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West Europe Report

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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TERRORISM

SPAIN

DETENTION OF KEY TERRORIST MAY FRUSTRATE NEW ETA STRATEGY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Nov 81 pp 55-64

[Text] If the Antiterrorist Central Brigade, a branch of the General Headquarters of Information, had not arrested Juan Antonio Madariaga Erezuma, the head of the information commands of the military wing of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] in Madrid, just 12 months ago, a bus filled with commissioned and noncommissioned army officers would have been blown to bits before this coming 20 November, the anniversary of General Franco's death.

The military wing of ETA had chosen as its target one of the buses that leave the Army Ministry on Prim Street every morning between 0730 and 0800 hours and after picking up various groups of commissioned and noncommissioned officers in downtown Madrid, take Castellana Avenue to Castilla Square and then continue along Colmenar Viejo Highway to the El Goloso Barracks.

According to CAMBIO 16's information, two of the army's most important units are quartered in these barracks: the "Alcazar de Toledo" and "Asturias 31" regiments, both belonging to Armored Division No 1.

This division, which has more than 14,000 men, 210 tanks, 66 cannons, 122 artillery pieces, 290 armored vehicles and more than 1,500 support vehicles, is the Spanish Army's most important unit, and it could take Madrid militarily in a matter of 2 hours.

The ETA terrorists' planned assassination of some 50 commissioned and non-commissioned officers from the Armored Division was nothing more and nothing less than a bid to achieve what ultraconservative sectors had been trying to do long before 23 February: "move" the army against our democracy and constitution.

Appointment in France

"Dictatorships are obviously the best medium in which terrorists can engage in proselytism," a high-level Interior Ministry official told CAMBIO 16.

The plan to dynamite the bus carrying the army officers was communicated to the information command of ETA's military wing in Madrid last September by the Basque terrorist organization's three top leaders: Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, alias "Txomin," the number one commander of the military machine;

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Lorenzo Santiago Lasa Michelena, alias "Txiquierdi," the head of the illegal commands, and Jose Luis Ansola Larranaga, "Pello el Viejo," the head of the information division.

Maria del Carmen Gonzalez Penalva, one of the members of the information command in Madrid and who is currently being sought by the police, was in charge of contacting the ETA leadership in France.

After a rendez-vous in a cafe in Saint Jean de Luz, "Txomin," "Txiquierdi" and "Pello el Viejo" ordered Gonzalez Penalva and her companion, Juan Antonio Madariaga Erezuma, to put aside all plans that they had under way and to devote themselves exclusively to the search for a bridge or a sewer along Colmenar Viejo Highway into Madrid where they could place between 100 and 150 kilos of "goma-2" to dynamite one of the army buses heading for El Goloso.

The information had to be in ETA's possession by mid-October in order for it to have enough time to decide on the final positioning of the charges.

Jose Antonio Madariago Erezuma, the head of ETA's information commands in the Spanish capital, was unable to carry out the plans. Ten days after the Basque terrorist organization's top leaders had met in southern France, agents of the Central Information Brigade captured him on Orense Street in Madrid. His companion, Maria del Carmen Gonzalez Penalva, fled Spain with the police hot on her heels.

Change of Strategy

Madariaga Erezuma's arrest did, however, help State Security Forces to familiarize themselves with ETA's plans in Madrid and, in particular, with their basic guidelines, which at present entail a major change of strategy. According to the studies done by the Interior Ministry on the information gained from Madariaga, the ETA's military wing plans to abandon isolated attacks on army officers, commanders and generals and to assault them as a group.

"The ETA, which has so far gone about shooting at individual Armed Forces officers and generals," one of the Interior Ministry's main analysts pointed out, "has now realized that picking off victims one-by-one is not going to 'move' the Armed Forces and that they need to undertake more ambitious activities. Therefore, they are going to attack the Armed Forces as an institution."

The government has charted its own strategy to counter ETA terrorism. For the past 2 months the police has focused all of its efforts on wiping out all of ETA's infrastructure in the interior. The terrorists' operational capacity has thus been greatly reduced, as well as their chances of launching a major attack in which several commands of action would take part simultaneously.

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The fact that ETA allegedly intends to attack the army as an institution does not mean that it is going to stop killing individual military officers.

The State Security Forces are well aware of this, as they found more than 50 file cards on army and navy colonels and generals among the papers that Madariaga Erezuma had in his apartment on Madera Street in Madrid.

Through Madariaga Erezuma, ETA's military wing had maintained almost permanent surveillance of the army officers living in the military housing on Santa Engracia and San Francisco de Sales streets and were familiar with practically all of the vehicles they used, the routes they took, their work hours and their established habits.

For example, the terrorists knew that a major general who until a short time ago lived on Santa Engracia Street took the same car every day: a blue Seat-124. They were also familiar with his routine: He left home between 0945 and 1000 hours, got in his official car and then, a couple of hundred meters past his house, turned right onto Maudes Street.

After studying his route thoroughly for a month, Juan Antonio Madariaga Erezuma marked one of the "yield right of way" signs on Maudes Street with a cross. This was the exact spot to assassinate the general, because his car had to come practically to a stop there to let the cars coming in the opposite direction pass.

The King as a Target

Also found in Madariaga's possession was a similar plan to assassinate Army Chief of Staff Jose Gabeiras Montero; ETA knew where he lived, the kind of official car he drove and the number of police escorts who accompany him everywhere.

Two other high-ranking military officers were also under "permanent surveillance" by the information commands of ETA's military wing: Generals Jose Juste Fernandez, a 63-year old native of Madrid and the former commander of Brunete Armored Division No 1, and Felix Alvarez-Arenas Pacheco, a 68-year old former army minister.

But the terrorists were giving "priority attention" not only to the army. Among the documents that the police seized from Madariaga in his apartment at 57 Madera Street in Madrid was a gray folder with the words "Royal Family."

Inside it, agents from the Superior Police Force found an extensive report on King Juan Carlos's overseas trips and a detailed study analyzing the security measures that the monarch customarily takes during his vacations.

In other folders the police found extensive documentation on the suppliers to Zarzuela Palace, the royal residence, as well as detailed information on a number of persons close to the royal family. One of them is the Marquis

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of Albuquerque, Beltran Osorio y Diez de la Rivera, Juan de Borbon's secretary, who was under surveillance for a month and a half. Madariaga sent the information on all his movements to ETA leaders in France.

By all indications, the ETA's military wing wanted to set its gunsights on King Juan Carlos or well-known figures close to his family or professional circle, as happened last May with Lt Gen Joaquin de Vulenzuela, the commander of his military picket, in order to force the monarch to institute harsher rule in the country, which would benefit ETA's interests.

Surveillance of 600 Individuals

In addition to the king and ranking military officers, some 600 others have been under surveillance by the terrorist group, which was planning attempts on their lives. The reports on these individuals (politicians, judges, newsmen and businessmen) were found in a more than 2,000-page file divided into 45 folders of different colors, which the police discovered in Madariaga's possession when they arrested him.

According to police estimates, these 45 folders contain the license plate numbers of more than 1,000 official, unmarked and private vehicles and the addresses of at least 800 homes that the ETA had put on its lists so that it could later select its targets.

The police also found in the Madera Street apartment detailed diagrams of Carabanchel, Herrera de la Mancha and Zamora prisons, as well as two huge maps of Madrid dotted with four different color thumb-tacks. The map showed the exact location of the homes of the four categories of persons whom ETA was planning to assassinate. The red tacks represented judges; the green ones, Superior Police Force officials; the blue ones, military officers, and the black ones, journalists.

The file, considered the most important confiscated from ETA over the past 10 years, also contained some surprises. For example, the Basque terrorist group kept an up-to-date index-card system on the country's main political parties: the Democratic Center Union, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, the Spanish Communist Party, Popular Alliance and New Force.

Party Headquarters

These cards listed the sites of the various party headquarters, the arrival and departure schedules of their main leaders, the model and license plate number of their vehicles and the security measures that some of them employed. This information seems to indicate that at some point ETA might have entertained the idea of firing on Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Santiago Carrillo or Felipe Gonzalez.

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In late March 1980 the Basque terrorists also had plans to take the life of Fernando Abril Martorell, who was then economic vice president under Adolfo Suarez's fourth administration.

According to the information that this magazine had access to, in mid-February Madariaga Erezuma, the head of the ETA information commands in Madrid, happened to discover where Abril Martorell lived in the northern part of Madrid.

For a month and a half, Madariaga kept the former vice president under surveillance once or twice a week (so as not to arouse suspicions among his escort car drivers), and he learned that Abril Martorell's vehicle, a Seat-131, left Pedro Muguruza Street between 0930 and 1000 hours and followed the same route: Pedro Muguruza-Padre Damian-Paseo de la Habana-Paseo de la Castellana.

Driving his own car, Madariaga covered the same route as Abril Martorell's official car some 20 times and came to this conclusion: The ideal spot to assassinate him was at the entrance to the tunnel that connects Paseo de la Habana with Castellana.

Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez beat ETA to the punch, however, In the summer of 1980, he renounced his confidence in Vice President Abril Martorell, who thus left the administration, and the terrorists automatically abandoned the plans they had formulated to kill him.

Magistrates

National Court Magistrate Siro Garcia Perez also had a terrorist command on his heels for 2 months. Madariaga Erezuma had located his home on Rosario del Pino Street in mid-1980. Garcia Perez, who had a police escort, according to the ETA report, drove a yellow Seat-124 at the time and often changed routes to his office at the National Courthouse.

Sometimes he went by Cuzco Square, down Castellana and up to Colon Square, and other times he detoured onto Orense Street.

"The best spot to execute him," Madariaga Erezuma wrote to ETA leaders, "is a 'yield right of way' sign on Orense Street." ETA was unable to carry out its designs, however.

Shortly after the report got to the group's leaders in France, Judge Siro Garcia Perez moved, and the terrorists were unable to locate his new home. They did, however, find out where Ricardo Varon Cobos, the regular judge in Court No 1 at the National Courthouse, lived.

Varon Cobos was not listed in the 1980 Madrid telephone directory. But the ETA military wing knew that prior to his post in the National Courthouse he had been assigned to other courts in Madrid. The terrorists then looked in past telephone directories and found out his address and telephone number.

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Ricardo Varon lived at the time in the Ventas district. Outside his house was a newspaper stand, and every 2 or 3 days Madariaga Erezuma bought a paper there. As he leaned against a doorpost and read his paper, he watched the Court No 1 judge get into his official car and head for Salesas Square, the site of Madrid's courts.

On 25 September, when the police arrested Madariaga on Orense Street in Madrid, he had just been conducting surveillance on Prosecutor Miguel Ibanez Garcia Velasco and Police Commissioner Andres Gomez Margarida, the former superior chief of police in La Coruna and adviser to the Single Antiterrorist Command.

Some months before, the commando chief had also been following other judges and prosecutors, among them Jose Maria Gil Albert, the government attorney general, and Ricardo Hijas Palacios and Jose Antonio de la Campa, Madrid court judges, whom ETA intended to assassinate.

In contrast, they were planning to kidnap Eduardo Aznar Coste, a businessman. The ETA military wing had even pinpointed the spot: at the door to his office on Alcala Street, between Independencia Square and Cibeles. It remained for them only to set a date.

The terrorists, who had been monitoring his every movement, knew that the director of Aznar Shipping lived in a housing development on the outskirts of Madrid, where it would be very difficult to accomplish their plans without the police being alerted within 5 minutes. They also knew that he arrived at his office around 1100 hours and usually left at 1300 hours.

According to the ETA information command's report, Eduardo Aznar drove a green Mercedes and was almost always accompanied by a Renault-12 as an escort.

By referring to the 1977 Finance Ministry lists and "Dicodi," the "heraldic guidebook" of Spain's entrepreneurs, the ETA military wing knew of the Aznar family's fortune and had found out that Eduardo was the president of Ferarco, Nacional Hispanica Aseguradora and Compania Espanola de Pinturas "Internacional." He was also an adviser to the Urquijo Bank and the managing director of Aznar Shipping.

Other Businessmen

The same kidnaping-for-profit scheme included other Madrid businessmen: Luis Valls Tabener, a member of Opus Dei and president of the Banco Popular Espanol; Santiago Foncillas, president of the Businessmen's Club, Preciados Galleries and the multinational corporation Westinghouse; Antonio Enrich Valls, president of Carten and Aceros de Vizcaya and a board member of Bank-union and Union Levantina, and Eloy Censano Martinez, the director general of Michelin.

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The most complete file card, however, was on Basque businessman Luis Olarra, the owner of Bodegas Olarra, Aceros Olarra and a former royal senator.

To judge by the information in the dossier that the terrorists were keeping on him, the ETA was interested in all of his movements around Madrid, where the businessman from Vizcaya, whom the organization has threatened on several occasions, generally takes lengthy vacations, ensconced in the home of relatives or friends and surrounded by bodyguards.

The terrorists had all this kind of information on CAMBIO 16's main executives, on the editor of DIARIO 16, Pedro J. Ramirez, and of EL PAIS, Juan Luis Cebrian, and on the political correspondent of the Miguel Yuste Street paper, Miguel Angel Aguilar, the former editor of DIARIO 16.

Among the bits of information found in ETA's possession (five pages handwritten by the head of the Madrid information commands) were the license plate numbers of official CAMBIO 16 cars, the arrival and departure times of the magazine's top executives, and their home addresses and phone numbers.

The ETA military wing also had extensive reports on the editor of EL PAIS and on journalist Miguel Angel Aguilar, reports drawn up over a period of several months of investigation and surveillance around Madrid.

"All of this clearly shows," one of the newsmen in question told CAMBIO 16, "that the blind terrorists in ETA's military wing are worried about only one kind of press, the only press in this country that has the democratic legitimacy to combat them with the only weapon that journalists have: their typewriters."

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

JUSO CHIEF PIECYK INTERVIEWED ON PACIFISM, SPD

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 9 Nov 81 p 2

[Interview with Willi Piecyk by Pietro Sormani: "We Don't Want World War III To Start in Germany"]

[Text] Willi Piecyk, "Jusos" leader, explains the success of the pacifist movement. He believes that Bonn can do something to disassociate itself from Reagan's policies.

Bonn--The wave of pacifism which has beset West Germany in the past several months has surprised political observers by its amplitude, and raised a number of questions, some of them disturbing, on the fate of the nation. Many persons have interpreted the movement as a rebirth of German nationalism, aiming to reunite the two German states by virtue of their neutrality.

I have asked Willi Piecyk, one of the leaders of the pacifist movement and president of the Social Democratic youth organization, for his opinion on the matter. The "Jusos," as his organization is generally known, number 350,000 and speak for the party's radical wing. On various occasions in the past they have given their leadership a good deal of trouble and, still today, they openly dispute policies followed by the government and Chancellor Schmidt.

A self-educated former policeman, Piecyk looks younger than his 33 years. Under his seeming ingenuity, however, lurks a considerable political acumen.

Violence and the Left

[Question] The 1 October demonstration in Bonn was a great success--but a success for whom?

[Answer] For everyone. For us because we had to combat the opposition forces of the party. Our greatest success was a total lack of violence. A lot of people associate the Left with violence, and they hoped that some untoward incident would afford them a pretext to denounce the demonstration.

[Question] Has it changed anything?

[Answer] Certainly. The Christian Democrats had been talking about creating a "popular front" but, with that enormous crowd that turned out for the

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demonstration, they had to call off their plan. Schmidt must have realized that the pacifist movement is much stronger than he thought. The demonstration, too, started a discussion on our security policy, and made people understand that a nuclear war is indeed possible, and that it can be limited to Europe, just as Reagan pointed out.

[Question] You don't think, then, that the demonstrators' attitude was purely negative?

[Answer] Absolutely not. How can you say an attitude is negative when it calls for a denuclearized zone in Europe? If anything, some of our slogans were too idealistic, but that is only natural in manifestations of the kind.

[Question] Is pacifism part of a broader movement, with armaments only one of its preoccupations?

[Answer] Pacifism should be put within a global political context: the dialogue between North and South, and the battle against social differences, both in Germany and on the international scale. But right now, we consider the most urgent issue to be the stockpiling of arms in Europe by the two superpowers.

The National Question

[Question] Pacifism is common to many European countries, but in Germany it has different characteristics. Would you say that it could be a short cut to reunification?

[Answer] In the past, the national question in Germany was monopolized by the Right. Adenauer often spoke of reunification but, in fact, he carried out a policy that divided the country more than ever. All over the world, the Left has always upheld people's right to sovereignty, from San Salvador to Chile, but that has never happened in Germany. Yet, neither of the two German states enjoys full sovereignty, and Reagan showed that in his decision on the neutron bomb. Reunifying Germany and setting up a denuclearized zone are part of SPD's program, even if Schmidt forgets that sometimes.

[Question] Is it true, as we read in the papers, that a new nationalism, also leftist, is becoming entrenched in Germany?

[Answer] Not in the strict sense of the word. But people have come to realize that another war, if it comes, would break out in this country. It happened twice in the past, and it can happen again in the future.

[Question] By opposing Euromissiles, are you harming SPD by playing into the hands of the Christian Democrats, who favor them? Isn't this a contradiction?

[Answer] The SPD is not the government. The problem is to maintain the party's identity, not to keep it in power. A question like that of NATO missiles must transcend political interests.

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[Question] There is a lot of talk about "Operation Zero." Would the USSR accept it?

[Answer] I hope so. We do not know how much the USSR is willing to concede; therefore, in order to find out, we must negotiate. The difficulty here is that negotiations require so much time, and NATO is committed to install the missiles by 1983. Even the Americans accept "Operation Zero," but it is not clear whether they really want it or whether they are exploiting it in some sort of tactical ploy.

[Question] Will you stage protest demonstrations during Brezhnev's visit at the end of this month?

[Answer] Like other groups, we will undertake some sort of initiative, but we have not yet decided in what form. We are in favor of Brezhnev's visit, but we are against the Soviet SS-20's.

[Question] Would you say that SPD has lost contact with the population of Germany, particularly the young?

[Answer] Not the entire party. The government has made many mistakes in the recent past, thus inducing the people to adopt a psychological attitude that sparked the pacifist movement. Certainly it is not the government's fault if Reagan is in the White House, but it can do something to disassociate itself completely from his policies.

Reconstituting the SPD

[Question] Is it necessary to reconstitute the SPD?

[Answer] Yes. While it is still in power, SPD must recover its identity, beginning at the base. SPD's single alternative is a better SPD. We have no guarantee that if it passes to the opposition, the party would be capable of bettering its program; to the contrary, the facts show that when it was in the opposition, it leaned more to the Right than it does now. In any event, I am not sure that in 1984 (when the legislative term will normally expire), SPD will still be in the saddle. If it is not, in my opinion, that would be no tragedy. Unfortunately, most people who vote for SPD are insensitive to the most pressing issues, like pacifism; they like the small, everyday issues that affect their interests more directly. This is true especially of the working class.

[Question] Is there a leadership problem in SPD?

[Answer] Everyone knows that Brandt and Schmidt differ in their political views. Brandt has a broader vision; his "Ostpolitik," for example, has left its mark on German history. We must realize, however, that the situation is more difficult today. Schmidt errs in behaving as if nothing has changed, as if no economic crisis existed in Germany and the rest of the world. Instead, he persists in believing that it is still possible to maintain constant growth. As I see it, SPD today must confront two problems: the pacifist movement and unemployment. If these problems are not resolved, things could go badly for our party.

"No" to Euromissiles at the SPD Saar Congress

Bonn--At the Saar SPD Congress last night, the great majority of delegates disapproved the installation of medium range missiles in West Germany, in protest against the NATO decision of 12 December 1979.

In a resolution passed by 80 percent of the delegates, the Saar SPD asked the Soviet Union to reduce the number of its atomic warheads aimed against Europe to the 1978 level, and objected to the production of neutron bombs as well as chemical and biological arms.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

REGIS DEBRAY REFLECTS ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10 Oct 81 pp 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 116, 121, 133

[Interview with Regis Debray by Jean-Paul Enthoven: "Régis Debray's Long March"]

[Text] From Che to Mitterrand? From the Third World to high public office? From leftism to social democracy? These, apparently, are Regis Debray's contradictory itineraries. Nevertheless, by publishing, very recently, in the Gallimard publishing house, the book on which he worked for 10 years--"Critique de la raison politique" (Critique of Political Reason)--the new adviser to the president of the Republic takes the risk of finally saying who he is and what he thinks. Jean-Paul Enthoven met him in his office, in the executive mansion.

Regis Debray: The essential thing, for me, is to know how to differentiate between what lasts and what does not last. And a book can last. It can--it should--hold out against the moods of the moment. With regard to the rest...

(The "rest"? In view of the circumstances, it is difficult, however, not to take it into account. Seated under the president's portrait, behind a desk decorated with acanthus motifs, and while ministerial limousines come and go on the gravel of the executive mansion, Regis Debray is no longer only a young man already less young and vaguely restless. His moustache, formerly Nietzschean, has been disciplined. The knot of his tie has been drawn tight. Everywhere, file folders, telephones, embassy calling cards, noiseless presence of secretaries and ushers.)

Regis Debray: Having said that, if one wants, like me, to reflect on politics, it is not a bad thing to rub shoulders with everyday practice. That is an experience that an intellectual would be wrong in neglecting.

(Then I say to myself: Debray, but which one? Depending on the date, there are several versions: The comrade of Fidel, of Allende, or the novelist liked by the Femina ladies? The prisoner of Camiri or the irascible essayist who legislates, in Paris, on the treason of the clerks? The "dangerous leftist" mentioned by American columnists, or the "adviser" who received me, one Wednesday, in the palace where he lives his new life every day? After all, those who knew Malraux in Terruel before finding him again, 20 years later, in marble halls, know that nothing is truly improbable in the field of reincarnation. Sierra? Bolivia, a lyric illusion?

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When one has never gone there, it is ticklish to reproach those who come back from there for no longer being there. Regis Debray, the undesirable, the petit-bourgeois caught between two fires and four walls, is from now on a member of high officialdom and that is the way it is. Can it have been forgotten, since the time of the moralists, that men are sometimes as different from themselves as from others?)

Regis Debray: I have always thought that an intellectual did not have to produce "ideas," but rather transform his ideas into practical activities, incorporate them in reality.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Could that mean, for you, that nothing has really changed since 10 May?

Regis Debray: What has changed, what has changed me, is that I have learned to be more modest. Since that date, I have discovered how much I did not know. The state, as a thought category, was familiar to me, but I hardly knew the everyday state.

And if I speak of "modesty," it is purposely. We intellectuals tend to believe that we are entitled to produce the truth. Now, I have discovered that, in the submerged part of the state, in the so-called "public" administration--and which is, after all, not very public--there are people never shown on television. People who, because of this, are nameless and who conceal a mass of experience, of subtleties, of maturity of which I had not idea. I assure you that the breed of the great civil servants deserves consideration.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, from this point of view, might not the "Critique de la raison politique" that you have just published lag somewhat behind your experience?

Regis Debray: I do not think so, insofar as this "Critique" is a theorist's book and not the book of an intellectual.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Which means...

Regis Debray: That the theorist is, differently from the intellectual, the one who tells the truth with no concern for the effects of that truth on his life and on the life of others. The theorist is a geometrist or a psychoanalyst and he could in no case be held responsible. In this connection, and to anticipate your objections, I take upon myself the cleavage that there may be between my work as a theorist and my activity as an intellectual. There is the whole difference between them that separates a manual on geometry from an architect's plan.

(The "geometry manual" weighs, in this case, 468 pages. You proceed in it by degrees through a "dialectics" and an "analysis" that profess to be without concession. The project? To answer this question: "Why must men talk nonsense as soon as they live in a group?" Therefore, it is a question, in this "Critique," of going back to the source, toward the obscure "situation of the possibility of collective delirium." Debray, a Kantian in spite of himself, specifies: "For a long time, politics concealed politics from me (...) Not in the sense in which one train conceals another, but in which that train conceals the rails on which it runs. There are many runs, many speeds, but only one railroad--or station of

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the Cross." He even adds, moreover, that his long tracking aims at nothing less than expressing "mankind's political unconscious." The vastness of the task disconcerts a possible skeptic. We should tell ourselves: Debray works here in magnificence, and of all the deliriums that he makes compatible in his demonstration, the one that drives him to rise so high--to rationalize irrationality, to think the unconscious or to name the "constants" in our history, is not the least strange.)

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Why is it possible to read, from the first page in your book, that "the one who engages in an action is different from the one who theorizes on the general conditions of that action"? And, farther on, that "this duality must be cherished passionately, like a secret weapon?"

Regis Debray: True. But "secret weapon" does not mean capability, held in reserve. of contradicting oneself, of reversing one's judgment. It is simply the "secret weapon" of freedom and of one's rationally unjustifiable choices.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, what can the "intellectual" discover in the field of politics of which the "theorist" was still unaware?

Regis Debray: It is less a question of discovery than of verification. And what I verify is that the power is, first of all, an administration of impotence.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That kind of paradox resembles the rich man's contempt of fortune, the graduate's indifference toward diplomas.

Regis Debray: Wrong. When I say that the power is only an administration of impotence, I describe it at the minimum. It is, in fact, a system of relative impotences that balance each other and that produce a decision at the end of the circuit. I knew that the mythology of sovereign, omniscient power was suspect. Now I know that it is false.

Of course, I would be wrong in measuring the impotence of others by my own. Since 10 May, I have had, personally, no power and I am always surprised that power is attributed to me. After all, here, in the executive mansion, there is only one person who, in addition to his authority, has real power: the president. I have no more to say in this connection.

(He had let me know beforehand: "We talk about my book and that is all." The rest, evidently, comes under the obligation to respect classified information. Nevertheless, we should like to know what really happened in Angola 5 weeks earlier; what he said, or did, at the United Nations, in the White House, where he was received at the end of September by Dick Allen, the chairman of the National Security Council; what he thinks, or knows, about the Franco-Mexican stands on El Salvador, on Cubans in Africa, on the Cheysson-Arafat meeting. It would be, nevertheless, less inconsequential than to vaticinate loftily on the summits of a "critique" that convokes Gregory VII or Emperor Constantine. But Debray does not understand it like that. He has been in the executive mansion for 4 months and he has been writing his book for 10 years. In his opinion, therefore, there is no question of establishing the authority of a "position" for himself in the machinery of state, in order to make his theory on politics legitimate. Thus, he will inform anyone wanting to listen to him that the "president's adviser" does not necessarily resemble the philosopher that he can be. He has no doubt that file folders are not handled like concepts.)

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: When Francois Mitterrand was elected, he put his 7-year term under the gaze of three illustrious deceased persons. At the same moment, who were the heroes of your own Pantheon?

Regis Debray: At that time, like everyone, I was in a state of withdrawal, and, in a state of about to find a forgotten history. Francois Mitterrand helped us find ourselves. Heroes are less important because of what they are than because of what they allow us to remain. And with Giscard, national identity was breaking up.

Having said that, I reached the point, a long time ago, of respecting, in heroes, only obstinacy, consistency and capacity for solitude. Therefore, I like the desert crossing of a De Gaulle or of a Mitterrand. I like the fact that those men were scorned for so long by those who now shower praise on them. But allegiance to De Gaulle was akin to mystical veneration. Loyalty to Mitterrand proceeds from a feeling of respect. I prefer that.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Basically, in your opinion, political commitment depends more on feeling than on ideas. Lyricism--or "respect"--inspires more decisive convictions in you than reasoning.

Regis Debray: That has always been true, for me as well as for a society in general. The "International" has produced more Marxists than reading "Das Kapital." From this point of view, we are lagging far behind in a knowledge of the emotions--hatred, love, passions--on which our convictions are based.

As a theorist, I do not have to produce a "truth" superior to other truths. I must explain, and only that, why there is belief--collective or individual--in a "truth" that may be logically weak. It is a question of breaking away from the attitude of a judge who, on the overhang of history, distributes his blessings or his curses. I say, on the contrary: Hitler, Stalin, Khomeyni exist and we cannot impugn them like exotic monsters. Let us leave the naivety of the Illuminati, who believed that intelligence can dissipate evil, that it suffices to pursue Jesuits, or perverse spirits, in order to give birth to a just, reasonable society. No, the matter is more complex. Let us ask ourselves, rather: why must men unite not by virtue of a clear, distinct idea, but rather to make concessions to the least rational part of their nature?

In this sense, actually, politics depends less on logic than on emotion and the strength of an idea is derived there, first of all, from its lyric capacity.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: When a person is interested less in truth than in actual lies, he is completely cynical.

Regis Debray: The "cynical" tonality is inherent in every activity and in every project of knowledge. In my book, I have kept only one principle: we must rid ourselves of the ideal of good and evil to understand what happens, in a group, as soon as there is a stake and effects of power. By shunning any value judgment, I try to conduct myself, with regard to the nature of power, like an anatomist confronted by a tumor. And I admit, as a premise, what common sense says--politics makes one mad, savage, dangerous--and I add immediately: nothing happens without reason.

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Then, what is the reason for this endless irrationality? I state that our age seems to me more cruel but no less mad than others: Saint Bartholomew or goulags, religious wars never end. Now, if the atrocity of our customs is ageless, let us ask the only valid critical question: why must men act irrationally? Because all that resembles a history full of noise and furor, from where does the eternity of that noise and that furor come?

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: In your opinion, there is no question of envisaging the possibility of a pacified, reasonable society? Not the slightest golden age either upstream or downstream?

Regis Debray: The group is misfortune. The collectivity is violence. And we shall not come out of it. In other words, every project that puts forth society's self-organization--or the disappearance of power authorities--or self-management in the quality of metaphysical strangely resembles concepts devoid of historicity. Most often, exorcisms of a magic type are what promise us, once more, and under the outward appearance of a criticism of the morrows that sing the Marxist version, other morrows singing the Castoriadis version.

These hymns depend on incantation and I do not recognize in them a beginning of experimental versification. Once more, through them, the impotence of men in society to think about their impotence is observed. And then, morality, like discourses, nauseates me.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Is it not preferable for men to feel obliged to praise good and curse evil?

Regis Debray: That does not prevent morality from starting and finishing only with action, and not with words.

(When Regis Debray convokes his army of shadows, he gives way with pleasure to his oldest inclination: to discredit with a mood, with a word, with a sneer all that is not authenticated in the history of men by heroism and by blood. One feels judged, then, by the yardstick of a sublime, distant martyrology. One feels that one is ridiculous and badly judged by the High Court of Tragedy to which Debray is admitted. To do what there? Those who succeed, like him, in capitalizing on the misfortune of the world always make an impression. They--he--seem to tell us: come now, no salvation without a cross, no redemption without an abominable execution. I have wondered for a long time whether Regis Debray's real peculiarity did not result from that very Christian fondness for suffering and sacrifice under our de-Christianized latitudes.)

Regis Debray: Sacrifice is what makes sacred and, in order to understand politics, it is possible, then, to become a theologian without risk. In this respect, the basic thesis of my "Critique" is that there are two histories in one. Up to the present time, it has been possible to analyze the history of men in their relations with nature rather correctly. But the other history, the history of man's relationship with man, is still an enigma. While the first history is evolutive, the second one does not budge, does not pass on. That means that the history of man reverts back to a fixed, circular, repetitive time by immobilizing man.

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In this sense, the group's misfortune is a constant and politics would be the science of its management. In this area, the very notion of "progress" is illusory. Today, no one is a better politician than Demosthenes could be in the 4th century BC or the Assyrians 3,000 years before us. The time of politics depends on an eternal present.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That "eternal present" greatly resembles the "human nature" of the philosophers. On the other hand, at present, it is rare to have recourse to it....

Regis Debray: Not at all! At present, return to nature is in fashion. Let us not fall from one intoxication into another, from too much history to too much nature. Having said that, as a reader of Lucretius, Spinoza and the Stoics, the "order of things" exists, in my opinion.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That is an unexpected revelation. Until this recent book, you were still believed to be a Marxist.

Regis Debray: What does that mean? Obviously, I am not a Marxist when I am a philosopher. And if I take an interest in painting or in death, Marxism has nothing to teach me.

On the other hand, if I have to analyze the mechanisms of profit, in France, in the 1880's, or the struggles for power in Argentina, I obviously am a Marxist. When you construct a triangle, you all are Euclidean. Therefore, when you make local political analysis, you all are Marxist. Of course, with regard to the vision of the world implied by this local analysis I am not a participant in it.

(What is given here as an established fact--"of course"--might surprise those who still remember some aphorisms of the former Leninist-Castroist Debray. But the times are far off when the rhetoric of the Teachers College student was cast in the molds of a "revolution within the revolution," and in the tempo of the attack bugles. By entering the publishing house of Gallimard, in the very prestigious "Bibliothèque des idées" [Library of Ideas]--where he becomes the neighbor of Merleau-Ponty, Koyle, Foucault and Sartre--the militant's style seems to have taken on itself more decorum, more strictness. He retains from Marxism nothing more than the tone and sarcasm of the young Marx, the one whose formula, steeped in Hegel and Feuerbach, likes to loop back on itself and to produce small local explosions in reasoning. The situationists had already tested the effectiveness of this literary style that convinces more than it demonstrates and whose harmonics Debray has been exploring since "Les Rendez-vous manqués" [The Missed Appointments], his best book, perhaps, written 6 years ago "for Pierre Goldman." From then on, our author has been quoting Saint Paul more often than Lenin and, without departing from the requisite sanctities, his new Holy Family no longer has the appearance of the old one. Patristics and the history of art are more important to him than the fluctuations of ground rent. The Councils of Nicea have replaced the congresses of Gotha or Basle. Believing that Rome, definitely, is no longer in Rome and that Debray--frantic--has decided to think, first of all, against what he was).

Regis Debray: Yes, I did not stop writing this book for a long time, while I was publishing other books. It is not, I hope, a "book of ideas," but rather a "work of thought." Not fireworks. A painful childbirth in the ancient manner. An ethics

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of disappointment, of movement in the wrong direction, had made me postpone its publication at the time of the great anti-Marxist confusion in these last few years.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Could not Regis Debray let himself cease being Marxist like--or at the same time as--everyone?

Regis Debray: I especially did not want to howl with the wolves. All the less so, because their howling resulted more from a political strategy than from a desire to know. What else was there to do, except remain silent and wait--even if it means asserting oneself counter to one's own pursuits--in the face of the Misereres of the unfrocked who were chorusing on the majority stage of the moment?

Therefore, let us be earnest. Marxism was the rule in intellectual circles until 1970. Then the fronts were reversed. The fashion, and even the legitimacies of thought were then geared to the distance put between oneself and Marxism. It was really too easy to let oneself be carried off by that wave. And then I had no desire to become a "new philosopher." That is all.

I suffered greatly from the cliches that I dragged along behind me at that time, from that archeoboyscout, third-world "position" to which I had been assigned by controversial discussions. It was constantly necessary to react, to be in a hurry: it is law of the environment. Hence the advantage, the immense advantage of prison.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Where you were, from that point of view, more free than when you came out?

Regis Debray: In fact, prison is the last place where it is still possible to think in peace. There is time to ruminate there--remember Nietzsche's "cows"--to make oneself a double stomach there, and it is all the same more valuable than to glean among ideas.

And then, in prison, you define yourself with regard to yourself and no longer with regard to others. There, there is no longer any room for theatricals--anger, indignation. One day, I shall write a "Praise of Prison," but I can state right now that one of the causes of the drying up of leftist thought comes, evidently, from the fact that leftists have no longer been put in prison for the last 40 years. Have you observed that everything that has been "thought" in socialism comes from a jail: from Blanqui to Gramsci, Rosa Luxemburg and Kautsky, not to mention Kuron and Modzellerski, the latest beneficiaries of the privilege of prison introspection? A great wrong is done to many people by letting them discourse in the street, give five interviews a day and go from one meeting to the next. The pace of political activity in modern liberal societies produces too many decerebrated persons. Therefore, I am attached to my prison stock and I indeed hope that one day I shall be given an opportunity to replenish my supply.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: You say that you discovered the importance of the history of religions in prison at Camiri.

Regis Debray: Chronologically, my liking for the history of religions comes from my fondness for painting. I have entirely forgotten the catechism, but I remember the smallest museum that I visited as a child. Now, painting--Cimabue, Giotto and,

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especially, Tintoretto--is Christianity, whether one likes it or not. Were not the catacombs painted in fresco, which is rather odd, because it was a question of struggling against idolators who worshiped emperor's statues or pictures? Besides, as Christians by heritage, we are the beneficiaries of a historical miracle--the miracle of of the Incarnation--and from which all our modernity--and our power--is derived.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: In what way?

Regis Debray: Christianity gives us the authorization, obliges us, to seek a word behind all flesh and that is a fundamental innovation. Alexandre Koyre had an interesting theory in this connection. He said that the mystery of the Incarnation had made scientific research possible, to the effect that it was no longer, through it, a sacrilege to find logic in phenomena and a "reason," divine at that time, behind the fall of solids. I shall even say that our desire for political consistency--to base our everyday behavior on an idea of the world and to give a sense to things of the city--is the small change of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Early Christianity bequeathed us a formidable means of producing theory. Added to that is the fact that a Camiri chaplain put in my hands a biography of Gregory VII. And that enabled me to understand the century. Yes, in Camiri, I was thinking of Canossa.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That does not lack elevation, but agree that it has only a remote connection with what you were living.

Regis Debray: Wrong. I did not understand communism, that is to say, ideocracy, until I understood what happened at Canossa. Without an analysis of what is produced by the theocratic merger of a temporal power and a spiritual power, it is impossible to find one's way in present-day geographies. It is impossible to understand how and why the sole fact of believing that one holds a universal truth incites to taking iron and fire to the four corners of the planet.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Therefore, from Byzantine caesaropapism to czarist autocracy and to communist "ideocracy" there probably is only one single history, according to you.

Regis Debray: One single lineage, in fact, that goes back to Constantine, who proclaimed the dogma of the Incarnation. After all, Christianity is what has accustomed us to the idea the God had only one son. Now, the path is familiar from unity to exclusiveness and to totality. In this connection, I find that they went a little too fast, in the West, in getting rid of totalitarianism--and of its despotic versions--in the East. In this respect, I should like Christians, in general, and Catholics in particular, to have a little more memory. They should begin by sweeping in front of their own door, that is to say by reflecting on Gregory VII, before giving lessons of tolerance.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Historians, those who deal with facts, with details, are not going to like that kind of transition from a medieval pope to a party secretary. Those are somewhat rapid productions, factitious syntheses perhaps.

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Regis Debray: False process. When a biologist takes the cell's chemical plant apart he does not discredit the zoologist. The basic logic of the living being does not mean that an elephant, man and a nightingale must be confused. There is, therefore, a history of religions, but the religious has no history. That is what the history of religions teaches.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, nothing has probably changed in our heads, in our customs, since the great Babylonian myths?

Regis Debray: Why do the statues of Phidias move us? Why does Shakespeare talk to us today? Nevertheless, the slavery production method has passed, just as definitely as the transition from feudalism to capitalism and, in spite of that, these works are contemporary for us.

Therefore, an "emotive stratum" has to subsist in man, beyond the vicissitudes of his history. Then, what causes time to have gaps, fadings, syncopes at certain times?

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Therefore, has the relationship between the religious phenomenon and the esthetic phenomenon driven you to reflect on the timeless aspect of men's history?

Regis Debray: At any rate, that is the basis for my attempt, in my book, to understand a certain number of things: the group, authority, fanaticism, and so on.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Let us recapitulate. With Christianity, we have the mystery of the Incarnation, therefore, the Mediator. Because that is incarnate in the religious order, it is also incarnate in the political order.

Regis Debray: The group will never finish with the figure of the Mediator, because it owes its identity and permanence to him. Everything is there and that is precisely the point that I wanted to stress and on which to base my demonstration.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That is your "nugget," so to speak.

Regis Debray: Exactly. The fact that a group can grasp its own identity only through someone who represents it--therefore, who become necessarily charismatic by virtue of this--and who offers it the grace of being in contact itself through another seems to be an insurmountable fact. And that operator of cohesion seems to me to be, in turn, a constant in every power structure.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Therefore, the figure of the Mediator is probably one of those great immovables of the political phase, a kind of ice floe always resembling itself that travels indifferently from the Agora to Red Square in the form, for example, of that personality cult from which it is probably impossible to escape.

Regis Debray: We must not exaggerate anything. History can modulate the necessary cults just as for an individual the fact of growing up and of becoming "normal" consists in managing the Oedipus curse. It is better to know that something in us wants to kill papa and marry mama than to discover it at a crossroads. Thus, the dismantling of the political unconscious does not free us from the curse lying there. It enables us, nevertheless, to manage it in the best possible way, lucidly.

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When the laws of gravity are known, that does not prevent apples from dropping, but, at least, we know what awaits us if we jump out of the window.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What right do you have to decree like that what is constant and what is not?

Regis Debray: In the name, precisely, of what history teaches me. In it, it appears, evidently, that any society without a strong belief is a dying society. The religious aspect, therefore the political aspect, is--if you wish--the disease of the group, but the cure for that disease would be the death of that group.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, why must there be belief in a group? You just raised that question without answering it.

Regis Debray: That obligation of belief is not a moral imperative, but, rather, a logical necessity. It is deduced from what I call the group's "nonfulfillment."

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: That requires some specific explanations.

Regis Debray: With the notion of "nonfulfillment" I am generalizing in the political order what Godel's theorem states in the logical order. Now, this theorem demonstrates that "no system can establish its truth without resorting to a factor that is outside it." In other words, no system is demonstrative of itself.

Therefore, I am trying to illuminate the social system in the light of that, because there is a system nature there, what, then, is the outside factor that is going to make it possible to establish its truth? Hence, the figure of the Mediator, that is to say, of the charismatic chief.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, does that mean that it is rational for there to be irrationality in a group?

Regis Debray: It is, in fact, a naturalist explanation of the social supernatural. And, for a materialist like me, that is not a negligible result. It makes it possible to reject just as well abdication when faced with the ineffable--rhapsody on the "return of what is sacred" and company--as the stupidity of Monsieur Homais for whom religion is merely the stupid childhood of mankind. It is possible to expel the Jesuits and even God Himself. They will come back in through the window. That, for example, is called "real socialism."

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Thus, the Mediator would guarantee the group's closure by offering it transcendence. But what transcendence?

Regis Debray: There, it is up to politics to come into play and to provide an empirical content for that transcendental category: ayatollah, secretary general, president of the republic, head of free France. Let politics choose. Transcendence can come indifferently from a mystical incarnation, from the socialist myth, from universal suffrage. It is simply necessary for the Mediator to represent something other than himself: Proletariat, Justice, Rights of Man, Allah, whatever you wish. Political freedom consists in choosing between those capital letters. Obviously, I prefer the capital letter Mitterrand to the capital letter Brezhnev or Reagan. A very appreciable technical difference, but the effect of one and

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the same logical structure in which each one is a "lieutenant"--therefore "holds the place"--of another.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Hence, the concern, for any politician whoever, for producing--or even of manipulating--transcendencies.

Regis Debray: Hence, especially, the interest of death in politics. As soon as something dies, it produces, in the system, a hole toward the beyond and transcendence is swallowed up in it. That is why burials are always strong phases in political activity. All the people who march then are content, in spite of their affliction, because they know that, thanks to death, they form a group. Every society begins by being a society of the friends of the deceased, because every society needs to believe in a transcendence that will terminate it and dissolve it.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: If we admit the validity of that observation, what kind of belief would then have to be produced so that "things will go well" in our societies?

Regis Debray: Precisely, "things do not go well," because effective beliefs are no longer produced. Consequently, contraband beliefs are increasing in number--just as at the end of the Roman Empire--without offering any lasting coherence. For a long time, I believed that Marxism might be the great founding illusion for our age. Now, I am indeed obliged to observe that it is makeshift. In the history of religions, Marxism-Leninism is, evidently, a poor relative.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: You used to say, formerly, that the saints and apostles of our times were Guevara, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky or Politzer.

Regis Debray: It is true that at a specific time communism had a great mythical fertility. It still has it, to a considerable extent, in the Third World. In this connection, in matters that are socially sacred, Afghanistan and Poland are undoubtedly opening up a new age.

Confronted by that, our democratic societies are confessing an undeniable--and dangerous--emotional weakness. This tepidness, this lack of capacity for sacrifice may cause uneasiness with regard to their future. When the sons of Blum are able to oppose the sons of Lenin with their own Fifth Regiment--the one that defended the University of Madrid to the death--then, without any doubt, we shall be able to be a world alternative.

LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Therefore, according to you, the worth of an idea would be evaluated by the number of people ready to die for it?

Regis Debray: Not its logical value. But, rather, its gravity, its political earnestness. That is to say that ideas weigh less, in practical history, than images and myths. But that does not mean that there is no logic in the order of the myth. A leftist cannot worship death as a redeemer or a transfigurator. His slogan is "Hurrah for life!", but La Pasionaria says the opposite with her famous "It is better to die standing than to live on one's knees." Now, a system of deductive ideas is not what makes a man or a society, kneeling, stand up again one day. I believe that it is, rather, an imaginary quantity of convocation.

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LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Then, you should appreciate the fact that two of the three founding heroes under whose auspices the new 7-year term has started are martyrs.

Regis Debray: Cult of the great ancestors is the short circuit of life, not the morose cult of sacrifice. I wrote once: memory is revolutionary, without knowing that the statement would prosper and it would one day take shape in the street. In our country. The ceremony of the Pantheon to which you referred bears witness to the fact that France has stood up again. It might be said that this country has stood up again, by bringing Francois Mitterrand to the presidency, because it did not want to die as a nation. This country, your country, my country, our country in short. Do you realize it, To be able to say at least once in your life, holding your head high: "France, my country." If we had only recovered that pride, nothing of what we shall do together will have been in vain.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

MAKNO OPINION POLL ON PRESENT GOVERNMENT

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 13 Nov 81 pp 12-15

[Article by Donato Speroni: "Spadolini: Seven More"]

[Text] He inspires trust: his policies bring hope for success in the fight against inflation. Even the institutions seem to be viewed more favorably. But the IL MONDO Makno poll shows that taking advantage of this will be something else again.

In only 4 months, Council President Giovanni Spadolini has succeeded in establishing a solid consensus in national public opinion. His administration has succeeded in increasing trust in government institutions and may even be having some success in the fight against inflation. The government, which has a lay, non-church affiliated presidency, is projecting a positive image whose benefits accrue not only to the Republican Party, of which Spadolini is the secretary, but also to the Socialist Party and its leader Bettino Craxi.

Once again, the new IL MONDO-Makno poll shows the new trends that have appeared on the Italian political scene and the shifts that have taken place in Italian public opinion. To take the poll, Makno uses the same 3,000-person cross-section of the county's social and demographic composition. Thus, the risks of casual fluctuations from one poll to the next is significantly reduced, and comparisons can be made with less margin for error (the poll is now in its 4th edition; for the previous ones, see IL MONDO No 24 (1980) and Nos 5 & 6 (1981)).


Government and Inflation

The Spadolini cabinet has sharply reversed the sample group's opinion of the government. While governments with a Christian Democratic [DC] presidency never surpassed a maximum of 18 percent favorable rating, Spadolini has won the approval of 28 percent of those polled, and he belongs to a party that has only 3 percent of the vote (see graph No 1). The negative responses have dropped for the first time to 43 percent. An analysis of the data shows that the jump in popularity relative to Arnolde Forlani's government is due mainly to the favorable opinion held by women: it has doubled and almost balances out the opposition (28 percent to 36 percent); it is due also the increased favorable opinion among 20-year olds and the elderly (39 percent for, 31 percent against) and Southerners. Even in the Northwest, which showed the least trust in government under Forlani (11.3 percent), there is much more credit given to Spadolini (27.6 percent). The heaviest negative results for Spadolini came from central Italy.

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
[Graph No 1] Is the present government suited to solving the country's problems?

- (1) yes
- (2) no
- (3) don't know
- (4) October 1981
- (5) June 1981
- (6) January 1981
- (7) June 1980



[Graph No 2] Is its anti-inflation policy effective?

- (1) Ineffective, like that of the preceding governments
- (2) Even more ineffective
- (3) Effective to contain inflation
- (4) Rather effective, but insufficient
- (5) Don't know



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Besides the increased acceptance of a government with a lay presidency, the poll has measured public opinion on how well the fight against inflation is going. Indeed, this is the main task confronting Spadolini's government. As inflation also results from expectations, positive opinion in this area would indicate that Spadolini has the battle half won. In general, favorable opinion is 46.3 percent and unfavorable only 28.7 percent (see graph No 2). But only 10 percent think that Spadolini's action will suffice to contain inflation. Women are less optimistic than men: 51.8 percent of men think Spadolini's policies will be effective or at least more effective than past ones, while only 40.7 percent of women share this conviction.

After Spadolini

The new popularity that Spadolini has brought to the government is accompanied by many signs of a new shift in public opinion in favor of lay parties. Among the possible council presidents (see graph No 3), there is a strong surge for the present one (from 3 percent to 17 percent, with marked popularity among people over 45) and, besides him, the other lay leaders: Marco Pannella, Pietro Longo, Bruno Visentini, and Valerio Zanone, not to mention Craxi, who has regained 8 points since his abrupt decline in popularity in June. The ascent of lay leaders is confirmed by possible government coalitions: a possible DC-lay party alliance, with a Socialist in the Chigi palace has gained support (from 5.3 to 7.4 percent) and is increasing especially in the Northwest, where it has reached 13.3 percent, with an increase of 7 percent.

As for the Communists, the shift of the PCI seems to have been absorbed at the grass roots. While the number of those questioned who would like to see Enrico Berlinguer become council president has increased more than 6 percent, a government based on a DC-PCI coalition has fallen from 26.8 to 19.3 percent. This is a difference of 7 percent, which has shifted entirely toward a government of the left without the DC. "Essentially," Makno observes, "Communist opinion has turned towards making the PCI compatible with a possible alternative, whereas it was divided in previous polls between supporters of a government of the left and those who yearned for national unity. This process of consolidation has caused an opposition consensus to form around Berlinguer."

There is even something new for the DC: the preferred choice for council president includes leaders Giulio Andreotti, Arnaldo Forlani and Benigno Zaccagnini. On the other hand, Francesco Cossiga has shown a recent decline.

Parties


Graph No 6 shows for the first time a tripolar situation that, if translated into votes, would surpass Craxi's wildest dreams: the DC, PCI and PSI [Italian Socialist Party] are at almost equal strength, thanks to the PSI's surge (up 2.4 percent above the already high level of June) and the DC's slump (down 5.8 percent). If we add to the Socialist vote that of the Republicans, who have shown a sharp increase (up 2.9 percent), Liberals and Social Democrats, the lay sector portion comes to 35.6 percent, by far the strongest political grouping in the country. But these findings are tempered by the observation, well known to political scientists, that lay voters are explicit in declaring their vote only with respect to Christian Democrats, MSI [Italian Social Movement] members and, especially, Communists.

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[Graph No 3] What political figure is best suited to be council president?
(Two choices)

- (1) October 1981
- (2) June 1981
- (3) January 1981
- (4) June 1980
- (5) others

Quale personaggio politico è più adatto come presidente del consiglio?
(fino a due risposte)




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[Graph No 4] Which government coalition is best suited to solving the country's problems?

- (1) a government of technicians
- (2) a government without the DC
- (3) DC-PSI and other parties
- (4) DC-lay parties supported by the PCI
- (5) DC alone
- (6) DC and lay parties without the PCI and with the PSI
- (7) DC-PSI-PRI [Italian Republican Party]
- (8) don't know

Qual è la formula di governo più adatta a risolvere i problemi del paese?



[Graph No 5] Has your opinion on political parties changed in recent months?


- (1) changed for the better
- (2) changed for the worse
- (3) remained the same
- (4) don't know

È cambiato negli ultimi mesi il suo giudizio sui partiti?

	Dc	Pci	Psi
(1) Modificato in meglio	6,4	7,7	19,7
(2) Modificato in peggio	26,4	27,5	25,1
(3) È rimasto uguale	60,5	52,8	41,9
(4) Non so	6,7	12,0	13,4

[Graph No 6] What party do you think is closest to your own ideas?
 (Percentages in parentheses are those from the June 1981 poll)

Quale partito ritiene più vicino alle sue idee?
Tra parentesi le percentuali registrate durante il sondaggio del giugno '81



[Party abbreviations from top to bottom, in lower right corner]

- PRI Italian Republican Party
- PSDI Italian Social Democratic Party
- PLI Italian Liberal Party
- MSI Italian Social Movement
- PDUP Proletarian Unity Party
- PR Radical Party
- DP Proletarian Democratic Party
- altre others
- liste

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Some 43 percent of those polled refused to respond to the question concerning their preferred party. Of these, 21.3 percent declared that no party is now close to their own ideas. It may be supposed that void and blank ballots come from this area. Abstentions have been increasing with every election.

The analysis indicates that the people polled who are unwilling to choose a party are especially women (44.3 percent), younger than 20 years old (43.2 percent), and people over 45 years of age (43.8 percent up to age 55, 48.9 percent thereafter). But the regional breakdown is quite alarming: in northwest and central Italy, including Milan, Turin, Genoa and Rome, areas that usually anticipate voting behavior that spreads to the less developed regions of the country, abstentionism has reached 50 percent.

One of the poll's questions makes it possible to confirm that the Italian electorate remains characteristically stable: only 4.4 percent of the sample actually stated that they would no longer vote for the party they voted for at the previous election (in June 1979). This is one of the most stable of all data, because from one poll to another, over a span of months, the figures vary by a few decimal points. The sample shows that a Solomonic judgment prevails: the party they voted for has done some good things and some bad (from 30 to 31.7 percent in the last two polls) or at least had done what it could (from 25.9 to 28 percent). Only 17.2 percent (16.4 percent in June), however, said that they party they had voted for met their expectations.

How has opinion changed concerning the major parties? Here too, Makno observes, "a trend has appeared that is favorable to the lay parties: the PSI has marked an increase among the number of those polled who have changed their opinion for the better (19.7 percent)."

This fact, Makno states, "is relevant because it indicates an area of potential sympathy (or at least non-aversion) and shows an increase relative to preceding polls, where improved opinion held steady at about 15 percent. But the PSI has also shown an increase in the area of worse opinion (25 percent), which seems attributable to the high profile of conflict that the Socialists have shown toward other parties in recent months.

"The PCI and DC, in any case, both show a clearly worse opinion profile. Better-opinion responses remain at 6-7 percent, with an area of worse opinion steady at 25-30 percent. Essentially, then," Makno comments, "of the three major parties, the PSI seems to be the only one that has a consistently favorable opinion trend: the other two remain at best on the defensive for what they have already gained."

The Most Important Issues

Terrorism, inflation, unemployment, and lack of housing. These four came out clearly in previous polls in answer to the question "What should the government be doing right now?" (everyone questioned could give up to four answers). But this time, the sample gave various answers. First of all, terrorism has significantly lost importance, going from 67 to 41.5 percent of the responses. Fear of terrorism remains strongest among women over 45 and in central Italy. Concern about unemployment grew (from 49 to 51.9 percent), with a general bulge in the 20-24 age group (66.7 percent) and in northeast and central Italy (about 60 percent). The South is more resigned: the problem is felt by only 47.2 percent of the sample, 4.7 points below the national average. At the same level as unemployment (51.9 percent) inflation ranks as a problem, but it is considered less pressing by about 5 percent. Women, who are considered to be most

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sensitive to price variations, have caused the change in the figures for the inflation issue: their rate of concern has fallen from 65,8 to 49,6 percent. It also seems that the inflation issue has diminished especially in the northeastern regions, falling from first place (70 percent) to last (40 percent) among those who mention it.

The housing problem has also displayed a tendency to dispersed responses. It fell from 41.3 to 32.6 percent (the high point of 39.3 percent appears among young people 25-34 years old) and has been surpassed by the problem of drug use (32.9 percent of the sample, as opposed to 32.6 percent in the previous poll). Most concern about drugs is felt in the Northwest (36.9 percent) and among young people up to 19 years of age (44.2 percent). Among the other priorities, increasing importance is given to health reform (17.6 to 23.6 percent, with a significant bulge of 36.7 percent in central Italy) and to school reorganization (from 14.4 to 16.7 percent). There is also a net increase in the demand for introducing the death penalty (from 6.1 to 12.4 percent, with a bulge of 23.9 percent in the northeastern regions and a hollow of 2.2 percent in central Italy); there is an especially consistent demand for initiatives toward peace: from zero to 18.8 percent, with the strongest support among young people up to age 19 (28.8 percent).

[Graph No 7] In what directions should the government be moving right now?

[column headings, from left to right]: October, June, January 1981

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| (1) terrorism | (11) industrial relations |
| (2) pensions | (12) abortion law |
| (3) housing | (13) the concordat |
| (4) prices | (14) updating laws |
| (5) health assistance | (15) electoral reform |
| (6) unemployment | (16) presidential republic |
| (7) drugs | (17) pornography |
| (8) schools | (18) public morals |
| (9) police reform | (19) reconstructing the earthquake zone |
| (10) death penalty | (20) peace initiatives |

In quali direzioni il governo deve agire subito?			
	Ottobre 1981	Giugno 1981	Gennaio 1981
Terrorismo (1)	41,5	67,0	63,9
Pensioni (2)	29,5	33,0	25,8
Case (3)	32,6	41,3	33,5
Prezzi (4)	51,9	64,8	44,6
Assistenza sanitaria (5)	23,6	17,6	23,3
Disoccupazione (6)	51,9	49,0	41,5
Droga (7)	32,9	32,0	30,0
Scuola (8)	16,7	14,4	17,2
Riforma polizia (9)	7,0	3,3	5,7
Pena di morte (10)	12,4	6,1	7,1
Relazioni industriali (11)	5,2	4,6	6,3
Legge sull'aborto (12)	1,0	4,7	5,0
Concordato (13)	3,7	2,0	2,2
Aggiornamento codici (14)	10,7	7,2	7,4
Riforma elettorale (15)	6,4	6,1	5,7
Repubblica presidenziale (16)	2,3	1,7	1,0
Pornografia (17)	3,1	3,1	1,8
Moralizzazione pubblica (18)	14,3	15,9	23,9
Ricostruzione zone terremotate (19)	16,1	17,1	23,9
Iniziative di pace (20)	18,8	—	—

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The Most Accepted Institutions

Italians (or at least those who make up the sample) seem to be showing renewed trust in institutions. Although 4 months ago, when the question was asked "What institutions are contributing to the good of the country?" (to which the respondents could give two answers), only one institution (the church) got more than 15 percent of the responses, this level is now reached or surpassed by 7 institutions. First place is held by the independent press: it had 29.3 percent in January and slid to 12.9 percent in June at the height of the P2 scandal, but it has rebounded to 33.5 percent.

Its strongest credibility is in central Italy (from 14.7 to 41.7 percent) and in southern Italy (from 9.8 to 35.2 percent), and among the youngest age groups (47.8 percent of respondents between 25 and 34 as opposed to 23 percent in the previous poll). Second place goes to the presidency of the Republic with 29.3 percent, more than double the figure in the two previous polls. This is a sign that Sandro Pertini's style is being increasingly accepted in public opinion, despite the occasional irritation it provokes in some political leaders.

Although the church rose from 22.2 to 26.8 percent, it fell to third place, followed by the unions, which, with approaching contract negotiations, are showing a very strong capacity for gaining favor (from 2.2 to 18.1 percent). The unions are followed by the police (from 14.3 to 15.6 percent), the judiciary (from 7.7 to 15.4 percent), and municipal police (from 5.9 to 14.9 percent). Even political parties (from 6.6 to 11.2 percent) and the RAI [Italian Radio Broadcasting and Television Company] (from 2.3 to 9.2 percent) are enjoying the increased benevolence of Italians for their institutions.


The Unions and Automatic Wage Indexation

The renewed favor enjoyed by the unions shows up clearly in another question (see graph No 8). In general, the proportion of Italians who view the unions favorably has risen from 8.3 to 12.2 percent in recent months. This is the first time that opinion concerning the unions has shown signs of improvement, and it is confirmed by the drop from 31.8 to 26.5 percent in those who view unions unfavorably. Improved opinion is particularly strong in the Northeast, where favorable and unfavorable opinion balances out at 22.9 percent.

[Graph No 8] How Have the CGIL-CISL-UIL Been Doing in Recent Months?

[CGIL = Italian General Confederation of Labor, CISL = Italian Confederation of Labor Unions, UIL = Italian Union of Labor]

- (1) positive
- (2) negative
- (3) positive & negative
- (4) irrelevant
- (5) don't know
- (6) October 1981
- (7) June 1981
- (8) January 1981




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A specific question in the last poll concerned automatic wage indexation. Only one respondent in ten favors keeping it as is. Some 20.5 percent would like greater protection for more skilled workers: essentially, a one-point increase on the basis of wages. But the largest component (30.7 percent) was for increased protection for all categories of workers. It is no surprise that the opinion for differentiating the wage indexation scale is centered pretty much in northwestern Italy, which is the most industrialized and has the highest office workers' salaries, while an equal scale for all is most popular in central Italy (41.2 percent).

[Graph No 9] Should Automatic Wage Indexation Be Changed or Not?

- (1) kept as is
- (2) more protection for more highly skilled workers
- (3) abolished
- (4) all categories of workers strengthened
- (5) changed somehow
- (6) don't know



As we put together the figures on this question, we can see that only 20.2 percent of the respondents favor eliminating or weakening the inflation-insurance mechanism, while a bloc of more than 40 percent wants it kept unchanged and strengthened by maintaining its present feature of equal aid to all. Another 20.5 percent would accept a revision of wage indexation only if more highly-paid workers could be given greater advantage. There is, therefore, very little room for finding a solution to the problem of labor costs due to wage indexation. This shows that the Spadolini government still has some complicated tasks facing it, even though it has not yet displeased Italians.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PORTUGUESE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURVEYED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 16 Nov 81 p 12

[Article by Carlos Caceres Monteiro]

[Text] Anticipating what could become a new power bloc in Portugal for 1984 or 1985, each day sees stronger signs of rapprochement between Francisco Balsemao's Social Democratic Party (PSD), which is part of the government majority, and the Socialist Party (PS) of Mario Soares.

On the one hand, after a meeting Mario Soares had with several PSD ministers, the Portuguese press spread rumors that the social democrats are not excluding the possibility of supporting the socialist leader in his candidacy for the Presidency of the Republic in the elections 4 years from now. On the other, in the discussion of the constitutional revision, which is taking place in the parliamentary committees, important agreements are taking shape between the government and the socialist opposition which, for certain, is becoming increasingly divided, particularly with regard to military questions. It was agreed in Parliament that the commander general of the armed forces will be appointed by the president of the republic but at the suggestion of the government.

Some observers think there is a possibility that a new kind of party may emerge, called "presidential party," capable of bridging the gap between the two majority formations of Portuguese political life. However, the one who, in principle, would be called upon to become its natural leader, the current president of the republic, Ramalho Eanes, has not given the green light to any initiative.

On the other hand, the government could very well be especially interested in not having an opposition which is too hard at a time when there are increasing symptoms that the economic situation is tending to worsen. Could it be a circumstantial pact aimed at saving face? Perhaps, but with results which might be far-reaching.

The budget now being discussed may involve very deep cuts, especially in the area of public spending. That would be one of the more significant consequences. Joao Salgueiro, aged 47, a liberal technocrat who, 10 years ago, belonged to one of Marcelo Caetano's regimes, is now the strong man of the economy and finances of Pinto Balsemao's government and appears inclined, very rigorously, to demand the application of heavy restrictions in drawing up the next budget.

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Economic Recession

The public debt for 1982 is about 660 billion escudos. The Bank of Portugal has just published a report in which it speaks openly of a worsening of the balance of payments. The prospects point to a reduction in income from tourism, a decrease in remittances sent by emigrants, a reduction of exports and an increase in imports. In short, it is the phantom of economic recession with all its severity in a year in which agriculture did not achieve its minimum production and the management association of industrial enterprises sounded the alarm several times.

To all these black clouds must be added concern about the process of membership in the Common Market. The EEC wants Portugal to accept restrictions on the export of its competitive textile production and also on the circulation of emigrants. Salgueiro recently left a summit meeting of EEC foreign ministers in Luxembourg in a moment of outrage and considered its demands so unacceptable that he began to speak, apparently in all seriousness, of seeking "alternatives to the Common Market" for the Portuguese economy. What alternatives? No one knows. But it is certain that Portuguese public opinion is beginning to view the country's entry into the Common Market as an increasingly remote reality.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

ORDONEZ EXPLAINS DESERTION FROM UCD, NEW PARTY'S IDEOLOGY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Nov 81 pp 39-40

[Interview with Francisco Fernando Ordonez, former minister of justice and UCD member, by Jose Manuel Arija; date and place not given]

[Text] Many of those who were, until yesterday, Centrist coreligionists and some of the party leaders are breathing more freely. He has finally left the party. Francisco Fernando Ordonez, 51 years old, a lawyer and economist, first severed his ties with the government--the few he had as minister--and finally bolted the party.

Criticized as outspoken and unthinking, accused of personal ambition, he was, however, the protagonist of the two chief reforms carried out in these past few years: fiscal reform and the divorce law.

Now he is gone, along with nine other deputies and six senators, to found "Democratic Action," a future party ideologically situated, he says, "to the right of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and to the left of the UCD [Democratic Center Union]." He won the race for the position of "buffer party" between the two big political groups in the country.

[Francisco Fernandez Ordonez] My leaving was in response to a political decision, a judgment about the country's general situation, rather than to a sum of aggravations, which would be easy to enumerate, but I do not wish to do so. It is a question of a conviction: Spain has big problems with no answers, and it continues to need that political clarification which was begun in 1977.

We believe the UCD's original idea has exhausted its possibilities. We have carried on a tough struggle within the party to defend our positions. Today those positions have been sidestepped, or when we did succeed in asserting them, it was at a tremendous or destabilizing price, and to this was added the constant attempts of the traditional Spanish right to make the UCD a classic rightist party.

[Question] And this was demoralizing?

[Answer] In that atmosphere of pressure, we thought it easier to fight in the same way for the things we believe in from outside the UCD, and that therefore with our withdrawal we were contributing to clarifying and stabilizing the political system.

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[Question] Then it was not a sudden decision?

[Answer] We had been discussing it among ourselves for some time, until I arrived at the conclusion that I should leave the Ministry of Justice. I remained with the present administration almost exclusively to finish up the divorce law. The decision to leave the party was made jointly and by persons of the same political line: what we might call the liberal left or the social democrats, that is positions which are not socialist, but which do favor change and reform.

[Question] Did you consider the possibility that the democracy might be destabilized by your withdrawal from the UCD?

[Answer] The UCD made an attempt at settlement when it created the so-called "mission of salvation." But the only result was a mediocre document, which I compared to prescribing an aspirin for cancer. That was not the way. The way is ideological clarification, in which each one takes up his position and tells where he is. That is what we have done, and moreover, with a constructive spirit.

There is only one condition for clarifying areas: that it all be done while maintaining parliamentary stability, and we will sacrifice whatever is necessary to preserve that. If the only purpose of our operation is to stabilize the democracy, it would be ridiculous to produce the opposite effect.

[Question] From what you say, it appears that the UCD has no remedy, and that more "clarifications" will be forthcoming.

[Answer] The experience of the past few days demonstrates that the UCD's problems were deeper; I have resolved not to discuss the subject of the UCD from this time forward. It is a matter of mental health. Now, what we are working on is formulating the new plan that we are going to propose. We hope that, with our withdrawal, the civilized right will organize, because we are in another political space.

[Question] Did President Calvo Sotelo understand your withdrawal from the party?

[Answer] Calvo Sotelo saw clearly that we were a first expeditionary force for the political regeneration of everything that is to the right of the PSOE, or rather, of everything that is not socialism. It appeared to President Calvo Sotelo that all this would have a positive result, if we did it intelligently. What was absurd, in my opinion, was to keep instability institutionalized, an instability the people no longer profess to believe in.

[Question] Have you registered yet as a political party?

[Answer] At this time we are an independent political platform studying the eventual formation of a political party. We will study this calmly, because there is no hurry.

[Question] What would be the political and sociological profile of your party?

[Answer] It would be basically a reform and lay party, which would take the position of a real center, in the liberal, social democratic and radical area. We

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would have to include the aspirations of a youthful public, a high percentage of women, the urban salaried electorate, cadres, officials, liberal professionals and certain types of businessmen who are beginning to support us because they are aware that they must bet on the future in a positive manner and not with a defensive and coarse business attitude.

[Question] It would be a choice similar to Azana's radical-republican group?

[Answer] We have an Azanist base in the idea of regeneration and modernization of Spain held by Azana's followers, the Free Education Institution or Giner de los Rios. Here we have what is left of the intellectuals, but we also have another side, which is technocratic: I myself studied economics and finance all my life. Spain's current problems are not the same as they used to be. At this time the problems concern the developed society, industrial reconversion, public administration, etc.

[Question] How did you choose the name "Democratic Action"?

[Answer] That is still a temporary name, but it has the advantage of having echoes of the old tradition of Republican Action or, more recently, of the party of Dionisio Ridruejo. Because action gives the impression of initiative; because it is a question of trying to construct democracy in its deepest sense and because, in addition, it has no ideological problems. That is, we don't want to come out as a social democratic party, to avoid creating identification problems.

You have to distinguish between social democracy as an ideological base, which is what we said in our first document, and social democracy as a party. We may have that base, but we have no reason to play the role of a social democratic party. We also include the old liberal Spanish left, radical groups, etc. To raise only a partial ideological banner would be to leave out much of the type of group we hope to form, because there will be people who are not social democrats who will want to be in on this operation.

[Question] What would you say are the points which distinguish you from socialism?

[Answer] We are different because of the way our group was created. Socialism comes from the left and from workers' organizations. Our group comes from the middle classes, the bourgeois intellectuals and the cadres. On the other hand, the two have a common goal: reform and change. The problem will be how deeply and in what kind of reforms we get involved.

Since we are not socialists, we are concerned from another point of view. For example, we do not agree on what we might call the grand program of the PSOE; that is not our horizon, because we have a view of utopia different from that of the socialists. We are also different because we are against the nationalizations, although we do have plans for cleaning up the public sector, control of public expenditure, a change of image for public enterprise, reform of the criminal code, and to see that fiscal reform is not sidetracked, etc. That is, we are not willing to play at pseudoreform, but our reforms would be made from more centrist positions.

[Question] With that goal, then, do you not have difficulty in participating in a coalition with a socialist government?

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[Answer] What I believe is that we cannot continue with Spanish Manicheism, where a party which is to our right participates in the government, as for example in Germany. What is important in political parties is their own structure and their own historical background. There would be nothing wrong with a coalition with the socialists. But our party is not going to be born with a vocation to coalition, but rather as an independent body.

[Question] To participate in elections one must have substantial economic and financial support. Do you have that yet?

[Answer] It is true that our opposition and our potential will also depend on the support we find in that area. However, we will make our choice with absolute generosity, with no cards up our sleeve; therefore we will have to look for economic support. Fortunately, not all the businessmen are like the leadership of the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations], and we have young businessmen, concerned and active, who could support our idea, which is very simple: either Spain changes and adapts to what is going on in the world, which is a real technological industrial revolution, or this country will be left to administer a historic decadence.

[Question] Are you going to hold your Constituent Congress soon?

[Answer] We have not yet thought about that, because we are in the planning stage. What we want now is for wholesome people to join, people who are already politically formed and who can contribute something. It is not a question of going out to sign up so many thousand members, not at all. It is a problem of contribution, of segregating ideas and of making proposals for the country. We want voters, of course, but just now we want people who will work.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CARRILLO DEFENDS HIS METHODS OF RUNNING PCE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Nov 81 pp 46-47

[Interview with PCE leader Santiago Carrillo on PCE policies and difficulties, by CAMBIO 16 correspondent Jose Manuel Arija; date and place not given]

[Text] The latest rebellion in the PCE has been settled by expulsions and sanctions. The renewal sector sought a confrontation with the secretary general, but Carrillo read them the statutes and put them back on the right track. Santiago Carrillo tells CAMBIO 16 his reasons for deciding to expel the transgressors. "I had no alternative," he says, "for a party without discipline crumbles."

According to Carrillo, the renewers wanted to establish a parallel leadership and acted as an organized faction: "No party tolerates those things." A recent experience, an error committed a few months ago, and the firm intention not to repeat it, were fixed in the mind of the secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party.

Antoni GUTIERREZ, FORMER LEADER OF THE PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], had tolerated the emergence of factions among the Catalanian communists, and the result was that the pro-Soviets soon took over the party. The decision could not be repeated. Acting with legality, a new infantile disease of communism threatened the party: democratitis, as Carrillo himself said. Hence, the crisis.

Santiago Carrillo [S.C.]: It was a purely a conjunctural motive, the crisis which arose from the so-called new Basque Left. It came from farther back. The 10th Congress opted for a Eurocommunist policy and a democratic party without tendencies or organized factions. But there were two groups, the dogmatics and the renewers, which were defeated; and the latter did not accept their defeat.

I do not understand how a certain sector of the press can be astonished that factions are not accepted in the Communist Party when no political party in the country accepts them. However, the fact is that the party which the Lerchundi group is going to enter not only condemns Eurocommunism but also continues to proclaim its position against the Constitution and insists that only in terrorism can there be a cease-fire and at the same time a maintenance of independent positions. I ask myself: "If the PCE had accepted a merger with a group which speaks and expresses itself thus, what would not have been said of the communists!"

CAMBIO 16 [C16]: How would you summarize the differences between the officialist Eurocommunists and the renewers?

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S.C.: I believe that the differences may appear somewhat obscure inasmuch as the renewers do not maintain a different political plan and even say it is the same. The differences are limited to whether or not there should be organized factions in the party, although they even say they do not want factions. In short, in the PCE we have the impression that the only thing the renewers want is to change the leadership.

Cl6: They also criticize the lack of internal democracy in the PCE.

S.C.: That is a criticism which is easy to answer, for in its preparation and development the last congress was a model of transparency and democracy, and I am not the only one who says this. All the journalists who attended say the same.

What we cannot have in the Communist Party is two leaderships: one elected at the congress and the other which, in fact, is self-appointed and which, it appears, takes different positions. Lack of democracy occurs when the minority tries to impose itself on the majority.

Cl6: Do you believe the differences with the renewers will continue or, on the contrary, that there will be a possibility for understanding?

S.C.: We can reach an understanding on one condition: that the party's agreements and discipline be respected. We shall not make any deals to reach an understanding; but if they abandon their attitude of open conflict with the party, our will would be to reach a point where the sanctioned comrades could again be active in the party. It depends on them, for a party without internal discipline crumbles.

Cl6: Was it necessary to go to the extreme of expelling the Madrid city councilmen from the party?

S.C.: It was a test of strength which I do not understand. I understand that the councilmen would defend their positions within the party and their qualification as members of the same. I must say that those sanctioned by the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] had more of a party attitude, for they preferred to abandon their positions and continue to hold the party's membership card. In contrast, these friends who call themselves communists value position over membership.

That they made this reverse decision, preferring position to party membership, I cannot understand and, from the standpoint of PCE ethics, I have never known this to happen. If, tomorrow, someone said to me or to thousands of militants: "Which do you prefer: an identification card as deputy or an identification card as a member of the party?" I would choose the party, for, above all, I am a communist.

Cl6: Then the expelled councilmen are not good communists?

S.C.: If they were, they could have committed the error and even remained in their position; but they would not have stood in the way of their replacement in the city council. And here we have the question as to whom the elected councilmen represent--relatively unknown voters or the party? According to political ethics and the laws, persons elected through a candidacy represent the party and that is how the voters choose them. They do not vote for them because of their name, for they are persons who are more or less known, but because they are candidates of the party. They owe their responsibility to the party.

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Cl6: You say that the renewers are organized, but they deny that they are acting as a faction.

S.C.: But what is a faction? When a periodical, the foremost among the leftists, is, in fact, its spokesman; when there are horizontal and marginal meetings not compatible with the party organization; and when money is collected inasmuch as Lerchundi's activity in Madrid and press announcements cost money; this certainly speaks of an organization from all viewpoints.

Obviously, if they admitted that they are organized, they would be acknowledging that they are working as a faction; and this they will never confess. But it is evident that they are organized and are operating in that manner. The problem is that they are forming a faction without purpose. I would understand the dogmatics. But among friends who assert that they have no political differences, alleging only internal democracy, their work does not make sense. That labor is going to melt away like a brittle sugar bar within the party if they do not clarify their attitude and tell us precisely what they want.

Cl6: Aside from the lack of internal democracy, are they not also criticizing the leadership of establishing policy in accordance with the prevailing situation without a clear strategy?

S.C.: The only party which has a line so coherent, so coherent that it is repeated, is ours. From the beginning we said that the UCD [Democratic Center Union] could not make the change by itself, and we added that we needed a coalition government shortly after concentration, and now we are returning to a coalition. That is to say, a government in which the Left participates. That has been our constant political offer and now, since that kind of government did not emerge, the change was not the profound and serious kind it should have been. I see no sound reasoning in that criticism.

Cl6: If there are no reasons to criticize the internal democracy or the political line, is it then an open conflict by the renewers against Carrillism?

S.C.: In 1956 there was a crisis in the leadership which caused veteran leaders to abandon their posts. Afterwards, until 1961, there was also the so-called pro-China split. And the pro-China group engaged in launching that of Carrillism, for they thought it was more vulnerable to say Carrillist than to say PCE leadership. Then, in 1968, after that of Prague, the pro-Soviets made another split and also ganged up against me.

It was easier to attack Carrillism, which does not exist and is not a reality, than to attack the leadership as an entity. The renewers are pursuing this same tactic, thinking that to break up the leadership it is necessary to break the code of the General Secretariat. Today it is I; if tomorrow it were another, it would be the same.

Cl6: The present crisis could damage the communists in the next election. Are you taking that into account?

S.C.: We are restoring order in the party; and the way we would lose the election is if we continue the pandemonium we have had up to now. But if the party reestab-

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lishes discipline and presents itself united at election time, we shall not only not lose but win votes.

Cl6: What is the present situation of the pro-Soviets in Catalonia and, in general, in the PCE?

S.C.: When we speak of pro-Soviets, I distinguish between those who are carrying on organized work, more or less controlled from wherever, and a mass of party militants who, through their training and other factors, may sympathize with some aspects of the policy of the USSR. It will be difficult for the organized group which follows directives foreign to our national interests and to those of the party to continue, for it has another type of obedience.

The PSUC has entered a phase of normalization. Prior to the Fifth Congress, organized factions were permitted, which greatly damaged the party and started the crisis.

Cl6: And you considered that event when you sanctioned the renewers.

S.C.: Certainly. I do not want what happened in the PSUC to happen in the party as a whole. There was a disease in the PSUC--democratitis--which managed to permit the organization of factions and which, when they wanted to take stock, had gained ground and transformed the party. In no way do I want this to happen now in the Communist Party.

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