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# Korean Affairs Report

(FOUO 2/82)



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## KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

DETAILS OF PERSONAL NETWORK OF CHON REGIME REPORTED

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Nov 81 pp 156-170

[Article by Maeda Yasuhiro: "Personal Connections of the Chon Tu-hwan Regime"]

[Text] The Inauguration of the Chon Regime

President Chon Tu-hwan of the Republic of Korea has implemented important domestic and foreign programs one after another, including the presidential election, the National Assembly elections, the U.S.-Korea summit conference, and his visit to the five members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Moreover, he boldly carried out wholesale personnel changes in political and government circles. This was designed to achieve stability for his regime. In addition, during the past year he has also tackled reform of the top leadership of the Korean military forces, which form the nucleus of his power structure. Thus he has taken steady steps for the perpetuation of his power.

It was 1 year and 11 months ago, on 12 December 1979, that Maj Gen Chon Tu-hwan, commander of the Defense Force Security Command, daringly staged a "coup for military purge" to eliminate Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander Chong Sung-hwa and other top military leaders and elders. Also, it was a little over a year ago, on 1 September 1980, that he abruptly forced acting President Ch'oe Kyu-ha to step down and took over the presidency. It took President Pak Chong-hui (a major general at that time) 2 years and 7 months from the time of the military coup in May 1961 to become president in December 1963. Compared to this, one can see how speedily he usurped political power and has pressed forward with reforms.

The new lineups of the political, government, and military circles that support the Chon regime will be scrutinized below.

To begin with, let us trace the steps leading to his political takeover. It all started with the measures taken on 17 May 1980 to expand and strengthen the Emergency Martial Law. Because of intensified student demonstrations the measures called for banning all political activities. The Defense Force Security Command (CIC) arrested on the suspicion of antigovernment activities and illicit accumulation of wealth the so-called three Kims, that is, Kim Tae-chung, former presidential candidate of the opposition party, the New Democratic Party; Kim Chong-p'il, former prime minister (and president of the progovernment party, the Democratic Republican Party), and Kim Yong-sam, president of the New Democratic Party.

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On the following day, 18 May, protest demonstrations by students and the masses demanding the restoration of democracy, the breakup of the Yusin system, and the resignation of the Chon Tu-hwan military regime were started in Kwangju city. After armed intervention with indiscriminate mass slaughter by the Airborne Special Warfare Corps (paratroopers), the protest demonstrations were quashed by the martial law troops on 27 May.

The schedule for General Chon to take over political power emerged in concrete form with the "Emergency Countermeasures Committee for National Security" inaugurated after the suspension of all the functions of the National Assembly at the end of May. General Chon, as chairman of the Standing Committee for National Security, pressed ahead with steps to let the Ch'oe Kyu-ha regime transfer its power. This Standing Committee of the Committee for National Security was composed of 18 active-duty soldiers as the nucleus. It gave birth to a new constitution which was promulgated in October 1980, 1 month after Chon became president.

Furthermore, on the basis of the supplementary rules of this constitution, a legislative organ, the Legislative Assembly for National Security (the so-called Legislative Assembly) was established on 27 October to replace the National Assembly.

This Legislative Assembly (composed of 81 members in all, with military officers at the center) would be led to the formation of an assembly for the president to serve as a stable political base with a progovernment party holding a majority. During the 156-day period until the day before the opening of the new assembly on 10 April 1980 when it was dissolved, the Legislative Assembly held no less than 196 sessions, including plenary sessions and subcommittee meetings to pass at a stretch as many as 219 bills, including 189 legislative bills, plus the 1981 national budgetary bills, and some resolutions.

Included in them were the Political Climate Reform Law aimed at purging established politicians, the Presidential Election Law, the National Assembly Election Law, the Political Party Law, the Political Fund Regulation Law, the Fundamental Press Law, and others.

The personnel changes among the top military leaders, regarded as the granting of rewards for their service in the 12 December military purge, were tentatively completed. The personal connections in the military were drastically changed as a result of the replacement of the brains at the Blue House and the transfer of military brass to administrative sectors and to the assembly.

Who has the real power within the Chon Tu-hwan regime and who exerts influence? What kind of character do the people who form the core of the power in the regime have? The following persons are discussed in this context based on information available up to now.

#### National Assembly

In accordance with the new constitution, 15 electoral districts were added to the previous 77 electoral districts. Thus there are 92 local electoral districts. Two seats are elected from each district, 184 seats in total. Then 92 national

district seats termed the "proportional representation system" are added to the local districts. The grand total is 276 assembly seats.

According to the new Election Law, the seats in the national district are not elected by direct popular vote. Instead, the party which wins first place in the local elections receives two-thirds (61 seats) of the national district, and the remaining 31 seats are distributed among the second place party and others proportionately according to the number of seats they win. The progovernment party, the Democratic Justice Party (Mingjong Party) which was hastily inaugurated toward the end of 1980, aimed at becoming the first-place party by putting up one candidate each in all 92 electoral districts. It won 90 seats. As was expected, it gained 151 seats after adding the proportionately distributed seats, greatly surpassing the simple majority. The Democratic Korea Party (Minhan Party, with Yu Ch'i-song as its president) which was formed with persons from the right-of-center faction of the opposition party during the Pak regime, the New Democratic Party, became the second-place party, winning 57 seats, and after adding 24 proportionately distributed seats the total number of its seats was 81 (82 later as an independent joined the party). The third-place party, formed with the core coming from the Democratic Republican Party and the Yushin Friends Party (Yujong Party), both progovernment parties during the Pak regime, was the Korean Nationalist Party (Kungmin Party, with Kim Chong-ch'o as its president). It won 18 seats, and its total reached 25 after adding 7 proportionately distributed seats. In addition, the Democratic Socialist Party which claims to be a socialist party, the People's Rights Party, and the New Politics Party won two seats each. The Democratic Agrarian Party and the Anmin Party won one seat each. There were 11 independents elected (one independent later joined the Minhan Party). These minor parties received no proportional seats.

Precisely herein lay the aim of the Chon regime in proclaiming its welcome to a "multiparty system," designed to cause a mushrooming of minor parties. As a result, the Minjong Party with only 37 percent of the votes gained 54 percent of the seats. The persons who make up the three top-ranking parties represent the crisscrossing of former progovernment and opposition party members. There is no difference whatsoever in their political beliefs and ideals or in their policy. They are, moreover, all "conservatives."

The first-place party, the Minjong Party, is expected to play only the role of a voting machine for President Chon. In the new National Assembly, major bills are expected to be automatically approved. The drafting and proposing of legislative bills is carried out by the brains at the Blue House and the administrative bureaucrat group. The scope of the activities of the National Assembly has been drastically curtailed. The quintessence of the function of the National Assembly is different from that of a Western-style parliament. Its aim is to develop goodwill diplomacy toward the two major allies of Korea, the United States and Japan, by using National Assembly members as a conduit. Although the National Assembly members are "not needed for the deliberation of bills," these newly elected assembly members who will form a part of the power structure as the progovernment party members for 4 years to come will be analyzed, beginning with the process of their elections.

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Composition of the New National Assembly Members

President Chon assigned his trusted lieutenants to form a progovernment party. First of all, the makeup of the 151 members of the Minjong Party is characterized by the massive presence of former soldiers. With Military Academy graduates at the center, 28 either recently retired from military service or served in the military in the past. They are followed by 25 former ministers and high-ranking bureaucrats. Included in them are a former assistant director of the Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), an attorney general, and a director of the Seoul Metropolitan Police.

From among the Legislative Assembly members who assisted in the formation of the new National Assembly, 24 were selected to become new National Assembly members. From the Democratic Republican Party, the progovernment party of the Pak regime, 11 were selected. From another former progovernment party, the Yujong Party, seven were selected (some of them were also Legislative Assembly members). Eight are former assembly members from the New Democratic Party. In terms of occupational classification, there are as many as 22 well-known journalists, such as newspaper executives, reporters, and television newscasters. They form one of the three main forces of the party, along with the former officers group and the politicians. In addition, 22 members were selected from financial and business conglomerate circles. There are 12 former scholars and school administrators.

While the majority of the Minjong Party assembly members, 83 of them, are over 40 years of age, only 3 are in their thirties. Of the total, 46 are in their fifties, and 17 in their sixties. Although the average assembly member is somewhat younger than his counterpart under the Pak regime, it does not coincide with the younger trend of the eligible voters, as 60 percent of them are in their twenties and thirties.

This is the result of the appointment of old politicians who survived the Political Climate Purification Law, and especially of the appointment of 61 members as proportionate representatives from among noted elder politicians, financiers, and high-ranking government officials, with the exception of some young former soldiers dispatched by President Chon for the formation. Compared with Japan, the average age of the leadership in every circle is younger by 10 years. Of the five persons in their thirties, two are women (both served in the Legislative Assembly) who were assigned to seats from the national district. Other members in their forties were selected by direct vote. Therefore, the generational change in certain quarters is not designed to reflect the diversifying political trends of the eligible voters. Instead, it is a product of "deliberate" consideration.

As will be discussed later, the former subordinates of President Chon (50 years of age) occupy the leading positions. With the exception of those who occupy honorary positions and had meritorious service in the Legislative Assembly, the actual working force is composed of persons in their mid-forties. In terms of educational background, as many as 20 are graduates of Japanese universities and colleges (including former ones in Manchuria, now Northeast China) such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku, Nihon, Waseda, Chu and Doshisha Universities. Being the Japanese-speaking generation they are still regarded as playing a part of the role of conduit between Korea and Japan (ages quoted in the following are all calendar-year ages in the Korean style).

## Soldiers-Turned-Politicians

The group in the Minjong Party that exercises the real power is led by former Legislative Assembly member Kwon Chong-tal (45), who is the central figure in the "leading reformist force." He retired from active military service as a brigadier general in October 1980 and contributed his efforts to the inauguration of the party. He has been appointed secretary general of the party. He was born in North Kyongsang Province and is of the 15th Class of the Military Academy. He is regarded as a personal follower of Yun P'il-yong, former commander of the Capital Guard Command. In the Defense Force Security Command (CIC) he was in control of intelligence on the military. The fact that he served as director of the CIC Intelligence Office at the time of the 12 December coup for military purge led to his exceptional promotion. Since he visited the United States and Japan as a confidential emissary of the president to resolve the dispute between Japan and Korea over the execution of Mr Kim Tae-chung, he has been busily occupied also with the behind-the-scenes operations regarding Japanese political circles on behalf of Korea's request for a 6-billion-dollar loan.

The number two man is a deputy secretary general of the party, Yi Chong-ch'an (45), of the 16th Class of the Military Academy. He garnered 116,000 votes in the celebrated electoral district which includes Chongno-ku and Chung-ku, popularly known as number one on the political street. In May 1980 he was appointed director of the Planning and Coordination Office of the KCIA in order to carry out a wholesale purge of the persons connected with Kim Chae-kyu, former Director of the KCIA who shot Pak to death. He displayed his ability in the revamping of the KCIA. He is said to be favored with the influence of his grandfather, who was a former vice president and an anti-Japanese fighter. He served as a councilor at the Korean Embassy in London and is also a talented administrator. He is expected to be active as chairman of the Steering Committee of the National Assembly.

Yun Sok-sun (44), who was ranked third in the proportional representation (national district) list, is a deputy secretary general of the party. He is one of the young and powerful triumvirate. He is not a Military Academy graduate, but was selected from his former position as director of the General Affairs Bureau of the KCIA. He is closely connected with Ho Sam-su, chief presidential investigation secretary, who was a classmate of Yun Sok-sun at Pusan High School. Ho is one of the powerful men at the Blue House, as will be discussed later. The names of these young powerful men were hardly known to the Korean people until half a year ago. This attests to the fact that this series of political changes constitutes a military coup in the purest sense of the term.

Former Minister of National Defense Chong Nae-hyok (55), one of the 28 soldiers-turned-politicians of the Minjong Party and elected speaker of the National Assembly, is a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy. He is known even in Japan for his activity to obtain the release of the hostages in the hijacking of Japan Airlines' Yodo (1970). He has many acquaintances in defense circles in Japan. He will serve as an important pipeline when new exchanges between Japanese and Korean parliamentarians commence. There are 21 graduates of the Korean Military Academy. The 8th Class is represented by four, the 13th Class by three, and other classes generally by one or two. Only one, Chong Son-hu (43), former managing director of the Korean Electric Wire Company, represents the 17th Class among those who



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form the young core of the leading reformist force. It is characteristic of those of the same class who enter politics after doffing their uniforms that they are appointed only to positions in the inner circle at the Blue House or to diplomatic posts.

Yu Kun-hang (53), a retired major general who was commander of the Army Intelligence Command, of the 2-A Class of the army, is reputed to have been one of the army supporters for the coup for military purge. Kim Yong-son (51) of the 7th Class and former director of the Anti-Espionage Countermeasures Headquarters, is President Chon's senior by 4 years. He is highly familiar with military intelligence and military justice. As the presiding judge of the common court martial under the martial law during Kim Chae-kyu's trial, he handed out the death sentence to Kim Chae-kyu. Assembly member Kim Yong-son was selected along with incumbent Minister of Home Affairs So Chong-hwa (47) as a deputy director of the KCIA, after Yun Ik-kyun and Kim Chae-tok (former minister to Japan), who had close personal ties with Kim Chae-kyu, were discharged. Kim Yong-son is regarded as outstanding in his service in reorganizing the KCIA to suit the Chon Tu-hwan regime.

A superstar among the 8th Class is Pak Tae-chun (54), chairman of the Pohang Steel Company. As the president of the company he was successful in its management, and developed the company into one of the representative enterprises in Korea. He suddenly surfaced as a leader in financial circles after the Chon regime was inaugurated. He was appointed chairman of the Korea-Japan Economic Association inaugurated on 26 February, thus becoming a manager on the Korean side of the pipeline that connects the economic circles in Japan and Korea. Before the liberation he once studied at Waseda University in the Science and Engineering Department, but he withdrew before graduation and later entered the Korean Military Academy. He was appointed to the position of director of the Secretariat to the Supreme National Reconstruction Council immediately after then Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui started a military coup. He is currently active as chairman of the Finance Committee of the National Assembly. Other members of the 8th Class are Yi Pom-chun (53), former assistant minister of national defense for logistics and director of the Maritime and Port Administration; Pak Sang-kyu (50), former director of the Housing Corporation and a retired brigadier general; and Yi Sang-ik (53), former Yujong Party assembly member and minister to Japan. Of the 8th Class of the Military Academy, former Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il and Yi Pyong-hui, former minister without portfolio (in charge of Japan affairs), were purged from politics for 8 years on the suspicion that they had been involved in irregularities and corruption. Thus a clear demarcation line was drawn among them.

What attracts one's attention is the 11th Class, the classmates of President Chon Tu-hwan. The three prominent ones are: Kim Sik (48), former director of the Materiel Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense; Kwon Ik-hyon (47), former assistant to the minister without portfolio; and An Kyo-tok (47), president of the Chongu Development Company. As will be related later, President Chon strongly wanted his comrades bonded in blood at the time of the 12 December coup for military purge, Lt Gen Chong Ho-yong (49), deputy army chief of staff, and Lt Gen No T'ae-u (49), commander of the Defense Force Security Command--ranks given are those held at the time of the purge--and others who were in uniform to turn to politics. Not all of them would doff their uniforms. Messrs Kim, Kwon, and An were not closely connected as comrades in the coup for military purge, but they

were classmates who pledged their cooperation from outside at the time of the inception of the Chon regime. The Chongu Development Company was started as a military supply contractor to the American forces in Korea. The company adopted a copresident system, and former generals have filled the positions. Therefore, the company has strong ties with the government. One president, Min Sok-won, is not an assembly member but he was a member of the 11th Class of the Military Academy. He came to Japan last April and seriously attempted to "make an inroad" in Japan's political and financial circles as President Chon's highly trusted representative from business circles. Mr An held the position of Chief of Operations of the Army Staff and rose as high as to the rank of full colonel. Hereafter, Presidents An and Min are expected to be in charge of the twin sectors of politics and economy in laying the pipeline between Japan and Korea.

Then, those in the 11th Class were followed by Ch'oe Nak-son (47), president of the Koesong Paper Manufacturing Company, of the 12th Class; O Han-ku (47), director of the Pohang Steel Company, of the 13th Class; and Pae Myong-kuk (47), the president of a construction company, and Yi Ch'un-ku (47) who was active as chairman of the Purification Committee, both of the 14th Class.

Those who directly changed their status from active duty to become members of the Legislative Assembly include Yi U-chae (47), of the 13th Class, a brigadier general who commanded the V Communications Corps; Chong Sun-tok (46) of the 16th Class, a brigadier general who served as the chief of staff of a field army; and Ho Ch'ong-il of the 20th Class, a military police officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Assembly member Ho also cooperated with General Chon at the time of the 12 December coup and served with distinction.

Participating in the Chon regime from the air force and navy are: Ch'on Yong-song (52), president of the Korea Electric Maintenance Corporation, of the 1st Class of the Air Force Academy; Kim Yong-su (52) of the 2d Class of the Air Force Academy, who served as commander of the Air Force Training Base; Chong Won-min (54), former First Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Standing Committee of the National Security Committee, of the 5th Class of the Naval Academy; Kim Chong-ho, of the 3d Class of the Naval Officers' Candidate School and former Second Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; and Yi Yang-u (49), of the 4th Class of the Naval Academy and former Yujong Party assembly member. Besides these, Yi Chae-hwan (43), former director of the Presidential Protective Service Office, is one of the unique participants.

In terms of former military personnel, 12 retired generals led by Pak Kyong-won of the 6th Class of the Military Academy, who was former governor of Kangwon Province, joined en masse the then New Democratic Party in pursuit of their political careers. But all of them were implicated thereafter in the Political Climate Reform Law. Even though they were not purged, none of them has become a member of the National Assembly. There are gigantic forces working against military men who try to join an opposition party.

#### Journalists-Turned-Politicians

As journalists-turned-politicians, assembly members Kim Yun-hwan (49) and Nam Chae-hui (47) are already well known. As they have an excellent command of the Japanese

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language and also are well acquainted with all circles in Japan, they have loomed as the central figures among Japanese and Korean parliamentarians. Mr Kim was born in Sonsan, North Kyongsang Province. He was a special correspondent of CHOSON ILBO in Tokyo and assistant managing editor of the same paper. He was then appointed Yujong Party assembly member in 1979. Mr Nam was managing editor of CHOSON ILBO, and chief editorial writer of SEOUL SINMUN. He was appointed Democratic Republican Party assembly member in 1977. Both were known as specialists in Japanese affairs. Winning President Chon's confidence early, they joined the progovernment party, and they were promised cabinet posts at later dates. Pak Kyong-sok (44), who was appointed the progovernment party spokesman, was a former editorial writer of TONG ILBO and also a special correspondent in Tokyo. It gives the impression that those at the frontline level of Korean journalist circles have "rallied" under the Chon regime, including Song Chi-yong (65), a former editorial writer of CHOSON ILBO and a former member of the Legislative Assembly; Kim Yong-t'ae (45), former managing editor of CHOSON ILBO; Chong Nam (40), assistant managing editor of KYONGHYANG SINMUN; Sim Myong-po (46), former managing editor of HANGUK ILBO; and Yi Yong-hui (50), a woman editorial writer of HANGUK ILBO. Pong Tu-hwan (46), a former newscaster with TBC, a commercial television station, who editorially argued for the Pak regime, won the largest number of votes (158,000) throughout the nation as a representative of the television industry.

In addition, there are active newspaper management representatives such as Nam Chae-tu (42), president of TAEJON ILBO, and Sim Sangwu (42), president of CHONNAM ILBO. Those antigovernment journalists charged with violating the Emergency Martial Law and various other laws during 1980 were either imprisoned or were forced to resign from their employment positions. Thus they have disappeared from the scene to lead the remainder of their lives in a manner contrasting with those journalists who have penetrated the central nerve system of power.

Among those who have sideslipped into various positions from executive and judicial circles are Kim Ki-ch'ol (64), former minister of communications, and Chong Chong-t'aek (46), former minister of agriculture and forestry. Mr Chong has been appointed to the newly created post of first minister for political affairs. Others are Hwang In-song (55), former minister of transportation; Kim Chong-kyong (58), former attorney general; Yi Yong-hun (54) former director of the Legislative Bureau; Na Kil-cho (58), former associate justice of the Supreme Court and a graduate of Meiji University in Japan; Pak Tong-chin, former minister of foreign affairs and a graduate of Chuo University in Japan; and Kim Chong-ho (46) former vice minister of home affairs. Unique among those who benefitted from the influence of relatives is Pak Chae-hong (40), President Pak's nephew, who is chairman of the Tongyang Steel Pipe Company.

In response to President Chon's summon for "national concordance," as many as eight assembly members and even staff members of the former largest opposition party, the New Democratic Party, have participated in the Chon regime. Yi Chae-yong (66) former vice president of the New Democratic Party, who paved the way for party President Chon to assume the presidency, has been appointed a representative member of the party. He is a graduate of Chuo University in Japan. For his service in inaugurating the party, he was named to the first position in the list of the national district. Other former New Democratic Party assembly members were all accused of being "turncoats" but won elections in local districts in a good fight. They thus acted as models of the posture for national unity.

Among them, assembly members O Se-ung (48), Pak Kwon-hom (49), and Han Pyong-ch'ae (48) are also known in Japan through the former Japan-Korea Parliamentarians League and other organizations. Assembly member Chin I-chong (59) quickly turned his coat under the Ch'oe regime following the shooting death of President Pak to serve as minister of public health and social affairs for the first time as an opposition member. Among the turncoat group are assembly member Yun Kil-chung (65), a former member of the Legislative Assembly and a graduate of Nihon University in Japan, and Na Sok-hu (46), who once defended Kim Tae-chung and others who were implicated in the case of the Declaration for Democratic National Salvation (March 1976). Assembly member Cho Chong-hu (60), a former opposition party member who served as a secretary to former President Yun Po-son, the leader of the anti-Pak forces, also served as an assembly member. As he was a member of the former Legislative Assembly, it indicates the broad base of support for the Chon regime.

Of former progovernment party assembly members, both the Democratic Republican and Yujong Parties, the majority of bigwigs and able persons were implicated in the Political Climate Reform Law and forced to retire from politics for the next 8 years. Consequently, almost all new assembly members are almost unknown "small wheels." The precious few survivors among them are assembly member Kim Suk-hyon (64), elected in a local district and a graduate of Waseda University, and assembly member Sin Sang-ch'o (59), elected in the national district who once attended Tokyo University. While with the Yujong Party he won the confidence of President Pak and long served behind the scenes in negotiating with Japan. For this reason he has many acquaintances in political, financial, and government circles in Japan. He is expected to assist the Chon regime in its dealings with Japan in a style different from that of the young group of Japan specialists.

#### The Most Corrupt Elections in History

The recent elections were held in accordance with the new election laws which gave landslide victories to the progovernment party. Moreover, the whole government and bureaucrats openly engaged in baiting with promises of benefit. All opposition parties deplored this: "These elections were the most corrupt in the history of Korea."

Large handing out of subsidies as special favors of the government to local cities, towns, and villages, the indiscriminate issuance of campaign pledges, and the buying of votes were openly rampant. In the two cities of Taegu and Inchon, in the presence of President Chon, progovernment party candidates petitioned for the promotion of their cities to the status of special cities. Their petition was instantly approved. It was obviously a case of doing "one favor every day." The opposition found no ways to counter and were beaten.

In Korea, the local self-government system has not been implemented since the period of the Pak regime. Instead, the existing system calls for the appointment of provincial governors by the president and also for the appointment of mayors, county, town, and village chiefs by the superior government agencies. Also, local legislative councils at all levels have been disapproved on the ground of financial saving. Therefore, there is a complete centralized system enforced in Korea. For this reason more than 500,000 public employees and police officers functioned as vote-collecting machines for the incumbent regime, forced voters

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to go to polling stations, and obstructed opposition party candidates. This resulted in making the recent elections more corrupt than those during the Pak regime. The reason is clear, then, for disapproving the enforcement of the local self-government system in the new constitution in spite of the strong demand for it on the part of the people.

Mr Im Pang-hyon (51), a famous Blue House spokesman under the Pak regime, ran as a candidate in Chonju-Wanju District, North Cholla Province, with the slogan that "progovernment bureaucrats were needed for the development of North Cholla Province." Even President Chon went there personally to endorse his candidacy and publicly pledged scholarships to young people from the Cholla provinces and the remodeling of the Chonju railroad station. Assembly member Im was successfully elected. The FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW commented: "The politically oppressed people judged it hopeless to change the situation and sold their votes. Such a phenomenon portends danger."

There were some incidents leading candidates who held strong views against the incumbent regime to withdraw their candidacy. In Kwangju city, South Cholla Province, where there were bloody riots in May 1980, a powerful local leader, Maj Gen Chong Ung, ran as an independent, but he disappeared 10 days before the voting. At the time of the Kwangju incident, Major General Chong was commander of the 31st Division stationed in the locality, and he issued a statement that he could not obey the orders from the national government to mobilize troops for the suppression of the "riots." He thus won fame overnight.

In the 11th National Assembly which opened on 11 April 1981, the Democratic Justice Party picked Ch'ae Mun-sik (56), a former New Democratic Party member and a member of the Legislative Assembly, as vice speaker of the assembly, and conceded another vice speakership to Kim Un-ha (56), vice president of the Democratic Korea Party. But the Democratic Justice Party members monopolized the chairmanships of all 13 standing committees. Six former military men were among them. The party made it clear that it would manage the National Assembly with the progovernment party alone.

Although the second largest party, the Democratic Korea Party, was criticized for being "an opposition party by day and a progovernment party by night" by other opposition parties, it was successful in electing many assembly members, mainly from among former New Democratic Party Assembly members. As somewhat distinct from rightwing New Democratic Party members who turned to the Democratic Justice Party, the Democratic Korea Party includes such middle-of-road and left-leaning assembly members as Ho Kyong-man (43), who was a defense lawyer during Kim Tae-chung's trial, and Son Se-il (45), who was an assistant to Kim Yong-sam, president of the New Democratic Party. Also, the third largest party, the Nationalist Party, originated from the former Democratic Republic Party. It is considered a quasi-progovernment party by the Korean people. Conspicuous among the Nationalist Party assembly members is Cho Il-che (53), from North Kyongsang Province, a former assembly member from the Yujong Party. He served as deputy director for security at the KCIA, and was appointed consul general in Osaka and then minister at the Korean Embassy in Japan. He was active in controlling "anti-Korean organizations" in Japan.

## Socialist Parties

Compared to the above-mentioned three parties, the independents and socialists were pathetic. "The only way to maintain order in the National Assembly is to prevent the assembling of individual politicians without party affiliation. That is to say, the new National Assembly should keep quiet and should not undertake any activity" (statement by Kwon Chong-tal, secretary general of the Democratic Justice Party, as quoted in REVIEW). As expressed in this statement, independents and socialists have become open targets for obliteration.

President Chon approved the establishment of socialist parties for the recent elections. His foremost aim was to effectively win the support of West European nations with strong socialist democratic forces for the Chon regime. Another reason was that President Chon could also refute the accusations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) that "South Korea is controlled by military fascist groups, and socialists are oppressed."

First of all, Mr Kim Ch'ol (55), former adviser to the United Socialist Party, took the initiative in forming the Democratic Socialist Party. During the Pak regime Mr Kim demanded recognition of North Korea and President Pak's resignation, and he led the labor movement. He was imprisoned altogether 24 months. Thus he was known as a diehard fighter for democratization. In November 1980 President Chon appointed Mr Kim Ch'ol as a member of the Legislative Assembly. Mr Kim consented to have his name listed as a member of the Legislative Assembly in order to gain the legitimization of the activity of socialist parties, because he aspired to the "complete and unconditional restoration of parliamentary politics." However, while he was out of the country attending a Socialist International conference toward the end of 1980 and the early part of 1981, another veteran "socialist," Ko Chong-hun (61), took control of the Democratic Socialist Party. Thereupon, the "orthodox" faction led by Mr Kim founded the Socialist Party and split from Mr Ko's group. Of 20 active socialist elders, 18 rallied to the Democratic Socialist Party. As a result, Mr Kim's party became an extremely small party, and his longtime comrade, An P'il-su, former chairman of the United Socialist Party, was apprehended. Mr Kim himself was defeated in the election, and his party gained no seat in the assembly. The Democratic Socialist Party elected two, including Mr Ko. In accordance with the New Political Party Law, along with the Korean Christian Democratic Party, the Wonil Party, and the United Nationalist Party, the registration of the Socialist Party was invalidated.

There are large groups of unorganized workers who are not allowed to engage in political activity. It is a future task to decide which political party will forge them into a large viable political force. As the Chon regime estimates that a socialist party will intrinsically lead to the denial of the military regime, even if it adopts anticommunism as a slogan, the Chon regime has obliterated in every way the emergence of a socialist party. Mr Kim considers the existence of the Democratic Socialist Party as the "Trojan horse that will destroy socialism." However, many in the democratic forces are strongly critical of Mr Kim on the ground that "he was defeated in the election because he had been appointed a member of the Legislative Assembly to be integrated into the Chon regime and this alienated the voters."

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Mr Ko prides himself on the fact that a socialist party won assembly seats, if only two, for the first time; he has a colorful personal history. During the period of the American Military Government he served as a language officer for the American forces, and as a full colonel was active in military intelligence. But after the student revolution of 1960 he organized a reformist group to develop a socialist movement. He experienced a total of 56 months' imprisonment. During the past 10 years he has exclusively engaged in writing, publishing a large number of works. At the same time, he has close relations with many former military men who make up the Chon regime. He came to Japan last mid-April to contact the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan, and announced that he would attempt a substantive development of his party after the "realistic idealist" model of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan." They are watching him more than the major parties to see whether under the military rule he will be able to advance the cause of democratization, including the welfare of the poor classes, or whether he will become a Trojan horse to take the teeth out of the socialist movement.

## Exchanges Between Japanese Parliamentarians and Korean Parliamentarians

In terms of Korea's relations with Japan, the former Korea-Japan Parliamentarians League has undergone a massive organizational change. The Korea-Japan Parliamentarians Security Consultative Conference and the Korea-Japan Friendship Society have been dissolved into a single organization, the new Korea-Japan Parliamentarians League.

Exchanges between Japanese parliamentarians and their Korean counterparts which started in 1965 under the Pak regime led to corrupt power practices called "Japan-Korea connivances" in both countries. Arguing that such exchanges frequently resulted in negative aspects whereby the interest of individual parliamentarians became preponderant, the Chon regime switched to a parliamentary diplomacy to be conducted under the supervision of the Blue House. On 8 May the league selected assembly member Yi Chae-yong as chairman, assembly member Kim Yun-hwan as chief secretary, and assembly members Pak Kyong-sok and Chong Nam as standing secretaries. The total number of Korean members is 52, from both the progovernment and opposition parties.

The Korean side has no intention of limiting the pipeline between Japan and Korea to the hawkish group in the Liberal Democratic Party and a faction of the Democratic Socialist Party as in the past. Instead it wants to extend the pipeline to other forces in the Liberal Democratic Party and to the Komei Party, the New Liberal Club, and the rightwing faction of the Socialist Party as well. The Korean delegates who came to Japan last June for a get-together made aggressive contacts with influential representatives of all circles. It has already achieved substantive progress through the general meetings of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians League and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians League held last September in Seoul.

## The Blue House

First of all, it must be mentioned that the inner circle of the Blue House (official presidential residence) as an agency "reigns" over the three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial.

At the time of his election as the 11th president by the National Conference for Unification on 27 August 1980, President Chon announced the appointment of his Blue House staff. He abolished the positions of special assistant that existed under President Pak. He let Special Assistants Nam Tok-u (economic affairs) and Ham Pyong-chun (diplomacy) go, and put the only remaining special assistant, Kim Kyong-won (45), in charge of international politics as director of the Presidential Secretariat. He appointed Yi Ung-hui, former managing editor of TONGA ILBO, as the spokesman, Brig Gen Chong Tong-ho (retired as a major general) of the 13th Class of the Military Academy as chief of the Presidential Protective Service, and Kim Pyong-hun, former director of the Secretariat of the National Security Committee, as chief protocol secretary.

Chong Tong-ho, chief of the Presidential Protective Service, served as an assistant brigade commander when President Chon was commander of the First Airborne Special Warfare Corp. On 13 July Chief Chong was transferred back to a military unit. In his place Brig Gen Chang Se-tong (45), of the 16th Class of the Military Academy, former commander of the Airborne Special Warfare Brigade, was appointed new chief of the Presidential Protective Service. Brigadier General Chang served in such important posts as the Army Headquarters, the Presidential Protective Service, the Capital Guard Command, and the Airborne Special Warfare Corps. When he was dispatched to Vietnam, he served under President Chon, who was commander of the 29th Regiment of the White Horse Division. That was the beginning of their relationship. As one can see, the props supporting Chon's military rule consist of his personal connections in the CIC, the Special Warfare Corps, and Vietnam veterans. Chief Chang is said to lead the list of the successful of the 16th Class, along with assembly member Yi Chong-ch'an, who turned to politics. President Chon was also appointed commander of the Airborne Special Warfare Corps Brigade after his return from Vietnam with the rank of full colonel, and was later promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Within 2 years President Chon was serving as assistant deputy chief of the Presidential Protective Service under President Pak. Chief Chang seems to closely follow President Chon's footsteps. The abrupt transfer of Chief Chong is causing some suspicion in connection with the changes in the military leadership which will be described later.

The Presidential Protective Service has had the closest access to the president since the time of President Pak. President Chon also served in 1973 as assistant deputy chief of the Presidential Protective Service. It was not that the Presidential Protective Service was simply charged with the duty of protecting the president. Instead it has gradually grown into an office with influence over national politics in general and personnel in all areas. Mr Pak Chong-kyu, who resigned over the attempted assassination of President Pak (August 1974), and Mr Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, who had the same fate as President Pak in the assassination, were known by the title of chief of the Presidential Protective Service.

It is said that with the strengthening of the Secretariat under President Chon, the political power of the Presidential Protective Service has been held down in a relative sense. However, to the post of deputy chief of the Protective Service, President Chon's real brother, Chon Kyong-hwan, was appointed. He is occupying the most important position among President Chon's close circle. The background of Deputy Chief Chon Kyong-hwan is totally unknown. But as early as in June 1980, immediately after the bloody Kwangju incident, he made a secret trip to Japan.



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He is known as the person who gave advance warning to Japan's political circles on the emergence of the Chon regime. Also toward the end of February 1981, he accompanied President Chon during the latter's visit to the United States with a large number of the Protective Service members to direct CIC staffs and members of the KCIA, which was redesignated the National Security Planning Agency in December 1980, stationed in the United States. He became the target of talk because of his imposing protective arrangements. Another deputy chief was said to be Brig Gen Ko Myong-song of the 15th Class, but his position after the change of chief is not known.

Director of the Secretariat Kim Kyong-won was born in South Pyongan Province in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). He studied at Harvard, and was one of former Secretary of State Kissinger's favorite students. He taught at New York University and Koryo University, and served as special assistant in the role of a window for important negotiations with the Nixon administration as assigned by President Pak. He was inactive during the Carter administration. But in view of the fact that the Republicans won and the Reagan administration was inaugurated in the United States, he is once again in the limelight as an important brain in terms of Korea's American policy. President Chon's "lightning" visit to the United States would have been unthinkable without the preliminary operations undertaken by Director Kim Kyong-won. He is mild-mannered as well as young, 45 years of age. He is also effective in controlling the Secretariat group comprised of persons who are only 1 or 2 years younger than he.

Chief Public Affairs Secretary Yi Ung-hui was once a special correspondent in Washington, and is one of the specialists in American affairs.

Members of the Secretariat who are known as the "inner circle" at the nerve center of power of the Chon regime have been completely changed since September 1980.

The office of the Chief Political Affairs Secretaries was divided into two. To the post of First Political Affairs Secretary, U Pyong-kyu (51), former secretary general of the National Assembly, was appointed. Kim Ch'ang-sik (51), who formerly held the post of Chief Political Affairs Secretary, was appointed to the post of the Second Chief Political Affairs Secretary. Kim Chae-ik (42), former chairman of the Economic and Scientific Affairs Committee of the National Security Committee, was appointed to the post of Chief Economic Affairs Secretary. These three persons are civilians. Mr Wu is from Masan City in South Kyongsang Province.

More than these secretaries, the following four persons appointed on 9 September 1980 are regarded as important.

They are led by Mr Ho Hwa-p'yong (43), who was appointed as an assistant in the Secretariat, followed by Ho Sam-su (43), who holds the post of Chief Inspector Secretary. Both are from the 17th Class of the Military Academy. Ho Hwa-p'yong is from Pohang, North Kyongsang Province. He was singled out for appointment to that position because of his connections with President Chon. He once served as an aide-de-camp to Gen Chon Tu-hwan. Mr Ho Sam-su is from Miyrang, North Kyongsang Province. While serving as an officer in the Airborne Special Warfare Corps (paratroopers) he was picked by Gen Chon Tu-hwan in the area of intelligence gathering on military personnel. Yi Hak-pong (43), who was appointed to the post

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of Chief Civil Affairs Secretary, is also of the 17th Class of the Military Academy, and is from Pusan, South Kyongsang Province. He is a former intelligence officer, like Mr Ho Sam-su, who was transferred from the Airborne Corps to serve in the CIC.

Ho Mun-to (43), who was appointed to the post of Political Affairs Secretary, was also born in Pusan, South Kyongsang Province. But, in contrast to the above three, he graduated from Seoul National University and served as a special correspondent of CHOSON ILBO. Within the Blue House, along with its spokesman Yi Ung-hui, he is a former journalist. He was transferred to the Korean Embassy in Japan as secretary in charge of public information. Furthermore, when General Cho was concurrently appointed deputy director of the KCIA (April 1980), he was picked as director of its Public Information Office as the young top Japan specialist, and he began to follow the course for elite bureaucrats. It is reported that it was because he was Mr Ho Sam-su's high school classmate that he was appointed to the Blue House post. In a joint conference to scrutinize the basic policy on the eve of the Japan-Korea cabinet-level conference in September 1981, Secretary Ho Mun-to represented the Blue House to finalize the Japan policy together with bigwigs from the cabinet, the progovernment party, and the National Assembly. It is definite that Mr Ho is one of the important figures acting as the brains in the formulation of the Japan policy.

The role of these three--the two Messrs Ho and Mr Yi Hak-pong--is said to be that of a brains trust which makes domestic and foreign policy recommendations directly to President Chon. Since they exercise greater power than the members of the cabinet and the National Assembly, the previous Blue House system under President Pak has been further strengthened. The young inner circle, "the gang of four," comprised of the three of the 17th Class of the Military Academy and Mr Ho Mun-to, has already demonstrated a powerful influence in the countermeasures to the anti-government activity and in the Japan policy. It is widely rumored that of the two lines, hard and soft, pursued by the Chon Tu-hwan regime, the hard line originates from this group. After the general elections these young secretaries called in progovernment party leaders and leading assembly members for intensive lectures on the leadership ideals of President Chon. Because of their places of birth, some voice the view that the regime is onesidedly leaning on those who are from the Kyongsang provinces. It was the 8th Class of the Military Academy which carried out the 16 May 1961 military coup led by Maj Gen Pak Chong-hui. They were called the "mainstream force of the revolution." In contrast, it was the 11th Class of the Military Academy that forced the carrying out of the 12 December coup for military purge. Then, the "main leading reformist force," that is, the young leadership group which supports the Chon regime, is exclusively composed of the 17th Class of the Military Academy.

It is characteristic of the new members of the Blue House staff that they are America and Japan specialists. But it is not widely known that former journalists in their early forties are serving as windows to Korea's major friends, the United States and Japan. However, there are also reports that an internal struggle due to the fact that "they are all alike" has begun to erupt.

We know that those of the 17th Class of the Military Academy also have immense power among the military personnel and administrative bureaucrats, as will be described later. They spent boyhoods of poverty during the Syngman Rhee regime

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(1948-1960) and received a thoroughgoing anticommunist education after the Korean War. Those who chose to go to civilian colleges and to civilian careers instead of the military academy also entertain strongly nationalistic ideas. They are called a generation of "pure culture." Even though they speak flawless English and Japanese as foreign languages, they entertain distinctively and completely different views on the nation, and the United States and Japan, from those of the established generations of 50 years or older who spent their youth during the Japanese rule and the American Military Government period.

## Government Circles

Since December 1980 changes of foreign service officers have been speedily implemented. During this period 22 heads of overseas missions at the ambassadorial level have been transferred. To these posts, half, or 11, of those appointed as new heads are former military men. Since there are 48 overseas missions at the ambassadorial level, this amounts to a large-scale advance of former military men into the diplomatic service. Ambassadors T'ak Na-hyon (to Uruguay), Ch'oe Sang-chin (to Jamaica), and Hwang Kwang-mak (to Ghana) are of the 17th Class. Others, Ch'oe Sang-sop (to Libya), and Song Song-mo (to Bahrain) are of the 12th Class; Kim Chae-su (to the Vatican) is of the 12th Class, Pak Tong-won (to Nigeria) is of the 13th Class, Yi Si-yong (to Liberia) is of the 18th Class, and Sim Chang-sop (to Sudan) is a graduate of the Air Force Academy. All of them are much younger than the former ambassadors at average ages of 54 and 55. They were promoted from the ranks of lieutenant colonel and full colonel to that of major general just before retirement, and they immediately took up diplomatic posts without interruption. Although such transfers of former officers of the 11th Class, that is, President Chon's classmates, and of the 17th Class, the main leading force, into the diplomatic field are designed to implement President Chon's positive foreign policy at overseas posts, it is pointed out that some military men were forced to retire in the reorganization of the military and that those who refused to be transferred to political and government positions had to be taken care of. Admiral Kim Chong-kon, former Naval Chief of Operations, was also transferred, as ambassador to Taiwan.

Since April 1981, personnel changes involving some provincial governors, mayors and bureaucrats have been implemented. Among them, both the Military Academy graduates and those from the Kyongsang provinces are conspicuous. To analyze the April appointments and transfers, Kim Song-pae, governor of North Kyongsang Province, is from Kangwon Province; others are from the Kyongsang provinces, such as Pak Chong-mun, governor of Kangwon Province who is from Kochang, South Kyongsang Province; Kim Mu-yon, mayor of Pusan city, who is from Andong, North Kyongsang Province; Kwon Chung-tong, minister of labor, a newly created post, who is from Andong, North Kyongsang Province; Chong Tong-cho'ol, vice minister of labor, of the 12th Class of the Military Academy, who is from Taegu, North Kyongsang Province; Kim Sang-ku, deputy secretary general of the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification, and Son Chae-sik, vice minister of home affairs, who are from Miryang, North Kyongsang Province.

It is the same with the judicial circles in that they face a period of upheaval. By the end of April 1981 "revolutionary personnel changes," including the minister of justice, the attorney general, the chief justice, and even low-level judges and

prosecutors, were carried out. Reportedly, Yi Chong-won, former chief prosecutor of the Taegu Higher Prosecutors Office, replaced O T'aek-kun as minister of justice as a part of the cabinet personnel change. But of 14 justices of the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Yu T'ae-hung, only 3 were reappointed, and 11 new associate justices were newly appointed. Also at the low levels, 37 judges were not reappointed and were forced out of judgeship. It is reported that such steps were taken in accordance with the "criteria for judicial appointments" that President Chon directed, including whether a candidate had firm views on the state and security, or whether he had the intention to actively participate in state reform. Moreover, it is interpreted that such steps signify that the further process of turning the judicial branch into the status of a "handmaiden" has taken place. Even among prosecutors, shocking changes have been made in which 28 out of 35 at the top level were relieved. Thus the prosecutors ranks have been changed in one jump to the younger ranks in their forties from the older generations of prosecutors who received their education during the Japanese rule in Korea.

#### Military

Since immediately after the bloody Kwangju incident (June 1980), large-scale personnel changes were carried out in two stages to reorganize the military completely as a part of the Chon Tu-hwan regime. In the first stage, as Lt Gen Chon Tu-hwan replaced President Ch'oe Kyu-ha in September 1980 and vacated the three positions--commander of the Defense Force Security Command, acting director of the KCIA, and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Emergency Countermeasures Committee for National Security--that he held, chain-reaction personnel changes took place. Figure 1 shows the lineup of the military leaders as of June 1980, immediately before his usurpation of power, except for some changes that had taken place after the 12 December coup for military purge (December 1979).

Figure 2 shows the organization of the chain of command as of September 1981, after personnel changes during about 1 year after the bloody Kwangju incident.

What draws one's attention in the first stage of personnel changes up to March 1981, when President Chon assumed the presidency as the 12th president, is that his classmate, Lt Gen No T'ae-u (former commander of the Capital Guard Command), replaced him as commander of the Defense Force Security Command. Then, Lt Gen Yu Hak-song, commander of the Third Army, retired from the military service after he was promoted to the rank of full general, and was appointed director of the KCIA (redesignated the State Security Planning Agency).

By March 1981, Lt Gen Chong Ho-yong, commander of the Airborne Special Warfare Corps, President Chon's classmate in the 11th Class, was appointed to the post of Vice Army Chief of Staff. Maj Gen Pak Se-chik replaced him as commander of the Capital Guard Command, and Maj Gen Pak Hui-to was picked as commander of the Special Warfare Corps. Both are of the 12th Class of the Military Academy and are from the Kyongsang provinces.

Gen Hwang Yong-si of the 10th Class of the Military Academy from North Kyongsang Province, who formerly held the post of Vice Army Chief of Staff, was appointed commander of the Third Army, regarded as the most important among field forces. Please refer to Figure 3.

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


Figure 1. Chain of Command of the Korean Armed Forces (as of June 1980)

## Key:

1. President of the Emergency Countermeasures Committee for National Security--Ch'oe Kyu-ha
- Chairman of the Standing Committee--Lt Gen Chon Tu-hwan
2. President--Ch'oe Kyu-ha
3. Martial Law Command--General Yi Hui-song
4. Prime Minister--Pak Ch'ung-hun
5. Korean Central Intelligence Agency--Acting Director Lt Gen Chon Tu-hwan
6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Gen Yu Pyong-hyon
7. Minister of National Defense--Gen Chu Yong-pok
8. Defense Force Security Command--Lt Gen Chon Tu-hwan
9. Combined U.S.-Korea Forces--commander of U.S. Forces in Korea Wickam  
Deputy Commander--Gen Paek Sok-chu
10. Superintendent of the Military Academy--Lt Gen Ch'a Kyu-hon
11. Army Chief of Staff--Gen Yi Hui-song  
Vice Chief--Lt Gen Hwang Yong-si
12. Air Chief of Staff--Gen Yun Cha-chung
13. Naval Chief of Operations--Admiral Kim Chong-kon
14. First Army (Wonju)--Gen Yun Song-min
15. Second Army (Taegu)--Gen Chin Chong-ch'ae
16. Third Army (Seoul)--Lt Gen Yu Hak-song  
Chief of Staff--Maj Gen Kim Pok-tong
17. Air Force Units
18. Naval Units
19. Capital Guard Command--Maj Gen No T'ae-u
20. First Airborne Special Warfare Corps--Maj Gen Chong Ho-yong
21. Outside the chain of command under Combined U.S.-Korea Forces Command
22. Figure in ○ denotes Military Academy class  
\*denotes that the person is from the Kyongsang provinces

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


Figure 2. Chain of Command of the Korean Armed Forces (as of September 1981)

## Key:

1. President--Chon Tu-hwan
2. Prime Minister--Nam Tok-u
3. National Security Planning Agency (Redesignation of KCIA)--Gen Yu Hak-song (retired)
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Gen Yun Song-min
5. Minister of National Defense--Gen Chu Yong-pok
6. Defense Force Security Command--Maj Gen Pak Chun-pyong
7. Combined U.S.-Korea Forces--Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea Wickam Deputy Commander--Lt Gen Pak No-yong
8. Superintendent of the Military Academy--Lt Gen Kim Pok-tong
9. Air Force Units
10. Air Chief of Staff--Gen Yi Hui-kun
11. Naval Chief of Operations--Admiral Yi Un-su
12. First Army (Wonju)--Lt Gen Kim Yun-ho
13. Second Army (Taegu)--Gen Ch'a Kyu-hon
14. Third Army (Seoul)--Gen Hwang Yong-si
15. Air Force Units
16. Naval Units
17. Capital Guard Command--Maj Gen Ch'oe Se-ch'ang
18. First Airborne Special Warfare Corps--Maj Gen Pak Hui-to

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


Figure 3. Organization of the Korean Army

## Key:

1. Army Chief of Staff
2. Field Forces
3. First Army (Eastern Front)
4. Third Army (Northwest of Seoul)
5. Reserve Forces
6. Second Army (Central and Southern Korea)
7. II Corps
8. III Corps
9. I Corps
10. V Corps
11. VI Corps
12. Capital Corps
13. Seoul District South of Han River
14. Pusan Logistics Command
15. Capital Guard Command
16. First Airborne Special Warfare Corps
17. Special Warfare Services Command
18. Warfare Development Command
19. Pusan
20. Blue House, Seoul District North of Han River
21. Kimpo and Northwestern District of Seoul
22. Southeastern District of Seoul
23. II Region
24. III Region
25. V Region
26. Combat Unit Training Base
27. South Kyongsang Province
28. North and South Chungchong Provinces
29. North Kyongsang Province
30. North and South Cholla Provinces
31. Total 8 Divisions
32. Total 12 Divisions
33. Total 10 Reserve Divisions

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Besides, Kim Pok-tong, former chief of staff of the Third Army, a comrade of President Chon's in the coup for military purge and his classmate in the same Military Academy class, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and appointed superintendent of the Military Academy. The above four generals, No, Chong, Hwang, and Kim, together with Army Chief of Staff Yi Hui-song, are either seniors, juniors, or contemporaries from the same province and are all related by marriage. They are so to speak President Chon's "hereditary vassals."

Of them, the post of Vice Army Chief of Staff is charged with personnel matters and is a pivotal post with complete control over the distribution of power within the military. The General Yi-Lieutenant General Chong team undertook the large-scale second stage of personnel changes thereafter.

It is reported that President Chon's idea regarding the reorganization of the military is aimed at retiring his seniors from the 7th Class to the 10th Class of the Military Academy and other elder generals, and then giving their vacated posts to his contemporaries. Although this elder class of generals may be regarded as "blood relatives" who pledged their cooperation with the Chon military regime rather than of siding with the enemy in the coup for military purge, with the progress made in President Chon's takeover of power, their role is said to be coming to an end.

In May 1981 Gen Yu Pyong-hyon, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (of the 7th Class of the Military Academy who is from North Chungchong Province) was transferred to the post of ambassador to the United States. He was replaced by Gen Yun Song-min (the 9th Class), former commander of the First Army. General Yun is one of the rare cases from South Cholla Province.

President Chon undertook the second stage of changes. On 16 July 1981 he appointed Gen No T'ae-u (who was promoted on 11 July to the rank of full general, and retired on 15 July), as second political affairs minister in charge of national security and diplomacy.

Political affairs ministers are said to be the "cabinet posts directly under the president" which were newly created in March 1981. As many as three persons can be appointed to the posts. General No is the second one, following First Political Affairs Minister Chong Chong-t'aek. The change for General No was said to be an "appointment in the capacity of deputy prime minister." In terms of influence, Minister No surpassed Prime Minister Nam Tok-u, and he reportedly secured the position as the most powerful cabinet minister. Mr No has a good command of the Japanese language that he can be proud of. There is a story that when Abe Shintaro, director of the Policy Affairs Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party, visited Korea in June 1981, the Korean side arranged a secret meeting with Mr No. It is expected that Mr No will play an important role as the president's brain in dealing with Japan in the future.

Also, Gen Ch'a Kyu-hon, of the 8th Class of the Military Academy, who was transferred from the post of superintendent of the Military Academy to the post of commander of the Second Army, was promoted to the rank of full general at the same time as Mr No. It is expected that in order to smoothly carry out the promotions of officers of the 12th Class and later classes to the ranks of major



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general, lieutenant general, and full general, the retirement of generals will take place with the exception of President Chon's brother-in-law, Gen Yi Hui-song. In addition, Lt Gen Kim Yun-hc, of the 10th Class, former commander of the First Corps, was promoted to the post of commander of the First Army. Lieutenant General Kim is considered to be close to Gen Hwang Yong-si.

Among the 11th Class, considered as the "hereditary vassals" in the Chon Tu-hwan system, the moves of the three generals, No T'ae-u, Chong Yong-ho, and Kim Pok-tong, have been scrutinized with interest. Of them, even though at the time of his takeover of power President Chon repeatedly entreated Mr No "to doff his military uniform and participate in the formation of a progovernment party," Mr No reportedly insisted on remaining in the military service. Therefore, he constituted the most ominous presence in the Chon regime. As Mr No joined the cabinet, the persistent rumor of a feud between President Chon and him disappeared from the surface, and the Chon regime seemed to have been further stabilized. At the same time, many considered that Mr No had made further progress toward his position in the "post-Chon" era.

The personnel change involving Gen No T'ae-u had hardly been settled when Maj Gen Pak Se-chik, commander of the Capital Guard Command, one of the major units, was taken to the Defense Force Security Command (CIC) for questioning regarding irregularities involving his taking advantage of his position.

While vacationing in the suburbs of Taegu for the summer, Major General Pak was summoned back to Seoul on the pretext that he was immediately wanted by President Chon for a talk. He was interrogated for a week at the interrogation headquarters of the CIC located at Pinggo, Yongsan-ku, popularly known as "Pinggo Hotel." The disposition leading to his being relieved of command and his retirement from the Army was announced. The commander of the CIC was Maj Gen Pak Chung-pyong, his classmate, who had just taken over the post from General No. The Capital Guard Command, together with the Airborne Special Warfare Corps, is outside the chain of command of the United Nations forces (U.S. Forces in Korea). It consists of guard troops directly under the president. It is an important command in charge of the security and defense of the Seoul area. Major General Pak's dismissal was the first downfall among military leaders since the inauguration of the Chon regime. For this reason, for a while a tense air prevailed in military circles. To replace him Maj Gen Ch'oe Se-ch'ang of the 12th Class, commander of the 20th Division, was appointed.

Maj Gen Pak Se-chik was charged with taking bribes from his former Military Academy classmate (a retired full colonel), who returned from the United States. Although it is claimed that President Chon, who is forging the image of a clean administration by purging corruption, fired even his deeply trusted close subordinate, the truth is that the criticism already beginning to emerge within the military had to be nipped in the bud before it reached serious proportions.

NEWSWEEK, a U.S. publication, in its 31 August issue reported that General Pak and the young inner circle of President Chon (the Blue House brains formerly with the military) had collided over the issue of suppressing the student demonstrations in the spring of 1980. In August 1980, Major General Pak, who took over the Capital Guard Command from General No T'ae-u, openly announced at a drinking

party: "It will be I who will take over from Chon." He frequently met with important figures, both Korean and non-Korean, to make his "political activity" noticeable. Major General Pak visited the United States in the fall of 1980 to negotiate with the United States the issue regarding the trial of Kim Tae-chung. He promptly met Secretary of State Haig (a general at that time). He was thus regarded as a rising star among the 12th Class.

Some attach importance to the fact that three generals, No T'ae-u, Chief of the Presidential Protective Service Chong Tong-ho, and Pak Se-chik, who are all close to the president, have been transferred from their previous posts one after another.

NEWSWEEK quoted an elder Korean politician: "During the first 3 years Gen Pak Chong-hui transferred 25 to 30 generals who had cooperated with him. He believed that once generals attempted a coup, they would want to repeat it. President Chon will probably act in the same way."

In their places the trio from the 12th Class, Pak Chung-pyong, Pak Hui-to, and Ch'oe Se-ch'ang, became relatively visible. They appear to form the top military echelon in the Chon regime.

Lieutenant Generals Chong Ho-yong and Kim Pok-tong are not in an open competitive position as General No is. They are expected to be promoted in the near future to higher positions, such as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff and to support the Chon military rule.

Gen Paek Sok-chu, of the 8th Class, former commander of the Combined U.S.-Korea Forces, retired from service last August and was appointed on the recommendation of high quarters to the post of president of the Hanyang Chemical Company. In his place Lt Gen Pak No-yong (51), former commander of the Capital Corps, was appointed. Lieutenant General Pak is from North Chungchong Province. He is one of the rare non-Military Academy graduate generals who graduated from Tongguk University and Seoul National University. It appears that among the "hereditary vassals," his neutrality has been valued.

In the troop organizations (the army) in the Korean Armed Forces, politically important positions are reported to be corps and division commanders of various corps under the Third Army and the First Army.

The then "hereditary vassal" generals who made the coup for military purge successful were all corps and division commanders at the front line. The transfers and moves of the military leaders since early this year have been made with the new hereditary and blood related vassals in the Chon Tu-hwan military rule as the key figures. That is to say, the personnel changes have been made with promotions as rewards for the services of those brigadier generals, major generals, and lieutenant generals who were selected to serve as members of the "Emergency Countermeasures Committee for National Security," which was inaugurated on 31 May 1980 as an organ to assist President Ch'oe. As a result, Lt Gen Yi Ki-paek, commander of the I Corps who is of the 11th Class and former commander of the 15th Division; Commander of the VI Corps Lt Gen Kim Hong-han (former director of the Personnel Bureau, army headquarters); and Commandant of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt Gen Kang Yong-sik (of the 10th Class and former commander of the VI Corps) have been promoted. Lieutenant General Yi has been President Chon's close friend

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since the Military Academy days, and he will form powerful working troops in the future as well with his background in field forces. In the group remaining in the current status are Maj Gen Yi Kwang-no, commander of the East Coast Guard Command, and others. But they will be a group that will rise to the center of those in uniform.

Similarly, Gen Yi Hui-kun (of the 1st Class of the Air Force Academy), Air Vice Chief of Staff from the Kyongsang Province clique who served on the Committee for National Security, was promoted to the post of Air Chief of Staff. Also, among the "comrades in the coup for military purge," Maj Gen Pak Chung-pyong (of the 12th Class), who was active as commander of the 20th Division at that time, made a great jump from the post of Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel to commander of the Defense Force Security Command. Similarly, Maj Gen Pae Chong-to (of the 10th Class, former commander of the 26th Division) was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Maj Gen Kim Song-kak (of the 8th Class), a comrade in the coup who was deputy commander of the Third Army at that time, retired with the rank of lieutenant general last June and was appointed from above as president of the Ulsan Petrochemical Company.

Furthermore, it has been confirmed that Yi Sang-hun, who is one of the 11th Class but reportedly is not in the Chon Tu-hwan faction, was appointed commander of the III Corps of the First Army. Of the same 11th Class, Kim Song-chin, who graduated with top honors in the class, is second deputy director of the National Security Planning Agency. He studied in the United States. With his command of English, he is one of those who were active in setting up President Chon's visit to the United States. He has retired from active service and is outside the central nerve system of the military. But he is said to be the person who controls the Security Planning Agency.

As there are some military leaders from the rival factions under Gen No T'ae-u and others who are placed in important positions mixed with others, some observe that although such personnel changes were ostensibly carried out with President Chon's approval, it is premature to judge that a monolithic system has been solidified for the Chon regime.

In the foregoing, the lineup of the top military leadership has been outlined. But it can be pointed out that it has not settled as an ultimate lineup. Clean-ups and purges were rapidly carried out after Pak's assassination, the coup for military purge, and the expansion of martial law. Thus the military chain of command was drastically disrupted, and its adjustment has not been completed yet. There is an enormous difference in the treatment of different classes of the Military Academy. Even the 12th Class was shaken so severely as to be divided into two groups, the winners and the losers. Frontline generals of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Classes are smoldering with discontent as their promotions are hitting the ceiling. When the 12th Class group makes gains in the future, the 13th Class group will be overshadowed that much.

In contrast to the fact that the 11th Class led by President Chon clearly indicates a generational disruption from the senior elder generals group, the younger officers with the rank of major and junior grades who went into the army during the high-rate economic growth under the Pak regime show a greater discrepancy. The level of stability of the Chon Tu-hwan military rule will change depending on who controls the younger officers of the 18th Class and later classes.

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