--E.N.) that the Dakar constabulary reportedly collected some weapons in an armory on Lamine-Gueye Avenue several days ago. I am not sure about that information, but I hope that they have not been buried somewhere so that later they can be "discovered" and blamed on us!

[Question] Doudou Camara has admitted organizing military training courses in Libya.

[Answer] Doudou Camara said that he had taken it upon himself to organize a training course for PDS "gorillas" in Libya.

[Question] You say that as if you wanted to disclaim any responsibility.

[Answer] I assume moral and political responsibility for the initiative that was taken of sending people to get training abroad in how to provide for my protection. The PDS takes responsibility, regardless of what group made the decision, the conditions, or the circumstances.

[Question] Do you continue to maintain that you were not fully informed about these training courses?

[Answer] To make a comparison, I would tell you that our party is set up like a government. If the minister of national education decides to send people to take training in London or Moscow, the president does not necessarily know about it in detail. But he takes responsibility for it.

[Question] In the case at hand, the trainees were of a particular sort. They were your bodyguards.

[Answer] Our national convention (the equivalent of a congress) gave Doudou Camara responsibility for taking care of party security,--and I am saying the security of the party, not just of the secretary general. He chose to give the bodyguards training in Libya.

[Question] But do you really need bodyguards?

[Answer] I was the victim of several attacks. I have received death threats. Party leaders thought it was necessary to train effective bodyguards, recruited from among the militants.

[Question] But you said that Amadou Fall was not in the PDS...

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[Answer] Fall, that is something else. He had offered to train my bodyguards--I have had four of them for 7 years. But I told him that I would not need him until 1983, when it would be time for elections. However, then and there, I did ask him to prepare a paper in which he would give me his ideas about security for me. That paper exists.

[Question] Where is it?

[Answer] I fear the comrades may have destroyed it. I had read it beforehand. In the first part, Fall gives the number of henchmen necessary, talks about their training (exercises, gymnastics, etc.). In the final part, he talks about shadowing party leaders...

[Question] Because you wanted to spy on your comrades?

[Answer] To prevent betrayals, he told me. The report exists. I told Fall to get together with my henchmen and show them how to position themselves around me.

[Question] Why should Libya have been chosen for their training? Why not somewhere else?

[Answer] (Laughter) For sure, if Morocco had been chosen, there would not have been nearly the outcry!

[Question] Are you certain that your henchmen did nothing more than take a course for bodyguards?

[Answer] I am going by what they said during their interrogation. Not to what Fall has reportedly said, but what the other 5 said: they took a course for thugs.

Full stop.

[Question] Who paid for the training?

[Answer] It was free.

[Question] Who paid the airplane tickets?

[Answer] I do not want to go into details. The preliminary hearing is still going on. I do not want to interfere with it.

[Question] You do not want to answer.

[Answer] The judicial inquiry will come up with an answer.

[Question] You yourself were in Tripoli early in September....

[Answer] So what? That is no secret. Everyone knew it. I met with journalists there. I gave 15 interviews. I chaired meetings.

[Question] Did you see Qadhafi?

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[Answer] No. But if I want to see Col Qadhafi tomorrow, I will see him. My relations with Libya are normal. When Senghor was in politics, I went to Tripoli. I saw him before, and I returned to see him afterward. (A silence)..Senghor understands me. Diouf does not understand me.

[Question] Have you seen Abdou Diouf since he became president?

[Answer] We have met twice. The first time was several days after Senghor's departure; he made a big statement about democracy. He told me that he would make sure that the 1983 elections unfolded without any irregularities. I ask no better. The second time, in August, after the events in Gambia, he gave me the same spiel: "Have faith in us. Everything will be democratic." Myself, I want to see it. Those people do not want democracy.

[Question] Do you miss Senghor?

[Answer] People do not understand the political and intellectual game that was played between Senghor and me. His personality put him above the conflict. Diouf does not understand that.

[Question] Were you not hoping Senghor would name you prime minister and heir to power?

[Answer] That is not true. My ambition is not to become president of the Republic of Senegal--but if it happens tomorrow, I will serve. My ambition is for Senegal to be a democratic country. If, tomorrow, Majhmout Diop, or Cheikh Anta Diop (respectively the leaders of the African Independence Party and the Democratic National Rally--E.N.), or even Abdou Diouf is elected president, I will be the democratic opposition.

[Question] Abdou Diouf is already president!

[Answer] Thanks to a constitutional coup! He was not elected! You know very well that I have always contested his legitimacy!

[Question] What are you calling for today?

[Answer] We are for social-laborism, which is center-left, combining elements of moderate socialism (which is particularly opposed to nationalizations) and progressive liberalism.

[Question] What a combination!

[Answer] If you cannot understand it, that is your problem! But it is a fact. It is not a combination. I reject the Western typology of political currents. We are against inequalities, against the exploitation of man by man; but we are for a multi-party system, and for freedom of opinion.

[Question] But Senegal already has a real party pluralism.

[Answer] I do not want the PDS to be restricted to a role of eternal opposition, destined to serve only as a safety valve for the party in power. My enemies do not want to see alternation. I think that conditions for the pursuit of normal political activity no longer exist. That is the real reason for the machinations concocted against us.

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[Question] Because you still maintain it is a conspiracy? You are not guilty?

[Answer] Guilty of what? I am not guilty, and I am not afraid of being arrested!

[Question] But you do not want to return to Senegal.

[Answer] I tell you that my party entrusted me with a mission abroad! If, tomorrow, it tells me to come back, I will take the next plane.

[Question] Are you not afraid that during your absence your top deputy, Fara N'Diaye, will take your place?

[Answer] People have tried to divide us. They have not succeeded.

[Question] Since you contend that the conditions for normal opposition activity no longer exist, what are you planning to do?

[Answer] I am up against people who do not want democracy. I am therefore thinking about ways to continue the struggle.

[Question] While remaining abroad?

[Answer] One can struggle abroad just as one can struggle within the country. But it is no longer possible to engage in a dialogue with the PS. We will carry on the struggle by other means.

[Question] With arms, for example...

[Answer] Oh, no! That is completely out of the question! There are other ways.

[Question] What?

[Answer] Use your imagination.

[Question] But for now? What do you intend to do?

[Answer] Today, since the departure of Senghor, and even though I do not speak in the name of the now-retired president, it is I who represent legitimacy. I received 20 percent of the votes in the elections. While Abdou Diouf has never had a single vote.

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SENEGAL

FINANCIAL BACKERS MAKE UP DEFICIT FACING NATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 20, 21

[Text] Senegal has found the money it needed to get through the year. The figures speak for themselves. Once again this year, Senegal will only have sold about half as much abroad as it purchased from abroad. The difference is about Fr CFA 100 billion. As its financial reserves are very thin, it must be borrowed.

Two important international meetings to resolve Senegal's financial problems were held in Paris--first on 12-13 October with countries that have money loaned out to Senegal, and then on 19-21 October with countries and institutions which might loan Senegal the cold cash to carry out the projects called for in its development plan. After those two meetings, the problems might be considered resolved, at least for a few months. Especially if France discreetly makes up for any shortfalls.

Indeed, the most difficult part was the laborious negotiations last spring with the International Monetary Fund [IMF]. Those negotiations were concluded 16 September with a loan of 105 million SDR's [Special Drawing Rights], or Fr CFA 40 billion.

Bankers and high officials understand that the IMF requires countries like Senegal to take strong economic recovery measures in exchange for its loans. An agreement with the Fund is equivalent to a certificate of good behavior. Assisted by private French advisers, the government in Dakar was able to turn this to advantage by presenting itself as a poor but virtuous country during the meetings in Paris.

At once the creditor countries in the Club of Paris agreed to reschedule over a 9-year period, with a 4-year grace period, the Fr CFA 22.6 billion Senegal was to pay back this year. The private banks are expected to do the same thing in November on their own loans. Finally, the countries and institutions that are already financing a very high percentage of the projects in the development plan seem amenable to the idea of going even further. The very unusual meeting was called to persuade the financial backers to pay all the cost of the projects. The Senegalese state, which no longer has the means to finance a development budget, cannot pay its share (or "counterpart") in the projects.

The bankers and friends of Senegal are thus agreeing to redouble their efforts...so long as the IMF gives its blessings. Fund experts will be returning to Dakar in December to make sure that, following the increase in the price of gasoline, sugar, value added tax...that the patient continues to take his bitter medicine.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

PDS SEEKS FRENCH ARBITRATION--Abdoulaye Wade would like the PSF [French Socialist Party] to arbitrate his disputes with the Dakar government (see p 18). This is because of the ties between the Senegalese PS (in power) and its French counterpart. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9516

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TANZANIA

SALIM DISCUSSES UN SECRETARY GENERAL CANDIDACY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 30, 31

[Interview with Salim Ahmed Salim, by Jean-Louis Buchet, date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] We hear talk that Africa is not united behind your candidacy, and the nonaligned are even less so. There is even a possibility of Latin American candidates.

[Answer] Raising doubts about our unity after every major discussion is nothing new. When the OAU [Organization of African Unity] speaks with one voice after a long discussion, someone says right away: "it was a hasty decision, Africa is divided." It is contemptible and ridiculous! Besides, the minutes of the meeting where the decision to support my candidacy was made clearly show that I have the support of the OAU in its entirety: those known as "moderates," those known as "progressives"; both French-speaking and English-speaking; Arabic-speaking and Portuguese-speaking. It is the same among the nonaligned, who did not support me at the beginning.

However, one must not think that 100 percent of the nonaligned countries are for me. None of their decisions get 100 percent support. Anyhow, the one which concerns me has not given rise to objections. The facts speak for themselves: there is only one declared Third World candidate, proposed by Africa and supported by the Arab League and the nonaligned, in other words two-thirds of the members of the U.N. As for the Latin Americans, they will only be candidates if there is an impasse. I do not want to speculate about that.

[Question] You have a majority in the General Assembly, but it is being said this is not the case on the Security Council, especially as regards the United States...

[Answer] I have no reason to fear that I lack sufficient support on the Security Council. I have no reason to think that a country is really opposed to my candidacy. I have no indications about any hostility from a permanent member.

[Question] People are also saying that the international situation favors Mr Waldheim.

[Answer] That is specious. Who says that in 5 or 10 years the situation will be any less tense? If it remains tense, are we going to have the secretary general serve for life? The world is changing, the United States has a new president, France does too...So it is ridiculous to claim that the U.N. secretary general cannot be changed. I will go even further: it is not right to maintain that any one person, whatever his role and merits, should have a monopoly on wisdom and talent for bringing about peace and compromise.

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[Question] What could an African secretary general bring to the U.N.?

[Answer] I am African, I am from the Third World. My experience and attitudes are from Africa and the Third World. But, if I am elected, I will not be an African secretary general. I will not be a secretary general of the Third World. I will be the successor of Kurt Waldheim, and I will bring Third World know-how, experience and sensitivities to the position. But I will also consider the legitimate interests of all the members of the U.N., including those of the great powers. My past and experience will help me, and help the U.N., resolve the problems of Africa and the Third World. And I do not accept the notion that I can be accused of bias on these questions just because I am African. On that basis many people would have to be disqualified, starting with Europeans in regard to East-West issues.

[Question] Can the position of the secretary general be made a more effective one?

[Answer] Whoever holds the position, there are limits to what can be done. The secretary general is guided by the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. He must be sensitive to the interests of the North and of the South, the great powers and the other countries. He must be familiar with and understand these limits. Without using it to justify inaction. He represents the moral authority of the U.N. at least.

I also think that it is necessary to take steps to insure that the UN does not appear to be on the sidelines of major world events. It must regain the confidence of public opinion and the governments. That is the challenge for whoever heads the U.N. during the next 5 years.

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ZIMBABWE

MUGABE BROADENS CONTROL OVER PARTY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1087, 4 Nov 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Sadio Lamine Sow: "The Danger of Power"]

[Text] After having gotten rid of the hard-liners in his party, Robert Mugabe has a free hand--for better or worse.

Nothing has changed in the office where Ian Smith had been sole commander: sitting in that office, Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, on 12 October was waiting for his health minister Herbert Ushewokunze. Crossing the threshold of Government House in Harare (ex-Salisbury), the minister had no doubt that he would emerge a few minutes later minus a job. Mugabe as a matter of fact did not hesitate to discharge him, accusing him of holding "a position that is difficult to reconcile with the policy of reconciliation with the whites."

Herbert Ushewokunze was the last representative of the "hard-line" group in ZANU, the party of the prime minister, which held the majority in the Chamber, after the departure, from the Mugabe cabinet, of his friend Edgar Tekere, former minister of vocational training who resigned on 11 January 1981. "This decision obviously shocked me," said the former health minister, "but I suppose that scapegoats do not have the right to defend themselves."

From here on in, Robert Mugabe is the sole boss of a formation which is totally devoted to him. Will he benefit from that to promote the establishment of a single party (although accepting certain tendencies within it) for which the former guerrilla chief never concealed his preference? Possibly. The reason given is hardly original: Zimbabwe must not scatter its forces at this stage in its existence. Moreover, Mugabe still is suspicious of his former ally from the heroic days, ZAPU chief Joshua N'Komo; he suspects him of not playing the democratic game by rejecting the verdict of the polls. The prime minister furthermore believes him to be responsible for the increasingly pressing wage demands of lower-level civil servants who are very closely linked to ZAPU; during a demonstration in Harare on Monday, 20 October, 700 petitions were presented from teachers and nurses. As for Ian Smith and his party, the Republican Front, Mugabe accuses them of opposing his program for the Africanization of cadres by all means. The complaints made by both sides against the prime minister indicate clearly that they are entirely opposed to the single party.

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For N'Komo, ZANU--which has seized all of the means of communication (newspapers, television)--is solely responsible for all domestic political tensions. The same protestations come from Ian Smith who is increasingly becoming the spokesman for the traditional recriminations of the whites against the heavy taxes and social policies of the new regime which are wrong, according to them.

As a matter of fact, the departure of the whites, especially to South Africa, Australia, and Great Britain, continues at a disquieting rate. Of course, among them there are those who could not remain lower-level civil servants in the administration and the police under Ian Smith, secretaries and farmers who were in the red. Out of 8 million inhabitants in Zimbabwe, the whites today represent 2 percent of the population, in other words, a total of 160,000 as against 200,000 at the time of independence in April 1980. But Robert Mugabe must above all--with success, for the time being--prevent the departure of 4,000-5,000 white farmers who provide 80 percent of the country's food and a by no means negligible share of its foreign exchange earnings coming primarily from trade with South Africa.

Now, relations between Zimbabwe and its all-powerful neighbor, always rather mediocre, continued to decline in 1981. More specifically, this has been happening since the election of President Reagan in the United States who encourages South African raids into Angola and Mozambique. Of course, Pretoria is not yet involved in open warfare against Zimbabwe but the threat of a real economic blockade remains. This is true above all to the extent that the Harare--Beira (Mozambique) railroad--which enabled Zimbabwe no longer to be dependent on its exports for the "southern route" to Port-Elizabeth--remains closed as a victim of sabotage actions by the anti-Marxist guerrilla fighters of the MRM [Mozambique Resistance Movement] (the Mozambican UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]).

Pretoria for its part can only rejoice over the difficulties of the young Zimbabwean army which Robert Mugabe is trying to organize. Springing from the merger of the two guerrilla forces--the ANLA (armed branch of ZANU) and ZIPRA (ZAPU)--it has since 7 August 1981 been commanded by a white, Gen Sandy McLean, with the help of British advisors. Only one elite battalion is commanded by about 100 North Koreans. While the objectives of integrating this army have been practically attained, rivalry between the old guerrilla fighters of Mugabe and those of N'Komo is far from over. This is a difficult kind of coexistence which, after 1981, led to violent clashes, causing several hundred dead at Bulawayo, the country's second largest city. The new army with its 70,000 men is still a very motley one, with dissonances which reflect those of the political chessboard. Moreover, many former guerrilla fighters who have returned to civilian life and who are unemployed for the most part are increasingly expressing the discontent by organizing acts of sabotage in certain barracks.

Robert Mugabe, who is said to be pragmatic, runs the risk of soon having to prove to his army that he does not lack firmness.

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