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1 February 1982

Japan Report

(FOUO 6/82)



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JAPAN REPORT

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'NIHON KEIZAI' VIEWS JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TIES

OW141140 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Jan 82 Morning Edition p 2

[Editorial: "Security Consultations and the Way of Studying Emergencies in the Far East"]

[Text] The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee met for the first time in 3 years and 2 months. At the meeting both sides exchanged views on the international situation and on defense cooperation. They also agreed to commence a "study of emergencies in Far East areas other than Japan." Japan's security is supported by two major pillars, the security treaty and Japan's own defense capabilities. It is important to conduct constant checkups and take swift and appropriate measures to insure effective functioning of this mechanism in the event of an emergency. Moreover, it should be noted that cooperation among the Western allies has become more important in view of the recent Soviet military buildup and the consequent relative decline of U.S. military capabilities. In this connection both Japan and the United States should continue efforts to remove seeds of mutual distrust at every opportunity available, including at security committee meetings.

In this context, it seems to be appropriate to raise a few points regarding the current way of mutual communication between Japan and the United States. First, it should be pointed out that the present Security Consultative Committee is not functioning properly as a forum for timely exchange of mutual views: The number of meetings held by the committee is extremely limited and they proceed rather too ceremoniously. The committee was established to enable the two parties to "consult each other from time to time" as provided for in Article 4 (of the Security Treaty). Japan would be represented by its foreign minister and the director general of the Defense Agency, and the U.S. side by its ambassador to Japan and the Commander of the Pacific Forces. This indicates that the United States considers it sufficiently important to send those who have a good grasp of actual developments and are flexible. Accordingly, the committee would meet immediately whenever a significant change takes place in the international situation or members have been replaced in the committee. Oddly enough, however, the committee failed to meet in over 3 years in the past despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq and changes of members in the committee.

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Moreover, at the recent Security Committee meeting the Japanese side merely read off prepared documents in expressing its views on international developments, while the U.S. side presented a view on "Soviet military capabilities" which did not go beyond what had already been published by the U.S. Government. Can we rightfully claim that the committee is fully performing its functions as a quasi-top-level conference between two allies when it is used merely for a formal exchange of analytical reports on the present situation?

The second point at issue concerns Japan's attitude. That is, Japan is not making active, voluntary efforts to have Japan's real defense effort understood by the various circles in the United States. At the recent Security Committee meeting, the U.S. side spoke highly of Japan's 1982 defense budget bill. There is no knowing however if the United States really appreciates the budget bill at heart, but at least it means that the U.S. Government cannot but assess it highly from a diplomatic viewpoint. This provides a good chance for the Japanese government. The government should not be contented with this U.S. assessment. Furthermore, it should dispatch the foreign minister or a special envoy to the United States to explain Japan's defense effort to the U.S. Congress, which is currently preoccupied with an off-year election to be held this fall, and to various industrial circles. This measure is worth studying.

Another point concerns the apparent difference of perception between Japan and the United States regarding the "study of emergencies in the Far East." The study primarily involves the question of logistical support in the event of a war on the Korean peninsula, including the issue of to what extent Japan can offer self-defense force bases to the United States for joint use and to what degree it can provide its transport and port facilities for use by the U.S. forces. Last fall, Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan Donnelly made a remark to the effect that the United States expects Japan to offer conveniences equivalent to the level provided during the Korean War, which broke out when the United States was occupying Japan. Probably, this is the real U.S. intention. However, before anything else, the United States should realize time and again the fact that Japan is an independent country with a peace constitution, three nonnuclear principles and a prior consultation system.

At the recent Security Committee meeting, the U.S. side expressed its respect for these premises and it is hoped that they will continue to be observed by all means. On Japan's part, it should have the fundamental perception that if an emergency arises on the Korean peninsula it should be regarded as a grave development that poses a direct threat to Japan's security. However, the entire government should approach matters carefully in case of such an emergency because the slightest misstep could easily be interpreted as an act of collective self-defense, which is banned in Japan's constitution.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'NIHON KEIZAI' SCORES SUZUKI'S CONCEPT OF DEFENSE

OW171305 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 16 Jan 82 Morning Edition p 2

[Editorial: "Will the Defense Concept of Attaching Importance to the Naval and Air Forces Hold?"]

[Text] Prime Minister Suzuki on 12 January issued instructions to Defense Agency Director General Ito on how Japan should work out its defense plan. This is the first time that the prime minister issued comprehensive instructions on the defense question and we think that it is quite desirable for the prime minister, the person in charge of civilian control, to display his leadership from a broader point of view prior to the mapping out of the 1983-1987 defense capability maintenance plan (referred to as mid-term defense estimate).

In the instructions the prime minister stressed that 1) Ministries and agencies concerned should hold consultations before the necessary spending for the mid-term defense estimate is finalized so as not to make the estimate excessive; 2) A study should be made of a balance among the ground, maritime and air self-defense forces compatible with Japan's geopolitical location; and 3) Considerations should be given in the Japan-U.S. joint study of contingencies in the Far East so as not to pave the way for the exercise of the right to collective self-defense which is prohibited under the constitution. We regard these points noted as quite natural.

However, a close check of the prime minister's instructions shows that the instructions contain a mixture of casual thoughts and political considerations and even lack integrity in some areas as a theory of defense. Therefore, we think it necessary for ministries and agencies concerned to examine the instructions carefully from various angles before making the best use of them in implementing policies.

A problematic point in the prime minister's instructions is his stressing excessively that the "theory of coping with threats" should not be adopted. The prime minister stressed that the "sharp increase" in the 1982 defense budget, a 7.754 percent increase over the preceding fiscal year, is designed to help Japan steadily reach the level (in basic defense potential) envisaged under the defense plan outline but not to cope with tension in the international situation.

This remark is believed directed against a possible crop of criticisms of the "sharp increase" in the course of forthcoming Diet debates. However, the policy

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of hitting the goal of the outline at an early date found its expression in the draft defense budget for the next fiscal year as a result of the "Japan-U.S. alliance" confirmed by the prime minister himself and his pledge that Japan will "share a role" as a "member of the Western bloc" as contained in the Japan-U.S. joint statement of May 1980. Furthermore, it is a grim fact that in its background is the increased threat posed by the Soviet military buildup.

In our opinion, the prime minister should have rather actively noted the tense international situation and appealed to the nation on the necessity of building up defense potentials commensurate with Japan's economic power than using a double-tongued rhetoric--a hawkish one for the United States and a dovish one domestically.

In indicating his notion of how to build up defense potentials in a concrete form, the prime minister once again called for the establishment of a "porcupine-like defense posture." In essence, he said: "Since Japan is an oceanic nation, we should repel an external enemy at the water's edge before he lands on our soil. To this end, we should make the entire Japanese archipelago like a porcupine by such means as the deployment of air-defense missiles."

Generally speaking, it is most desirable, if possible, to avoid a war at home which incurs tragedies of bloodshed and to let the external enemy give up invasion before he lands in Japan. But, as a matter of actuality, we must realize that we would need a vast sum of funds and have to expropriate land to build two-fold and three-fold defense networks at the water's edge since Japan has vast coastlines and a countless number of places vulnerable to enemy landing. Even if this might be feasible, if we place too much emphasis on defense at the water's edge without the backing of mobile defense capabilities in depth, we are afraid that our defense posture would be fragile because the line of defense might be broken by a breakthrough at one place at the water's edge.

If we should attach importance to the fact that Japan is an oceanic country, we are afraid that so-called defense at the water's edge amounts to no more than a castle in the air unless Japan holds the command of the sea and air in the broad sense in the Far Eastern region. Furthermore, if we think about whether or not we can secure food and energy without the capability of defending sea lanes, we can see the limits of the theory of defense at the water's edge.

Last year the prime minister put forward the policy of defending sea lanes extending 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. We wonder how that policy is linked to the theory of water's-edge defense. In working out defense plans, we think that we should first think about building well-balanced defense potentials and then, in that course, set priorities.

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JSP GROUPS FORM 'NEW MAINSTREAM FACTION'

OW291147 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Dec 81 Morning Edition p 2

[Text] Representatives of five groups within the JSP which supported Chairman Asukata in the JSP chairmanship election, including the Katsumata faction and the New Life Study group, held a meeting in Tokyo on 25 December to discuss how the new leadership under Chairman Asukata should operate in the future. The meeting decided to form a "Five-Group Consultative Council" consisting of one representative from each of the five groups, namely the Katsumata Faction, the New Life Study Group, the Socialist Association, the Old March Society and the Middle-of-the-Road group made up mainly of senior members of the JSP, who are to cooperate with each other in support of Chairman Asukata and carry on close consultations for this purpose.

The formation of the "Five-Group Consultative Council" is interpreted among inner party circles as an indication that these five groups which supported Chairman Asukata in the recent party chairmanship election plan to organize a new five-group leadership alignment for a "new mainstream faction" aimed against the coalition concept study group, which supported policy board Chairman Muto in the election, and the Socialist Study Group (the Old Sasaki Faction), which called for "independent balloting."

On the other hand, the establishment of the council is interpreted among rightwing factions, including the coalition concept study group, as a move intended to "shield the socialist association," by far the largest faction in the party which has drawn the brunt of criticism, by banding the five groups together. Rightwingers expect the "New Five-Group Alignment" to launch an offensive against them.

With Asukata's third straight election to the JSP chairmanship, the selection of a new party secretary general is now the foremost issue for the party. Voices within the new mainstream say that the new secretary general should come from the five groups. Thus the formation of the "Five-Group Consultative Council" is expected to generate a heated rivalry between the coalition concept study group and socialist study group on one side and the five groups on the other.

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'ASAHI' URGES PEACE STRATEGY FOR JAPAN

OW011201 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 1 Jan 82 p 5

[Editorial, ASAHI SHIMBUN 1 January: "Peace Strategy"]

[Text] What steps should be taken to ensure peace and security for Japan, Asia and the world and encourage stable development? The development of a proper strategy for peace has become more urgent than ever for Japan.

One reason for this is that Japan, with a Gross National Product of more than 10 percent of the world's GNP, has become one of the most important countries of the world. It is only right that Japan should quickly define its role in the world.

The second reason is the fact that, both inside and outside Japan, there is a growing body of opinion in favor of Japan's building up its defenses as proof of its willingness to share responsibility. Most of this pressure comes from the United States, and this pressure has encouraged the advocates of a defense buildup within Japan. We should take care not to be confused by this loud chorus in judging the matter.

Non-Nuclear Principles

First, it should be said that the foundation of a peace strategy must be the "peace constitution," and that strict adherence to the three non-nuclear principles is of great significance.

In the first half of 1981, the non-nuclear principles were faced by a major challenge as a result of a statement by the former American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer. And it was argued that it is asking too much to refuse to allow nuclear weapons to be brought in to Japan while Japan depends on the American nuclear deterrent. But in the latter half of 1981, there was an event which once confirmed the propriety of the three non-nuclear principles: This was the anti-nuclear movement which spread throughout Europe as a direct result of American policy-makers saying on several occasions that a limited nuclear war was a possibility.

The idea of a limited nuclear war resulted from the long-cherished hope of strategists officially to add nuclear weapons, as "weapons which can be used," to

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the arms inventory. And the arms industry, which aims at increasing the production of nuclear weapons, wants to give nuclear weapons tactical and strategic reasons for existence. The idea of a limited war was the response of the strategy experts to these demands.

But this idea aroused complex repercussions in the nations of the free world. People realized that they would definitely be the victims if such a war were waged, and they began to protest out of the feeling that security in a nuclear age should be considered in terms of who would be the victims in a nuclear war.

The experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should now be brought to the fore again. After the meeting of the independent commission on disarmament and security in Japan in December, its chairman, Olof Palme, the former Swedish prime minister, said, "the leaders of those nations that possess nuclear weapons should be obliged to visit Hiroshima immediately after assuming office." Strict adherence to the three non-nuclear principles and the publicizing of the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both in Japan and elsewhere, must be the basic principles of Japan's peace strategy.

'Prewar Syndrome'

Second, the elements that may obstruct a peace strategy must be singled out and eliminated.

Last year, there were many arguments and articles about the Manchurian incident and the Pacific war. This was probably because 1981 was the 50th and 40th anniversaries, respectively, of their starting. But an even more important reason was the fact that, ever since the Liberal-Democratic Party's winning a secure majority in 1980, there have been a number of developments that have a "prewar" flavor.

There is the large increase in the defense budget, for which our statesmen utilized the pressure from the United States. Japan's defense budget increased by about seven percent a year in the 1970s, a rate very much higher than in other countries, and is still growing rapidly in the 1980s, when the country is faced with the need for financial reconstruction. The defense white paper in the summer of 1981 adopted a strong tone and said, "a state that gives its people as much freedom as possible is worthy of being protected;" and, "real patriotism manifests itself in the enthusiasm to work together to protect the nation in emergencies."

The argument that there is a Soviet threat is being touted, and the advocates of state protection for the Yasukuni Shrine and the revision of the constitution are speaking more loudly. Changes have occurred in the government inspection standards for textbooks, so that illustrations showing the tragedy of war have been removed from textbooks for junior and senior high school students. The executive branch is more and more taking the lead in formulating policies, and the functions of the Diet are becoming weaker, partly because of the weakness of the opposition parties. One scholar has called this the "prewar syndrome."

Japan today, of course, is different from prewar Japan. We have a democratic and affluent society, and people obviously want to minimize the dangers to this society. At the same time, nations are more dependent on one another than before,

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and this reduces the risk of open confrontation. And international agencies are functioning much more effectively than before World War II.

One should not be completely pessimistic, but we must beware of being overwhelmed by the kind of syndromes that overwhelmed the world before. We must maintain a careful and strict watch to prevent undesirable tendencies. Efforts to learn the truth, respect for "the right to know" and ensuring a situation in which free discussion is possible are all prerequisites. The establishment of a system whereby access to information is made free is very important in this connection.

Clarify Differences

It is only natural that Japan's world should be considerably different from that of the United States, for Japan, though a great economic power, does not possess nuclear weapons. Japan's own character should be insisted on more strongly.

The nations are more dependent on one another than ever before, and they aim at stable development and the furthering of these relationships of dependency. On the other hand, many nations face the problem of limited resources. In the advanced nations, a slowdown in economic growth has become inevitable, and this trend is more apparent the more advanced a nation is. This is one of the reasons for the United States' loss of power to influence events and the stagnation in the American economy.

Unfortunately, the advanced powers tend to shift the responsibility to other countries. They also tend to demand that other countries take over responsibility. These pressures distort the proper international responsibilities of those powers that have arrived later on the world's stage. In this connection, one cannot help but worry about the present state of economic and defense relations between Japan and the United States.

There is a great asymmetry between Japan and the United States in terms of size and available resources, not to mention the fact that one does not possess nuclear weapons while the other does. It is only natural that Japan cannot follow the United States with respect to security. Japan's statesmen have the responsibility of making other countries understand the differences in policies. It should be understood that the fact that the various Western countries do not pursue the same policies contributes to peace in a multi-polarized world.

Concerning the arguments to do with the balance of power, nations get caught up in the arms race and find it ever more difficult to break away from. In consequence, their economies become even less flexible. Security based on military strength is being shown to be more and more futile, and Japan is in a position to point this out to the United States.

North-South Problem

Fourth, the North-South problem and disarmament are major problems. This was pointed out by the prime minister at the Cancun Summit. The important thing here is not to make vague statements of principle, but to take concrete measures.

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There has so far been no adequate reply to the question of how to contribute to the development and stability of the nations of the Third World. Education, cooperation for industrial development in the ways most appropriate for individual nations and the supply of "appropriate technology"--Japan has the responsibility to do all these things.

Regarding disarmament, Japan must play an appropriate role in the United Nations Special General Assembly on Disarmament in June. It is evident that nuclear disarmament will not make progress unless those nations that possess nuclear weapons, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, are willing. But other important nations are in a position to influence these nations. It is Japan's duty to cooperate in this with other nations that do not possess nuclear weapons.

Besides the advocacy of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, steps should be taken to create denuclearized zones. And Japan is in the best position to work for a denuclearized zone in Northeast Asia. Japan should start drafting an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons with contents that are acceptable to the nations that possess nuclear weapons.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JAPAN PLANS ALLOWING FOREIGN EMBASSY RADIOS

OW041011 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 1 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] The government intends to authorize foreign embassies in Tokyo to have their own radio stations to communicate with their governments in emergencies, so that Japanese embassies abroad can do the same.

The government takes a serious view of the fact that the telephone and telex communications between the Japanese Embassy in Warsaw and the foreign ministry in Tokyo have been cut off since a state of emergency was declared in Poland on 12 December.

Under the principle of reciprocity, the embassy cannot have its own radio station, because the Japanese government does not permit the Polish Embassy in Tokyo to do so.

Article 3 of the radio waves law says: "The government of a foreign country or its representatives shall not be allowed to run a radio station."

In the past the foreign ministry repeatedly asked the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry to amend the law to permit foreign embassies in Tokyo to have their own radio stations.

But the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry refused, saying that it had to give priority to Japanese citizens and organizations in issuing licenses for radio stations.

But the ministry is now willing to revise the law, and Prime Minister Suzuki has instructed the government to do so.

The foreign ministry and the Posts and Telecommunications Ministries plan to present a bill for revision of the radio waves law to the Diet during its current session.

According to the foreign ministry, 58 countries permit the foreign embassies in their capitals to install radio equipment and other countries give the same privileges to the embassies of the 58 countries under the principle of reciprocity.

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- Japan has embassies and legations at 163 places in the world, some of which are in areas of political unrest.

- The government feels that it is necessary for the Japanese embassies in these areas to use radio equipment to communicate with the foreign ministry in Tokyo when necessary.

- As the telephone and telex communications between the Japanese Embassy in Warsaw and the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo were cut off following the declaration of a state of emergency in Poland, the embassy sent two of its staffers to the Japanese Consulate General in West Germany on 16 December to report to the ministry on the telephone that Japanese residents in Poland were safe.

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'ASAHI' ON TANAKA'S ROLE IN LDP POLITICS

OW070915 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 6 Jan 82 p 7

[Editorial, ASAHI SHIMBUN 15 January: "A Political Crossroads"]

[Text] Over 400 visitors went to the Mejiro home of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on 1 January to wish a happy new year. The same occurred last year and the year before.

This has become an annual event, so people no longer think it is strange. But it is surely an unusual political situation when important politicians and government officials, including members of the present cabinet, gather around a man who is implicated in an important bribery case and toast him as if he were their political and administrative leader.

This year's principal political issue is whether politics can be separated, as a result of the decisions in the Lockheed case, from the structure of adhesion among politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats, a structure that encourages corruption. If administrative reform is to succeed and if relations with the U.S., particularly with respect to trade and defense, are to be put on a better footing, a healthy system of politics is needed. If the present structure of wasteful expenditure is maintained, and there appears to be no prospect of pending questions being solved, the sympathy and cooperation of the public cannot be gained.

Let us look at the present situation. Last year, a "gray official" in the Lockheed case was appointed secretary-general of the Liberal-Democratic Party and, at the same time, the "Tanaka Corps," which is led by a man who is not a party member and is the focus of controversy, increased its strength. Because of the pressure brought to bear by the Tanaka faction, the Suzuki cabinet appears now to be managed by Tanaka, whereas previously it was only influenced by him.

The Lockheed affair cannot be regarded as exceptional. It has deep roots in the structure of our politics, economy and society, and it poses some fundamental ethical questions. But instead of reflecting on these questions, the political world seems to be getting more defiant. This may make those who hope for real political reform despair, but they would be wrong.

For example, although Tanaka's forces have grown, the Tanaka faction has, for a full year, done rather badly in factional politics. The Lockheed trials, from one

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hand, and public opinion and legality on the other. But, at the same time, it is a matter of life and death for Tanaka as a politician. Although the Tanaka faction is still growing, the proper relationship between the law and politics must be upheld. Behind Tanaka's display of strength is the fear of being boxed into a corner.

Opposition to Factional Strength

The attraction of being a member of the Tanaka faction lies in the allocation of posts and in improving one's standing in one's constituency by means of the faction's ability to provide funds. But many public opinion surveys have shown that people, even those who support the LDP, are gradually becoming more and more opposed to the use of factional strength in the manner of the Tanaka faction. This was seen in last year's Tokyo Municipal Assembly election, in which candidates who were supported by the Tanaka faction were conspicuous losers.

By means of the supply or reduction of slight advantages constituencies are cultivated and factional power can be made to grow. But now that the period of high economic growth has ended, these political techniques, which are rooted in the political climate of Japan, have surely lost their *raison d'etre*. To extract ourselves from the spell of these politicians and revitalize politics, continued efforts are necessary, and we hope that between the high court decision, which is expected within this year, and the next nationwide elections, some reforms can be made.

Suzuki has staked his political life on administrative and financial reform, but he is under such pressure from those who think only of protecting their vested interests that reform is making little headway. One did not see much heart-searching among our politicians, who should be looking for a way in which Japan can exist as a peaceable nation, when it came to the fiscal 1982 defense budget, which was increased.

At times, Suzuki has shown a fear of public opinion, e.g. when there was a dispute within the government over the Japan-U.S. joint communique and when the government disagreed with the Second Extraordinary Administrative Research Council over administrative reform. But Suzuki fails to go any further; he carries favor with the majority in the LDP and lets things take their course. In brief, he has coped with the various problems of the past 18 months by yielding to pressure. He seems to have decided that maintaining himself in power is more important than political reform.

Suzuki has survived the various problems that have come up presumably because neither the domestic nor the international situation has been all that difficult. And, for the general public, there have been no burning political issues. But we cannot assume that things will remain the same.

There are now calls within the LDP for the dissolution of the Lower House and for a general election to be held this year because there are some causes for concern over relations with the United States.

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Originally, the Suzuki cabinet was regarded as necessary for the continuity of LDP rule at a time when the generations were changing within the party leadership, and the public is concerned about what will happen after the Suzuki cabinet. The responsibility of the LDP's new leaders for the future must be taken account of.

'Leadership of Elders' Still Strong

Looking at the "new men" who have been appointed to the Suzuki cabinet and top party positions, we cannot in all honesty feel that a political revitalization is around the corner. The "leadership of elders" is still strong within the LDP, and it is still customary to avoid challenging the opinions of elders on important issues and, moreover, to find opportunities of flattering them.

Most of the new leaders are merely the proteges of existing luminaries within the party, and they have taken the shortest route to power by virtue of their being loyal followers. The "rehabilitation" of former Prime Minister Tanaka can best be seen in this light.

Leaving aside the outcome of his trial, what would happen if Tanaka were to leave the political world and announce that he was taking political responsibility for the Lockheed scandal. It is just possible that the LDP might take the opportunity to reform itself in a fundamental way and to create a new political approach based on a change of generations.

This is the only way that Tanaka can properly rehabilitate himself as "the prime minister of the common people." By behaving as "the black general," using as a weapon the expansion of his faction and bringing unreasonable pressure to bear on the Suzuki cabinet, Tanaka only falsifies his rehabilitation and weighs down the entire political system. But there is no one who will tell this to Tanaka to his face.

Some people clearly have a political ability that goes beyond factional politicking, and they are rational; but they still cling to the old cliquish state of affairs way of doing things. And there are those who spend their time smoothing over intrafactional differences and supporting their leaders to the hilt. In the political world, it is perhaps true that, to achieve a position in which one can give voice to one's own ideas and wield power, one has to begin by attaching oneself to an important man. But one has to say that the LDP's new leaders are characterized by a conspicuous lack of new ideas or policies. Nor are they any younger than their predecessors.

One hoped that the appearance of new men would herald the introduction of political blueprints and ideas that accord with the problems we face. In the event, one has to ask whether they are merely taking over the mantle of conservative politics from the past leaders. To what are they being so faithful? The history of prewar party politics was a sorry one in many ways: The parties disintegrated without being able to prevent the rise of a military clique to power. Nevertheless, we do have politicians who sound the alarm about military expansion and rushing into war, and who are resolved not to repeat the mistakes of the past.

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This kind of spirit and the will to make Japan a country of peace are essential for our new leaders. The LDP stands at the crossroads with respect to political reform, but it does not have such leaders. For this, it deserves the harsh judgment of the public.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SUZUKI'S DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS NOT CLEAR

OW170030 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 15 Jan 82 p 2

[Editorial, YOMIURI SHIMBUN 14 January: "Clarify Defense Limits"]

[Text] There are questions on why Prime Minister Suzuki gave nine-point instructions to Defense Agency Director-General Soichiro Ito to work out a defense buildup plan based on Suzuki's "hedgehog" theory.

What puzzles many is why the instructions were issued now after the fiscal 1982 budget had already been decided, and just before debates in the Diet which will resume its sessions late this month.

It is speculated that Suzuki's main motive was to forestall the expected attacks from the opposition in the Diet on the sharp rise in the defense budget. It is believed that the "instructions" were intended to prove that Suzuki intends to keep the Defense Agency in check and prove that he is still "dovish" at heart. This suits Suzuki's political style based on harmony.

How Far Can 'Hedgehog' Go?

Suzuki's defense policy still remains very vague although he has defined it as a hedgehog strategy. Now a hedgehog has sharp spines or quills, and Suzuki's aides explain that he means that Japan's defense should be based on a policy of driving back any enemy before they invade Japan, limiting Japan's military capabilities to a purely defensive role.

However, he does not clarify how far outward Japan should project its military power. Too far out could be interpreted as a threat to other countries but too far in would not comply with Suzuki's pledge to the United States to defend Japan's immediate sea lanes. Suzuki also wants stress placed on the maritime and air forces rather than ground forces.

It is our belief that the premier's "instructions" do not help clarify Japan's defense strategy which would be done better in the National Defense Council. And without clear objectives, it will be difficult for the Defense Agency to draw up its next equipment purchasing plan covering the years from fiscal 1983 to 1987.

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Check for Priorities

We certainly agree with the premier that Japan should not vastly expand its military forces. Japan cannot afford to participate in a arms race like the superpowers. Nevertheless, the current defense buildup program will cost 20 trillion yen, and such expenditures call for careful consideration of priorities.

We urge the Diet not to concentrate on the defense budget rise solely in debates but consider also what the nation's defense setup should be. It is important also for Japan to conduct joint defense studies with the United States on the Far East by making clear that Japan cannot participate in "collective military action" under its constitution.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'AKAHATA' ON SOCIALIST-KOMEI AGREEMENT CONTRADICTION

OW161021 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMT 16 Jan 82

[Text] Tokyo, 16 Jan, JPS--The editorial of AKAHATA of 16 January charged that the Socialist Party still clings to the "Socialist-Komei Agreement" approving the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the self-defense forces even when the Liberal Democratic Party is speeding up its preparations for the revision of the constitution. The editorial said that socialists' appeal against the revision of the constitution and their expectation for a joint struggle with the Komei Party run in a serious contradiction.

The LDP Constitution Research Commission has studied a memorandum on the revision of the constitution, which expresses opposition to the principles of the present constitution of permanent peace, people's sovereignty, and the respect of fundamental human rights. The commission is planning to work up the draft revision of the constitution by the next Upper House election in 1983.

The plot to revise the constitution is expected to be confirmed in the forthcoming LDP convention and will be sped up, the editorial said.

Under these circumstances, the Socialist Party on 14 January issued a draft action program calling for the formation of a "people's grand alliance against the revision of the constitution." This position of the draft program, in its words, is fundamentally in line with the desire of wide public for the protection of peace and democratic provisions of the constitution, said the editorial.

At the same time the editorial also pointed out that the draft action program of the Socialist Party criticized the Komei party for taking an open stance at its party convention for the continuation of the security treaty and the constitutionality of the self-defense forces. But, on the other hand, the editorial made the following point:

"But the draft action program of the Socialist Party makes no mention of the "Socialist-Komei Agreement" which approves the current maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the self-defense forces. Even more, it expresses expectation for a joint struggle with the Komei party. This is a serious contradiction."

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"We have to warn again that the socialists' slogan, 'opposition to the revision of the constitution,' cannot meet the expectation of the people nor is [it] effective in defeating the LDP plot to revise the constitution without renouncing the 'Socialist-Komei Agreement' line."

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'ASAHI' VIEWS 'REACTIONARY' LDP ACTION POLICY

OW191149 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 18 Jan 82 p 3

[Text] The Liberal-Democratic Party's 1982 action policy, which is to be presented to the party regular convention on 21 January, has a rather reactionary coloring, while the Japan Socialist Party's action policy talks of the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The LDP executives have approved a draft that emphasizes the need to build up Japan's defense on the grounds that Japan faces a serious military threat for the first time since the end of the war as a result of the Soviet Union's military buildup.

The action policy also says Japan should have a constitution that it has written itself. The policy, however, does not dwell on the need to establish morality in politics, and this may be due to the fact that Mutsuki Kato, who was tarnished in the Lockheed payoff scandal, was in charge of preparing the draft.

The LDP policy also pledges to carry out administrative and fiscal reform. The pains of reform should be shared by the government, LDP and all the people, the policy draft says.

The JSP's action policy draft will be presented for discussion at the party convention on 4 February. It calls for the elimination of nuclear arms, the maintenance of peace, the maintenance of the present constitution intact, opposition to administrative reform such as is being carried out by the Suzuki cabinet, tax reductions, etc.

It also criticizes the clean government party (Komeito) for tilting to the right in connection with the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the self-defense forces.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'ASAHI' COMPARES LDP'S OLD, NEW ACTION POLICIES

OW191147 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 18 Jan 82 p 5

[Editorial, ASAHI SHIMBUN 16 January: "A Lapse of Memory"

[Text] "We should not be arrogant in consequence of overestimating the political conservatism of the public. The public responds swiftly to mistakes in political judgment and to authoritarianism."

"Public trust is necessary if political leadership is to be exercised. The basis of this trust lies in the establishment of strict code of ethics and their comprehensive application."

The above comes from the Liberal-Democratic Party's action policy for 1980. As can be seen, the party is criticizing itself, probably because of the sense of crisis that arose in the party after the preceding general election, in which it lost support because of its dependence on money and its lack of worthwhile policies. But things have changed a lot since then.

After its triumph in the elections for both houses of the Diet, the LDP vaunted in its 1981 action policy that "the overwhelming victory we have won was brought about by the good sense of the public." They adopted a course of great confrontation toward the opposition parties and proposed strengthening the national defenses and promulgating a new, independent constitution. And without a mention of the Lockheed case, they reverted to preaching that "all classes of society should be aware of their responsibilities and duties in the new age."

A comparison of the LDP's action policies of the last two years with the draft of the action policy of 1982 makes one aware of the changes that have occurred in the political world. This year's draft focuses on strengthening the national defenses. The party also calls for a declaration of support at the national convention for the promulgation of an independent constitution, i.e. the revision of Article 9. This is closely connected with the emphasis on strengthening the national defenses, and it makes us feel extremely uneasy.

The draft takes on a tone of crisis with the assertion that "with the increase in Soviet military strength, Japan, too, faces a military threat." It goes on to say "Japan should fulfill its responsibilities to the greatest possible extent by

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increasing its military strength." The issue of arms reduction, on which Japan should take the initiative in an appealing to the world, is only touched on as an afterthought.

The government and the LDP think that they must respond to the demands for the strengthening of Japan's defenses to a certain extent so that they can deal with foreign relations issues, in which trade and defense have become closely linked. But even if this is accepted, it remains that Japan's chief task is to make every effort to halt the worldwide arms race.

The draft, however, makes no mention of an independent strategy for peace that Japan may pursue. In the name of "answering international expectations," it proposes stepping out on the endless road of military expansion. The LDP's more open advocacy of bringing to public attention the need for an independent constitution is clearly related to its policy of strengthening the national defenses.

But what does the draft have to say about administrative reform--a vital political issue this year? It asserts that "each member of the public should realize what his responsibilities are" and that "all of the public should share the pains." But for all the LDP's preaching at the public, changes are not being made in the present political and administrative structure, which depends upon collusion among politicians, business and the bureaucracy.

The reasons for the disappearance of talk about self-discipline and political ethics include the recent situation inside the party and the appointment of a "gray official" as chairman of the National Organization Committee, Mutsuki Kato, which is in charge of drawing up the action policy.

Concerning administrative reform and the establishment of political morality, the draft talks as if these matters were wholly the responsibility of the general public. Views that are opposed to strengthening the national defenses are considered heretical and the arguments that are advanced in support of these views are largely ignored. As time passes, a current similar to the prewar imperial rule assistance association grows within the LDP.

This year's action policy is the result of this content. The LDP has taken advantage of the weakness of opposition parties and treated lightly the fears and wishes of the public.

The LDP party congress which will review the draft on 21 January will probably be, as usual, a "rubberstamp congress." More members of the public should look hard at the actions of the LDP.

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MILITARY

'SANKEI SHIMBUN' ON DEFENSE ISSUE

OW101101 Tokyo SANKEI SHIMBUN in Japanese 5 Jan 82 Morning Edition p 10

[Editorial: "The Way To Avoid Defense Friction--What Should Japan Do for the Present?"]

[Text] This year Japan is very likely to come under fire over its defense effort and its share of the defense burden as a member of the Western world. Is the 7.75 percent increase in defense spending, adopted late last year, sufficient for Japan's defense? Does the increase mean that Japan is now fulfilling its share of the defense burden? Western nations still have strong complaints about Japan.

On the surface the United States will welcome the increase in defense spending but basically it is expected to be more dissatisfied, saying, "why does Japan, a giant economic power, not exert more adequate efforts in defense?" Obviously the U.S. anger will be directed toward Japan's evasion of responsibility as seen from its failure to adequately defend even its own territory.

As stressed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown, we must bear in mind that "the Japan-U.S. relations will not last long if Japan relies only on the security arrangements" and fails to cope with the defense friction which is expected to further escalate in the days to come. What should Japan do first of all to this end?

This year the defense friction is first expected to come to the fore at a U.S. Congressional public hearing scheduled from late January to early February. We can easily see how this public hearing, to be held at the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the House, will turn into a big chorus of denunciations of Japan's selfishness.

The House Foreign Relations Committee, which is to take up the Japan-U.S. security issue in the main, will probably make an overall check of the security arrangements. The Senate, which is to discuss the Asian question in general, will undoubtedly also discuss the defense issue involving Japan.

What the result of these debates will be is clear. The U.S. criticism of Japan for its insufficient defense effort will further intensify and the U.S. Government and Congress will further increase their pressure. Can this trend be called merely friction? It is very likely to develop into a serious conflict.

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What should Japan do to effectively cope with this situation? Fundamentally we think that there is no other way but to make Japan's position and views clear, both domestically and externally. For one thing, at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting scheduled for 8 January, Japan should clarify what Japan can do to share the defense burden and spell out its policy on the proposed Japan-U.S. military technological cooperation and on coping with an emergency in the Far East.

For another, Foreign Minister Sakuraido or Defense Agency Director General Ito should visit Washington before the U.S. public hearing opens and explain in detail the content of Japan's budget for the next fiscal year and particularly its defense buildup plan envisaging expenditures to be defrayed in subsequent fiscal years. Thus, they should try to win the understanding of the United States.

We also believe that it will be an effective way for Japanese Dietmen connected with foreign relations and defense affairs to contact their U.S. counterparts and help resolve their dissatisfactions and questions. It is important, we think, that Japan show its defense effort by making the first move and forestalling questions from the other side.

It is true that, in working out the fiscal 1982 draft budget for defense, a considerable amount of consideration was given to defense despite the difficult financial situation and despite having to overcome contrary public opinion. But we also think that it is natural if the United States continues to show its dissatisfaction, saying, "that is not enough."

In the Japan-U.S. joint statement issued last May, Japan pledged to "assume an appropriate role" and "make further defense efforts" for the sake of the peace and security of Japan and the Far East. If this is the case, Japan should have done more. This, we believe, is what the United States really expected from Japan.

We do not have to be reminded by the United States to realize that Japan cannot defend itself independently. Japan relies on the United States for offensive striking power and nuclear deterrent which may be called the core of the national defense. That is why the United States asks Japan to strengthen its own defense potential. However, Japan's defense spending, the proof of its intentions, has not increased noticeably. Whenever the United States complains, Japan parries, citing only domestic factors as its reason. So, we must understand the challenging attitude of the other side which urges Japan to "look at the international situation."

Nevertheless, Japan claims that "the increase in Japan's defense spending is the highest among the Western nations." In making this claim, Japan closes its eye to the difference in basic figures. The rate of Japan's defense spending to its gross national product has finally increased to 0.93 percent but this is still much smaller than the 5.2 percent of the United States, the 4.9 percent of the United Kingdom and the 3.3 percent of West Germany. It is open to question if Japan possesses half of the defense potential it really requires for its self-defense. In view of this, Japan should think more before it starts talking about how big the increase in its defense spending is. In sharing the defense burden, Japan must first of all acquire the capability of defending itself and safeguarding

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the waters around it extending to hundreds of nautical miles and its sea lanes extending to a radius of 1,000 nautical miles.

What Japan should do for the present, along with making a full-dress review of its defense spending, is to start working out its military technological cooperation with the United States and study how to cope with an emergency in the Far East.

Speaking of military technological cooperation, it is the U.S. side which has been providing it to Japan all along. Today, however, with Japan having become a technological giant that possesses optic fiber, vlsi and other world-level advanced technologies, it is quite natural that Japan is asked to make these technologies available.

The United States has willingly made its technologies available to Japan, but Japan refuses to reciprocate. This is unfair. But it is not the government that possesses these technologies and therefore it is not a simple matter. Since it is the private sector that possesses these technologies, it is ultimately up to the enterprises concerned to decide if their technologies should be offered to others. Thus, how to guide them becomes an important question for the government. A continuous one-way traffic would be impossible.

More importantly, we should think about why the United States, a military technological giant, is so tenaciously asking for exchanges in this field. The United States may be dissatisfied with Japan's three arms export principles, and by demanding these exchanges it may be venting this dissatisfaction. As for the three nonnuclear principles, it should equally be noted that a real defense of Japan is impossible without allowing a "transitory introduction of nuclear arms." Defense policies should be changed as time passes.

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MILITARY

'MAINICHI' RAPS BUSINESS LEADERS OVER DEFENSE OUTLAYS

OW111358 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 10 Jan 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Military Expansion, Economy"]

[Text] We have noticed the emergence of a dangerous sign in Japanese economic circles. Yoshinoro Inayama, president of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and three other top business leaders have told a joint press conference that national defense and social welfare must be treated as two different things, and also that the defense expenditures in the fiscal 1982 budget draft are reasonable.

In the statements of these business leaders, we noted a generous chorus of support for an expanded defense capability. At the same time, we also know that not a small number of businessmen, especially those in the service industry, are opposed to the defense expansion. But the statements at the press conference seem to have exposed an undercurrent among business leaders who have become tolerable toward military expansion after the repeated American requests for a bigger Japanese role in this specific field. We regard this as a dangerous sign because we doubt that military expansion and civilian vitality or economic development can coexist.

In the postwar days, Japan achieved the highest economic growth rate in the world. It has been regarded as a model in this respect because of its light military outlay under the war-renouncing constitution. This has also been proven by historical fact when we compare Japan with the United States. In short, among the democratic nations, the productivity of Japan, whose military burden was light compared with its Gross National Product (GNP), has been exceptionally high while the productivity of the United States, the super military power, has been the lowest.

Japan's defense outlay remains less than one percent of its GNP and the total production of the defense industry is also less than one percent of the total industrial output. Accordingly, economic circles still remain optimistic that the vitality of the Japanese economy and economic development would not be hampered by the militarization of the economy.

Japanese economic circles believe that civilian vitality must be maintained and that the free economic system must be protected. We believe that the business leaders must bear the responsibility of thinking about the future of the Japanese economy from a long-range viewpoint.

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MILITARY

KEEP CONTINGENCY PLANS WITHIN LEGAL BOUNDS

OW121259 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 11 Jan 82 p 2

[Editorial, YOMIURI SHIMBUN 10 January: "Planning for Emergencies"]

[Text] The Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee on Security Friday agreed to launch a study covering bilateral cooperation to cope with an emergency in the Far East. In concrete terms, the study is to determine in what ways Japan can support U.S. military operations in case of another war in Korea.

The Japan-U.S. security setup is a hollow promise if both sides are unable to cooperate with each other. Article 6 of the treaty allows the U.S. to use bases in Japan to defend this country as well as the peace and security of the Far East. Naturally, Japan has to cooperate. And Japan cannot reject the planned study for that reason.

But the study should be carried out strictly within the limits of existing laws, including the constitution. The study of an emergency in the Far East should not be conducted unconditionally.

No Prior Obligations

As a precondition of the joint study, it is stated that both governments are absolved from taking mandatory legislative and administrative steps to implement the findings of the study. This means that Japan is under no prior obligation. Under this principle, Japan will be able to distinguish between areas where it can cooperate and where it cannot. Furthermore, the prior consultation system should be strictly applied in carrying out the joint study.

The restoration of Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations has drastically changed the Korean equation. The U.S. military presence in South Korea virtually rules out another military clash on the peninsula.

Contingency Planning

But, one must prepare for the worst. If ever there should be another clash in Korea, the possibility arises that Japan could get involved, perhaps on the grounds of collective defense, although the constitution forbids this.

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The U.S. is not always right in its judgments. Japan should be able to judge situation coolheadedly. The prior consultation system serves this purpose. Japan should also prudently study the repercussions of allowing U.S. aircraft based in Japan to engage in direct battle.

During negotiations for the return of Okinawa, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato gave a de facto "yes" to sorties of U.S. aircraft from Okinawa. Today, such consent needs reexamination when it bears on the fate of this country.

Prime Minister Suzuki and other cabinet ministers should be kept directly informed of the nature of the studies. Otherwise, they may not be able to make a free decision in the face of a fait accompli.

The Diet, on its part, should conduct an in-depth study on security. Otherwise, the study of emergency situations may advance beyond civilian control.

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'ASAHI' RAPS JAPAN'S MEEK CONSENT TO EMERGENCY STUDY

OW130955 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 12 Jan 82 p 5

[Editorial, ASAHI SHIMBUN 10 January: "Defense Cooperation"]

[Text] The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee met for the first time in three years and two months, and it was agreed that a joint study on bilateral cooperation in the event of an emergency in the Far East should be made. Also, opinions were exchanged on the military situation in Northeast Asia and on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.

In this consultative committee, which was established on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, both sides should frankly exchange opinions. But in the latest meeting, there was no substantial rebuttal by Japan of the American contention that the military threat from the Soviet Union has increased, and that the situation with regard to security in the Far East has worsened. In fact, in answer to the American request that Japan should cooperate more in defense, Japan even said that it was exerting efforts to that end. Japan merely made agreeable responses in a one-way discussion conducted according to the American pace.

Ever since the joint statement that was issued after the U.S.-Japan summit meeting in May 1981, discussions on defense cooperation between the two countries have been repeatedly held outside the consultative committee. The working-level talks between the foreign policy and defense authorities of the two countries in Hawaii and the meeting between Defense Agency Secretary-General Joji Omura and U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger are examples. Even without the convening of the consultative committee for the first time in a long time, it was clear that defense cooperation was being advanced.

The contents of the study on bilateral cooperation in the event of a Far Eastern emergency will include the extent and scope of the logistical support Japan will provide to the U.S. forces in an emergency, and the assistance the self-defense forces will give to the U.S. forces. All the contents raise serious questions.

Regarding the provision of logistical support, it is said that this will include the use by American forces of SDF bases, civilian ports and airports, and the procurement and transport of arms, ammunition and food. Take only the case of the use of SDF bases by the U.S. forces: It entails a new interpretation of Article 6

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of the Security Treaty, which concerns the stationing of U.S. forces and their use of facilities and areas, and of the status of forces agreement under the security treaty.

Also, in the operational field, if maritime SDF ships escort U.S. naval reinforcements, this may go beyond the scope of the right of simple self-defense to constitute collective self-defense, which is not recognized under the Japanese constitution.

Another matter was Foreign Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi's touching on Japan-South Korea relations in the consultative committee meeting, acknowledging that a very tense situation persists on the Korean peninsula, and saying: "The military strength of South Korea and the American forces in South Korea are contributing to the North-South balance, and Japan would like to contribute to the economic recovery of South Korea." At this rate, Japan will be thought to have approved South Korea's linking its demand for a \$6 billion loan with security on the Korean peninsula. It must be said that Sakurauchi's statement was far from circumspect.

Admiral Long, who attended the meeting of the consultative committee, asserted that the Soviet Union was increasing its military strength both quantitatively and qualitatively and said, "when evaluating Soviet military strength, the focus should be on military ability, because military intentions can change in one night." The Japanese defense authorities have hitherto differentiated between military ability and intention and have tended to emphasize the latter. We cannot understand why they made no attempt whatsoever to rebut Long's statement.

Defense discussions between Japan and the U.S. should not be restricted to the security policy adopted by Japan, i.e. the expansion of its defense capability, but an effort should be made to get the U.S. to understand the development of peaceful diplomacy and disarmament efforts, and the significance and scope of a comprehensive security policy that covers economic cooperation.

If Japan swallows whole the argument about the Soviet military threat, it will not only become embroiled in the power politics of the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Recent discussions on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation raise the fear that Japan will lose its capacity for independent action and be incorporated into the American strategic system. Both Japan and the U.S. must recognize that there are definite limitations on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, including the provision of military technology.

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JAPAN'S MSDF TO TAKE PART IN 'RIMPAC 82'

OW161001 Tokyo JPS in English 0907 GMT 16 Jan 82

[Text] Tokyo, 16 Jan, JPS--The 1982 Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC 82) will be conducted from mid-March to late April in the Central Pacific near Hawaii, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces will send two missile-mounted destroyers (DDG), one helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH), eight P-2J anti-submarine patrol aircraft and about one thousand personnel to the exercise. This was revealed by the Defense Agency sources on 15 January.

The RIMPAC is an exercise planned by the U.S. 3rd Fleet and participated in by navies of the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The aim of the maneuver, AKAHATA on 16 January said, is to secure U.S. command of the air and the sea in the region.

The Japanese vessels that are to take part in the exercise are a DDH "Shirane," and DDGs of "Asakaze" and "Tachikaze." The DDH "Shirane" carries the so-called "Link 11" communication system that is also carried by U.S. ships. The MSDF's DDH conducted a joint communication exercise with "Blueridge," the flag ship of the U.S. 7th Fleet, in last June and July. AKAHATA pointed out that the participation of "Shirane" (in RIMPAC 82) is aimed at drawing the MSDF into the U.S. task forces and strengthening the Japan-U.S. joint operation posture.

The Japanese government has alleged that "MSDF doesn't act for the purpose of defending U.S. ships." But, AKAHATA said, in the RIMPAC and other joint exercises, circular formation trainings were also conducted to defend U.S. aircraft carriers, on the premise of exercising the right to collective defense which even the LDP government has regarded unconstitutional.

In addition, AKAHATA stressed, strengthening the joint operation posture with the U.S. Navy armed with nuclear weapons, the Japanese MSDF will consequently assume the role of a part of a limited nuclear warplan of the U.S. Reagan administration, even if the MSDF does not possess nuclear weapons.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENT ROBOT DISCUSSED

Tokyo SHUKAN BIRION in Japanese 6 Nov 81 pp 39-41

[Article by science critic Yasu Ariga]

[Text] Not a single day passes without one reading something about robots in the newspapers. Last year, 1980 was dubbed the "first year of the robot"--the reason being rapidly increasing robot production and a steadily increasing number of robot manufacturers entering the field. The 1980 production was originally estimated by business circles at 60 billion yen, which turned out to be far below the actual results: 78 billion yen. At present, there are approximately 30 big manufacturers, out of a total of about 140 manufacturers.

This year has been called the "first year of the intelligent robot." Hitachi, Fuji Electric, and Nippon Electric are already commercializing their second-generation industrial robots, and other powerful manufacturers in the field, including Yasukawa Electric, Mitsubishi Electric, Matsushita Electric Industrial, and others, are each promoting robot development, with commercialization as the goal.

The key to a significant qualitative leap of the industrial robot market lies with the "intelligent robot." This was shown clearly at the "1981 International Industrial Robot Fair" held in October at Tokyo-Haruumi. The highlight of the fair consisted of the display of various intelligent robots incorporating advanced mechatronics technology, such as an "electrically powered robot with artificial intelligence" (Kawasaki Heavy Industries), a "welding robot with sight sensor" (Hitachi), and an "assembly robot for precision electronic parts" (Nippon Electric).

According to the demand forecast made by the Society of Japanese Industrial Robot Manufacturers, intelligent robot production will increase from approximately 4 billion yen in 1980 to 12-40 billion yen in 1985--an increase of 3-10 times--and to 43-120 billion yen in 1990--an increase of 11-30 times. The reason the predicted values have a wide spread is because there are many uncertainties.

For reference, Japan's projected industrial robot production is 78 billion yen for 1980, approximately 300 billion yen for 1985, and approximately 600 billion yen for 1990. The ratio of intelligent robot production to total robot production is predicted to be 5 percent for 1980, 4-13 percent for 1985, and 7.2-20 percent for 1990. The ratio is expected to increase steadily.

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At present, Japan's industrial robots are said to be tops in the world in every respect, including total production, number of robots in use, and performance. These robots are also highly appraised abroad.

Intelligent robots with sensors are also being studied abroad, including the United States, and their development is being undertaken aggressively. In Europe, France and West Germany have undertaken large scale research supported by their governments. In the United States, research is being carried out systematically by the military, government, universities, and public organizations.

In Japan, MITI has just adopted a program to undertake R&D of the "intelligent robot" as a large-scale project which is to be treated as one of the important themes related to the development of advanced technology. According to this plan, R&D activities will be undertaken by an intelligent robot research organization consisting of the government and private sector, including--in addition to a dozen or so companies such as Hitachi, Fujitsu Fanac, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Yasukawa Electric, and other enterprises related to robot production--the Electronic Technology Consolidated Research Center and the Mechanical Technology Research Center of the Academy of Industrial Technology.

Now then, what is an intelligent robot? According to Prof Ichiro Kato, Faculty of Engineering, Waseda University: "To take the next action based on a decision which is made after the information received by the sensors is processed is a form of intelligence; any robot capable of doing this can be called an intelligent robot; it is quite impossible to replace a human being having the excellent abilities called the five senses completely with any machine; intelligent robots for industrial applications are therefore moving toward acquiring only certain specific functions, such as a sense of sight or touch."

The MITI department in charge of robot matters considers that robots, just as computers, should be classified according to generation and type, as shown in Table 1. According to this table, the 1980's will be the period of the second-generation robot, consisting of the sensing and decision-making robot (this is the first-generation intelligent robot). The department considers that "at this time, industrial robots have just made a move in the new direction. In 10 years, a significant improvement in functions unimaginable today and an accompanying expansion of the field of application are expected to take place. We consider this to be a 'movement toward intelligence of industrial robots.' Such industrial robots are an example of mechatronics, and mechatronics is considered to be an industry highly compatible with Japan. This industry is highly likely to evolve into Japan's strategic industry alongside computers in the future. To be able to realize this, the robots must become more and more intelligent, so R&D of intelligent robots becomes more and more important."

The Electronics Enterprises Have a Definite Advantage

The intelligent robots today depend on a number of key technologies, such as microcomputer technology, voice-recognition technology, pattern-recognition and information-processing technology, sensor technology, and software technology needed for recognition and decision-making. It is evident from this that,

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although intelligent robots are considered mechatronics products, the weight of electronics far surpasses the weight of mechanics as the robots become more and more intelligent. It is understandable, therefore, that the serious intelligent robot manufacturers are also often electronics manufacturers. Those manufacturers engaged in both semiconductor and computer production are said to have advantage over other manufacturers. Why?

A comparison between the progress in mechanical technology and the progress in electronics technology over a period of 5 years shows that while the former is making only small progress, the latter is advancing by leaps and bounds, and the situation can change a great deal in 5 years. This is particularly true in the field of semiconductors and computers. As a countermeasure, a number of manufacturers, including Hitachi, Nippon Electric, Fijitsu, and other computer manufacturers, have adopted the "double-layer system" for their R&D activities.

That means that the system consists of development of merchandise which is to be marketed in 2 years or so (short-range goal), and development of basic technologies required for the development of high-technology merchandise which is to be marketed in 5-7 years (long-range goal). Of course, early results obtained from the latter undertaking can also be applied to the merchandise that is to be marketed in 2 years in order to improve the performance and increase the market values.

This system becomes increasingly advantageous to the computer manufacturers as the intelligent robots become more and more intelligent. There are all sorts of intelligent robots. Any manufacturer can make an intelligent robot with a simple magnetic sensor or a touch sensor. However, if an intelligent robot capable of pattern-recognition or processing complicated information is involved, the consolidated electronics manufacturers have distinct advantages.

One of the manufacturers which recognized its own potential early is Hitachi Ltd. This company began to work on the intelligent robot 10 years ago with the goal of factory automation. An arc-welding robot with a sensor, "Mr Aros," was completed 6 years ago for the first time in the industry. A multipurpose "processing robot" which is applicable to a wide range of manufacturing process operations, including welding deburring, polishing, and assembly, was commercialized in April last year.

At the "1980 Hitachi Technology Fair" held at Kitanomaru Park, Tokyo, last November, Hitachi's intelligent robot, which was capable of recognizing a pattern with its sight sensor and carrying out the image processing, was proudly displayed, showing off Hitachi's true power.

On the other hand, Hitachi's robot development system has undergone an extraordinary strengthening process, and the entire company has plunged itself into an all-out robot strategy. There are two objectives: 1) early attainment of automation, removal of humans from the FMS (flexible manufacturing system) in its internal plants and factories; and 2) acceleration of the development of a high-performance, low-cost robot, experimentation with it in internal plants, improvement of it, and expansion of its share as a leading item of merchandise.

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Moreover, the technology thus developed will be protected by a patent. It is truly no less than a total war organization, and to concentrate all its energy organically is the supreme goal.

When it was announced in July that Hitachi and the U.S. General Electric were to enter into overall cooperation on matters related to robot production and sales, Hitachi was criticized as "sending salt to the enemy." This writer disagrees.

According to what was revealed by Hitachi: 1) the robots involved are the three types referred to above, including a "painting robot," the "arc-welding robot Mr Aros," and the "Hitachi processing robot," while advanced intelligent robots are not involved in the deal; 2) Hitachi's strategic goal (the long-range goal referred to above) consists of the development of an "autonomous movable intelligent robot" with multiple arms and legs, an advanced microcomputer as its brain, an advanced sense of sight, advanced sense of touch (including pressure, force, and rubbing), and capable of voice recognition and moving around by itself; 3) General Electric is lagging behind Hitachi's all-out setup in many respects, including the development power and the technological level, thanks to a vacuum created by its retreat from the field of computer manufacturing. The gap is so big that the chance is very slight that G.E. will ever be able to catch up with Hitachi, much less surpass it. Moreover, the contract signed by G.E. and Hitachi is only a nonexclusive contract with an effective period of 7 years.

On the other hand, Nippon Electric has also entered the intelligent robot market. This company started to undertake the development of various types of intelligent robots several years ago for internal applications. Its research activities are centered around its Production Automation Headquarters and Production Equipment Headquarters. "Precision assembly robots" capable of performing assembly and inspection of electronic parts have been supplied to its own production lines. With technologies thus cultivated and the knowhow accumulated, it has developed three types of precision assembly robot and entered the robot business in earnest.

In the background is an ability peculiar to this company of being able to foresee the growth of this type of intelligent robot. In disagreement with the prediction made by the Society of Japanese Industrial Robot Manufacturers, this company holds that "although the majority of robots in practical application today are centered around painting and welding robots, the future belongs to the assembly robot. Its growth rate is expected to exceed 50 percent and the market scale is expected to reach the order of 7 billion yen by 1985. There is a large potential demand for a precision assembly robot capable of handling small parts such as electronic parts." If so, 23 percent of the total robot production would be occupied by precision assembly robots. Counting backward, the growth rate of the precision assembly during the first half of the 1980's would amount to 77 percent per year. In contrast, the average annual growth rate of all robots during the same period is expected to be approximately 30 percent, indicating that a significant structural change in the robot industry is taking place in the 1980's.

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Moreover, one of the three machine types commercialized by Nippon Electric-- "NEC precision assembly robot Model A"--has the following characteristics: 1) Its two arms can operate independently or in concert; 2) the arms are driven by a linear motor and controlled by a microcomputer, and very high positioning accuracy, of the order of 8 microns (1 micron = 1 thousandth of 1 mm), can be achieved; 3) program language for robot application is available, greatly facilitating composition and modification of the program; 4) the robot can be applied not only to assembly work but also to a wide range of operations, including processing, inspection, and sorting, by simply changing the attachment joined to the end of the arm, using a different attachment according to the task.

The Period of Robot Industry Shakeup Soon To Come

In the semiconductor industry, which has been regarded the symbol of a knowledge-intensive industry, assembly of transistors and IC's constitutes a labor-intensive operation. This operation has so far been supported by an army of female workers. Both the quality and quantity of the products has depended strongly on the mastery as well as the dexterity of the worker. Because it is an operation that requires a very high degree of concentration and repetition, errors and reduced efficiency due to worker fatigue could not be completely avoided so far.

This difficulty has been solved as a result of the development of an "automatic assembly (robot) system which is capable of pattern-recognition from a combination of mechanical technology and electronic technology, including pattern-recognition technology, consisting of a microcomputer processing a picture image received by a TV camera," according to Hironori Osaki et al of Mitsubishi's Production Technology Research Center.

For example, the main features of its "fully automatic transistor assembly (robot) system" applied to the wire attachment process are as follows: 1) its range of vision for pattern-recognition is small, 0.96 x 0.96 mm; 2) the speed of pattern-recognition is 0.2 second/image; 3) the accuracy of pattern-recognition is 1 micron; 4) the speed of welding is 0.7 second/joint; and 5) the welding format is an ultrasonic heat press. A production line using this system automatically produces 18,000 transistors an hour, with only three operators attending to the raw material supply and keeping watch over the system. As a result, the rejects have dropped to less than 10 percent, the product quality has become quite homogeneous, and a material utilization rate of 100 percent has been achieved.

It is inevitable that the age of structural change in the robot industry will be ushered in by the advanced assembly robot. Kawasaki Heavy Industries pioneered Japan's robot industry by importing the first-generation robot technology from the U.S. Unimation Corporation 18 years ago and has manufactured 1,600 industrial robots so far, leading the entire industry in production. This company will continue to develop new fields of application for conventional robots. At the same time, in order to be able to cope with the demand for diversification, it has begun to undertake the development of a purely home-made robot independently, without relying on the Unimation technology. A brand-new type of second-generation robot employing a hydraulic-electric control reportedly is to be made

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public within a year. The technological development speed of Unimation regarding its second-generation robot appears to be unable to catch up with the Japanese manufacturer's, so Kawasaki Heavy Industries cannot help but leave Unimation behind.

It appears that 1981 robot production will reach as high as 11 billion yen, an increase of 40 percent over that of 1980. At this growth rate, the 1985 production may reach approximately 42 billion yen. By that time, some of the first-generation robot manufacturers may have dropped out due to the difference in their development power.

Table 1. Development Trend of Industrial Robots

Generation Item	First generation	Intelligent Robot	
		Second generation	Third generation
Feature	Playback robot	Sensing, decision-making robot	Learning robot
Format	Link-cam format Teaching-playback	Sensor-feedback Senses of sight, hearing, force, touch, and pressure	Learning function Reasoning function Judgment function
Movement format	Ordinary movement format	Omnidirectional movement format	Walking Staircase climbing
Application	Painting Spot welding Pick and place	Arc-welding Assembly Medical care Remote operation	Automatic assembly Independent work robot Household
Period	1960	1980	1990

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