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23 December 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 66/81)

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POLITICAL

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BRIEFS

MORE ACCURATE MISSILE--The new M4 multiple-head missiles that are to equip France's strategic submarines after July 1985 will be of remarkable accuracy; they will have a CEP of 200 meters after traveling 4,000 kilometers. Of 5 test firings carried out at the prototype missile test center at Landes, 4 were complete successes. The [President's office at the] Elysee expressed its satisfaction with these results. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 Dec 81 p 18] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]

CSO: 3100/168

FORMER DEFENSE CHIEF CARVER ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

PM141329 London THE GUARDIAN in English 14 Dec 81 p 7

[Article by Field Marshal Lord Carver, former UK chief of defense staff: "In a Conventional War, Nuclear Weapons Must Never Be Used To Stave Off Defeat in Europe"]

[Text] After the recent antinuclear demonstrations, there can be little doubt in anyone's mind that the public attitude to defence in this country, and in European NATO nations--most significantly in Germany--is overshadowed by the nuclear issue. Some might say distorted, but, if we rely on the fear of nuclear war to deter war--as we have done for a long time--we must be prepared to admit it, and must take into account the effect of that fear on our own people.

It is remarkable that, for about 20 years at least, NATO governments have got away with hiding the issue under the carpet of an almost incomprehensible and certainly illogical concept, called flexible response. The illogicality of that concept has recently been starkly revealed by President Reagan, who clearly also found it hard to understand. If, instead of implying that the use of tactical or theatre nuclear weapons would not automatically and inevitably escalate to a strategic intercontinental exchange--which is the essence of the flexible response concept--he had said that it would, he would have been in equal, if not greater trouble, certainly with the American public. Not long after that Casper Weinberger, in his long interview with Michael Charlton on BBC Radio 4, stated categorically that the USA would never engage in a first strike, a blow to NATO's nuclear strategy, which depends on the threat of a first strike to deter conventional aggression.

When President Kennedy made the same statement in the early stages of his administration, the cries of outrage from his NATO allies forced him to modify it by stating that, although the USA would never execute a first strike on the territory of the Soviet Union, it might do so against its forces involved in aggression outside it. Kissinger's remarks in Brussels a few years ago caused similar excitement, and President Reagan's second statement could be interpreted as following in Kennedy's second footstep.

At the heart of the problem is the dilemma that, if you wish to deter war by the fear that nuclear weapons will be used, you have to appear to be prepared to use them in certain circumstances. But if you do so, and the enemy answer

back--as he has the capability to do and has clearly said he would--you are very much worse off than if you had not done so, if indeed you can be said to be there at all. To pose an unacceptable risk to the enemy automatically poses the same risk, or perhaps an even greater one, to yourself; but to attempt to reduce the risk, in order to make the threat of use more credible, by some form of limiting nuclear war--territorially or by types of targets or means of delivery--begins to make the risk more acceptable and therefore less of a deterrent. The more acceptable nuclear war may appear to be to the governments and military men of the nuclear powers, the more likely it is that it will actually come about, and, even if it is limited in some way, the effects on those who live in the countries in or over which the nuclear weapons of both sides are exploded will be catastrophic. To call the results defence or security makes a mockery of the terms.

What is happening in the public attitude to this issue is that a number of very intelligent people, principally university professors, but supported by many others, notably in the teaching profession, have detected the weaknesses in deterrent philosophy and have followed the line of argument I have just described. They tend to differ about what should be done about it and almost all tend to exaggerate the danger of mutual deterrence failing to prevent war between the USA and the USSR, as Mountbatten did in his much quoted speech in Strasbourg in May 1979, when he described us as being on the brink of the final abyss. These professors, many of whom have become much more expert in the subject than most sailors, soldiers or airmen, have exploited the emotion that can easily be aroused in their students, in the young generally, among the old and in the churches.

Their opportunity was created by a concentration of circumstances. Events in Iran and Afghanistan made it look as if an armed clash between the USA and the Soviet Union was a real possibility. The Republican administration, headed by Reagan (who had made extremely hawkish statements in the presidential campaign), came to power with a clear intention of acting tough with the Russians, promoting a rearmament programme, in the nuclear as well as the conventional field, and no apparent interest in reviving SALT talks or in arms control generally; the American demand to station cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe as a response to the Russian SS-20s; the neutron bomb; and the British decision to welcome cruise missiles and to replace Polaris with Trident, with apparently no deep consideration of the pros and cons of either. Finally the puritannical, radical, middle-class urge to have some cause to protest about was rather short of themes. Only South Africa and some remote and unpopular issues in Central and South America were available, once the Rhodesian settlement had been achieved.

The anxieties, which this combination of reason and emotion have raised, have spread beyond the circles of the type of people who participated in the recent marches and wear lapel buttons supporting CND, END or other anti-war groups. Many parents, grandparents and children, even some service officers, express their concern. They are genuinely worried and perplexed; and it is not surprising that they are, when they hear the statements made by some members of the government on the issue. Whether they have been defending the Trident decision, the cruise missile, the neutron bomb or their rival defence policy, they have often given the impression that we have to be prepared to accept nuclear attack on this country, as if it were something not all that different in scale from the blitz of the second world war.

That is the view of one extreme. They paint a picture of Russia as bent on world conquest, constantly piling up arms, nuclear and conventional, on land, at sea and in the air, so that she can either overwhelm the quest by military action or by nuclear blackmail. The latter is based on a superiority in nuclear weapons, either within Europe, or strategically by the ability so to cripple America's strategic nuclear capability by a first strike that the latter's only retaliatory threat would be to Russia's cities, which would provoke a Russian second strike against American cities. Rather than make that threat, the Americans would have to give way to Russia's demands, whatever they were. Not only must the USA prevent this situation arising, by having a force which is invulnerable to a Russian first strike and which threatens Russian strike forces as well as her cities, but there must be a balance of nuclear forces within Europe at every level. The critics of that attitude see it, with some justification as they look at what has happened since 1945, as leading to a never-ending nuclear arms race, in which the numbers of warheads on both sides will escalate to even more grotesque figures than the 50,000 or so which exist today, as well as to proliferation among other countries.

The other extreme maintain that it is the nuclear arms race itself which is the principal potential cause of war. If it were eliminated, and the USA and the USSR separated from direct contact, especially in Europe, there would be no casus belli. We would all live together in amity, solving our differences by negotiations.

Nuclear weapons should be abolished altogether; but, as a first step, they should be removed from Europe, as should all the forces of both the USA and the USSR--Europe for the latter being deemed to start at its western frontiers. Those who are not pacifists or total disarmers go on to propose that the armed forces of the countries of Europe should consist of partisan or homeguard forces, which, they assume, would have no offensive capability, not therefore provoking their neighbours, but which they happily suppose will have considerable defensive and deterrent capability--a view of very doubtful validity. They contend that Europe would be more secure at less expense, both in terms of money and of the need to have standing forces (based either on conscript or voluntary services) than it is at present with forces and equipment that place a heavy burden on countries' economies, forcing NATO nations, because they are not prepared to carry the burden that balancing Russian conventional forces would involve, to fall back on a nuclear deterrent strategy, with all the consequences they believe it to involve. They have no faith in progress being achieved by negotiations between the two power blocs, and insist that the only way to get results is for the peoples of Europe to insist that nuclear weapons are removed from their countries, and their defence burdens reduced. This may or may not force the Russians and Americans to reduce and eventually abolish their respective nuclear arsenals, but at least it will ensure that they do not use Europe as the battlefield on which to fight out their differences.

The dialogue between those two extreme views is a dialogue of the deaf. Fortunately there is a wide spectrum of intermediate opinion, held by many sensible people; but they have difficulty in making their voice heard, and, when they do, getting their position understood. Moving across the spectrum from left to right, one finds those who would like to abolish nuclear weapons

altogether--and believe that a unilateral renunciation by this country would help to get the process going--through those who believe in multilateral negotiations to achieve the same aim, to those who do not wish to see them abolished altogether, believing that they do deter the great powers from fighting each other, but wish to see the numbers greatly reduced and the nuclear threshold raised.

Some of those who hold these views accept the logic that it sould mean that NATO should put a greater effort into conventional forces, although many of them hope that this can be done without increasing the real burden of finance and manpower--alternative strategies is the in-word for this. Further to the right are those who see no need for any fundamental change in NATO's strategy, apart from the recognition that one cannot actually fight a nuclear war; and there are those who believe wholly in NATO's current concepts, but think that there is no need for us to have an independent strategic nuclear force; and further to the right again those who think we should, but believe we could do it in a cheaper way than with Trident.

None of these attitudes between the extremes of the spectrum can escape the fundamental dilemma to which I drew attention at the start. They are vulnerable to the criticism that, if you wish your nuclear weapons to deter wars, you have to appear to be prepared to use them. Once you try to define the circumstances under which you would do so, you get into the tangle which President Reagan and his defence secretary have found themselves. But to fall back on the argument of uncertainty lands you in equal trouble. It is little wonder that the public find it difficult to make up their minds on the issue, and find it easier to drift to one extreme or the other. In spire of recent developments, my guess would be that the majority of the electorate is probably in favour of NATO continuing to rely on nuclear deterrance to war, some of it based on the simple view that, if any potential enemies have them, so should we.

But we should not be complacent about that. The dangers seem to me to be that, first: if there were a serious rise in tension, which made war in Europe look a possibility, NATO itself, and its constituent members, would be torn apart by having to face up to the possibility of nuclear weapons actually being used; second, that dislike of reliance on nuclear weapons affects defence generally, and antinuclear feelings can and do become anti-defence and anti-military feelings; leading to the third: that popular support for NATO's defence and its members' defence policies will be eroded; and, fourth, that this could undermine America's willingness to continue its support of European defence. If that were to be seriously called into question, and indicators of their intention to withdraw appeared, no amount of nuclear weapons, independent or not, would, in my opinion, prevent a general slide of western European nations into NATO an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

So what should we do? I have no doubt that the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the USSR deters them both from going to war with each other, and that it is the commitment of both to the security of Europe, one to the West, the other to the East, that has kept and continues to keep the peace in Europe: that stops the kaleidoscope from being re-shaken.

But if that deterrence were to fail, and then failed in its secondary purpose--to stop both sides from using nuclear weapons against each other--the nuclear war that followed, even if only a tiny fraction of the weapons available to both sides were actually used, would destroy European civilisation. It is only keeping the risks of war high that dissuades nations from embarking upon it; but there are far too many nuclear weapons and delivery systems than are needed to achieve the aim of deterring war in the first place and then deterring the use of nuclear weapons if that fails. We must find some way of reducing them, and of ensuring that, if deterrence were, tragically, to fail, we do not inevitably slide into a nuclear war, perhaps following the mistaken idea that the use of nuclear weapons can stave off a conventional defeat and result in something better than that would involve.

It is of great importance that we should propose practical measures to bring this about, and practical measures to improve our conventional defences so that NATO can confidently and [word indistinct] rid itself of the delusion form which it has suffered for over 20 years, that the possession of nuclear weapons at every level compensates for an inadequate conventional defence. Only when we can do that, shall we be able to defeat the threat from the extreme left and right, which are in danger of undermining Europe's security.

CSO: 3120/27

DELAYS IN COMPLETION OF HYDROELECTRIC PLANT AT PORTO TOLLE

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 20 Nov 81 p 7

[Article by Marco Moussanet: "There Is a Power Plant at Porto Tolle"]

[Text] Bureaucratic and political problems are preventing the ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] from activating two groups of 660 Mw on which the necessary tests have been run while estimates on interruptions in electric energy supply are getting worse.

Porto Tolle. Winter is drawing near and all Italy is wondering: Will there be any interruptions in our electric energy supply? And, if yes, will they be greater or lesser than estimated? Conferences, gatherings, meetings of experts, civil servants, and politicians have followed each other in rapid sequence, drawing a picture which leaves little room for hope and none for reliability and certainty. In the meantime, in the middle of the Po Delta at Polesine Camerini, 800 inhabitants, a small portion of Porto Tolle, 10 km from the county seat, a thermoelectric power plant, brand-new, capable of putting out trillions, is waiting to go into operation.

With its four sections of 660 Mw, each, it could, at full speed, turn out 15 billion kw per year, 8 percent of the country's total energy needs. It is not easy to explain its forced inactivity. It all began in 1971, when preliminary work was started for the construction of the power plant as such, with the necessary research, surveys, land surveying, and geological prospecting.

Those were the years when people began to talk widely about energy problems and when the ENEL started looking for sites for coal-powered, nuclear, and thermoelectric power plants, looking into the regions, provinces, and communities, a search which was later on stepped up considerably. In the Lower Polesine section, 20 years after the flood and with all of the problems which that tragic event brought and which are as yet unresolved, the first approvals were obtained. And Polesine Camerini was picked; the real construction work began in 1973.

Now people are thinking of how to supply fuel oil to the plants: With a pipeline starting from Ravenna, going through the Comacchio valleys, going all the way to Porto Tolle. The first blueprints were drawn up, prepared by SONE, the Northeast Oil Pipeline Company, charged by ENEL with building and managing the entire plant, said undertakings to be studied by the local governments so as to introduce any possible modifications.

Amid red tape and policy delays, the years passed while the power plant grew. That brings us down to our time: The tests have already been completed at Porto Tolle with gas-oil (which is more expensive and less efficient than fuel oil); these tests were made on two sections and test runs for the third section are being completed; the estimates tell us that the fourth group should also be ready to function in June 1982. All of this was done under the supervision of the plant manager, a man by the name of Fasolo, who was appointed by ENEL some time ago.

But Porto Tolle will not be started up that year either. The work on the oil pipeline has not yet been started and the supply of the power plant with the help of lighters is not yet possible because the responsible community government has not yet given its go-ahead for the boats to tie up and for the operation of the line from the government electric power facility on.

"To release the necessary authorizations," said communist mayor of Porto Tolle, Danilo Stoppa, "we are waiting for the ENEL and the Ministry of Industry to follow through on their commitments: Unemployment fund for the 1,000 workers who are facing the risk of losing their jobs after work on the power plant has been completed; reimbursement of damages caused to fishermen during the construction of the plant; and start of work on the construction of the oil pipeline."

Out of the 2,000 workers employed on the construction of the power plant, about 1,000 are employed by the contractor company and are not facing any risks. The others, hired specifically for this type of work, could be laid off. The documents requesting the special unemployment fund, submitted by the labor union federation of the province of Rovigo, is currently at the regional labor office in Venice, awaiting the report from the provincial inspector. It will then be forwarded to the Labor Ministry which in turn will submit it to the CIPI [Interministerial Committee for Industrial Policy Coordination].

The problem thus looks as if it could be solved easily. "Last 8 July," says Giorgio Nonnato, president of the province of Rivogo, "we signed an agreement in Rome in which the minister of industry pledges to speed up the processing of the unemployment fund. We believe that, once the bureaucratic problems have been solved, everything else will have been resolved."

But the mayor of Porto Tolle is not of the same opinion: "If we once again were to be faced with 1,000 unemployed: continued Danilo Stoppa, "we would be facing the unexpected deterioration of a job crisis which for quite some time has been leading to the forced emigration of people from Polesine and which registers a figure of 10,000 without work out of a district population of 250,000 inhabitants. And then there are the commitments which were made at the time for the development and upgrading of the area's characteristic activities, such as fishing, tourism, and agriculture, which could absorb 500 or 600 workers."

Another unresolved problem is the problem of compensation. According to the agreement signed by ENEL and the Province of Rovigo, which is authorized to handle the issue as the holder of the fishing rights, the electric power outfit should turn over to the provincial funds 3 billions, 2 of which are already due. This is a figure which the ENEL obviously is not prepared to turn over until it gets all of the licenses and authorizations it needs to start the power plant.

Once again we get back to Porto Tolle where the lighters should be tieing up with 1,350 t. of fuel oil, coming from Venice. Although it has discharged all of its commitments and although it is now facing a situation which it cannot change, the ENEL has already made provision for restoring the major roads in Lower Polesine to build a bridge, to construct basins, moorings, and everything else it was able to do in this regard.

"After all that," says Giancarlo Lizzeri, the agency's administrator adviser, "the community could not possibly prevent the supply of the power plant with fuel oil. This situation is no longer tolerable."

But everything is closed down and Porte Tolle is loudly asking for the start of work on the oil pipeline which has been suspended because of conflicts over the actual line layout which arose between SONE and the community of Comacchio.

"The initial line layout submitted to us by SONE," said Cesare Luciani, Comacchio deputy mayor, "called for running the eel ponds under the eel fishing installations. Apart from the hydrogeological disturbance which would have derived from the construction of the plant, we were thinking of what might happen in case of a leak. That would have been the end of Valli di Comacchio. We therefore initially asked for shifting the trace to the west of the fishing installations and, after receiving a negative reply from the company charged with the construction work, we confined ourselves to asking for shift of the line by 1 km to the east of the Romea federal highway toward the sea. On that point we got approval from the SONE engineers and we are now waiting to see the final blueprints before releasing the authorizations. In the meantime, SONE could start work."

But the contractor company working with the ENEL will certainly not give the go-ahead for construction work until it is certain that it has the necessary approval for the project (and that requires a new ministerial decree to cancel the one issued earlier). The people at the ENEL recall that the initial line layout was accepted at the time by the communities involved and by the Region of Emilia-Romagna and that only thereafter first Ravenna and then Comacchio asked for modifications in the line layout.

This is the story of Porto Tolle, full of questions, misunderstandings, and indecision. A power plant with 2,600 Mw is idle.

5058
CSO: 3104/46

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

FOOD EXPORTS TO USSR--West Germany will export DM 1BN (233M pounds) worth of agricultural products this year to the Soviet Union, a 50 percent increase over 1980. The West German Agricultural Marketing Board said the record sales resulted from greatly increased purchases by the Soviet Union of beef, sugar, flour and groats (crushed grain). According to Herr Claus Boecking, head of the board's foreign department, the Soviet Union is now "buying food on the basis of political decisions wherever they can get it." West German butter exports to Moscow had collapsed this year, he said, and were replaced by sales from other European countries. [Excerpts] [London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 24 Nov 81 p 6 PM--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CSO: 3120/23

ECONOMIC FRANCE

BRIEFS

CHANGES CONCERNING NATIONALIZATIONS--The government is admitting that it will have to amend the law on nationalizations at the request of the Constitutional Council. There is a readiness to make some concessions on the dividend payment in 1981 and in the manner in which indemnification is handled. In business circles there is hope of going still farther--without going too far, for a brutal political conflict is to be avoided. Thus, the Constitutional Council could consider the Delors plan calling for establishing the bank nationalization floor at 3.5 billion [francs] in deposits (rather than at 1 billion) so that foreign banks would automatically be unaffected by the law and not make the French banks feel discriminated against. This would keep a certain number of French banks within the private sector (such as the Banque Hervet, the BIMP and the Monod-Francaise de Banque). On this latter point, the government is quite reluctant to go along but the Constitutional Council doubts that Mitterrand will unleash a big political offensive (by resorting to a referendum) for so little. The necessity for it would not be understood by the public, it is believed. [A comment included with this article asserted:] Decreasing the number of banks to be nationalized may constitute, in the eyes of some of the more moderate elements of the ruling majority, the "signal" that would bring about a detente with the business community. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 23 Nov 81 p 2]

CSO: 3100/153

POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ALLENSBACH POLLS SHOW POPULARITY OF PARTIES, POLITICIANS

SPD Popularity Declines

Allensbach ALLENSBACHER BERICHTE in German No 22, 1981 pp 1-2

[Institute Report: "Movement in the Party Scene--CDU/CSU Above 50 Percent--SPD Reaches New Low--"Greens' at 5.8 Percent]

[Text] Allensbach/Lake Constance, Middle of October 1981--On its downhill slide since the last Bundestag election the SPD has reached a new low: with a share of the votes of 33 percent it now ranks about 10 percent below its showing of 5 October 1980. In other words: within the period of one year about 25 percent of SPD voters have abandoned the party. The Social Democrats have not done this badly even during the final phase of the Brandt regime. At that time, Allensbach found the low point of the SPD at 34 percent (March/April 1974). Two parties have profited from the vote upheaval during the last few months. The CDU/CSU showed an improvement of just about 6 percent during that period. At 50.3 percent it now commands an absolute majority of the voters. The "Greens" have climbed from 1.5 percent in the Bundestag election to 5.8 percent, their best showing to date. The Free Democrats were unable to profit from the SPD's decline. A 9.7 percent share of the votes equals less than the 10.6 percent they received in the Bundestag election and corresponds with the average for the last few months.

Number of people interviewed: about 2,000
Polling period: 19 September - 2 October 1981.

Genscher Most Popular Leader

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Nov 81 p 1

[Article: "Genscher Is Considered The Most Popular Politician"]

[Text] Bonn--FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) is considered to be the most popular politician; 65 percent of the population over 16 years of age have "the highest opinion" of him. Second to him in popularity is FRG Chancellor Schmidt (62 percent), followed by CDU Chairman Kohl and Berlin's Governing Mayor von Weizsaecker (48 percent each). Those are the results of a poll conducted

by the Allensbacher Institut fuer Demoskopie. High esteem is further enjoyed by Hans-Jochen Vogel (46 percent) and by Lower Saxony Minister President Albrecht (44 percent). The are followed by Schleswig-Holstein's Minister President Stoltenberg and by Deputy CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group Chairman Leisler Kiep, with 43 percent each. Willy Brandt, who led the popularity scale in 1972 with 66 percent, has dropped to 40 percent Strauss and Bahr have for many years brought up the rear.

9273
CSO: 3103/130

POLITICAL FRANCE

ROCARD REVIEWS PLANS FOR NATIONALIZED, PRIVATE SECTORS

PM041523 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 4 Dec 81 p 2

[Interview with Michel Rocard, minister of planning, by David Housego and Terry Dodsworth: "Rocard Quietly Rebuilds Influence"]

[Excerpts] Paris--"I don't know if it will be possible," says Michel Rocard, France's minister of planning, "but I would be prepared to write into the five year plan (1983-88) an economic growth target for France twice that of West Germany's."

He reacts strongly against public statements by his ministerial colleagues implying that the Planning Ministry--M Rocard was put there partly to keep him out of the front line of executive authority--will have a subordinate role in deciding and implementing the policies of the much enlarged nationalised sector.

"In the spring," he says, "a bill will be put to the national assembly setting out the procedures for drawing up the plan. At that moment we could have some difficult decisions on allocating responsibilities. Until those have been taken there is uncertainty. But I shall see there is no uncertainty after that. I may win or lose but I won't let the uncertainty continue."

M Rocard believes that the Ministry of Planning will have a substantial role to play. His idea is that the nationalised sector should be divided into two--public services, such as railways and utilities, on the one hand, and companies exposed to international competition on the other.

An inter-ministerial committee would translate the government's priorities in the plan into contracts applicable to different state enterprises. The task of actually negotiating the contracts and seeing that they are carried out would lie with the ministers concerned. For example, the transport minister would deal with railways and the minister of industry would handle the manufacturing sector.

"But there will also be a record of these negotiations and a staff to prepare it. That will be the job of my ministry," M Rocard pointedly adds.

The Planning Ministry would also ensure that state enterprises followed common methods. Thus, the Planning Ministry would be concerned with the external

balance of payments of each group; its exports and overseas requirements for patents and research licences; with the "social" policies it pursued; with its research policy; and with the decentralisation of investment. M Rocard adds that he has a front-line function in the latter area because of his shared responsibilities for decentralisation.

M Rocard stresses that state enterprises must be run on a competitive basis. If the state asks them to perform public services, like running uneconomic branch lines for the railways, then it must compensate them.

"I gave a long standing friendly respect for Tony Benn," he says. "But I don't share his economic philosophy. Our philosophy is strongly competitive.... Each time the state asks a company to do more than sound competition would require of it, then the state must compensate it.... A company that is run at a permanent loss adopts a mentality of security that is no longer productive."

In spite of his tongue in cheek ambition that the French economy should run at twice the pace of West Germany, M Rocard has not much faith in planning bases on macro-economic forecasts. M Rocard's two-year intermediary plan (1982-83) has been criticised by employers' organisations and trade unions for its lack of an economic framework to help companies make decisions. More cynically, they believe it reflects some of M Rocard's possible doubts about the two years ahead.

M Rocard says that his decision to omit a macro-economic framework was deliberate and carefully weighed. He believes that macro-economic forecasts amid the present uncertainties of the world economy do not have much value and that, inevitably, the change of government in France has added an uncertainty of its own.

Rather than face the risk that such forecasts become untenable, he prefers to try to accustom French public opinion to the broad goals of 3 per cent growth a year over the next two years, a hoped for reduction in the rate of inflation and stabilising unemployment next year before bringing it down in 1983.

For M Rocard, the "great gamble" of the immediate future is whether private manufacturing investment will recover. "The strategy of the two-year plan," he said, "is based on private investment taking off. So is the government's 1982 budget. One of the areas in which planned expenditure is to rise fastest is in the value of aid to industry."

M Rocard believes that the private sector's reluctance to invest is a "temporary psychological problem," reflecting employers' distrust of a socialist government.

M Rocard is concerned that the higher growth will worsen France's import bill and hence its balance of payments.

He points out that France imports 24 per cent of what it consumes. In the long run the only answers, as he sees it, to this structural weakness are to make

savings in the nation's energy bill and to develop French industry where imports are abnormally high--he mentions wood, leather and machine tools.

He believes the government should take a strongly interventionist line over machine tools, slimming the industry to companies which can compete abroad or hold their own in the domestic market and abandon the rest.

CSO: 3120/25

LABOR UNION BUREAUCRACY ANALYZED

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 13 Nov 81 pp 28-33

[Article by Lorenzo Scheggi]

[Text] The union agent's trade: strike manager. With his battered lunchpail gathering dust, today's union official has become a technocrat. But he's frustrated, fair game for countless critics, and ill-paid to boot. Has he picked a career with a future? If so, what kind of future awaits him?

On the rim of a pond, a frog is getting nowhere in his wooing of a lady frog. "Why won't you have me?" he asks in desperation, when he sees the futility of his endeavors. "Because," replies the lady frog, haughtily, "actually, I'm a princess. A wicked witch cast a spell on me, and turned me into what you see. "Well," replies the frog, glimpsing a ray of hope, "if that's all that's bothering you, I am really a metalworker." "Honestly?" inquires the lady frog, with avid curiosity. "How did it happen?" "Well," replies the frog, "that I really couldn't say. The guys from the union took care of the whole business."

That story has been making the rounds in labor circles for some time. Even now, though, anybody who dredges it up and serves it at a meeting of the local or even at a congress knows it's going to make a hit. The reason is that the irony of the joke cloaks a painfully deep-seated malaise. The fact is that the union cadres right now are the targets of venemous challenge, mainly -- though not exclusively -- from the rank and file. Luciano Lama, addressing the congress of the Rome Chamber of Labor, hurled blazing thunderbolts at union apparatchiks: "In Lazio," he charged, to deafening applause, "we have 600 union officials. There are far too many of them, and the fruits of their labor are not commensurate with their numbers." Just a few days previously, in his report to his union's congress. CISL leader Pierre Carniti was no gentler: "The crisis in union representation," he argued, "can be attributed primarily to the unchecked growth of a bloated full-time apparatus built up during the years of struggle, but increasingly beyond the reach of checks and controls."

Why are the union agents in the eye of the whirlwind? Why are they under simultaneous attack from the membership in the plants and from their national summits? Why do we suddenly see this burgeoning of books, articles, magazines (the latest of these was the entire fourth issue of LABORATORIO POLITICO, the magazine of the communist gadflies, run by Mario Tronti) devoted to them, to their history, their jargon, their problems?

The one-word answer to all these questions is, once again: crisis. The economic crisis. The reason why the union agent today is no longer the man who hands out the goodies, but the guy who is often forced to agree to layoffs, restructuring, retreat from long-secure positions, surrenders. The political crisis, in a labor organization that has been torn for years between the lure of a voice in management, recrudescent maximalist demands, the remnants of solidarity, and ceilings on the cost-of-living adjustment, in an unending April alternation of clouds and sunshine; between irreparable splits and wholly unforeseen outbreaks of peace. The consequence is an unavoidable identity crisis for those who live and work in this climate, for the people in organized labor and outside of it who are all asking the same question: just who is a union agent? Is he still the lord-high executioner of the hot autumn? Or has he already turned into an icy bureaucrat who manipulates the rank and file for his own purposes? Or again is he, or is he on the way to becoming something quite different from any of these things?

The odd thing is that this identity crisis has hit the union agents at what is apparently a favorable juncture.

There are so many of them. Almost a small army of them, more than there have ever been. For the CGIL (see Table 1) there are more than 5,000 full-time political officials (the leaders, those who actually do the negotiating, the men in the survey and research offices, right down to the rank-and-file activists who hand out leaflets in the plants), scattered through the country (in the regions and districts) and in the various categories. In the CISL, though, there are 3,500 professional union agents (in the CISL they are called agents, rather than officials, as in the CGIL and the UIL). And then there are the 2,700 in the UIL. That makes a grand total of 11,000 full-time union agents, who are backed up, however, by another 7,000 people in the technical staff and in the various agencies of the national organizations. The growth since the late Sixties has been dizzying: keeping pace with the upsurge in paid membership (up from 4,700,000 in 1968 to 8,900,000 in 1980) and the consequent growth in revenues from proxies, but a disproportionate share of the increment was due to the spiralling numbers of full-time agents. People who quit their jobs to work full-time for the union (in the CGIL 38 percent of the political staff has signed on since 1968), plus a lot more who moved into organized labor out of cynicism and greed. Everybody, to hear them talk, deplores such abuses, but everybody -- in the CGIL, CISL, and UIL alike -- finds their presence rewarding from at least the economic point of view, because it means that they have that many

agents working for them but getting paid by somebody else (see Tables 5, 6, and 7).

They are young, and they are educated. About 70 percent of the people (see Table 2) in the political apparatus of the three federations are between 25 and 45 years old. And between 40 and 60 percent of them have high school diplomas or university degrees.

They are famous. Television shows us the more familiar faces among them every evening. The newspapers write about them. In the national media, only Lama, Carniti, and Benvenuro get the full treatment, but there are hundreds of union agents written up every day in their local papers who have leapt featly across the threshold of anonymity. Debates, roundtables, conventions, and interviews--no matter what the subject, somebody speaking for organized labor is a sine qua non these days. His presence is a guarantee of high ratings.

They are powerful. At Christmastime they get cards from members of parliament, captains of industry, bishops, and prefects. Of course there are still some union agents who do unheralded welfare and support work without any compensation at all. Far more numerous, though, are those in the public eye who talk about macroeconomics, who are consulted on every labor issue, but consulted as well -- and perhaps primarily, these days -- on issues that have nothing to do with organized labor.

And yet it is in these same figures, which look so encouraging, that the crisis lurks. Are there just a lot of them, or are there too many of them? True, some of them have been dropping out lately. At the CGIL, for instance, the turnover rate is close to 5 percent. "That's very high," say CGIL officials. "The turnover problem," they say at the CISL, too, "is beginning to concern us." For the time being, though, the problem is not a lack of people: according to Lama and Carniti, the problem is quite the opposite. Even as late as 1976, the CGIL was still holding the line on the ratio at one to 1,011. It was higher, actually, in the CISL, at one to 1,200. Only the UIL was below one to 800. Today, though (see Table 1) even the CGIL and the CISL have swollen staffs, even though the edema is less pronounced than in the UIL, which, in order to man all the available slots, must make up for its thinner membership ranks with a massive official presence. There is one datum, though, that applies to all of them: the apparatus is spread unevenly, both with respect to geographical areas (high-density zones and others with nobody there), and with respect to labor categories.

Are they really educated people? Or have they, like everybody else, gone to school some? "We read so many newspapers," admits the UIL's top organizer in Lazio, Pietro Larizza, "that it is hard for us to find time to read a book, to go to the theater, or to study." There is a plethora of literature on the subject. The union agent is described as an omnivorous skimmer of the printed page. He walks around with fat bundles of magazines and newspapers under his arm, among

which is bound to be the Confindustria's peach-colored SOLE-24 ORE, plus, under the top leadership's elbow, LE MONDE. He has no time to study, to store up information, because his whole job consists of communications to the outside world. Of messages only he can send. And so he spins through his days like a top, parcelling out his time among local meetings, conventions, conferences, rallies, picket lines, processions, slogans, fliers, telephone calls, telex messages, radio and TV broadcasts, raffles, and photo opportunities. He must keep on talking, screaming, or chanting words: words are his badge of office.

Are they really famous and powerful, or are they poor misled dolts, with a predisposition to frustration? The union agent's life is not a happy one. "Physical endurance," admits CISL secretary Nino Pagani, "is not the least of the endowments a union agent must have." Those who work among the rank and file have to get up at 0500, so as to be at the plant gates when the first morning shift comes on. Stress, however, does not spare the higher echelons: negotiating sessions often last 20 to 30 hours without a break, meetings can run right into one another, not to mention forays from the Ministry of Industry to the Ministry for State Participation to the Ministry for Labor. All in the same day. And then there may be three, four, or even five crises at a time: "The upshot," an FLM secretary told IL MONDO, "is that we often sit down at the bargaining table without even knowing exactly what the issue is." Clearly, that means less time for the family. Not very much time for sports. Or for hobbies. Idolo Marcone, former CISL secretary, used to play the violin as a boy. He had to give it up before long. Ottaviano Del Turco, deputy secretary at FIOM, takes lessons in guitar and drawing. Bruno Trentin jogs through the quiet streets of Villa Doria Pamphili in Rome. But they are exceptions, and you can count them on the fingers of your hands. For the rest of them, there is only the union.

The other side of the coin, though, is that they haven't got what might be styled glowing career prospects. For the majority of them, the outlook inside the union runs something like this: you start in the plant, you get into the local executive, and then you're faced with a choice: if you're going to get ahead, you're going to have to quit your job. Devote yourself full-time to the union. And then you start taking training courses (see box, page 30). You move up in the hierarchy through the local executive bodies into the national industrial groups. Up and up, until you hit the regional executive. Beyond that, no more than 300 or 400 of you will ever go. For everybody, though, the road is a long one, except for the occasional brilliant career, which will be the lot of only a very few and will be the result of factional chemistry, of bonuses for minorities, or of local and industry quotas. The prospects outside the union are just as bleak. Particularly now that there is a perceived conflict of interest between political party positions and those in the union, the avenue for advancement in politics is no longer open. Not many can fall back on a profession to make a living. That leaves the government agencies: the National Work Accident Insurance Institute (INAIL),

the National Social Security Institute (INPS), and the hundreds and thousands of commissions to which the labor unions belong. But as for jobs, as for salaries, there is room for a few dozen people at most.

The career is not exactly tempting, any more than the salary. Union officials, on the whole, don't make very much money. So little do they make, in fact, that there are a lot of them who are opting to leave the union and go back to the production line. Salaries for national officials (see Table 3) are fairly low (for technical staffers, add on family subsidies, which even politicians get, and seniority increases, which the politicians don't get). All in all, for a high-middle-level union official, the paycheck will come to a net of 1 million a month. Of course, those not quite so high up will get less. The story is somewhat different for the top echelons in the national federations and for industry-union secretaries general or for the really big local organizations, where there are occasionally bonuses that don't show up on the payroll. At the national federation level, insofar as IL MONDO could determine, the only ones who get such bonuses are the top leaders of the UIL, who round out their pay checks with a bonus from the factions (reportedly amounting to 200,000 to 300,000 lire per month). In the CISL, too, according to some reports, there are some extra unofficial goodies. And then, too, there are the fringe benefits. Lama, Carniti, Benvenuto, Marianetti, and Marini all have personal cars with drivers. Every 3 years, CISL secretaries get from the organization a third of what it will cost them to buy a FIAT 131/1600cc. The UIL pays its secretaries 75,000 lire a month to cover the cost of newspaper and magazine subscriptions, while the CGIL and CISL provide them directly. For all of them, though, there is the bottom line of the expense account. Counting it all, the richest can get as much as 1.5 million lire net per month.

When you add to all these problems and frustrations the fact that, in our time, the labor union is an organization where only the men at the summit make decisions (according to some experts in the field, the union officials who really count for something in the chess-game of high politics number somewhere between 200 and 300); that the rank and file is increasingly inclined to challenge its leadership; that the representative essence of the union (witness the case of the FIAT strike) is open to question since the emergence of new union and professional groups like middle managers and since the startling growth of unafiliated unionism, you begin to see the roots of the identity crisis that besets most union officials. The past is far behind them. So are the heroic postwar years, when union officials knew exactly who they were. You could pin the ancient-history label on the Sixties, the glory years when the union officials could sail into the plants and learn to bargain over working hours, assembly-line speeds, piecework, and overtime. Long gone are the years of the hot falls, when the downhill road looked as if it would never end. Just as distant, though, are the Seventies, when organized labor was carving out ever-roomier spaces for itself in

the councils of government, when membership was climbing at a stupefying rate and the unions' apparatus was proliferating out of all proportion, simply to provide enough bodies to fill all the new places that were opening up before them, blissfully unaware that they were themselves laying the foundations for the crisis.

Trading in his lunchbox for his copy of 24 ORE, the union official became part of the misty world of politics, and thereby lost his old identity. This, though, is not a recital of individual sins, or of individual ambition, nor yet of cynical abuse of a rank and file that counts for less and less. No, say scholars close to the CISL, men like Tiziano Treu and Ugo Romagnoli: it's the union that has changed. It has changed so much that it can no longer be described as merely an organization that safeguards the economic and vocational well-being of its members, nor yet as an organization subordinate to the political parties: it has become an independent entity that operates inside the institutions, inside society, and inside the state. The consequence of that, according to Aris Accornero, who heads the PCI's political economy study center, is "that the union official nowadays is a politician, not in the party, but in the institutional sense: he is a political protagonist, quite apart from the union card he may not even have or want. His involvement in power relationships and his assumption of behavior patterns increasingly alien to the union make him part of a professional political class for a post-bargaining era." In short, being a union official today means, as Bruno Manghi says (see interview), entering upon an entirely new vocation, a career in which the job descriptions have yet to be written.

Bruno Magli: "Union Official? A Deputy Manager"

Is he a lay missionary? Or maybe an industrial relations expert? Or again a politician, just like a mayor, a member of Parliament, or a cabinet minister? Just what is a union official in the Eighties? IL MONDO put that question to Bruno Manghi, sociologist, ex-leader of Milan's metalworkers, now head of the CISL's Taranto labor school, one of the top-rated scholars in Italian labor problems, and the author of numerous works as the book "Fail As You Grow," (Mulino, 1977) which set the whole of organized labor by the ears when it appeared, triggering endeless polemics.

Question: How do you, as one who helped bring them up, define the union officials?

Answer: The union official's job is a trade, which makes it something different from a job you do just to stay alive. And, like every trade, it is a compromise, a blend of the requisite technical skills and identification with the ideal goals of the job itself. Let me make that clearer: the ideal objective of the union official is to succeed in translating and conveying the demands of those who have delegated that function to him. That ideal, however, can be achieved only through professional competence. It is a trade that

changes with the changing times, but even so it remains a trade. So what it amounts to is a blend of idealism and professionalism.

Question: What is the professional profile of today's ideal union official?

Answer: That's something I'd have to think about for some time. It seems to me, though, that one might safely say that there is no single ideal professional profile. There is, for instance, a certain kind of union official at the base who handles such matters as finding jobs, acts as mediator, provides help to those who need it. And then you have the union official who is also a political leader, who issues the marching orders, who stirs up emotion, who decides whether or not a particular government shall fall or stay in office. But as the central role, there is still that of the organizer and negotiator, the man who maintains relations both with the workers and with the employers. That, though, is a role played these days by a small minority of union officials.

Question: Why is that?

Answer: The union official of the Forties was an arbiter of individual quarrels or a fomenter of social rebellion. Then he became an organizer of the people to win specific fights. Then he changed again, to become a manager of the professional staff, an indispensable tool for command. Now people are asking the union official to concern himself with the major issues of general concern.

Question: In other words, you're saying that the union official has wound up as an ordinary politician?

Answer: The union official has been lured by the fascination of the spotlight, of power, of the state. There are 200 or 300 union officials today who have become part of the political elite. And this in turn fascinates all the rest, who perceive -- through them -- the labor union as a tool for success, as a tool for playing politics, rather than for making contact with people.

Question: So the union has even become a tool for the social advancement of the individual? A way to get ahead?

Answer: I said earlier that there is no one description of the union official. Even today there are union officials who are barely hanging on, especially in the south, who are not sure they are going to be paid, and who may even run afoul of the Mafia. Then there are the old breed, in the north, for whom personal achievement counts more than the career. And yet there is no question that, in the south as well as in the north, there are a lot of union officials who have won some degree of social status through the union. They are aware, especially out in the provinces, of what Lama, Carniti, and Benvenuto stand for in Rome, and consequently they are attracted, at all levels, to the big game, the high stakes. It will be interesting to see, over

the next 4 or 5 years, whether or not the union official will become an integral part of the power elite.

Question: Don't you think that, starting now, because of this gradual integration into the political power circle, organized labor may turn into a springboard for the ambitious?

Answer: A union official can turn into an opportunist. But I don't think it's very likely that anybody who starts out as an opportunist is going to last long as a union official. The selection process is pretty stringent. The work is hard. Advancement is slow. Even the prima donnas, the top leaders, do not lead what could be called an enviable life.

Question: The ideal union official, as you reminded us, is the one who successfully represents the workers. Yet union officials are increasingly under fire from the rank and file who fail to see their demands getting anywhere through what reps do. There is, in short, a very real crisis in the representative relationship. Why is that?

Answer: The union apparatus has long since become a class with interests of its own distinct from those of the people it represents. Of course this may be perceived among the rank and file as an abuse by comparison with their idealized view of themselves. And yet the fact of the matter is that people are eager to delegate. And they favor the idea of having somebody act as a union official professionally. It was the super-buildup of the workers' councils, the myths that occasionally grew up around them, that led to this replacement of reality with wish. In the name of this assumed starring role, people have tended to forget that in our society we have learned to handle a lot of problems all by ourselves, without the bosses and without the union. And therefore we have become willing to delegate certain functions to a professional class.

Question: Provided, though, that these professionals actually do the jobs the delegates expect of them. Today, however, it doesn't look as if the professionals are delivering.

Answer: That's true: there can sometimes be a dichotomy, as a result of which the things the official does are not what the membership expected. When this happens, it happens because the problems of the professional representatives become a filter in relation to those of the rank and file. It is no scandal. Because, as I said, union officials today have become a professional class. What might be done is to try to hold the dichotomy to a minimum. What actually scandalizes me is that the majority of those involved are not aware of it. They have become professionals, but they think they are still just working stiffs.

The Strike Universities

CISL: 750 million lire; CGIL: 550 million; UIL: over 200 million. In all, 1,400,000,000 the three national federations spent in 1981 to train their cadres. But that figure is only a small part of the total, it is only that portion of the outlay that devolves directly upon the three national federations. The industrial unions train their own cadres. So do the regional, district, and local bodies. In all, according to expert estimates, the total comes to as much as 4 to 5 billion lire a year. Where does all the money go? Mainly in three directions.

1. The lion's share of these funds goes to pay for courses for the rank-and-file membership, lasting anywhere from 2 or 3 days to a week. They are designed mainly to fire up the troops, are short on professional content, and aimed primarily at working members from the plants, or to provide a smattering of background to those making their first contact with organized labor.

2. Another fat slice goes to middle management cadres, who work in the industrial unions or in the regional or local structures. Courses for them are somewhat longer. There are handbook courses that last a week, and deal, for example, with job structuring or with some special reform, such as housing, health, or taxes. And there are some courses that last 2 or 3 months, whose purpose is to give junior officials some professional grounding. They study the history of the labor movement, a little economics, a little law. Most of these courses are sponsored by the CISL and the CGIL, while the UIL, which has a very brief history of training, has thus far tended to favor rank-and-file courses. The CISL in particular offers specialized 3-month classes according to the particular activity in which the officials are engaged.

3. And then there is training for high-level union cadres, the people in whom their respective organizations have decided to invest. By all odds the most venerable of these types of training is that offered by the CISL which from its very founding has made something of a fetish of training. Almost all the current leaders of the CISL, both federation and industrial, have gone through the school in Florence (Pierre Carniti top among them): that school is nothing less than a university for union organizers and officials. "The CGIL," they will tell you at CISL headquarters, "could count on the [Communist] Party to handle the training. Not us: so we had to do it ourselves." A year of study, combined with experience out in the field thus became the price aspiring union leaders have had to pay to be launched in their careers. Since the mid-Sixties, after a decade of easy riding on the "hot autumns" (the annual contract negotiating rounds) this kind of course had fallen into disuse. "But then," explains Michelangelo Ciancaglini, the CISL's director for training, "we realized that we had cadres who had got their training solely through activity in the movement, people who knew everything there was to know about tax loopholes, but had no idea how to reckon the tax bite out of a worker's wages. Hence the decision to go back to the lengthy courses and to open a new school

Taranto (a brand-new building, garishly colored, and dubious functionality just a step from Italsider, with a 4-billion-lire pricetag). The objective: to turn out 70 to 80 leadership cadres each year, each with a specialty tailored to his destined assignment. The CGIL followed suit last year at its school in Ariccia, with a year-long course for leaders, although it is based on less specialized training.

Apparently even the UIL wants to do likewise, with its Lavinio school, where it will offer courses lasting 6 to 7 months. The subject matter will be the same as is offered in the shorter courses: economics, history, contract negotiation. But the depth of the studies is equal to any in the universities.



ALL ORGANIZED LABOR'S CADRES

Key:

1. How many union officials per national federation
2. Political apparatus CGIL - CISL - UIL
3. Total apparatus (political, technical, and federation bodies)

Source: IL MONDO, from data received from the CGIL, CISL, and UIL

TABLE 1. HOW MANY PEOPLE BACK UP THE MEMBERSHIP?

The apparatus/membership ratio

Number of members	CGIL 4,600,000	CISL 3,000,000	UIL 1,200,000	Combined 8,700,000
Members of horizontal and vertical apparatus	5,095	3,583	2,276	11,404
Apparatus/membership ratio	1/902	1/837	1/476	1/780
Members of horizontal and vertical technical and political apparatus	6,329	4,376	3,973 (2)	14,718
Apparatus/membership ratio	1/722	1/685	1/327	1/604
Members of horizontal and vertical technical and political apparatus plus staffs of union agencies	7,859	5,400	4,615	17,847
Apparatus/membership ratio	1/585	1/555	;/281	1/548

Source: Il Mondo from data obtained from CGIL-CISL-UIL

(1) The figures were elaborated on the basis of CISL research on full-time cadres, submitted to the organizational assembly of 23 January 1980.

(2) There are no data on the horizontal technical apparatus.

TABLE 2 - BREAKDOWN BY SEX, AGE, AND EDUCATION

(figures in percentages)

	CGIL	CISL	UIL
SEX			
Male	93	94	98
Female	7	6	2
Total:	100	100	100
AGE			
25 or less	7.3	5.3	12
26 to 25	40.1	37.8	35
36 to 45	26.6	33.8	36
46 to 55	17.3	16.9	15
Over 55	8.7	6.2	2
Total:	100.0	100.0	100
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL			
Elementary school	18.8	7.5	6
Junior high school	39.2	39.1	32
High school	32.9	42.9	46
University	7.7	10.5	16
Unreported	1.4	---	---
Total:	100.0	100.0	100

TABLE 3. THE UNION OFFICIAL'S PAYCHECK

	CGIL		CISL		UIL	
Position	Gross	Net	Gross	Net	Gross	Net
Secretary-General	1,406,000	1.017,000	1,546,000	1,110,000	1,645,000	1,180,000*
Deputy Secretary-General	1,375,000	998,000	1,496,000	1,078,000	1,645,000	1,180,000
National Secretary	1,329,000	969,000	1,396,000	1,039,000	1,645,000	1,180,000
Policy functions	1.102,000	925,000	1,280,000	890,000	1,222,000	850,000
Executive functions	1,038,000	785,000	930,000	750,000	925,000	720,000
Responsibility						
Delegated	884,000	683,000	846,000	690,000	720,000	580,000
Executive staff	745,000	587,000	760,000	600,000	663,000	540,000
Auxiliary or newly hired staff	664,000	534,000	680,000	550,000	560,000	460,000

The figures refer to national apparatus. They were developed by IL MONDO using data provided by the three national federations, and averaging salaries for jobs on the basis of a single classification which takes the actual duties performed into account. The figures shown here include neither seniority raises nor family expenses, nor do they include possible bonuses not shown on the payroll, of which there is considerable discussion in the text.

(*) The UIL has no provision for a deputy secretary-general, and so the official salaries are the same for all members of the national secretariat.

TABLE 4 UNION OFFICIALS ON DETACHED DUTY OR ON STANDBY
(Political staff only, in %)

CGIL		CISL		UIL	
Non-detached	55.3	Non-detached	48.1	Non-detached	77.4
Detached	44.7	Detached	51.9	Detached	23.6
TOTAL	100.0	TOTAL	100.0	TOTAL	100.0

NATURE OF ASSIGNMENNT AND SOURCE OF COMPENSATION

CGIL			CISL			UIL		
Where they come from	%	% of total apparatus	Where they come from, who pays them	%	% of total apparatus	Who pays them	%	% of total apparatus
Government	34.1	15.2	Government-compensated detached duty	26.3	13.6	The union	36	8.5
Private business	56.2	25.2	Union-compensated company standby	45.4	23.6	The companies they work for	64	15.1
Unreported	9.7	4.3	Company-compensated detached duty	14.4	7.5	TOTAL	100.0	23.6
TOTAL	100.0	44.7	On active assignment, hence company-compensated	10.4	5.4			
Who pays them	%	% of total apparatus	On assignment paid by national union agencies	3.5	1.8			
The union	39.3	17.6	TOTAL	100.0	54.9			
Their own companies	56.2	25.1						
Unreported	4.5	2						
TOTAL	100.0	44.7						

(Source: IL MONDO staff, using data from the CGIL, CISL, and UIL)

POLITICAL SPAIN

COLUMNIST ANALYZES CAUSES OF DISARRAY IN UCD

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 9 Nov 81 pp 24-27

[Article by Jose Oneto: "The Only Way Out For the Centrists Is Through Calvo Sotelo"]

[Text] "It is not possible to govern seriously when we are written up every day in the news columns." This statement, a cross between irony and sarcasm, uttered by Calvo Sotelo on Monday, 2 November, in one of the official meeting rooms of Hotel Monterreal located at the outskirts of Madrid, perfectly summarizes the tumultuous meeting of the Executive Committee of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and, especially, the spirit in which the government party has been meeting since the Congress of Palma de Majorca held after the resignation of Adolfo Suarez.

As if it were a forecast, 24 hours later the UCD situation went from simple news columns to the covers of magazines: "The UCD Is Crumbling, Fernandez Ordonez Is Establishing the Democratic Action Party [PAC]."

It seemed like the natural consequence of the unfortunate statements of Party Chairman Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun who, with his characteristic volunteerism and lack of political vision, had declared at the end of the Executive Committee's stormy session that whoever wanted to leave could leave.

As if the signal for departure had sounded, a few hours later the group disbanded. On Tuesday, 3 November, amidst disorder, fear and astonishment, the teletypes of news agencies installed in the palace of the Congress of Deputies were giving, minute by minute, the gradual desertions from the government party as though they were speaking of deaths from rape seed oil. Early in the morning it was known that the Disciplinary Committee had expelled Segovian Deputy Carlos Gila. A few minutes later, public announcement was made of the suspension from militancy of Modesto Fraile, another Segovian deputy and vice president of the Congress of Deputies. Early in the afternoon, and to avoid disciplinary sanction, former Minister Ricardo de la Cierva announced his withdrawal from the party. A few minutes later, a list was published of the social democrats who, under the influence of former Justice Minister Fernandez Ordonez, decided, in agreement with the unfortunate proposal of Rodriguez Sahagun, to withdraw. The list included: Carmen Solano, Carmela Garcia Moreno, Maria Dolores Garcia Pelayo, Luis Berenguer, Javier Moscoso, Eduardo Moreno, Antonio Alonso Quiros, Luis Gonzalez Seara, Pedro Valdecantos, Carmen Pinedo, Ricardo Rodriguez Canstanon, Jose Herrero, Jose Gonzalez Monterroso, Manuel Cerca, Carmelo Fernandez...

In principle, and despite promises of support by the government of Calvo Sotelo, UCD's parliamentary group, in one single afternoon, in an ill-fated and sad afternoon, was reduced to 151 seats after the withdrawal a few months ago of former Culture Minister Manuel Clavero and Deputies Garcia Perez, Jesus Esperabe and Joaquin Molins; to only 30 seats away from the other majority, the socialist.

The Great Escape

What had happened in those few hours? How, in one single day, was it possible to go from news columns to the covers of magazines and give rise to a mass escape?

In the opinion of more impartial observers, the break was inevitable inasmuch as the UCD, especially since the last election, had already become a conservative party, losing its more progressive profile in the past few months. In the opinion of others, the flight of the social democrats was a natural consequence of the rightest trend observed in the political panorama and whose ultimate exponent was the electoral results of Galicia with the irresistible victory of conservative Fraga. In the opinion of men close to Christian democracy, the departure of Fernandez Ordonez was the second part of an exodus which began with the departure of the justice minister at the end of August and will very likely end in a closely related party or in a party close to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. In the opinion of men close to Ordonez, it was an irresistible decision after months of harassment by so-called critics. In short, in the opinion of the pro-Suarez faction, the entire procedure is simply a psychological consequence of a complete operation set up by the UCD's parliamentary group, which ended on 29 January with the forced resignation of Adolfo Suarez. That is to say, with the death of the father.

The Death of the Father

The death of Suarez, which, in reality, became a long, slow and dramatic agony, was not fantasies, set up after the disappearance of the old regime.

Adolfo Suarez resigned on 29 January, a few days after the frustrated coup d'etat, but he resisted disappearing completely from the political scene. Allied first with the pro-Ordonez people, then using the apparatus group (men placed within the complex UCD apparatus), Adolfo Suarez, a man made by and for politics, became the guardian of the alleged progressive essentials of the party in power. With errors by Calvo Sotelo, whose obsession was to become an anti-Suarez, and with errors by Suarez himself, who was not able to pursue a path of moral grandeur which he initiated with his resignation, the UCD entered an inevitable period of extinction after the Congress of Palma de Majorca.

For months, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, who had succeeded Adolfo Suarez, despite pressures by one of his right-hand men, former Justice Minister Pio Cabanillas, did not want to enter into the arduous, difficult and exhausting task of recomposing the party. Taking refuge in the task of governing and, especially, of administering, Calvo Sotelo, whose most serious opponents were Suarez and his men (Rodriguez Sahagun and Rafael Calvo Ortega), ignored the party until the party crumbled. He went from controlled explosion designed by Pio Cabanillas before summer and paralyzed by the social democrats to unforeseen explosion originated by an apparatus increasingly remote from the president of the government.

On Tuesday, 3 November, with the festivity of the Dead [All Saints Day] still fresh in mind, Adolfo Suarez, the father who resists dying politically and who is destroying his subsequent resurrection, appeared in Parliament more pale and sad than usual. While the teletypes of the news agencies were broadcasting the list of those affected by the centrist syndrome, his only answer was a laconic "I am sad, very sad."

It was only a few hours before that he had had a new dialectic confrontation with the president of the government during the meeting of the party's Executive Committee. Suarez had pointed out that this was not good and that his alleged confrontations with the president were being magnified. Calvo Sotelo had quickly retorted that it was very difficult to govern "without having the rearguard in one's own party covered." The Duke of Suarez had again spoken emphasizing that he was accepting the admonition or censure deduced from the words of the president of the government. Calvo Sotelo had finally settled the dialectic confrontation with a peremptory statement: "My words contained neither censure nor admonition; therefore, it is not possible to accept what was not given."

This had been one more confrontation in the long list of offensive remarks they had hurled at each other. Suarez repeats that Calvo Sotelo does not consult him on important matters (especially military) on which he has first-hand knowledge. Calvo reproaches Suarez on his lack of support and continuous intrigues through Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun. Last week, Calvo Sotelo, who succeeded in getting over the hump of Spain's entry into NATO, was hoping for some advice, some encouraging word, some help from Suarez. The help did not arrive despite the fact that Suarez knew the difficulties and danger of one of the most important discussions of the past 5 years.

In any case, the Suarez-Calvo confrontation, a confrontation which the collaborators of the two took it upon themselves to encourage, is just another indication of UCD's internal situation, which has lost all the regional or partial electoral debates held in Spain in the past year and a half.

The Situation

In this regard, almost all analysts agree in pointing out the political leaders, especially of the center, as the major causes of the present situation.

At present, all indicators are satisfactory, or almost satisfactory, when compared with those existing before the resignation of Adolfo Suarez. The subject of regional autonomy has been re-introduced, although difficulties persist. The economy is not worse, and there are obvious signs of improvement in the next few months. In the struggle against terrorism the situation is better than before the political transition began. The plaguing problem of the flags, one of the explosive elements of the coup d'etat movement of 23 February, has not only passed but has also been considerably reduced. Social peace being enjoyed by the country is perhaps the most serene in the last 10 years. Insecurity felt by the citizenry has decreased appreciably. In short, the only indicator of real concern is the military, particularly the administration facing Defense Minister Alberto Oliart. The Oliart phase, full of good will and lacking in disciplinary decisions, has contributed to a gradual growth of factional powers whose last decisions were the astonishing trial of Captain Milans and the awarding of a medal for suffering for the fatherland bestowed on Lt Gen Milans del Bosch, pending the trial for his part in the coup d'etat of 23 February.

Within this relatively serene panorama, what caused the crisis, according to some observers, is the governing party's absolute lack of leadership.

Up to now, Calvo Sotelo, who showed signs of indecision in not resolving a ministerial crisis, as planned since before summer, with the outbreak of the scandal over the massive poisoning by rape seed oil and in not restoring order in his own party, did not want to lose his strength in UCD's internal struggle. Calvo Sotelo, a politician who does not belong to any of the families who make up the government party, who, as a human being, is a government man rather than a party man, showed himself for months to be too lazy to disembark from a ship which, piloted by Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun and Rafael Calvo Ortega, was bound to be shipwrecked.

Moreover, the confrontations between Calvo Sotelo and Rodriguez Sahagun, with Suarez in the middle, have also not contributed to the centrist party's stability.

Now, when the party has found him thrust in its midst, Calvo Sotelo will have no other remedy than to descend into the political arena and try to recompose what is left of that great coalition which, according to Rodriguez Sahagun, was going to rule for 107 years.

In view of the serious situation created by the party's breakdown, on Tuesday, 3 November, President Calvo Sotelo called his right-hand men together at Moncloa Palace: Foreign Affairs Minister Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, Territorial Administration Minister Rodolfo Martin Villa, Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson, Economy and Commerce Minister Juan Antonio Garcia Diez and Justice Minister Pio Cabanillas.

The Alternatives

According to well-informed sources, four possibilities were studied at the meeting. The first was to accept the present situation, particularly assuming that the operation of the Social Democratic Party and other dissidents did not mean a loss of parliamentary support for the Calvo Sotelo government.

The second covered the possible dissolution of the two parliamentary houses and the holding of general elections within 2 or 3 months.

The third, not even studied but suggested by a few deputies in view of the difficult situation, included the possible resignation of Calvo Sotelo as president of the government. And the fourth, finally adopted unanimously, called for Calvo Sotelo to step down from the chairmanship of the Democratic Center Union.

For Calvo Sotelo to step down from the party's chairmanship it was also necessary to arrange for the disappearance of Augstin Rodriguez Sahagun, ally of Adolfo Suarez and one of the principal causes of the latest events which led to the UCD's breakdown.

At a time of real problems, Rodriguez Sahagun, a strange mixture of volunteerism, good will and inefficiency, is, together with Rafael Calvo Ortega, secretary general, one of the principal peons introduced by Adolfo Suarez to keep tied and well tied to his successor.

In this manner, the party's secretariat--discarding Rodolfo Martin Villa in the very beginning--would take on Jaime Lamo, one of Calvo Sotelo's men but who maintains good relations with Suarez, or Marcelino Oreja, present delegate of the Euskadi Government, who wanted to remain aloof from the party's internal intrigues and squabbles.

As part of an ambitious plan to revamp the present situation, Calvo Sotelo would try to recover some of the collaborators of Adolfo Suarez for the government, such as Luis Gamir, uncoupled from the pro-Ordonez social democratic car, Fernando Abril or Rafael Arias-Salgado.

In short, the last phase of the Calvo plan would pass through the agreed withdrawal of Adolfo Suarez, the party's current honorary chairman. Although he still maintains certain political clout, Suarez has allegedly been subjected to various insinuations and a trial balloon suggesting that he accept an important diplomatic post abroad.

Thus, according to an analysis made by those who are supposedly well-acquainted with the present structure of the centrist power apparatus, the absence of the duke would relieve much tension. The Duke of Suarez, in turn, far from the corridors of power for a few years, would have a historical opportunity to return via a hypothetical electoral campaign in 1987. For what is revealing is Calvo Sotelo's statement, a cross between irony and sarcasm, very much in tune with his Galician roots: "It is not possible to govern seriously when we are written up every day in the news columns."

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SOCIOLOGIST KORPI INTERVIEWED ON SPD, LABOR

Rome MONDOPERAIO in Italian Nov 81 pp 83-85

[Interview with Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi, author of the essay entitled "Class Conflict and the Swedish Social Democratic Party" (Stockholm, 1981), conducted by Mario Baccianini. Original title: "The Planet Sweden."]

[Text] During their years in the opposition, Sweden's social democrats found time for a redefinition of the terms of the "historic compromise" with capitalism, which they intend to renegotiate when and if they get back into power. We talked about it with Swedish sociologist and author, Walter Korpi.

[Question] Don't you think that the elements of political radicalism in the Meidner plan contributed significantly to the defeat of the Swedish social democrats in the 1976 elections?

[Answer] There were a lot of post-election opinion surveys taken, on the basis of the tactical moves of political spokesmen, their popularity, and the coverage devoted to them by the media. There were also a lot of polls on the structural changes in Swedish society. Both types of surveys show that the crucial factors in the social democrats' losses at the polls were varied in nature.

[Question] Well, then, in this context of disparity, how much did the Meidner plan account for?

[Answer] It certainly played a considerable, though not a preeminent role. Unfortunately, the Swedish trade union congress, which proposed the plan, met in June 1976, just as the electoral campaign was getting started. Maybe it was premature to launch it then. There wasn't time to talk it over, to digest it, inside the Social Democratic Party. The decisive issue, though, was nuclear energy. A secondary one was the centralization of political and organized labor power.

[Question] What form does this centralization take in a country as small as Sweden?

[Answer] The reform of local government, which began during the Sixties with the approval of all political parties, has led over time to

the disappearance of three out of every four independent communes, along with a drastic reduction in local political representation: of the 150 to 200,000 units we had in 1962, only around 42,000 were left by 1974. The same thing happened with labor representation. Three of every four LO sections disappeared between 1960 and 1975.

[Question] In short, a situation arose in which the unions took over all power from the workers.

[Answer] More as an image accepted by the media and by public opinion generally than in actuality. Although there has unquestionably been some dwindling in that stratum of citizens who used to act as intermediaries between the public and labor leaders: most of them today are full-time officials.

[Question] Don't you find that the rejection of the Social Democratic Party at the polls, for the first time in 40 years, is evidence of a determination to protect the Swedish social compromise against its replacement by the Meidner plan -- at least in its early version?

[Answer] As I said before, the Meidner plan, because it was introduced too hastily, played an important but not a decisive role. Far more important was the restrictive policy pursued by the social democratic finance minister early in 1976, which deepened unemployment in Sweden, albeit to a minor degree by comparison with jobless rates on the continent, as in Italy or England. A decline in job opportunities, coupled with fast-rising inflation, sapped the credibility of the social democratic government. By the early Seventies the welfare rate had grown, and in some cases reached the level of the immediate postwar years, when there was still widespread poverty.

[Question] Doesn't it seem a bit paradoxical to you that the liberal-conservative coalition was perceived as a better guarantee for social policies?

[Answer] It may well seem a paradox. But it is a fact that the social democratic government was perceived in some quarters as being to blame for the dire impact of an international recession whose consequences Sweden was feeling, along with everybody else. And until the new coalition got into office, there were those who gave it credit for better intentions, although they bitterly rue it today.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that thus far, in Sweden, there has been no taxpayers' revolt, despite a welfare burden that accounts for some 60 percent of your GNP?

[Answer] The issue of taxes has been a central one throughout the postwar period. For the last 30 years, taxes have been rising at a steadily increasing rate. The Social Democratic Party, however, managed to convince the people that optimum distribution of social services carries a pricetag. And they won an undeniable consensus on that proposition. Our tax system, furthermore, is relatively fair. And the

distribution of the benefits of our welfare state, too, are fairly and equitably distributed throughout the population.

[Question] And yet Sweden has experienced no aggressive rightist radicalism. Hasn't the free-trade economic philosophy caught on in Sweden?

[Answer] Just recently, there have been signs of such trends emerging within the Conservative Party and the SAF, the Swedish Federation of Employers... They are publishing translations of books by Lepage, Friedman, and Hayek. There is, in short, a strong ideological offensive under way, but it is hitherto confined to the Conservative Party and is merely lapping at the fringes of the center parties and the Liberal Party.

[Question] What, just briefly, were the special features of the Swedish social compromise that began during the Thirties?

[Answer] The background of that compromise was the installation of a stable Social Democratic government, supported by more than 50 percent of the electorate. Political power was sharply severed from economic power, and this fact forces all the protagonists on the Swedish social scene -- organized labor as well as business and industry, to take a close look at their old antagonistic strategies. The compromise had its positive aspects, among them full employment and the building of the welfare state. It had its bad points, too, such as the fact that a rapidly growing economic role devolved on management and on business and industry.

[Question] Could you give me a clearer explanation for what you call the "political tradeoff"?

[Answer] The labor movement had everything to gain by seeking an understanding with the industrial employers, rather than shifting the fight over income distribution over onto the political battleground. Meanwhile the employers, fearing possible political interference in the economy, perceived that it was to their advantage to redefine their own strategy and tactics. During the Teens and Twenties Sweden had what may well have been the highest incidence of labor strife in Europe. In 1909 there was a general strike that lasted a whole month, setting a world record. The historic compromise between capital and labor, reached during the Thirties, put an end to that state of affairs. With the social democrats in power, strikes declined to practically zero. The labor movement understood quite clearly that it could rely on political tools, rather than costly strikes, to redistribute the profits of production and to strengthen the position of the wage-earner. The new strategy did not mean, however, that the movement was scrapping its longer-term political objectives, which called for the ripening of the capitalist society according to the developmental pattern of political democracy, social democracy, and economic democracy typical of Swedish social democratic policy.

[Question] Sweden has been called a laboratory for social change. Don't you think, though, that here in your country there are historical and geographical peculiarities at work, such as the homogeneity of your country, the manageable dimensions of your population, which might explain the stability of your social system?

[Answer] These factors have been of considerable importance. Along with our historical development, of course. Sweden, for instance, has never had a strong movement on the extreme right. And our labor movement has never been split along religious lines, as has been the case in other protestant countries. Nor do we have any problems with ethnic minorities. Having said that, though, we have to give policy its due. Our stability can be partially explained on the basis of our political decisions, as we saw in connection with the conflicts between capital and labor. Our parties have been shaped and molded not so much by historical accident as by policy choices, by grand political plans. This has made our political choices simpler. And these choices, too, have played a preponderant role.

[Question] What has become of the Meidner plan lately? Ironically enough, it would seem that it can't even be called that any more, with all the sea-changes it has suffered.

[Answer] Here in Sweden we never did call it the Meidner plan. Meidner was chairman of the committee that drafted the proposal. It was generally perceived as closely tied in with organized labor. The plan was subsequently modified, with the active collaboration of the Social Democratic Party. Its basic thrust, however, remained the same: the labor movement wants to establish some form of control over the economic power structure, which until now has been heavily concentrated in the hands of some 15 or so great families.

[Question] But how did the plan change, with regard to the sources of financing for the workers' funds?

[Answer] Initially, the idea was to finance the wage-earners' funds set up under the plan solely out of shares of business and industry profits. Today we have two sources of financing: profit-sharing, higher taxes on pensions (taken out of paychecks). This increase is under consideration now among the unions as matter for wage negotiations. That means that the unions will agree to a policy of wage restrictions to constitute funds out of which they can buy shares in the corporations. About two thirds of these funds are to come from payroll deductions.

[Question] Don't you think that the Meidner plan would give the unions excessive power, at a time when they are already beginning to lose some of their effective representative character?

[Answer] There is another element that has changed in this plan. The administration of the funds will not be entrusted solely to union representatives. There will, instead, be direct elections held for seats

on the board of directors for each fund, and they will be open to all citizens. The original proposal called for the representatives to be elected by the LO congress. But then the national leaders of the union, Gunnar Nilson first among them, voiced concern over this conflict of interest for the unions, which would be called upon to represent both the workers and the spokesmen for capital.

[Question] Do you think that the present situation will permit such a leap forward for the Swedish labor movement as that called for under the Meidner plan?

[Answer] Politically, the situation is rather difficult. A lot will depend on the fact that the Social Democratic Party is able to map out a policy that will be perceived as reliable by the voters as a way out of the recession. One thing, though, is certain: Swedish workers will never accept a highly restrictive economic policy, like the one Mrs Thatcher is pursuing in England.

[Question] Perhaps that is true of the labor movement: but what about the middle class?

[Answer] In Sweden, 75 to 80 percent of white-collar workers are organized, and they have worked together for the past decade with the labor unions. We have a situation, as you can see, that is quite different, for example, from that of the German Angestellten, and even from Germany in general, where only 30 percent of the working population is unionized.

[Question] What are the terms of the new historic compromise which Swedish social democrats plan to bring to the negotiating table if and when they get back into power?

[Answer] The labor movement in Sweden is stronger today than it was in 1932, when only 50 percent of the working population was employed in industry. Women were not organized, nor were white-collar workers. The incidence of union membership in Sweden today is perhaps the highest anywhere in the west. Given these power ratios, it can demand more of a voice in the workplace. More control over economic power, and not merely through contract negotiations.

[Question] Just what, though, is the political program of Sweden's social democrats? A more advanced form of industrial democracy? Or an attempt to go beyond the present capitalist stance, as some quarters in the European radical left would have it?

[Answer] It's a new tradeoff, a new political swap. In the Twenties we got political democracy, with universal suffrage. In the postwar period, we won social democracy, with the establishment of the great social welfare services and full employment. The third phase, which is what we are going through now, is a striving for economic democracy. The Meidner plan calls for the establishment of 24 regional wage-earners' funds, which will give the wage-earner the same access to ownership of shares in private corporations as private capital has today.

But in ways that are better and to a degree far higher than those you find today in some European countries. In other words, to buy stock in percentages that will carry real muscle. This is the compromise the Swedish labor movement seeks. It does not want to nationalize corporations. Nor does it want to expropriate them under law. The public sector in Sweden is far smaller than in Italy or in England.

[Question] The idea, then, is new forms and avenues of control, rather than worker management?

[Answer] The main idea is to see that the funds controlled by the workers are not used for the same ends as those sought by private capital. Even though the pursuit of profit cannot be neglected, since we must go on competing in the export markets. Workers' control will be directed more toward improving working conditions, and things like that.

[Question] Just where does this forward thrust in Sweden come from? From the unions, from the party, or from society as a whole?

[Answer] Clearly, it comes from organized labor. And it is a continuation of the process begun in the Seventies with the Codetermination Act, the law providing for joint decisions, the Employment Security Act, freedom of information act, etc.

[Question] Aren't there other processes for reconciling the general interests of society with private interests? In short, to be blunt about it, don't you believe that the market economy ought still to have a role to play in the future?

[Answer] Here we run into massive misunderstandings, thanks to distorted interpretations of the Meidner plan. The LO's proposals aim at bringing democracy into the market. Centralized planning is alien to the Swedish social democratic tradition, just as much as the road of nationalization is. Today we have a situation in which a third of the upper class, around 10,000 families, control all corporate capital.

We want to correct this distribution of wealth. It is unthinkable to achieve a reconciliation between the general interests of society and private interests without workable patterns for redistribution of economic power. This line of action unquestionably involves some risk. But there is risk inherent in leaving the situation unchanged. Sweden's enduring social peace has been a historic achievement.

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GENERAL ITALY

CNR'S DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE ANTARCTIC

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 10 Oct 81 p 13

[Article by Gianni Migliorino: "Isn't Italy Sending Researchers?"]

[Text] Under the ice is El Dorado: petroleum, gas and coal, uranium, and other valuable metals such as copper and nickle; and, in the 35 million square kilometers of the surrounding seas, an immense patrimony of biological resources.

This is the picture of the Antarctic today after 20 years of research made in the name of science, but with an eye to the economy. In the preeminently inhospitable region there are 47 permanent bases that are active throughout the year. It is possible to live and work there and two facts now make it evident that the race to exploitation is about to begin. Many technologies are already in place and the moment of economic expediency is approaching at a great pace.

Therefore the Antarctic can now be likened to an immense sports track. Twenty-two countries are already at the starting line, ready to dash in a big race that is not devoid of difficulties, including political ones. The starting signal could indeed be given right after the expiration of the Antarctic Treaty, in 1991. Will Italy be there, too? Until a few months ago the matter could not even be proposed. The complete indifference of the Italian political class to the matter of the Antarctic for 20 years prevented our country from participating in the big international programs that all the major European and non-European countries carried out on the frozen continent within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty. The Italian scholars, under the sponsorship of the CNR [National Research Council], have had to be content with carrying out four small expeditions with the logistical support of other countries, such as the United States and New Zealand.

Then, at the beginning of this year, something changed; and in the month of March, without any vociferous announcements, the Italian parliament finally ratified the Antarctic Treaty; a basic step, but not a resolvable one. The recovery of lost time is now impossible. Only a race against time can let us establish a dignified presence in Antartica through the installation of a permanent base, which is the condition for participation in the SCAR (Scientific Committee on Artarctic Research) which coordinates the scientific programs.

Italy has only 9 years in which to do this, a very brief period, if we consider that the length of the season in which it is suitable to conduct expeditions and to work on the base installation is reduced to a few months, from November to February. At the beginning of March, the last ships and the last planes leave the continent. The men who spend the winter in Antarctica have no possibility of physical contact with the rest of the world until the end of the following October.

Therefore the next few weeks will be absolutely decisive and in a certain sense will reveal the actual desire to be present in the Antarctic. "The CNR has already been at work for some time," says Carlo Stocchino of the Atmospheric Physics Institute (who, having already participated in four expeditions in addition to a reconnaissance trip from 1968 to 1976, may be considered the most experienced Italian Antarctic scholar),"but if funds and the chartering of a ship are not granted soon, we risk having to postpone everything to the 1982/83 season, thereby losing a whole year."

Stocchino has scheduled the entire month of August for a trip through the European countries that have greater experience in the Antarctic for the purpose of gathering ideas and suggestions for the establishment of an Italian organization that will be capable of managing the Antarctic operation. The organization must be equipped with an autonomous and very active technical, administrative, and logistical structure.

According to Stocchino, the building of a ship is basic to Italy's installing a base and thus a real presence in the Antarctic. Since the main technical consideration of any expedition is the transportation of men and materiel, the ship must be a compromise between a means of transport, an icebreaker, and a laboratory ship. Basic requirements: great stability (the Antarctic seas are beaten by very violent storms during which the superstructures of ships are fearfully laden with ice) and great strength. A flight deck for a helicopter with an appropriate hangar is indispensable. It is thought that the largest of the five ships being planned by the CNR could be conceived with these characteristics.

The broad aspects of the possible Italian Antarctic program have already been studied. After a small expedition that should leave by the end of this year for the purpose of establishing a first nucleus of personnel ready to participate in future programs, a second stage (1982/83) should open with the equipping of a ship and the establishment of a base. Only beginning with 1984 can the actual research program start.

Several reasons suggest that the Italian base be located near the existing McMurdo (U.S.A.) base on the Ross Ice Shelf, or else near the German base located on the Ronne Ice Shelf. Proximity to McMurdo would make it possible to utilize the landing strips of William Field and its "port." The base moreover would be near the Transantarctic Range and the Dry Valleys, with their considerable facilities for the displacement of helicopters. Furthermore, a base on Ross island would make it possible to carry out operations as far the opposite Weddel Sea by plane, or as far as the Amundsen and Bellingshausen seas by ship.

The choice of the Ronne Ice Shelf would be important chiefly because of its nearness to the Pensacola mountain range and the Defek massif that offer promising possibilities for the exploitation of mineral resources. But precisely for this reason there have been controversies for some time among the countries that are operating in the area.

The discovery of the resources and the growing possibility that they may become economically accessible obviously have accentuated the significance of these controversies and have caused new ones to emerge. Projects like the "Drilling Project" carried out in the Dry Valleys and that of the Ross Ice Shelf in the Ross Sea carried out by the Japanese, Americans, and New Zealanders, or the "Biomass" project (Biological investigations of marine systems and stocks) begun this year did not fail to cause suspicions and slight disagreements in the countries of the Third World, which fear being excluded in the future from the possibility of obtaining the Antarctic resources that they tend to consider to be a joint patrimony. On the other hand, many countries that operate in the Antarctic claim the right of exploitation, citing the point that the discovery of ore deposits is the fruit of huge investments made over many years.

The entry of Italy into the Antarctic continent is thus occurring within an already anxious context and with the weakness that always characterizes the position of the latest arrival. For this reason, too, the participation should immediately receive necessary financial support, currently estimated at about a yearly cost of 10 billion, at present costs, apart from the cost of the installation of the base and the building of the ship. But political and diplomatic support will also be very important as a contribution to an effort that must be a joint one in order to prevent the race to the exploitation of the Antarctic from becoming the cause of dangerous conflicts.

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