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# Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 6/81)

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KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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CONTENTS

SOUTH KOREA

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

'SEKAI' Examines Japan-South Korea Relations (Otsuki Shinji; SEKAI, Nov 81) .....	1
--	---

- a -

[III - ASIA - 109 FOUO]

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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

'SEKAI' EXAMINES JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Nov 81 pp 122-128

[Article by ASAHI News Reporter Otsuki Shinji: "The Focus of New Collusion Between Japan and Korea: Rush to Seoul"]

[Text] Japan-South Korea Relationship Enters a New Phase

The 11th regular session of the Japan-South Korea cabinet conference in Seoul (10-11 September) broke the precedent of a joint declaration and concluded on an unexpectedly discordant note. Following the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, Sonoda and No Sin-yong, in August, the "second round" of the Japan-South Korea governmental level negotiations ended in disharmony. The general interpretation is that formal fence-mending will be delayed for a while. The Japanese Government declared that it will assume a watchful waiting stance for the time being. "We will rest a bit.... I think it is sufficient that we think about the future in small doses...." (12 September, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa)

Despite the ostensible confrontation, "Japan and South Korea are in basic agreement with regard to the perception of the international and regional situations. It has been a meaningful conference in that we were able to devote our zeal and effort to it and that we were able to obtain bright hope and anticipation for the future." (Foreign Minister No's speech at the closing ceremony of the cabinet conference) Thus it is true that Japan has steadily advanced toward advocacy of the Chun Doo Hwan administrations. The joint press release of the cabinet conference, compiled after much parley to avoid the impression of a split, stated that "under the current harsh conditions, the Japanese cabinet members appreciate the fact that South Korea's defense efforts are contributing to the maintenance of a balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. In order to contribute to Korea's nation-building efforts as a friend and neighbor, Japan will offer economic cooperation insofar as it can." With regard to the passage recognizing that there is a tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, Japan's original draft contained a phrase regarding "the presence of American forces in Korea." At the last stage, Japan agreed to strike this passage. According to Foreign Ministry sources, South Korea's argument was that "it would not be appropriate to include the United States in a discussion involving Japan and Korea." But it is clear that the true intent was to give a close-up focus to Korea's defense efforts.

Behind the recognition of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the evaluation that South Korea's defense efforts are contributing to the balance of power and promotion of the Fifth Republic's nation-building effort under the Chun Doo Hwan administration through economic cooperation can be seen a blueprint for the Japan-U.S.-South Korea

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division of labor in Northeast Asia strongly advocated by the Reagan administration. The basic tenor is very different from the joint declarations of the 10 previous cabinet conferences, which gave high marks for promotion of North-South talks and other tension-mitigating efforts and expressed hope for peaceful unification in the future. Although the press release does not go as far as "economic cooperation for security," in Japan-South Korea relations the dimension of fence-mending has been superseded, and we are about to enter a definite new phase.

## Rush to Visit South Korea

The shift toward "security mindedness" in the Japan-South Korea relationship can be seen as a logical development resulting from the Japan-U.S. declaration that in order "to promote peace on the Korea Peninsula as an important factor for the peace and security of East Asia, including Japan," Japan will accept appropriate responsibilities, and from the Ottawa summit declaration which concluded that "we need a strong defensive strength ourselves"--a conclusion based on a cautionary spirit against Russia. But we must not forget that an important factor which is supporting South Korea's strong negotiating posture is South Korea's offensive assault on Japanese political circles. Foreign ministers conferences, regular cabinet meetings, coordination by administrators--are all legitimate avenues for pressing its (South Korea's) views. At the same time, it is generating a mood of "acceptance of South Korea's position as reasonable" among Liberal Democrats, Democratic Socialists and even Komeito Party members. That is, South Korea is pressuring governmental, Foreign Ministry policy decisions by inundating the outer perimeters.

For approximately half a year after Chun Doo Hwan's takeover--September 1980--there were practically no visits by South Korea officials to Japan, and Japanese politicians' visits to South Korea were limited to a few pro-Korea Kishi/Fukuda faction members, and those were infrequent. The inauguration of President Chun on 1 September was attended by Japan-South Korea Cooperative Council Chairman Shinsuke Kishi; Secretariat Director-General Shun Hasegawa; Director Kazuo Yatsugi; representative of the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League chairman, Kazuyuki Kasuga; and Japan-South Korea Friendship Association Vice Chairman Masahide Kanegama. On 24-26 September 1980, former Prime Minister Fukuda visited Korea accompanied by Liberal Democratic Diet members Shintaro Ishihara, Noboru Sato, Mutsuki Kato, Yoshiaki Mori and others, and met with President Chun, Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwack, Prime Minister Nam Tok-u and Foreign Minister No. At President Chun's inauguration under the new constitution on 3 March this year, Foreign Minister Masaki Ito attended as the (Japanese) Government's representative. Aside from him, however, the delegation was the same--Kasuga, Japan-South Korea Diet Members League Executive Secretary Matsuhei Mori and so on.

The situation changed dramatically around early June, when the regular session of the Diet ended. First of all, the traffic of Japanese and South Korean politicians expanded significantly. In particular, the Japanese politicians' pilgrimage to Seoul took on proportions worthy of the term "rush." Secondly, there was a significant broadening of the class of politicians going to South Korea--in terms of age, the appearance of younger men in the middle echelon; in terms of Liberal Democratic Party factions, Daito of the Tanaka faction; and it culminated in the first ever visit by Komeito Party Chairman Takeire. These phenomena may be interpreted as a significant weakening of the traditional Japan-South Korea pipeline.

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In the context of Japanese circumstances, the tentative conclusion of the Kim Jae Kyu trial became the springboard. "In January 1981, the current South Korean Government recommended that the Supreme Court's death sentence be reduced and Japan declared that it applauded South Korea's action as promoting Japan-South Korea friendship and cooperative ties." (Diplomatic Blue Book) the interpretation was that "there is no longer the weight of the Kim Jae Kyu incident." Nevertheless, the Chun Doo Hwan administration was responsible for initiating the new contacts with covert intentions. After the presidential election under the new constitution on 3 March, Chun Doo Hwan was inaugurated. By transferring the second man in power--National Armed Forces Security Chief No Tae-u--to the post of second minister of state and so on, he consolidated the new order and he established as the most important prerequisite for the time being the goal of obtaining from Japan a 6-billion-dollar economic cooperation agreement tied to the security pact. While trying to negotiate through official diplomatic channels, South Korea also started to lay the foundation for directly influencing the Japanese political process.

The first group to visit South Korea after the close of the ordinary session of the Diet was the Liberal Democratic Party's policy study group (Kisaragi Club) of Hideshi Aizawa (9-12 June) at the invitation of the South Korea-Japan Diet Members League. The visiting delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party Policy Affairs Research Council (15-19 June) led by Council Chairman Shintaro Abe was invited by South Korea's new party in power, the Democratic Justice Party. A group of nine national Diet members of the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League headed by Chairman Ken Yasui (14-16 July) was invited by President Chun. House of Representatives Steering Committee Chairman Motoaki Yanashita and five other Diet members (21-24 July) were invited by South Korean Assembly Steering Committee Chairman Yi Chong-chan. Vice Secretary General of the cabinet Chikara Kawara and other parliamentary vice ministers (besides the Secretariat, the delegation, which visited 11-13 August, consisted of the Foreign Ministry, MITI, Transportation, and Self Defense Forces vice ministers) was invited by the South Korean Government. Komeito Party Chairman Takeire's visit to South Korea took the form of an invitation from South Korean National Assembly Speaker, Chong Nae-hyok. Indeed, they were literally surrounded by the Chun Doo Hwan administration. An organized, collaborative, well-thought-out diplomacy-by-invitation could be clearly detected in their moves.

## Shadow of Younger Leaders

The prime minister, Vice Premier Sin Sung-hyon (Economic Planning Agency chief), National Defense Minister Chu Yong-Pok, National Security Planning Agency head Yu Hak-song--all the major ministerial members of the Chun regime--South Korea-Japan Diet Members League Chairman Yi Chae-Hyong, Chief Secretary Kim Yun-hwan all those in charge of dealing with the visiting Japanese delegation spent time in conference with them, bombarding them with South Korea's claim: "The threat from Russia is making the East-West military balance uncertain. The defense efforts of South Korea holding off the "North" are contributing to the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, South Korea pours 6 percent of its GNP and 35 percent of its national budget into national defense. It can no longer rely on the United States economically. since Japan benefits directly from South Korean security, Japan should consider South Korea's situation as its own problem." "The trade deficit that accumulated in the past 15 years since normalization of diplomatic relations totals 19 billion yen. There is pent-up grievance within South Korea that what Japan has been doing is not economic cooperation but a profit-motivated commercial transaction." When appropriate, the

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Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan and the Second Military Build-Up Plan are explained in detail. The 6-billion-dollar economic cooperation request has been made unofficially through Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Abe and Japan-South Korea Diet Members League Chairman Yasui. "Seeing is believing" is South Korea's motto. A secret tunnel 40 kilometers north of Seoul that the "North" dug for invasion of the South and outposts along the Demilitarized Zone are included in the Japanese delegations' itinerary, and the North's "rapacious penetration" is repeatedly detailed.

A group of the Blue House [The official residence of the ROK President] secretaries, which forms the nucleus of the Chun Doo Hwan administration, the military and the National Assembly members who are nearly all freshmen representatives--many of these men belonged to the hangul [Korean language] generation and received thorough anti-communist, anti-Japanese education under the Syngman Rhee rule. It is the generation that opposed normalization of Japan-South Korea relations. Therefore, rather than the individual pipelines acting as healing catalysts, reliance on "rational, mutual understanding" (South Korea-Japan Diet Members League Chief Secretary Kim Yun-hwan) is strong on the South Korean side. The fact that South Korea did not bend its claim and handled the negotiations with Japan regarding the economic cooperation question in a "straight beeline fashion" (without compromise) is based on this kind of hard-nosed stand. Members of the South Korean delegation to the cabinet conference disclosed that "since they are diplomats, they know that there is a settlement point in negotiations but the men behind them (middle echelon, younger members of the administration) must be persuaded; and they are like a wall."

#### Exchanges Between Japan-South Korea Diet Members League and South Korea-Japan Diet Members League

The central figure in the Diet member's intercourse is still the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League and its Korean counterpart, the South Korea-Japan Diet Members League. The South Korea-Japan Diet Members League was officially founded by 197 Diet members on 10 June, and the lineup of actors has changed completely. Many influential politicians were arrested by the authorities and banished from political activity. President Chun Doo Hwan, who assumed his seat through the National Conference for Unification election set forth under the new constitution, ordered his political council, which he controls directly, to prohibit 835 old politicians from activity. Although 270 were exempt from the regulatory sanction, former Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil, a long-time chairman of the South Korea-Japan Diet Members League, and another former prime minister and the National Assembly Speaker, Chong Il-kwon, who attended Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's funeral--politicians who have had close ties with Japan--left the public sphere. Administrator-at-large Yi Sung-hi, who formerly handled all dealings with Japan and was regarded as the shadow foreign minister, is now concentrating on his post as the Asia Basket Association President, and he has not had any contacts with Japanese politicians since participating in the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League's special plenary session in December 1979.

The new principals are Chairman Yi Chae-hyong, First Vice Chairman Kwon Chong-tal and Chief Secretary Kim Yun-hwan. Chairman Yi is a politician who held the position of vice president of the New Democratic Party, but thereafter he switched to the economic world and returned to the political arena as the ruling party's (Democratic Justice Party) delegate under Chun Doo Hwan. He is 68 and is the elder statesman. He has not been involved in past liaisons with Japan, but he attended Chuo University

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and is quite fluent in Japanese. These, then, are his curriculum vitae which qualified him for his new post. Vice Chief Secretary Kwon is a 15th class graduate of the Army Officers' School and is chief of National Military Security Information and a power behind the Chun Doo Hwan (11th class) administration. He now holds the position of operational chief (chief secretary) of the Democratic Justice Party, which he helped to form. Prior to his state visit to the United States this August, he stopped in Japan and discussed the cooperation issue centering around the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League. Chief Secretary Kim transferred to the post of the Democratic Justice Party Assembly member from the CHOSEN NIPPO editorial staff, at which post he acquired experience as the correspondent in the United States and in Japan. His strengths are his many acquaintances in Japan, his inherent energetic personality and his flawless Japanese. When he came to Japan in May and again in June to present his credentials and to attend the fifth Japan-South Korea Friendship Society conference, he not only called on former Prime Minister Fukuda, Foreign Ministers Sonoda and governmental and Liberal Democratic Party leaders, but he also got in touch with Komeito, Democratic Socialist and New Liberal Club [Shin Jiyu Kurabu] Party members as well.

In response, on 3 June the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League chose former House of Councillors Speaker Ken Yasui (Liberal Democrat) as chairman to fill the seat left empty for 2 years by the death of Chu Funada. But Alternate Chairman Kasuga and Secretary General Mori and the other leadership-level participants have not changed much. Aside from the new chairman, the addition of Policy Affairs Research Council Vice Chairman Abe and Defense Agency Director General Nobumoto Kanemaru have been the only significant changes. According to sources connected with the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League, South Korea strongly advocated the appointment of former Prime Minister Fukuda to the chairmanship and has said privately that if possible, the other lineup should be changed completely. But Mr Fukuda declined firmly and instead recommended Mr Yasui. Those around Mr Yasui comment that "although he has always been interested in the Japan-South Korea issue, he is not a traditional Korea hand. Perhaps his prestige as speaker of the House of Councillors was the deciding factor in his appointment...." In any case, Japan did not agree to change the leadership lineup altogether. During President Pak's time, narrow, individual pipelines were thought much of and they became hotbeds of corruption. For the new Japan-South Korea relations, South Korea wanted broader ties at newer levels. However, Japan did not undergo a revolutionary reorganization; therefore, there was no basis for criticizing Japan's traditional roster.

South Korea's impetuosity caused much bewilderment and displeasure to the Japanese. When the Japanese delegates to the cabinet conference visited President Chun, one of the influential cabinet ministers said to him: "This may be uncalled for, but I would like you to hear me out. Perhaps it will serve as a point of reference.... I have been connected with the exchange of Diet members and have come to South Korea a number of times. But on this trip, I discover that my acquaintances have either vanished or been demoted. South Korea appears to have removed the people who have done wrong in the past and I do not defend the assembly members who were clearly proven to have done wrong, but those who participated in the Japan-South Korea transactions before and who did not err or who might have erred but now are sorry, should be put to effective use, perhaps in civilian roles...." His comments reflect the Japanese attitude.



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In any case, the activities of the Japan-South Korea and South Korea-Japan Diet Members Leagues have made a good start, and immediately after the conclusion of the regular session of the Japan-South Korea cabinet conference, the Ninth South Korea-Japan Diet Members League Joint Assembly was held in Seoul on 16 and 17 September. The joint declaration published after 2 days of debate "expressed deep concern regarding the shared recognition that the abnormal increase in the Soviet military might is creating many uncertainties in various regions of the world. The assembly recognized that in East Asia, there is constant crisis arising out of noticeable military buildup and constant aggressive acts by North Korea and there is severe tension on the Korean Peninsula as a result." In addition, the Japanese Diet delegation "expressed appreciation for the defensive effort of the Republic of Korea and thorough understanding of the difficult economic situation it faces as a result of the heavy burden of national defense cost," and promised "that (Japan) will give economic support in all sincerity. The logical construction that South Korea repeatedly reiterated at the foreign ministers conference and the cabinet conference was enumerated pretty much in its original form. It can be said that the realistic role of the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League, "backed-up" by the Chun Doo Hwan administration, has clearly been detailed.

## Tanaka Faction's Movements

But as pointed out before, one of the characteristics of South Korea's attempt to create new contacts is its sudden intimacy with the Tanaka faction, which had been relatively distant--in comparison to the Kishi, Fukuda, Shiina, Nakasone factions. House of Representatives Steering Committee Chairman Yamashita, who visited South Korea at the invitation of the South Korean National Assembly Steering Committee chairman, was accompanied by Tanaka faction politicians Yoshiro Yayashi, Tasaburo Doi, and Noboru Tawara. From 23 to 26 August, Noboru Takeshita, Keizo Kobori, Masaharu Gotoda, and Seiroku Kajiyama--all belonging to the same faction--visited South Korea. Foreign Minister who came to Japan for the foreign ministers conference, was scheduled to call on former Prime Minister Tanaka as well as Miki and Fukuda, but was unable to find time in his schedule as Tanaka was at Karuizawa. There is no question that South Korea is well acquainted with political cliques and the powerful influence of the Tanaka faction over the policy decisions of the Suzuki administration.

On 3 September the same former Prime Minister Tanaka scolded the younger members of his faction for "getting excited over 6-billion-dollar aid." South Korea was greatly heartened by his comment. As a matter of fact, a Japanese participant at the Japan-South Korea cabinet conference disclosed that the South Korean Assembly members and journalists often told him that "6 billion dollars worth of economic cooperation tied to the security pact is quite natural in view of the Japan-U.S. joint declaration and the Ottawa summit. And besides, former Prime Minister Tanaka says it is all right." He was embarrassed by this excessively high appraisal of former Prime Minister Tanaka.

Currently there appears to be vigorous pressure applied through the South Korean Embassy in Japan to get Liberal Democratic Party Executive Board Chairman Nikaido to visit South Korea. Mr Nikaido has been in China and has just completed the task of a special emissary of the Japanese Government in bringing the Sino-Japanese plant exportation question to a de facto conclusion. Although the general scenario was already written by undersecretary level personnel, the 300-billion-yen capital fund cooperation that Mr Nikaido took with him was hastily decided in a last-ditch negotiating session among the governmental agencies to synchronize with his visit to China. It was said that his close tie with Prime Minister Suzuki was the decisive factor. In

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view of his position as the highest executive of the Tanaka faction, it is no wonder that South Korea has high hopes regarding his influence. In any event, South Korea considers Fukuda and Tanaka as the two pillars supporting the Suzuki administration. South Korea is attempting to cement the bond of friendship with the Fukuda faction through the Japan-South Korea Diet Members League and related pipelines; at the same time, separate invitational diplomacy is being used to approach the Tanaka faction.

It appears to be a carefully planned strategy based on an astute analysis of the clique configuration within the Liberal Democratic Party.

It has been stated previously that the striking advance of middle-echelon, younger Liberal Democratic Party members into center stage is also a new trend. Following Mr Aizawa's "Kisaragi Club's" visit to South Korea, freshmen and sophomore Diet members' (Shizuka Kamei, Akio Karino and so on) "Tadpole Club," too, went to South Korea. Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawara and a group of other parliamentary vice ministers' group, President Chun expressed his hope that "Japan and South Korea have maintained friendly relations thus far, but hereafter we hope that we won't merely follow the old ways but will create friendly relations through new methods." In addition, he asserted that the consciousness of ordinary citizens needs to be revolutionized. That is to say, Korean nationals have entirely too strong an anti-Japanese sentiment because of unfortunate incidents of the past, and likewise, Japanese understanding of the actual state of affairs in Korea is insufficient. Thus, "in order to resolve this lack of understanding, I (President Chun) hope that you will persuade your people."

## Chairman Takeire Visits South Korea

Komeito Party Chairman Takeire's visit to South Korea symbolized the widespread and varied nature of the new ties between Japan and South Korea being formulated now. Traditionally, the intercourse with Korea by the opposition was the exclusive domain of the Democratic Socialist Party, and that at the discretion of aide-de-camp Kasuga. But although South Korea has taken quite a hawkish diplomatic stance, it realized that the Japanese public opinion building offensive should not be restricted to the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party. South Korea decided that "in terms of numbers, the LDP and DSP together may be sufficient; but the index of public opinion in Japan may be more faithfully represented by the utterances of the Komeito Party." (South Korea-Japan Diet Members League leadership) Consequently, South Korea spurred on Takeire's visit to Korea.

The Chun Doo Hwan administration's efforts in lobbying the visiting Komeito Party group reaped unexpectedly good results. The Komeito Central Committee meeting on 7 September focused on a speech which elucidated the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces, and Mr Takeire characterized the militarily tense situation on the Korean Peninsula as an objective reality and affirmed that although there is a tendency to downgrade the improvement of Japan-South Korea relations, the Chun Doo Hwan administration's advocacy of a new people-based friendship, quite detached from present and past experience, is appropriate for the new era and should be cultivated. Policy Board Chairman Masaki touched on Japan-South Korea economic cooperation and spoke in favor of special consideration: "Judging from the location of the two states across a narrow strait, it would be difficult to give aid as we would for all other countries of the world. It is necessary to take some steps."

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The shift of Komeito to a pro-South Korea stance created complex reactions among the various opposition parties. It appears that there may be polarization within the opposition coalition over the Korean Peninsula policy. In full agreement are the Democratic Socialists. They are happy because they have gained supporters who would give prominence to South Korea. The Communist Party has a contrasting reaction. Although the Socialists would not overtly criticize on account of their alliance with Komeito, in reality, their views are similar to those of the Communists. That is to say, they agree that Komeito's line is a clear elucidation of the "member of the West" concept and that it leads to promotion of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea military system. Within the Socialist Party, especially, there is a concern that since the breach over the South Korea policy has become so marked, alliance (between Socialists and Komeito) would necessarily fall apart.

An important condition for the success of the middle-of-the road coalition is an agreement regarding the national security and defense policies. The salient issues, needless to say, are: the role of the Self Defense Forces, continuation of the Japan-U.S. security pact system and the Korean Peninsula policy. As one aims for a middle-of-the-road coalition with a view to participation in the administration in the near future, one must deal with affirmation of the national security/defense policy. The Komeito Party's pro-South Korea stance patterned after the Democratic Socialist Party's symbolizes this fact. Then, what were the reactions of the New Liberal Club and Social Democratic League.

New Liberal Club representative Tagawa disclosed at a press conference on 4 September that "on defense policy and South Korea policy and the like we cannot go along with the current Democratic Socialist Party's views," thereby aborting the chance of forming a coalition in the Diet among Komeito, the Democratic Socialists, the New Liberal Club and the Socialist People's League.

The truth of the matter is that a speech by Democratic Socialist Party adviser Kasuga at a television debate implying that security-motivated economic cooperation is proper and just was interpreted by Tagawa as a show of bad faith, and he in turn decided against joining the coalition led by the Democratic Socialist Party. The Japan-South Korea issue had an important impact on the middle-of-the-road coalition movement.

In the meantime, the Socialist People's League has continued to have intercourse with the North. For example, representative Tagawa visited North Korea during April of this year. At the same time, the league's position regarding the Kim Jae Kyu incident is that so far there has been no definitive political solution, including the return of the status quo. It shows no inclination to agree with the Democratic Socialist's stance nor with Komeito's change of heart. Although South Korea's shakeup of the Komeito Party was successful, it rather invited negative results as far as the New Liberal Club and the Socialist People's League are concerned.

## South Korea Has the Initiative

Finally, I would like once again to touch on the issue of economic cooperation tied to the security agreement. According to Foreign Ministry sources, after the conclusion of the cabinet conference, the South Korean representatives began adopting the following lines: "Cement donated for social development will enable construction of highways for moving troops and encampments. Receiving rice and apportioning it to soldiers does not constitute military aid." The fact that Japan praised South Korea's defense efforts created the basic flow of things, and there is indication of a decision that the rest--disposition of the total amount--is a matter of political settlement.

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With regard to Japan's declared avowal of separation of security consideration and nation-building economic cooperation, it appears that the distinction between the two has become quite blurred. But avoidance of "economic cooperation tied to security consideration" was founded on the concept that in view of Japan's adherence to a peaceful constitution, it would be impossible to provide aid which is really a transfer of defense cost. Another significant element is (Japan's) diplomatic policy of cumulative contacts (commercial, economic, cultural) with the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) and through them, opening up avenues for communication. Still another is the recognition that the maintenance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is a matter of mutual concern to China and the USSR [as well as to Japan and the two Koreas], and that China and the Southeast Asian states must also be included in the consideration. That is to say, kyohi kaito [the "refusal"] was not based solely on the principle of economic cooperation--that governmental development assistance be directed toward the developing nations with a low income level or that cooperation between Japan and South Korea be, in the main, a civilian effort and that the aid is intended for stabilizing civilian life and improving people's welfare; and that there can be no guarantee of any comprehensive figure and so on.

Of course, there is need for broadening the avenue for Japan-South Korea communication at various levels, including political intercourse, and deepening of mutual understanding. Compared to the murkiness of the Japan-South Korea relations under the Pak regime, the current state of affairs at least is an improvement. But the loud chorus urging "appreciation of South Korea's position" composed not only of Liberal Democrats but of Democratic Socialists and Komeito as well, acting as a "cheering section" for the Chun Doo Hwan administration, ties the hands of Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Sonoda, who are trying to refuse aid that is coupled with the security issue; and there is danger of that chorus being used to destroy their political base. Already, the symptoms are apparent and the axis of coordinates has shifted considerably to a pro-South Korea position (in favor of the military government). We must not translate "ideological mutual understanding" into recognition of the Soviet's or the North's threat, or view and approach the Japan-U.S.-South Korea security pact in Northeast Asia and the division of labor between Japan and South Korea with "South Korean eyes."

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