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JPRS L/10186

14 December 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 65/81)



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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

GALLOIS INTERVIEWED, VOICES VIEWS ON 'ZERO OPTION'

PMO31519 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 1 Dec 81 p 5

[Interview with General Pierre Gallois by Paolo Patrino: "Zero Option Leads Only to U.S. Disengagement in Europe" in Paris; date not given]

[Text] Paris--"In Geneva the Americans are negotiating with the objective of the 'zero option.' To prevent the deployment of the Euromissiles, the Soviets are offering a reduction in their nuclear weapons and perhaps a partial withdrawal of their SS-20's. But if the negotiations end with an agreement, Europe will have little reason to be pleased or to applaud. Because in any case it is taking a big gamble." General Pierre Gallois, internationally famous strategist, author of a dozen studies of military strategy and international relations and one of the creators of the French strike force under De Gaulle, expressed in an interview granted to LA STAMPA all his reservations, as a specialist, about the Geneva negotiations and above all about European policy.

[Question] Why is Europe in danger?

[Answer] The problem is very simple: what specifically does the U.S. zero option offer mean? It means that the United States will relinquish deploying its Pershing II and cruise missiles in NATO countries served by U.S. personnel. In other words, Reagan is backtracking from Carter's proposal, correcting the "imprudent" levity of his predecessor at the White House and in practice facilitating a disengagement from the European theater. It is absolutely senseless and idiotic that European politicians immediately supported and applauded Reagan's zero option proposal.

[Question] But in exchange for the nondeployment of the Euromissiles the United States wants to secure a similar zero option from the Soviets.

[Answer] What, in fact, will the Americans be able to obtain, after many efforts? Perhaps that the USSR will reduce its number of missiles targeted on Europe a little, perhaps by a few hundred? But it is certainly the older weapons that will be put into storage. What about the SS-20's? The Russians might, as a demonstration of good will, agree to halt their deployment, reduce their numbers or pull them back a few hundred kilometers. Even deployed in the Urals the

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Soviet SS-20's could still hit the majority of main nerve centers in central West Europe. So what will we have achieved? Europe would remain the USSR's hostage, with the additional drawback of the U.S. disengagement.

[Question] Why have European politicians supported the U.S. zero option proposal: why did they not insist instead on the deployment of the Euromissiles?

[Answer] The European leaders, starting with Chancellor Schmidt, have displayed great ignorance of the problem of their countries' security. They are chasing public support and do not want to be accused of bellicosity. But they would do better to explain the real situation to people. They have been wrong from the outset. They should have reached an agreement with the Americans to form a fleet of 20-30 submarines deployed in the various seas and constantly on the move. Secrecy would have been safeguarded and the Euromissiles would have retained the advantage of mobility.

[Question] So what is the choice now, General Gallois?

[Answer] In my opinion the zero option is inconsistent and suicidal for us Europeans, who would be its victims. By accepting it, the European leaders are making their countries' future dependent on Russian good will.

[Question] In conclusion, is the choice between unconditional surrender and disaster?

[Answer] A disaster was a nightmare until 10 years ago. Now strategic changes and weapons miniaturization have made this terrifying hypothesis less realistic. There is still a possibility of a limited war, which could even be restricted to a mere disarming action to neutralize military objectives without hitting the civilian populations.

[Question] So what can we expect from Geneva?

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, it will be worse than the withdrawal of the Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe under Kennedy.

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

MISSILE'S RANGE POLITICAL--The communique from the [President's office in the] Elysee on 14 November, announcing the choice of the Hades tactical nuclear missile for the years to come, included a figure underlined for the benefit of the Germans, namely, the missile's range of 250 kilometers. The existing Pluton missile system has a range of only 100 kilometers. Stationed in France, it could hit only FRG territory and the West Germans are quite aware of it. The Hades missile, however, can reach the GDR from the Rhine. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Nov 81 p 19] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]

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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

BRIEFS

REAGAN'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL--Rome--In an article in today's L'UNITA, [secretary of the PCI Foreign Policy Studies Center] Romano Ledda recognizes the major importance of the U.S. proposal, whose "philosophy reverses the previous one: whereas before, rearmament was the precondition for any future negotiations, now it is asserted that there is a desire to negotiate a comprehensive reduction of all weapons." Nevertheless, the PCI representative identifies "a fundamental contradiction" in the U.S. President's speech. According to Ledda, Reagan is placing himself in "a negotiating position that is neither strong nor reasonable" because it goes beyond even the Italian socialists' stance--among the most radical--on the zero option. Indeed, it aims not only at the dismantling of missiles deployed since 1977, but also challenges the previous situation which, Ledda maintains, was "by consent" recognized as balanced. [Excerpt] [PM251551 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Nov 81 p 5]

CSO: 3104/52

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

METALWORKERS' UNION STRATEGY TO COMBAT UNEMPLOYMENT

Hamburg STERN in German 5 Nov 81 p 242

[Article by Heiko Tornow: "'No Icing on the Cake'--Why the Metalworkers' Union Plans to Forgo High Pay Raises"]

[Text] Wolfgang Engelmann, deputy representative of the Metalworkers' Union in Hamburg, had just explained his union's strategy for the impending contract negotiations to the staff of the Kolben Schmidt firm in Hamburg--scanty percentage raises but in return pensions at 60. The reaction surprised him. "For that we'll strike, even on Christmas Eve!" To their union leader the metalworkers announced willingness to strike.

"Pay pension" is the term that the Metalworkers' union seems to have used successfully not only in Hamburg to mobilize its membership in spite of dire economic prognosis. In view of the alarmingly high unemployment--feared to reach 2 million in the next winter--the metalworkers are urged to forgo parts of their salary increase.

In return Hans Janssen, in charge of pay programs for the world's largest single union, would like to wrest the following model from the industrialists of Gesamtmetall: Metalworkers will "go on pension" at 60 instead of the current 63 years. The industry is to pay them 90 percent of their salaries. The employers are also to pay social security contributions for them until the "paid pensioners" qualify for their state retirement. At the same time the jobs abandoned voluntarily by the older colleagues are to be filled by unemployed younger workers.

Wolfgang Engelmann thinks that 70,000 younger metalworkers could take the place of colleagues who retire early. But the Hamburg resident was given wrong figures by the headquarters in Frankfurt--in an internal document of the Metalworkers' union leadership a figure of barely 30,000 newly opened jobs is mentioned.

For Franz Steinkuehler, leader of the Stuttgart local of the Metalworkers' Union, this figure is too low. He is agitating among union leadership and members for a more comprehensive plan: In the future the workers reaching age 57 will work only three-quarter time, at 58 only half time and should retire at age 59. The union man has made calculations as to the benefit of this comprehensive

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suggestion for the labor market--67,622 jobs in the metal industry and 8395 among steelworkers.

Steinkoehler also pleads that the pay pension should not be negotiated at the same time as contract terms but later. The reason? The retirement policy is so complicated that the contract negotiations planned for February 1982 would unnecessarily be prolonged by it, and "we could be pressured for agreement." That could mean that the union would be forced to make great concessions in both the salary increases as well as the paid retirement areas. However, Steinkoehler wants to evoke just as few illusions about salary increases as union leader Janssen. A shortening of the working life means that the firms would have to expend money that will then not be available for higher salaries. Says Steinkoehler: "Of course we can't have that. That would be icing on the cake."

Opinions still differ about the amount that metalworkers would have to give up in their salaries in favor of early retirement. The Metalworkers' Union claims, "Not even one percent of salary." The employers' union Gesamtmetall is talking of 2 percent.

Behind the scenes union leaders are already talking about figures in a possible contract: "We can be happy if we get to sign at 3.5 percent plus contract rates." This would not even meet the inflation rate of 7 percent.

The employers still do not know how to react to the union proposal. Peter Stihl, spokesman for the employers in Baden-Wurttemberg, last weekend flatly rejected the paid retirement. It would be so costly that pay increases for 1982 would have to be "so unpleasantly low" that the union could not defend the contract to its membership. Besides, pensions are a matter for the state and should remain so.

On the other hand, the supreme federation Gesamtmetall praised the moderate tone of the Metalworkers' Union. After all, employer representatives have already calculated the benefits of a paid retirement for the firms. A younger staff is more efficient. Besides, the employers could demand that the Metalworkers' Union abandon its proposal for a 35 hour week in return for concessions in the field of paid retirement.

The idea of paid retirement will be of concern for other branches of the industry as well. Even before mapping his own union's strategy Eugen Loderer, chief of the metalworkers, obtained the approval of almost all members of DGB. Only the Printing and Paperworkers' Union did not agree.

The other unions want to copy the paid retirement agreement if the Metalworkers' Union's initiative is successful.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

SVIMEZ REPORT CITES NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC GAP

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 25 Oct 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Nando Mazzei]

[Text] Rome--Industrialization and urban renewal are the two main problems involved in the issue of the South in this phase, and these are the issues which special intervention will have to concentrate on more in order to reduce the persistent gap between North and South. The Svimez (Association for the Industrial Development of the South) 1981 report concentrates on these two aspects of the situation in particular depth, pointing out that all the regions in southern Italy are well below the national average in per capita production, and only Abruzzo, and to some extent Molise and Sardegna, show that they have reached higher levels, above the average of southern regions, thanks to a type of diversified industrialization with plants that have the lowest index of sectorial concentration. In these regions, according to the report, a trend is developing which has already been encountered in the North and in the central South in other decades, namely that of "an extension towards the South of the territorial propagation of development." Farther south, in fact, one finds areas in which intense urban and demographic concentration are a handicap to development, or regions like Calabria having the lowest index of industrialization and production per capita or, finally, phenomena of regression like in Taranto and Brindisi, in Puglia, and Syracuse in Sicily. In this last case, the difficulties are due to a vast spectrum of factors, among which the difficulties of large plants and the urban problem stand out, as well as demographic expansion. These are becoming, more and more clearly, real obstacles to economic progress and to the location in these areas of new industries.

It is with these obvious internal gaps within the area and with related problems that the policy for the South of the 1980's will have to come to grips, intervening not only at a national level but also at a regional level. The report emphasizes the importance of industrialization to amass revenue, and insists on rejecting as inadequate the suggestions of those who propose concentrating on developing the tertiary sector and on deindustrialization as an alternative to development. Only industry can guarantee the absorption of the excess labor supply in the South (816,000 people, or 10 percent of the labor force, as opposed to 882,000 in the Center and North, or 5.3 percent of the labor force). This excess of labor will tend to continue in the South because of the continuing

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expansion of the population of this area, despite the slower growth rate registered in recent years. Of course this stimulus to be given to industrialization, especially sophisticated sectors, must not neglect the development of a tertiary elite; but the report warns against the possibility of developing this type of tertiary sector in metropolitan areas like those in the South, because overpopulation, scarcity of civic services and housing, their "operational failure, unemployment, and urban deterioration are phenomena which are strictly interdependent and must be attacked jointly." Mere physical renewal is not enough, the report warns, in this connection. There must be a social-urbanistic renewal which makes it possible to find adequate solutions to the problems of employment and unemployment through long-term intervention at a broad territorial level. But to do this--in other words to do what policies for the South have not done in the last decade--we must resort to ways of planning that link the political will of the central authorities to that of local authorities.

As for the overall picture in the South this past year, the most significant data in the report decry an increase in population, going from 34.9 percent of the nation's population in 1973 to 35.6 percent in 1980, and, for the same period, an increase in the proportion of the population employed in agriculture of from 41.3 percent to 46.7 percent and of those occupied in industry from 52.6 to 54.3 percent. For the same period, the added value of agriculture increased by only 0.1 while that for industry increased 0.7. Between 1973 and 1980, bank deposits increased from 16.4 percent of the national total to 17.6 percent, but jobs diminished from 15.3 to 13.9 percent. In this past year there has been a relative contraction in private consumption, and a recovery in investment in absolute values which does not correspond to the rate of accumulation, however, which fell in the South to 25.9 percent of the national average as compared to 29.5 percent in 1974. There was also a reduction in payments made by the state and a 30 percent reduction in contributions made by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno (Fund for Southern Italy) to productive sectors.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

POINTS OF DISSENSION BETWEEN KOHL, GEISLER NOTED

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Nov 81 pp 14, 15

[Article by Ludolf Herrmann: "Left Turn"]

[Text] The SPD leadership trio is at odds within itself; but the CDU is not much better off. Helmut Kohl must defend himself against the attacks of his own secretary-general.

Opposition leader Helmut Kohl says he would rather not face the problems confronting Helmut Schmidt. For that matter, he does not need them because he has problems of his own. The chancellor may be confronted with rebellion in the ranks but in Kohl's case it is dissension at the top. Whenever he tries to lay down opposition strategy, his marching orders are thwarted by the very man who should maintain a relationship of special trust to the party chairman—the secretary-general. But Heiner Geissler, 51, does not let a single opportunity go by without undermining the authority of his personal friend, Helmut Kohl. While the party chairman is striving for harmony, Geissler publicly calls for "readiness to debate" and an "opening for new ideas." To show exactly what he means by that, he offers proof of his non-adherence to the party line given out by Kohl in each and every medium that provides him with a forum.

At the very moment that the CDU/CSU dominated Land governments were preparing to introduce draft legislation in the Bundesrat that would curtail radical abuse of the freedom of assembly, Geissler advised the party not to create the impression that it was out to defend the status quo with the help of rubber bullets and restrictions on the right to demonstrate. At the very moment that young voters, disappointed by the coalition's machinations and the weakness of the government, were slowly turning to the CDU/CSU, the secretary-general came out with the statement that the trend against the CDU/CSU among young voters had not yet abated. At the very moment that the peace movement was even causing the SPD to have second thoughts, Geissler, the individualist Swabian, was trying to make the peaceniks in his own camp look better, calling for: "more peace, more freedom from force, fewer weapons." He also adopted maverick positions on controversial issues which had not been counted among those in which he had any expertise before. Without much ado, he came out against arms shipments to Saudi-Arabia whose government he referred to as "unstable" and "less than serious." He revised this position later but had by then provided the government, which had been undecided on the issue, with a much-needed respite.

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More recently, the prominent deviationist of whom DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG said in 1977 that he was willing to upset "any and all applecarts" is trying to restructure the foreign policy orientation of his party. Kohl would like to see the government go before the public by itself to explain the problems the detente policy has encountered. The party leadership was all the more surprised therefore when a piece by Geissler appeared in the party's DEUTSCHLAND-UNION-DIENST which said it was the CDU/CSU's goal to enter into a continuing exchange of ideas and information with the Soviet leadership. The truth is, however, that this was not entirely unexpected. Geissler had said several times previously that the CDU/CSU should provide for "more of an opening to the East."

Another instance when the differences between party chairman and secretary-general became apparent was during the preparations for the Hamburg party congress in early November. Geissler wanted to turn it into a youth assembly but Kohl wanted to see the large political issues debated. Kohl did win out in the end but forums for young people did take place as well in which the party was subjected to public scrutiny.

Geissler did not restrict himself to such attempts to make the party chairman over into a figurehead who merely executes the policies of his secretary-general. He went beyond that, looking for opportunities to test his strength against that of Helmut Kohl. Early this year, the party chairman had informed the then party manager Ulf Fink that he expected him to step down by the middle of the year. Geissler countered by issuing a public declaration of confidence on Fink's behalf and the statement that Fink would stay on the job for as long as he enjoyed Geissler's confidence. In fact, the labor law does stipulate that the manager could only be dismissed by the secretary-general; but if party loyalties were what they ought to be, there is no question as to whose wishes would be respected by the party hierarchy.

When Fink did step down—and was sent to Berlin as senator for social affairs to resolve the issue—Kohl asked that the party manager's position be abolished for economy reasons. But Geissler once again made use of his prerogative and appointed Peter Radunski, head of the public affairs division at party headquarters, as new party manager. In this case, a compromise was reached with Radunski holding down both jobs simultaneously.

In September, Geissler called a press conference Kohl had expressly asked not be held to announce draft guidelines for the party congress. By jumping the gun, the secretary-general caused difficulties for the party when subsequent changes requested by the party presidium took on the air of a palace revolution against the authors of the original draft.

Without a doubt, the relationship between Helmut Kohl and his secretary-general is in shambles. It is plain to see that the two former friends from Rhineland-Palatinate have different political antecedents. Geissler, whose father worked for the old Center Party, has remained a leftwing Center Party politician at heart. Kohl, on the other hand, belongs to the enlightened conservative camp—a political orientation the postwar CDU developed as its very own contribution to German political life.

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This leaves the question unanswered whether a party that aspires to taking over the government can afford to have its secretary-general flagrantly disregard the very precepts of party discipline he ought in fact to uphold. As the executor of his party chairman's policies he could conceivably find his own views conflicting with them. But in such a case, he would not rebel against them but offer his resignation.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PS-DEPUTY, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; ECONOMIC, FOREIGN POLICY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17 Oct 81 pp 48-50

[Interview with Lionel Jospin by Albert du Roy and Kathleen Evin; date and place not given.]

[Text] Today, the great debates for the Socialists are more in the Parliament and in the antechambers of power than in the somewhat deserted "old house." It is therefore on the results of these 5 months of government action that Lionel Jospin, first secretary of the Socialist Party, answered our questions.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you think of Edmond Maire's statements?

Lionel Jospin: Two words: it is Edmond Maire's habit, before each Socialist Party congress, to assist us with his public advice. This time too, it must be that. On the basic issues, I would like to recall that at this time the nationalization battle against the Right and big business is beginning. Each of us is freely choosing the place he will take in it.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: As first secretary of the Socialist Party, how do you assess the new administration's actions 5 months after its installation? What is going well? What is not going so well?

Lionel Jospin: I may lack objectivity: this government is my government. I am not a member of it. But I am at its side, an actor and not a spectator or a judge. The most important point is this one: the change in France really began after 10 May. History has shown us so many parties who proclaim themselves leftist when they are the opposition only to abandon all or part of their program once in power. As for the Socialists, they are doing what they said they would do on all the large issues. I well know that there are changes on some points, such as on the energy problem. But they are moderate, and the reasons have been given. In the end, I find that as far as the major social and economic problems are concerned, based on which the Right was predicting our apocalypse, the government is in control of the situation. We are still confronted with unemployment and inflation. But neither of the two evils can be attributed to us. And at least we deny their inevitability. It can even be stated that the progress of

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unemployment is checked, and there is no side-slipping on inflation and prices. Finally, broad structural reforms have begun--must we list them?--which will bear their fruit in time.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Would you say, then, that the Socialists are not doing any worse than their predecessors?

Lionel Jospin: They are certainly doing differently. Furthermore, they are doing something which does not show up in the indexes. They are recreating the bases for true social cooperation in the face of the problems posed by the crisis, with the development of solidarity, of continuous dialogue between labor and management, of decentralization of responsibilities and, in general, development of social responsibility. But, let us be realistic, the situation is such that we can hardly set victorious economic goals for ourselves in the short term. We will be judged on the medium term.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: No dark areas in this assessment?

Lionel Jospin: I believe that there is a problem with the flow of information. Primarily between the administration, the ministers, their co-workers and the parliamentary group. The work load and the work pace are such that the elected officials sometimes feel they lack the time to participate in the drafting of texts. They perceive them, if I may say so, at the "finished product" level. We would like to be informed at the "semi-finished product" level. I am discovering that the parliamentary apparatus takes time. However, for our first reforms we needed to go quickly. Things will go better in the future, I imagine. There is also the problem of explaining our policy. The opposition speaks more and does less. Today we tend to believe that our actions speak for themselves. We should do a little more educating. And, concurrently, prevent some of our officials from announcing projects which are not yet decided upon, too early, too quickly.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Must the Socialist Party, as happened in the debate on immigrants, settle the possible disputes between its elected officials and the administration?

Lionel Jospin: The party's executive board does not set itself up as arbitrator between the parliamentary group and the administration. A matter is only referred to it, by the president of the group, when there is a problem among the members of Parliament. Then it is the executive board who decides. The Socialist Party is not a cog in the state wheel, it belongs to society. It must inform the Socialist ministers of the state of opinion, of the views of its militants and its officials. But it cannot constantly take the place of the executive.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What is the government's margin of freedom with regard to the Socialist Party program?

Lionel Jospin: The government is not just socialist. It is a government of union of the Left and even of a broader assemblage. This simple fact creates a certain distance with regard to the Socialist Party. Furthermore, the government is faced with the need to make decisions which weigh directly on the life of the French and to measure their consequences accurately.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Does this distance represent the margin between what is desirable and what is possible?

Lionel Jospin: The government must realize as much of the desirable as possible. For the moment it is applying the program approved by the people during the presidential election. To go beyond that will only be possible after a democratic vote. Of course, the farther one goes, the more new problems can arise for which this program provides no answer. The Socialist Party will have to express its opinion more often.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is it possible to foresee a split between the future choices of the Socialist Party and those of the administration?

Lionel Jospin: Possible, yes. Probable, no.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What is the status of your relationship with the Communist Party?

Lionel Jospin: The Communist Party respects government solidarity as the essential. Having said this, it is obvious that it cannot renounce its own existence, or autonomous expression. But it seems to me that its tone is adapted to the new period. As we are, it is retaining its right to legitimate criticism. Basically, our relationship is good enough, which is a pleasant change from the previous period. But is it the sign of an in-depth change? Only time will tell. For my part, I am not naive: I have forgotten nothing. And I am following what is occurring in the Communist Party with attention. For example, the reasons for its decline, at least electorally. I did not know that the causes were so distant.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Are you going to review the structure of the leftist union municipalities between now and 1983?

Lionel Jospin: The power ratio between the leftist parties has obviously changed. Drawing up the lists for the 1983 municipal elections is not yet on the agenda. When the time comes, we will, as usual, take the realities into consideration.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Contrary to the history of the Socialist Party since Epinay, it seems that the next congress in Valence, at least in appearance, must mark the disappearance of "political factions." Does this seem possible and desirable to you?

Lionel Jospin: The answer to this question must not be institutional, but political. If the elimination of the factions is an actuality, it is good. If it is a fiction, it is bad.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Recently, at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, Michel Rocard violently contested the new distribution of influence within the Socialist Party?

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Lionel Jospin: The problem will be brought up and settled in form and in substance within the party. The former "A" faction presented a text on political orientation which I signed with other comrades. We heard from all sides: "We are in agreement! We want to sign!" We made only one condition: to have a majority within the directing bodies of the party (steering committee, executive board, secretary's office). In our discussions, no one, to my knowledge, has contested the fact that in a vote among the militants we would undoubtedly have obtained clearly more than 51 percent of the vote. If this had been contested, it would have sufficed for each faction to agree to "count its own," which I supported. Throughout the party, the leaders discussed and the militants voted on the results of these negotiations. This is the reality. Therefore, no grandiloquent statement!

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Has admission of the former minorities to the Socialist Party's national secretariat been achieved?

Lionel Jospin: For some of them, it has. For others it is completely possible. This will depend on the congress.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Let us go back to the evaluation. Do you feel that the government has completed the nationalizations that were necessary, or that it should go further?

Lionel Jospin: Before going further, it must first succeed with the nationalizations. This success will be achieved if the rate of investment grows, leading to an acceleration of technical progress, to gains in productivity, to the modernization of these companies. This effort should cause a stabilization and even an increase in the number of jobs. It will contribute to our balance of trade through a better response to the requirements of international competition within the framework of financial stability. There is no doubt of success as far as the nationalized companies themselves are concerned. Just look at the results of the existing public enterprises.

The aim of the nationalizations is not to stand in the way of the development of individual initiative and small and medium-size companies, but to support and encourage them. Public management should also enable the growth of democracy in work, and it will be necessary to pay particular attention to organizing worker participation in the management of these companies.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is there a risk that certain deputies will profit from the parliamentary debate to go further?

Lionel Jospin: I don't think so. Since to have completed already the nationalizations which we are completing is a big event. In relation to the economic policy and the ideological taboos which still dominate in the Western world, it is a "split."

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Regarding national solidarity, many were shocked to see the Socialist Party oppose the participation of officials in the effort against unemployment.

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Lionel Jospin: First of all, let us note that under the solution decided upon, the officials are on exactly the same level as the others: if their incomes reach a certain level they will pay the unemployment tax.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: But when, as a tradeoff for their job security, it was a question of having them contribute to the UNEDIC [National Union for Employment in Industry and Commerce], thus aligning them with the other wage earners, the Socialist Party was opposed.

Lionel Jospin: It is true, we must avoid having two workers' classes: one threatened by unemployment, and the other protected. But the Socialist's traditional slogan is "the right to work" and not "work is a privilege." And the tradition that I perceived in the union's action was respect for the advantages acquired. The disadvantaged are progressively being brought to the level of the advantaged and not the reverse. Our goal is to reduce the number of unemployed, not to punish those who are employed. I am adding a political explanation to our position: was it the role of a Socialist government to do what no rightwing government has dared to do in 23 years? Particularly when opposed by a category of French people who, in the large majority, voted for the Left? In politics, I don't recommend masochism.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Are you satisfied with the tax reform?

Lionel Jospin: There has been no tax reform. We have not had the time and therefore we are still depending on an unjust and failing tax system to finance most of the budget. In this situation, the government has been compelled to draw from certain categories which it would have been desirable not to touch again. But all the new fiscal measures are going in the right direction. Is it necessary to mention the tax on wealth, the leveling off of tax relief for dependents, the fight against tax fraud? And then we would have to discuss expenditures. They mean: economic recovery, creation of jobs, research efforts, social justice. There, the Right is silent. In-depth tax reform is urgent in order to finance this policy more equitably. It must be conducted seriously.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Do the President's statements on the East/West balance--or rather imbalance--conform to the basic beliefs of the Socialist Party?

Lionel Jospin: Yes, they are in agreement as long as it is well noted that since the motion by the Metz Congress, the situation has changed: the invasion of Afghanistan, the change in the American administration, the Iranian crisis. It is the facts which have changed, not our principles.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Doesn't this policy often a pacifist sympathy within the Socialist Party?

Lionel Jospin: I will say, as does Francois Mitterrand himself, that within the Socialist Party what interests us is peace and not pacifism in itself. Munich was, it seems, a victory for peace! All Socialists know that the danger exists in the West, with a disorganized rearmament, as well as in the East, with excessive military deployment. In Europe there is an imbalance which favors the Soviets. Balance must be reestablished towards the lower end of the scale, if not it will establish itself at the upper end, which will be dangerous

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for peace. Our policy must be considered in all its aspects. A step such as the French/Mexican declaration on Salvador is a good demonstration that it is not a matter of being Atlantic or anti-Atlantic, but of affirming principles while proposing concrete solutions.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: In taking sides on the political problems of the continent of South America, France is directly opposed to the United States. Can this new attitude go beyond the symbolic level?

Lionel Jospin: The political, historical and cultural links between Europe and Latin America are as obvious and of earlier existence than the economic and strategic links formed between the United States and South America. And over the past 10 years, the Socialist Party has established privileged relations with the democratic movements on this continent which are struggling against dictators. Despite the different levels of development, these countries are very close to us. To accept the reality of dictatorship in their countries is to accustom ourselves to the idea here. If democracy is reborn there, it will be strengthened here. The United States wrongly places Latin America's problems within the East/West context. For us and for the Socialist International, whose leaders are not suspected of pro-Soviet tendencies, it is above all a matter of autonomous economic and social development and of respect for human rights. It is tragic to make a whole part of this continent, so rich in potential, unproductive through violence and terror. Europe must act.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What lesson do you draw from Sadat's assassination?

Lionel Jospin: What struck me at the funeral service was that the Egyptian people had to be held back. This is symbolic: to conduct a foreign policy as original as his, President Sadat would have had to have had a domestic consensus.

For his economic and social policy no doubt would not enable attainment of this goal. What also strikes me is that all the Western countries were represented, but almost no Arab countries. His friends were there, but not his family. The former considered Sadat a man of peace (this is also my opinion) the latter, a traitor. Such a gap is concerning. But how can an area of understanding be reestablished between a part of the Third World and ourselves? If Western rationalism means massive unemployment, shantytowns, malnutrition, flagrant inequalities, and outside interference, it will be rejected. And this has already begun.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

ALLEGED SOCIALIST PLAN TO SPLIT CGIL UNION

Drop in Union Membership

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 9 Oct 81 pp 12-13

[Article by Renzo Rosati: "The Desire Count"]

[Text] The first warning signal arrived, once again, from union membership. A decrease in membership of 20,000 among Piedmont metalworkers and just as many among those in Lombardy. In the entire Lombardy industrial sector, 40,000 members are about to leave the union. From north to south the decline follows the location of the traditional bastions: 30 percent of Puglia laborers will not renew their membership and, in Bari alone, 5,700 out of 10,000 will quit.

At the end of November, when CGIL [Italian Confederation of Labor], CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] will take stock, one will find out, perhaps, that in spite of substantial gains among retirees, 1981 has been even worse than 1980 which already was a bad year (the CGIL alone lost 93,000 members among active workers, partially made up by retirees).

However, on a general overview of union strength never as full of uncertainties as at the present time, the decrease in membership is not the leading problem worrying national and local officials; who, nevertheless, do not underestimate its effects, including material ones: Angelo Airoidi, FIOM [Federation of Metallurgy Industry Workers] secretary from Lombardy, explains: "Our revenue will be 2 billion lire less. As far as the general picture is concerned, this is like saying that, all of a sudden, Genoa FIOM would be closing down." "What is happening," points out Agostino Marianetti, CGIL's number two man, "is not that the union is being rejected, but that it is being increasingly criticized." Ottaviano Del Turco, FLM [Federation of Metalworkers] secretary, remarks: "Lay-offs, unemployment, wild economic crisis are the causes for the reduction in union membership. If we want to regain credibility, in addition to membership we must look elsewhere, forgetting about the figures."

Look in what direction? Rank and file and top management agree in indicating member representation as the key question. The factory council mechanism, through which representation is exercised, seems, in fact, to be jammed. And, according to some, to have gone wild.

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The UIL, as it has been happening increasingly more frequently, has ignited the powder. Massimo Mazzantini, Milan's UIL secretary, in a document on the relations between the factory and terrorism at Alfa Romeo, sternly accused the councils for failing to represent the members, for failing to monitor their mood, for failing to observe the biennial expiration of the renewal of the mandates, and for failing to exercise any control over the rank and file and on themselves. "A state of affairs," concluded Mazzantini, "that not only places the representation in a crisis, but that opens new space to terrorists."

Immediate and violent was the rebuttal of the CGIL and CISL. "Does the UIL, perhaps, wish to go back to the method of long lists, of internal committees like those of the 1950's?" asks Antonio Pizzinato, CGIL secretary for Lombardy. "Factory councils are the labor union's backbone for unity," remarks Sandro Antoniazzi, Milan's CISL secretary, "let's take any necessary initiative for strengthening our relation with the rank and file, but let's be careful in avoiding the councils' debacle."

The matter also involves southern industries. On Wednesday, 23 September, the general assembly of factory councils convened at Brindisi's petrochemical plant to deal with the renewal of mandates: 105 out of 150 delegates deserted the meeting. Three days earlier, at Taranto's ITALSIDER, a 2-hour strike called by FIOM failed, not only because the rank and file boycotted it, but a large number of union delegates as well. Giovanni Cazzato, Taranto's CGIL secretary, admits that: "We have a very serious representation crisis. We have a 70-percent rate of unionization, but at this point it is a theoretical figure, in view of the fact that only 20-30 percent of the workers participate in meetings and strikes."

The contrasting reactions among the three confederations and the various categories toward the proposals on economic policies introduced by Giovanni Spadolini's government, must be added to the decline in membership, to the matter of factory councils and to the representation crisis. And, probably, many aspects of the same problem are involved: the union model, born out of the 1968 and 1969 struggles, finalized by unifying mechanisms, solid and cohesive in the last decade, is probably undergoing a crisis.

It is too soon to say that the union's unity is in crisis: certainly, the union's dream of the 1970's is in crisis. The leadership and the rank and file, all realize the immediate danger of this situation: that the spirit of confederation, the return to parallelism toward the parties intended as home base, in other words, the desire to count may prevail.

There are those who believe that the only remedy to this danger, which would truly cause the end of the union's unity, would be to listen directly to the voice of the workers. It is an old idea of Giorgio Benvenuto, which the UIL's leader is now reintroducing with vigor; Benvenuto told IL MONDO: "To exorcize the fear of counting, there is only one method; make the workers count. Ask, therefore, their opinion on the whole range of problems to be discussed: whether to act on the automatic wage indexation or directly on salaries; whether to favor contract renewals or to accept a partial pause in exchange

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for guarantees on severance pay and mobility. But it is urgent that voting be reintroduced in the factories and on concrete proposals. Because of this point we don't know anymore what is the rank and file and who are the peripheral members."

Starting from these considerations, Benvenuto is about to launch an offensive against the present factory council mechanism, "which now," he states, "is just a caricature of what it should be." In support of the initiative, the UIL cites the results of a survey conducted in 525 factories in the industrial triangle and in Veneto. The resulting picture is alarming: each factory has its own rules for the election of union delegates, the 2-year expiration term for the renewal is seldom enforced, there is no record, either territorial or national, of factory councils. The same clause on union protection, prescribed by the workers; bylaws, is applied at FIAT and Alfa Romeo under different terms. Furthermore, the present composition of the councils no longer reflects the structure of the labor force; according to the UIL's survey, 90 percent of union delegates are laborers and, of these, only 70 percent are of the third level (assembly line for metalworkers): "It is obvious," Benvenuto remarks, "that there is a leveling at the lowest ranks, that, practically, workers have no representation and that all this hinders any discussion on professionalism."

What Benvenuto wants to accomplish on a large scale, someone has already accomplished here and there. For example, a survey by the Pietro Seveso foundation on FILM's [presumably FIOM] and CISL's metalworkers shows that 50.6 percent of the members seek better pay and recognition of professionalism, that 68.8 percent would accept mobility, even if negotiated, that only 15.3 percent believe that the union should not get involved with productivity. In appearance, almost the opposite of CISL's traditional line. Also party affiliations have been changing: in 10 years, the DC decreased from 80 to 47 percent, the PSI rose to 22.5 percent from 11 percent, the PCI to 18.5 percent from 5 percent.

It is in this multicolored picture that the desire to count and Benvenuto's attempts of having the workers count are being injected. Until now, this last proposal has been received by the other confederations with some diffidence: Benvenuto is being accused of open gambling, namely without taking into account the UIL's real dimension, of waving the referendum like a slogan without the support of concrete contents and adequate structures for its realization. However, greater consensus is becoming apparent, especially as far as the CGIL is concerned. "Without doubt," Marianetti admits, "we are at fault in our relations with the rank and file. In general, union culture is at a standstill, we have to start it in motion."

Anti-Inflationary Pact

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 9 Oct 81 pp 13-15

[Article by Lorenzo Scheggi: "Anti-Inflationary Pact--Who Will Be the First To Break It"]

[Text] "If it is broken because of the government which breaks down, the union does not break down, otherwise it breaks down." The interpretation of this

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politically union-oriented riddle, authored by Ottaviano Del Turco, FIOM-CGIL adjunct secretary general, is not difficult. In a few words, it means that what is still left of the union's unity is in the hands of Beniamino Andreatta, treasury minister, and in those of Giovanni Marcora, his industry colleague. It means, even more clearly, that at this point the union, after months and months of polemics on the anti-inflationary pact, automatic wage indexation, the dynamic of salaries, can manage to stay united only as far as rejection of the government's measures is concerned. "But if instead of saying no, we should say yes," many of the leading confederation officers told IL MONDO, "we would arrive at ruptures that this time could be truly irreparable."

The truth is, in fact, that among the many issues at stake in this maxinegotiation among government, unions and business, there is also the future of the relations among the CGIL, CISL and UIL, which seems now destined to follow predetermined tracks on the basis of what the developments of the anti-inflationary pact will be. The viable solutions are, substantially, two. Both, however, are subordinated to a premise: the anti-inflationary pact, conceived originally as a social pact, is by now mere fantasy. The communists, afraid of signing a blank debit note on behalf of a government and a majority to which they do not belong, do not want it. Nor do many Christian democrats, for fear that layman Giovanni Spadolini may make it where all their colleagues who succeeded one another at Palazzo Chigi failed. But what are these two scenarios? How will the unions react in one case or the other?

There Is Neither a Pact Nor Traumatic Breaks

Giorgio Benvenuto, for example, sustains that "partial agreements may be reached," as an alternative. Several small agreements, Del Turco sustains, "so that nobody can claim complete success or complete failure." CGIL socialists sustain that "on the basis of several partial agreements it may be possible to obtain at least some results which are not completely negative so that the union may consequently honor the commitment of handling the dynamic of salaries, maintaining them within the agreed ceiling of inflation, for the forthcoming renewal of contracts." Anyhow, one thing is certain: in this scenario we don't talk about automatic wage indexation. Not only will there not be any agreement for its substantial modification (a possibility that, on the other hand, has not been suggested yet by any union), but not even the proposal of economist, Ezio Tarantelli, supported by the CISL, will get through.

In this event, namely of partial agreements, the union front will see the CGIL and UIL on one side and the CISL on the other. The first two, united in particular by the preoccupation of not creating too many problems for Spadolini, is a common goal of all the political forces present in the two confederations, including the communists in their own way.

This solution is not acceptable to Pierre Carniti's CISL on the eve of a congress where instead there will be strongly reintroduced the necessity for an anti-inflationary pact rigorously limiting investments, prices and tariffs and which the union may be inclined to approve, agreeing to limit wage indexation increases for a while. It is, therefore, against partial solutions, against the

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alternative of many limited agreements that Carniti spoke up during all the trade congresses he attended this last week. "We will not sign phony pacts," he said in Termoli, at the home builders congress. "The truth is," one hears from the other two confederations, "that Carniti is ill-disposed because Spadolini did not include Tarantelli's formula in the economic program, with the result that he now finds himself isolated, since he lacks the political support which would have pushed forward a proposal that now, instead, is dead."

One thing is certain: Carniti will not give up. Because he must show his organization that he is not the secretary general of defeats (the reduction in the work schedule has not been approved for the time being, nor the 0.50 percent fund). And, in particular, because he must show CISL's pro-Christian democrats, and there are many, that he has no intention of giving Spadolini what he did not give Forlani or Cossiga. Therefore, if the anti-inflationary pact does not go through, Tarantelli's formula included, it is almost certain that during the next few months we will see a CISL hypercritical of any government measure, ready to fight the CGIL and UIL.

Breakdown Among Government, Unions and Business

This second scenario has two variables, depending on who causes the breakdown.

--The first: The breakdown occurs because the government, divided in its own front, does not give in at all to union requests on prices, tariffs, taxes and investments. It is the hypothesis already taken under consideration by Del Turco: "If it is broken because of the government which breaks down, the union does not break down." In this case there will not be any particular consequences. "However," they say at CISL in particular, "we will have lost a great opportunity and we will find ourselves facing again the same old problems with the added drawback of hurling at each other accusations for the responsibility of this failure."

--But there is also a second hypothesis: That the breakdown occurs because of the union. What would happen in this case? According to IL MONDO, this was explicitly discussed in mid-September by Agostino Marianetti and Giorgio Benvenuto, during a meeting with Bettino Craxi, PSI secretary, at the Socialist Party headquarters. In the end, this was the decision taken: The socialists do not want a crisis of the Spadolini government. Therefore, the socialist ministers as well as the socialist union representatives, each at their own end, must work so that breakdowns do not occur. They must continuously submit mediation proposals, seek alternative solutions which would not entirely jeopardize the negotiations. However, the breakdown could occur just the same, in which case if the major reservations originate from the CISL, CGIL socialists will continue supporting Luciano Lama and the UIL will move the axis of its alliances from the CISL toward the CGIL.

Instead, if the CGIL communists cause the breakdown with the government, Agostino Marianetti's socialists will not hesitate to declare war, perhaps calling a CGIL congress on opposite theses. In this case, then, the alignment would see CGIL socialists united, plus the entire UIL and CISL. And this would mean, in effect, also the end of the remaining union unity. And the unified federation itself would be probably swept away. The communists, however, decided against causing the breakdown, at least for the time being.

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Well, what is going to be the winning scenario? It is too soon to say. It is certain, however, that if the hypothesis, even the least tramatic for the union, should occur, the fragments of union unity will be even further destroyed. And then? Giorgio Benvenuto tells it straight to UIL national officers: "The CGIL, CISL and UIL must establish a new unity pact: if we do not succeed, the union runs the risk of being literally crushed."

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GENERAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

ARIANE LAUNCH DELAY--A 10-day strike that has slowed down work at the Toulouse Space Center where the European Marecs A satellite is being readied has resulted in a 4-day postponement of the launching of the Ariane LO4 on which the Marecs A is to be the principal payload. Originally planned for 14 December, the launching is now to take place on the 18th. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 23 Nov 81 p 19] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]

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