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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

'AFRIQUE-ASIE' REPORT ON U.S., ANGOLA TALKS

PM111221 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1-14 Feb 82 pp 7-10

[Simon Malley "exclusive" report: "The Secrets of the Paris Meeting"--passages between slantlines are printed in italics]

[Text] Everything had been perfectly orchestrated. On 29 December, 3 days before the leadership of the U.S. Congress [presumably, House of Representatives] decided to examine, in its turn, the Reagan Administration's request for the lifting of the Clark amendment--which has banned any aid to the Angolan counterrevolutionary forces since 1976--a request already approved by the Senate 30 September last year, [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)] Jonas Savimbi arrived in New York at the invitation of "Freedom House" (note 1) (extreme rightwing institute financed by bodies linked to the CIA and maintaining close ties with South Africa). "In our view there is no doubt that Savimbi's visit is directly connected with the campaign mounted by the White House to have that amendment suppressed...." Howard Wolpe, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's African subcommittee, immediately stated.

Indeed, as soon as he arrived in Washington Savimbi was received at the State Department, the White House, the pentagon, the CIA and Congress in turn. Over a 14-day period he met with dozens of prominent officials and private individuals, while the media were pressed by the powerful "Freedom House" "lobby" and by South Africa to have interviews with the UNITA leader or to hold press conferences for him. But the action supporting him was not isolated. As if by chance (!), Zairian President Joseph Desire Mobutu [as published] was quick to follow him to the American capital, accompanied by his brother-in-law Roberto Holden and his accomplices from the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] who, with the blessing of some secret services--especially the American, Moroccan, South African, Egyptian, Gabonese and Zairian secret services--have formed the military committee of the Angolan resistance. Thus the Kinshasa dictator, who had vowed to the late President Agostinho Neto and then to his successor Jose Eduardo dos Santos never to have any further direct or indirect relations with the Angolan counterrevolutionaries, received Jonas Savimbi and his accomplices at Blair House, where he was staying. He met with them three times. Two of those meetings took place in the presence of American "experts and specialists." What took place in those meetings between the Americans and their interlocutors?

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The best-informed sources in the American capital provided us with some particularly significant elements. Let us not dwell on the positions adopted by Jonas Savimbi, which have been repeated by him on many occasions, especially when talking with representatives of the imperialist powers and their allies: professions of anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-Cubanism: assertions that UNITA controls half or even two-thirds of the Angolan population, that if free elections were held it would win 60 percent of the votes, that most of its arms come from the PRC (550 tons in 1979!), from Morocco, where hundreds of officers are training, from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some African countries like Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Sudan: claims about the size of its forces, which allegedly already amount to 15 battalions equipped with sophisticated weapons [AK-47 automatic weapons, SAM-7 missiles, armored vehicles and helicopters], and about the possibility of turning his guerrilla war into a conventional war, with cities being occupied....

However, what should be noted in the positions expressed by this self-confessed agent of the CIA and the former International and State Defense Police [PIDE] (note 2) (Portuguese secret service in the colonial period) is the care he takes in forcefully expounding the arguments and ideas of the Pretoria racist authorities on the settlement of the Namibian question:

1--The vital need to link Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola: "Without such a withdrawal," Savimbi stressed to Secretary of State Haig and Chester Crocker, his assistant for African affairs, "not only would Namibia be turned into a Marxist-Leninist state or be forced to unite with the People's Republic of Angola [PRA] but it would also become a base for aggression from which the security and independence of the neighboring countries would be threatened and a hotbed of agitation and constant destabilization for the whole of Southern Africa."

2--The only way of preventing "this plan by international communist strategy" is to give UNITA a share in a national union government in Luanda, and consequently to insist on a "national reconciliation" between the popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA] and UNITA. It is these two objectives which American diplomacy should try to attain.

Savimbi's line of argument coincides--could this be any surprise?--with that used by the South African leaders during their talks with Chester Crocker in Spring 1981 and then by the latter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Africa subcommittee 17 June 1981. But the Angolan puppet went even further. In reply to the American secretary of state, who asked him 9 December whether he thought it was possible that the MPLA leadership might agree to a reconciliation with UNITA, "which we recognize as a legitimate political force which should be taken into account," Savimbi said that, although it was true that UNITA was prepared to open exploratory talks with the Luanda regime with a view to forming a coalition government which would not be very different from the one now existing in Zimbabwe, he did not think that the majority of existing MPLA leadership members would be prepared to envisage such a solution; "that is why I think that the American Government should play for time, allowing the discussions on Namibia and on any normalization with the present Angolan regime to drag on. For I am convinced that the state of war which exists today is bound sooner or later to lead to a deterioration in the internal situation which would facilitate both the overthrow of the regime and the departure of the Cuban troops. And if the latter leave Angola, INITA will seize power within 6 months at the most.... What I know is that the differences of opinion prevailing within the MPLA leadership team on ways of reaching a settlement in the Namibian

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Affair and on a reconciliation with our movement will ultimately prove us right. This is our only hope of bringing Angola back among the nations of the free world...."

Of course, the Zairian president's positions were not substantially different from those expressed by Savimbi. His hopes for a positive evolution in Angolan policy after President Neto's death have largely been dashed, he said. "However," he told President Ronald Reagan who was accompanied by the secretary of state, the defense secretary, the "bosses" of the National Security Council and the CIA and by the chief of general staff [as published; presumably the joint chiefs of staff], "the reports reaching me from Luanda are particularly worrying. The communists are planning new attacks on Zaire's independence, using as proxies Angolans and the Zairians who have found refuge, support and military training in the PRA. The Angolan military forces, the Angolan People's Liberation Armed Forces [FAPLA], have built a whole series of military bases on their northern border in which thousands of Zairian oppositionists are trained night and day by Soviet, Cuban, East German and Angolan officers. For those countries know that as long as Zaire is independent and anticommunist it will form an insuperable barrier to Soviet penetration into southern Africa."

"And what suggestions can you make, Mr President?" the American Government chief asked.

[Answer] The political, economic psychological and military pressure of all the free world's forces--including those of South Africa which are, why not admit it, our objective allies--on Angola's Marxist-Leninist Government should now be stepped up. Granting independence of Namibia in the present situation would be handing Southern Africa over to the Soviet imperialists and their agents. No solution to the Namibian affair should be envisaged before the last Cuban soldier has left Angola. And nothing could serve that objective better than to push for Angolan national reconciliation in order to ensure the restoration of a sense of security in all that country's neighbors.... [Mobutu ends]

After painting this background picture, it is easier to understand the significance and scope of the talks which took place in Paris Friday 15 and Saturday 16 December between PRA Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge--brilliantly supported by Angolan ambassador to Paris Luis de Almeida--and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. For more than 13 hours, and virtually without interruption, the two statesmen had a tough debate on two of Southern Africa's thorniest problems; Namibia's independence and relations between the PRA and the United States in the context of the war being waged by Pretoria against the progressive states of Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.

It was the first time in the tense and explosive history of relations between the two countries that such a frank, blunt and incisive--and long--meeting had taken place, one in which the Angolan foreign minister's well-known coolness, calm and sense of humor contrasted with the clumsy attempts at education made to the PRA envoys by the "brain" of the Reagan Administration's African policy.

How did that come about? In fact everything began last September when General Haig, the American secretary of state, was received, at his own request, by Paulo Jorge at his hotel, the United Nations Plaza in New York. It was their first

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official meeting and, since it was taking place on General Haig's initiative, the two ministers spent more than 2 hours together. Although the discussions, despite their length, did not produce any practical results, the head of American diplomacy expressed this Angolan counterpart his government's wish to resume these bilateral talks not only in order to review Southern Africa's problems together but also to tackle the problems of normalizing relations between the two countries. That was a direct and apparently unambiguous appeal.

Some 3 months later, 10 December to be precise, speaking at Cabinda on the 25th anniversary of the MPLA's formation, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos gave a positive reply to General Haig's appeal, while violently condemning American interference in Angola's internal affairs and asking the current OAU chairman and secretary general to lodge a vehement protest with the American Government, which "is having an official meeting with a group of Angolan puppets."

It was, therefore, at the American Government's initiative that the Paris meeting was held. In keeping with normal practice the Angolan Government planned to send to those talks an official of the same rank as Chester Crocker. But as President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has decided to send Paulo Jorge to hand an important message to President Francois Mitterrand, it was decided that he would head the Angolan ministerial delegation in person.

It was at the hotel intercontinental that the two delegations began their discussions Friday, 15 December at 1400 hours. They were to be resumed Saturday and to last all morning and evening. And to avoid having to continue them into Sunday, the two delegations even lunched together.

Although discretion was the rule on both sides, diplomatic sources close to the two delegations have enabled us to draw a general picture of the proposals which Chester Crocker put to the Angolan delegation. These proposals show that the American leaders do not seem to have changed their state of mind or behavior. Still less their sense of the objective realities of the national, regional and international situation.

How does Washington envisage the normalization of its relations with Angola and Namibia's independence? How does it view the restoration of regional security, an end to South African attacks on Angola and the other "frontline" countries? How does it plan to open a new era in relations among the Southern African countries? To discover that you just have to reread first the view expressed by its main agents in the region, Joseph Desire Mobutu and Jonas Savimbi, which we reported in the first part of this article. Second, you have to refer to all the statements made by "PIK" Botha and the other members of the Pretoria Government. But that is not all. We would not be doing full justice to the strategy of Ronald Reagan's African policy unless we cited the substance of what Chester Crocker said to his Angolan interlocutors. Those statements deserve the greatest attention.

/We Americans want to move quickly, very quickly, very quickly/, Chester Crocker stressed. /If you accept our suggestions, things can be settled in a few weeks. For instance by the end of March Namibia could be well on the way to independence, with the implementation of the process of South African withdrawal and our relations with the PRA restored and normalized. Not rendered commonplace, but normalized and

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developed. Together Washington and Luanda can upset the whole geopolitical MAP of Southern Africa. We are prepared to cooperate closely on your national rebuilding, to organize a conference of Western and other donors to guarantee you billions, no tens of billions, [of dollars]. We are prepared to give you real guarantees of our sincerity and our sincere desire to restore peace, and security in the region. But/--because, of course, there is a "but" with a capital B--/for peace to be restored there must first be confidence between us and among all the states in the region. Now that confidence does not exist at present. Zaire is worried because you have bases directed against it (note 3) (Chester Crocker produced maps showing alleged Zairian oppositionist bases in Angola). Zambia is destabilized by internal difficulties. The Congo is uneasy. South Africa is under attack from the South-West African people's organization and the African national congress, which you and other countries support(!)./

Why is there insecurity? The Angolans asked. Because South Africa is attacking, assaulting, killing, massacring and violating the territorial integrity of independent countries, sending its commandos and mercenaries here, there and everywhere, even to the Indian Ocean to sow terror and destruction. Because it is illegally occupying Namibia despite 1,001 UN, OAU, Arab League and nonaligned movement resolutions.

/No! It is quite simply,/ Chester Crocker asserted brazenly, /because there is internal instability in Angola caused by internal dissension and the presence of UNITA, a legitimate movement, which you must take into account and with which you must be reconciled and must include in the government. And it is because Cuban troops are still in Angola. You say this is to help you defend yourselves against the South Africans? Come on, now! They are there basically to protect you against UNITA, to ensure your internal security.... Let them withdraw and you will see how quickly peace will be restored./

The peace of the graveyard, Mr Crocker?

But is Chester Crocker's position not at variance with that of the other countries belonging to the contact group? And is it not inconsistent with the assurances given by Secretary of State Haig to the Angolan minister of foreign affairs in September 1981? Have President Francois Mitterrand, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt not stated and restated to Paulo Jorge and Luis de Almeida that they were opposed to establishing any linkage at all between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and Namibia's independence? Have they not said that even though they would like to see the Cubans withdraw from the PRA, they recognized that their presence falls exclusively within the province of the two states' sovereignty and that no state, no organization and no authority should interfere in order to dictate to Luanda what attitude it should adopt?

/Of course,/ Chester Crocker asserts, /we do not wish to interfere in your domestic affairs. But we know that the South Africans will not withdraw from Namibia unless Cuban troops simultaneously withdraw in accordance with a mutually agreed timetable.... If we want to reach the third phase of the Namibian plan--that of disengagement--before the end of March, the disengagement of the Cuban troops seems to us of fundamental importance..../

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A dialogue of the deaf? An attempt to gain time with a view to continuing to destabilize Angola and its allies? And making it possible to strengthen the counter-revolutionary movements and countries subservient to imperialist powers in the region, like Zaire, in order to perpetrate new aggressive acts and seek to overthrow Luanda's people's regime? Undoubtedly. In any case, this is the view which now prevails in Luanda, where the Zairian and American allegations about bases containing members of the Zairian opposition in the PRA are seen as obvious attempts to divert the Zairian people's attention from their serious domestic problems.

The report prepared by Paulo Jorge after his return to the Angolan capital has surprised neither President Jose Eduardo dos Santos nor his colleagues because they know they can expect nothing from an American administration which sees South Africa as its privileged ally in Africa. And the views of the Angolan Government were clearly explained in a presidential message conveyed to French President Franco's Mitterrand last Thursday, 14 December:

First, the government of the People's Republic of Angola rejects any suggestion that any concomitant linkage be established between any settlement of the Namibian question and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Second, under no circumstances will the government of the People's Republic of Angola agree to enter into negotiations with UNITA, a movement of traitors in the pay of foreign powers.

Third, relations between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba fall exclusively within the competence of these two independent and sovereign states.

Fourth, Once Namibia becomes independent, aggressive acts by South Africa cease and guarantees are given that the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola will be respected, the Angolan Government will enter into discussions with a view to determining a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country.

Nothing could be more precise and clear. And even though the message from the Angolan head of state was received "very favorably" at the Elysee, it has been hinted within the entourage of the French head of state that "the American obsession about the Cuban troops in Angola could well lead to an unnecessary deterioration of the explosive situation which already prevails in Southern Africa." For, as the Angolan foreign minister has so clearly explained, as soon as South Africa ceases to support UNITA and Namibia becomes independent, that counterrevolutionary movement, which has solely been created to serve neocolonialist interests, will collapse like all such movements before it has collapsed. Furthermore, what mental aberration has prompted some people to draw at all costs a parallel between the independence of Namibia, a territory under international mandate from which Pretoria refuses to withdraw, and the sovereign rights of an independent state like the PRA? Raising the question of a timetable for a simultaneous withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops is tantamount to equating in a familiar manner the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

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So how can you explain Chester Crocker's insistence on organizing more meetings either in Paris or elsewhere in February and March? "This is understandable," they say in Paris; "the isolation from African opinion and even from some important areas of Western opinion in which they have shut themselves up has induced the Americans to test the Angolans' resistance on the one hand and to seek to acquire a clear conscience by showing that they are continuing their efforts, on the other. They hope to silence their critics in this way...."

When do they expect to mislead again? In any case, certainly neither the MPLA revolutionary militant nor the FAPLA combatants. Nor is it among them that they can hope to find gullible people, accomplices or traitors.

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ANGOLA

ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR SURVEYS NATIONAL SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 44

[Report of press conference of Mr Luis de Almeida, Angolan ambassador to France, on 22 December 1981: "1981 was a Hard Year; 1982 Looks Better"]

[Excerpts] The year just ending has been difficult, but the outlook is better for 1982, said Mr Luis de Almeida, Angolan ambassador to Paris, on 22 December at a press conference in which he surveyed broadly the economic and political situation of Angola.

"Keep on Making Friends Unexclusively"

Naturally, Luanda would like to establish normal relations with the U.S. government on the model of its relations with American multinational companies operating in Angola, especially in the areas of oil production--in Cabinda, where President Dos Santos paid a visit on 10 December--banking, and aeronautics. Angola's foreign policy has not changed. It was set by former President Neto and consists in continually "making friends unexclusively."

Thus, even though Angola thinks the time has come to establish bilateral relations with the United States, it would be inaccurate, Mr de Almeida explained, to speak of a "diplomatic offensive."

Closer Relations Desired with France

The Angolan authorities wish to welcome the French president on a state visit to Luanda and have already invited the French minister of Foreign Relations, Mr Claude Cheysson, and of Cooperation and Development, Mr Jean-Pierre Cot. The Angolan government wishes to "institutionalize" its relations with France by signing a framework agreement for cooperation, which is now being negotiated between the two countries.

Among other things, it expects to diminish the cost of French personnel, which seems quite excessive. For example, Mr de Almeida explained that, qualifications being equal, a Portuguese costs three times less than a Frenchman. There are considerable areas in which French cooperation might increase, as Angola's needs are also considerable, especially in health, industry, construction, agriculture, research, and oil production. Some French companies are already doing a large business in Angola, such as Renault, El-Aquitaine and the French Oil Company, as well as specialized institutes in coffee and cotton. There is room for these businesses to grow and for other French companies to move in. Angola has already become an important customer

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for France, whose exports reached Fr 180 billion as opposed to only Fr 395 million in 1980. On the other hand, French imports of Angolan products are very low, between Fr 3-5 million in 1981.

Measured Optimism for the Economic Outlook

Economically, the southern part of Angola and other provinces suffered an exceptional drought in 1981, and this seriously affected the country's agricultural production. Angola has also had its oil prices go down, and these account for 75-80 percent of exports. As a consequence, its imports of capital equipment and food have been reduced.

The outlook for 1982 seems to be distinctly better. Better-distributed rainfall promises better harvests of coffee, cotton, corn and manioc. The authorities have undertaken to reorganize distribution pragmatically the better to meet the population's food needs.

The Angolan government is placing great hopes on the discovery of new oil deposits. The French Oil Company is evaluating offshore oil reserves, which may come to 50-100 million metric tons. Foreign-currency income from gas production could start in 1982. Exports of iron and diamonds should also show improvement in 1982, and the government is eager to exploit the mineral deposits abounding in Angola.

The Angolan ambassador still did not hide the constraints that temper his optimism: the lack of managers and technicians, the threat of the South African army, and the difficulties inherent in the Luanda government's learning the ropes of administration. After all, Mr de Almeida noted, Angola has just celebrated its 6th birthday!

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

NEW OPPOSITION GROUP'S CLAIM--A new opposition group in Angola, the Center of Democratic Independence (CID), has claimed responsibility for the sabotage of the PETRANGOL [Angolan Petroleum Company] refinery in Luanda saying that this was its "first operation" against the current regime of Luanda. Responsibility for the sabotage of the refinery, an action attributed to South Africa by the Angolan regime, had already been claimed by Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], the main opposition movement in Angola. The attack, which according to the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum, did not damage the refining facilities, was condemned by the African-Arab Solidarity Conference held in Luanda. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3382] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 8796

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CAMEROON

TECHNICAL, OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81;
No 1886, 1 Jan 82

[25 Dec 81 pp 3435-3436]

Text In this study which is based on several official reports and some personal statements, we will present first the different levels of this teaching and then we will summarize some fundamental problems.

1) The Different Levels

Technical and occupational training in Cameroon has four levels: the post primary, the first stage of secondary, the second stage of secondary and higher education.

A) The post primary level--It involves the SAR Rural Craft Section and SM Domestic Section whose aim is to contain the rural exodus and help young people to adjust to their original environment, while helping to improve it. In the SAR's, they teach carpentry, masonry, maintenance mechanics, basket making, weaving and leather and wood-working. A general education is given, as well as an introduction to bookkeeping and organization. Studies last 2 years. The SM's represent for girls what the SAR's do for boys.

In 1978-79, there were 70 SAR's and 40 SM's which had about 4,000 students. These institutions are more numerous in the provinces of the Center-South (22) and North (14) than in the others, where it is true they are less extensive.

When we know the difficulties for schools and secondary schools in equipping themselves, to operate and have enough good students, we can imagine the problem of the SAR's and the SM's, in spite of their insignificant demands. In addition, these institutions have been blamed for not providing a certificate (it was desired) and consequently not allowing a continuation of studies, and especially of not encouraging the area's development, by only concentrating on young people.

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It is possible from now on to omit the SAR and SM in the CET Technical Training School provided you are not over 16 years old and you have passed an entrance exam.

B) The CET's--Their purpose is "to train the skilled workers and employees necessary for the country's economic life." This training is confirmed by the CAP Occupational Aptitude Certificate.

Consequently entrance is by competitive exam for candidates 16 years old at the most, who hold the CEPE Certificate of Basic Primary Studies or recently a SAR or SM certificate. Studies last 4 years, including a year of introduction and 3 years of specialization. In 1977-1978, the following number of students were recorded:

	Commercial	Industrial	Domestic	Total
Public	1,235	3,684	603	5,522
Private	17,982	4,796	2,310	25,088
Total	19,217	8,480	2,913	30,610

Growth is indicated by the fact that the total number of students were 17,400 in 1970, 19,761 sic and 21,063 in 1974-1975. The CETI expansion unknown is the school which is solely industrial; the CETIC expansion unknown also has a commercial branch; the CETIF expansion unknown is a domestic training school for girls.

Private denominational education has played a leading role, for example, the School of the Holy Ghost at Douala for girls. The quality of its teaching is generally superior to the private secular institutions. The public schools have 66.7 percent of their students in industrial training, compared with 19.1 percent only for all private schools. An official commentator can say: "This heavy concentration (of private education) in the commercial sector is explained by the not very expensive investment in equipment and in buildings in the creation of a school of this type."

In 1976-1977 there were 44 CET's, of which 13 were public and 31 private; among the latter 8 Catholic, 7 protestant and 17 secular; 10 CET's are on the coast and 10 in the Center-South, that is to say in the most industrialized provinces.

The specialities taught are the following: industrial training: mechanics, automobiles, building and TP Public Works, electricity, electronics, woodworking, textiles, chemistry, telecommunications; commercial education: accounting, office-secretarial; domestic training: sewing, domestic science.

On this technical secondary level, a loss of students because of drop-outs is to be deplored, especially in the first 2 years. However,

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the loss is smaller than in general secondary: 49.5 percent in technical (first stage) compared with 65 percent in general secondary.

The quality of the teaching staff is thus judged, often with amazing statements such as: "80 to 90 percent of the teaching staff lacks any teacher training" or moreover: "in one case out of two, the teacher has no practical experience in the trade he is teaching; in one case out of three, the teacher has a standard of training which does not exceed the CAP." There are frequent complaints about the teachers' lack of motivation.

These teachers numbered 1,688 in 1977-1978 or 18.1 students per teacher. The ratio is better for public education: 13.1 students per teacher.

As regards material facilities, it is especially the CETI's which lack quarters, equipment and adequate grants. Whether there are enough shops or not, there are too many students per shop, besides the Cameroonian standards are below the French standards: mechanics: 3.8 square meters per pupil, compared with 9.4 in France; building: 7.5 square meters per pupil compared with 25.2 in France. Moreover these standards are not respected.

"On the level of investments, it appears that mechanics only has 21 percent of the necessary equipment, while for building, they have only 4 percent of what would be necessary, in adopting foreign standards." The defects are sometimes dramatic: the CET in Bangangte reportedly "operated" for 5 years without electricity. The machines, when there are any, are sometimes very old: lathes 20-25 years old; it is still necessary for devoted and competent teachers to maintain and repair them after working hours!

Grants for operations are insufficient and late and this is true also for the technical secondary schools. The head of an auto mechanics shop told us in November 1981 that he had an operational credit of 600,000 CFA francs for 50 students, or 12,000 CFA francs per pupil; he had just bought 60,000 CFA francs of soap (2 kilograms per pupil for a year) and 4 batteries for 14,000 CFA francs; he must also buy gasoline, oil, rags, spare parts etc. Consequently this shortage limits shop work.

Until recently, technical training schools were able to enjoy subsidies from enterprises, deductible by the latter from the apprenticeship tax. Since these subsidies went more to some private schools, the government eliminated this convenience: it collects the apprenticeship tax and then provides subsidies, depending on the merit and importance of the schools.

These schools would also have the opportunity of doing outside work, but in the case of public schools, they must return the amounts

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received to the treasury. Some have gotten around the problem by bartering: "I will make some wheelbarrows for you, you will give me some working material."

The percentage of success in 1977-1978 was 25.8 percent for the industrial CAP's and 7 percent for the commercial and administrative CAP's. We again find the same percentage of 7 percent in 1981 for the commercial and administrative CAP's in the coastal examination center. Thus the efficiency of the industrial CET's is higher and the percentage of success in the public schools is better. The public school has one passing student for three candidates, the private school, one passing student for four. To these two sources are added the free candidates (a third of the candidates), often the failures of previous years. Nevertheless, a private school such as the CETI de la Salle in Douala stands out: from 1956 to 1975 out of 1,175 candidates who took exams, 749 passed or 63.7 percent.

Do the CET's train enough skilled workers for the occupations involved? In 1978, the ratio of skilled workers to the working population was about 0.3 percent for woodworking trades, textiles, sewing, mechanics, electricity, radio repairmen, automobile and transport and 0.6 percent for building and zero for tanneries and boot and shoe manufacture. To appreciate these percentages at their true value, we point out that some of these branches employ very little and that some CET(s) have had to close their building--TP section or their woodworking section. Nevertheless, a study of the Ministry of National Education makes the following interesting observation: "With an average annual share of 0.4 percent of skilled workers, the average level of technical development cannot rise. It would be necessary to increase the number of skilled workers tenfold to observe a noticeable effect."

Another finding: companies are not very enthusiastic about CAP holders: "50 percent of companies do not employ them and 88 percent of those who employ them are not satisfied: the CET graduates are reproached for lack of efficiency, poor quality of work, their demands and their lack of initiative..."

On the other hand, the students of some schools like the CETI de la Salle in Douala are in demand and have no trouble in finding a job, at least until 1980. At the close of the 1981 examinations, out of the 64 graduates of this CETI, it was possible to trace 57 of them: 16 found a job; 21 are continuing in technical secondary schools and general educational schools; 20 are not working yet (5 months after the examinations).

Consequently, we observe two innovations: the existence of a relationship between the CET's and the secondary schools, which is very recent; a phenomenon of unemployment which corresponds, according to school leaders, to a decline in the labor market and consequently to a slowing down of expansion.

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Preparation for the vocational license takes place mainly through evening courses given to CAP holders, who have a job. Training is both technical and general and it suffers from the same defects as the rest of technical training; let us add to that the fact that the students are tired from the day's work, that they are often absent to continue their job and it is understandable that the results are not very striking; in the examinations for the vocational license in 1980 on the coast, 23 candidates out of 134 passed, or 17.6 percent.

C) The purpose of the LTS's Technical Secondary Schools is dual: "to provide for the training of skilled technical personnel and prepare the best students for higher technical and industrial studies."

There now exists at least one LT per province: coast: Douala LT founded in 1948, (industrial and commercial courses); Bonaberi Multipurpose Secondary School founded in 1973 (by Canada); it includes both general education and industrial courses: Center-South: Yaounde LT founded in 1963; it is now a mixed secondary school with administrative and commercial and nonindustrial courses; North: Garoua LT founded in 1977: industrial and economic courses.

Since 1978, some CET's have been converted into LT's: in the West at Bafoussam; in the Southwest at Kumba; in the Northwest at Bamenda; in the East at Bertoua; this with the assistance of the World Bank.

Students with the BEPC Elementary Certificate for the First Stage are recruited by competitive examination; in fact, the best go into general education. A LT headmaster tells us: "Our students come from private schools of all types." Besides the low standard of the students, there is a second handicap, which has now been reduced, since the CAP holders can participate in the competitive entrance examination. "It is regrettable that the old rule which allowed the beginning of technical studies as early as the first form has been eliminated. In fact, the 3 years at the present time do not allow compensating for the lack of a technical background and acquiring sufficient knowledge," an official report says. Another excuse: technological training has become compulsory in the first stage of general education, but since it is superimposed on many other subjects and it experiences the same problems as technical training (equipment, teachers' qualifications and motivations), its theoretical aspect is more developed than the practical applications and it is resented by many students as a useless imposition.

There were 2,126 LT students in 1974-1975 compared with 1,502 in private education (mainly commercial and administrative courses) and 2,733 for public schools in 1977-1978. One finds similar situations to those on the CET level: more students in commercial and administrative courses; the industrial courses are especially represented

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in public education, with a few exceptions like the denominational industrial schools of Ndoungue (near Nkongsamba) and Bali (near Bamenda).

Consequently we take note of the industrial courses of the others.

The economic courses include: G1, administrative methods; G2, quantitative management methods; G3, commercial methods. Studies in these three courses are authorized by qualifying examination (end of the sixth form) and the bachelor's degree, as in general education. We also find here the economic course B, classified here under technical training, because bookkeeping has more of a place here than in France. Finally, various levels of accounting studies: the examination for the DECS [expansion unknown], the certificate for senior accounting technician (see below).

Then the industrial courses. Studies in the E course and the F1 and F5 courses are also authorized by qualifying examination and the bachelor's degree: E, mathematics and technical (level C for mathematics); F1, technician in mechanical construction; F2, electronic technician; F3, technician in electrotechnology; F4, technician in civil engineering and building; F5, refrigeration technician.

In the following courses, the studies end with the qualifying examination, then a technician certificate: MA, automechanics; MB, wood-working trades; CH, boilermaking; GT, geometry-topography.

To the credit of the leaders in technical education, let us note the diversity of the courses: by way of example, the examinations last 2 whole months each year in the examination centers.

As regards results, on the level of the secondary technical schools alone in 1977-1978, the percentages of success were the following (qualifying examination and bachelor's degree): economic courses: 27.75 percent in G1, 35.6 percent in G2, 46.75 percent in G3 or an average of 34 percent; industrial courses: 20.8 percent in E, 10.64 percent in F1, 58.4 percent in F2, 40.9 percent in F3, 66.6 percent in F4, 41.6 percent in F5 or an average of 41 percent.

The results indicate that, on the whole, relatively few are called and even less are selected, especially on the level of the industrial courses: 89 passed out of 217 candidates (41 percent). In Cameroon, there is a great disproportion between the bachelors of the general courses and those of industrial training; it is even truer in higher education: hundreds of graduates in economy, law, letters, come out of the universities every year compared with a few dozen senior technicians. The first are finding a job more and more difficult. The relatively low rate of success in technical training leads not a few students to repeat, which burdens the educational system.

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As regards the adjustment of those who passed, a study made in 1976-77 showed that, out of 108 students who passed courses G1 and G2 (consequently economic): only 21 went to work; 45 are continuing the BTS /Senior Technician Certificate/ (which is also an assigned goal of technical training); 38 joined the faculty at a secondary teachers' training college or in a business school; one went into computer technology; two are unemployed; one is not mentioned.

Consequently there exists for 39 of them (faculty plus computer technology) "a forward movement, pursuit of a university type diploma," and "this hemorrhage deprives the country of the best students it had trained in the technical field." The study referred to sees two main causes for it: a poor understanding of the purpose of technical studies (they are considered as a roundabout way to rejoin general education); the fear of starting on a job, either because of a feeling of inadequacy or because of lack of knowledge of vocational fields.

In order to limit this hemorrhage, since 1980, these graduates can no longer join faculties; the measure was resented as a persecution, for they have many large schools available after the technical bachelor's degree.

We do not have any facts for the industrial courses, but only a few findings.

The technicians (MA, F5 etc.) do not find employment easily in their branch, for according to Cameroon law, they should be hired first in the eighth category, while they do not have any occupational experience, which would place them above persons with proven experience; under these circumstances team work would be impossible.

Second fact, technicians and bachelors in industrial courses are employed by oil companies for specialties other than their own, and at high salaries. A professor declares: "They are paid as much as us, while they are only probationers. Once they are confirmed in their position, they are paid twice as much, at least."

Let us sum up the position of enterprises. Many of them train their personnel and complain about the certificate holders hired: lack of efficiency, inadequate quality of work, too theoretical knowledge, adaptation too long, exaggerated demands and lack of morality. The enterprises prefer those leaving the occupational training centers, who, unfortunately are still not very numerous.

An official document makes the following observation: "When the enterprises are not directly involved with the educational process, they underestimate the training given." This situation is the reflection of a lack of cooperation in the country. At Yaounde, they prepare

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programs in the dark without the presence of industrialists; they attempt to reproduce foreign programs, without taking into account enough the need of the country.

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[1 Jan 82, pp 31-32]

/Text/ We are rendering below the second part of the article on technical and vocational training in Cameroon, whose first part can be read in MTM /MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS/ of 25 December 1981 pages 3435 and 3436.

I) The Different Levels (continuation)

D) The higher level--we are presenting here the institutions less known by the public at large, namely, ENSET /Secondary Technical Teachers Training College/, the certificates of senior technicians and the National School of Technology. It is no doubt unnecessary to mention the National Higher Polytechnical Institute.

1) ENSET has been detached from the Secondary Teachers Training College in Yaounde, but it still has not had its own buildings since 1971; at present, it is installed in one of the CETI buildings in Bassa, where CENAFOP /National Vocational Training Center/, founded with the help of the ILO, is also located.

ENSET has two stages: one, which lasts 3 years, trains the CET student-teachers; the other, which lasts 5 years, trains the LT student-teachers. Each of these two stages includes two divisions: division of industrial methods and division of auxiliary methods for administration and the economy. It is recognized there that these two divisions correspond to the two important branches of technical training. The third year of the first stage includes teaching courses; likewise, the third to fifth years of the second stage.

This school has suffered and still suffers from a lack of suitable space and equipment of its own; it has been hampered by a lack of teachers; thus it has not been possible to create a "school spirit." Recruitment of CET student-teachers, division of industrial methods has been limited by the small number of bachelors in the F courses. It is a fact that this school has not attracted students from the beginning, perhaps because of living conditions, which were considered inadequate by the teaching staff, on the whole. The number of students entering rose from 6 in 1971-1972 to 34 in 1977-1978.

Another objection, no doubt connected with the lack of its own equipment: theoretical studies have been extended to a high level and teacher training reportedly has been neglected.

2) There are two types of BTS: the BTS for the management secretariat, which is offered in the Yaounde LT and which attracts mainly

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girls: the BTS for accounting and enterprise management, which is offered in the LT's in Douala and Yaounde and which attracts mainly boys. The studies last 2 years.

In 1980-1981, the BTS management secretariat had 25 students in the first year and 17 in the second year; there were almost as many for the bilingual option. As for the students in the BTS for accounting in Yaounde, there were 24 each year. There are 16 in the second year in 1981-1982 at Douala. We note that these two BTS are connected with the G1 and G2 courses; there is, moreover, a question of creating a BTS distribution which would extend the G3 courses. According to the leaders, the holders of accounting certificates find openings in private industry fairly easily.

3) ENAT [National Institute of Technology] in Yaounde is responsible for "the training, improvement, retraining and specialization of the staffs of land registration survey, rural engineering, civil engineering and city planning." Stage B trains senior technicians who are the direct assistants of engineers. Stage C trains technical representatives. This school works mainly for public administration. In 1980-1981 it was in the process of reorganization and had 344 students, including 6 girls.

After this inventory, we will summarize some problems common to the various levels of technical training.

II) A Few Main Problems

1) The students--They face a not very favorable opinion about technical training which is considered as inferior and reserved for the less gifted; technical studies are making their debut under the sign of failure and rejection. If the openings are sufficient and the salaries suitable, this image can be corrected. To tell the truth, we have found that the entrepreneurs distrust these certificate holders; new rejection! In addition, life in the shop or factory is less secure than office work: we have observed that the certificate holder can fear going to work and turn towards university teaching. Is this situation not the cause of the resignation, lack of initiative and responsibility of which the students are sometimes accused? A LT headmaster sees another cause for it: the young people are taken care of too long by their families, he tells me, thus a lack of responsibility. It is possible to see another cause in the students' lack of motivation: they are not attracted by a trade, but rather by a social status; consequently they are not ready for everything to master this trade.

Then the acceptance of the technical world is the result of a type of conversion which requires several generations. For not a few of the peoples of the Third World, technology is more a "magic of the whites" than the product of great effort. The African cities and countryside

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still present a picture of technological deterioration: the roads, buildings, vehicles, machines are not regularly maintained. Repairs and improvements are done sporadically and often come from outside or a foreign enterprise. This environment certainly affects the students. A breakdown is not disastrous because it is the return to the traditional life which is not without charm.

Similarly, the young African does not live in an atmosphere saturated with technology; rare are those who have played with erector sets, Legos or electric trains; rare are those who have learned to take care of their bicycles. Contrary to a young European, the Cameroonian of the same age who attends the LT does not have the money to buy parts to build himself a quartz alarm clock or a transistor device: he does not have pocket money and the necessary parts are rare and expensive here. This fact and the environment cause the student to be slow in his studies: a teacher of electronics says that to do all the program he would need 50 hours besides.

2) The teachers--National education is making efforts to improve the competence of technical education teachers; these efforts are not eliminating the dissatisfaction of the teaching staff and results which proceed from it: irresponsibility, absenteeism, resignations.

Thus, when ENSET still only had the stage of CET student-teachers, Canada (ACDI [expansion unknown]) trained 35 LT Cameroonian student teachers, often former teachers. After 5 or 6 years, 24 of these teachers moved into private enterprises and only 11 remain on the job. One of them declares: "I am still here, for I have been waiting for 6 years to be reclassified in accordance with my certificates; then I would not remain, unless I am satisfied; if not, I will seek employment elsewhere." This situation is not unusual in Cameroon: officials wait years to be reclassified and they must be absent from their work for 15 days, several times, to go to Yaounde to speed up their file. Many official reports mention excessive administrative delays.

There is a growing disparity in Cameroon between the standard of living of professional workers in the private sector and that of professional workers in administration, particularly those in teaching whose work is demanding. This disparity favors the administration's corruption and inertia. The salary of a secondary school teacher at the beginning of his career is about 120,000 CFA francs per month and that of a technical teacher still at the beginning of his career is about 80,000 CFA francs; to these amounts is added a lodging allowance equal to 20 percent of the salary. Just as bonuses have been granted in secondary teaching, it has been proposed that a system of bonuses be established for technical teaching and, at the present time we do not know if it has been approved.

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Let us emphasize here the considerable assistance provided by French cooperation workers to Cameroon technical training.

3) Material facilities--A LT headmaster admitted that with the rapid development of technical training, it is difficult to increase significantly the credit for each school. Overall, technical training's resources have developed faster than the number of students trained, except for the investment budget which has declined from 1971 to 1973; moreover, this budget rose to 15 million CFA francs in 1973 for all public technical training, which made it possible quite appropriately to buy a system of some importance. The total equipment budget for all technical and vocational training during the Fourth Plan (1976-1981)--including agriculture, the national civic service for participation in development etc.--provided for 15 billion CFA francs in buildings and equipment.

Two problems often recur in reports and conversations: the age and backwardness of some installations, administrative delays in releasing moderate credits.

Age and backwardness. The equipment is old and prevents instruction of students in recent technologies. Thus in MA Auto Mechanics, they do not have an electronic inspection system, so that the students learn understandably to be jacks-of-all-trades like in the "neighborhood garages." In mechanics, a milling machine with a cubic cycle and pneumatic controls is a laboratory curiosity. There is talk about establishing television in Cameroon, but the electronics teacher says he would need an additional year to initiate the students. A professor of electrotechnology told me that Cameroon is 20 years behind and he adds: "The gap is widening with Europe; and, nevertheless, they are building modern plants here. Well, each time we are forced to bring in foreign technicians." That is not quite exact, for in the case of Sonara (petroleum refinery), the future Cameroonian operators were trained in Europe for 2 years, as well as other technicians.

Administrative delays and lack of coordination. Here are a few facts: "At the Douala LT, four milling machines out of seven were broken down because of lack of parts, which did not cost over 200,000 CFA francs. In June 1978, the suppliers had not been paid for the raw material used for the bachelor's degree examinations in June 1977."

Examples of lack of coordination: "In connection with a grant of credit by the World Bank for the physics laboratories of the Douala LT, the arbitrary elimination of some items by administrative services makes some equipment delivered unusable. For the Bonaberi secondary school, some of the equipment delivered is not usable (60 Hertz oscillograph) or shortages of equipment make all training impossible (no engine in the MA section)."

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But the responsibilities are not only on the part of the central administration; we could mention such a school where school equipment has not been maintained (numbers of tables and chairs were allowed to deteriorate in the sun and the rain) and where the students themselves are assessed to buy a padlock to prevent their property from being stolen.

Conclusion

This summary shows some positive aspects and indicates some solutions.

On the government level, we find a real desire to encourage technical training although this desire is slow to be realized and an interest in clarity. To go further in this field, the National Ministry of Education has established a standing committee for the development of technical training.

Students in secondary technical definitely increased, rising from 4,400 in 1960 to 57,000 in 1980, compared with 8,500 and 180,000 for secondary general on the same dates. Nevertheless, the increase of secondary general has been more rapid, since technical which was 51.7 percent of secondary general in 1960, was no more than 31.6 percent in 1980. Certainly, the government would like for technology to increase more rapidly.

There is no simple solution in such a complex field. It would even be deceptive to believe that there where qualified and valuable people are necessary, as well as considerable funds, the atmosphere of technical training can be rapidly changed. The problems will continue for many years.

It will be necessary to increase expenditures for equipment, to renovate the schools and augment their stock of tools; also necessary to increase operating expenses to provide more opportunity for practical shop training; necessary finally to reevaluate the teacher's function.

It is desirable to improve cooperation between the teacher and the enterprises; it has been discussed for years in France; in Cameroon, the fact that many enterprises are still managed by foreigners should no longer be an obstacle to this cooperation, for there are many enterprises managed by nationals. If we want the enterprises to hire certificate holders, it is advisable to interest them more in training, by consulting them about programs and goals; the employers' association could have some influence in the creation and development of vocational schools; it would be necessary to moderate wage legislation; it would be possible to expedite the transfer of some equipment from enterprises to schools; finally, if it is desired to spread the practice of training courses, it is necessary to consult the enterprises.

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GABON

SOCIAL MEASURES INCLUDED IN 1982 BUDGET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3375

[Text] An official communique, issued after a meeting of the Gabonese Council of Ministers on 5 December (see MTM of 11 December 1981 p 3313), gives the following details about Gabon's budget for 1982 which amounts to 453.5 billion CFA francs.

The budget, 10 percent higher than the 1981 budget, is broken down as follows: public debt, 120 billion CFA francs; operating expenditures, 132.1 billion; transfers and operations 18.6 billion; investments, 182.8 billion.

In the development budget, special emphasis is given to social, educational and health expenditures as well as to agriculture and infrastructures.

The various chapters of the development budget are: vocational training: 1.71 billion CFA francs (7.9 percent increase compared to 1981); national education and higher education: 11.24 billion (up by 7.1 percent); health, 4.04 billion (up by 2.6 percent); social affairs, 850 million (up by 0.5 percent); subsidized housing, 7.08 billion (up by 4.5 percent); agriculture, 12.5 billion (up by 7.8 percent); energy, 14.13 billion (up by 8.9 percent); roads and bridges, 29.26 billion (up by 18.6 percent).

Social Policy

Since the purpose of the government's social policy is to improve the living standard of all social strata, in the course of the Council of Ministers' meeting the head of state ordered the minister of economy and finance to seek additional funds to accelerate the implementation of the national housing program.

Also, in an effort to lessen some of the social burdens of the Gabonese people, the government has decided:

(1) Starting next year, to grant family subsidies to the poor; the method of payment will be announced at a future date.

(2) Starting on 1 January 1982 and applicable to the entire national territory, the rates for ordinary medium voltage electricity will remain frozen at the level of 31 December 1981.

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"This measure consolidates the decision made by the president of the Republic in July 1980, which is now in effect, to freeze all charges for low voltage electricity throughout the country and the water rates in towns other than Libreville and Port-Gentil. These measures...are mainly intended to lighten the burden of the Gabonese people's family budget and to encourage small and medium-size businesses."

(3) To study the possibility of having SOTRAVIL (Libreville Transport Company) purchase an additional batch of buses for the urban transport services.

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GABON

FAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE SHOWN FOR 1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3438

[Article: "Balance of Payments Surplus in 1980"]

[Text] Gabon's Balance of Payments Committee met recently in Libreville and noted a surplus of 20.3 billion francs CFA [African Financial Community] for the 1980 fiscal year, as opposed to a deficit of 3.5 billion CFA in 1979, according to the account given by the Gabonese daily L'UNION.

The volume of balance of payments transactions reached the record level of 800 billion francs CFA in 1980 (up 30 percent over 1979).

These quite favorable results were achieved despite large expenditures (232.5 billion CFA for the operating budget and 102.4 billion CFA for the development budget), as well as payback on the national debt. The surplus is due mainly to increased income from oil production.

Despite a production drop of 900,000 metric tons [mt], receipts rose from 273 billion CFA in 1979 to 413 billion CFA in 1980 because of the combined effect of an increase in the price per barrel on the international market and the great strength of the dollar at the end of the year following spectacular increases in value.

The amount of the paid, direct and guaranteed Gabonese national debt on 31 December 1980 still came to 406.8 billion CFA. The 1981 budget allocates 270 billion CFA to partial retirement of the national debt.

Gabonese exports other than oil (manganese, uranium and wood) had some trouble in 1980 because of the international economic situation. Still, the trade surplus reached a record level at 390 billion CFA in 1980 as opposed to 263 billion CFA in 1979. This increase largely made up for service expenses, which are still large, whereas the overall positive balance of goods and services came to 202 billion CFA as opposed to 72 billion in 1979.

Free loans removed a deficit of 26 billion CFA caused by foreign workers' sending their wages home. The deficit in the balance of services increased concurrently with increased expenditures due to oil prospecting and development.

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The deficit in long- and short-term capital was much greater (up 152 billion CFA) mainly because of payments on foreign debt and especially commercial credit to finance increased exports.

The committee also noted that the 1981 balance of payments is expected to show another large surplus.

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GABON

BRIEFS

INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION PROSPECTS--Gabon now produces 7.5 million metric tons [mt] of oil a year and could, "with time," bring production up to 10 million mt a year, said the 2nd vice-prime minister of Gabon, the minister of Mines and Oil, Mr Etienne Buy Mouvagha-Tchioba, in the journal PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES. The Gabonese minister explained that recent discoveries have doubled Gabon's known oil reserves but that the government has not yet decided on the production level to be reached. Mr Mouvagha-Tchioba admitted that Gabon had had "some trouble" in selling its oil at \$35 a barrel. Since 1 November the price of Gabonese crude has fallen to \$34, and Mr Mouvagha-Tchioba thinks it is still too early to say whether this decrease "has been enough for customers to increase their orders." As for relations with foreign oil companies operating in Gabon, the minister revealed that the Gabonese government's objective is to increase its share in their capital from 25 percent to a 35-41 percent portion. Negotiations have been undertaken with ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France], which accounts for most of Gabon's production, and Shell. The Gabonese minister hopes to reach an agreement before the end of 1982. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3438] 8782

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

INCREASED FRENCH COOPERATION DISCUSSED--General Joao Bernardo Vieira, president of Guinea-Bissau, discussed increased cooperation between Paris and Bissau with Mr Francois Mitterrand in a 3/4-hour conversation in Paris on 17 December. After the discussion, General Vieira, who was meeting the president of France for the first time, mentioned that he had brought up with Mr Francois Mitterrand the possibility of "triangular cooperation" between France, Portugal and Portuguese-language African countries. This theme had been stressed by Mr Francois Mitterrand during his visit to Portugal last week. As concerns bilateral cooperation, the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) provided 13.7 million French francs in subsidies in 1980 and directs its efforts mainly toward restoring peanut production, which is Guinea-Bissau's main source of foreign currency. The FAC is also participating in developing the country's hydroelectric resources and in taking a mineral resources inventory (especially in prospecting for phosphates), as well as aiding fisheries. About 40 Guinea-Bissau citizens hold French scholarships, while about 30 French technical assistants are presently in Guinea-Bissau. France has been giving Guinea-Bissau wheat and corn in food aid annually since 1977. In 1980, this aid amounted to 1,000 metric tons [mt] of wheat flour and 1,000 mt of corn. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) has been aiding Guinea-Bissau with loans since 1976. Loans amounted to Fr 8.4 million in 1980. The 3rd meeting of the joint France-Guinea-Bissau commission was held in Paris in March 1981. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3426] 8782

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MOZAMBIQUE

SPECTRUM OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3449

[Article: "Franco-Mozambican Financial and Economic Relations"]

[Text] The following is a summary of France's financial and economic relations with Mozambique as of the date of Mr Jean-Pierre Cot's visit to that country and the signing of a general cooperation agreement.

(A) Public and private financing: On 23 April 1977 a group of French banks, including the General Company and IndoSuez, and the Bank of Mozambique concluded a purchasing credit framework agreement. This agreement was made for 2 years and included a Fr 50 million credit ceiling that was later raised to Fr 75 million and Fr 125 million. This agreement was renewed in April 1981 for a maximum of Fr 175 million in credit usable till April 1983.

Also, financial agreements were concluded in Paris on 18 March 1980. They included a Fr 117-million contract (mixed loan) for buying 15 shrimp boats from France, opening a Fr 100-million line of credit for miscellaneous purchases in France, a Fr 50-million to buy various food and agricultural products from France, and financing for two large contracts in the energy sector.

At present these various lines of credit have been exhausted, and the framework of financial relations between France and Mozambique consists of the aforementioned interbank agreement and the balance of the mixed loan.

Negotiations were undertaken between the governments of the two countries to set up a new cooperation agreement, which was signed in Maputo recently on the occasion of the visit by Mr J.-P. Cot (mentioned above).

(B) Operations and investment: The development of economic and commercial relations between France and the People's Republic of Mozambique goes back to 1979-80. It is, then, recent in date and has so far been implemented by large sales of semi-finished products, agricultural and food products and equipment.

(a) In engineering, nothing concrete has been achieved, but contacts and studies have involved the energy sector, transports and communications, civil aviation, telecommunications, industry and agriculture.

(b) Equipment is being supplied and installed by the group CGEE [General Electrical Equipment Company]-Alstom for the Cabora Bassa dam (2,250 megawatts) and, jointly with the Italian company SAE [expansion unknown] it has been building the electric line linking this dam with the Center and North regions of Mozambique. It has also

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been participating in building the Mavusi hydroelectric plant. The Campenon-Bernard Company has been taking part in constructing a bridge on the Zambezi.

(c) In industrial construction, the group Renault Industrial Vehicles has been closely involved in repair operations on Berliet heavy vehicles. The Cifal company has contracted to build a 15,000-metric ton [mt] capacity refrigerator warehouse in Maputo to receive potatoes and onions.

(C) Mining and oil production: The BRGM [Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration] and the General Geophysical Company are doing geophysical and photogeological studies for mineral prospecting in the North and West regions of the country. No mining is being done at present by French companies, as this sector is the object of close cooperation between Mozambique and the GDR. However, some projects in this sector have been discussed by the Mozambican coal authorities and the French. Similarly, the national hydrocarbon authorities would like to bring France into seismic gas exploration. French companies have not done any oil exploration in Mozambique since the country became independent in 1975.

(D) Trade: In 1979, France's trade with Mozambique came to Fr 137 million of exports from France and Fr 53 million of imports to France. France was then the 8th largest supplier to Mozambique (4.1 percent of imports to Mozambique) and its 7th largest customer (3.1 percent of imports from Mozambique). The financial agreements concluded on 18 March in Paris between the two countries as complemented by the credit agreement of 21 May 1980 on various agricultural food products, as well as excellent use made of the framework agreement on purchase credit signed 12 April 1979 have all contributed much toward improving the French position on the Mozambican market.

Indeed, French sales had reached Fr 215 million or an increase of 56.93 percent. This increase was due largely to capital equipment, as French purchases declined by 16.98 percent, amounting to only Fr 44 million.

At the end of the first 7 months of 1981, French exports to Mozambique are considerably more than Fr 231 million, and imports amount to Fr 29 million.

French exports are made up mainly of 3 main groups, which are all up: semi-finished products and intermediate goods, 53.06 percent of the total; agricultural and food products, 21.59 percent; capital equipment, 18.4 percent.

Mozambican exports also fall into 3 main groups: agricultural and food products, 48.42 percent; consumer goods, 30.9 percent; and raw materials, 18 percent.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

PORTUGAL-EEC CONNECTION VIEWED--According to Mr Prakash Ratilal, vice-governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Portugal's eventual entry into the EEC could favor increased economic cooperation between Lisbon and Maputo. Mr Ratilal sees Portugal's access to EEC finance sources as possibly helping Portuguese industrialists overcome their investment problems, which are preventing them from putting into effect several economic development projects in Mozambique. Mr Ratilal says that Portugal's cooperation should involve particularly the sectors of light and heavy industry, petrochemicals, cattle raising, shipyards, and the pharmaceutical industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 43] 8782

STEEL SALVAGE PROJECT PLANNED--Some Frenchmen may remember the slogan popular in 1939-40: "We shall forge scrap metal into the steel of victory." This is what Mozambique intends to do now. The CIFEL [expansion unknown], in Maputo, has set up a project that should start about the middle of the current decade and eventually produce about 50,000 metric tons of steel a year. CIFEL plans to use as raw material old, scrap ship hulls purchased abroad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 43] 8782

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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

BADEA LOAN WILL HELP TO DOUBLE ENERGY PRODUCTION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3373

[Text] The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA) decided, at the end of October, to extend to the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe a \$5 million loan to help that country launch a project to increase its production of electricity.

This is the first time that the BADEA is participating in a project in that country which, however, received assistance from the FASA (Special Arab Fund for Africa) on 2 occasions (\$10 million to finance several small investment projects and \$500,000 to help with its balance of payments) and several other contributions from Arab sources.

The power project, partly financed by the BADEA loan, represents a total investment of \$12.85 million and its other financial backers are the IDA [International Development Association] with \$5.1 million, the Portuguese Government with \$2.2 million and the Government of Sao Tome and Principe with \$550,000.

Currently the country has an installed capacity of 4,270 kilowatts generated by public (81 percent) and private (19 percent) facilities. Out of that total, 2,358 kilowatts are produced at hydraulic power plants and the rest at thermal power plants. The total amount of electricity needed is estimated to be 5,600 kilowatts which means that there is a supply deficit of 1,330 kilowatts. This deficit, caused by a 10 percent rate of growth in the demand, will be as high as 3,500 kilowatts in 1983 which is why the government urgently must rectify the situation and why it has worked out the current plan. The various aspects of the plan involve building, in the industrial zone of Sao Tome and Principe, a new power station equipped with two diesel generators capable of generating 2,000 kilowatts each; carrying out the necessary civil engineering works; building tanks which can hold 380 cubic meters of fuel and oil; training technical personnel for the power station, supplying various electrical equipments; giving technical assistance to and training staff for the Electricity and Water Company.

When this project is completed, the result will be a significant increase (almost 100 percent) in electricity generation to meet domestic and industrial demand. This project is the first answer to the problem of limited hydroelectrical power generation in the islands (particularly during the dry season and when the volume of the river flow goes down) and to the need to turn to thermal power. The problem will have an indirect effect on the national economy and will enable the government keep the same rates as in 1978 for electricity and water supplied for household use.

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According to the construction billbook, the project which will be supervised by the Electricity and Water Company (attached to the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Industry), is scheduled to be completed in August 1983.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON MASS MEDIA INQUIRY

PM051259 London THE TIMES in English 5 Feb 82 p 8

[Article by Michael Hornsby: "Hostility to Press Plan Rejected as Hysterical"]

[Text] Cape Town, 4 Feb--Mr R. F. Botha, the South African foreign minister, today described as hysterical and premature the hostile press reaction here and abroad to the proposals of the Steyn Commission of inquiry into the mass media.

In an interview with THE TIMES, Mr Botha maintained that the press coverage of the Steyn report had been deliberately "dished up in such a fashion as to give the impression to the reader abroad that the government intends to kill press freedom in this country",

"Some papers here obviously expected the government to react immediately, and to clamp down on the press, and the government did exactly the opposite", Mr Botha maintained. "The present hysterical outburst is apparently based on frustration that the government did not react as expected".

The Steyn report, accompanied by draft bills embodying its proposals, was tabled in parliament earlier this week. If implemented, the draft laws would, among other things, require all journalists to be licensed by a statutory board of controls. This has been widely condemned as a means of imposing political conformity.

The prime minister's response in parliament to the Steyn report had been "very, very categorical and clearly stated", Mr Botha declared.

"He said that the government could not give a conclusive 'yes' or 'no', that it was a voluminous report, that it required study and that negotiations would take place with the press. Now what more reasonable attitude can any government adopt?"

It was impossible, Mr Botha insisted, for the government to indicate that its final position might be when it was still only "at the beginning of discussion with the press". Nor could he be able to express any personal view on the Steyn proposals until he knew what the outcome of these negotiations were.

Mr Botha's comment will do little to calm the fears of editors and journalists here who question the motives of the government in commissioning the Steyn report in the first place and are alarmed that the government should be prepared even to consider a measure like the compulsory registration of journalists.

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The foreign minister's remarks tend to confirm the view gaining ground here that the government's initial strategy will be to try and persuade the press to exercise self-censorship while holding over its head the threat of legislation as a weapon of last resort.

The government's main target is the influential English-language press, which is by far the freest in Africa and keeps up a constant nagging assault on the policy of apartheid. Pretoria would dearly love to see this criticism muffled.

In response, newspaper owners and editors have set up a committee to draw up a plan for remodelling the existing, though largely ineffectual, South African Press Council.

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