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3 February 1982

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 6/82)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STEEL INDUSTRY 'OUTSIDERS' PLAN SURVIVAL TACTICS

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Dec 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Michael Gatermann: "Steel Industry; Those Who Are Declared Dead Live Longer"]

[Text] In the ailing steel industry, illnesses are being used to indicate moods. When reporters inquired about the health of Hoesch boss Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, whose appendix has been operated on, his information office gave this tip: "Consider it to be evidence of the degree of agreement." The boss of the desired candidate for the steel merger, Krupp steel boss Alfons Goedde, had had his appendix removed 6 weeks before.

A third element would only disrupt so much harmony. Ernst Pieper, chairman of the board of the federally owned Salzgitter concern and supporter of a three-way steel marriage, remains outside. Now Pieper, just like Herbert Gienow of Kloeckner, must give thought to how his company can survive competition with the new giant (sales in 1980--altogether 9.7 billion marks, 61,000 employees). But the Big Five (Thyssen, Kloeckner, Salzgitter, Hoesch and Krupp) registered losses of approximately 2 billion marks in business year 1980. Since 1977, 40,000 steel workers have lost their jobs in the Rhein-Ruhr area, and the steel expert of the Metal Workers' Union, Rudolf Judith, had figured out from the firms' plans, "In the next 6 years 30,000 more will have to go."

Withdrawals from the umbrella organization, wrangling about the timing of a price hike and rumors about other competitors accentuate the disunity in the crisis-ridden industry. At least Dieter Spethmann would like to demonstrate harmony. At 55, Spethmann is manager of the Economic Organization of Iron and Steel and head of Thyssen Inc., the largest German steel company (steel sales in 1980--11.7 billion marks, 69,000 employees). Thyssen produces 40 percent of all West German steel. As the last genuine "Ruhr baron" (born in Essen) among pure strangers to the Ruhr area, Spethmann praises his business as the one remaining steel producer. "The others have all handed steel over to subsidiaries."

That does not seem to be good for business. Thyssen is the only company that has lived through the steel crisis that began in 1971 without substantial losses. Though annual production is down 28 percent, Spethmann is optimistic about the future. "We can even make a profit from 12 million tons of steel a year."

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The Thyssen boss is annoyed about the accusation that he deliberately postponed the steel price hike planned for October because he could afford it. "We decided that in our association only on account of our customers," he denies. "Thyssen was always a pioneer in raising prices." The postponement is costing the companies, says Spethmann, a total of 20 million marks; there is no point in becoming excited. Herbert Koehler, CDU deputy and manager of the Economic Organization of Iron and Steel, of which Spethmann is chairman, estimates the loss of income at 33 million marks. Gienow, head of the suffering Kloeckner Company (sales in 1980--6 billion marks, 32,000 employees), alleges that the loss of sales amounts to something like 100 million marks. Since he left the Eurofer cartel last year, the 55-year-old Hamburger has been the black sheep of the sector. He is no longer a member of the Economic Organization, just like Baden steel manufacturer Willy Korf.

For years Gienow has been fighting the production quotas assigned Kloeckner by the Common Market authorities in Brussels. "The commission's problem in setting quotas was whether it should provoke a battle with the French Republic and the giant Thyssen Company or us," he reasons. High interest rates (cost in 1980--258 million marks) were such a severe blow to Kloeckner that in May 1980 Gienow was left with only a capital cut with subsequent refunding. That put 230 million marks in his treasury, but in the opinion of experts, this was just enough to last one more year. Then it would be over for Kloeckner. "Those who are declared dead," Gienow rejects all prophecies of doom and recommends, "You can conclude from my calm what our profit situation is." After January's price increase he is going to be in the black again. A rationalization program will save him 300 million marks a year. "It is not so easy to come up with something else to improve," Gienow says in praise of the structure of his company and therefore is not looking for a partner at the moment.

However, Ernst Pieper, 52, head of the Salzgitter concern (2.7 billion marks in steel sales, 16,000 employees) shows tremendous need for support. He desired the partnership with Hoesch and Krupp Steel because his business seems too small to him for real rationalization. But his marriage proposal was ignored. Therefore, Pieper has to plan his survival without a partner. He already knows how. "We are going to bring in a business consultant--McKinsey or someone like that--and will correct old errors." Processing and finishing are his priorities. The Salzgitter boss sees the consequences as follows: "There will be parallel investments of hundreds of millions of marks."

The course of the next ruinous competition has been determined.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

DELORS INTERVIEWED ON 'BRAKE ON HIGH SALARIES'

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 4 Dec 81 pp 108-109

[Interview with Jacques Delors, minister of economy and finance, by Noel-Jean Bergeroux and Patrick Arnoux, date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] In your opinion, will the purchasing power of professionals be maintained in 1982?

[Answer] If economic growth surpasses 2.5 percent, it should be possible to maintain the purchasing power of the vast majority of professionals, except for those with very high salaries. However, the priority of our economic and social policy remains to preserve, on the average, the purchasing power of salaried employees. Growth surpluses and gains in productivity should be divided among financing investments, creating new jobs, and raising low salaries.

[Question] Do you favor tightening up the range of salaries by curbing, or even freezing, high salaries?

[Answer] For the time being, measures limiting the nominal increase of high salaries would, in my opinion, be welcome. Society cannot be changed by decree in this area. I remain staunchly in favor of contractual policy. If, during this or that salary negotiation, the unions discuss tightening up the salary structure with management, then they should come to an agreement among themselves. But these annual boardroom discussions, too infrequent in the private sector, should be based on an overall policy: salary structure and associated benefits, possibilities of internal promotion, work conditions and duration, and employment and training policy.

[Question] Today the professionals' mood is more one of discontent than consensus, isn't it?

[Answer] Let me point out first that professionals were equally unhappy during the preceding administration. This is an attitude, a concern that has several facets. The present financial system seems unjust to them. Professionals have the impression that non-salaried individuals don't pay as much tax as they do. I have always thought it necessary, at equal levels of responsibility and comparability of work, to ensure that non-salaried individuals pay the same tax as salaried workers. The budget minister's goal is to clarify this question. Once this is done, professionals will be able to concentrate on their own problems. Unlike what is happening in other

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European societies, a worker in France can have a good salary, a very interesting job, and a high social standing. In our firms the management structure is thicker, that is, denser, than in other countries. In those countries professionals, of course, have possibilities of promotion in an interesting job, but the connection with the social standing hierarchy and such high salaries is looser than in France. In other countries, by the way, professionals pay higher taxes than in France. Some of these countries have even gone too far, and have established withholdings that were too high and that have discouraged some professionals. We have not reached that point.

[Question] The risk of discouraging French professionals doesn't worry you?

[Answer] Yes, it does. I am very aware of management psychology, even beyond that given by union organizations. Their vehemence sometimes seems to me to be removed from reality--personality rivalry notwithstanding--but I know French professionals well. A small proportion of them think too much of themselves because they went to the well-known schools, but the majority started out very modestly. They have benefitted from the breathing room economic growth provided. They also have the feeling that they deserve a relatively high salary, an interesting job, and everyone's esteem.

The path towards greater social justice, towards greater equality through a different division of responsibilities, must take place with their agreement and not against their wishes or with indifference towards their feelings. Those who would do otherwise would be making a big mistake. Professionals must be fully involved in the changes. During my last meeting with the unions I proposed, with the agreement of the minister of labor, a series of round table discussions to examine these issues in depth. I am against excessive elitism in French society, but eight out of ten professionals are not a product of this elitism.

[Question] You have proposed new rules for salary policy. Aren't they inflationary?

[Answer] The idea is simple. A first step can be taken by going from a price increase of 14 percent to one of 10 percent, which can be done just by an effort of collective temperance. The prevalent skepticism, caused both by past political failures, including those of Raymond Barre, and by generalized indexing, which guarantees your purchasing power no matter what happens, must be overcome. No one feels involved or concerned by the fight against inflation; behavior will have to change. We have to show that you can live better at 10 percent than at 14 percent, and prices should set the example. I hope that we will see a slackening in the rate of price increases as early as the fourth quarter of 1981, and that this will continue steadily and gradually until a level around 10 percent is reached. This will not prevent us from attacking the structural causes of inflation at the same time. But during this slow-down phase of nominal movements we are suggesting a contract for salaried workers, by offering them an advantage to offset this new experience: salaries will not catch up with prices, but there will be an advance estimated on the basis of an annual price rise of 10 percent. And twice a year we will make adjustments, thanks to a protection clause. Salaried workers will have nothing to lose and they will be assured of keeping their purchasing power. However, this new policy must be tried within the framework of free salary negotiations. Its



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success depends primarily on the mood of contractual policy. Unlike my predecessors, I am not making any startling announcements about the standards to aim for, and much less about the goals.

The ball is on management and labor's side. Union or management organizations cannot agree with one hand, and refuse to sign with the other; this would demonstrate their hostility towards freedom of salary negotiation and towards contractual policy. I would call on public opinion as my witness, so that everyone's responsibilities would be well defined.

[Question] How do you envisage the concrete application of this new method?

[Answer] Agreements will be signed in each firm. In France, the CNPF [National Council of French Employers], which is always so prompt to denounce state intervention, is still waiting for public firms to set an example.

In this respect I am happy to note that this new salary and social program was the basis for negotiations held at the SNCF [French National Railroad Company] and the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System]. The results that were obtained are encouraging from three points of view: a positive change within the unions, which previously have rebelled against this type of agreement; but, in accordance with their wishes, a widening of the field of discussion to areas not covered until now; and prudence of the criteria retained for the nominal advance in salaries, accompanied by the protection clause. These first steps are very encouraging. I hope that labor and management will use them as a foundation in other areas and in the maximum number of firms, where negotiation and contracts should be the rule for new social relations.

This withdrawal cure must be done gradually. It would be best to initiate the 1981 adjustment this coming 1 January and expect the first advance around 1 March so that the system doesn't cause any telescoping.

[Question] Does the INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] index seem to you to be a good measure of price increase at the present time?

[Answer] Frankly, the scientific quality of this index is admired by experts the world over. If, for reasons of trust between labor and management and the state, it seemed necessary to discuss it technically, I wouldn't be opposed to it. But it is very well done. Of course, the day will come when it will have to be updated. It is in our interest not to mix apples and oranges: on the one hand a perfectly clear index established by independent experts (INSEE); and on the other hand, discussions on income, salaries, and purchasing power, which are conducted equally clearly on the basis of objective data from the economy and from firms' performances.

[Question] You stated you were in favor of a pause in the announcement of reforms. In your opinion, does this pause jeopardize financial or national health service reforms?

[Answer] Not at all. I simply said that we should, through patient work, initiate three structural reforms: expansion of the public sector and, based on this, an industrial policy and a reform of our credit system; decentralization, which aims

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to "put democracy within hand's reach"; and the implementation of an active employment policy (solidarity contracts, job sharing, flexibility in the job market, professional and social integration of youth...). Here are three exciting tasks for attacking the challenges of the new industrial revolution and the basic disease of unemployment, and for promoting a better division of responsibility. This will not prevent us from adopting our fiscal policies (starting with the professional tax) and the national health service structure in order to improve it gradually and fundamentally. That is the role of a government action which is careful to explain future directions and to determine precise rules of the game.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

POSSIBLE SPD CHANCELLOR CANDIDATES ASSESSED

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jan 82 pp 16-17

[Article by Martin Bernstorff: "Alternative Service"]

[Text] Ever since the chancellor's heart ailment became known, the coalition parties have been focusing on the crucial question of a successor. Only the FDP has a real candidate to offer: Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Last September, Helmut Schmidt cheerfully called his own state of health "terrifyingly good." He was feeling "so well that it would have to terrify Mr Kohl."

But 3 weeks later it was not Helmut Kohl who was terrified. The chancellor, in mortal danger for a brief period of time it seems, was taken to a hospital where doctors implanted a heart pacemaker.

3 weeks before he collapsed, he had said he was likely to run for chancellor again in 1984. "And if I do run again," he said, "the CDU/CSU will once again lose the election."

In the meantime, the pollsters find that only 33 percent of the population would vote for the SPD, if elections were held next Sunday. Since he cannot be elected directly, the chancellor would hardly be able to close the wide gap between this low popularity rating and an absolute majority for the coalition—in spite of the still high esteem in which he personally is held.

Schmidt's uncertain state of health and the poor SPD ratings have given rise to lively speculation in Bonn. There are two basic scenarios: The chancellor might resign during this legislative session, that is prior to the 1984 elections, for health reasons or because he has lost his taste for running the government. (It has, in fact, almost become customary for him to announce his resignation.) Or, he does run again in 1984 but resigns his post soon thereafter.

Both scenarios are predicated on the assumption that the coalition will hold, that the SPD (and the liberals) will win the 1984 election again and will be called upon to head the government. Speculations which are not as urgent center around the question of a new SPD candidate for chancellor in case the coalition breaks up and the SPD leaves the government.

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For years, this issue did not seem to be a problem. Time and again at least one of the leading SPD politicians was being touted as a successor to Schmidt. And this even while the chancellor appeared to be in good health and certainly in good spirits—the chips were not down by any stretch of the imagination. Now that the chips almost were down, no one of "chancellor caliber" is sitting on the bench. Schmidt's political foster son Hans Apel has incurred the wrath of the left wing of the party not only because of mismanagement of the financing arrangements for the "Tornado" super-fighter but also, most likely, because of his unconditional allegiance to NATO. Ever since the left wingers booed him in Hamburg's St James church he no longer qualifies as a compromise candidate the entire party might agree on. For some time, former minister of justice Hans-Jochen Vogel figured to be the secret top choice after Schmidt. But now that Vogel obeyed the party's call to go to Berlin in order to save the SPD cause as lord mayor and lost the election instead, he no longer has much appeal, either.

That leaves Hans Matthoefer among those most often mentioned. Chances are, he would be Schmidt's first choice at this time. The fact that the finance minister could be identified with the series of budget deficits running into the billions does not bother the chancellor, who shares this political responsibility, very much. For that matter, he is impressed with the elegant way in which Matthoefer manages to describe ever new budget shortfalls as the most natural occurrences in the world.

There is only one person who speaks against Matthoefer as a successor to Schmidt and that is Matthoefer himself. Like Schmidt, he suffers from arrhythmia occasionally. And he says he wants to be a good finance minister and nothing else. But what he does not mention is that he would hate to lead the SPD as chancellor to certain defeat in the 1984 election (as things look today). The intensive search for a successor to the chancellor becomes all the more difficult once the three men mentioned drop out of the race. The few Laender still governed by the SPD boast of almost no reserve personnel. In Hesse, upright Holger Boerner has aroused the ire of all left wingers. In Bremen, Hans Koschnick has been cutting a rather weak figure as head of the city government. Hamburg is burned out to such an extent that Bonn had to send in lord mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi to try to put out the fire.

That leaves only one strong SPD bastion: North Rhine-Westphalia whose minister president Johannes Rau is beginning to look like the party's last hope by now—or rather is being touted as such. To be sure, Rau, too, has a budget deficit which runs into the billions and Duesseldorf opposition leader Kurt Biedenkopf is saying that he does not have "a clear view of things." But most recently, Rau has developed into a jovial popular leader, a kind of bargain basement Willy Brandt.

In Bonn, most social democrats speak well of Rau. Party chairman Brandt likes him for reasons of elective affinity. Party manager Peter Glotz—who is smarter than all the other "candidates" but has not acquired enough stature as yet—sings the praises of "Hannes who can tell a joke better than anyone." Hannes as a model of integration—he could be a consensus chancellor but does he already have enough expertise to hold down such a job?

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At any rate, coming directly from the chancellor's hospital room, he was received by Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin last October. For that matter, Rau has a lot of foreign travel behind him. "He would certainly do as well as Kohl under any circumstances," a Bonn SPD functionary says. But, as in Matthoefer's case, he himself puts the brakes on speculation. Rau, who is described by members of the cabinet as "anti-work but a hard drinker," does not want the job of chancellor.

Or at least not yet. Rau, too, can see a country-wide SPD election defeat coming in 1984. For himself, he is hoping for a kind of SPD "restitution victory" in North Rhine-Westphalia one year later. With that under his belt, he would—with more experience—no doubt want to unseat the CDU/CSU government in 1988. By that time, Rau would likely have become SPD chairman—which is said to be what Willy Brandt would like to see—and could at long last reunite both posts in one man. The point being that it was Schmidt's mistake never to have sought the chairmanship.

Understandably, Johannes Rau would not want to destroy this well-laid plan by an unnecessary early start. On the other hand, Rau could hardly turn the party down, if it called out to him in greatest need. If such an emergency did arise, the party might have to overlook a great many things. It might have to swallow hard and accept someone like Apel or Vogel in the end. Whatever reservations might now apply, a decision would have to be made in a real-life setting the actual features of which cannot be foreseen by anyone.

No matter what the circumstances were under which the chancellor would have to be replaced, the FDP would play its role having tied its participation in the government to Helmut Schmidt personally. And so, on that fateful day the two party chairmen Brandt and Genscher might sit down together and agree, for the sake of holding on to the coalition, that one of them would have to bear the cross. And if the SPD would tolerate it—Hans-Dietrich Genscher would not hesitate for a second to assume the post of chancellor.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

POLL EXAMINES ATTITUDES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Paris LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 81 pp 11-13

[Report on a French Public Opinion Institute-LATITUDE exclusive poll: "The French People and Foreign Policy," based on questions asked of 2,059 persons, 18 years old and over, from 15 to 22 September 1981]

[Text] Worry over the American monetary policy, which comes before Soviet expansionism in the concerns of the French people. Continuation of the preferential ties with the Federal Republic of Germany, whose chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, is regarded as "the most likable" of the three NATO leaders. Rapprochement with the Third-World countries, especially the ones in Africa or Latin America.

These three main topics of the exclusive IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute]-LATITUDE poll--"The French People and Foreign Policy"--should comfort Francois Mitterrand in his analysis of international problems. They are, in fact, an outright approval of the policy being conducted by the president of the Republic since 25 May, going back, from this point of view, to the sources of Gaullism.

At the start, a remark. This poll offers a new fact: the French people are much more concerned over international problems than is sometimes said. And they are more aware. A small third of the persons polled did not pronounce themselves on France's bilateral relations with a given nation. But only 17 percent find no special concern among the three proposed concerns.

East-West Relations: Partisan Divisions Predominating

France is in no way safe from the neutralist temptation whose manifestations, violent at times on the other side of the Rhine, are being observed at present. Of the persons interviewed by the IFOP, 43 percent believe, in fact, that America's monetary policy is more dangerous than Soviet expansionism. Only 24 percent make the opposite choice. On the other hand, the yellow peril causes little worry: 16 percent of the persons polled place Japan's economic policy at the head of the perils.

United States President Ronald Reagan reaps personally the unpopularity of his interest rates: only 29 percent of the French people find him more likable than Helmut Schmidt. At the same time, almost one Frenchman out of two (41 percent) believes that Franco-American relations should be more independent.

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But the attitude of the French people with regard to the United States--or as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union--is not uniform. On the other questions (relations with Germany or the Third World), a real consensus that disregards partisan differences emerges, as will be seen. On the other hand, the nature of the East-West relations is perceived differently depending on the domestic partisan options.

Thus, Soviet military policy worries 39 percent of the UDF [French Democratic Union] voters and 32 percent of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] voters, compared with 18 percent of the socialists and 7 percent of the communists. As a consequence: 52 percent of the followers of Giscard d'Estaing (but only 42 percent of the Gaullist voters) believe it necessary to strengthen France's ties with the United States. And half the opposition voters (RPR, 54 percent; UDF, 49 percent) want France's policy with regard to the Soviet Union to be more independent. On the other hand, more than half the majority voters (PS, 52 percent; PCF, 56 percent) want a little distance to be placed between France and Uncle Sam. In the opinion of 46 percent of the communists, the USSR would even become a completely suitable replacement.

Depending on whether you are a communist or a follower of Giscard, a socialist or a follower of Jacques Chirac, the eyes of Chimene [heroine of Corneille's "Le Cid"] will gleam on America or on Russia. On the other hand, the gaze is less passionate--or, at least, passion is common to a whole people--when we come back to Western Europe or when we take off for the poor countries.

## Continuation of the Franco-German Axis

It is known that Francois Mitterrand, as head of the French opposition, did not have the best relations with Helmut Schmidt. Since his election, on the other hand, he has continued and even developed the ties between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The French people approve him enthusiastically. Franco-German relations, regarded as very satisfactory by one Frenchman out of two, should be strengthened. Even the Gaullist voters appear to advocate this agreement (64 percent), but the communists do not lag behind (51 percent). And by an overwhelming majority, they consecrate the West German chancellor as the most likable chief of state.

## Relations With the Third World: Between Generosity and Commercialism

The chapter of France's relations with the Third-World countries seems marked by several contradictory feelings. First of all, pardon. The rancor created by de-colonization and especially the Algerian War seems to be softening with time. In fact, almost one Frenchman out of two wants ties with the Maghreb to be strengthened.

Second feeling: generosity. Over half of the persons polled want cooperation to be developed with the countries of Latin America, Africa and India. This feeling is more pronounced among socialist and communist voters.

Finally, the import of France's economic interests is not absent from answers by the persons polled. This was already perceived in the concern with regard to American economic policy. It is still more noticeable in the desire to see our

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relations with the Arab oil-producing countries strengthened. Half of the persons questioned (slightly fewer Giscard followers) want to see ties with the Persian Gulf developed and improved.

Final remark: the relative indifference displayed with regard to countries as different as Japan, Iran (45 percent of the persons polled did not express an opinion on relations with the country of the ayatollahs), or even Israel. With regard to Israel, a third of the persons polled believe that relations are satisfactory, a third want to improve them and a third are indifferent about them.

Therefore, three lessons to be drawn from a reading of this IFOP-LATITUDE poll. A certain amount of interest in foreign problems, requiring increased information by the citizens. LATITUDE will apply itself to that, without demagoguery or jargon. A great concern over economic matters: the tie between outside causes and domestic causes is, therefore, established in apprehension over the economic crisis. Finally a desire to see France make the voice of the poorer countries heard.

Question: For each of the following different countries or groups of countries, do you think that the relations maintained with them by France should be improved, or do you think that these relations are satisfactory at present? [Key: 1. overall; 2. Left Radical Movement; 3. improve relations; 4. relations satisfactory; 5. no opinion]

Question: And for each of these groups of countries, do you want France, in its foreign policy, to be more independent toward them, or to strengthen its ties of cooperation?

[Key: 1. overall; 2. Left Radical Movement; 3. more independent; 4. strengthen its ties; 5. no opinion]

## The French People and the Great Powers

| (1)                          |            |        |          |          |          | (2)                      |            |        |          |          |          |
|------------------------------|------------|--------|----------|----------|----------|--------------------------|------------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
|                              | ENSEMBLE % | P.C. % | PS/MRG % | R.P.R. % | U.D.F. % |                          | ENSEMBLE % | P.C. % | PS/MRG % | R.P.R. % | U.D.F. % |
| <b>UNITED STATES:</b>        |            |        |          |          |          | <b>UNITED STATES:</b>    |            |        |          |          |          |
| (3) Améliorer les relations  | 40         | 36     | 41       | 50       | 55       | (3) Plus indépendante    | 41         | 56     | 52       | 37       | 31       |
| (4) Relations satisfaisantes | 40         | 49     | 47       | 36       | 33       | (4) Renforce ses liens   | 35         | 29     | 32       | 42       | 52       |
| (5) Ne se prononcent pas     | 20         | 15     | 12       | 14       | 12       | (5) Ne se prononcent pas | 24         | 15     | 16       | 21       | 17       |
|                              | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |                          | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |
| <b>CHINA:</b>                |            |        |          |          |          | <b>CHINA:</b>            |            |        |          |          |          |
| ● Améliorer les relations    | 41         | 53     | 49       | 44       | 43       | ● Plus indépendante      | 27         | 32     | 26       | 28       | 28       |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes   | 27         | 23     | 28       | 29       | 34       | ● Renforce ses liens     | 38         | 43     | 46       | 45       | 40       |
| — Ne se prononcent pas       | 32         | 24     | 23       | 27       | 23       | — Ne se prononcent pas   | 35         | 25     | 28       | 27       | 32       |
|                              | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |                          | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |
| <b>USSR:</b>                 |            |        |          |          |          | <b>USSR:</b>             |            |        |          |          |          |
| ● Améliorer les relations    | 37         | 51     | 43       | 38       | 34       | ● Plus indépendante      | 43         | 35     | 44       | 54       | 49       |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes   | 33         | 28     | 37       | 38       | 35       | ● Renforce ses liens     | 26         | 46     | 31       | 24       | 24       |
| — Ne se prononcent pas       | 30         | 21     | 20       | 24       | 31       | — Ne se prononcent pas   | 31         | 19     | 25       | 22       | 27       |
|                              | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |                          | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |

## The French People and Europe

| (1)                        |            |        |          |          |          | (2)                    |            |        |          |          |          |
|----------------------------|------------|--------|----------|----------|----------|------------------------|------------|--------|----------|----------|----------|
|                            | ENSEMBLE % | P.C. % | PS/MRG % | R.P.R. % | U.D.F. % |                        | ENSEMBLE % | P.C. % | PS/MRG % | R.P.R. % | U.D.F. % |
| <b>GREAT BRITAIN:</b>      |            |        |          |          |          | <b>GREAT BRITAIN:</b>  |            |        |          |          |          |
| ● Améliorer les relations  | 46         | 42     | 55       | 54       | 54       | ● Plus indépendante    | 31         | 31     | 32       | 30       | 34       |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes | 33         | 40     | 34       | 28       | 33       | ● Renforce ses liens   | 43         | 47     | 50       | 49       | 46       |
| — Ne se prononcent pas     | 21         | 18     | 11       | 18       | 13       | — Ne se prononcent pas | 26         | 22     | 18       | 21       | 20       |
|                            | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |                        | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |
| <b>WEST GERMANY</b>        |            |        |          |          |          | <b>WEST GERMANY</b>    |            |        |          |          |          |
| ● Améliorer les relations  | 32         | 26     | 35       | 35       | 43       | ● Plus indépendante    | 23         | 29     | 24       | 18       | 23       |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes | 45         | 54     | 53       | 49       | 38       | ● Renforce ses liens   | 50         | 51     | 57       | 64       | 57       |
| — Ne se prononcent pas     | 23         | 20     | 12       | 16       | 19       | — Ne se prononcent pas | 27         | 20     | 19       | 18       | 20       |
|                            | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |                        | 100        | 100    | 100      | 100      | 100      |

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## The French People and the Thrid World

| THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES<br>(India, Pakistan)             | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|--|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Améliorer les relations .....                        | 52            | 61        | 62          | 58          | 45          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes .....                       | 18            | 19        | 18          | 19          | 25          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 30            | 20        | 20          | 23          | 30          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES                               |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Améliorer les relations .....                        | 47            | 58        | 53          | 51          | 44          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes .....                       | 19            | 16        | 21          | 17          | 24          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 34            | 26        | 26          | 32          | 32          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| BLACK AFRICAN COUNTRIES                                |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Améliorer les relations .....                        | 47            | 57        | 56          | 50          | 44          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes .....                       | 26            | 24        | 26          | 28          | 30          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 27            | 19        | 18          | 22          | 26          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES<br>(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Améliorer les relations .....                        | 42            | 49        | 50          | 41          | 43          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes .....                       | 30            | 29        | 33          | 36          | 29          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 28            | 22        | 17          | 23          | 28          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

| THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES<br>(India, Pakistan)             | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|--|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Plus indépendante .....                              | 20            | 21        | 17          | 16          | 23          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....                             | 47            | 59        | 57          | 57          | 39          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 33            | 20        | 26          | 27          | 36          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES                               |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Plus indépendante .....                              | 22            | 21        | 23          | 19          | 24          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....                             | 42            | 56        | 48          | 50          | 35          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 36            | 23        | 29          | 31          | 41          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| BLACK AFRICAN COUNTRIES                                |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Plus indépendante .....                              | 22            | 21        | 22          | 18          | 28          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....                             | 45            | 57        | 56          | 54          | 39          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 33            | 22        | 22          | 28          | 33          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES<br>(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Plus indépendante .....                              | 27            | 27        | 27          | 28          | 33          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....                             | 40            | 50        | 50          | 43          | 36          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....                           | 33            | 23        | 23          | 29          | 31          |
|  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

## The French People and the Trouble Spots

| ISRAEL                           | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Améliorer les relations .....  | 36            | 40        | 41          | 43          | 42          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes ..... | 29            | 33        | 35          | 28          | 27          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....     | 35            | 27        | 24          | 29          | 31          |
|                                  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| POLAND                           |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Améliorer les relations .....  | 46            | 58        | 52          | 55          | 49          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes ..... | 28            | 27        | 31          | 28          | 29          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....     | 26            | 15        | 17          | 17          | 22          |
|                                  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| IRAN                             |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Améliorer les relations .....  | 30            | 38        | 33          | 37          | 23          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes ..... | 24            | 32        | 28          | 23          | 25          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas .....     | 45            | 30        | 39          | 40          | 52          |
|                                  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

| ISRAEL                       | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Plus indépendante .....    | 29            | 39        | 29          | 28          | 27          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....   | 34            | 34        | 39          | 38          | 40          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 38            | 27        | 32          | 34          | 33          |
|                              | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| POLAND                       |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Plus indépendante .....    | 20            | 21        | 17          | 19          | 23          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....   | 46            | 57        | 55          | 53          | 48          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 34            | 22        | 28          | 28          | 29          |
|                              | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |
| IRAN                         |               |           |             |             |             |
| ● Plus indépendante .....    | 42            | 48        | 48          | 47          | 49          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....   | 17            | 27        | 17          | 18          | 16          |
| — Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 41            | 25        | 35          | 35          | 35          |
|                              | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

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## The French People and the "Nouveau-riche" Countries

| JAPAN                            | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Améliorer les relations .....  | 36            | 38        | 41          | 39          | 40          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes ..... | 34            | 41        | 36          | 37          | 35          |
| - Ne se prononcent pas .....     | 30            | 21        | 23          | 24          | 25          |
|                                  | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

  

| JAPAN                        | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Plus indépendante .....    | 36            | 36        | 41          | 40          | 36          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....   | 31            | 37        | 35          | 32          | 36          |
| - Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 33            | 27        | 24          | 28          | 28          |
|                              | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

  

| ARAB OIL-<br>PRODUCING<br>COUNTRIES | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Améliorer les relations .....     | 47            | 49        | 49          | 55          | 53          |
| ● Relations satisfaisantes .....    | 28            | 32        | 34          | 27          | 25          |
| - Ne se prononcent pas .....        | 25            | 19        | 17          | 18          | 22          |
|                                     | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

  

| ARAB OIL-<br>PRODUCING<br>COUNTRIES | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Plus indépendante .....           | 32            | 34        | 34          | 27          | 38          |
| ● Renforce ses liens .....          | 40            | 50        | 46          | 49          | 40          |
| - Ne se prononcent pas .....        | 28            | 16        | 20          | 24          | 22          |
|                                     | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

Question: The following are three concerns for French policy: Japan and its economic policy, the USSR and its defense policy, the United States and its monetary policy on interest rates (rise in the dollar). Which one seems to you to be of most concern to France?

[Key: 1. The United States and its monetary policy; 2. the USSR and its defense policy; 3. Japan and its economic policy; 4. no opinion]

Question: Of the following three leaders who are France's principal allies, Ronald Reagan, Helmut Schmidt, Margaret Thatcher, which is the one whose personality is most likable to you?

[Key: 1. no opinion]

|                                | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Les États-Unis et leur       |               |           |             |             |             |
| (1) politique monétaire .....  | 43            | 66        | 53          | 38          | 30          |
| ● L'URSS et sa politique       |               |           |             |             |             |
| (2) de défense .....           | 24            | 7         | 18          | 32          | 39          |
| (3) Le Japon et sa politique   |               |           |             |             |             |
| économique .....               | 16            | 14        | 20          | 19          | 19          |
| (4) Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 17            | 13        | 9           | 11          | 12          |
|                                | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

  

|                                | ENSEMBLE<br>% | P.C.<br>% | PS/MRG<br>% | R.P.R.<br>% | U.D.F.<br>% |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| ● Helmut Schmidt .....         | 43            | 55        | 56          | 48          | 48          |
| ● Ronald Reagan .....          | 29            | 17        | 23          | 40          | 39          |
| ● Margaret Thatcher .....      | 5             | 3         | 5           | 4           | 1           |
| (1) Ne se prononcent pas ..... | 23            | 25        | 16          | 8           | 12          |
|                                | 100           | 100       | 100         | 100         | 100         |

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

ALLEGED PLOTTING BEHIND 'MANIFESTO OF THE 100' DESCRIBED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Dec 81 pp 36-39

[Text] The civilians and military officers who secretly plotted the abortive 23 February coup d'etat and attempted another uprising on 23 June, the day before the king's birthday (See CAMBIO 16, No 503) are also behind the "Manifesto of the 100," the manifesto signed by 100 commissioned and noncommissioned army officers and published early this month. Under the pretext of protesting an alleged press campaign against the Armed Forces, the manifesto glorifies the coup plotters who are awaiting court-martial.

One of the individuals most active in all this plotting, the elderly Jose Antonio Giron de Velasco, a former Franco minister and president of the National Confederation of Combatants, met for a 3-hour lunch with a group of manifesto signers 2 days before it was published.

According to military secret service and police sources, at the luncheon "they put the finishing touches on the manifesto and decided what strategy to pursue so that it would be reported as widely as possible by the national press."

In the event that no paper wanted to publish the document, according to same sources, Giron de Velasco promised to publish it in EL ALCAZAR, the pro-coup, anticonstitution and antimonarchy paper whose Board of Directors Giron heads.

Their luncheon meeting over, Giron de Velasco returned to his house in Madrid, ordered his bags packed and unexpectedly headed for his vacation home in Fuengirola. He was supposed to leave 3 days later.

The lunch at which they decided on their strategy for the manifesto's publication took place on Wednesday the second at a restaurant in the old section of Madrid, decorated with bullfighting motifs and specializing in typical Spanish stew.

Present at the lunch in addition to Giron de Velasco were Commander Ricardo Saenz de Inestrillas and Lt Col Jose Medina Gonzalez, both of whom have been linked in police investigations to the organization that planned

the unsuccessful coup d'etat on 23 June. Col Luis Sicre Canut, whom the police have linked to the same network of coup plotters (see CAMBIO 16, Nos 499, 502 and 503) had announced that he would be there but at the last moment decided not to show up.

Four of the signers of the "Manifiesto of the 100," including Infantry Capt Ignacio Gasca Quintin, were present, however.

The anti-coup squad, which had been waiting for this luncheon get-together for a week, was unable to record the conversations of the presumed coup plotters or to photograph them. Capt Gasca Quintin, who specialized in surveillance and countersurveillance techniques while a member of the National Police, spotted, as soon as he got to the restaurant, the camouflaged car from which two police agents were trying to operate their cameras and record what they were saying with directional microphones.

Since the car's cover had been blown, some other policemen tried to dine at the same restaurant, but the owner, whom EL ALCAZAR wants to pay homage to, refused them a table.

Considered a "nest of fascists" by the police, which is why it was attacked early last July, the restaurant did not serve a single drink until Giron de Velasco and his companions left. In spite of everything, the anti-coup squad knew the substance of their conversation at lunch 24 hours later.

At the IMEC [Military Instruction of the Complement List]

It was learned, for example, that the document had been drafted a week before by a high-ranking officer of Military Instruction of the Complement List, at the offices of Military Headquarters in Madrid.

The man who inspired the manifesto, however, was not this officer but Col Jose Ignacio San Martin, 54, an intelligence expert, former staff commander of Brunete Armored Division 1 and one of the officers implicated in the abortive 23 February coup d'etat; with whom the ranking IMEC officer met frequently during the time the manifesto was being drawn up. San Martin denies this.

By chance, one of the signers of the document is 30-year old Infantry Capt Jose San Martin Naya, Colonel San Martin's son, who had been stationed at the Madrid district IMEC until a short time ago.

The document was not, however, published as Colonel San Martin and the ranking IMEC officer drafted it. Government and police sources feel that it was redrafted by a group of attorneys defending the 23 February coup plotters at an office on General Martinez Campos Street in Madrid.

Blas Pinar Lopez, the leader of New Force and a notary, and his son, Blas Pinar Gutierrez, an infantry captain of class 27 who is also stationed at the IMEC and is a practicing attorney, have their offices in this building.

#### DIARIO 16 and EL PAIS Attacked

In the opinion of the police, the manifesto was not supposed to be a wild, slanted attack on the press, which is what it seems to be on first reading. Instead, it represents an underhanded defense of the arguments of the 23 February coup plotters, for whom the 100 signatory commissioned and non-commissioned officers show absolute veneration in certain paragraphs. As far as the signers are concerned, the coup plotters are the Armed Forces.

The sponsors of the manifesto, including Capts Rogelio Gonzalez Anradas, Blas Pinar Gutierrez, Enrique Gonzalez Mateos, Juan Canadas Lorenzo and Jose Lorenzo Esperante, all of whom were suspended in their posts this past 11 December, hoped that at least 90 percent of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Armed Forces would sign the document.

Another aim of the document signers was to call for the closure of the papers DIARIO 16 and EL PAIS, which extremist factions of the Armed Forces accuse of waging a campaign against the military.

This contrasts with the strong pressure that military groups have been putting on the government to prevent the closure of the paper EL ALCAZAR, which has been characterized over the past 2 years by its abject, ongoing adulation of ultraconservative factions in the Armed Forces in the bid for a military coup against our freedoms.

#### The Lower Rungs of the Ladder

When Defense Minister Alberto Oliart asked several commanders whether it would be a good idea to close down the mouthpiece of the Combatants and the people who are nostalgic for Franco, they pointed out that it was not necessary to close EL ALCAZAR, and some of them, as EL ALCAZAR maliciously noted, wanted to know why the question referred only to the mouthpiece of the National Brotherhood of Combatants.

The government had been aware that the manifesto was in the works 10 days before it was published. In late November it had detected several meetings between commissioned and noncommissioned officers from the Recruit Instruction Center (CIR) at Colmenar Viejo and IMEC Capts Blas Pinar Gutierrez and Ignacio Gasca Quintin to discuss the manifesto.

At one of these meetings Captains Pinar and Gasca made it known that the manifesto had been drawn up with an eye towards having it signed by the rank-and-file of the Armed Forces, in other words, the youngest commissioned and noncommissioned officers who had not fought in the Civil War.

With this they were attempting to demonstrate that there was a single Armed Forces philosophy and that both the commissioned and noncommissioned officers who had not taken part in the Civil War and the colonels and generals who had shared the same concerns and were opposed to the democratic system.

#### The Military Speaks

According to the statements of its sponsors to the anti-coup squad, the document had been drawn up with an eye towards having it signed by at least 30,000 soldiers. They expected at least 1,000 signatures in the Colmenar Viejo CIR alone.

To achieve this they needed a catalyst that would force the great majority of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the Armed Forces to sign the document en masse. And according to the statements of its sponsors, the catalyst was publication of the manifesto in the press, along with the signatures of 100 commissioned and noncommissioned officers, plus as much coverage as possible.

Around the time that these investigations were under way, the anti-coup squad, which is headed up by Police Capt Emilio Sanchez, got wind of some revealing remarks by Commander Saenz de Ynestrillas to a comrade of his who wanted to sign the manifesto.

"You can't sign now, because only 100 or so are going to," Ynestrillas said. "I think that we're talking about the people on the lower rungs of the ladder, up to the sixth, and you're on the eighth, understand?"

At the time the manifesto was limited to the Colmenar Viejo CIR, where its sponsors hoped to obtain the first 100 signatures. The Defense Ministry sent a commander to tell the CIR colonel that the signature-gathering had to stop.

The colonel who commands the Colmenar Viejo CIR immediately met with the commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the orderly rooms and told them in no uncertain terms about the instructions he had received. The command had informed him that signatures were being gathered for a petition that was also supposed to appear in the press. The commissioned and non-commissioned officers under his command knew perfectly well that group petitions within the Armed Forces filed outside of prescribed channels constituted a serious violation of discipline that was banned by the Royal Ordinances and severely punishable under the Military Justice Code.

The reaction of Colmenar CIR commissioned and noncommissioned officers at the time was total support for their superior and compliance with regulations.

The CIR colonel reported the matter to the commander of Madrid, Guillermo Quintana Lacacci, and the top brass felt that the issue was closed and that no further importance had to be attached to the manifesto. Defense Minister

Alberto Oliart himself, who was kept posted on the matter, spent the first weekend of the month away from Madrid, which indicated that things were calm in the Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, the first week of December was rife with developments in the military. Two days before, on 30 November, Infantry Capt Lorenzo Fernandez Navarro commanded a Military Police unit against a legal demonstration in La Coruna; on 2 December, Capt Ignacio Urruticoechea declared himself pro-ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty], and two officers from the Vicalvaro 11 Artillery Regiment were involved in an incident in a town outside Madrid that same day.

All of these incidents, which were reported in the press, were misrepresented by the sponsors of the manifesto as a campaign against the Armed Forces. The situation, which had been regarded as under control 24 hours before, got out of hand again on 2 December when the top commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the Brunete 1 Armored Division placed their signatures at the foot of the document.

#### Call for Order

Vigorous action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prevented the massive support that the sponsors of the manifesto were hoping for. On 6 December, the 100 signers of the document were disciplined with 15 days preventive custody, and 5 of the sponsors were removed from their posts and placed on call.

Subsequently, Cavalry Lt Col Tomas Almazan Lastieri, who had been stationed in Salamanca, was also removed for having signed the manifesto.

The final episode in the "Manifesto of the 100" story was the 2-hour meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the king on Friday 11 December.

Juan Carlos, who had been on a trip to several Arab countries when the manifesto was published, received the joint chiefs and after bringing himself up to date on the situation in the Armed Forces, issued a "call for order" and discipline in the military.

Two days later, the army chief of staff, Jose Gabeiras Montero, summoned the commander of the Canary Islands, Jesus Gonzalez del Yerro, to Madrid.

General Gonzalez del Yerro's name had appeared often in the papers the previous month in connection with rumors about a possible caretaker government headed by him, after a series of meetings in early November in Madrid.

The meetings had been organized by individuals linked with pro-coup groups. Attorney Antonio Garcia Lopez was also involved in these contacts with Oscar Alzaga y Osorio. Their idea was to "create" a new leader in the Armed Forces so that a coup would come easier. In all his public statements, however, Gonzalez del Yerro has declared himself a constitutionalist and loyal to the crown.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

MILITARY, REPORTERS MEET TO DISCUSS DIFFERENCES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Dec 81 pp 36, 37

[Text] As some 50 journalists attentively looked on, Gen Juan Cano Hevia raised his glass and said: Should we propose a toast?

The military officers responded in the affirmative, an answer that as General Cano himself would explain later, reflected the trust, friendship and approval that the representatives of the Armed Forces felt towards the men of the press with whom they had spoken openly for 48 hours about the hottest political, military and journalistic issues of the day.

With the waterfall behind the speakers platform gurgling, they all stood up and drank to the good king, to the constitution, to Spain.

Applause, more toasts, applause. It marked the close of a straight-from-the-shoulder dialogue during which the commanders of the three branches clearly pledged to uphold the constitution. It was an attempt by the commanders to give the newsmen an in-depth look at the internal problems and the workings of the Armed Forces. It is a delicate world inside the "big silent one," as the French have come to call their Armed Forces and as the audience here began to define them.

It was Gen Cano Hevia himself who unhurriedly explained what the silence of the Armed Forces means to society.

"Our society," he said, "is interested in our being somewhat silent."

He was not talking about a news-related silence nor about a deeper, more wideranging silence when he reminded the audience that society has created a body to defend it and has armed it. In this case, if the silence were broken, it could have dangerous consequences for society itself, General Cano explained.

Military Officers and Newsmen

Some 30 ranking commanders, chiefs and officers of the three branches of the Armed Forces and the Civil Guard attended the meeting with about as many newsmen, with General Hevia acting as moderator and discussion leader.



With refreshments for everyone, the military officers voiced their complaints over how certain papers handled a number of news stories about the military, although in spite of repeated requests by the newsmen the officers never got down to naming names.

The purpose of this talk, which was organized by the Defense Ministry, was to "downplay a situation that had been artificially played up," in the words of Gen Cano Hevia. Underlying all of this, however, was what Rear Adm Jesus Salgado Alba ultimately described as follows, with an eye towards the upcoming 23 February trials:

"We are asking for prudence," Rear Admiral Salgado explained, "in order to resolve serious problems, big problems having to do with the security of our country. There are two attitudes towards this, and one of them is to add fuel to the fire."

That was the message, and it was repeated on television ("La Clave") and radio ("Directo...Directo"). Prudence, accurate reporting, no touching the military's sore spot. Upcoming events are significant enough to assume that certain elements and groups are going to add fuel to the fire in an attempt to divide the army.

The military spokesmen came out without reservations in favor of freedom of the press, although at times questions arose that are by their very nature the subject of debate within the media themselves in free nations.

"Have you ever placed limits on your freedom of expression for the sake of a higher good, such as the defense of democracy, for example?" Gen Fernando Rodriguez Ventosa, commander of the Operations Division, asked.

The word that came up at that point was responsibility, the responsibility of the informant and the responsibility of the reporter or analyst.

It was a lively debate, marked by strong disagreement in many instances and by discretion in others, but by the end fears had vanished. One got the feeling that the officers and the newsmen really wanted to tell each other what they thought.

Dissatisfaction with the press? It came out that there obviously was, at least with certain papers, although no specific ones were mentioned, except for minor cases. As Lt Col Manuel Monzon, the Defense Ministry's media director, commented, "Our dissatisfaction with the press has to do more with form than substance, and we often see a lack of respect for the military."

A newsman then mentioned the reverence that the Armed Forces received in the press during recent decades under the previous regime. What should it be: reverence or respect?

Air Force Maj Gen Jose Rebuelta Garcia replied: "Respect, of course!"

We then heard about the military's silent majority, which General Cano underscored because of what he considers its historic role during this transition from one regime to another. "And the silent majority in the Armed Forces has nothing against the press," Cano Hevia said.

The Armed Forces are disturbed that they have been identified with isolated actions or the positions of fringe groups. Do the Armed Forces oppose the constitution and want a coup?

"Do we want democracy?" Rear Admiral Salgado asked rhetorically; his reply to the newsmen was categorical: "Just as much, exactly as much as you do!"

It was then Gen Enrique Ugarte's turn: "Our compliance with the constitution is total and absolute. The fear of a military coup that seems to be floating around is just wishful thinking. Is there any option other than democracy in Spain?" And he concluded: "Gentlemen, if there is no other option, what are we going to create one for!"

#### Getting to Know Each Other

The newsmen looked surprised. They are not accustomed to hearing such blunt talk at times like these. Perhaps it is because of the lack of contact, their lack of familiarity with an institution that by its very nature is practically impenetrable. All of Ugarte's comrades, whom we were watching for a response, assented.

Rear Admiral Salgado spoke up again: "I subscribe to what the general (Ugarte) has just said."

As far as General Ventosa is concerned, an understanding between newsmen and military officers is difficult, because "we are very different." The military is a hierarchy..."and you are not," he said, adding: "We are all in agreement on theory, on the way to apply general principles, which I think is the hardest part. It's a road that we have to travel."

But how can these differences be settled? Rear Adm Antonio Urcelay, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JUEM), explained it this way: "That's pretty obvious. By putting yourself in the other person's shoes."

"With regard to the love of freedom that has come up here," Rear Admiral Urcelay remarked further, "I would have to say that the older you are, the more love of freedom you have."

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GENERAL

FRANCE

RECENT APPARENT ILLNESS OF MITTERRAND VIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Nov 81 pp 40-42

[Text] In its dealings with various administrations, presidents and governments, PARIS MATCH has always been fair. PARIS MATCH is recognized as a national magazine and throughout the historic upheavals experienced by the French nation--Algeria, the putsch, the OAS [Secret Army Organization], May 1968--it has always been intent on providing information to enlighten its readers.

Today, by publishing the article which you are about to read, PARIS MATCH has no other purpose than to help keep every French citizen informed.

"The French have a right to expect that the man whom they have elected to occupy the highest office in the nation will provide information about both his assets and his health." This was the opening sentence of a communique (issued on 20 May 1981) from Dr Claude Gubler, senior non-resident physician of Parisian hospitals, who issued it at the request of the president of the republic. Referring to Francois Mitterrand's health, it stated: "Height: 172 centimeters. Weight: 80 kilos. Cardiovascular examination: arterial pressure on both arms: 13.5-8. Normal and rhythmical pulse. Electrocardiograph, different auricular and ventricular parameters and repolarization are all normal. The same applies to the clinical and radiological lung examination, to tests on the hepato-digestive system, to endocrinologic, neurological, ophthalmological and oto-rhino-laryngological tests. Same results for the locomotive system and for the examination of superficial body growth (hair, nails, etc.). None of the various biological tests conducted indicate anything unusual in the parameters usually controlled at the chemical and hematological levels. In brief," says the communique, "both clinical and paraclinical results are normal. Francois Mitterrand's general condition is completely satisfactory and no acute or chronic abnormality can be detected." During Georges Pompidou's long illness, Francois Mitterrand did not make any official statement. He merely remarked on the day of the funeral: "The president of the republic dies while remaining true to himself and to his notion of duty. It is important for a statesman to present his country with this fine example...Today, we should collect our thoughts and meditate about what will be good for France." But if Mitterrand remained silent during Georges Pompidou's illness, the then chairman of the socialist group at the National Assembly, Gaston

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Defferre, wrote in his newspaper LE PROVENCAL on 5 June 1973: "The French people have the right to know exactly what is happening. Their future depends on it. This is not a private matter but something involving the destiny of the nation in the person of the man who wanted to become its leader...The president of the republic has the duty to inform us. We have the right to publicly raise the question no matter how distressing it may be. The interest of the nation is at stake." On behalf of the Communist Party, Rene Andrieu wrote in L'HUMANITE issue of 27 March 1974: "The Communist Party, for its part, will not join in what at times seems like a gathering to watch the kill. It wants the mandate of the president of the republic to come to an end not through illness, but through the popular vote."

Back in 1977, persistent rumours about Francois Mitterrand had circulated and at the time he said in jest: "Let Moliere's doctors deliver their diagnosis. These illnesses are so mysterious that I haven't even been told about them. I can sneeze when in a draft but this is not necessarily fatal. Watching how I am being examined for symptoms, I feel that there is a certain amount of nostalgia." Subsequently, Mitterrand also said: "The best denial is to be alive." Finally, during his most recent press conference, in September of this year [1981], Francois Mitterrand, by then president of the republic, said: "Finally, you have asked about my health. When I was elected, I adopted a procedure which many of you had advised me to follow, not just as an individual but as the holder of this office, and which consists in disclosing the state of my health. It seems that many heads of state are unwell, and I feel that many would like me to join their ranks...I must admit that sometimes I happen to sneeze...and a few days ago, I made some careless motions while engaged in a most commendable activity of a sporting nature and slightly twisted a vertebra. Beyond this, I will issue an official communique on the state of my health every 6 months. I issued one last May and will issue another one next December to keep up with the 6-month interval but, if you want, I could give it to you tonight: all is well."

However, on Saturday 7 November 1981, something unusual happened. The president of the republic spent the night, as usual, in his Paris home located at 22 Bievre Street. But on that morning, his condition must have caused him some concern because at 0915 hours Professor Laverdan, a specialist in gastroenterology and senior consultant at the Val-de-Grace Medical Clinic, a new ultramodern military hospital which opened in January 1979, received a very confidential call telling him that Francois Mitterrand would be arriving very shortly. That hospital is the one where all the prominent political and military personalities from France and abroad are treated with the utmost discretion, since the hospital is not only bound by professional secrecy but also by military secrecy. The doctors who work there are the professional elite of the armed forces' medical service. These men, most of them top "senior consultants," have at their disposal the best and most advanced equipment, ranging from the laser in ophthalmology to computerized monitoring of all major vital functions in the emergency services and in the intensive care services. The technical facilities for radiology--11 rooms--and for radiotherapy are the most efficiently organized with absolute respect for the patient. The equipment is among the most modern available. The surgical unit--seven rooms, four of which are ventilated by laminar flow--and the sterilization unit were built and equipped in accordance with the strictest standards. It was to this new "Val," which leaves nothing to be desired in comparison to the most modern hospital in the world, is where Francois Mitterrand went.

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At 0920 hours, a brown unmarked car drove into the old Val-de-Grace through the entrance located on Saint-Jacques Street. That entrance does not have an automatic barrier, and if the gates are opened in advance, an additional chance of prying can be avoided. The car drove through the old military hospital, past a baroque-style church, around the new building which had five levels above ground and two under, and stopped at the lower ground-level entrance used for ambulances bringing patients who want to avoid the upper ground-level, where too many people are always milling around. Two men came with the president: one of his sons (or somebody who looks very much like him) and a driver. At the entrance, he was met by General Thomas, the top senior consultant of Val-de-Grace, who was suffering from a very bad cold on that day, and by Professor Laverdan, a "big shot" in the field of gastroenterology. Laverdan was given the appointment to Val-de-Grace because it was known that his reputation would bring in very high-ranking patients. This 55-year-old son of a policeman has surrounded himself with a team of hand-picked doctors and, therefore, is assisted by the top specialists of the department which he heads.

The automatic entrance door opened and Francois Mitterrand, flanked by his driver and his son, walked through a corridor with off-white walls leading to the SUSI (emergency service). There, for obvious reasons of security, the president of the republic was registered under the name of Albert Blot or Biot. Those who saw and recognized him would say later that his skin had a "lemon yellow" color and that he was walking with difficulty, but did not have to be carried on a stretcher or wheelchair or perhaps he refused to do so. It was 0925 hours. What happened afterwards? The president went into the radio-diagnosis room. In that large room there is a table covered with a sheet. On the ceiling, hanging for a rail, is a huge articulated arm operated by remote control which can be beamed on the exact spot selected by the operator. This operator was a 51-year-old chief warrant officer who walks to the hospital every morning and happened to be on duty on that day. He is the man who administered the intravenous injection to do a scintiscan, a diagnostic procedure which consists in following the path of a radio-active isotope emitting gamma rays as it travels through the body. The sparkling flashes produced by the isotope are recorded by a scintiscanner, which gives a picture of the organ under observation indicating its contour, its unimpaired condition, any tissue changes and so on. (The most typical example of this procedure is for the thyroid gland. The thyroid gland absorbs iodine. When the gland functions normally, the injected iodine will be absorbed homogeneously. The path of the iodine can be followed on a screen and the contour of the gland appears in a photographic plate. When the gland is not functioning, nothing appears in the picture. If the gland is only functioning partially, some sections will show while the rest will be black. If the gland contains cancerous nodules, black spots called cold nodules will be visible).

On that Saturday morning, Francois Mitterrand, alias Albert Blot or Biot, remained in Val-de-Grace until 1030 hours, then went back to Bievre Street. That same day at 1400 hours, Francois Mitterrand went back to Val-de-Grace driven in an unmarked Citroen-X. The purpose of this new visit was to take a "delayed plate." This was to see how the drug injected in the morning had concentrated. Only one person came with the president and they followed the same route. Francois Mitterrand stayed in Val-de-Grace until 1700 hours. Dr Laverdan was accompanied by a radiologist, Bouquet, an anesthesiologist, and a rheumatologist. In fact the entire emergency

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team of Laverdan's service was on call. Since Laverdan is a specialist in gastroenterology, he was personally in charge of the case. An echography was also performed on the president of the republic. Between each series of tests, the president rested in an austere furnished room with orange walls.

The echography, a kind of sonar or radar which scans the body of the patient, took 45 minutes. Each test, each result was verified twice.

The president was then told the results of the general checkup and whatever diagnosis was made, which only Dr Laverdan and General Thomas know. It is reported that following the visits and tests a decision was taken, in the utmost secrecy, to alert 15 or so top specialists and to set up a permanent team capable of treating the president in the Elysee should it become necessary.

If there is a copy of the case file on Albert Blot or Biot, it is locked in Doctor Laverdan's safe at Val-de-Grace. It was not until the evening of Saturday, 7 November, after a long day of tests which should have been conducted under the utmost secrecy, that the management of the Val Hospital was given formal orders to forget everything which had taken place on that day. But those who saw Francois Mitterrand were not aware that they should not have seen a certain Albert Blot or Biot, and that nobody was supposed to have met that patient.

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