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(FOUO 7/82)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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EGYPT

EXCERPTS FROM BOOK OF PROMINENT LEFTIST LUTFI AL-KHULI

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22, 23-29 Oct, 5, 6-12, 13-19 Nov 81

[Article: "Chapter From Lutfi al-Khuli's New Book: 'Al-Sadat Political School and Egyptian Left'; Al-Sadat: Those With Him and Those Against Him"]

[16-22 Oct 81, pp 48-50, 55-56]

[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will, as of this issue, publish in series a chapter of Lutfi al-Khuli's new book which will be published shortly under the title of "Al-Sadat Political School And The Egyptian Left." In this chapter, the author answers a large number of perplexing questions that continued to accompany al-Sadat from the time he assumed power in Egypt after President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's death to the time when all political forces with their various inclinations, united against his domestic, Arab and international policies and the time when he finally fell with the bullets of a fedayeen [commando] group of the Egyptian army.

The series deal in succession with al-Sadat's tactics in insuring his assumption of power with the unanimous consent of all the national and progressive forces in 1970, with his managing to gain exclusive control of power in the face of the early opposition forces which preferred to confront him from within their positions in the regime's bureaucratic agencies, without the participation of the masses. This is what became known as the so-called "centers of power" which were headed at the time by 'Ali Sabri, the vice president of the republic, in his capacity as the "head of the ruling Nasirist group." The series also deal with the causes and motives for al-Sadat's manipulation of Egypt's policy from the July 1952 revolution, from the Nasirist line, from pan-Arabism, from the Palestinian issue and from the position of nonalignment to what became known as the May or al-Sadat revolution, to the open-door economic policy, to alignment with the United States, to antagonizing the Arab national movement and to concluding peace with the Israeli enemy.

Lutfi al-Khuli--by observing and analyzing a number of events to which he himself was a witness or in which he was a participant, events most of which are revealed for the first time--follows carefully the movement of events in Egypt from the early 1970's to answer the big question concerning the emergence of the new, harmonious and fundamental national opposition force from its positions in the socio-political street against al-Sadat regime. This emergence led to intensifying the comprehensive confrontation between the two sides in a manner which made the political observers record the confrontation very carefully, especially in the wake of the large-scale campaign of arrests launched at the beginning of last September.

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This is the "extraordinary" event which led to the estrangement between the regime and all the vital forces in the Egyptian society. This is also the event which opened the door to numerous expectations, the most prominent being the comparison between al-Sadat regime in Egypt and the shah's regime in Iran.

Lutfi al-Khuli, who is known for his national and progressive political activity throughout the past quarter century, had concentrated, with the aid of the editorial staff of AL-TALI'AH magazine whose chief editor he was from 1965 to 1977, on studying al-Sadat's political steps with all their details and dimensions and studying what al-Sadat had told him confidentially in the numerous meetings between the two men which continued until 1975. In dealing with "al-Sadat phenomenon," al-Khuli has employed the instruments of objective analysis as a researcher in a political laboratory and has ended up crystallizing the concepts, goals, and technology of what he calls "al-Sadat political school" and its movement which constitutes a retrogression from the march of Egypt's national and pan-Arab history. In this study, al-Khuli had expected al-Sadat to embark after the October war on concluding a separate peace with Israel under the auspices and support of the United States. This expectation came a full 5 years before the peace was concluded.

In the same method and inside the political laboratory, al-Khuli has also dealt with the phenomenon of the comprehensive opposition to al-Sadat regime--opposition launched at the outset by the leftist forces with their various intellectual sources.

Lutfi al-Khuli was the chief editor of the Egyptian AL-TALI'AH magazine which al-Sadat shut down in 1977 in the wake of the well-known popular uprising which covered all of Egypt on 18-19 January of that year. He is a member of the Central Secretariat of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party and a member of the 100-man committee of the National Coalition Front. Last March, he was elected a member of the Journalists Union Council and headed the committee to defend the press and unicist liberties. He was banned from writing and publishing in AL-AHRAM as of 1976 even though he is a member of the Editorial Council, a political commentator and the man who founded the paper's Opinion Page in 1962. President al-Sadat ordered his arrest as part of the campaign which he had launched against his opponents a month before his assassination. But al-Khuli escaped arrest because he happened to be abroad at the time for heart treatment. Al-Khuli has been arrested more than once and he has written numerous political and literary books.

When President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir died in September 1970, the part of the regime floating on the surface of the Egyptian arena consisted of a number of "legitimate institutions" in which the main positions were held by personalities that had been always eager to declare their full abidance by the July 1952 revolution with its Nasirist concept and course that were embodied in the 1962 National Action Charter and the 30 March 1968 program.

None of those personalities had been known to hold an opinion or a position, stated or implied, conflicting with the position or opinion of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir until the time of his death. If it so happened that one of them declared a position on an issue before 'Abd al-Nasir had made his decision on the issue (and this rarely happened), then the individual involved quickly changed that position to make it compatible with the opinion on which the "chief" had decided.

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It so happened that when Washington declared in 1970 the so-called "Rogers initiative" to solve the Middle East crisis, 'Abd al-Nasir had been preparing to visit the Soviet Union. He preferred at the time to delay declaring his position toward the initiative until after the end of the visit. But Anwar al-Sadat, the then vice president, hastened--in the face of urgent questions raised during meetings of the Socialist Union--to declare Egypt's rejection of the initiative, replying on the general line followed by 'Abd al-Nasir in his relationship with the United States. But as soon as 'Abd al-Nasir decided to approve the initiative, Anwar al-Sadat changed his position, continuing the performance of his duties as vice president.

At the top of the institutions left by 'Abd al-Nasir's regime emerged the "presidential institution, which, upon the death of the "chief," belonged temporarily to al-Sadat in accordance with Article 110 of the constitution in his capacity as the sole vice president. Since his sudden appointment to the position on 20 December 1969 until a new president was to be elected within a period of no more than 60 days.

Under the canopy of the presidential institution lied the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, the sole political organization ruling the country. This leadership was embodied in the Supreme Executive Committee formed of Husayn al-Shafi'i, 'Ali Sabri, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur, Dr Mahmud Fawzi, Dr Labib Shuqayr, Diya' Dawud and Kamal Ramzi Istaynu, in addition to Anwar al-Sadat who succeeded 'Abd al-Nasir to the chairmanship of the committee and the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers (the executive authority) after 'Abd al-Nasir's death.

Within the framework of the Arab Socialist Union leadership, the union's organizations in each of the two governorates of Cairo and al-Cizah in particular occupied a special place because of their "massive popular membership" which was relatively active and effective on the Egyptian political arena in comparison to the Socialist Union organizations in the other governorates. 'Abd al-Majid Farid, the secretary general of the presidency, was in charge of the Cairo organization while Farid 'Abd al-Karim was in charge of al-Cizah organization.

The People's Assembly (the legislative authority) emerged within these institutions. All its members belonged to the Arab Socialist Union and its speaker was Dr Labib Shuqayr.

The "armed forces institution," if we may use the phrase, came under the direct control of the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir after it had been purged of the elements produced by the conditions and complications of its defeat on the hands of Israel while under the command of Field Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir who preferred to commit suicide after his abortive coup attempt. 'Abd al-Nasir had focused the greater part of his time and his efforts on rebuilding the armed forces and preparing them, with massive aid from the Soviet Union, to "restore what Israel had usurped by force," assisted by Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi, the minister of war and the general commander, and by Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq, the chief of staff.

Heirs of Decision

In addition to all this, a number of personalities that had gained an influential position in making and implementing the political decision held important positions in the structure of the regime as a result of their presence within the narrow circle of trust surrounding the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. Foremost

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among those personalities were: Dr 'Aziz Sidqi, the deputy prime minister and minister of industry; Mahmud Riyad, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal who held the position of minister of information in addition to that of chief editor of AL-AHRAM; Amin Hawaydi, the minister of state; Muhammad Fa'iq, the minister of state for foreign affairs; Sami Sharaf, the minister of state for presidential affairs who also held the position of director of the late president's office for long years; Muhammad Hafiz Isma'il, the chief of intelligence who replaced Salah Nasr who had held the position for long years and who had been relieved from this position after participating with Field Marshal 'Amir and Shams Badran, the minister of war during the 1967 war, in the coup attempt in the armed forces; and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the commander of the republican guard which had turned into a military force, with resources exceeding its traditional function as a mere guard force, and into a force trained to confront and fight any coup attempt.

The "judiciary authority" retreated to a corner of the society after the ferocious battle which had taken place between itself and the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union over the so-called politicization of the judiciary and its transformation from an "authority" to a popular "utility" as a result of the statements made and position taken in the wake of the defeat by the Executive Council of the Judges Club, headed at the time by Counselor Mumtaz Nassar who was also the deputy chairman of the Appellate Court, on the need to amend or abolish the laws restricting the liberties. The statements and positions also condemned a number of measures and actions taken by the security authorities which undermined the rights and liberties of the citizens. The battle was managed on the side of the Socialist Union by 'Ali Sabri, the then union's secretary general, the Muhammad Abu Nasir, the [minister] of justice at the time. Because the battle intensified to the degree of an actual strike by the judiciary--something which threatened the regime's stability and prestige in the wake of a terrible national defeat--the late President 'Abd al-Nasir formed a committee under the chairmanship of Anwar al-Sadat to examine the tense situation and to propose decisive solutions for it. The committee ended by recommending the dismissal of nearly 200 judges in the general prosecution on the grounds of their disloyalty to the regime, according to the regime's general political and social criteria. President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir approved the recommendation and issued a law implementing them on 31 August 1969. This is the law which the majority of the country's intellectuals called the "judiciary massacre" to reflect the dark shadows which it cast over the "regime's democracy."

It seemed from observing the movement of the visible events in the period following 'Abd al-Nasir's death and until May 1971 that the "regime's heirs" had clung to unity and solidarity and had overcome the differences within their ranks on the one hand and had fought, on the other hand, any endeavor to expand the "inheritance circle" including them by adding to it other outside elements. They declared their firm resolution to enact the rules of the regime's legitimacy, as stated by the existing constitution, in the transfer of power to a new president and a new government within the framework of the "Nasirist regime" without any change and through a collective leadership that continues the march "on the path of the immortal leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, relying on the Arab Socialist Union organization and the People's Assembly and adhering to the slogan of "no voice above the voice of the battle until all the traces of the 1967 aggression are eliminated." They all condemned, in one form or another, all the voices that had risen at home and abroad to speak about either the presence of conflicts among the "legitimate heirs" or

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about the presence of a terrible vacuum in the wake of the absence of 'Abd al-Nasir with his leadership and his historical weight--a vacuum which the "legitimate" heirs could not fill by themselves.

As soon as 'Abd al-Nasir was laid to rest in his grave, the Socialist Union hastened to declare the organizational steps for the transfer of power from Anwar al-Sadat, the interim president, to a constitutionally elected president. It was decided to bring up the issue of nomination of the new president before the Supreme Executive Committee on 3 October 1970, to summon the People's Assembly to an extraordinary session on 7 October to ratify the nomination and to conduct a referendum on the president of the republic on 15 October so that the People's Assembly may, if the result of the referendum is positive, meet on 17 October 1970 in order that the president may take the oath of office before it.

This is why a general impression was left in the country that the "collective" leadership which had inherited 'Abd al-Nasir's regime was united." This impression was helped by the considerably quick tempo of the transfer of power and by the unanimous consent on a single candidate for the presidency, namely Anwar al-Sadat who was projected to the masses as the only man among the Revolution Command Council members selected by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir as his sole vice president under the terrible conditions prevailing after the 1967 defeat. The Socialist Union agencies, especially the organizations of the Cairo and Alexandria Governorates, organized dozens of "popular processions" to the residence of the sole candidate in al-Tahirah Palace to declare their absolute support for him as the successor of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, as leader of the procession and as head of the state.

Image and Reality

Before the sun of 1970 had set, the new regime established itself atop the society in the form of a "Nasirist regime" not different in form, in slogans or in persons from the regime existing until 28 September 1970, except for the absence of the person of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir by reason of death.

At the presidential office and in the Socialist Union leadership, Anwar al-Sadat settled down as president and declared that his program is the same program which 'Abd al-Nasir included in his proclamation of 30 March 1968. 'Ali Sabri and Husayn al-Shafi'i became his vice presidents and the Socialist Union Supreme Executive Committee remained as it had been previously without any change even though one of its members, namely, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nar, became secretary general instead of 'Ali Sabri. The People's Assembly maintained its previous condition under the speakership of Dr Labib Shuqayr. Dr Mahmud Fawzi, President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's assistant until the president's death, became prime minister and selected his cabinet members from among the personalities which held the main positions in the regime after the 1967 defeat, excluding Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, who by his own choice, preferred to leave the Ministry of Information to devote his time to his original work as chief editor of AL-AHRAM.

Thus, the image floating on the surface of society seemed calm and stable, combining in harmony all the so-called "legitimate heirs" of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

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But deep inside, the conditions were the complete reverse of the outwardly image. Latent conflicts stirred in various forms among numerous axes, entangled by intrinsic and objective complications, within the circle of the so-called legitimate heirs. These are the conflicts which Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir used to settle or suppress with deterrant and restraining measures which reached the point of punishment at times. With the disappearance of 'Abd al-Nasir, the conflicts revived but with caution dictated by the sudden death of the "chief" which took all concerned by surprise and without their being prepared on the one hand and without the heirs having the experience, on the other hand, to exercise power directly and not through or under the shadow of the "teacher." Each axis, and at times one part of the axis acting against the other parts, tried to gain time and supporters in an effort to gain sole control of power.

The phrase "the others" was not confined at the time to the numerous axes within the circle of the legitimate heirs but extended to include the historical leaders of the July revolution who, in the name of national unity and of filling the vacuum left by the absence of the revolution leader, tried to participate in power. The phrase also extended to the movements of the rightist and leftist forces in society with their various currents and their efforts to push the post-'Abd al-Nasir regime in their direction.

Foremost among the axes involved in deep conflict was the so-called Presidential Advisory Committee which the president had formed after the 1967 defeat and after foiling the coup attempt led by Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir. 'Abd al-Nasir relied on this committee in running the country's internal affairs and in supervising the activities of the Council of Ministers, which the president himself headed, in accordance with the instructions he issued. The president thus began to relieve himself gradually from the burdens of internal executive action and its daily details and to devote the major part of his efforts and time to rebuild the armed forces and to manage the international diplomatic battle against Israel and the United States of America. This committee, shrouded in secrecy, consisted of Sha'rawi Jum'ah, the minister of interior; Amin Huwaydi, who held the position of minister of war, of chairman of the general intelligence and of minister of state; Muhammad Fa'iq, the minister of state for foreign affairs; and Sami Sharaf, the president's information secretary and the minister of state. 'Abd al-Nasir used to surprise the committee every now and then by including Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the minister of information and chief editor of AL-AHRAM, in its activities.

Another axis was developing within the leadership of the Socialist Union (6 million registered members) and of its main and assisting organizations, such as the People's Assembly, the trade unions, the press and the information media. This axis was developing under the leadership of 'Ali Sabri and was gaining its weight from its actual ruling power in each of the Supreme Committee and the Central Committee. Prominent members of this axis included Sha'rawi Jum'ah (who used to take part in the meetings of the Supreme Executive Committee in a special capacity even though he was not a member of this committee), 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur, Dr Labab Shuqayr, Diya' al-Din Dawud, 'Abd al-Majid Farid and Hafiz Badawi. This axis exercised its power by organizing popular demonstrations under slogans which it determined for those demonstrations and by having the "required decisions" issued without much difficulty by the various leadership bodies of the political organization.

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Parallel to this axis, another axis, including the leadership of the so-called Vanguard Organization, was formed. This axis was closest in structure to the formula of a socialist party with secret cells entrusted to exert efforts to guide and lead the Socialist Union from within by way of a "trained socialist cadre," on the grounds that the Union--a vast and broad alliance comprised of the people's working forces, including the national capitalism, was a slow-moving body. This is how the idea emerged on the need to form the Vanguard Organization so that it may lead the Socialist Union slowly but surely through the complex phase of transformation into socialism. 'Abd al-Nasir had called secretly for formation of the Vanguard Organization in the mid-1960's so that it may include the socialist elements from the various currents which accepted the National Action Charter as a course and as a central starting point in the phase of transformation which 'Abd al-Nasir had estimated in 1962 would require 10 years, ending in 1971-72. Thus, membership of the Vanguard Organization was opened to the leftist Nasirists and the communists who had dissolved their independent and underground organizations in the mid-1960's and joined membership of the Socialist Union individually.

'Abd al-Nasir himself continued to supervise with enthusiasm the formation and management of the Vanguard Organization, assisted by 'Ali Sabri, Ahmad Fu'ad and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. But 'Abd al-Nasir's enthusiasm turned quickly lukewarm as a result of domestic and external conditions, especially because of the efforts demanded by the process of rebuilding the armed forces in the wake of the 1967 defeat. However, 'Abd al-Nasir continued to maintain the Vanguard Organization as a source of information on the tendencies and movements of society's socialist forces and as an agency entrusted with "revolutionary" tasks in confronting the "conservative forces" in the regime and in society whenever the need arose to deter those forces. This was done in such a manner to make it seem as if it emanated from the popular base below and not as mere administrative measures imposed "from above." Upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, 'Ali Sabri, Ahmad Fu'ad and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal had been removed or had set themselves apart from the Vanguard Organization leadership which was concentrated in a central secretariat controlled fundamentally by Shar'rawi Jum'ah, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Fa'iq and Hilmi al-Sa'id, the economic advisor to the president, assisted by two or three Marxist elements, such as Ahmad Hamrush and Mahmud Amin al-'Alim.

But the most dangerous axis was embodied in the Military Committee to rebuild the armed forces and to prepare them in the relatively long range to launch a comprehensive war of reprisal against Israel and prepare them in the short run, not exceeding 1972, to implement the "Granite" plan calling for crossing canal, storming the Bar-lev line and proceeding forward in the Sinai to control the passes. 'Abd al-Nasir focused his energies in this committee, assisted by Gen Muhammad Fa zi, the minister of war, and Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq who succeeded Gen 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad to the post of chief of staff after the latter's martyrdom, in addition to a limited number of commanders of the armed forces.

In addition to this axis, there rose the Republican Guard axis whose forces had been strengthened to the point of being able to launch offensive warfare, thus exceeding the lines of a conventional guard force. 'Abd al-Nasir supervised this axis through Sami Sharaf, the presidential secretary for information and the minister of state, and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the guard commander.

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It can be said that there were two other axes, each of them revolving fundamentally around a distinguished personality which had gained special weight as a result of special talents which it employed intelligently or as a result of holding important positions within the narrow circle of trust surrounding Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, thus becoming able to know the regime's secrets and to participate partially or completely in making the political decisions.

The first personality was embodied in Anwar al-Sadat who had been selected by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir from among all members of the July Revolution Command Council as his sole vice president on 20 December 1969 on a sudden decision which had the impact of lightning on everybody. This decision continued to be hard to understand or accept by the other axes. However, those axes agreed on assessing this decision as one which led to forcing an "intruding" element on the relations of each of them with the president who had started experiencing severe physical, psychological and nervous pains as a result of a degenerating heart disease and of diabetes in his exhausted body and as a result of the interaction of these ailments with the pressures of the defeat and of the abortive coup attempt led by 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, 'Abd al-Nasir's lifelong friend and comrade in struggle. The coup culminated with 'Amir's suicide and with the trial of his partners who had occupied sensitive positions and had enjoyed the "chief's" trust, such as Shams Badran, the minister of war, and Salah Nasr, the director of intelligence.

Thus, al-Sadat moved suddenly, and in less than one year before 'Abd al-Nasir's death, from the rear and dark positions in the regime to the spotlights of the forward positions and he came to be trusted by the "chief" with official or popular positions which, by their nature, had been previously the monopoly of this or that axis. He came to have a hand or a finger in every place and replaced the "chief" in running the country's affairs whenever the latter was on work or treatment trips abroad, including the duties of heading the state, the Socialist Union and the Military Committee. The Vanguard Organization's leadership committee was the only axis which al-Sadat could not penetrate. Al-Sadat had participated in the Vanguard Organization at the outset but he soon found himself excluded from it when he and other prominent figures of the regime were ousted silently from the organization upon its reorganization in the wake of the defeat.

Al-Sadat wasted no time or effort from the moment he entered the circle of power when he was appointed vice president. Quietly and silently, he began to form a "socio-political" base upon which to rely inside and outside the regime in confronting all the other axes which considered him an intruding element to be rid of or reduced to minimum size as soon as possible.

In the Socialist Union, al-Sadat took charge of the Political and Foreign Relations Committee. In this capacity, he proceeded actively to hold periodic organizational meetings in the various governorates of the republic and formed the so-called "political club at the central headquarters of the Socialist Union in Cairo" where he met weekly with members of the Socialist Union and with its committee officers to answer, in the name of 'Abd al-Nasir, whatever questions he raised, after reaching agreement with 'Abd al-Nasir on the broad lines of the answers. In this regard, al-Sadat was able, without clamor, to rally behind him leadership elements of the political organization tied by interests to the bourgeoisie despite the socialist slogans they were raising. This is in addition to rallying some liberal elements which had become upset with the sequestration measures and with the restrictions imposed by the "regime's leftist axes."

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In the government agencies, al-Sadat was able to win over to his side the elements hostile to the "regime's leftist axes" which held important positions in the power structure, such as Maj Gen Ahmad Isma'il who had been the field commander of the Suez front and who reaped 'Abd al-Nasir's wrath in the wake of the Israeli raid on the front's modern radar at the end of 1968 (Isma'il later became the minister of war and the general commander of the armed forces during the October 1973 war); Maj Gen Muhammad Sadiq, who was occupying the position of chief of staff of the armed forces (later became minister of war before being dismissed by al-Sadat prior to the October war); and Maj Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali who later became minister of war and minister of foreign affairs.

Al-Sadat infiltrated the People's Assembly also and was able to form secretly within it groups loyal to him, led by Hafiz Badawi and Mahmud Abu Wafiyah in Lower Egypt and by Ahmad 'Abd al-Akhir and Yusuf Makkawi in Upper Egypt. Al-Sadat also proceeded to strengthen his relations with and to spread his protection over groups of the new class engaged in the sphere of contracting, wholesale trade and agricultural investment, such as 'Uthman and Ahmad 'Uthman, Muhammad Shahin and others.

Thus, when 'Abd al-Nasir disappeared and the wheel of the struggle for power turned, al-Sadat's personality seemed to appear lonely and with no supporter on the national political arena. But behind the scenes, the arena was crowded with groups, eager to conceal their identity to the last moment, which supported him strongly.

The second personality was Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the journalist, as he likes to describe himself always. But all the Egyptian, Arab and foreign observers and politicians who had close contact with 'Abd al-Nasir's regime were unanimous in describing him as the "regime's number two man" who holds no official positions and who doesn't seek them so that he may not become a party to the ongoing struggle and may not reduce his weight to the size of the position he holds. There are conflicting opinions and positions on Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's rise [background]. But his opponents agree with his friends that he is "the most capable and brilliant" in the sphere of the Egyptian and Arab press and that if Haykal has benefited from his closeness to 'Abd al-Nasir, then 'Abd al-Nasir benefited in return from Haykal's journalistic professionalism and intelligence.

Haykal had started his journalistic life in Muhammad al-Tabi'i school in AKHIR SA'AH and then moved to the rightist school of AKHBAR AL-YAWM (Mustafa and 'Ali Amin) before rebelling against it in the wake of the July revolution and becoming-- with visible and invisible support from 'Abd al-Nasir with whom Haykal's pen and experience were intrinsically and objectively tied--chief editor of AL-AHRAM in 1956. Haykal developed this paper from a distinctively local newspaper with a daily circulation of 60,000 copies to a paper with a weighty influence at the local, Arab and international levels and with a daily circulation of more than one-half million copies.

Haykal became not only 'Abd al-Nasir's closest adviser and confidant but also the "daily debator" accepted by 'Abd al-Nasir without any formality or sensitivity.

With his famous weekly article which he used to write under the title of "Frankly Speaking," which was quoted profusely by all the international wire services and in which he revealed and analyzed the direction of the wind in the movement and

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thought of the regime led by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir with his Arab and international weight, and with his rebuilding of AL-AHRAM Establishment to make it the most advanced and serious information agency in Egypt, the Arab homeland and the Middle East area--an establishment that includes political, economic, cultural and journalistic research centers and specialized magazines and an establishment crowded with professional, intellectual and political capabilities from the various inclinations, beginning with the liberal right and ending with the Marxist left--with all this, Haykal, as an individual and as an institution, was able to attain an independent and strong position inside the regime and in society vis-a-vis the other axes, with whom his relations ranged from the relations of a truce to the relations of secret and open conflicts.

The formula which governed Haykal's movement, and which was accepted by 'Abd al-Nasir, was that of abidance by absolute support for 'Abd al-Nasir with relative freedom in criticizing the regime, its institutions and its leaderships. The implementation of this formula left all the local, Arab and international political sources with the impression that Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal did actually represent the position of the "number two man" in the regime without being involved in assuming an open official responsibility. Perhaps this is what motivated 'Abd al-Nasir at the beginning of 1970, according to what many observers find most likely, to appoint Haykal as the minister in charge of information, despite Haykal's objection, while retaining his position as chief editor of AL-AHRAM.

Outwardly, all these axes stood united and shoulder to shoulder under the banner of "completing 'Abd al-Nasir's procession with its political, social and economic dimensions, especially in whatever pertains to continuing the process of the socialist transformation of society while purging the process of the negative aspects caused by the 1967 defeat, waging the battle against Israel to erase the traces of the 1967 aggression and realizing the Palestinian people's legitimate rights through building the unity of Arab action and through alliance with the Soviet Union."

But under the surface, conflicts were raging by varying degrees among the various axes and even within each axis, as revealed at the end of 1971 by the investigations in the case known as "the plot of the centers of power" against "al-Sadat's legitimate authority." It was proven then that there had been no trust and no unity of thought or of action, not even at the tactical levels, among the axes which had been in agreement on not enabling al-Sadat to attain permanent power, or at least not to attain sole control of power. The crisis of trust among those axes reached the point where they were watching each other's movements, spying on each other and recording the telephone calls exchanged by members of the same axes to use them as future incriminating evidence when one axes, or a part of an axis, gains the power. These are the recordings which fell in al-Sadat's hands and which he used against those who had recorded them.

Initially, the struggle crystallized between two main figures: 'Ali Sabri and Anwar al-Sadat. 'Ali Sabri considered himself, objectively and subjectively, the person more strongly entitled and the fitter to succeed Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir to power and viewed al-Sadat as an intruding element on the revolution and the Nasirist experience--an element belonging to the counterrevolution which seeks ultimately to liquidate Nasirism. Sabri also believed that if "misfortune" had led al-Sadat to the position of vice president which he occupied until the death

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of 'Abd al-Nasir, this did not require the Nasirists to submit to the outwardly formalities of legitimacy without its essence, else such submission would mean the end of all the Nasirists. But the other axes, excluding Haykal's axis which preferred to take the position of outwardly neutrality while harboring in fact hostility to 'Ali Sabri, agreed that it was impossible to practically separate the formalities of legitimacy from its content, else rightist or leftist figures more dangerous than al-Sadat would be able to exploit the separation gap and sneak through it to seize power. Moreover, those axes had never at any time truly welcomed the transfer of power to 'Ali Sabri because they were filled with doubts regarding his intentions and position toward them. They preferred Anwar al-Sadat who seemed to them to be weak and to be courting their friendship and their participation in the power. Consequently, they were confident that the foreseeable future would ultimately move in the direction of their gaining the sole control of power, especially since they were in full control of all of the regime's main political, information and security agencies, in addition to their success in establishing an alliance with Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi, the minister of war and the general commander of the armed forces, who seemed to be the strongman of the military axis.

As for al-Sadat, he used the tactic of the "weak and isolated chief" who would have no power and no authority without the support and participation of all the axes, excluding the axis of 'Ali Sabri. Al-Sadat had shown his personal dissatisfaction with dealing with 'Ali Sabri because of the latter's personal ambitions and of his dictatorial tendency which destroys the spirit of collective action which he, al-Sadat, wanted to prevail in the relations among the officers of the new regime as a single family. Despite this, al-Sadat did not object to meeting the demand of those axes for the appointment of 'Ali Sabri as vice president, just as a gesture of honoring him and without giving him any powers, exactly like Husayn al-Sahfi'i. Al-Sadat was thus able from the first moments to isolate 'Ali Sabri, the thinking and planning mind behind the opposing axes, and to paralyze Sabri's ability to move and maneuver.

In his movement on the stage of the events, al-Sadat was careful to appear as if he was an individual by himself and a limb cut from a tree, without supporters and without any force behind him. He was able to conceal his real relations with many of the regime's pockets and forces, such as Mamduh Salim who was at the time the Governor of Alexandria and one of the most outstanding political security men serving under Sha'rawi Jum'ah, the minister of interior; Maj Gen Muhammad Sadiq, the chief of staff of the armed forces and the most prominent member of the Military Committee; and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the republican guard commander. Sami Sharaf, the director of the president's office, the minister of state and the man with influence in more than one axis, had continued to be confident of his sole control over the republican guard until he was shocked by the reality when he was arrested by Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif personally on the night of 14 May 1971.

Al-Sadat was not content with this but proceeded to create the first of his political electric shocks, which have become one of the characteristics of his political movement, when he arranged, with the support of the other axis, an almost public confrontation between "Haykal's axis" and "'Ali Sabri's axis," at a meeting of the Socialist Union's Supreme Executive Committee.

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Dr Labib Shuqayr, the People's Assembly speaker and member of the Executive Committee, had reviewed at one of the committee's meetings an article which Haykal had written in AL-AHRAM under the title of "'Abd al-Nasir Is No Myth" and in which he had criticized some people (meaning 'Ali Sabri and the other axes allied with him) for defying 'Abd al-Nasir as if he were a god and for instating themselves as priests in his temple who are solely entitled to decide who is Nasirist and who is not. Haykal stressed in his article that 'Abd al-Nasir is a historical leader produced by the popular struggle which had realized accomplishments under his leadership and that, consequently, 'Abd al-Nasir, with his intellectual thought and his heroic struggle, is the public property of all the people, without any need for distinguished middlemen. Dr Shuqayr concluded his review by charging Haykal with demeaning and debasing the status of the immortal leader and of the Socialist Union and by demanding that Haykal be tried politically.

The trial demand was one of the links in the chain of the ferocious struggle among the axes for power. Through this demand, the Socialist Union leadership axis sought to realize more than one goal. The first goal was to entrench its position vis-a-vis the other axes, even the axes allied with it, as a major force in the regime and in society with the right to level charges, to try and to convict. The second goal was to release a test balloon in order to find out the dimensions of the strength of each axis, especially of al-Sadat axis, in comparison with the strength of the Socialist Union leadership axis. The third goal was to intimidate whoever contemplates, be he an individual or an axis, adopting a vacillating, neutral or opposing position toward the "legitimate heirs of 'Abd al-Nasir." The fourth goal was to destroy the Haykal axis and to gain control over the sophisticated information outfit (AL-AHRAM) with its effective influence.

Al-Sadat hastened to respond to the demand without any discussion. In the Executive Committee's subsequent session which was set for the trial and in which the members were scheduled to discuss among themselves in detail the charges made against Haykal and to issue their verdict, al-Sadat surprised all those present by inviting Haykal to attend the session and to defend himself on the grounds that it is illegal to try a defendant in his absence, especially since the defendant was one of the closest people to 'Abd al-Nasir and since the charge was that of debasing the status of 'Abd al-Nasir himself.

Haykal defended his views of and his position toward 'Abd al-Nasir, living and dead and man and leader, with a strong logic supported by documents and proven events witnessed by some of the committee members themselves. One of the proofs cited was a personal wish by 'Abd al-Nasir--a wish reflecting his confidence in the defendant--that Haykal write his biography if he was to be assassinated or when he died. Haykal was able to win over to his side significant number of the members, led by Dr Mahmud Fawzi who had always enjoyed the respect of the overwhelming majority of the regime's "legitimate heirs." Al-Sadat took the position of a neutral judge and recommended, with the approval of the majority of the committee and the silence of its minority, that the trial dossier be closed without a sentence and that the case be considered as if it had never existed.

Thus, al-Sadat realized more than one goal from his first electric shock within the framework of this trial. The first goal was that of aborting all the objectives planned by the axis of the Socialist Union leadership, and by 'Ali Sabri in particular, through conducting this trial. The second goal was that of appearing as

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the fair and neutral judge who is eager to investigate objectively and in the presence of the defedant the charges made by the parties to the regime against each other, all on the basis of the principle of the single family and of collective leadership. The third goal was that of creating a split between 'Ali Sabri's axis and the other axes allied with it and of sowing the seeds of doubt among their ranks regarding the soundness of the tactics of 'Ali Sabri's axis and of its hasty decisions in leading the struggle for power. The fourth goal was that of driving Haykal's axis from the position of neutrality to the position of actual alliance with al-Sadat axis and of encouraging the other elements and forces in the regime vacillating because of their fear of the might and influence of the axes controlling the regime's main political, information and security agencies to move to the positions of supporting al-Sadat axis after having proven its ability to give Haykal's axis actual protection.

Thus, the struggle among the axes went on in the form of attack and retreat and of below-the-belt blows exchanged within the closed walls at the top of the regime's structure. But upon the disappearance of 'Abd al-Nasir and because of it, the Egyptian arena was broader and more complex than the ability of any of those axes, whether individually or in partial alliance with others, to absorb and control the various and conflicting socio-political forces surging on the arena and penetrating, by varying degrees, the walls of power through the movement of the struggle of the axes and the calculations of each of them.

Each of those forces proceeded from the various positions it occupied in the society's and the state's class structure after 18 years of the revolution's victories and defeats to try, with relative independence, to assert its positions, to secure its interests and to exert pressure in order to exercise its right to participate in power, presenting directly or indirectly its conditions for allying itself with this or that axis. The common denominator in those conditions, whatever the nature of the political or social forces presenting them, was that of democracy and of putting an end to the security agencies' violations of human rights.

The first movement by those forces came from the group of surviving leaders of the July revolution who had disagreed with 'Abd al-Nasir for various reasons and who had been ousted from the regime's power circle. But contacts had been resumed between those leaders and 'Abd al-Nasir in the wake of the 1967 war and of the terrible defeat it produced. The contacts were intensified during the last months of 'Abd al-Nasir's life with 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi who, along with his colleagues Kamal al-Din Husayn and Zakariya Muhyi al-Din, preanted a memorandum to Anwar al-Sadat, in his capacity as the interim president, proposing re-formation of the Revolution Command Council under al-Sadat's chairmanship and suggesting that the council assume the task of calling on the people to elect a constituent assembly to draw up for the country a constitution defining the quality and course of the new regime on a democratic basis and in accordance with the principles of the July revolution. Ultimately, the new president of the republic was to be elected on the basis of this constitution to take power over from the Revolution Command Council.

Of the surviving members of the Revolution Command Council, Husayn al-Shafi'i, who was a participant in the regime, Hasan Ibrahim, who had abandoned political life

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for commercial business, and Khalid Muhyi al-Din, who had rejected the idea altogether as constituting a deviation from the legitimacy of the existing regime which he respects, declined to sign the memorandum.

This movement caused strong confusion to the calculations of all the axes. This confusion was further intensified by what was known about the dialogue between Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi--a dialogue which had almost achieved specific results. 'Abd al-Nasir himself had made references to this dialogue at the meetings of the Socialist Union Executive Committee in the wake of the defeat. To deal with the regime's shortcomings and gaps--shortcomings and gaps revealed by the 1967 war--'Abd al-Nasir brought up the idea of the formation of an opposition party from the sons of the July revolution inside and outside the Socialist Union to represent the "other opinion." 'Abd al-Nasir nominated for the purpose 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi and Kamal al-Din Husayn for being always frank in their opposition without abandoning the principles of the July revolution or involving themselves in any coup attempt against the revolution. When the Executive Committee opposed 'Abd al-Nasir's proposal almost unanimously on the grounds that the country was not yet ready to put it into implementation, not to mention its perils to national unity in confronting the defeat and preparing the army and the society for the war of revenge against Israel, 'Abd al-Nasir shelved his proposal. But he continued his contacts and dialogue with Baghdadi on the possibilities of cooperation between them. Reliable information, confirmed by Muhammad Husanayn Haykal, had asserted that 'Abd al-Nasir was about to appoint 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi to the position of vice president in charge of managing the domestic front and preparing it for the war while the president devoted his efforts to the process of rebuilding the armed forces as quickly as possible. But death snatched 'Abd al-Nasir before he could issue his decision.

The axes of the Advisory Presidential Committee, or the Socialist Union leadership and of the Vanguard Organization leadership hastened to stage a counter-movement under the "banner of legitimacy" to foil the endeavor of "those who disagreed with 'Abd al-Nasir when alive and who want to usurp power from the revolution's legitimate institutions after his death." The members of those axes rallied behind Anwar al-Sadat as interim president and as sole candidate for the presidency in enactment of the constitution. They shelved their doubts about one another and their hidden conflicts with one another, considering that restoration of the Revolution Command Council represented the imminent and urgent danger that would deny the "weak al-Sadat who is isolated from the regime's main agencies" the position of president of the republic.

As for al-Sadat axis, it exploited the movement of the Revolution Command Council group to whip the other axes into speeding up the steps for nominating and electing him a constitutional president of the republic. While declaring his rejection of the proposals of Baghdadi and his colleagues, al-Sadat did not sever his contacts with them but proceeded to manage the dialogue with 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi for future cooperation between them after election of al-Sadat to the presidency.

There was another force with weight in the regime and in society. This force was embodied in the group of nationalist technocrats and managers who grew up and developed in the process of the large-scale industrialization of the country and of building the public sector as leader of the development plan and as the base of Egypt's economic independence in the Nasirist experiment. Leading this group,

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which owed its expertise and its distinguished positions to the July revolution, was Dr 'Aziz Sidqi who had been entrusted by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir with setting up and managing the Ministry of Economy and with building the public sector from 1956 until 'Abd al-Nasir's death in 1970, except for one year during which Sidqi held the position of the president's adviser for industry. Dr 'Aziz Sidqi expressed the strength of this force when he underlined his support for the legitimacy represented by Anwar al-Sadat on the grounds of al-Sadat's declaration of his abidance by the July revolution and by the 30 March program, especially its democratic dimensions, which 'Abd al-Nasir had proclaimed in order to deal with the negative practices of the regime and to put an end to the violations committed against the citizens' rights and liberties. This constituted a direct reference by 'Aziz Sidqi against the axis of 'Ali Sabri with whom he had been in constant disagreement from the days of 'Abd al-Nasir. Sidqi also stated his opposition to the attempts of those "who rebelled against 'Abd al-Nasir while alive to return to power after his death." This was a reference against the movement of 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi and his colleagues. 'Aziz Sidqi concentrated on protecting the gains of the engineers, managers and workers who built the public sector and referred to their right to share the power in order to guarantee the continuity of the path chosen by 'Abd al-Nasir for planned development under the leadership of the public sector.

At that decisive moment, this force elected to stand in the midst of the struggle with al-Sadat axis against the other axes because it doubted its own ability to act individually and independently on the one hand and because, on the other hand, it doubted that it could perform its econo-political role if power were controlled by 'Ali Sabri and the axes allied with him in view of what it had suffered from the bureaucratic and punitive security practices of these axes--practices from which this force had been saved by nothing other than the direct intervention of 'Abd al-Nasir. All this at a time when this force viewed al-Sadat as a solitary and powerless personality which needed ties with partners to share the power with him without the complexes of past experiences and without the fear of any of the partners pouncing, after lurking silently, on the presidency or on the public sector's leadership of the national economy--the mainstay of the political power in society.

But all these struggles, with their varying degrees and levels and with their various faces, continued to be governed essentially by the relations and conflicts of the forces with which society was throbbing and by the degree of each force's qualitative and quantitative capabilities, its organizational resources and its means of movement amidst the masses.

[23-29 Oct 81, pⁿ 50-53]

[Text] The true dimensions of the events being witnessed by Egypt at present cannot be understood without a calm reading of the recent history. Lutfi al-Khuli, who has been known for his progressive national political activity as well as for his journalistic activity in the past quarter century, has written a book which will be published under the title of "Al-Sadat Political School, And The Egyptian Left." Before al-Khuli presented his book for printing, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI acquired from him the copyright to a chapter of the book which is tantamount to an observation from within of the circumstances which carried Anwar al-Sadat to

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power from the time of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's death and until all the political forces with their various inclinations united against al-Sadat's domestic, Arab and international policies and until he fell finally with the bullers of a fedayeen [commando] group of the Egyptian army.

In the first part (previous edition), al-Khuli dealt with what he called "the war of the axes" which carried al-Sadat from the shadows to the top of the Advisory Presidential Committee, the Socialist Union leadership, the Vanguard Organization leadership, the Military Committee and the republican guard. Al-Khuli also dealt with how the struggle crystallized between Anwar al-Sadat and 'Ali Sabri through the trial of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, all within the framework of the political forces ruling Egypt and the framework of their capabilities and conflicts.

In this part of the series, Lutfi al-Khuli defines what he calls the "rightist lines" and the "leftist lines," the eruption of struggle between the "centers of power" after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence and al-Sadat calculations in that phase.

It can be said that upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, the social struggle movement crystallized at the popular level between two main axes: An axis to the right of the regime and another to its left.

Each axis consisted of a number of forces with varying social and intellectual roots. But upon the death of the historical personality which had played the decisive role in defining society's course throughout 18 years, those forces agreed upon a minimum limit of "general political concord" which governed their movement vis-a-vis the other axis.

The rightist axis combined the wholesale merchants, the contractors, the rich farmers and the upper segment of the bureaucrats which were called at the end of 'Abd al-Nasir's era "the new class" at times and the "reactionary party" at others. Those forces had, especially in the wake of the 1967 defeat and through exploiting their positions in the state and in some public sector organizations and through their mostly parasitic practices, accumulated a capital exceeding the needs of their luxurious lifestyles and one which they wanted to exploit in private and independent investment free of nationalization and sequestration, of the restrictions of the state laws and of the domination of the public sector. The right was strengthened when it was joined by the prominent military bureaucrats who had been ousted from their distinguished positions in the large-scale purging operations necessitated by the need to liquidate the elements loyal to the abortive coup attempt led by Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir and the elements which formed an obstacle in the face of the steps to rebuild the armed forces technically and socially in the wake of the 1967 defeat. It was natural that the rightist axis would be also joined by the old capitalist elements which had been harmed by the nationalization and sequestration decisions and which had been lurking in active exploitative pockets in society which they had concealed under such perfectly camouflaged masks that they had been raising the slogan of socialism and "had been joining the Socialist Union membership enthusiastically." This is in addition to the "protection shields" which those capitalists had created through marriage relationships with many elements of the first and second ranks of the July revolution. This rightist axis with its numerous forces was able to attract various groups of intellectuals with liberal inclinations who had continued to undermine all the positive accomplishments of the Nasirist experiment by exploiting the

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intelligence and security agencies' restrictions on and violations of some human rights. The 1967 defeat, which had created in all the classes a deep wound bleeding sweeping anger at and comprehensive criticism of the negative practices of the regime, gave those liberal intellectuals the opportunity to speak with a loud voice which had its tangible impact in society.

The right, with its growing parasitic nucleus, had a finger in political formulations of various kinds and at various levels. In addition to the underground organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood, there was a number of political islands lying hidden under the skin of the government, information, People's Assembly, Socialist Union and even the Vanguard Organization agencies, especially in the rural areas and in the small towns (such as the information groups, led by Musa Sabri, Anis Mansur, Muhammad 'Abd al-Jawad, Safiyah al-Muhandis and Himmat Mustafa, and the political groups, most prominent of which were 'Abd al-Qadir Hatim group, the Upper Egypt deputies group led by Ahmad 'Abd al-Akhir and Yusuf Makkawi and the delta [Lower Egypt] deputies group, led by Ahmad al-Qasabi, Muhammad Shahin, Hamid Mahmud and Mahmud Abu Wafiyah). This is in addition to the contracting and land speculation sector ('Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman), the chambers of commerce, the social and athletic clubs, the writers and women's federations and a number of professional unions.

The "general political concord" of the rightist forces crystallized in five fundamental lines:

First, to block the path practically in the face of continuation of 'Abd al-Nasir's march after his death while raising, at the same time, the slogan of "continuing on 'Abd al-Nasir's path" so that all the forces resisting the attempts for the seizure of power by those who consider themselves the heirs of 'Abd al-Nasir or leaders of the July revolution, whether individually, allied with each other or in alliance with the leftist forces, may join ranks safely under the canopy of this slogan.

Second, to exploit religion in instigating a campaign against the Nasirist experiment on the pretext that it is an "atheist Marxist socialist" experiment which has plundered the people's property under the name of nationalization and sequestration and which has violated the people's dignity and liberties and the sources of livelihood that God has given them and under the pretext that correcting those conditions was not dictated by religion alone but also by the spirit of belief in the July revolution--a spirit completely lacking since the early 1960's and since proclamation of the National Action Charter.

Third, to act under the banner of democracy and of guaranteeing liberties and the supremacy of the law to enable the rightist forces to gather and organize their scattered lines and to infiltrate into the main positions of power, exploiting in this the masses' urgent demands for democracy--demands which had not yet crystallized in specific formulas even though they had been vacillating between developing the Socialist Union to become a progressive national alliance comprising certain political forces and currents, and not just a mere vessel for the quantitative gathering of citizens, and abolishing the oneness of the Socialist Union as a political organization and replacing it by the multi-party system. The rightist forces were inclined, with some reservation, toward the latter

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option so that they may act compatibly with their pressures for releasing the freedom of the private sector to independent investment and to unlimited growth and for putting an end to the public sector's leadership role in developing the national economy.

Fourth, to open the door before foreign and Arab capital to invest in the country without restrictions and to give this capital incentives to participate with the private Egyptian capital on the grounds that this is likely to make it possible for the country to overcome its economic crisis and its technological backwardness emanating from the so-called period of economic and political isolation to which the Nasirist experiment, with its atheist communist dimension, had led, especially with its comprehensive development plans and the inevitability of the socialist solution. This is in addition to exploiting the fundamental changes occurring in the Arab world as a result of the accumulation of oil revenues in the regimes described by the Nasirists as reactionary at times and as conservative at others--regimes with which Egypt's relations had ranged from open hostility to silent alienation.

Fifth, to make the political and intellectual preparations to put an end to the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the main economic, military and human burden of which falls on the shoulders of Egypt when Egypt has no direct interest in this conflict and when it is pushed to contribute the major share under the pressure of the Arab countries generally and of the Palestinians in particular just for the sake of helping. This burden turned Egypt from the richest Arab country at the outset of the conflict to the poorest one in the wake of the 1967 defeat. Now that the attempts to settle the conflict with the force of arms, whose source has been the atheist Soviet Union, have failed, reason dictates the need to look for a non-military solution with Israel by way of the United States which supplied Israel with all the means of strength and protection that made Israel always the stronger party in the conflict with the Arabs. This is something which necessitated reconsidering Egypt's international relations to reduce the ties with the Soviet Union as much as possible and to resume building strong bridges with the United States, especially with the disappearance of 'Abd al-Nasir who had poisoned the walls of friendship with the United States.

This is insofar as the rightist axis, which gathered its old and new remnants in a minimal degree of organization over a specific program and which started to move rapidly and flexibly, wagering all its strength on deciding the power struggle in favor of al-Sadat, is concerned.

As for the leftist axis, it comprised the largest number of the productive working forces. The Nasirist experiment had destroyed many of the shackles of exploitation and repression from which these forces had been suffering in the pre-July 1962 society--a society described as the "one-half percent society." As a consequence, millions of citizens converged on the political and social action arena for the first time. In addition to the right of work and of safety from the tyranny and exploitation of capitalism, the Nasirist legislation had guaranteed these forces positions with influential quantitative weight in the political organization (Socialist Union), the People's Assembly (legislative authority) and in other popular councils. The fundamental options of the Nasirist experiment, especially in the 1960's, brought about the birth of new qualitative groups with a revolutionary spirit on the political and social action arena which was filled

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by the production forces with their enormous numbers of millions. These new qualitative groups were embodied in the small farmers who benefited from the agrarian reform, the public sector workers and nationalist technocrats whose fate was tied to the sector and the intellectuals who rose from poor labor and peasant roots, who benefited from free college education on the one hand and from the spread of the socialist thought platforms on the other, in the wake of proclamation of the National Action Charter and who started to spread in the various spheres, beginning with the village school and ending in the nuclear reactors, the state's civil service apparatus and the armed forces.

The leftist forces had emerged in numerous positions of control in society and had been concentrated mainly in the cooperative associations, the rural youth centers, the information and culture agency, the labor unions, the Socialist Union's bases and some of its central or leadership structures, such as the Central Committee, the Youth Organization and the Socialist Studies Center, and in the secret Vanguard Organization. Those forces had also stormed the army bases when many university graduates from among the sons of peasants and workers were conscripted in the army both as soldiers and as officers.

It can be said that upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, the phrase "leftist forces" was embodied generally in two distinctive currents, even though one of them had always moved under the banner of 'Abd al-Nasir and acted under his leadership.

The first current was the Nasirist left which was formed amidst the Nasirist experiment and its successive phases, beginning with the phase of "cooperative socialism" in the 1950's, to scientific socialism with its own Arab quality and as defined by the National Action Charter in the 1960's and ending with "Arab socialism." The Nasirist left proceeded, out of necessity at the outset, from positions hostile to the Marxist thought and the Egyptian communist movement. But in the mid-1960's, this left reached the point of co-existing with the Marxist thought and the communists by defining the points of agreement on the issues of the inevitability of the socialist solution, of class struggle, of planned economic and social development, of liquidating the remnants of capitalism and of parasitism, of bolstering the political and economic independence, of Arab nationalism and the issue of liberating the Arab homeland from imperialism, neo-colonialism and Zionism and rebuilding its unity. The points of disagreement continued to revolve over the issue of democracy and of formulating it in a class alliance of the people's working forces consisting of the workers and the farmers instead of the superficial quantitative alliance between individual citizens in a flabby bureaucratic political organization dominated by the thought and interests of the petit bourgeoisie under false slogans of socialism. The points of disagreement also involved the issue of the need for the alliance to be led by a vanguard socialist party that is public [legal] and that has set features and a set program to offer the masses and a party whose movement is subject to the control of the organized masses. This is in addition to the independence of the unionist and student movement and of the popular organizations and their initiatives and to releasing the freedom of expression and of dialogue for all the national and progressive forces.

The second current is the Marxist leftist current which is older than the Nasirist left and whose history dates back to the second decade of the 20th century. This current adhered to the Leninist-Marxist philosophy in its ideas and in its

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movement "to change the conditions in Egypt in favor of the working class and its allies, the farmers and the revolutionary intellectuals." The Marxist-Leninist philosophy, with its international strength, especially in the wake of the Soviet revolution's victory in 1917, had begun to invade the minds of the "intellectuals rebelling against the shackles of colonialism, backwardness, social oppression and political repression in the Arab countries" and had begun to transform them from "utopians" to "scientific people" and from "adventurers" into "revolutionaries." But the predominant characteristic of those intellectuals continued, for a long time and until just before the inception of the July revolution, to be governed on the one hand by their petit bourgeois roots and by the weighty positions which the intellectual elements--some of them Egyptianized foreigners of Jewish origins--held in leading the Marxist movement. Historically, those elements contributed the major effort in transmitting and translating the Marxist-Leninist thought into Arabic. On the other hand, the participation of the urban and rural working class in this current's organizations was weak. Thirdly, this current did not have the ability necessary to develop a formula of Leninist Marxism acceptable to the Egyptian reality and a formula to which the masses could respond, whether in terms of the language of address or in terms of the movement's tactics and strategy. Fourthly, the constant campaign of violent repression launched against the underground marxist organizations by colonialism and by the secular and religious reactionaries had been intensified on the grounds that the organizations were illegal and constituted a form of atheism. Finally, there were the widespread and blind accusations of lackeyhood among the members of the Marxist movement and organizations whenever disagreement of opinion among them intensified. They resorted to these accusations instead of solving their disagreement through dialogue within the organizational principle known as the principle of democratic centralism.

All these factors combined with the difficult circumstances of underground action and with the complex and backward economic, political and social conditions to obstruct crystallization of the class struggle in a healthy manner and to cause the phenomenon of fragmentation and of division to dominate the Marxist left at the outset of the 1950's and to turn this left into a mere "force of expression" instigating, inciting and encouraging the crushed masses to bring about change with the ideas which this left was offering instead of being a "political force" with quantitative and qualitative influence and with weight in the process of change itself.

As a result of these conditions and even though one of the numerous Marxist organizations with which the movement abounded, namely the organization known by the name of the Democratic National Liberation Movement [DNLM], had firm relations with the leadership of the Free Officers Organization before it set off the July 1952 revolution, this organization was not able to maintain and develop those relations and to take an actual part in power. On the contrary, that relationship was quickly destroyed before the end of the first year of the Free Officers' assumption of power. The Free Officers sent the leaders of the DNLM and many of its cadres, along with the leaders and cadres of the other organizations, to jail, excluding a number of personalities who were tied to 'Abd al-Nasir by personal friendship or who had come to occupy positions in the structure of the new authority and who had come to put their loyalty to the authority over their loyalty to the DNLM which had embarked on a struggle against the authority.

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The tragic dimensions of this situation become evident when we know that the Free Officers Organization's relationship with the DNLM before the revolution was supervised by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir personally on the one hand and, on the other hand, by Ahmad Fu'ad al-Qadi who became chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Egypt throughout 'Abd al-Nasir's era and who continued to hold the position during al-Sadat's era, and by Ahmad Hamrush, the officer who became the chief editor of the first magazine issued by the Free Officers and known by the name of AL-TAHRIR and then of ROSE AL-YUSUF in which he continued to write during al-Sadat's era. Al-Qadi and Hamrush supervised that relationship by virtue of their being in charge of the army section of the DNLM. This is in addition to the presence of two original members in the Revolution Command Council who were close to the DNLM, namely Yusuf Siddiq who commanded the first confrontation force which seized the headquarters of the royalist regime's chief of staff, and Khalid Muhyi al-Din. The first was relieved before the end of the first year of the revolution and the second was compelled to resign because of the events of March 1954 concerning the nature of the democratic national authority which the revolution was to set up in place of the defunct regime.

The truth is that the 1952 revolution, which took the form of a "military coup" and on the strength of an armed national political organization which had entrenched itself among the armed forces' ranks under the name of the Free Officers, came as a surprise to all the political forces and parties at the time even though everybody had known before 23 July 1952 of the presence of the Free Officers Organization, had read the secret pamphlets which the organization had been issuing and had supported strongly the organization's inclinations which were hostile to "colonialism, the royal palace, feudalism and the exploitative capitalism" and even though relations of varying degrees had been established before the eve of the revolution between a number of the political forces extending from the extreme right (the Muslim Brotherhood) to the extreme left (the DNLM of the communist movement) [and the Free Officers].

The Marxist left's view of the event was "generally" based on its being a military coup. In the Marxist literature accumulated in light of the international experiences in Europe and Latin America, a military coup is always a coup in the interest of society's most reactionary forces. The Egyptian Marxist left in its entirety was not able to deal with the "phenomenon of the military coup" in light of the conditions and of the given facts of the Egyptian reality and was unable to consider this phenomenon was a new formula of the national revolution--a formula unprecedented in history and a formula which could be used as a measuring stick, with the exception, to some minds, of the Peronist experiment in Argentina, but only to a degree.

But within a period not exceeding the first year of the revolution, the predominant opinion in the DNLM was inclined toward supporting the "military coup" in order to preserve the movement's relations with the Free Officers Organization and on the basis of analyzing the coup as one that carries limited nationalist and progressive ideas and tendencies which must be supported in order to overcome the other vacillating elements in the revolution command who are influenced by their ties to society's reactionary forces.

But the other organizations of the Egyptian communist movement, led by the Egyptian Communist Party, took a stance of fundamental opposition to the "1952

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military coup" as a coup which aborts the popular capabilities escalating toward a revolution in the interest of all the reactionary forces and of the U.S. neo-colonialism. To prove this, the Egyptian Communist Party offered as evidence a number of indications embodied in the establishment of good relations at the outset between the Revolution Command Council on the one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on the other in contrast to the Council's hostility toward al-Wafd Party with its national influence and its broad popularity, in the strict regressive measures with which the Council confronted the strike of the workers of Kafr al-Dawwar textile plants and in the immediate military trial which the Council held for party leaders--a trial which concluded with the execution of two of those leaders, namely workers Khamis and al-Baqari, in September 1952.

Thus, the atmosphere between the revolution command and the Marxist left, including the DNLM, became extremely hostile and the two sides exchanged accusations of lackeyhood to the United States on the one hand and to the Soviet Union on the other and the revolution launched large-scale campaigns of arrest against the Marxist left.

The situation between the two sides continued to be tense until Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir attended, in the name of the Revolution Command Council, in the Bandung conference in Indonesia in 1955 where he participated positively with Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-lai in building a united force for the Third World against the U.S. imperialism, the colonialist countries and economic and social backwardness. This is the force which later became the basis for laying down the foundations of the nonaligned movement.

This was followed by 'Abd al-Nasir's step of "breaking the weapon" monopoly and of concluding the weapon deal, which came to be known as the Czech weapons deal, with the Soviet Union to confront the Israeli aggression and then by the step of nationalizing the Suez Canal and of waging the Suez war, in which Britain, France and Israel colluded against Egypt and which was followed by nationalization of the British, French and Belgian companies and nationalization of the other interests of the old colonialism in the country.

Those fundamental changes in the Revolution Command Council's policies motivated the bases of the Marxist left with its various organizations to reconsider their analysis and evaluation of the "July revolution" as a mere fascist military coup serving the interests of reaction and colonialism and to deal with the new regime as an advanced phase of the democratic revolution which must be supported positively with the purpose of pushing it toward further political, social and economic steps in this direction, without letting this support abolish the right to criticize the regime's negative practices, but from a background of alliance and not one of hostility.

It can be said that this phase which extended from the middle of 1955 to the end of 1958 was characterized by the quality of crucial relations between the "revolution's regime" and the Marxist left--relations which were interspersed every now and then by small crises which were absorbed and solved with the direct intervention of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. But on the other hand, the relations were characterized by the revival of critical thought within and around the Marxist movement.

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This revival led to the emergence of the so-called "phenomenon of the Marxists who are independent of the organizations," thus resulting in further serious divisions within the organizations which soon turned into an element of pressure by the bases for unity. This unity imposed itself on the leaderships and produced a united organization under the name of the United Egyptian Communist Party at the end of that phase.

But the relations between the revolution's regime and the Marxist movement declined rapidly to a state of full crisis and of violent confrontation with the end of 1958 as a result of the circumstances and conditions of the rise of the Egyptian-Syrian unity and of the deteriorating relations between the revolution's regime and the Soviet Union with whom the relations had been established to confront the Zionist-imperialist aggression on the one hand and to realize economic development (constructing the High Dam and participating in the industrial development plan) on the other. The relations between the regime and the Marxist movement also declined as a result of the position taken toward the Iraqi revolution of July 1959, which also took the form of a military coup led by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim. The Iraqi communists and the Arab communist parties supported Qasim in his confrontation with Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

From the dawn of 1959 till the third month of that year, the revolution's regime launched the broadest-scale campaign of arrests in the country's history against the Marxist left, both as a united party and as independent personalities, and against those sympathizing with the democratic intellectuals.

During the period of arrests, which included more than 3,000 detainees, the Egyptian-Syrian unity broke down and 'Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime in Baghdad was toppled. 'Abd al-Nasir raised the slogan of scientific socialism with its distinctive Arab quality and called for unity of the goal as substitute for the unity of the ranks of the Arab national liberation movement's forces. A succession of progressive social laws were issued on nationalization and on building the public sector as the leader of the development plan. Those laws ended with a national congress and at that congress the National Union, the sole political organization, turned into the Socialist Union which approved the draft National Charter which 'Abd al-Nasir had submitted in 1962 as a guideline for revolutionary action during the phase of transformation into socialism which he had set at 10 years ending in 1972.

The wings of the United Communist Party were shaken by these fundamental changes and contrasting theoretical analyses emerged on the social and political depth and effectiveness of the changes, thus touching off splits anew in two main organizations [of the communists], in addition to other subsidiary organizations and groups of independent Marxists.

At the same time, Arab and international campaigns of pressure were initiated against the revolution regime to release the detainees. Foremost among those who exerted such pressure out of a position of alliance and friendship were the Algerian revolution leaders (especially Ben Bella and the Marxist wing cooperating with him), the leaders of the Guinea revolution (Sekou Toure and the Marxist wing cooperating with him) and Yugoslav President Tito. The pivot of the pressure exerted on and of the dialogue conducted with President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir revolved around the view that having taken the socialist option as a must for

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development, he could not continue to be hostile to the scientific socialists and should, instead, employ their capabilities in building and developing socialism.

'Abd al-Nasir ended up being convinced of this pivotal idea and began to discuss it with his aides who were divided into two factions: A faction which opposed the idea on the basis that the socialism of the July revolution is an Arab non-Marxist socialism which had emanated without the participation of the Marxist current and that to guarantee the continuity of this socialism without Marxist influence required continued isolation of the Marxists from this socialism and another faction which supported Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's view that the revolution's socialism, like the Marxist socialism, emanates from a unified historical scientific source and from the same laws but that the two forms of socialism differ, theoretically, on two fundamental issues: The first is the position toward religion and the second is the position toward the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peacefulness of the class struggle--differences which lead, practically, to differences in application, not only because of the theoretical differences but also because of the particularities of the Egyptian reality. It was 'Abd al-Nasir's view that this new situation dictated that the revolution's regime modify its position toward the Marxist left, replacing the measures of repression and isolation by opening the doors of dialogue and cooperation.

'Abd al-Nasir had actually begun as of the latter part of 1960 releasing gradually a number of the Marxist personalities. Within the framework of the experiment of "dialogue and cooperation, the Cooperation Page was established in AL-AHRAM. The chief editor of AL-AHRAM was Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal who played a role in extending the bridges between 'Abd al-Nasir and the Marxist left. Lutfi al-Khuli took charge of this page of the paper, assisted by a number of Marxist intellectuals who had already been released. The Cooperation Page started its first days by publishing a series of articles on the "crisis of the intellectuals" with its social and political dimensions in the Egyptian reality in particular and the Arab reality generally.

The Cooperation Page played an important role in creating a healthy climate for the broadest and most profound dialogue between the left with its various factions on the one hand and the revolution regime with its various wings generally and the person of 'Abd al-Nasir in particular, with his major influence and decisive role in the country's development movement.

The dialogue was not only conducted publicly but also took at times invisible courses through a number of personalities close to 'Abd al-Nasir, led by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, 'Ali Sabri, Sha'rawi Jum'ah and Ahmad Fu'ad. Each of these personalities, despite the intellectual, objective and subjective differences among them, had personal relations with some leaders of the Marxist left from various positions.

In this dialogue, 'Abd al-Nasir proceeded to project the idea of building a unified force for the Egyptian left, with its varying intellectual roots, in the form of a vanguard organization based on the principle of democratic centralism to lead the Socialist Union in accordance with the National Charter and the concept of scientific socialism with its special Egyptian-Arab quality. 'Abd al-Nasir expressed his readiness to release all the detainees, to abolish whatever criminal sentences had been issued against them and to consider such sentences null and

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void and to open the doors of work before them in all the spheres of society with all its agencies and without any restrictions in return for their commitment to dissolve their independent organizations and to join as individuals the active membership of the Socialist Union and to accept its leadership.

After sharp debates among the Marxists, the two main organizations, namely the DNLM and the Egyptian Communist Party (al-Rayah), reached the conclusion, in the face of opposition from small factions, that the objective conditions of Egypt made it a must "to terminate the independent organization of each of them" and to accept 'Abd al-Nasir's conditions for the sake of united action to enable socialism to triumph against its enemies at home and abroad, especially since all the contradictions between the revolution's regime, embodied in the leadership of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, and the Marxist left are being settled in the interest of the working masses, except for the difference over the issue of the formula and exercise of democracy.

By 1964, all the detainees had been released and the criminal sentences issued against them had been dropped. The Marxist organizations dissolved themselves in succession after special congresses held for the purpose. This was an unprecedented act in the history of the Marxist movement, whether at the Arab or the international level and it has been considered one of the characteristics of the Egyptian experiment, with its distinctive weight in the Third World experiments.

As of that time, the Marxist left was supposed to have become, both in terms of movement and of thought, a part of the fabric of the July revolution, led by 'Abd al-Nasir.

But practically, the Marxist left faced from the outset strong resistance, both direct and indirect, from a number of the regime's leaderships, especially from Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, the armed forces general commander at the time, and from the security agencies (the general intelligence). The appointment of Marxists to positions compatible with their skills and education and equal to the positions of their non-Marxist colleagues was obstructed. The weapon of starving and of arm twisting was used against some of them. Many of the Marxists' applications to join the Socialist Union were disregarded and the membership of most of those who were accepted as members was frozen under security pretexts.

Despite this, some well-known personalities from the Marxist left got the opportunity, upon the personal intervention of 'Abd al-Nasir, to occupy sensitive positions in the press, culture, public sector, and the Socialist Union and Vanguard Organization agencies (Mahmud Amin al-'Alim, Ahmad Hamrush, 'Abd al-'Azim Anis, 'Abd al-Razzaq Hasan, Sa'd Kamil, Mahmud Tawfiq, Salah Hafiz and others). Other personalities were able to run entire instruments and platforms of intellectual political education, such as AL-TALI'AH magazine (Abu Sayf Yusuf Abu Sayf, Fu'ad Mursi, Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, Michel Kamil, 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Ghazali, Lutfi al-Khuli and others) and the Socialist Studies Center (Ibrahim Sa'd al-Din, Fawzi Mansur, Muhammad al-Khafif and others). This prepared a common and fertile ground for dialogue between the Marxist left and the Nasirist left (the Youth Organization and a number of the members of the Socialist Union's Central Secretariat and of units of the Vanguard Organization). This is the dialogue that was proceeding constantly toward crystallizing the unity of view, of analysis and of movement on the political action arena. This progress caused the regime's agencies and some

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of its leaderships to fear the rise of a new and growing revolutionary political force whose projections [views] receive broad and deep response in the Egyptian society, especially in the wake of the 1967 defeat for which the people held the regime and its leaderships, with the exception of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, responsible. This was confirmed clearly by the sweeping popular uprising of 9 and 10 June 1967 which urged 'Abd al-Nasir to continue shouldering the leadership responsibilities and to fight the defeat and overcome it and, at the same time, to punish those responsible for the defeat and to rebuild the regime, in terms of both persons and agencies, so as to purge it of the negative practices and to make it qualified to mobilize the people's capabilities for continuing the march of freedom, socialism and unity and for waging the battle to eliminate the traces of the defeat at the Egyptian and Arab levels.

Therefore, the majority of the regime's leaderships united and focused their efforts on liquidating this new revolutionary political force which reflected its effectiveness more than once after the 9 and 10 June uprising in the form of worker and student demonstrations against what became known as the sentences in the cases of those responsible for the catastrophe of air force in the 1967 war. The blows were focused on the Socialist Union's Youth Organization, the Socialist Studies Center and AL-TALI'AH magazine which constituted the backbone of the instruments and platforms of the new revolutionary political force which continued to struggle without wavering and with the minimal degree of the required self-independence to preserve the vitality of the ground of the dialogue and dealing between the Marxist left and the Nasirist left. This force did actually manage to survive under the canopy and the protection of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and continued to fight the pressures of the regime's leaderships and the intimidation of the regime's agencies to dissolve and crush it. It also continued to fight against drowning in the subsidiary and unprincipled conflict flaring up openly and secretly between the numerous parties to the regime.

The more the solidarity of the Marxist left and Nasirist left was strengthened and the more direct bridges the Marxist left extended with Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, the more fiercely the regime's agencies, with their various conflicting parties, used whatever powers they had and whatever security, administrative and political agencies they controlled to destroy those bridges and to arouse 'Abd al-Nasir's doubts over this new revolutionary political force. For this purpose, those agencies innovated the method of distinguishing between what they called the "constructive and trustworthy left" and the "destructive and sabotaging left." Each party to the regime, even those parties classified as being to the left of the regime, proceeded to absorb a number of the Marxist personalities by using this method of distinction and discrimination and exploiting at the same time whatever ideological and political differences continued to exist among the Marxists themselves or the so-called diseases of cliquishness and of narrow-minded organizational jingoism.

Under the impact of the successive blows from the numerous sources, the path was blocked in the face of the new revolutionary political force which had been produced by the interaction between the Nasirist left and the Marxist left in the melting pot of society from fighting the 1967 defeat and its political, economic and social dimensions at home and abroad. The elements of fragmentation and frustration were finally able to destroy that force. The instruments and platforms which had continued to cling to their self-independence, to the unity of all

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the leftist forces with their different intellectual and social roots and to regaining the revolution's vitality through more fundamental organizations, methods and goals, determined in the light of the exorbitantly costly 1967 defeat, became isolated islands in society receiving blows from all the parties to the regime, the most painful being the blows dealt by the Socialist Union leadership, represented by 'Ali Sabri, and by the agency of Sami Sharaf, the minister of state and the head of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's office in the Vanguard Organization [sic].

'Abd al-Nasir discovered the truth of this tragedy too late and acknowledged it in an interview which AL-TALI'AH conducted with him throughout 2 hours at the end of 1969, i.e., one year before his death. 'Abd al-Nasir acknowledged the blows dealt to the new revolutionary political force by all the parties to the regime, especially when this force called for the formation of popular committees called the 30 March committees, in reference to the program submitted by 'Abd al-Nasir to confront the defeat under the name of the 30 March declaration, so that those committees may form the new base of the democratic organizational structure of the alliance of the people's working forces instead of the bureaucratic formula of the Socialist Union. 'Abd al-Nasir admitted that they (he did not give any specific names) continued to pursue him with piles of reports against the AL-TALI'AH group which they considered a "destructive party seeking to seize power." The reports presented to 'Abd al-Nasir did not stop even while he was being treated at (Tskhaltubo) spas in the Soviet Union. 'Abd al-Nasir also said that he discovered the untruthfulness of those reports when he himself studied carefully, despite his sickness, the ideas and solutions projected by AL-TALI'AH and found himself in agreement with most of them. Concluding his interview with AL-TALI'AH, 'Abd al-Nasir said in the presence of his Vice President Anwar al-Sadat and of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the chief editor of AL-AHRAM: "Frankly, people, the group controlling the Socialist Union is completely against you and will not allow you to engage in any political action. They consider you more like Masons. To correct these conditions, I have one of two options: Dismiss the people in charge of the Socialist Union, and I am not ready to do this because who will I be able to put to the work? Or respond to their request and close AL-TALI'AH, and I reject this. The second option is to devote a large part of my time to follow up this struggle minute by minute and confront it with personal intervention. But for 2 or 3 years to come, I have to devote my time and efforts for one issue that is above all considerations, namely the issue of rebuilding the armed forces so that they may wage the comprehensive fateful battle against Israel. This is the topmost priority at present. Anything else takes second place, regardless of how important it is to you. I advise you to steer clear off the spheres of direct political action and of the endeavors to hold positions in this action and to embark on struggles and to be content with Saint Peter's role insofar as revolutionary preaching and education are concerned until we end our battle with Israel. Then we will start taking stock anew with persons, institutions and positions..."

It is axiomatic that the reactions of the majority of the Socialist Union and Vanguard Organization leadership and of the security agencies tied to them was a violently angry reaction to the ideas, analyses and to the criticism of the conditions projected by AL-TALI'AH and toward Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's assessment of the situation and of its future dimensions. Those reactions were embodied in the adoption of measures to suppress and restrict the freedom of some members of AL-TALI'AH group and in the endeavors to sour relations between this group and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir on the one hand and between the group and a number of the Marxist and Nasirist leftist personalities on the other hand.

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It is my assessment that al-Sadat, having attended the interview and followed it carefully and silently, drew some important conclusions which he took into account when the struggle for power erupted after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence. Perhaps the most important conclusion was that there was a gap or a struggle between the "regime's left," comprised of the political figures which were in control of the regime's political and executive institutions and which al-Sadat later named the "centers of power," and the newborn revolutionary political power which had been created independently through the interaction between the factions of the Nasirist left and the Marxist left. Al-Sadat also understood from the interview, as he later indicated in a private conversation (conversation with Lutfi al-Khuli in January 1972) that even though 'Abd al-Nasir had supported the "centers of power" in the interview because it contained his aides, his position toward them was at the time critical and "their being brought to account was postponed till after the battle." Al-Sadat also sensed Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's appreciation for the role of AL-TALI'AH group, even though he continued to confine it to the "framework of preaching."

Thus, the position of the left at the moment of 'Abd al-Nasir's sudden disappearance from the arena seemed, outwardly, as the position of an enormous and cohesive force with united slogans, goals and language and with control of the leadership positions in the political organizations, in the executive agencies and in the instruments forming the public opinion and a force behind which the popular masses rally spontaneously and with their emotions.

But the reality was in fundamental contrast with this apparent image.

This is because the left was actually divided into factions and cliques engaged in a fierce struggle in which the intellectual and political struggle mingled with the struggle of cliquishness and with the residues of the old annularism. Perhaps the secret behind the contrast between the apparent image and the latent reality is that the leadership of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, the personality with the historical weight, represented the backbone for the movement of all the leftist factions with their various schools and cliques in a current with numerous sources but with a single direction. With the loss of this support upon the death of 'Abd al-Nasir, every faction or clique was freed of the commitment to the unity of the movement. This is natural because the personal role of 'Abd al-Nasir in the history of the political and social movement could not possibly continue after his death.

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[Text] In this part, the third of the series, Lutfi al-Khuli deals with the phase which witnessed the open confrontation between 'Ali Sabri and Anwar al-Sadat and in which the leader of the "regime's left" fell and the arena became free for Sha'rawi Jum'ah who will face al-Sadat in another round (next part of the series).

Even though all the leftist factions raised the slogan of continuing 'Abd al-Nasir's procession in accordance with the National Charter and the 30 March proclamation and of preparing the armed forces and the people to wage the battle of liberation against Israel, those factions disagreed on the principles and starting points of the movement to implement those slogans after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence, on the methods and the socio-political criteria necessary to separate the revolution forces and allies from their enemies at the local, Arab and international levels

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and on the priorities of the issue of democracy and of organizing the masses' effective and direct presence in society's movement.

Though the right had prepared its forces after 'Abd al-Nasir's death for the process of gradual retreat from the Nasirist experiment, hiding behind the slogans of socialism, there were two main inclinations within the leftist ranks: The first demanded continuation of the conditions, institutions and development limits as they had been without any further step forward whereas the second inclination insisted on the need to immediately take socio-political steps to liquidate the retrogression forces which had revived immediately upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death and had begun the counter-movement from their positions in the wholesale trade, the contracting business and the investments of the richest landowners. This inclination also insisted on the need to mobilize the masses democratically so that they may be armed with the ability to protect their gains, to confront the imminent danger of the retrogression appearing on the horizon and to immunize the people to withstand any sacrifices and losses demanded by the liberation battle.

The first inclination was expressed by the so-called "regime's left," which al-Sadat later called the "centers of power," which was comprised of a group of axes dominating the Socialist Union, the Vanguard Organization and the state institutions, such as the People's Assembly and the executive information, local government, police and intelligence agencies, in addition to the military axis. The movement of these axes was dominated by the bureaucratic system of action from above. Despite the unity of their tactical position vis-a-vis al-Sadat axis, those axes were actually divided among themselves, disunited and harbored doubts toward each other insofar as the strategic position after settling the struggle for power with al-Sadat was concerned.

The second inclination was expressed by the new revolutionary political forces which crystallized as a result of the interaction between the Marxist left and the radical elements in the Nasirist left. The dominant characteristic among those forces was the unity of their movement and of the issues and action lines which they projected. But at the same time, those forces were no more than a power of expression and of political pressure in the Socialist Union and the Vanguard Organization because the real power lied in the hands of the "regime's left." Those new revolutionary political forces were not able to jump with their movement over the Socialist Union and the Vanguard Organization to the masses and their unionist and democratic organizations, either due to the lack of at least a minimally independent organization capable of such action or for fear of direct confrontation with the "regime's left"--a confrontation which would have widened the gaps in the general leftist front in contrast to the tendency of the rightist forces to unite their ranks.

Between the two inclinations, the Nasirist left--worried by critical observations concerning both the regime's left and the Marxist left--continued to vacillate and to be unable to decide its position while facing for the first time a fateful option in the absence of 'Abd al-Nasir, the leader who had polarized its boundless confidence and the one from whom it had become accustomed to expect the "option decision" every time and to implement this decision with the loyalty of "loyal troops."

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Nearly 2 weeks after 'Abd al-Nasir's death, the first political contact was made between the regime's left and the other leftist factions with the aim of coordinating the movement. The main preparation for that contact was made by the Sudanese Marxist left which had been participating at the time in the regime led by Ja'far Numayri. The preparation was done especially by Faruq Abu 'Isa, the then Sudanese minister of foreign affairs, with the help of an Egyptian friend who was one of the leaders of the Marxist left, namely 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Ghazali, the secretarial editor of AL-TALI'AH. This was not the only channel of contact. There were numerous other channels in which a number of the Marxist leaderships working with the regime's left in the Socialist Union and in the Vanguard Organization participated, such as Mahmud Amin al-'Alim, Ahmad Hamrush, Ibrahim Sa'd al-Din and Fawzi Mansur. Other independent leaders also participated in those channels, such as Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Dr Fu'ad Mursi, Dr Isma'il 'Abdallah and Abu Sayf Yusuf Abu Sayf who was in charge of the responsibility of chief editor of AL-TALI'AH because the magazine's chief editor had been in jail since May 1970, i.e., 6 months after conducting the interview between AL-TALI'AH group and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. The chief editor had been jailed under the case known as the voice recordings made by the security agency controlled by Sami Sharaf in which the chief editor was charged with making critical remarks at a private meeting in his home against the measures violating the democracy and against the [regime's] bureaucratic dealings with the masses, thus undermining the cause of liberation and of socialism.

In this contact, the "regime's left" asserted that it was in full control of the situation and that it possessed all the resources for confronting and defeating any rightist endeavor to retrogress from Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's path. It seemed at the time that the danger lay, in the estimate of the "regime's left," in the movement of the surviving members of the Revolution Command Council and in their attempt to contain Anwar al-Sadat so as to turn against the regime's continuity and against its legitimate institutions.

The "regime's left" asked all the leftist factions with their various inclinations to unite their efforts to protect the "legitimacy of the regime" from those calling for a turnabout and for reforming the Revolution Council. The regime's left also urged the leftist factions in society to participate with all their strength with the Socialist Union and Vanguard Organization agencies for the continuity of the regime through the popular and unanimous nomination of Anwar al-Sadat, who had become an interim president after 'Abd al-Nasir's death, to the position of original and constitutional president and, consequently, to rescue al-Sadat from being contained in the bosom of the "reactionary forces" led by the veteran members of the Revolution Command Council. The regime's left underlined its agreement with Anwar al-Sadat to continue the regime's situation and the responsibilities of the main figures in the regime as they had been before 'Abd al-Nasir's death.

The regime's left turned down all the proposals made by the leftist factions on the need to exploit that opportunity to build the unity of all the leftist forces through reorganizing the masses on a democratic basis and around a definite program emanating from the positive aspects and accomplishments of the experiment and from reading the future with socio-political clarity--a program to be discussed in organizational meetings and broad popular meetings and to which the new president and his assisting crew will commit themselves before the

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people who, with their organized presence, will make up for the loss of the historical leadership of 'Abd al-Nasir. Thus, the objective and subjective guarantees for continuation of the march would be insured. But the regime's left viewed those proposals as an unsafe adventure and as a gamble on the unknown and believed that the objective and subjective guarantees were present through its almost full control of the regime's agencies, especially the internal security forces, the armed forces and the republican guard, on the one hand and through the undeclared agreement with President al-Sadat on the other hand.

The events came in succession and in accordance with the agreement between the regime's left and President al-Sadat who had been elected constitutional president of the republic in October 1970 with the unanimous consent of the Socialist Union, the Vanguard Organization and the People's Assembly.

But hardly a few months had passed when al-Sadat began to put an end to the honeymoon between himself and the regime's left by resorting, step by step, to drugging this left with the comfortable seats of power and to isolating it from the other axes struggling within closed walls and far from the masses. Moreover, al-Sadat aroused division and doubts between 'Ali Sabri's axis and the other axis of the regime's left and proceeded to raise on his own the slogan of democracy and of the supremacy of the law, hinting that the regime's left was misusing its power and violating the law and the citizens' liberties and rights. He used a number of sequestration cases, imposed as a result of personal or of vengeful motives on the part of some figures in the regime's left and without the knowledge of 'Abd al-Nasir, as flagrant examples of such violations. The campaign against the sequestrations was the real preparations for al-Sadat's exercise of his method, later known as the "electric shocks" method. Al-Sadat declared, with popular support, abolition of the sequestrations and refrainment from imposing any new sequestrations illegally and without a legal trial before the judiciary so as to safeguard against the repeated misuse of power.

Al-Sadat followed this with another shock, namely his separate and closed talks with William Rogers, the then U.S. secretary of State, who had come to Cairo on a reconnaissance visit after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence. Al-Sadat held the talks without the participation of the group of the regime's left. Al-Sadat didn't give this group a breather but hastened to surprise it with another shock, embodied in imposing the Egyptian-Syrian-Libyan unity plan within the framework of the so-called Confederation of Arab Republics. This motivated 'Ali Sabri to stage an open counter-movement.

'Ali Sabri proceeded in his calculations on the basis that there were rules governing the game of the delicate balance in the regime after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence and that upsetting or disregarding those rules exposed the regime to cracking and collapsing. Foremost of those rules, of which al-Sadat had to be reminded constantly, was the rule that the acknowledgement by 'Ali Sabri and by his colleagues in the axes allied with him of al-Sadat's succession to 'Abd al-Nasir and their acceptance to work under him does not mean that al-Sadat has turned into a new 'Abd al-Nasir but means that he has become a partner in the power with 'Abd al-Nasir's aides and legitimate heirs and, consequently, it is extremely dangerous for al-Sadat to resort to "concocting" secretly such a serious decision as the decision of unity with Syria and Libya, with all its subsequent effects on the relations of the forces within the regime and the government agencies and among

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the regime's leaders, and to surprising his partners in the power with the decision, thus compelling them to submit to and accept the fait accompli. Permitting al-Sadat to pass this "concoction" without a minimum degree of discussion and accounting is likely to give him the permit to repeat it. With time, the regime's "legitimate heirs" will be transformed, with all the political organizations and main institutions of the state which they control, from "strong partners" into "weak hostages" which have but one option in the near future: Either resign or be relieved.

Even though the other axes allied with 'Ali Sabri shared the same concerns, they expressed their fears of having the first open confrontation between them and al-Sadat erupt over an issue connected with Arab unity, considering that this unity constitutes one of the distinctive features of Nasirism and especially if it is projected as a guarantee of the pan-Arabism of the battle against Israel. In such a case, it is inevitable that the leaders of these axes would appear as if they resisted unity and the pan-Arabism of the battle whereas al-Sadat would emerge as the genuine Nasirist knight struggling for unity and for the pan-Arabism of the battle.

Therefore, those axes urged 'Ali Sabri to avoid touching off the confrontation because of this issue and to wait for another opportunity in which the circumstances and the issue of the confrontation are more opportune.

But 'Ali Sabri, who had concluded from the indications of the events which were moving at an ever-faster tempo, that time was against him and his allies and in favor of al-Sadat and that he had to move very energetically and without any delay to break the blockade which al-Sadat was about to seal around him and around his supporters to paralyze their movement. So 'Ali Sabri made it clear that he was not convinced by his allies' fears and insisted on waging the open confrontation, accusing those who exaggerated those fears of justifying in fact a "subjective fear" which leads to a "subjective escape" from the inevitable confrontation because they prefer deep in their hearts the path of bargaining with al-Sadat--a path which, in Sabri's assessment, would only lead to the full liquidation of the July revolution and of all those who had worked with 'Abd al-Nasir, one after the other and regardless of their current positions or relations with al-Sadat. When 'Ali Sabri became certain that he had persuaded some of the leaders of the axes allied with him ('Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur, Dr Labib Shuqayr and Sa'd Zayid) of his viewpoint and when the other leaders ended their opposition and took a neutral position, he decided to lure al-Sadat to a public confrontation over the political ground on which he, 'Ali Sabri, enjoyed the greatest degree of influence, namely the Arab Socialist Union with its various organizational and leadership levels. Sabri called for an emergency meeting of the Supreme Executive Committee to discuss the issue of unity and to determine the degree of the constitutionality of the decision which al-Sadat had adopted independently.

Under those delicate circumstances, contact was again resumed between the axes of the "regime's left," which had entered the open confrontation with al-Sadat axis without prior agreement among them, and the leftist factions in an attempt to build the broadest front possible inside and outside the political organizations to confront al-Sadat axis.

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During the contacts, all inclinations and positions were discussed. The predominant view of the leftist factions insisted on the need to examine carefully the dual character of the plan for unity with Syria and Libya and the many possibilities this plan reflects, meaning that the unity plan could continue to be confined to its framework of being one of the maneuvering tactics in the struggle for power. It could also be a strategic nucleus for a unionist Arab action for the comprehensive Arab confrontation against Israel, imperialism and backwardness. It was also the view of the leftist factions that under the circumstances, it was the duty of all the national forces, including the Marxist and Nasirist left, to struggle in order to enable the strategic side to predominate the tactical side in the unity plan and that this required bringing the issue of unity, with its contents, goals and forms, down to the masses along with the issue of the struggle for power so that the masses may be the decisive element in dealing with the struggle in a healthy manner that insures the regime's political, economic and social directions against any possible setbacks. But the "regime's left" with all its axes rejected this view and even rejected to extend the battle going on inside the Socialist Union to the general congress. Those axes insisted that the battle be confined within the limits of the Supreme Executive Committee and the Central Committee, if necessary.

The argument cited by the axes of the "regime's left" in this regard was the argument that popularization of the battle and of the struggle under the circumstances carried the dangers of creating a state of chaos among unorganized masses which did not have enough information on the real backgrounds of the struggle--dangers from which al-Sadat would benefit in his capacity as the legitimate ruler who masters the game of manipulating the slogans of democracy, freedom and the supremacy of the law--whereas if the struggle and management of the battle continued to be confined to the institutions, where the axes of the "regime's left" have control over the regime's striking agencies, the fate of al-Sadat would actually continue to be under their mercy. Those axes revealed a plan which they formulated against al-Sadat axis--a plan beginning with escalating warning measures and ending, should the warnings fail to realize their purpose, with containing, blockading and dismissing al-Sadat constitutionally. All that was required of the leftist factions at the time was to support the positions of the "regime's left" and to propagate them in their circles.

Thus, the second endeavor to establish coordination between the axes of the "regime's left" and the leftist factions failed, even though succeeding partially in persuading some leftist elements in the Socialist Union to abide by the line projected by the axes of the "regime's left" for the battle inside the political organization.

In the emergency meeting of the Socialist Union's Supreme Executive Committee, held in April 1971, 'Ali Sabri launched an open attack against al-Sadat for the latter's disregard of the political organization's and the state's leaderships and for adopting independently the decision on unity with Syria and Libya without a profound study taking into consideration the lessons of the previous experience of unity with Syria, the ideological and political differences among the regimes involved in the unity or the refrainment of Sudan, which had become the regime closest to the Egyptian regime, from taking part in the unity despite the persistent appeals made to it on the grounds that the unity decision is a "hasty and an unstudied" decision. 'Ali Sabri then revealed the discussions that took

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place between him and Libyan Chairman Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi at Cairo Airport when he went to receive him there at the request of the presidency. Sabri also revealed that al-Qadhafi was not reassured by the bases on which the unity was founded. Sabri did not stop wondering what was behind al-Sadat's extraordinary insistence on establishing the unity and proclaiming it quickly.

Defending his position, al-Sadat said that he was only completing a fundamental plan which the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir himself had started and in which the regime's leaderships, including 'Ali Sabri personally, had participated. Al-Sadat proceeded to add that he could explain 'Ali Sabri's position in only one of two things: Either that Sabri did not want to complete 'Abd al-Nasir's pan-Arab procession or that he opposed the unity because it was not being realized under his leadership. Al-Sadat then said that this was a subjective position governed by narrow-minded personal calculations that sacrifice the urgent objective motives for the unity as an essential starting point for the pan-Arabism of the battle against Israel.

The debate was not settled at the Supreme Executive Committee meeting which lasted 7 hours. The two poles to the conflict (al-Sadat and Sabri) continued to cling to their conflicting positions. Meanwhile, a minority led by Dr Mahmud Fawzi supported al-Sadat's position and another minority consisting of the axes of the "regime's left" proposed the formation of a committee "to study all aspects of the issue" whereas the majority of the committee remained silent.

Al-Sadat rejected the proposal and it became evident that the committee was unable to make a decision. It was agreed to refer the issue to an emergency meeting of the Socialist Union's Central Committee before the end of April 1971.

Prior to the convocation of the Central Committee, al-Sadat met with the axes of the "regime's left," with the exception of 'Ali Sabri's axis, to notify them that he did not intend to back down on the unity decision, that he was going to go ahead with its implementation, regardless of its ramifications inside the regime, that he considers 'Ali Sabri's attack against unity an attack against him personally and that 'Ali Sabri defies him intentionally, imagining that he [Sabri] is a "center of power" with a special weight.

This was the first time in which al-Sadat used the phrase "centers of power," threatening that if the Central Committee let him down on the instigation of the "centers of power," then he would go over its head and address the people directly from the radio and television and call for a general referendum on the establishment of the Confederation of Arab Republics which represents the correct realistic step toward building the Arab unity and confronting Israel. Should this happen, al-Sadat said, he would have no alternative but to dissolve the Socialist Union and rebuild it from top to bottom in new elections.

The Central Committee, to which the arena of the struggle had been extended, convened in a tense atmosphere. Al-Sadat and Sabri again reviewed their positions and it was noticed that each of them resorted to the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's views and opinions to support his position. This [use of 'Abd al-Nasir's views and opinions] was especially evident in quoting the speech which he made in May 1970 on the first anniversary of the Sudanese revolution and when

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al-Sadat quoted 'Abd al-Nasir's words: "We are fighting for a single nation, for a single homeland and for a single people against a single enemy assailing all of us." 'Ali Sabri answered him by saying that this was a partial and distorted quotation of the late President 'Abd al-Nasir's views and opinions who had said in the same speech: "Our struggle for unity must be armed with a strong weapon, namely the weapon of the masses' awareness and the masses' knowledge of every step they take. Before embarking upon any step, we must present it to the people and their political organizations so that the people may not be misled. This is the lesson we learned after the breakdown of the pioneer unity of 1958. If the masses approve such a step, we will put it into implementation and if the masses find that they want further clarification or further study, then let them have further clarification and further study."

The meeting flared up with heated debates and some political elements in the committee resorted to underlining a "fundamental dimension" on which 'Abd al-Nasir had focused in the same speech and which both al-Sadat and Sabri disregarded, namely the dimension embodied specifically in 'Abd al-Nasir's words: "The revolutionary nationalist forces are required before anything else to build their fundamental bases, and I don't mean here the bases of power. The masses are the real force and power without the masses is a mere domination hostile to the essence of the truth. All this serves realization of the meeting of the revolutionary forces. With this, the unity of the revolutionary forces will be able to shoulder the responsibility of the serious confrontation currently imposed on the Arab nation. Insofar as this confrontation is concerned, the nation will ultimately withstand [accept] nothing other than complete victory."

Thus, all the allied and conflicting forces were resorting in their offense and defense, and even in their maneuvers, to selecting from 'Abd al-Nasir's legacy that which supported their positions.

After 5 hours of heated argument, interspersed with the manifestations of ridiculing al-Sadat and denouncing his views, it was evident that the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee members were sympathetic to 'Ali Sabri in a strong and organized manner whereas a small minority, no more than a handful, supported al-Sadat. This tempted 'Ali Sabri to continue the pressure for translating this support through the issuance of a decisive resolution which would push al-Sadat to a "serious dilemma" he couldn't overcome without approving new conditions imposed by 'Ali Sabri to guarantee his actual participation with al-Sadat in the exercise of power.

But the axes of the "regime's left" led by Sha'rawi Jum'ah who, in addition to his organizational responsibilities in the Socialist Union and the Vanguard Organization, held the position of minister of interior rushed to contact the Central Committee members to resist 'Ali Sabri's plan to push al-Sadat to the "dilemma" because, through their analysis of the given facts of the real situation, those axes believed that if it was possible to push al-Sadat to the dilemma, then al-Sadat could drag the entire regime along with him, being left with no alternative other than to carry out his threat to leap over the political organization and the state institutions and address the people directly, thus preferring to "pull down the temple on his head and the heads of his enemies." This is why those axes resorted to concerted movement in two parallel directions:

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First, to prevent the conflict which had erupted over the issue of the Confederation of Arab Republics from taking the form of a violent confrontation between al-Sadat and 'Ali Sabri during the Central Committee's voting and to make a collective endeavor to overcome the dilemma with a compromise satisfactory to all the parties involved, even if at the expense of 'Ali Sabri, the ally.

The second direction was to take all the precautions necessary to prevent al-Sadat, at any cost, from using, in his capacity as the president of the republic, the radio and television to address the people directly.

Those axes did actually achieve success in both directions and were able to bring the Central Committee's meeting to conclusion without any voting, being content with announcing an official statement saying: "Due to the large number of those who requested to speak on the issue and due to the importance of the issue, it has been decided to form a technical committee under the chairmanship of 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu al-Nur, the Socialist Union secretary general, to receive all the opinions and to present a report on them to the Central Committee which will meet again on a date which will be set this week." Those axes were thus able to defuse the "timed bomb" which 'Ali Sabri had planted in the Central Committee under all the parties fighting under the regime's roof.

At the same time, the axes of the "regime's left" led by Sha'rawi Jum'ah took security precautions in anticipation of what al-Sadat may do to transfer the struggle for power to the street with a general and direct speech to the people. They imposed a strict blockade around the radio and television building which would be impossible for al-Sadat and his supporters to penetrate. They also resorted to staging a show of force by holding a series of conferences for the vital and influential sectors of society under their leadership at the headquarters of the Central Committee and the Socialist Union's centers, such as the conference of the labor leaderships, the conference of the press leaderships and the conference of the teachers of national subjects and of philosophy in the secondary schools and of equal schools in Cairo Governorate. The aim of those conferences which preceded or followed the Central Committee's tempestuous meeting was to convey an indirect, but clear, message to al-Sadat on the extent of those axes' capabilities for confrontation in case they are attacked.

By the end of April 1971, the struggle for power, despite the calm prevailing on the surface in the wake of the tempest created by 'Ali Sabri and ending practically with his defeat and isolation from the leadership of the axes of the "regime's left," was heading rapidly toward the "bone-breaking" confrontation between the axes of the "regime's left" with their new leadership, embodied in Sha'rawi Jum'ah, and al-Sadat axis. Each side started to prepare and organize for waging the battle under the mask of the mutual camouflage and warning operations.

On the one hand, the axes of the "regime's left" showed and spread their disagreement with 'Ali Sabri's axis in pushing al-Sadat toward the dilemma, played the role of the fireman putting out the fire which had flared up politically in the Central Committee and turned the direction from voting on a resolution "incriminating" al-Sadat politically to bestowing a kind of legitimacy on his independent decision to establish the Confederation of Arab Republics and to considering the issue a mere technical, and not political, issue.

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On the other hand, al-Sadat axis was eager to declare that it made a distinction between the irresponsible axis of 'Ali Sabri which is motivated by personal rancor and the other axes of the "regime's left" which had been characterized by wisdom, objectivity and the appreciation of responsibility in their exercise of power.

Yet, there were differences connected with the goals and means of managing the struggle between the two sides fighting silently.

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[Text] In the first part, Lutfi al-Khuli dealt with what he has called "the war of the axes" which moved al-Sadat from the shadow to the top.

In the second part, al-Khuli dealt with what he calls the "rightist lines" and the "leftist lines" and with the eruption of the struggle among the "centers of power" in the wake of 'Abd al-Nasir's absence.

In the third part, the author dealt with the phase which witnessed the open confrontation between 'Ali Sabri and Anwar al-Sadat.

This part of the series, the one before last, recounts the events of the "Hulwan battle" and of the fall of 'Ali Sabri and paints the climate of the decisive battle between al-Sadat and the Egyptian left--a battle leading to the "May Movement" which settled the "palace coup."

Al-Sadat axis relied on the method of lurking and of surprise pouncing and attack in its efforts to liquidate the axes of the "regime's left" from all their positions in the regime in the shortest time possible. As for the axes of the "regime's left," they took the stance of fortified defense inside their positions in the regime, venturing every now and then to twist al-Sadat's arm as a warning and confining their goal to only insuring their "participation with al-Sadat in power" through a long-drawn and patient approach.

Only a few days had passed on the "Central Committee battle" from which no party to the struggle emerged vanquished or victorious--with the exception of 'Ali Sabri, the only loser--when the Hulwan battle erupted in the open and before the masses for the first time. It had been decided to celebrate Mayday on the morning of 1 May 1971 within the square of the enormous industrial bastion built by 'Abd al-Nasir in Hulwan where al-Sadat was to make, in his capacity as the president of the republic and the Socialist Union chairman, a political speech--as was the custom in 'Abd al-Nasir's era--before thousands of workers and representatives of the Arab and foreign labor unions and in the presence of the leaderships of the state and of the political organization.

Each side had prepared itself to wage the new battle with the aim of modifying the upset balance of forces resulting from the Central Committee battle. The news of that battle had spread inside and outside Egypt.

Each side had drawn its plan for the "open Hulwan battle" on the basis of inflicting on the other side a tangible and calculated degree of defeat which would have its direct returns insofar as the positions of the vacillating or neutral axes

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in the state agencies and in society are concerned on the one hand and, on the other hand, insofar as the movement of the unorganized popular masses and the calculations of both the friendly and the hostile Arab and foreign forces are concerned.

The fundamental weapon in the hands of the axes of the "regime's left," which had entered this battle with unified forces and directions, was their ability, with which al-Sadat axis could not compete, to mobilize the enormous mass of the Socialist Union and Vanguard Organization members in the set place and at the set time, with the movement of this mass being led by trained elements and professional cadres with such discipline as to be close to military discipline. This mass would fill the meeting or celebration square on the occasion specified and for the length of time required, thus leaving in the minds of others the general impression that it is the victorious force that cannot be defeated.

As for al-Sadat, his weapon was the "legitimacy" which he derived from being the sole vice president appointed by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in the last year of his life and from being elected unanimously the president of the republic after 'Abd al-Nasir's death. In Egypt, "legitimacy" gives whoever holds it a big asset of traditional respect in the general conscience of the masses. This respect remains constant, at least during the first years of the holder's term--years constituting the time for experimenting and the period for testing. In addition to this "conventional weapon," al-Sadat used a "new weapon," namely that of advocating, from his position at the top of the regime, democracy, freedom and supremacy of the law for all the citizens without exception.

In the arena of the "open Hulwan battle," the weapons of the two sides clashed before the eyes of the masses.

The masses of the Socialist Union members which had occupied strategic positions on the geographic map of the celebration site, exercised their power to interrupt al-Sadat while he was delivering his speech by raising thousands of pictures of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in his face and by shouting implicit slogans warning al-Sadat not to swerve from 'Abd al-Nasir's path or to undermine the Socialist Union and its leadership. This almost prevented al-Sadat from finishing the delivery of his speech, had it not been for the visible and international intervention of the cadres of the axes of the "regime's left."

Meanwhile, al-Sadat hastened to raise the banner of continuing on 'Abd al-Nasir's path, along with the banner of democracy, freedom and the supremacy of the law, asserting that after 'Abd al-Nasir's death the revolution "has become the property of all the people and not of one group to the exclusion of others" and promising, as a responsible legitimate ruler, not to permit under any circumstances the presence in the regime of "centers of power" which monopolize the revolution and impose their custodianship over the people.

Al-Sadat's statements on what he called the "centers of power" was a surprise which caught unawared the axes of the "regime's left" that had read the text of the written speech in advance and had found no close or remote reference in it to the "centers of power."

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Explaining this issue afterwards, al-Sadat said that he had asked Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the chief editor of AL-AHRAM who had written the speech, to write on a separate page a paragraph on the "centers of power." But Haykal had declined for two reasons: The first was that he did not want to become a party to the struggle between al-Sadat and the axes of the "regime's left." Considering that those axes knew that he was the one who wrote the official speech, they would consider the slander accusing them of being "centers of power" as a slander coming originally from Haykal and would think that Haykal had convinced al-Sadat of this. On the other hand, Haykal believed that any open talk of the "centers of power" would be tantamount to a "declaration of war" against the group in control of the state agencies and of the political organization, thus blocking the path in the face of any dialogue and any possible reconciliation between the parties to the struggle, and would pose a threat to the country's stability and unity in confronting the enormous dangers accumulating in the wake of 'Abd al-Nasir's sudden absence.

But al-Sadat, who had adopted the system of blitzkrieg, insisted on declaring an open war before the masses, considering that it is the only solution to liquidating the crisis of power before it gets more complicated and, consequently, rocks the country's stability and unity. On this basis, he decided to write personally the paragraph on the centers of power on a separate page which he put away in his pocket. Just before completing the delivery of his speech, he took the bomb out of his breast [pocket] and exploded it among the ranks of the axes of the "regime's left" which were stunned.

Al-Sadat departed from the celebration, leaving behind him serious question marks over the future and the destiny [of the leadership]--questions needing an urgent answer.

The wait did not last long. The answer, exceeding all expectations, came on the evening of the same day in a two-line decision issued by al-Sadat, in his capacity as the president of the republic and the Socialist Union chairman, "relieving 'Ali Sabri from all his positions." Sami Sharaf, the minister of state for presidential affairs and one of the leaders of the axes of the "regime's left," was summoned and asked to convey the decision officially to 'Ali Sabri and to notify the Egyptian and foreign information media to publish and announce it immediately.

All the efforts exerted by the axes of the "regime's left" did not succeed in making the president postpone implementation and announcement of the decision just for 24 hours to prepare 'Ali Sabri psychologically for the shock and to take precautions in anticipation of the reactions in the country generally and inside the political organization in particular. Al-Sadat rejected all those endeavors and even refused to relieve Sami Sharaf from the task of implementing the decision.

Thus, al-Sadat moved with a sudden speed which his adversaries had not expected, declaring war on them in the morning and destroying with his artillery in the evening one of the strategic strongholds of the axes of the regime's left, after having isolated him from his colleagues. With one blow, al-Sadat realized three goals: First, appearing as a strong president who fulfills what he promises. He had threatened to strike the so-called "centers of power" and he did actually liquidate a "center of power" who had defied him as an equal. The second goal [was to show] that the legitimacy he possessed was more effective in its movement and influence than the Socialist Union cadres which had displayed their force against him openly at the Hulwan meeting. The third goal was [to show] that all

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the "positions of power" in the regime controlled by the axes of the "regime's left" not only failed to protect the head of their major ally from falling but also that one of their leaders was the executor, thus weakening extremely the status and credibility of those axes' strength and unity.

The events then moved in rapid succession toward the decisive battle in the struggle for power which everybody expected to erupt any day, even though 8 months hadn't yet passed on 'Abd al-Nasir's death.

The stunningly simple and easy fall of 'Ali Sabri in the Hulwan battle, without any of the expected violent and large-scale organizational and popular reactions, led to extremely significant ramifications in the ranks of the two fighting camps.

In al-Sadat camp, the outcome of the Hulwan battle contributed to creating the right conditions which encouraged the dormant political and social pockets supporting al-Sadat in the regime and in society to organize and prepare their forces for the battle and to come out of their hiding places under the surface to occupy positions of confrontation above the surface. That outcome also encouraged the majority of the axes and forces which had continued to vacillate or to take refuge in neutrality throughout the 8 months of the struggle to decide their position and to align themselves with al-Sadat axis, considering that al-Sadat had shown with the 'Ali Sabri blow that he was not a weak and powerless individual but a leader who clings to legitimacy strongly in comparison with the axes of the "regime's left" which seemed to assume an inflated, but incapable, bureaucratic image.

As for the camp of the axes of the "regime's left," chaos spread in its ranks and its opinions on what was to be done varied. After the Hulwan battle, a sense of guilt prevailed among this camp's men because of what had happened to 'Ali Sabri, considering that their failure to support him fully through their positions in the Central Committee is what encouraged al-Sadat to topple him. 'Ali Sabri, from the moment a weeping Sami Sharaf notified him of al-Sadat's decision until the outbreak of the decisive battle 13 days after his fall, continued to pull strongly the cord of remorse among his allies, urging them to move with utter speed and with all the resources available to topple al-Sadat and get rid of him before he could get rid of them one after the other.

At the same time, there were increasing pressures from a number of the Socialist Union organizations, especially in Cairo under the leadership of 'Abd al-Majid Farid and in al-Jizah under the leadership of Farid 'Abd al-Karim, urging the leaders of the axes of the "regime's left" to enter into an alliance with the leftist factions in society and to include the masses in the struggle, instead of confining the struggle to the cells of the regime, by mobilizing the masses to "protect 'Abd al-Nasir's regime and the accomplishments it has realized for the workers, farmers and intellectuals from the danger of al-Sadat coup against them."

But the leaders of the axes of the "regime's left" continued to cling to their positions of rejecting the masses' participation in the struggle, considering such participation an (unethical) act with uncertain consequences. Those leaders did actually confront a number of initiatives launched by some units of the Socialist Union and clung to managing the struggle with al-Sadat from their positions within

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the regime and through the mutual acts of plotting. After the military axis had aligned itself with them, those leaders estimated that they were able to deal a fatal blow to al-Sadat. They waited for Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi, the minister of war, to notify them that he had completed his preparations to move within days so that they may support him with an assisting movement by the republican guard axis under the command of Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif. Sami Sharaf thought that this axis was totally loyal to him, as revealed by the confessions of the leaders in the investigations in the case known as the "case of the plot of the centers of power in 1971."

This was not the only thing revealed by the investigations in the case. It also became evident that al-Sadat axis had attracted to its ranks three executive elements with leadership tasks in the plan of the axes of the "regime's left" to deal the fatal blow to its opponents. Those elements were: Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq, the armed forces chief of staff and one of the leaders of the military axis; Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the republican guard commander; and Mamduh Salim, the governor of Alexandria and one of the prominent officials in the internal security agency and in the Vanguard Organization. What is more, the investigations exposed the deep crisis of confidence existing among the leadership of the axes of the "regime's left"--a crisis which motivated each leadership to monitor the telephone conversations of the other leaderships dealing with the anti-Sadat plans and to record those conversations on tape in its offices. These are the tapes which ultimately fell in the hands of al-Sadat axis and which this axis used in incriminating evidence against those who had recorded them.

This was the position of the two fighting sides while approaching the moment of the decisive battle. It seemed from the movement of both sides as if they were committed to a "gentleman's agreement" to keep the masses completely isolated from the battle and to wrestle each other for power within the bounds of the well-known game of the "palace coup."

Considering the relations of the forces after the Hulwan battle, al-Sadat axis was in stronger offensive positions than the axes of the "regime's left" whose positions were defensive positions predominantly.

Suddenly, the distinctive incident which touched off the battle occurred. According to the story of al-Sadat axis the incident was spontaneous and was summed up in that one of the officers of the monitoring and recording security unit operating in the office of Sha'rawi Jum'ah, the minister of interior, knocked on the president's door at night, insisting on seeing the president to present something important to him. It later became evident that that thing was a number of secretly and illegally recorded tapes containing conversations monitored from the president's house, in addition to other tapes on telephone conversations between Sha'rawi Jum'ah and other leaders of the axes of the "regime's left" on the plans to confront al-Sadat. Al-Sadat continued to listen to the tapes from midnight until dawn on 12 May 1971. In the morning, he immediately summoned Sami Sharaf and assigned him to go to Sha'rawi Jum'ah, who had taken command of the struggle from his position in the Central Committee, to either resign or be relieved immediately.

But a careful reading of the movement and documents of the events makes it more likely that this incident was not spontaneous and that it had been planned carefully by al-Sadat axis which had gained the support of key figures of high degree

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of importance in the axes of the "regime's left" and in the agencies they controlled. The motive of that plan was to impose the battle on the other side while in a state of fragmentation and before it could succumb to the increasing pressures to bring the struggle down to the masses and to mobilize them and before the military axis could complete its preparations to deal a fatal counter-blow. It was not incidental that Taha Zaki, the officer who carried the tapes to the president's residence, was the cousin of Fawzi 'Abd al-Hafiz, the president's private secretary, and it is not customary for the president to be awakened from his sleep to listen to some recorded tapes when hearing those tapes could have been delayed, without any noteworthy danger, until the president had awakened in the morning. It is most likely that Taha Zaki had been recruited to work for al-Sadat axis from his sensitive position in the Ministry of Interior.

Once again, a weeping Sami Sharaf carried out the mission entrusted to him by President al-Sadat to give Sha'rawi Jum'ah the option of either resigning or of being relieved. The axes of the "regime's left" were shocked by the second surprise attack which al-Sadat launched when no more than 13 days had passed on relieving 'Ali Sabri.

An urgent conference was held for the leaderships of the axes of the "regime's left" to study the situation and to confront al-Sadat attack with a rapid counter-attack. It became evident from assessing the situation that the military axis was not yet able to move due to the fact that Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi had discovered that Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq and a large number of high-ranking officers on whom he relied had aligned themselves with al-Sadat axis on the grounds that al-Sadat represented legitimacy. It was also found out that Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the republican guard commander, had shifted his loyalty from Sami Sharaf to the president of the republic.

The conferees also received reports that Maj Gen Mamduh Salim, whom al-Sadat had appointed minister of interior in the place of Sha'rawi Jum'ah, had gained firm control over the security agency and that a survey of the People's Assembly members, all of whom were members of the Socialist Union also, showed that no more than 18 out of 350 members were still loyal to the axes of the "regime's left." Moreover, most of the leadership of the public sector workers and of its managers had aligned themselves with al-Sadat axis under the leadership of 'Aziz Sidqi.

It thus became evident that the plan of the axes of the "regime's left" to manage the struggle for power according to the "palace coup game" was a futile plan in view of the successive attacks launched by al-Sadat under the slogan of "legitimacy, democracy and liquidation of the centers of power." The only option left for those axes was to either capitulate and succumb or fight on the basis of "collective resignations from the regime's main positions," thus causing, in their estimate, a constitutional collapse in the country motivating the masses to move and rebel in response to the weight which those leaderships represented--in their own estimates--in 'Abd al-Nasir's struggle experience.

On the evening of 13 May, the leaderships of the axes of the "regime's left" did in fact surprise al-Sadat axis, the people and their cadres in the Socialist Union and the Vanguard Organization by tendering their resignations, in solidarity with Sha'rawi Jum'ah, from all the positions they held in the Supreme Executive

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Committee and the General Secretariat of the Socialist Union, in the cabinet, in the People's Assembly speakership and in the command of the armed forces and of the general intelligence.

The last action carried out by Muhammad Fa'iq, the minister of information, before leaving his office for his house was to issue his instructions, like all the other resignees, that news of the resignations be broadcast on the radio without waiting for the official documents to be presented to the president of the republic.

Even though this stance taken by the axes of the "regime's left" was essentially within the bounds of a reaction, the collective quality of the stance and the way it was announced were characterized by the qualities of offense and of defiance, considering that it took the form of "throwing the glove openly in the face of al-Sadat" with the aim of holding him accountable before the people for the responsibility of the collapse in the state institutions as a result of "his endeavors to gain the sole control of power and to liquidate the aides of the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and the protectors of his principles."

The axes of the regime's left thus gambled by tendering their resignations to the people before the president in the hope that the masses would respond to the message and would rise to help them, to besiege al-Sadat and to return them to their positions with greater power.

In fact, several limited movements were observed in some parts of Cairo, al-Jizah and Alexandria. The vanguards of those movements proceeded from units of the Socialist Union under the leadership of a number of the second-line commands. What was surprising was that most of those commands had always suffered by varying degrees from the bureaucracy of some leaders of the axes of the "regime's left" whereas the first-line leaderships and the cadres closest to the axes of the "regime's left" and the ones most vociferous and clamorous when those axes controlled the reigns of power--those first-line leaderships and those cadres lay low and refrained from engaging in any movement. The explanation offered by this kind of cadres, which later transferred their full loyalty to al-Sadat with ease, was that they could no longer struggle by themselves when their leaderships had abandoned their responsibilities, had left for their homes and had closed the doors behind them.

But a reading of the movement of the events reveals that there actually was an objective opportunity to transform the limited popular movements which had emerged spontaneously into an effective broad-scale popular action had the axes of the "regime's left," instead of resigning from the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat of the Socialist Union, been content with resigning from their positions in the government agency only and had they, instead of taking refuge in their homes, fortified themselves in the Socialist Union and the Vanguard Organization and proceeded from them to unite with the masses.

The gamble of the axes of the "regime's left" failed not only because this was done at the last moment but also because resorting to the masses was done bureaucratically by government ministers and officials who had lost all bureaucratic influence and official prestige after having resigned from their positions and having lost their legitimacy.

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Even though for the first time in the struggle al-Sadat axis was surprised by this collective stance on the part of the axes of the "regime's left--a stance which had left serious vacuum in the state institutions--that axis recovered quickly from the shock, taking advantage of the fact that its opponents had frozen their movement at the point of resigning and of watching and waiting at their homes. This axis moved with all its forces to fill the vacuum created by the resignations from the state's political and executive agencies. At the same time, al-Sadat entrusted the offensive operations to three persons who had been working for him within the fortifications of the axes of the regime's left and whom he described as the "true heroes" of the movement to correct the July revolution on 15 May 1971. This is the name which al-Sadat continued to give his victory in the struggle for power over the axes of the region's left until 1975 when he replaced it by the term of the "correction revolution" at times and the "May revolution" at others.

The three heroes were Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq, the armed forces chief of staff whom al-Sadat hastened to appoint minister of defense and general commander of the armed forces immediately upon the resignation of Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi. Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq was also entrusted with the task of securing the armed forces' loyalty to al-Sadat, of purging them of the elements loyal to the vanquished "centers of power and of imposing a security blockade on Cairo, Alexandria and a number of other major cities so that the armed forces may be prepared to intervene quickly in case hostile popular movements are staged with such force as to exceed the capability of the local police to deal with them decisively.

The second hero was Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the national guard commander, who took charge of the task of arresting and jailing all the resigning and non-resigning leaderships of the axes of the "regime's left" on the night of 14 May 1971.

The third hero was Maj Gen Mamduh Salim who was appointed minister of interior on the day Sha'rawi Jum'ah resigned the position and who took charge of confronting the limited popular movements and of purging the Socialist Union and the other political and state agencies of the dangerous cadres and of the elements known to be sympathetic to the vanquished "centers of power" and the task of arresting those cadres and elements, using the security forces.

The rightist forces comprised of the delta deputies and the Upper Egypt deputies allied with al-Sadat axis hastened to call for an urgent meeting of the People's Assembly on 14 May 1971 and attended that meeting loaded with arms. Emerging prominently in the Assembly's discussions to condemn the "rightist forces plot" and to "declare loyalty to President al-Sadat" was deputy Hafiz Badawi, the minister of social affairs in 'Abd al-Nasir's last cabinet and one of the leaders closest to the axes of the "regime's left." During the meeting, the membership of Assembly Speaker Labib Shuqayr, of the two deputy speakers and of 15 other members who refused to approve the condemnation of the "centers of power," a condemnation which was then issued unanimously, was dropped. Hafiz Badawi was elected speaker. He was later appointed chairman of the Supreme People's Court which tried his former leaders and friends in the axes of the "regime's left" who had become the main defendants in the case of the "plot of the centers of power."

Al-Sadat, in his capacity as the Socialist Union chairman, issued a decision forming a provisional secretariat for the Socialist Union of nine members under the chairmanship of Dr 'Aziz Sidqi.

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At the same time, al-Sadat announced for the second time re-formation of the cabinet under the chairmanship of Dr Mahmud Fawzi. One of the leaders of the Marxist left, Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, entered the cabinet for the first time as deputy minister of planning.

Thus, before 3 days had passed (13-15 May 1971), al-Sadat settled the struggle for power following 'Abd al-Nasir's absence in accordance with the rules and criteria of the "palace coup." Consequently, al-Sadat took sole control of power and threw the axes of the "regime's left" in jail as "leaders of the plotting centers of power." Soon, sentences were issued against them ranging from death (mitigated to life-imprisonment at hard labor) to imprisonment.

On 15 May 1971, the term "the May movement" stormed into the political dictionary in Egypt. This term reflects al-Sadat political school which began to crystallize when al-Sadat managed to settle the struggle for power emerging after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence in his favor. The roots of this movement are founded on the identicalness of al-Sadat's class position in society with his political position in the July revolution within the framework of the interests, concepts, values, aspirations and alliances of the rural petit bourgeoisie.

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[Text] In the part before last, Lutfi al-Khuli recounted the events of the Hulwan battle, the fall of 'Ali Sabri and the atmosphere of the decisive battle between al-Sadat and the Egyptian left, leading to the May movement which settled the "palace coup."

The May movement began its first humble beginnings in 1971 as a corrective movement vis-a-vis the plotting of the centers of power against the July revolution and ended in May 1975, on the eve of reopening the Suez Canal for navigation since its closure in the 1967 war, by declaring itself "the revolution to correct the July revolution itself."

The transformation from correction movement to correction revolution did not come in one leap. Rather, it passed through three phases:

First phase: From the time of 'Abd al-Nasir's death in September 1970 until the struggle for power was settled and the so-called centers of power liquidated in May 1971.

In this phase, al-Sadat sought, under the banner of the July revolution and of continuing on 'Abd al-Nasir's path, to appear intentionally as a humble successor loyal to the leader of the July revolution--a successor who had been entrusted with "the family of the July revolution and of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir."

In his speech before the parliamentary body of the Socialist Union on 10 May 1971 (only 5 days before toppling the axes of the regime's left), al-Sadat said:

"Let our guiding principle always be that we are the family of the July revolution and of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and that the members of a family may disagree and may argue, but under the canopy of the family and not of the canopy of struggle, because the goal must always be the interest of the entire family. The people having

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honored me with being the expression of this family, I will not permit the struggle. But all this will be within the bounds of the supremacy of the law."

With this approach, in which al-Sadat mingled the idea of a debating, but not conflicting, family dominated by the rule of the law with the idea of continuity of the spirit of the July revolution and of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, he was able, on the one hand, to attract to his axis the forces of the liberal right and to reassure the old and new rightist forces of being accepted in his family which is dominated by the law and by the freedom of discussion whereas the interests of those forces had been constantly threatened by the measures of the revolutionary legitimacy in 'Abd al-Nasir's era.

On the other hand, al-Sadat was able to drug the axes of the "regime's left" opposing him--axes which had begun to reunite their ranks after the fall of 'Ali Sabri in the Hulwan battle--by inviting them to unite with him within the family of the July revolution and of 'Abd al-Nasir and by acknowledging the "right of debate and disagreement within the bounds of the supremacy of the law" as long as those axes steered clear off alliance with the leftist factions. Al-Sadat was aware of the ongoing contacts between those axes and the leftist factions which were calling for "igniting the social and political struggle in the country" by organizing and rallying the masses behind their interests and by having them participate in filling the vacuum created by the absence of 'Abd al-Nasir's leadership as an inevitable must for enabling the July revolution to continue the economic, social and political development and to confront Israel and imperialism.

With the forces he won over to his side and with the drugging he induced, al-Sadat was able to deal his final blow in the struggle for power and to settle this struggle in his favor under the name of the correction movement.

The second phase extends from the date of the so-called correction movement in May 1971 to the outbreak of the October 1973 war. This is a phase characterized by extreme complexity due to the strong ebb and flow in the activity of the popular movement and to the intricate alliance and struggle operations between al-Sadat and the leftist groups after liquidation of the so-called centers of power.

Al-Sadat, in sole control of power and having attracted the support of all the axes and forces that had been vacillating, launched this phase by taking a stance vis-a-vis the struggle for power and by appealing to all the popular masses with all their inclinations, including the leftist groups--both Nasirist and Marxist--to participate in the national action. He coupled the appeal with measures translating it into a tangible reality for the first time.

In his speech to the People's Assembly on 20 May 1971--a speech in which al-Sadat presented his report on the decisive battle for power and on his assessment of the battle--al-Sadat said: "We have been exposed, for only a few hours, to deviation from 'Abd al-Nasir's path. I say for the record that the correction operation staged by the people on 15 May 1971 does not make a new leadership for Anwar al-Sadat. Its value and its genuineness lie in its giving the command and the leadership to the alliance of the people's working forces."

After urging the people to put what had happened behind them and not to stop at that point "because the future is worthier of our attention," al-Sadat proceeded

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to assert that the direction of the work and of the future is tied to focusing on two issues: "First, the issue of the battle with Israel for liberation of the land and, second, building the new state by continuing Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's procession because it is the road we want to open for the march of the alliance of the people's working forces, the makers of freedom and of socialism and the pioneers of unity."

In the course of speaking about the battle with Israel, al-Sadat asserted that Egypt's position was the position of "no relinquishing of the land and no bargaining over the Palestinian people's rights." He further asserted that opening the Suez Canal "is not an independent goal but one of the phases of full withdrawal. We accept no discussion of our armed forces [right to] cross the east bank of the Suez Canal. We will not agree to extend the cease-fire endlessly as long as there is a single soldier on our land--and our land is the pre-4 June 1967 land insofar as we and the entire Arab nation are concerned."

Defining the position toward the Soviet Union, al-Sadat said that it is "the honorable friend who has given us weapons without saying: Come sign a contract with me and pay me. He gave us to enable us to stand on our feet politically, militarily and economically. He has given us honorably, sincerely and without restrictions or conditions."

As for the United States, al-Sadat described it as "a fundamental element in the problem because it supplies Israel with everything from 'a loaf of bread to Phantoms.' Without the backing, support and assistance of the United States, Israel will not be able to do what it has been doing." He also declared that he had asked Rogers, the U.S. secretary of state, during their talks in Cairo that the United States define its position "because I am now facing historical positions which must be completely defined, considering that it is an issue of peace or war."

As for building the new state and the future directions, al-Sadat projected a number of ideas on what the new constitution--which he had entrusted the People's Assembly to draft so that it may put to a public referendum--should contain so that it may be the basis of movement in all spheres. Those ideas included:

Realizing and underlining the Egyptian affiliation with the Arab nation.

Protecting and bolstering all the socialist gains and creating the right conditions for expanding their sphere, including the percentages set for the workers and farmers in the People's Assembly and in the elected popular councils at the various levels (50 percent at least).

No decision and no measure without judiciary control.

Including the people in the administration of justice through jurors.

Underlining and protecting the role of the public, cooperative and private property.

Putting a time limit on the term of service in high-ranking political and executive offices so as to insure renewal and rejuvenation. He declared that he would start with himself and would not renew his nomination for the presidency.

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At the outset of his speech to the national congress of the Socialist Union--after the Union had been re-formed from top to bottom by election--on 23 July 1971, al-Sadat said: "Though we face this day without the presence of the hero of 23 July among us, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, with his principles, is always with us and with all the generations as the supreme ideal of the honorable struggler who carries his flag on his shoulder and his heart on his palm and confronts, struggles, dreams and accomplishes."

Defining his position toward the battle with Israel, al-Sadat said: "We must make the decision on war and peace while fully aware of our responsibilities." He also declared that he "will not permit 1971 to pass without settling the issue of the aggression politically or militarily."

Al-Sadat presented to the congress a "national action program" to act as the basis for political action in the Socialist Union. The program had been formulated by a group of Nasirist and Marxist leftists under the chairmanship of Dr 'Aziz Sidqi, with Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam al-Zayyat (who later became the Socialist Union secretary), Dr Fu'ad Mursi (who was afterwards appointed minister of supply), Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah (who became minister of planning after having served as deputy minister of planning) and Dr Muhammad al-Khafif (who became a member of the Socialist Union Central Committee and the official in charge of the Strategic Studies Institute) as members. Lutfi al-Khuli, al-Khafif's colleague, served with him as member of the Central Committee in charge of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The program sought to realize three main goals, namely: Realizing the victory, establishing a modern state and defining a clear role for the Socialist Union's political organizations and for the unions.

The program also pledged to double the national income in 10 years, to rebuild the Egyptian villages within 20 years at a cost of one billion Egyptian pounds and to develop fundamental industrial complexes so that they may employ 3 million citizens of working age in the subsequent 10 years.

The program also pledged to involve workers of the public sector units in discussing the plan of their units, to secure the guarantees necessary for the private sector to perform its defined role in the development plan under effective popular supervision, to exert efforts to raise industrial production during the program's phases from 2,123,000,000 pounds to 4,663,000,000 pounds, to increase agricultural production from 1,075,000,000 pounds to 1.6 billion pounds, to reorganize the government administration and define the responsibilities so that they may not clash and to give the citizens the right to resort to the attorney general when they become aware of deviation from the law or of the misuse of power.

The program further pledged efforts for the establishment of a vanguard organization, as stipulated by the Socialist Union charter, including the leadership elements emerging during action among the masses and acting as an open agency, "because socialism is not built secretly and freedom is not realized behind curtains."

All this was coupled with measures for the release of the political detainees from the various inclinations. The leftist groups, represented by Dr Fu'ad Mursi,

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Dr Muhammad al-Khafif and Ahmad Nabil al-Hilali, participated in the 100-member committee which supervised the elections for rebuilding the Socialist Union. The friendship and cooperation treaty between Egypt and the Soviet Union was also concluded in June 1971.

In this climate, the objective factors became available for the establishment of an alliance between the regime and the majority of the leftist groups over the national action program, on the ground of the July revolution and for the goal of uniting the national forces to wage the battle of liberation against Israel in the year of decision, 1971.

While the year of decision was moving fast toward its end, al-Sadat's political directions--projected through his representatives in the agencies of the various levels of the Socialist Union, the cabinet, the press and the information media--were moving very close to the positions of the left concerning the national and pan-Arab battle.

Al-Sadat translated this closeness clearly in the speech which he delivered in November 1971 to the opening session of the newly-elected People's Assembly when he stressed: "The United States is primarily responsible for Israel, its instrument in implementing interests which the United States imagines it has in the area. Israel is the biggest means of coercion, intimidation and of obstructing the inevitable development on the Arab land..."

Defining the U.S. interests in the area and the extent of their danger to Egypt and the Arabs, al-Sadat said: "America wants to oust the Soviet Union from the area and we view the Soviet Union as a friend in war and a friend in peace. American wants to isolate Egypt from the Arab nation. Historically, and fatefully, we cannot accept such isolation because Egypt is a part of the Arab nation, both in terms of destiny and of the future. America wants to strike the socialist experience in Egypt and we believe in our method of development and insist on it to the utmost."

But al-Sadat quickly backed down on deciding in the year of decision and began to adopt measures against the leftist and democratic elements in the Socialist Union. From their positions in the political organization, those elements exposed and criticized the shrinking democratic guarantees in the Socialist Union and the press, the infiltration of parasitic and opportunistic elements to some leadership positions, through their personal loyalty to al-Sadat, to realize their ends and ambitions at the expense of the interest of the masses, the concealment of the facts from the people and from the organization's leaderships, the strong contrast between the declared goals and the available resources and capabilities and the viewing of the political organization as a mere agency for explaining and justifying the executive authority's actions.

The gap between al-Sadat and all factions of the Egyptian left began to widen and al-Sadat, in his own way of bringing the opponents together when attacking the left, denounced at a plenary emergency meeting of the Central Committee in April 1972--a meeting in which the ministers, governors and the Socialist Union secretaries participated--rightist elements responding to leftist elements in the campaign of casting doubts on the regime "with the former hiding behind the mask of

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national independence in confronting what they call the Soviet influence while the latter claim that we are reluctant to embark on the battle even though the Soviet Union has supplied us with all that is needed for this battle. Both sides are wrong."

On 8 July 1972, al-Sadat suddenly made a decision "to terminate the mission of the Soviet military advisers and experts" at a time when the rightist and parasitic forces were infiltrating the authority's agencies more strongly and when they were engaging in campaigns of slander against the July revolution, socialism and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in the hearing sessions which the People's Assembly was holding under the chairmanship of Mahmud Abu Wafiyah. The signs of the fabrication of a sectarian sedition between the Egyptian Muslims and Christians also started to erupt in a noticeable manner.

The struggle erupted in the street between the national and progressive forces on the one hand and, on the other hand, the retrogression forces which were gaining an ever-increasing influence in determining the regime's political, economic and social line. Successive demonstrations were held by the students and the workers with the support and backing of the various factions of the leftist forces, of the professional unions and of the masses of the national intellectuals. The regime confronted this movement with repressive measures which led to the imprisonment of many of the leftist and national elements, to dropping their membership in the Socialist Union, including the Central Committee, and to their expulsion from their jobs in the press and the information media. This was done through rigged political trials which came to be known as "the massacre perpetrated by the regime's committee in the Socialist Union." That committee was headed by one of the knights of the new right, namely Muhammad 'Uthman Isma'il.

The struggle continued to intensify until the eruption of the October 1973 war. The alliance was then reestablished between the regime and the national and leftist forces. But that alliance broke down rapidly and the struggle erupted anew over the issue of continuing the October war and exploiting its outcome when al-Sadat decided to freeze the war and to accept a cease-fire on 22 October 1973 and when the Kilometer 101 negotiations--which threatened the unity of the combat line between Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian revolution--were started.

The third phase covers the period between the end of the October 1973 war and the end of 1975 in which started the planned movement for the retrogression from the July revolution and for proclamation of the "May revolution" as an actual contemporary alternative to the July revolution under new slogans totally remote from the July revolution's slogans of freedom, socialism and unity. The May revolution coined general, unenlightening and indeterminate slogans speaking of "the state of science and faith, the modern state with an open society and the state of institutions and of the supremacy of the law."

Within this framework, the policy of planned comprehensive development was replaced by the open-door economic policy which opened the door for the investment of foreign capital in the private and public sectors, for creating free zones and cities, for reducing the public sector's role in the national economy in the interest of the parasitic growth of a limited number of elements of the private sector, for diversifying the sources of military armament by not relying on a

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single source, namely the Soviet Union, and for opening the door of relations of freindship and cooperation with the United States of America through responding to the "dear Kissinger diplomacy" which produced the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Syria, thus posing the threat of isolating Egypt from Syria and the Arab homeland on the one hand and, on the other hand, paving the way for imposing a separate peace between Egypt and Israel in one form or another. On top of all this, the "May revolution" dropped all the documents of the July revolution, especially the National Action Charter and the 30 March Proclamation, abiding only by the six general principles of the July revolution which, by their very nature, are subject to more than one political and social interpretation, depending on the character of the social force doing the interpretation in its interest.

The matter did not stop at dropping the July revolution documents but were beyond to dropping even the National Action Program which al-Sadat himself had approved and issued in 1971 after settling the struggle of power with the axes of the "regime's left" in his favor.

Al-Sadat presented a complete alternative, known as the October Paper which reflects the "correction revolution's" visualization of the map of the Egyptian political, social and economic movement until the end of the 20th century, to a public referendum in May 1974. The paper got the approval of 99.95 percent of the voters--the figure characterizing all of the regime's referendums, without any increase or reduction.

In an interview with the Lebanese AL-BAYRAQ on 10 December 1975, al-Sadat, expressing the positions reached by the "May revolution," said: "I want to say that there are the 23 July principles. There is no Nasirism. However, some want to call it so. As long as the revolution exists and as long as we cling to the revolution's (meaning the May revolution) charters, then let anybody call it whatever he wants--Nasirist revolution or whatever they wish. But I reject the name of Sadatism..."

Thus for the first time in long years, a process of natural and deep sifting took plce in the modern Egyptian society for all the visible and hidden forces in this society in such an open manner that tore the masks of concealment, falsification and patching when the sores of the parasitic right broke on society's skin.

The movement for the unity of the various factions of the leftist forces, especially of the Nasirist and Marxist forces, began to emerge anew--after it had been interrupted in the critical period extending from the end of 'Abd al-Nasir's era and the beginning of al-Sadat's era and the struggle for power--with the aim of besieging the parasitic right and its alliances at home and abroad, especially with the U.S. imperialism, and of exerting efforts to foil the alliances before they manage to implement their scheme to liquidate the July revolution's accomplishments, to obstruct continued progress, with a new breath, on the path of freedom, socialism and unity and to squander the political and economic independence, and perhaps even push the regime toward concluding peace with Zionism through the shuttle policy practiced by the "dear Kissinger."

Herein lie both the danger and the issue.

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IRAQ

IRAN'S NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 253, 18-24 Dec 81 pp 24, 25

[Article by Kamal Hasan Bukhayt: "Iraqi Vigilance Aborts Blind 'Attack of Millions'"]

[Text] It is a policy of hopeless attacks which the Iranians are pursuing against the confrontation lines with Iraq, using more men and equipment, with failure after failure. The latest one is what the Iranians call "the attack of millions." Iraq called it the "third Susangerd massacre." The attacks continue, the Iraqi army is in its positions, and the Iranian regime is incapable of making peace.

For months the Iranians have been preparing a widespread attack against Iraqi positions in the Susangerd area. Calls went out to all Iranians of various ages to take part in this campaign. In view of the dreams held by the leaders of Iran regarding what this campaign would achieve, the leadership was able to round up huge numbers of soldiers and thrust them into battle. The Iranian attack, which began on 29 November, and which continued for a full week, ended in a devastating failure before the countering Iraqi military plan. The attack began on two main axes, supported by large numbers of soldiers backed by tanks and armor, and various types of weapons. A diversionary attack was made against a third axis, aimed at deceiving the Iraqi forces.

The first Iranian military mistake occurred when large groups of soldiers charged into mine fields planted by the Iraqi army. This resulted in hundreds of deaths without any military result worth mentioning.

The second Iranian error was an error in judgement. The Iraqi military command was in the highest state of alert and had prior knowledge of the Iranian movements. The Iranian attack was robbed of its strongest element, that of surprise, in terms of timing and direction.

Despite that, the various military reports issued discussed damaging battles between the Iranian and Iraqi forces. This resulted from the blind charges launched by the Iranian troops, as well as the huge numbers of attackers in comparison with the opposing Iraqi forces.

The battle rapidly turned to the advantage of the Iraqi forces, before ending in a new military defeat for the Khomeyni regime's forces. The new Iraqi victory was caused by a number of factors, including:

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* The specific superiority of the Iraqi soldier's ability and in the Iraqi military leadership over the Iranian soldier and leadership, which contains elements of anarchy, favoritism and purge campaigns.

* The effective role played by the Iraqi Air Force. The recent battles demonstrated a change in the balance of air power between the two sides. After Iranian air superiority in the beginning of the war, it is obvious that the Iraqi army has gained control, to a large extent, over the skies over the battlefields. In the recent battle, Iraqi fighter planes were able to destroy large numbers of attacking armor, as well as impeding the forward movement of other groups.

* The effective role played by "special forces," which are distinguished by superior mobility, military effectiveness and suicidal tactics. These forces were able to plug some of the gaps and to encircle numerous Iranian groups.

In Baghdad, a military spokesman announced that the losses inflicted on the Iranian army in last week's battles totaled 6,500 dead, "in addition to 262 tanks, 51 troop transports, 61 artillery pieces, 24 vehicles, 12 (shaglan), and 11 fighter planes destroyed. There were also a large number of Iranians taken prisoner. Large quantities of equipment and ammunition were seized along with medium and light arms."

If the Iranian attacks have indeed been thwarted on the battlefield, the question remains: Why does the Khomeyni regime persist in continuing these hopeless attacks, since all of them are ending in failure?

We shall find the answer through a quick look at the domestic political and economic situation inside Iran. The highlight of this situation is the internecine struggles between contending movements and power centers, and the struggle between the regime and the opposition forces, in addition to the Kurdistan war. These struggles continue viciously, which has led and will lead to the weakening of the Iranian soldier's morale, as well as destroying careful military leadership.

It is obvious that the continued Iranian escalation at the front is aimed at achieving two goals:

1. Attempt to reduce the intensity of the domestic struggle by directing attention to the front,
2. To distract the Iranian army and remove it from any effective role in the struggle against the authorities.

As for the goal of shifting the war inside Iraqi territory, so far the possibility is remote and unrealistic.

On the other hand, it is clear that the war has not as yet exhausted the Iraqi army, despite its continuing and the numerical disparity. The Iraqi military positions have been changed into a fait accompli. The Iraqi soldier has found in his leaders all the support and expertise required to look after his needs and security. More than that, the people and regime in Iraq are putting all their resources into the battle at the front. One of the prominent factors during the recent battles was the presence of President Saddam Husayn once more at the scene of combat. He personally directed the campaign and drew up the defensive and offensive battle plans. He did not return to Baghdad until after he was reassured about the results of the fighting.

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The Iraqi president went from the front to some villages, where he met the people and talked to them about their problems. He personally reported to them the latest news from the front.

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