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Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 6/82)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

LIBYA-MOROCCO DIPLOMATIC TIES--A simple question of language is delaying the arrival in Rabat of a Libyan diplomatic mission. Tripoli calls it a "fraternity office." For the Moroccans, the head of such an office could not have contacts with the palace where only recognized ambassadors are received. The most difficult problem, however, has been surmounted since all sides are in agreement that Libya reestablish its diplomatic representation in Morocco. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1092, 9 Dec 81 p 44] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.]
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AFGHANISTAN

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TRADITIONAL HIERARCHY STUDIED

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Winter 81-82 pp 514-525

[Monograph by Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont; July 1981: "Village in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Afghanistan is baffling, particularly the situation created by the Soviet intervention on 27 December 1979. We are far from having simple models with clearly identifiable elements: occupation, resistance, liberation movements, collaborators, progressives, conservatives. The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is considerable--perhaps the largest number in the post-war period, but it is often not known who they are, what they are running away from, or why. The resistance defies analysis because of its many factions, divisions, and inability to portray itself as representative of the country as a whole.

Moreover, the information from Delhi, Moscow, Kabul or border crossers reveals little about the real situation in the countryside, the villages, or the peasant communities in what is sometimes called the "liberated areas." Also, the insistence among information professionals on intelligibility prompts them to employ some strange analytical concepts. We sometimes hear about the Afghan peasants being oppressed by a feudal system operated by the big landowners, tribal chiefs, and fanatical mullahs; and at other times about democratic, egalitarian, and semi-autonomous village communities.

Give Up Preconceived Notions

The 13 million Afghans are not just emerging from the Middle Ages; most of them are not members of nomadic tribes, but of a peasant society mobilized for centuries by powerful and bureaucratic states, and consolidated around urban centers containing garrisons, markets, and administrative bodies.

Study of the authority-dependence relationship of the village communities and the administrative centers, and of the recent changes observed just prior to the 1978 coup d'etat, makes it possible to put in perspective the questions being raised about Afghanistan.

How can we describe the government's activity and its representation in the northern Afghanistan villages? The peasant communities are only partial entities and are dependent. We have therefore decided to treat as a study unit, in the

following pages, the network composed of the administrative center of the provincial subdivision and its dependent villages, the network which is the context for the direct confrontation among the peasants, prominent individuals, and the administrative representatives sent by Kabul.

The subprovincial administrative center is usually at the end of the passable vehicle road. It is also the site of the weekly or semiweekly market, of the large mosque which gathers the people from surrounding areas on Friday or major feast days, and of the district officials' building.

Since unification of the country by the Mohammadzai dynasty in the 19th century, the Kabul government has controlled, through a hierarchical administrative and political system, an extremely diverse collection of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. This ethno-cultural complex includes speakers of Tadzhik, Arabic, Pashtu, Mongol, Uzbek, and Turkmen, to cite only the main languages. The communities are not autonomous and do not appear anywhere in the organizational pyramid diagram of the provinces, subprovinces, or districts; there are no formal ties between them except through their common administrative center.

The modern means of communication: roads and official vehicles, telephone and telegraph connections, as well as the omnipresent, earth-colored soldiers' uniforms confirm the broad spread of Kabul's authority; one can say that Afghanistan is a centralized state governed by telephone instructions from Kabul to the government.

The Afghan society is fragmentary, including elements who are qualitatively different in language, ethnic origin, andalso in the basis of their sense of identity: genealogical for some, territorial for others, religious for some minorities within Islam, and for the people of the north and south a separateness of the whole community due to the way in which they became part of the Afghan state. The north, like the center and east, were conquered and "pacified" for the Emir of Kabul by the Pashtun tribal alliances in the second half of the 19th century. The state and its officials are still regarded by many as the envoys of a conquering power, formerly foreign and today still viewed as radically separate, charged with maintaining order and raising the tribute payment in men and money.

The Afghan sociopolitical system exhibits the dual character of centralization of the state apparatus and heterogeneity of the local communities. The state has an extensive coercive power of which it has sole control. The centers of decision-making are "interlocked," from the top all the way down to the smallest administrative units. The positions of command, in particular in the army, police, and among high officials, are occupied by a political elite with its own clientele. This elite, which has both an ethnic and regional basis, is of Pashtun origin and has its own divisions and factions, for example between the Durrani of the southwest and the Ghilzai of the east. Finally, the loyalty of the civil servants is one of clientele and ethnic ties, whereas the loyalty of those administered is based on acceptance of the legitimacy of the rule and not on identification with a national entity.

Failure of the Nation State and Pashtunization

Following the example of the European states of the past century, the Kabul rulers had one objective, a national state of Afghan people, with a common political goal.

It is clear that at the beginning of the 1970's Afghanistan was more a feudal state than a nation state. The sub-national identity, belonging to an ethnic community, and the supranational identity, belonging to Islam, were much stronger than identity with an abstract national entity. Open claims to regional identity are a recent phenomenon dating from the last years of the monarchy, and resulted only, and that only intermittently, in some radio broadcasts in languages other than the so-called national tongues, Pashtu and Dari (Persian and Afghanistan).

For most of the farmers, farmer-herdsmen, and craftsmen of northern Afghanistan, the state is, to use Olivier Roy's expression, in exterior location; it constitutes a radical alterity. Its officials are considered to speak a foreign language, Pashtu, even though it is the official language and there have been repeated efforts to impose it on petty local officials and secondary school students. Pashtu is the language the police chief and governor use when they talk, the languages of decrees broadcast over radio, the language of official documents, and the language of the notations on the identity card which all adult males have to carry.

The Pashtun control over the non-Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, and particularly the north, was achieved in two stages. After the conquest of the north and the pacification at the end of the last century by Emir Abdur Rahman, the Kabul government settled Pashtun elements from the south and southeast--people of turbulent reputation and some only recently pacified--on cultivable, irrigable, and fertile land which was supposedly state land but was in fact often seized from the local farmers. This process of Afghanization has continued into recent years. By so doing, the government wanted not only to take them away from their environment of origin and end any dissidence, but also to establish in Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Turkmen areas "naqelin" colonists speaking the same language and of the same origin as the ethnic group in power and tied to this group by having received land from the state. This creation of Pashtun pockets in the north has caused, and still causes, many problems of an interethnic nature. Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens regard these Pashtuns, even those who have been there a long time, as alien people in league with the Kabul government, and as usurpers of land which they feel was stolen from them.

What is called Pashtunization is of more recent date; it is a result of the central government's desire to impose on the whole country the Pashtun administrative system, language, way of life, and ideology.

The national radio, even though it transmits its official broadcasts in Dari, the lingua franca of the country, uses abstract and administrative language which is incomprehensible to the rural people. Finally, the officials have received an education--at Kabul, in secondary schools, and at the university--of a "modernist" type; they are not scholars in the Islamic sense of the word, but Westernized elitists, whatever their political tendency. The signs of the power: concrete administration buildings, and the clothing and uniforms of officials, are in full evidence, but the power's words and its goals are not intelligible.

This unintelligibility of the ruling power seems to us to be a general phenomenon in Afghanistan. The peasants do not understand the laws, regulations, or measures which are applied to them; no effort is made to inform them, and what information is approved for the public is incomprehensible; figures on taxes, duties, and fees

due from citizens are outside the people's understanding. The peasants and the administration literally do not speak the same language, since interpreters are necessary to disseminate information. The villages' only access to the state employees is through the channel of these intermediaries: and conversely, the officials are unable to do anything without these local mediators. Any change in this pattern of relations among the state servants, peasants, and local prominent people thus has an impact on the functioning of the system as a whole.

A power is not illegitimate merely because it is unintelligible; the legitimacy does not depend on prosperity of the citizens or the honesty of state officials, but to the Afghans on the government's ability to achieve certain objectives, among them the exercise itself of authority, the capability to win respect for the government's autonomy and autochthony, the capacity to successfully maintain equilibrium among the elements we have described, and, finally, of being able to claim Islamic orthodoxy.

Minimum Unit of State Administration

Afghanistan in the 1970's counted 70 provinces and 325 "uluswali" and "alaqadari," plus Kabul city. The "uluswali" is a subdivision of the province, and the "alaqadari" a subdivision of the "uluswali." Each province is composed of several "uluswali," but only a few "uluswali" have subsidiary "alaqadari." "Uluswali" refers to both the district and its administrative center. Many of the latter barely qualify as large villages, containing a small bazaar with perhaps only a few shops and a long mud-brick building with beaten earth floor, next to the telephone office. The long building is imposingly called the "hokumat," or government seat. It has four or five rooms accommodating the district's administrative services. The rough furnishings include wooden cabinets and chairs covered with record books and sewed-binding files. In one corner is a cast-iron stove with stovepipe joints daubed with clay. The doors to the outside are almost never shut, and the temperature in the offices is close to freezing in winter. The office workers bundle up in European overcoats of the 1950's bought at secondhand clothing shops in Kabul or the provincial capital. Two of the rooms do not open to the outside but only a waiting room; these are the rooms of the district chief, the "uluswal," usually called the "hakim," and the "gendarmerie" chief, the "kumandan-e amnya," or his deputy the "zabet-e amnya," responsible for public order. The "uluswal" serves both as magistrate and representative of Kabul; he shares with his deputy the "maimur-e maliat," who is responsible for taxes, the executive authority over the region. The other officials have the role of implementing, or are specialists. Although several ministers: finance, army, justice, communications, and agriculture, make a contribution in local administrative management, it is the interior minister who has the deciding voice in choosing officials and priority in use of the media. The secretaries and other employees are spread among several offices: the "hakim's" office includes an office chief, a secretary for civil law, and in particular an employee handling statistics and conscription. It is the latter that the male villagers have dealings with for their identity card, the "taskira," and the compulsory military registration card, which the father of the family must fill out for his son. More often, it is the employee, the "sarkateb-e ehsaya," who every 2 years makes the rounds of the villages of the "uluswali" with a photographer to prepare the "taskira" of children beginning from age two or three.

The office of the gendarmerie commander includes an employee handling imposition of penalties, a secretary to draw up the orders for gendarmerie missions, and a jailer--if there is a prison. Under the office's control are about 30 gendarmes drawn from among the soldiers of the contingent.

The office of the director of taxation is particularly well-staffed: employees handling payments overdue, employees dealing with real estate, the treasurer, etc. There is also the office of the judge, the "qazi," with his deputy and assistants, as well as a number of officials who report directly to the province or to Kabul: an employee for communications and his telephone operator, a secretary for education, and an employee responsible for forests, in summary, a total of some 15 to 20 employees and officials, supplemented from time to time by development program representatives: vaccinators, agricultural advisers, veterinarians, teachers, and, if the center includes a lycee, several secondary school officials.

Those in charge of these service are poorly paid and have the feeling of being in exile. They are transferred often, every 2 or 3 years. Most of them have left wife (or wives) and children in Kabul or in one of the country's major towns. But a stint in an "uluswali" increases prospects of a promotion or at least the chance to "live off the land" through a system of tariff levies.

The "mamurin," the collective term for officials, are the target of an almost physical distrust by the local people. An official's very appearance shows that he is not "one of us." He bears the negative marks of a city person and a lay person: he wears the Astrakhan hat, the "kula," and not a turban; his smoking habits: cigarette and not the hookah; the behavior of his wife, who does not wear the red veil of the village woman but rather the chadri of the town or even a scarf; or his bachelor status, without family, which arouses mistrust and suspicion of moral violations--alcohol or use of concubines--and corruption.

The cultural separation between the rural people and the officials is very wide. It is this separation that is the major obstacle for the teachers and development workers dedicated to public service, because by their manner, clothes, and speech they are lumped together with all the "mamurin." Public service as such is not understood by the villagers, who consider that all service has a price.

Also for the "mamurins," the distance which separates them from the local people is immeasurable: they themselves are educated citizens who are familiar with the means and ends of authority; they show some contempt for the way of life, the ignorant sluggishness of the peasants. Their duty is to administer them and collect what they owe to the state: work duty, money, and army service; but also to try to instill in them something of the rational and urban way of life, respect for authority, and a sense of progress. The "uluswali" officials therefore subject the local people to a condescending and often brutal pedagogy.

Peasant Society Versus State

The term "dehqan" applies to the peasants in general, but particularly to small landowners and peasants without land. The rural population is 85 percent of the total population. Afghanistan ignores "absentee" owners, with the exception, during the period we are discussing, of certain "khans" in Herat Province and

members of the royal family. Few properties are larger than 300 hectares: this is small compared to other Middle East countries but large when you consider that the average size of units is less than 2.5 hectares and that more than one-third of the peasants do not own the land they cultivate.

It is the small landowners and tenant farmers who are on the receiving end of the "pedagogy" from the state officials and who oppose the dusty offices with a resistance composed of exaggerated sluggishness, silence, and an oafish and awkward physical bearing; they endure in silence, the abruptness and irritation by those they encounter: "straighten up, get up, don't move, answer, who is your "arbab" (village chief), animal reply, what is your name?" Authority is reportedly exerted in a rude and severe manner; instead it should be sensitive and clear.

Deliberations, questioning, discussions, and audiences are public. There is no chance for closed-door discussion or private conversation in the offices, whose doors are always open onto the corridor or the street, which anyone can enter at any time, and which are full to overflowing on market days. The officials make public show of their advantages and their superiority before the local people, whose humiliation is thus also public. Moreover, everyone knows what is going on; the public knowledge of bureaucratic decisions at least provides more oral information. Conversation is not shielded from public criticism.

As we have said, communication between the representative from Kabul and the farmer is difficult: the latter is there to renew his identity card, because he has been summoned for labor duty, because his brother or son has failed to report for conscription, or to lodge a complaint. He cannot cope with the stilted office language or, above all, having to write. Thus, for all his requests he has to go through the professional writers: the letter-writer in the market or literate village head.

Regularization of Rural Land

One of the most effective government measures and one which has contributed most to "regularization" of the rural community has been the application, in the last few decades, of agrarian land registry to "lalmi," or rainy-season, land. Formerly, this land, on which crop-raising is high-risk, could in principle be freely acquired by anyone who wanted to grow on it, and there would be no tax. These government measures have thus decreased the unauthorized exploitation of pasture land--a practice which has often been the result of expropriation of the best land for the "naqelin." These measures have thus subjected to tax, and thus control, the land necessary for small farmer subsistence; in summary, the measures have brought under the registry system land which had previously been free of any strict control and whose value had depended on investment of labor time, effort, and quantity of seed sown. The 1978 coup d'etat and the gestures at agrarian reform have only increased this surveying trend, including control over unregistered land, which has of course caused farmer resistance.

For the peasants, the government presence is felt not only through the "uluswali" office building; there are also the periodic expeditions by its agents to the villages: the "mamur-e maliat" to check the land registry records for agricultural revenue, the employee for conscription and statistics coming to issue the

"taskira," and the gendarmerie commander and prosecutor for criminal investigations. The word expedition is not too strong; officials always travel in a group, which includes soldiers, orderlies, guide, surveyor, and photographer. These trips last several days, or even several weeks; they involve requisition of horses, billeting requirements, taxes, and other charges.

The village reacts with a unified and defensive attitude; an expedition not directly connected to the "uluswali," such as a vaccination team (smallpox, cholera), can be put off quite easily by a sum of money collected by the village chief and presented, after keeping a percentage, to the chief medical officer. Other visits, by the tax collector or the census-taker, are unavoidable; all one can do is limit the inconveniences, by pretending a horse is foaling or by sending the horses to pasture before the visit, and above all by having taken care to select an "arbab" capable of negotiating with the visiting officials in regard to information to be supplied and the customary payments.

Itinerant Soldier

On the other hand, the people the villagers see on the roads all the time are the soldiers; couriers assigned to requisition or to summon individuals to the "uluswali." Soldiers for the gendarmerie are normally detached from the regular army; these are coveted assignemnts, far from the harrassments of the barracks and providing more freedom. You have to be the son of a small or medium landowner to get such an assignment, because of the need to pay the captain several thousand afghanis for assignment to a provincial administrative center. However, the fate of a "gendarme" there is not much more enviable than being in the regiment; he serves as orderly in the offices or prison guard, an unpleasant duty since if there is an escape it is the guard who is imprisoned in place of the person he was guarding. A present to the commander can finally gain for him the privilege to be transferred to the "uluswali." It is true that he will not get his pay, which will be accepted in his stead by his commander or divided within the offices; nor will he get the few kilos of wheat to which he is entitled, or the new equipment, which his commander will sell for his personal benefit; but he will have lenient discipline and the opportunity to recover his expenses from the local citizenry. During his travels to the villages delivering summonses, he will stay with the village head or at the house of a villager and be able to demand that for a day or two he be served meat and be given a fixed sum of money, "kharchi."

However, the system is made less burdensome by a whole set of implicit rules. The soldier is himself from a modest peasant background; he "knows how it goes." He is not armed, except for a baton; but even though this baton is used more for keeping dogs away than hitting people, it is nevertheless a sign of authority: "be suta askar namesha," no baton, not a soldier. Considering the 10 to 15 Afghans on whom he imposes and the chicken he usually gets, the soldier is more an extortioner than a plunderer. Sometimes he is even fairly well received to the degree that he brings news from the administrative center.

This informal news is valued; knowledge of personnel changes in the regional administration, possible application of anticorruption measures, grain prices in the large city food markets, and rivalries and standing of officials all serves for defensive measures in the tactics to resist authority.

Villagers Against Progress?

It is not reforms or progress as such that the peasants of northern Afghanistan oppose; they refuse to put their confidence in the personnel and system seeking to implement them. The Afghan peasants have the profound intuition that their environment offers only limited assets to the community, and that any change in the balance, any advantage given to some, is done to the detriment of the others. A long experience in failed schemes, in expensive rural medicine campaigns, expropriational land improvement projects, and schools without qualified teachers tends to support their view.

In fact, the villagers regard the teachers and lycee instructors of the administrative center as hardly different from all the "mamurin," to whom they are culturally related and whose manners, customs, and languages they share. In the situation, they are trapped by their status as members of the intelligentsia, despite the sincerity and desire for reform of many of them. They often join the officials in a contemputuous pedagogic attitude toward dense and illiterate peasants. In "objectives," they are the opponents of the village Koran school. They are the "bare heads," the "sarluchi," spreading ideas contrary to Islam. Finally, they do not always avoid the temptation, being very poorly paid and living far away from their families, to accept presents from local prominent persons at the time their children are taking exams.

Men of Influence in the Village

The peasant community, which stands together in its defensive shell, is far from being homogeneous: it includes men of influence; mullahs; "seyed," descendants of Muhammad; "hadji," Moslems who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca; and prominent persons who are wealthy in land, called "khan" or more often "bey." To be a "bey" it is not enough to be a landowner, one must be both rich and influential, be member of a "family" in the genealogical sense--the "bey" is often the "elder" of a local ethnic group--and in the sense of the strength of numerous relatives.

His influence assures the "bey" a clientele, and sometimes control of a hamlet where he has built the mosque. The "bey" derives also some symbolic capital as a servant of Islam. By building a guest house he gains prestige from his hospitality and welcoming of noted guests. The "bey" has friends in the "uluswali" to whom he presents favors without strings attached, for example a cow loaned to the "qazi," or a horse placed at the disposal of the gendarmerie commander. Above all, the "bey" appoints the "arbab" of the village or the ethnic community, or at least manages his appointment, which is made by the assembly of "gray beards" "rish-e safid," or heads of families.

The small farmers and peasants are dependent on the "bey" first of all in their sharecropper relationship, but also for a loan of money or grain to get them through the spring. To the peasant, the "bey," powerful as he may be, and however unjust his power may be perceived, is "country"; he is predictable, a known quantity; he is the last resort in case of need for money or food, or a major problem with the commander, when the "arbab: is not enough. Even though the "bey" is at the center of a network of mutual services which he uses to his advantage, using for profit the community institutions or collective labor, the peasant

regards him as a person necessary to the good order of things, relating to the cycle of seasons and the perpetuation of society. There are good and bad "bey"; but one could not imagine a village without them. In contrast to the arbitrariness of the state personified in the "uluswali" officials, he is part of a world that is comprehensible, interpretable; he is an integral part of the peasant community's image of itself.

The role of the "bey" and village personalities was strengthened following the 1964 constitution, because the candidates, "wakil," for the "shura," assembly, were recruited primarily from their ranks. The "wakil" has numerous privileges. He can directly contact the Kabul offices regarding the issues in his constituency. For the average, comfortable peasant, for anyone involved with the law, or for ethnic communities in conflict, the importance of having a representative in Kabul is enormous; it is essential to have "one of us," an "elder" of the community, to defend our interests in the capital, particularly in case of conflicts arising over ownership of the so-called state lands for the "naqelin." Election of the "wakil" has usually reflected the ethnic solidarity groupings which, far more than the almost nonexistent parties, reflect the major interests of the communities.

Should we include the "mullahs" among the prominent people? The word signifies any educated man, educated in the sense of knowledge of the Book, the Koran, as opposed to the knowledge acquired at a government school. The person who leads the Friday prayers in the main mosque is the mullah imam; in the village he often teaches the fundamentals of the prayers to the children outside the mosque. Also, many ethnic or local communities have "pir" or spiritual intercessors, themselves often "seyed," descendants of the prophet. These "pir" are small or average property-owners who periodically visit their proteges and by prayer for a fee, assure the success of the harvest and prosperity of the family. The mullah, "pir" and mosque fall within a frame of reference for the peasant which is distinct from that of the "uluswali," the public school, or politics; they are part of a separate design of society, more social than clerical in nature, which is the peasant's view of the just Islamic society.

The more the state affects by its initiatives its fragile equilibrium with the local prominent personalities and the Islamic design of society, the more the government and its representatives become the target for resentment. Evidence of this is the ever-growing rejection of the lay school, a creation of "parchami" and "khalqi," and of its products such as the bachelors sent to the provinces to "educate the people." The crisis of confidence in regard to intellectuals has certainly worsened in the last few years. Some Western observers have used the cliche of the confrontation between intellectual "progressives" and religious "reactionaries." In fact, the former are rather "statists" who have been seduced by the myth of a totally effective intervention which will produce a change in society, and the latter are far from all being reactionary and conservative; they are the conveyors of real knowledge, and many have traveled beyond the provincial center and have some knowledge of the world, and a deep curiosity about what exists elsewhere; they are familiar with the peasant's world yet keep their distance from some village traditions. Certainly the democratic mullah of Gudri who copied this poem for us in 1973 was dreaming of another republic:

"To the Glory of the Republic"

"May the republic last forever
In this country, which could then attain
And reintegrate the sphere of science with knowledge...
According to the teaching of the Koran, which spreads
Knowledge to the world, the best of men
Is he who does the most good.
Thus, we utter the cry: glory to the new system.
If you seek progress through joining with youth,
Keep vigilant, heroic, with face open and smiling."

Assigned Intermediaries

Between the "bey" and other local personalities who are part of the intelligible world and the administrative authority in Kabul, between the sharecropper and the official, there are established intermediaries. These are primarily the "arbab," also called "quaryadar" or "malek" in some regions, terms improperly translated by the village head. The main function of the "arbab" is to serve as intermediary between the village and the "uluswali," but also to provide a screen between the zeal of the officials and the big property holders. In principal he is appointed by the assembly of heads of families meeting at the mosque, but he is more often selected by influential "bey"; the selection is finally submitted for the signature of the "uluswal." It is rare that a "bey" himself becomes "arbab," but it can be a younger relative. He has a complex role: in a society in which the peasant and the administration do not speak the same language, he is the channel for passing information. On market days he accompanies those villagers who have been summoned by the "uluswali" services. Conversely, it is he who entertains the touring officials, at his guesthouse in the village. He also serves as a buffer, a screen between the authorities and the village. The "arbab" have the task of moderating, in return for remuneration from the villagers, the demands of the administration. He handles the requisitions for riding animals. He receives the teams of rural development officials and other people who should be avoided, and sometimes pays them off to shorten their visit. It is to the "arbab" that a touring soldier turns to find out "who is who." The "arbab" thus play a key role in the village defense system. It is up to the "arbab" to settle matters in the village and prevent quarrels and internal disagreements from coming before the "uluswal" or the "qazi," which would bring more visits to the village and further payments. His function is thus ambiguous: he is feared and courted, but his position is constantly in danger. In theory he has many duties and he fits into the implementation of administrative activities; in fact, his cleverness is often the key to the village resistance. In addition to his mediatory duties, he keeps records of births and deaths, and alerts those who must obtain an identity card. He represents the authorities at weddings, he countersigns land sale contracts, and in general keeps the "uluswali" services informed of what is going on in the village.

Certainly, the "arbab" derives some advantages from his position: first of all--influence, and also in the form of a fixed remuneration; a few measures of wheat per household and some fuel for the winter. But for each specific service--serving as witness, intercession at the "uluswali," or signing--the "arbab" gets paid in cash. For example, a peasant who has "forgotten" to send his son for

recruitment into the army could be sentenced to a heavy fine; through the efforts of the "arbab" the fine may be reduced somewhat, but there will be a payment for his services. When the "arbab" is assigned to collect fees or tax, he collects more than is due (the individual does not know exactly what he owes the state) and puts the excess in his pocket.

From Remuneration for Services to Outright Extortion

To the outside observer, the gratuities to officials like the "arbab," and the sums extorted by soldiers, are elements of a corrupt system. However, the peasants make a clear distinction between payments that are illegal, but customary and fixed, and therefore tolerable--everyone has to make a living--and the violence of unjust treatment, extortion, seizure without compensation, and false court decisions. They call this kind of corruption tyranny and curse those responsible, although they grant that service to the state must give its officials some advantages over and above their inadequate salaries. In one sense, corruption is reassuring; the corrupted person, by accepting the gift, becomes to some degree "one of ours." His venality makes him predictable, brings him closer. At the other end of the chain, the "uluswali," the sums obtained are shared and the network is thus extended, tieing together those who benefit.

In performance of his functions, the "arbab" relies on a kind of consensus. If he makes too many demands, if he has gone too far from the administration's point of view, he loses his reason for being, which is precisely to keep disagreements and quarrels from coming up to the center. In the administration's view, he will no longer be considered useful to the degree that his flow of information to the administrative center is reduced and his collection ability declines.

Some important "arbab" in the north do not represent villages but rather ethnic groups. In such a case, the "arbab" may be responsible for the ethnic communities of five or six different villages and hamlets. If the "arbab" is powerful and the communities are large, he may have a deputy "arbab" in each hamlet. The importance of this role can be seen in interethnic relations. Some very influential "arbab" are virtually "bey." Far from being regarded as "uluswali" cops, they sometimes play the role of defenders of the community and enjoy a genuine popularity. At any rate, when it is a question of the relationship with the outside, the "arbab" is regarded as one of "ours."

Beginning with the first coup d'etat (1973) and following the Sawr coup d'etat (1978), the revolutionaries wanted to get rid of the "arbab," those "suckers of the people's blood," in order to establish "forthrightness" in the relations between state and peasants. It was a purely abstract measure aimed at eliminating the intermediaries who obstruct the communication of the center's orders. But the reaction of the peasants was that a flagrant injustice had been committed, their spokesman had been removed, even if he was expensive. This measure could only increase the rift between the peasants and the state. Later, under Taraki, the "arbab" were restored almost everywhere.

Divorce Completed Between State and Peasantry

From 1978 on, the state's representatives in the country have been from that intelligentsia to whom the USSR has offered the model of a different society.

They have envisaged an even greater integration of the peasant communities into the state system. They have operated through the school, agrarian reform, and the army; they have even replaced the municipal officials with Khalq and Parcham people. They have thereby continued and worsened that bureaucratic and authoritarian policy of the previous regimes. The brutal measures which have been taken have strengthened the peasants' hostile image of an outside and abstract state. By imprisoning and driving out the local and traditional leaders, the Kabul representatives have eliminated the element in the power set-up that was comprehensible and known, and linked inseparably to the autochtony and the perpetuation of the peasant society. By causing a sharp break between the "hokumat" (government), the prominent persons and the village, by damaging the implicit or explicit design of an Islamic society, and by putting itself under the protection of the foreign occupier, the present government only appears more arbitrary and less legitimate than the regime which preceded it.

On each occasion, an increase in the flow of refugees followed the Sawr coup d'etat, Amin's emergence, and the December 1979 Soviet invasion. It has been said that the dependent and conservative peasants followed their khans and big landowners into exile. But it would be more accurate to say that they could not tolerate the break inflicted on their relationship to their symbolic and human environment, and rejected a society which was not their own.

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INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN ITALY DESCRIBED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3300

[Text] Libyan officials are reported to be currently negotiating to repurchase the Maraldi group, a large Italian steel and sugar company, for around 500 billion lire or approximately $450 million. This repurchase will be made through the Libyan Arab Investment Company. The Maraldi group (with some 35,000 employees) has been in trouble for several years and owes the Italian state several tens of billion lire in unpaid social security contributions.

The deal now in progress is part of an increasing penetration of the Italian peninsula by Libyan capitals, an example of which is the acquisition of a minority partnership (9.1 percent due to go up to 13.4 percent by the end of 1982) in the FIAT group.

Libyan investments in Italy, according to official figures, amount to 370 billion lire ($350 million approximately) but, in the view of observers, this figure does not correspond to the many Libyan acquisitions in that penisula.

The Libyan penetration of Italy which, as pointed out by the AFP is economic as well as political and ideological, started on a small scale following the "green revolution" with the purchase of a hill on the very small island of Pantelleria, the southernmost point of Italy.

In 1975, Tripoli purchased many hotels and plots of land in that island and was even instrumental in improvements made on an airfield in Pantelleria, an airfield where commercial and military aircraft can now land.

The next step in this Libyan northward "advance" was Sicily where the Tripoli regime has holding now in three sectors: agriculture, real estate (mainly luxury hotels in Palermo, Catania and Siracusa) and fishing. Libya owns 10 percent of the fishing fleet of Mazara Del Vallo (Sicily's major fishing port) and these vessels are the only ones which are allowed to sail into the territorial waters of the Libyan Jamahiriya.

In Sicily, the economic penetration goes hand-in-hand with a strong Libyan "cultural" effort. In this large island, Libya owns, among other things, a television network (Telesicilia Color), a radio station and even a bimonthly magazine SICILY TODAY. In addition, the daily ORA regularly publishes an Arabic language supplement.

In the political sphere, Tripoli has good relations with representatives of the Italian political parties. Naturally, Italian leaders do not forget that, beyond political considerations, their country is heavily dependent on Libyan petroleum (Libya was the peninsula's second largest supplier in 1980 with 13 million tons) and that even Italian industry does quite well out of Libya where 17,000 Italians are established. Not counting the EEC, Libya is today the second largest exporter of Italian goods behind the United States. In 1980, Italian imports of Libyan goods, mostly petroleum, amounted to 3,000 billion lire (about $2.7 billion) and Italian exports to Tripoli totaled 2 billion lire (about 11.8 billion).

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BRIEFS

PAKISTANI WORKERS REPATRIATED--An official communique issued in Islamabad, on 17 November, announces that Libya has agreed to repatriate immediately to Pakistan almost 3,000 Pakistani workers who had been recruited for security jobs in Libya. The Pakistanis were hired on condition that they would not be employed in military or paramilitary tasks. They were only employed to guard key Libyan installations. In October, the Pakistani press reported that these workers had been forced to undergo guerrilla training. It was also reported that 150 of them had been sent to Syria from which they would be sent to fight the Israelis in Lebanon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3238] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8796

PRODUCE PACKAGING PLANTS--Libya has issued a call for bids to set up several fruit and vegetable packaging plants (cardboard boxes with plastic lining, cellophane and net bags to pack potatoes, onions, oranges). The bid must also include technical assistance. The company awarding the contract is the General Company for Marketing and Agricultural Product, Tripoli. Closing date: not specified. For information in Paris apply to the CFCE [Council of Commercial Federations of Europe]. (Telephone: 505-37-86, Miss Clergeau; No 1025). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3238] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8796

PASTA PLANTS--The CFCE [Council of Commercial Federations of Europe] announces in Paris that the National Company for Semolina and Products, a Libyan national company, wishes to establish direct contacts with French companies specializing in the construction of pasta manufacturing plants (macaroni, semolina and so on). Address: National Co for Semolina and Products, P.O. Box 12852; Telex: 20634. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3238] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8796

CSO: 4519/73

SUDAN

ELECTRICITY PROJECTS REVIEWED, EXPANSION NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 pp 3299, 3230

[Text] Sudan's electric power generating capacity, which was 165 megawatts in 1978-79, jumped in 1981 to 280 megawatts, 90 percent of which (270 megawatts) is generated by just the Blue Nile Grid (BNG). Moreover, the BNG is being expanded with the Power III and Power IV projects which will make it possible to provide additional supplies of electrical power: 120 hydraulic megawatts (turbines 5, 6 and 7 in Roseires); 120 thermal megawatts (mostly from the diesel-operated power station of Burri); 60 thermal megawatts (mostly from the diesel-operated power station in Khartoum-North).

The current expansion program, scheduled to continue until 1984-85, will progress as follows (figures given in megawatts):

	Hydraulic	Thermal	Diesel	Total
Installed Capacity in 1981	145	85	40	270
Power III Projects				
1982	-	-	10	280
1983	40	60	30	410
1984	40	-	-	450
Power IV Projects				
1985	-	60	-	510
1986	40	-	20	570
Total	265	205	100	570

The current development program also includes many projects of a smaller scale such as the project in Port-Sudan: 15 megawatts in phase A (1980-81), 15 megawatts in phase C (1982-83, with French financing).

For the long term, that is to say with the year 2,000 in mind, the Sudanese Government will map out a hydroelectric power program based on two studies conducted by the British firm Alexander Gibb and Partners (White Nile Study Long-Term Plan) and by the International Science and Technology Institute of the United States (Long Range Electricity Futures for Sudan, Two Scenarios 1982-2000). According to these studies, by the year 2,000 Sudan will have an installed capacity of almost 1,000 megawatts from various hydraulic sources.

Its hydroelectric power capacity at the moment is only around 160 megawatts from three dams (Roseires and Sannar on the Blue Nile and Khashm al-Qirbah on the Atbarah). The Roseires Dam was built with room to house seven groups of turbines. Three 30-megawatt groups are now in operation; their number will increase to 6 when 3 other 40-megawatt groups are installed before 1985.

This will bring the total hydroelectric power capacity to 360 megawatts by the year 2,000 a totally insufficient amount of power in view of the projected needs. This is why a project to build another dam on the Nile is under consideration. Various preliminary studies on this subject have established that of the various possible locations (the sixth, the fifth and the fourth cataracts), the last one is the most suitable for the project. This expansion project could be implemented following one of two plans: either building dams at Marawi and 90 kilometers up river at Shirri, or else building a single large dam at Marawi. These dams could generate 600 megawatts.

We should mention that the following consulting firms have been preselected to conduct the technical studies for the Power IV project (a seventh turbine in Roseires: 40 megawatts; expansion of the diesel-powered Burri plant: 20 megawatts; new thermal power plant in Kosti: 60 megawatts): Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, and Merz and Mechley (Great Britain); U Bank (Great Britain); Lahmeyer (FRG); SCI and Motor Colombus (Switzerland). The name of the successful tender should be known very soon. Let us also mention that Lahmeyer is already acting as a consultant for the Power III project.

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BRIEFS

REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT--The Mowlem-Africa Construction Company, a Sudanese-British joint venture company which is a subsidiary of the John Mowlem Company of Jersey and of Africa-Construction of Khartoum, has obtained from Sudan a contract worth 10 million pounds to build a real estate development in Khartoum for the Sudan Development Corporation (SDS). The development will comprise 3 major buildings: a 6-story high building for the SDC offices, a commercial building with 8 shops and a 7-story high residential building with 27 apartments. The development, located in the new part of the Sudanese capital, will cover a total floor area of 190,000 square meters. It is scheduled to be completed around July 1983. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882, 4 Dec 81 p 3238] 8796

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