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West Europe Report

(FOUO 9/82)



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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

TEXTILES, NAVAL SHIPYARDS, STEELWORKS REORGANIZE TO FACE CRISIS

Textile Sector Lagging

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4-10 Jan 82 pp 46-48

[Article by Richard de Vendeuil: "Slowdown in Textiles"]

[Excerpts] It is better to sign nothing rather than endorse a bad agreement. From the Textile Industry Owners Union to the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]-Hcuitex, the negotiation of the third multifiber agreement (AMF) has created a harmonious whole. To the point that the prime minister has said:

"We will no longer allow countries claiming to the 'developing nations' to disturb our markets."

The textile owners who 2 weeks earlier had demonstrated in the streets under the slogan "don't give up, Mauroy, stand firm," said they were reassured. Now they are concerned.

The fact is that the task of renewing the multifiber agreement which was entrusted to the Brussels Commission differs substantially from the position asserted by France. That position was designed to reduce the penetration of imported textile items (accounting for 50 percent of the French market and 44 percent of that of Europe), and thereby, secondarily, to safeguard industrial activity.

"Any 1 percent increase in imports leads to the elimination of 1,000 jobs in France," Mr Pierre Dreyfus said in pleading his case in Brussels.

Despite the support of his British, Italian or Greek colleagues who favor a firm attitude toward the four musketeers of Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Macao), the French Ministry of Industry did not carry the day on 23 December in Brussels: The European liberals--the Germans, Danes and Dutch--continue to support a more open strategy (see box on p 48).

Will the decision adopted cancel out the textile strategy pursued by Mr Dreyfus?

"In any case, it received a warmer welcome than that of his predecessor," Mr Pierre Rodes, general manager of Gaston Jaunet, has commented.

Some 35,000 jobs lost this year, 880 court settlements in 1980, foreign trade showing a deficit of 3 billion, domestic production which has dropped 20 percent in 3 years--the symptoms of the ailment are obvious. To prevent it from spreading to the 550,000 jobs in the textile-clothing chain, Mr Andre Giraud is encouraging investment and Mr Dreyfus is betting on a reduction in the social burden on enterprises.

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This alleviation of wage costs (up to 12 points for the employers' quota), a kingpin in the plan, puts French enterprises back in the game. The percentage of social charges they bear in comparison to total wages (41 percent in France, as compared to 20 percent in the United States and 18 percent in the FRG) seriously limits their ability to compete. The effort agreed upon (1 quota point represents 300 million francs) means an improvement of 3 or 4 percent in production costs.

"It is a matter of gaining a respite, the better to reorganize," Mr Dreyfus has said. Meaning to organize as our neighbors have. The Germans and the Italians, like ourselves, have experienced a textile crisis. Between 1970 and 1978, while their ranks were declining by 32 and 14 percent respectively (22 percent in France), they developed an active defense strategy.

The German scenario called for disengagement in the clothing sector (subcontracted abroad), stability in fiber processing and development in machine textiles.

Thanks to untiring effort and the statute allowing 500,000 "homeworkers," as well as a judicious investment policy, the Italians, still participating all along the chain, are in a stronger position in weaving and knitwear.

France failed to follow. It was not until 1978 that investments came to 5 percent of the turnover figure in the sector. The result was a production chain in which industrial concentration lags behind that elsewhere, and in which even the most dynamic enterprises produce series which are too short to make cost prices competitive. Where a German produces 5 million items, his French counterpart produces only one-tenth that many.

"If no corrective step is taken today, we will lose 90,000 jobs by 1984," the clothing enterprise owners say.

The minister of industry, a businessman, is aware of this. His plan refers to "maintaining employment at as high a level as possible." It also includes a whole series of improvements in the chain:

Establishment of a promotion center to concentrate the facilities existing on the various ownership levels and to strengthen the cooperation between manufacturers and distributors;

Establishment of a fashion school to stimulate the creative spirit; and

Development of innovation and technology, automation of clothing manufacture and textile machinery.

Taken together, these are measures already urged by the Textile Industries Union, and they would cost the state some 600 million francs in investment aid. The existing procedures (participation alone, industrial policy credit, development contracts) have been extended to the small and medium-size business sector.

"Your move!" Mr Dreyfus is telling the industrialists.

Many of them did not wait for the last of these suggested measures before taking action. In many cases, the government plan does no more than endorse and systematize steps already undertaken by a certain number of enterprises.

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First of all, in distribution. With 76,000 points of sale (60 percent of them with a turnover total of less than a million francs), our distribution system is plethoric in its diversity and anarchic in its price and market policy.

If prices (public) reach a substantially higher level in France than abroad, it is more because of distribution costs than cost prices at the factory gate, according to a recent report by the Economic and Social Council.

To undo the tangle, some garment makers favor major distribution outlets, while others are testing their own retailers. Mr Paul Salmon, president of Catimi (children's sportswear), believes that the formula is simple.

"Study methods for optimizing sales and marketing in the form of a franchise or partnership agreement with the middlemen."

A similar review has been undertaken with regard to the methods of developing textile products, with consumer panels presenting designers with a list of requirements, prototypes being drafted and final selection made before collections are presented.

From the programmed designing of patterns to the cutting of pieces by laser scissors, automation is gaining ground in the clothing industry. One example: in Douai, in the north, the Scalabre-Belleteste group has just received a bid from Anvar to install robots to produce its jackets, with a 30 percent saving in time as compared to the traditional procedure.

But much remains to be done before this sector can regain the "cruising speed consistent with the times," as Mr Christian Pierret, a deputy from Vosges, hopes it can do.

Modernization of Metallurgical Sector, Shipyards Linked

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 11-17 Jan 82 pp 43-45

[Article by Guillaume de Truchis: "Reequipping the Shipyards"]

[Text] Matters are still in the talking stage, but if the government does in fact come to the aid of the naval shipyards, three birds will have been killed with one stone: completion of the modernization of the metallurgical sector and the simultaneous rebuilding of the Schneider group and the naval construction industry.

For the idea came from Schneider. In this sprawling and disunited group, the departure of Baron Empain, who was replaced by Paribas (now nationalized) as main stockholder, and the assumption of a management post by Mr Didier Pineau-Valencienne were to speed up a number of "boundary adjustments." It was in fact a question of remedying, as well as could be managed, the fate of a number of deficit activities of the rue d'Anjou group. Among these were two heavy burdens--the metallurgical sector and the shipyards.

In 1977 the Normandie Metallurgical Company (SMN) (Empain-Schneider branch, with 41 percent) and the France-Dunkirk shipyards, with 80 percent control, were merged to form the Normandie Metallurgical Company-Naval Division (SMN-DN). This merger was something of a surprise: These two businesses did not supplement each other at all and they had nothing in common outside their main stockholder. But one sector, metallurgy, was losing money, while the other, shipbuilding, was still profitable. And it was indeed hoped that the latter would help refloat the former, which was in even greater need of assistance when the Normandie Metallurgical Company found itself excluded in November of 1978 from the aid program which the state limited to the Usinor and Sacilor companies exclusively.

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The situation has now become untenable for ship construction. In 3 years, this sector has advanced nearly 1.4 billion francs to the metallurgical sector. Its results last year, which unfortunately have not been published separately since the merger, were burdened by the allocations of 191 million for work in progress and 70 million francs for adjustments to methane tankers already delivered. For the first time, this sector was unable to offset the losses of the steelworks.

Following the negotiations pursued for 3 months by the Schneider group and the public authorities, the fate of the metallurgical sector was one of the first points settled: it will be left in the hands of the USINOR and SACILOR.

The fate of the shipyards thus remained to be determined.

Here Mr Louis Le Pensec, minister of maritime affairs, intervened immediately to explain that because of trade union vulnerability, there could be no question of reorganization in the sense given the term to date. The word itself causes fear, for it is synonymous with the shutdown of shipyards and thus dismissals.

There have been no shipyard shutdowns since 1971. The last was that in Bordeaux, belonging to France-Gironde, the very firm which was to become France-Dunkirk.

Negotiations on shipyard mergers have on the other hand had their ups and downs, being shelved for years on end in the offices of successive ministers. The most recent of any size was the merger in 1954 of the Penhoet Shipyards and the Shipyards of the Loire, to form the Atlantic Shipyards. At the time, there were already no more than 12 naval shipyards in France, the same number as prior to 1914. Today there are six. Four are large: Atlantic Shipyards, Mediterranean Industrial and Naval Construction (CNIM), La Ciotat and France-Dunkirk, and two are small--Le Havre-La Pallice and Dubigeon-Normandy.

There was talk first of negotiations between La Ciotat and Atlantic, and then about negotiations between the so-called "Atlantic" shipyards on the one hand and the "Mediterranean" shipyards on the other. A little more than 2 years ago, the idea of a merger of France-Dunkirk and Atlantic within a company of which the state would be the majority stockholder was also discussed. After the fact, the concept seemed like a trial balloon to see what "the others" would say.

The solution urged by the public authorities today is similar to that which was suggested in 1978 and was called, curiously, the "eastern grouping" as opposed to the "western grouping." It calls for a merger of the France-Dunkirk, La Ciotat and CNIM (La Seyne) shipyards. All three, similar in size, would constitute a complex of nearly 12,000 persons (4,640 for the CNIM, 3,700 for La Ciotat and 3,400 for France-Dunkirk) and would have a turnover figure (variant including work in progress) of about 3 billion francs.

No final scheme has yet been adopted. In one possible solution, each of the three independent companies would become a portfolio company, controlling a percentage of the stock (to be determined) in an industrial company called the Naval Shipyards of France (the former name of the Dunkirk Shipyard), which would operate the three existing shipyards (see our table of organization). The name of the man who would head the new complex, Mr Dellois, of Schneider, has even been suggested.

Although not unanimously agreed, the trade unions have nonetheless given evidence of indisputable good will. This solution has won the support of the leaders of the Schneider group. Mr Gerard Chauchat, currently president and general manager of

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SMN-DN, readily recalls that he had proposed such a plan during the commissioning of a methane tanker at Dunkirk, in October 1973, in the midst of the Yom Kippur war. Its promoters believe it would make it possible to obtain synergetic effects in the realm of prospecting (thanks to a more powerful and more structured marketing service), production (better use of installations as a function of the variety of orders) and research, while at the same time reducing the devastating competition which leads to the acceptance of orders at a loss.

The difficulty which could be claimed in the past of managing shipyards so far apart one from the other would no longer apply in the era of computers. One might mention by way of example the collaboration between the shipyards in Kockum and those in Lisbon, or between the shipyards in Nagasaki and those in Tokyo.

At the Atlantic Shipyards, by far the leader in France, relief prevails: they will be excluded from the confusion. At the most there is talk of a possible "bridge" between the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire and the Dubigeon establishment in Nantes. This suggestion is vague enough to allow any interpretation.

In 1976, the Atlantic Shipyards merged with Alsthom, and this operation was roundly compared with the merger of France-Dunkirk and the SMN. In this instance also, there was one company in difficulty (the shipyards) and another on the path of recovery (Alsthom). There was above all a supplementary aspect to the work of the two groups, long accustomed to working together.

At the Atlantic Shipyards, which is only one of the eight divisions of group now, Mr Regard congratulates himself again each day on his collaboration with Alsthom. The market prospecting of the shipyards advanced the world reputation of Alsthom, and it was thanks to the support of this quite diversified group that the shipyards can permit themselves the luxury, if one might put it that way, of taking orders at a loss. This is the kind of situation which has long been the strength of the Japanese shipyards.

There is a ready inclination to compare the new group planned, which would be predominantly private, with Alsthom-Atlantic, which as a branch of the nationalized CGE is a state group. In brief, those in charge at Alsthom-Atlantic will certainly see a change in the structure of their board of directors, but there is no reason, a priori, to foresee a change in the management team.

On the other hand, the three merged shipyards will very certainly benefit from rather more generous government aid than in the past. All in all, in a sector which depends on state aid to this point, the discussion remains academic.

One thing is certain: the French shipyards (despite diversification long since undertaken by Atlantic and encouraged by the public authorities) are operating at 60 percent of their capacity. They are not alone in their difficulties: as of last 30 September, the portfolio of orders from the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries had shrunk 2.5 percent. Japan, which alone has 57 percent of these orders, has experienced the most serious decline (6 percent). To the point that it is the first to complain about the Korean shipyards, operating at a deficit and receiving heavier subsidies than the others.

The Atlantic Shipyards order book is full until 1984. Put in another way, if no further orders are received, the sheet iron shop, the first involved in the building of a vessel, will have nothing to do in the second quarter of 1983. And recovery, regularly predicted, is not expected before 1985.

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In the naval shipyards as elsewhere, reorganization cannot alter the situation.

It is not by adding to the losses of shipyards that prices can be brought down the 30 percent which separates them from the Japanese. Even if there were to remain only one shipyard, it would still have to be able to secure orders.

In Sweden and in Great Britain, the nationalized shipyards are well aware of this. They have not been spared by the crisis.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

ARZALLUS: PNV MAY SUPPORT CALVO SOTELO, ETA ISOLATED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 Jan 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Ander Landaburu: "ETA on the Ropes"]

[Text] As if to spoil the yearend celebrations for many Basques, the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] terrorist organization gave signs of life with an early, macabre Magi gift. A few days ago, dozens of individuals were frightened again upon receiving the threat of the so-called "revolutionary tax" through the traditional message.

Describing the ETA coercion as a "tax for the destruction of Euskadi," the PNV's [Basque Nationalist Party] Biscay assembly assumed a clearcut position against the ETA members, and as on previous occasions asked its members not to pay even a single five pesetas.

Last Sunday, Xabier Arzallus, president of the Basque Nationalist Party, who was far more harsh and direct, launched an attack against the perpetrators of the tragic blackmail in the locality of Ordicia. Without mincing any words, so that he would not be called ambiguous again, the PNV's supreme leader said: "It is impossible to strive for amnesty when thousands of families are afraid to go out on the street in the belief that they are under the sight of a pistol, because they are unwilling to pay the revolutionary tax. I tell that mob that if the people were with them they would have no reason to coerce, nor to demand a tax under threat of death."

Hours later, less agitated and more concerned over the aspects of the Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomous Process (LOAPA), and the coup plot, the PNV president received CAMBIO 16 in his office on Gran Via in Bilbao.

CAMBIO 16: At a recent luncheon in Madrid with the foreign press correspondents, you remarked that the coup movement in the Army is not the fundamental one.

Xabier Arzallus: It is fundamental in that they have the weapons, but what I meant was that there is much talk here almost exclusively about the Army, whereas in reality there are coup backers among many groups, and on many levels of interest. To talk only about the Army or a sector of that Army is over-simplification. The military would not set forth with a coup if there were no one pushing them; that is the key issue in how the Army is being incited by other groups.

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C 16: Then is there a civilian coup plot?

X.A.: Of course, obviously. It is very clear to me that there is very little investigation here, very little follow-up, or very little known in this regard, at least on a general level, concerning all those coup-related interests and sectors that exist, and the matter is concentrated too much on the Army.

C 16: With respect to the controversial issue of the LOAPA and the autonomous pacts between UCD [Democratic Center Union] and PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], do you believe that a solution can be found with the Nationalists? Under what conditions would PNV make a pact, and with whom?

X.A.: We are still sincerely willing to hold dialog. However, I more than suspect that in the autonomous pacts (as well as in the matter of LOAPA, for we already know what that consists of), in those bilateral agreements there are secret pacts. We learned some things as a result of a "blunder", for example when Txiki Benegas mentioned the topic of the quota in the magazine ESCORIAL. It may not take 2 months before that secret pact becomes known publicly. The purpose of that secret agreement would be to reform the Electoral Law; and that change in the electoral system would mean reducing the potential of the regional and nationalist parties in favor of the so-called state ones. However, the political pacts are closely related to the goals being pursued by each political party or group. In that regard, it is clear that our preeminent goal is the issue of autonomy, the establishment of the statute and its intensification; and for us the main purpose of negotiating a pact would be that.

C 16: If President Calvo Sotelo needs the PNV's votes for his parliamentary majority, would you agree to back the president, and under what conditions would you do so?

X.A.: There is a possibility of that parliamentary backing, but the price would obviously be an understanding on the basic statutory issues which have been raised for some time, such as those concerning the LOAPA, the issue of the bases for the Local Regime, that of the officials, and the definitive formation of the quota in the agreements. These would be the issues to be brought up, and if we are given satisfaction, we would support Calvo Sotelo in Parliament. To put it briefly, the PNV's backing for Calvo Sotelo necessarily entails a change in the LOAPA and a government program that will satisfy us.

C 16: And in the event of a PSOE victory in the next elections, would the agreement be reached more readily?

X.A.: The fact is that we have not had any great success in our pacts with the PSOE to date.

C 16: The ETA's action has declined spectacularly, as has the violence in the Basque Country as a whole. What does this fact represent?

X.A.: For the present, it represents a relief, a great relief; although, on the other hand, it has also caused a certain amount of disillusionment, from the standpoint that there was so much talk about terrorism, and then it turns out that when we had months without any major terrorist activity was when there was the most talk about a coup. So one wonders about the reason for the situation. But it is

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a relief, and although they are still blowing up Iberduero turrets, at least they are not killing, which is after all the most tragic and saddest thing that could happen.

C 16: What is going on in ETA?

X.A.: Well, we don't know for sure. It has given the impression that there is strong internal tension, that there are many matters being discussed or reviewed, and probably a serious confrontation of some kind. In my view, that is the greatest reason for this standstill. But, on the other hand, there has also been an obvious decline in popular support, as well as the police action which has meant hard blows to the organization. However, let us not deceive ourselves, ETA will always be able to engage in certain action, even though it may not have the backing that it did before. Carrying out a spectacular action, something very serious, is not so difficult either if one acts with the surprise factor, using a certain system, even without major infrastructure. France's position has also had an influence. The issue of the extraditions is still hovering, and it could also be a major factor in this present standstill in ETA activities.

With regard to them, our position is still the same; and I stated it clearly on Sunday in Ordicia. If they are trying to scare our people with coercion, we too shall manage to instill fear in them. The increasing isolation of ETA is obvious, and abysmally greater than previously.

And its isolation will be total when the Statute on Autonomy is fulfilled, and the work of the autonomous police comes under the command of the Basque Government.

C 16: Recently, there has been a debate on the topic of the Lemoniz nuclear powerplant in the Basque Parliament. Do you think that this nuclear powerplant is necessary for Euskadi?

X.A.: We have approved the matter of Lemoniz with some logical conditions. What we note is a need, which we observe. We want to gage the risk and the extent to which the need compensates for the risk, which we do not consider excessive by any means. It is a risk which is more theoretical than real, if there are actually guarantees for the control of that powerplant. I, of course, am absolutely convinced that, if there were an extensive, and properly conducted debate, with opportunities for everyone to speak, which reached everywhere, then afterwards a referendum would be won calmly in favor of Lemoniz, as has occurred in my own party.

Moreover, the argument has declined, and I sincerely believe that Lemoniz is necessary for Euskadi. The fact is that everything has been mixed here: there has been opposition to Lemoniz, opposition to Parliament, opposition to NATO, opposition to everything. Certain political groups have made a militancy out of "no" and topics which could have been subjected to a special discussion have also fallen under the weight of the "no". Those who were sincerely opposed to the powerplant have lost moral strength as a result of these negative positions at the outset, those dynamics of rejecting everything.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

EE'S ONAINDIA TO PUSH FOR UNITY OF BASQUE LEFTISTS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 11 Jan 82 pp 29-31

[Article by A.L.: "Merger for a Basque Force"]

[Text] Crafty, with a good-natured manner at his 33 years of age, Mario Onaindia, the one formerly condemned to death in the famous Burgos Trial of 1970, is about to become the great leader of the new Basque left which is becoming established amazingly and at a rapid pace.

Respected in Madrid, appreciated and even feared by his political foes in Euskadi, Onaindia is currently considered the leading architect of that ambitious plan. Some time ago he rejected all the violent options, and now, harshly criticizing the two branches of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], the present secretary general of EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party], a most staunch defender of the Statute of Autonomy and of the democratic process, states in a categorical but dispassionate manner that he is more concerned over the political analysis than with winning or losing votes.

He is not the traditional party secretary general, he refuses the election-oriented dynamics of publicity and over-simplification, "which have done so much to disillusion people." He wants to create a party in which the membership is not boring, not "stupid."

In his small Vitoria apartment, surrounded both by books on Marxism and politics and many volumes of literature and poetry in Basque and Spanish, Mario, facing the classic Groucho Marx poster, "appearing out of nowhere," is working hard on the preparation of the reports that must be submitted at the forthcoming congress in March.

In fact, after long, difficult months of negotiation, within a couple of months, Euskadi will officially observe the rise of a new Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque Left] party (Left for Socialism), resulting from the convergence between the Basque Communist Party and EIA and some independents from the former ESEI [Basque Socialist Coordinating Force], a party which at the moment has aroused great expectations, interest and even uneasiness, both among the traditional nationalist right and among the "statist" left.

During this agitated year of 1981, two extremely important events involving Euskadi have occurred: the truce of the Polimilis [ETA military faction] and the process

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of convergence for the creation of a new Basque left. In the documents or reports being prepared for the congress, Mario stresses that there is an unquestionable defense of the country's democratic process; a position consistent with the Euskadiko Ezkerra policy since 15 June: "One of the reasons that we defend the Statute of Autonomy is precisely to achieve the democratization of the state apparatus. I think that these documents are along the line of what we have always upheld."

And, as if to prove it, he recalls the many fine "no" proposals or the appeals of unconstitutionality in the defense of the text compared with excerpts of it which his party submitted in both the Madrid Parliament and that of Vitoria; or how they were alone on 27 February in the streets of Bilbao after the demonstration to defend that process following the attempted coup of 23 February.

As for the creation of that new party, the idea arose after a long period of reflection during which both Onaindia and his collaborators, and later the Lerchundi sector of the PC [Communist Party], realized that there was a serious problem which had to be solved; that, since the transition, the balance has been quite negative for that left which, nevertheless, had borne all the burden of the anti-Franco struggle, and which now has a right wing government in Madrid and Vitoria; that, in Euskadi, a right wing party had reappeared with an enormous entrenchment among the people; and that the latter were protecting the interests of the state right wing on key issues.

The Convergence

At the same time, in their analysis, the "convergers" admitted that the left in the autonomous community was divided into four irreducible parties, opposing the right from different vantage points, and with very few points of agreement. Mario comments today: "At that time, this situation had to be surmounted, a left had to be created in Euskadi which would propose the elimination of the old division between nationalists and non-nationalists; in other words, a left which would serve all the workers of the Basque Country combined. Although all of us claimed that, except perhaps for PSOE, recently, no one would face the problem completely. And so long as we did not seek unity with other parties from different areas, we would actually continue to do what we were condemning in theory. Then we realized that the only solution to this problem would be based on convergence."

That convergence among parties with a "clearcut", "key" entrenchment in the Abertzale [Patriotic] area, and others in the non-nationalist area, for the purpose of forming a new party, was created at first with the majority sector of PC, the Lerchundi sector, spokesman for the renewal movement. According to its promoters, this new party must have a real social entrenchment in those two areas of Basque society in order to be able to claim that the gap between nationalism and non-nationalism has been bridged.

According to the former secretary general of EIA, a party that has recently been dissolved, this convergence is also a result of the autonomous process itself, and the parties which have backed it: "In the accomplishment of the process, for us (and we have stressed this), is was not merely a matter of obtaining authority from

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Madrid, nor of bringing our area closer to the administered ones, nor merely from the standpoint of a liberation process; rather, it was to have the authority to carry out the democratization of the state apparatuses, and this was indispensable for making it possible for a process of establishing a single nationality to occur in Euskadi, in the strong sense of the term; in other words, the creation of a single autonomous community or people. In a country that was lacking in vitality, distorted and disjointed (with 50 percent abstention and parties exclusively in the state area), the autonomous process would unite it; and that is what has happened."

Continuing this analysis, the EE leaders express agreement on the fact that, within the left, many excluding proposals of the nationalist parties have been cut down, and the traditional left has also, for example, been forced to consider the following problem: How is it possible to carry out a type of political leadership in a country which is more democratic than the party itself? (as in the case of the PC).

In this connection, it should be noted that the Basque Parliament now has more powers in many areas than the Socialist Party of Euskadi-PSOE has.

This represents a contradiction for the two converging parties, and the process cannot remain there. There is still a considerable abstention, there is the PSOE, a camp which they wish to reach, as well as the world of Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity].

Mario Onaindia seems confident that this is only the first step. "I think that the beginning is usually always the most difficult, and that after this there will be other processes which will not be exclusively those of absorbing other forces or the electorate, but rather that we shall make demands on the left, if we want the workers to 'make any mark' in this country, for convergence processes that are seriously proposed."

Fear of Utopia?

However, not all the left in the Basque Country views this convergence process with optimism. "It is nothing but a mere communist utopian scheme," claim Txiki Benegas' socialists with contempt but with fear; while the minority sector of the Stalinist Ramon Ormazabal blames Lerchundi for breaking that unity (?) of the left by giving in to Euskadiko Ezkerra.

PNV, for its part, somewhat concerned, predicts the failure of the plan as a result of the danger of radicalization of the members of the new party which, according to the PNV leaders, will preclude a genuine process to agglutinate the left in the Basque Country.

Mario repudiates these charges, although he admits that, in its beginnings, EE started with more radical principles than those of HB, and that, at the time of its creation, EIA "intended to devour the world;" but that afterwards, a real change took place, when it demonstrated its desire to participate directly in political activity, in the decision-making institutions or locations. During 1975-76, the radicalization in Euskadi was enormous, and it was in that context that EIA was created.

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Mario declares: "Later, after 15 June, we defended the democratic process. This defense of the democratic process has prompted us to keep our feet more on the ground, and to attempt to engage in politics, not just with the Abertzale left or the most radical sectors, but for all the workers in Euskadi combined."

Actually, the evolution of EIA has been a very remarkable event since its creation. For example, it is the only party emerging from the anti-Franco era to be able to compete with the traditional parties. According to Onaindia, that real evolution "from textbook Marxism-Leninism to a position of its own" has features similar to those of the Italian PC during the 1920's or 1930's, or those of other socialist or communist parties in post-war Europe.

According to the former EIA secretary general, most of the militants in that future party would now be in the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education] of the French PS, or in the PC, in the case of Italy. "Nevertheless, we are attempting to escape that separation between communism and socialism. It is a separation that does not make much sense. Today, especially in Europe, there is an evolution based on what was then termed the two and a half International."

No to Eurocommunism

In his historical analysis, Onaindia notes that there is on the part of the PC's Eurocommunism an acceptance of a democracy of an instrumental type, which does not have repercussions on the party, but rather on the strategy that is pursued for socialism (inspired by Gramsci). There has also been a similar evolution in certain socialist parties. "For example, at present the French Socialist Party is not the old SFIO [French Section of the Workers International], and some interesting new concepts, such as that of CERES, are occurring in a socialist party. Therefore, we in Euskadi have the good fortune of being able to create a party with those ideas; in other words, we can form a party with less dead weight."

Despite its process of convergence with the Euskadi PC, which could take away its image as a result of the harsh criticism from certain Abertzale sectors, Onaindia rejects and discards the Eurocommunist formula for the Basque country: "We could not be such, not even if we wanted to." According to Mario, Eurocommunism, as an attempt to gear the PC's or the European communist movement to the new situation created by the economic development of the World War II post-war period, may have certain similarities to what they want, such as in the democratic strategy for socialism; despite the fact that they are not features discovered nor invented by the PC's, but rather date back far earlier, to the Second International, before the break. "It is ridiculous to propose a war of labels."

Moreover, the provisional leadership of the recently established future party intends to invite to its first congress representatives of the French and Greek Socialist Parties, the Italian PC and the British Labour Party, with which relations are maintained more on the intellectual level than with the parties themselves, officially.

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Unskilled Left

Mario Onaindia thinks: "The left, both in Euskadi and the rest of the State, lacks the experience which the European left has from 40 years of the post-war period. We here emerged from Francoism, but not during the era of the Marshall Plan, rather, at the height of a crisis in the model of development. That enormous gap which the left has must be filled."

As for the relations with the rest of the left in the State, the leaders of the new party want an opportunity to improve them. However, day by day the agreements are not extensive enough to propose any "hypothetical" federations of parties or merely institutionalized relations as yet. Mario claims: "We would like to have them, but if that cooperation does not exist it is due far more to a lack of willingness on their part than on ours. Furthermore, both the PCE and PSOE maintain political parties here which prevent their seeking a broader spectrum of allies than the party itself. In the PSOE, it could be far more serious from an historical standpoint. And, with a view toward a possible victory in the 1983 elections, this would be a very great mistake."

The prolonged truce of the Polimilis has unquestionably benefited the rapprochement among some of the leftist political forces in the Basque Country. Concretely, in this instance, it has hastened the process of convergence between Euskadiko Ezkerra and the Basque Communist Party. Therefore, according to Onaindia, this truce has represented the second most important event of last year.

According to the leader of Euskadiko Ezkerra, the standstill of the action by ETA P-M [Political and Military] has entailed a change in the Basque society, and in a way has carried along the other branch of ETA, the "Milis". "The violence has been reduced, and they have fallen back. The infernal dynamics has been broken. This has been extremely positive, and on the subject of ETA I think that we must be very consistent; because the solution to the violence entails an intensification of the democratic process and the Statute of Autonomy.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

NEW TRAINING PLANES DESCRIBED AS MORE ECONOMICAL, EFFICIENT

Mirage F.1B, Squadron 3/5

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 12 Dec 81 pp 27-30

Article by J. G.

Text "Air Force policy in the matter of combat aircraft," General Capillon Commander of Air Defense told us in his introductory remarks, "is to have, for each type of aircraft, a two-seater training version, the final goal being to have available as soon as possible the greatest possible number of operational combat pilots. What is an operational combat pilot PCO? It is a pilot who responds to an alert, that is, who is capable of taking off on very short notice on an interception mission, accomplishing it successfully, and bringing his aircraft back to base in weather conditions in which the maximum ceiling may be as low as 200 ft (60 m) and horizontal visibility may be but 1 km."

"In view of that," the general continued, "the advantage of a two-seater Mirage F.1 trainer appears evident, for it permits training, both basic and advanced, to proceed under the four following conditions (as contrasted to a training mode using two single-seater aircraft): faster, and consequently at less cost; better; and in complete safety:

"Faster and cheaper: the one is the consequence of the other. With two aircraft, basic training required 16 months and 240 flying hours; advent of the two-seater has permitted reduction of those times to 12 months and 180 hours. The gain is evident;

"Better: all pilots in transitional training prefer to have onboard their own aircraft an instructor who guides them by having before and around him the same environment as their own. For the pilot in training, an instructor onboard means someone who sees the same things he does, at the same instant.

"That is true for initial training, and true also for operational training. Better than with a team-mate in another aircraft, the pilot in training realizes the limitations of his aircraft in combat maneuvers;

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"In safety: that is evident. Onboard, everything happens as if the pilot in the forward seat were at the controls of a single-seater. Except that from the rear seat someone can, at the last second, correct an error which could have been fatal."

With the F.1B the Air Force is striving not only to insure the turnout of young pilots destined to fly the F.1C, but also, with concurrent use of simulators, to provide their operational training. Concern to insure that operational training was strongly apparent to us during our visit to the Orange base, commanded by Col Pierre Richalet, which is the home station of the 5th Fighter Wing, commanded by Lt Col Michel Gachelin, whose Squadron 3/5, the Comtat Venaissin squadron, commanded by Maj Yannick Chardin, is the unit equipped with the Air Force's F.1 two-seaters.

Squadron 3/5, we recall, was created on 1 January 1953, disbanded on 30 October 1957, and reactivated on 1 April 1981. The traditional ceremony marking the assumption of squadron command, presided by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Guy Fleury, took place on 3 July 1981 (see AIR ET COSMOS no 868).

The decision to reactivate the squadron followed that taken by the government in 1976 to order 20 two-seater versions of the Mirage F.1. Squadron 3/5 will receive 15 of them, the others being intended for the CEV [Test Flight Center] and CEAM [Center for Military Aviation Experiments], or to make up for attrition. When it has taken delivery of the last of these 15 F.1B's, the squadron will number 19 pilots, including one operations chief; the full complement will be 140.

The squadron now has five aircraft and nine instructor pilots, of whom eight are former F.1 pilots and the ninth is an instructor who trained students of the Fighter School at Tours on Alpha Jets. These instructors were retrained by eight flights on F.1B's at the CEAM in Mont-de-Marsan.

We note that the major peacetime mission of Squadron 3/5 is "instruction and monitoring of Mirage F.1 pilots. Its principal wartime mission is interception at all times, since all operational equipment and armament installed in the F.1C (except for two internal cannon, which can be replaced by an external pod mounting) are found also in the F.1B.

Externally, the two versions are similar: the forward extremity of the F.1B fuselage is longer by 30 cm; the forward position in the two-seater, occupied by the student pilot, is identical to that of the single-seater. In the rear position, the piloting, navigational, and interception controls are the same; in addition, a few safety devices are available to the monitor-instructor for control of the engine, airbrakes, landing brakes, and pressurization system particularly.

All Mirage F.1Bs leave the factory equipped with the IV M version of the Thomson CSF Cyrano radar.

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The Mirage F.1B cannot be refueled in flight. But a few of them in Squadron 3/5 will be equipped with removable but non-retractable coupling arms, identical to those mounted on the single-seater versions, to train F.1 pilots, in dry contact exercises, to place the arm in the cone of the fueling aircraft.

Another difference between the F.1B and F.1C concerns the ejectable seats. Both are Martin Bakers, but those of the two-seater (MkF-10M) permit 0-0 ejections, while those of the single-seater (RM4) permit only 0=90 ejections.

The operational F.1Bs of Squadron 3/5 have the following capabilities:

Familiarization missions for training in piloting of the aircraft;

Missions for advanced training in operation of the complete Mirage F.1C weapons system (firing, combat, in-flight reloading);

Retraining missions for qualified operational pilots;

Operational combat missions.

Squadron 3/5 provides Mirage F.1 training for very young pilots who arrive in Orange at the end of their stage with the 8th Fighter Wing based at Cazaux, whose Mystere IVs, until now used for firing training of fighter pilots leaving Tours, are being gradually replaced by Alpha Jets. These young pilots, who have about 300 hours' flying time on arrival in Orange, receive an initial training which now extends to eight or ten flights. They then rejoin their assigned squadron, where they remain for approximately 6 months, during which they fly some 100 hours. They then return to Orange, where they receive their real training as operational combat pilots ready to respond to alerts. That essential complementary training "to learn combat" is and will remain the constant and ever growing concern of the Squadron 3/5 instructors. It includes, of course, a good portion of theoretical instruction on the ground, supplemented by hours on the simulator. That device proves at this juncture to be the indispensable complement of the aircraft. Not everything can be learned from it, but for reasons of economy the pilot in training should not wait upon the aircraft to teach him what he could have learned on the simulator, one of whose essential functions is to adapt the student's behavior to the actual handling of the aircraft.

This complementary training also includes, and in fact emphasizes, in-flight training, of which 40 to 50 hours are now scheduled. Major themes stressed on these flights are air safety, weapons management, and combat. Here again, all the advantages of the two-seater can be appreciated. Onboard, the pilot in training learns the systematic character of everything relating to procedures and terminology of air safety or air police missions; he learns all he must ask of ground control in the course of an interception; and he learns to carry out combat maneuvers while following appropriate paths. This initiation to combat, not only with aircraft of the same type, but also with different types, goes hand in hand with conduct of interceptions involving flights at very low altitudes above the sea.

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Definite instructions from the Air Defense Command foresee the regular presence of one or two F.1Bs and a number of monitors with each squadron carrying out an air-to-air firing exercise at Solenzara.

By 30 November 1981, the Air Force's squadron of two-seater F.1s had just completed 500 hours' flying time. It had conducted 23 day flying qualifications (for both very young pilots and qualified pilots who had not flown the F.1), and 25 night flying qualifications, as well as 14 refresher flights. It had to its credit three completed operational retraining cycles, and two more were in progress.

The wing and squadron commanders, while not discounting the magnitude of the task remaining, do not hide their satisfaction with the way the F.1B is integrating itself into the fleet of Air Force combat aircraft.

That satisfaction was shared by Lt Col Jean-Pierre Leclercq, chief of technical services for the 5th Fighter Wing, even though the need to insure maintenance of the F.1s, which are not all equipped to the same standards, poses evident problems with regard to spare parts and establishment of a maintenance program.

The evolution of Mirage F.1 maintenance is marked by transition from maintenance of the classic type, called programmed maintenance (periodic inspections every year or every 300 hours, with major inspections at 8, 16, and 24-year intervals) to a method called progressive maintenance, which has proven itself for civil aircraft, and which consists of carrying out successive operations on a rather shortened cycle.

From delivery to units until its sixth year of operation, servicing and maintenance of the airframe (lubrication and periodic inspections or special fatigue inspections) are done within units, by wings or GERMAS [Specialized Air Materiel Service and Maintenance Group] units, as the case may be. From the sixth year, major inspections will be made every 4 years, or every 1200 hours, in air industrial shops, a progressive servicing inspection also being made, in the interval, every 1200 hours.

This increase in cycles, together with a reduction in the number of operations performed at inspection times, naturally leads to greater aircraft availability. Studies in progress are aimed at lengthening equipment life.

Modification work on the first F.1Cs, which was performed by the AIA [Air-craft Industries Association] facilities at Clermont-Ferrand on aircraft of the 12th Wing, concerned essentially a renovation of the navigational and weapons systems, which appreciably enhances Mirage F.1 performance, notably in the interception function, by improving radar pickup quality, and makes it possible to take the best advantage of the qualities of the Super 530 medium range air to air missile.

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There is no maintenance difference between the F.1B and F.1C other than that concerning the ejectable seats: periodic inspection every 6 months for the single-seater, and every 2 years (until now scheduled every 12 months) for the two-seater.

Engine maintenance has also evolved toward lengthening of intervals, which are now 300 hours for hot parts and 400 for cold, having been initially set at 75 hours.

For servicing and maintenance of Super 530 missiles, the Orange base will by the end of 1982 have a maintenance bench for second echelon servicing operations.

Eight years after its entry into service with the Air Force, the Mirage F.1, in its interception and training versions, is having a very fine career.

Microjet 200 to Fly in June

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 12 Dec 81 pp 16-17

[Article by J. M.]

[Text] Flight tests of the small two-seater twin-jet Microjet 200 trainer developed by the Microturbo firm around its TRS-18 turbojet are in progress at Toulouse-Colomiers. The plane now has about 200 hours of flying time. Tests will henceforth be made by Claude Lelaie, former chief of the aircraft section at the Test Flight Center, who has recently joined the Microjet 200 team gathered by Microjet around Jacques Grangette, who can thus devote himself more fully to the tasks awaiting him: launching of the prototype series and marketing of the Microjet 200B, in which interest is shown by various countries of Africa, South America, the Middle East, Far East, and even Europe.

Tests of the Microjet 200 prototype have indeed made it possible to take a long stride toward definition of the production model, to be designated Microjet 200B. The Microjet 200, we recall, was shown in flight at the last air show at Le Bourget. Industrialists or military staffs of many countries immediately showed a lively interest in this "hyper-economical" aircraft: the first because Microjet offers partial or total licensing for building of the airframe or engine, a manufacturing arrangement which would in certain cases permit the inception of an aeronautical industry where none has existed; and the second because the Toulouse-built twin jet offers possibilities heretofore unknown for training at very low cost. The reduced dimensions of the plane, the adoption of simple systems, the elimination of other than indispensable equipment, the presence of a unique set of instruments simultaneously accessible to both pilots, the very low fuel consumption of the twin engines, and the easy and infrequent maintenance--all these factors contribute to a surprisingly modest operating cost. Both as a school trainer for basic training of pilots between initial selection and advanced

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training, and as a means of maintaining the skills of pilots already trained on combat aircraft, the Microjet 200 thus appears to be a product with a future, for it is both effective and economical.

Interested countries have, of course, put forward certain requirements, and all the more so since the aircraft's design lends itself to complementary uses such as liaison, photographic observation, and various missions possibly requiring additional payload. Moreover, the twin jet design is justified for certain missions only if the thrust-weight ratio for a single engine is sufficient always to assure safe single engine operation. Finally, certain countries might be led to set particular requirements owing to high prevailing temperatures there.

Consequently, the Microjet 200 is now powered by two TRS-18-1 engines whose unit thrust at takeoff has been raised from 115 to 130 kg. Better still, thanks to the electronic control with which this turbojet is equipped, it has been possible to install a system which in the event of failure at takeoff by one engine, or even in the event of a 10 percent variation in engine thrusts, automatically provides emergency power to raise thrust to 145 kg--while keeping within the same weight limits: 650 kg with no load, 995 kg at category A takeoff, or 1,150 kg at category U. But at Microturbo they are already thinking of a TRS-18 "X" capable of delivering a takeoff thrust of 160 kg, or 180 kg in emergency conditions, which would permit performance levels far in excess of present ones.

Meanwhile, Microturbo has found an effective partner in Marmande Aeronautics, whose president M. Creuzet, has taken a lively interest in the new aircraft. Contracts have consequently been signed by the two companies which provide that Marmande Aeronautics will coordinate manufacture, which is to be done in part at Marmande and in part by subcontractors whose activities are to be coordinated by Marmande Aeronautics. Now underway, or on the point of being launched, are the following stages:

Building of an airframe for static tests, which will go to the CEAT Center for Aerodynamic and Thermal Studies;

Building of three pre-production aircraft;

Necessary tooling-up, which in practical terms means 70 to 80 percent of production tooling.

The firms concerned are resolved to move fast. Everything is being done so that the first pre-production Microjet 200B can be presented at the next Farnborough show. For that to be done, it must fly by June 1982, which is the target date. This Microjet 200B, we note in passing, will be rather different structurally from the present Microjet 200, even though its general design remains the same.


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The aircraft's performance characteristics are shown by the two graphs for range and flight envelope. Service ceiling is 30,000 ft; VNE /Never Exceed Speed/ is 300 kts; and endurance can reach 2 hours, for a cruising range of 1,000 km (with two 300-l tanks). Maximum load factors are +7 and -3 "g" (+ 4/- 1.8 "g" at full capacity, and the aircraft has already demonstrated flying qualities which make its piloting comparable to that of a combat aircraft. The flight controls, moreover, reproduce to the utmost the sensations of a pilot in an aircraft with servocontrols, and the number of "g's" sustained in turning permit great realism in combat maneuvers.


Photos and diagrams on following pages

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


The Microjet 200 has undergone few modifications: to be noted, however, is the addition of vortex generators on the tail unit to improve longitudinal stability at low speeds. Flight performance range has been explored to 250 kts and 26,000 ft.



Three-view plan of the Microjet 200CB (pre-production version). Geometry has been slightly modified (particularly the canopy), but structure is different: wood is abandoned; the fuselage will have a metallic structure, while wings and tail unit will be of composite materials (fiberglass and epoxy resin. Microjet 200CB no. 2 will fly about November 1982, and no. 3--possibly modified--early in 1983.

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