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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 3/82)



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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

BOOK EXCERPTS: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow ISTORIOGRAFIYA VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNY -- SBORNIK STATEY in Russian 1980
(signed to press 10 Jan 80) pp 3-4, 283-285, 5-36, 162-177, 277-282

[Table of contents, Foreword, Zhilin article, Rzheshhevskiy article, Conclusion, and
Appendix of book, edited by Academician M. P. Kim, A. I. Babin, L. S. Caponenko,
G. A. Kumanev, N. I. Makarov, A. V. Mitrofanova, V. P. Naumov, and Yu. V. Plotnikov]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

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FOREWORD

More than three decades have passed since the terrible events of World War II, of which the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against German fascism and Japanese militarism was the main component part. This war went down in history as a great armed conflict between socialism and the shock forces of imperialism and world reaction.

"The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War," states the 29 January 1975 CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," "persuasively demonstrated the viability and invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It constituted the triumph of a new societal and governmental system engendered by the October Revolution, of the socialist economy, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the moral-political unity of the Soviet society, and the indissoluble friendship of the peoples of the USSR."¹

The road leading to this Great Victory was incredibly difficult, of unparalleled hardships and intensity. The Soviet people bore measureless suffering, calamities and losses during the long days and nights of the battle with fascism. The struggle with the invaders claimed the lives of 20 million sons and daughters of the Soviet people.

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And the further the events of the Great Patriotic War recede into the past, the outstanding contribution made by the Soviet Union to the defeat of Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan appears increasingly more multifaceted and stands in increasingly higher relief. Time is powerless to weaken in the hearts and minds of generations the memory of the unprecedented exploit of the peoples of the USSR which, under the leadership of the Communist Party, smashed the mightiest imperialist predator and carried out their international duty with honor, saving mankind from the threat of Nazi enslavement.

One of the most important focal areas of our historical science is comprehensive illumination of the events of the past war, the mass heroism and courage of Soviet citizens, and the leadership role of the CPSU in organizing defeat of the German-fascist invaders and Japanese militarists.

In the more than 30 years which have passed since the war came to an end, many of its aspects have become the focus of serious scientific investigation, as a result of which an extensive, diversified historical literature has been established, totaling more than 16,000 titles.

The truthful and harsh history of the Great Patriotic War offers a clear answer to the question why, in spite of the desperate situation in the first months of the war, the Soviet people were able to stand up, and not only to stand up but, halting the advance of the shock forces of world imperialism, to gain a world-historic victory over them.

Turning to the exciting pages of history, one can easily see the main sources of the valor and fearlessness of those who strode through the flaming battle fronts with weapon in hand, and those who forged the weapons of victory on the home front. They include fervent love of the multinational socialist homeland and total dedication to our native land, our great and just Communist cause. United by the will of the Communist Party, Soviet fighting men and workers on the home front defended the independence of their homeland, at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices and brought liberation to many peoples of the world.

In addition to great scientific-cognitive value, historical literature on the Great Patriotic War is also important for military-patriotic indoctrination of the masses for the purpose of affirming "in the consciousness of working people, and particularly the younger generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the Soviet Union, in our homeland, and readiness and willingness to stand to the defense of the achievements of socialism."²

In spite of the vast literature on the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, many aspects of this heroic epic have not yet been investigated, and as regards some topics, including basic ones, certain publications lack requisite preciseness and rigorous objectivity of interpretation.

An all-union scientific conference entitled "Historiography of the Great Patriotic War" was devoted to summarizing the results and achievements of historiography of the Great Patriotic War and determination of unaccomplished tasks and the most significant problems which require further elaboration.

This all-union conference was organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History, the Scientific Council on History of Building Socialism and Communism in the USSR, and the Scientific Council for Coordination of Research in the Area of Military History. Holding this conference was an important factor in development of research on important problems of the past war. Approximately 200 Soviet research scholars took active part in this conference.

During the two days of the conference the conferees heard more than 50 scholarly papers and reports on the most important aspects of Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War. All presentations emphasized that the results of research conducted in this area are rather impressive in a quantitative respect and on the whole are on a high scholarly level. At the same time a number of problems of history of the past war have not been discussed, while many have been analyzed far from adequately. Much also remains to be done for a synthesis of the most effective forms and modes of combating bourgeois falsifiers of history.

The all-union scientific conference helped not only summarize the status of treatment of many current-importance problems dealing with defense of the socialist homeland but also helped delineate paths of further profound investigation and study of one of the most heroic periods in the history of our homeland.

This volume is based on the materials of the plenary session and the three conference sections, reworked by the authors into the form of scholarly articles and summaries. The first item is a substantial introductory article by a prominent Soviet military historian, Lt Gen P. A. Zhilin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and head of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Military History. This article traces in detail the birth and development of Soviet historiography of the past war and presents a general picture of the development status of this important area of Soviet historical science.

The first section of this volume ("The CPSU -- Inspirational Force and Organizer of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War") contains articles and summaries which analyze the principal works dealing with the diversified activities of the Communist Party pertaining to directing the struggle of the Soviet people against the German-fascist invaders.

The second section ("Armed Struggle of the Soviet People Against the German-Fascist Invaders in the Years of the Great Patriotic War") contains articles examining the status of scientific treatment in Soviet historiography of various aspects of the armed struggle against the enemy on the battle fronts and behind the Hitlerite lines.

The final section ("The Soviet Home Front in the Great Patriotic War") deals with analysis of the literature which discusses military-economic problems, aspects of the labor exploits of the Soviet people and their selfless efforts to gain an economic victory over the fascist bloc.

This volume, while essentially the first summary historiographic work on the Great Patriotic War, of course does not claim exhaustive treatment of all the questions examined.

Academician M. P. Kim

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Technical preparation of the manuscript for publication was performed by scientific personnel from the USSR history in the period of the Great Patriotic War sector of the Institute of History of the USSR of the USSR Academy of Sciences: L. M. Tsymbal (coordinator), N. N. Yefimova, Ye. M. Kozlova, and E. N. Revuk. Appended to this volume is a list of topics recommended by the conference and the indicated scientific councils for investigation.

The editors would like to express their profound gratitude to twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy [deceased], Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor A. F. Smirnov, Doctor of Historical Sciences N. M. Aleshchenko, all groups and individuals who contributed comments and suggestions during the preparation of this volume.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Tritsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Dok. i mater." [30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1975, page 4.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS i ocherednyye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki. Doklad XXV s'yezdu KPSS 24 fevralya 1976 g." [CPSU Central Committee Report and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy. Report to the 25th CPSU Congress of 24 February 1976], Moscow, 1976, page 91.

P. A. Zhilin. CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The historic resolutions of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are increasingly strongly influencing all aspects of societal affairs -- both the practical, production activities of Soviet citizens, and scholarly-scientific activities. The congress documents and materials, and particularly the CPSU Central Committee Report presented by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, substantiated and validated the party's general policy line -- continued building of communism in the USSR, a consistent campaign for peace, and firm, reliable defense of the productive labor of the Soviet people.

The peace-seeking foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its readiness at all times to offer a rebuff to an aggressor comprise the essence of the political and military doctrine of the Communist Party. As early as October 1918, during the period of emergence of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin said: "No revolution is worth anything unless it is able to defend itself."¹ Guided by Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland, the CPSU and the Armed Forces succeeded in defending the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution in two bloody wars -- the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. These outstanding victories demonstrated in a most convincing manner the invincibility of the Soviet governmental and social system, the vitality of the organizational and theoretical principles of

defense of the socialist homeland, the unity and unprecedented heroism of our peoples. The victory by the Soviet Union over German fascism and Japanese militarism elevated the Soviet nation and enhanced its international prestige. Today as well the results of this outstanding victory are exerting enormous influence on the entire international atmosphere.

A glance at the road trod by mankind during the postwar years shows that many traits of our time were formed under the influence of the processes which were born in those days, when the fate of peoples was being decided on the battlefields of the most savage, most destructive and bloody war in history. The victory of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany and militarist Japan became that point at which began a new period in the history of mankind. "In the course of the 20th century our country stood twice at the source of major changes in the countenance of the world," stated L. I. Brezhnev. "Such was the case in 1917, when the victory of the October Revolution heralded mankind's entry into a new historical era. This was the case in 1945, when the defeat of fascism, a decisive role in which was played by the Soviet Union, raised a mighty wave of sociopolitical changes which rolled across the entire planet and led to strengthening of the forces of peace throughout the world."²

The revolutionary experience of the USSR and the experience of armed defense of the socialist homeland constitute a most valuable asset of the Soviet people, the Leninist party, and the Soviet Armed Forces. It is not only of national significance. It is important today for all peoples struggling against the imperialist aggressors for their social liberation.

Profound assessments of the events of the Great Patriotic War are contained in CPSU Central Committee documents, in particular in the decrees on the 30th anniversary of the Victory Over Fascism and on the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, in the speeches and reports of L. I. Brezhnev, and in statements by party and government leaders. All progressive people throughout the world have a feeling of profound sympathy and respect for the historic exploits and accomplishments of the Soviet nation and its decisive contribution to the victory over fascism. The lessons of the war are of vitally important significance for the masses today as well. They enable one to penetrate to the essence, into the social nature and character of those worldwide forces the contest between which is determining the content of the social processes and phenomena which are taking place in our era.

In their statements at the 25th CPSU Congress, many foreign government and party leaders highly praised the exploits of the Soviet people. Greeting the congress delegates on behalf of the Cuban people, F. Castro stated: "Displaying heroic efforts and abundantly shedding their own blood, the Soviet working people opened up the road to the future and were able to defend it. Twenty million noble and self-sacrificing sons and daughters of the Soviet Union gave their lives in the Great Patriotic War. This terrible price was paid in order to thwart an attempt by world reaction to halt the unrelenting advance by mankind toward justice, prosperity and peace."³

We know that in some quarters there is a different attitude toward the outcome of World War II, toward its immediate and long-term results. There exists a profound

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difference in evaluation of the war's results and consequences. Confirmation of this is the attitude toward such a date as Victory Over Fascist Germany Day. In the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries celebration of Victory Day has assumed a truly popular character -- it is a great and joyous day in their history, of triumph of the ideals of peace, democracy and socialism.⁴ The peoples of the former colonies celebrate the anniversary of Victory as an event which shook the colonial system of imperialism to its very foundations and which in the final analysis led to its collapse. Progressive forces in the capitalist countries appraise the results of the war as a victory for freedom and democracy, which created favorable conditions for the struggle for the social and national liberation of working people. But while for the socialist countries, the peoples of the former colonies, for the international Communist and worker movement and for all progressive peoples throughout the world the anniversary of the defeat of fascism is a joyous holiday, for the representatives of imperialist forces it is cause for bitter reflections. Certain circles in the West attempt to ignore this date, to muffle its historic resonance.

It is easy to understand why the consequences and the lessons of World War II evoke the displeasure of imperialist circles, for the immediate results of the war were far from those which some people in the West would have liked to see. The collapse of fascism signified not only the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. It was also the collapse of the hopes of reactionary forces for defeat of the world's first socialist state and for annihilation of the Soviet system. Invasion of the USSR by the Hitlerite hordes became the logical continuation of that struggle which the old world had been waging against the new societal system from the moment of its emergence. German fascism was nurtured, supported and encouraged by the totality of world reaction in its struggle against the Soviet Union -- bulwark of the international revolutionary-liberation movement. Our country was struck with a blow of enormous force. But the wave of invasion by foreign armies broke against the staunchness and courage of Soviet citizens, indoctrinated and inspired by the Communist Party. "In a protracted war, the most difficult war in the history of our homeland, the Soviet people accomplished a deed unequalled in the history of mankind," states the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution." The Soviet people were able not only to defend their own freedom and independence but also made a decisive contribution to the cause of saving European and world civilization from destruction by the fascist barbarians."⁵

All this attests to the fact that the events of the Great Patriotic War are of unfading significance. This is why our party and its Central Committee constantly devote great attention to the military experience of defense of our nation, its study and synthesis. An important role in this is assigned to scholars representing the social sciences, particularly historians.

* * *

Investigation of any historical event is a process, a protracted process which frequently involves considerable difficulties. This is especially characteristic of study of such a complex social phenomenon as war, particularly one such as the Great Patriotic War, in which the entire country and millions of people took part.

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The complexity of treating the history of a war also lies in the fact that frequently all documents are not preserved, and some things remain unrecorded, unknown, lost forever. Therefore the historian who studies a war should possess not only the great skill and expertise of the professional scholar, profound general and specialized knowledge, but also genuinely scientific objectivity of judgements and conclusions. The responsibility of the scholarly investigator is particularly great, since his writings, reaching a broad readership, form public opinion on the major events of the war, historical figures, the outcome and results of the war, and their influence on the subsequent course of world history.

The history of the genesis, course and outcome of World War II and the Great Patriotic War attracts the attention of many scholars -- historians, economists, philosophers, sociologists, jurists, as well as political and military leaders. In many countries vast literature has been published, large multivolume works have been written, the memoirs of combat veterans have been widely disseminated, and popular scientific books are published in large press runs. Bibliographic lists contain tens of thousands of books and collections of documents dealing with the past war. This gives grounds to affirm that the war period of modern history occupies a central place not only in Soviet but also in world historiography. And although the "geography" of publications has not yet been fully studied, one can state with assurance that there is no country in the world in which books on the history of World War II and the Great Patriotic War have not been published. The greatest number of books and articles are published in countries which directly participated in the war.

Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War is quite extensive. It has covered a long journey in its evolution. Years and decades were required to gather together facts and documentary materials, and hard work by many scholarly investigators was required in order comprehensively to examine the highly complex processes which took place during the war years. Overcoming the difficulties of wartime and the postwar years, at all stages Soviet historical science was performing important tasks of casting light on the Great Patriotic War.

Even while the war was still in progress, literature on military history was indoctrinating Soviet citizens in a spirit of patriotism and noble traditions of defense of the homeland. A weighty contribution, which has not yet been adequately evacuated, was made by Soviet historians in forming the fighting and moral qualities and in instilling courage and staunchness in the defenders of the homeland. Books and pamphlets on the defeat of the vile German knights on Lake Peipus, the Mongol-Tatar hordes on the Kulikovo Plain, the Swedish at Lesnaya and Poltava, on the defeat of Napoleon's Grande Armée in Russia, as well as pamphlets and articles on the first victories in the Great Patriotic War, which reached the foxholes and dugouts on the battle front, raised the spirits of officers and men. Prominent Soviet social scientists B. D. Grekov, N. S. Derzhavin, F. M. Druzhinin, Ye. M. Zhukov, I. I. Mints, M. V. Nechkina, A. M. Pankratova, P. N. Pospelov, B. A. Rybakov, Ye. V. Tarle, M. N. Tikhomirov, P. N. Fedoseyev, V. M. Khvostov, and many others gave their knowledge and talent to the cause of victory over the aggressors.

The history of the Great Patriotic War began to be written while the war was still in progress. The generation of wartime historians and those of the early postwar years, who studied the war from "fresh tracks," worked hard and accomplished a great

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deal. Teams of scholars from the General Staff Military Historical Directorate, the service academies, the military history teams operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, and specialists at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History were the first to study primary sources, to assemble masses of documentary materials and circulate them within the scholarly community, to form concepts and lay the foundations of contemporary views and evaluations of the military-historical events of the Great Patriotic War. A large team of historians, under the direction of I. I. Mints, proceeded to collect and prepare materials on history of the Great Patriotic War while the war was still in progress.

At that time military scientists stood at the sources of the creation of military-historical literature on the armed struggle with fascism and scholarly treatment of the major operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces in 1941-1945 -- officers, general officers and flag officers I. V. Anisimov, V. I. Achkasov, Ye. A. Boltin, V. V. Voznenko, F. D. Vorob'yev, S. Golikov, A. I. Gotovtsev, N. M. Zamyatin, I. S. Isakov, A. N. Krutikov, I. S. Korotkov, G. A. Deborin, V. M. Kravtsov, G. V. Kuz'min, M. M. Minasyan, N. G. Pavlenko, I. V. Parot'kin, S. P. Platonov, N. A. Talenskiy, B. S. Tel'pukhovskiy, N. A. Fokin, Ye. A. Shilovskiy, and many others.⁶ Military historians visited the army in the field, gathered and processed documents at front and army headquarters. This made it possible to produce major studies in a short period of time. Suffice it to recall that the first three-volume study of the defeat of the German-fascist troops at Moscow, under the editorship of Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov, was published in 1943; a book on the battle of Stalingrad came out in 1944, and in 1950 -- a major study of the Berlin Operation, edited by N. A. Talenskiy.⁷

In subsequent years there was a substantial increase in the scale of scholarly work being done on the history of the Great Patriotic War. This found reflection in the organization of a number of scientific research establishments needed for further study and synthesis of the experience of the war. For example, a department of history of the Great Patriotic War was established at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism (1957-1966), which played an important role in getting scientific cadres together, gathering archival materials, preparation and publication of a six-volume work on the history of the Great Patriotic War.⁸

Publication of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL was resumed in 1959; this journal does a great deal of scientific research work and plays a significant role in treating the history of the Great Patriotic War and the art of warfare of the Red Army and Navy. Articles on various aspects of the history of war are regularly published in the journals KOMMUNIST, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, VOPROSY ISTORII, ISTORIYA SSSR, and NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA. The Newspapers PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA contribute greatly to the elucidation of facts of heroism by Soviet citizens during the Great Patriotic War. There was a substantial increase in the work activities of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, which in essence has become the archives of the Great Patriotic War.

An important contribution to historiography of the Great Patriotic War was made by the authors of the volumes in the series "World War II in Studies, Memoirs, Documents" (Moscow, 1964-1974) (chairman of the board of editors -- USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member A. M. Samsonov). The books in this series are prepared by institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, individual historians and Soviet military commanders.⁹

The Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense was established in 1966 by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, for the purpose of further broadening and raising the theoretical level of scholarly investigation in the field of military history. This institute soon became a center for the study of combined problems of military history, particularly history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II.¹⁰ Sectors were also formed: history of the USSR in the period of the Great Patriotic War -- at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR; history of World War II -- at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World History; history of the CPSU in the prewar and war period -- at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

Considerable work is being done at the institutes of history at the academies of sciences at the union republics, at branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in the appropriate departments of service academies and institutes, and in the humanities faculties at this country's universities. A contribution toward elaboration of this problem is being made by the Znaniye Society, the Soviet War Veterans Committee, DOSAAF, as well as scientific, educational and public organizations. Extensive scientific research work is being conducted in the USSR on the history of the Great Patriotic War. It encompasses a broad range of problems connected with comprehensive reflection of the organizing and directing activities of the CPSU, and the great exploit of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. There is a need to establish under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences Department of History a Scientific Council on History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, which would unify the efforts of scholarly researchers working on this most important area of Soviet historical science, with the aim of coordination of all this work and elaboration of unified concepts on the most important scientific problems.

A 12-volume combined study entitled "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945],¹¹ produced by the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR and Institute of World History is an exceptionally valuable study. It reveals various aspects and processes, features and characteristic traits of the war, its prehistory, course and outcome, results, consequences and lessons, and their significance for the present day. Essentially this work is the first major synthesis of the history of World War II not only in Soviet but in world historiography as well.

Work pertaining to writing the history of the past war is not only an experience of collective creativity but also experience in elaboration of a unified concept of Soviet historical science on major problems of the war. As a result of comprehensive, thorough discussion at the Main Editorial Commission by the volume editorial boards, concepts were elaborated on such important aspects of the history of World War II as its division into periods (which was of importance in determining the structure of the entire work), the political character of the war, the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, failure of the plan of "blitzkrieg war," the radical turning point in the course of the war, the role of external and internal forces in the liberation of European countries, etc. All of this is of considerable significance both for Soviet scholars and for the historians of the socialist countries and for historical science throughout the world. The 10 volumes of "History of World War II" which have already been published have been greeted by

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the public with great interest. This work is being ordered in 37 foreign countries, while it is being translated and published in its entirety in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

According to the figures of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, between 1945 and 1973 14,500 books and pamphlets on the history of the Great Patriotic War have been published, in a total of approximately 600 million copies. And if we include studies published in connection with the 30th anniversary of Victory and subsequently, the total number of titles increases to 16,000, in more than 700 million copies. The historiography of wars of the past never involved such numbers. This attests to the fact that in this country military-historical knowledge has acquired broad social significance.

We must note the large contribution made by Komsomol members and Pioneers to the finding of documents and relics on the battlefields of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. Tens of thousands of young patriots take part in the numerous excursions organized for this purpose. The Preservation and Utilization of Historical and Cultural Monuments Law, adopted in October 1976 at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, provides for safekeeping and preservation of monuments of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War.

There are tens of thousands of such monuments in the USSR, and their number increases with each passing year. New memorials are opened, monuments are erected, and the memory of local fighting men is perpetuated in this country's cities, towns and villages. The largest are the memorial complexes on Mamai Hill in Volgograd, at the Piskarevskoye Cemetery in Leningrad, at the Brest Fortress-Hero and at Katyn' in Belorussia, etc.¹² Memorial complexes are being constructed which immortalize the people's exploits on the battlefields at Kursk, in the hero cities of Kiev and Novorossiysk. A Victory Monument will be erected in Moscow, on Poklonnaya Hill.

The great interest in the events of the past war is explained by a number of factors. It is determined in the first place by the tasks of Soviet historical science, by the necessity of the fullest possible reflection in the history of the USSR of its war period, and securing of a solid, reliable foundation for handling the history of wars in textbooks for secondary schools and higher educational institutions; secondly, by the necessity of the most active utilization of the heroism of the war years for instilling in our young people lofty patriotic feelings and love of the homeland; thirdly, by the fact that the study of military history is assuming great importance for improving the theory and practice of military affairs, since it reveals the laws, patterns, mechanisms and trends in their development, warns against extremes, introduces the element of practical experience into theoretical reasoning, and provides a wealth of material for conclusions and syntheses.

We know that war and the history of war as the object of scholarly investigation are extremely complex. War encompasses various realms of activity of states, parties, and classes. The historian is dealing here with an enormous scale of events taking place in the political, economic, ideological and military areas. Consequently military history by its very nature is a multibranch science, since it studies and investigates war as a whole, all its social, economic, and military-technical aspects.

Study of societal processes during the war years makes it possible to see them not simply in a special situation but in an aspect which enables one to assess them more deeply and comprehensively, to compare and examine them in an integrated form both in peacetime and in wartime. Hence the exceptionally important practical significance of joint efforts by specialists in the area of solving the main problem of the present day -- the problem of war and peace, discussed by L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report at the 25th CPSU Congress, presenting the principal areas of fundamental scholarly investigations by Soviet social scientists.¹³

Not only historians create the history of the Great Patriotic War. It is written about by political, government and military leaders of that time, thousands of active participants in the struggle against fascism, writers, playwrights, poets, and journalists. New areas and new genres in literature were formed -- war documentary fiction.

War memoirs have become quite popular both in the Soviet Union and abroad. The memoirs of Mars SU I. Kh. Bagramyan, A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. A. Grechko, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, N. I. Krylov, K. A. Meretskov, K. S. Moskalenko, K. K. Rokossovskiy, and V. I. Chuykov, Adm N. G. Kuznetsov, Gens P. I. Batov, D. D. Lelyushenko, and S. M. Shtemenko, Mars Avn A. I. Pokryshkin and S. I. Rudenko, and others are quite popular.¹⁴ The memoirs of war veterans constitute testimony of great importance. No documentary materials are capable of recording the entire complexity and dynamic nature of military events taking place over vast areas or of conveying the character, intensity and spirit of an engagement or battle. In addition, frequently very important directives and orders were issued orally, by radio or telephone, and were not recorded in any written documents. Therefore the historian of the Great Patriotic War, researching various engagements, battles, and operations, encounters difficulties which he is unable to resolve without the help of an eyewitness to those events. While he learns from archival documents how a given engagement or operation took place, the historian frequently is unable to obtain information from such documents which gives him an answer to the questions why given events evolved precisely as they did and not otherwise. And it is by no means because the answers are locked tightly away in a safe somewhere, but because they are preserved only in the memory of the direct participants in the engagements and battles. It is primarily those who were in the war, who experienced it, who saw it with their own eyes who are capable of describing most fully and vividly and transmitting the heroic deeds of Soviet citizens and our fighting men. In this regard the recollections of eyewitnesses are an important military and historical source, but no more than that. It is difficult to write the history of a war without the testimony of direct participants, but the history of a war cannot be learned from memoirs alone.

The broad front of scholarly investigation of the Great Patriotic War attests to the fact that Soviet historians are successfully accomplishing important tasks advanced by the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Measures for Further Development of the Social Sciences and Enhancement of Their Role in Building Communism" (1967).¹⁵ They are directing their efforts toward profound scholarly research on the Great Patriotic War and on comprehensive examination of the unprecedented exploit of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, as well as the decisive role of the Communist Party in achieving victory in the struggle against the most dangerous foe of all mankind -- German fascism; on

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synthesis of the experience of the Soviet State in mobilizing the nation's manpower and resources for repulsing the enemy; on writing major works on the history of the Great Patriotic War. Showing the superiority of the socialist societal and governmental system, revealing the powerful sources of the strength of the Soviet Union and the grandeur of Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland, and exposing the prewar policy of the principal capitalist powers, which promoted the aggression of Hitlerite Germany, scholars are making a positive contribution to the campaign for resolving the principal question of the present day -- the question of war and peace.

A detailed analysis of literature published on principal problems is contained in a number of works.¹⁶ Soviet historians have investigated a broad range of questions connected with all areas of CPSU activity in the war years, have written studies on the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia, have discussed the struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces on the battle front, the actions of partisans behind enemy lines, and the military and labor exploits of women, young people, and Komsomol.¹⁷ One can state with full substantiation that the concrete-historical, factual side of the history of the Great Patriotic War has been studied in detail in this country.

Presently the task of historiography is to synthesize and analyze available literature on the history of the Great Patriotic War in a critical manner and to assess its significance from the standpoint of the present level of knowledge. In other words, we must build a historiography of the Great Patriotic War which would provide answers to at least three questions:

- 1) With what degree of detail and authenticity is the factual aspect of the war examined, and does this factual component constitute a solid foundation of historiography?
- 2) What are the advantages and drawbacks of all that has been published?
- 3) What tasks face us as regards future investigation of the history of the Great Patriotic War?

* * *

One of the most important tasks of future study of the Great Patriotic War, its results and consequences lies in further comprehensive elaboration of the international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the war and its influence on the state of mankind. This problem is advanced to the forefront primarily because essentially the emergence of socialism beyond the framework of a single country, the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, collapse of the colonial system, expansion of the sociopolitical rights of working people in capitalist countries, and increase in the prestige of the international Communist movement would all have been impossible without the crushing defeat of fascism.

The foes of socialism believed that the Soviet nation would be unable to recover from the wounds which had been inflicted on it, that it would be unable to rebuild the demolished economy on territory liberated from the enemy, and for a period of

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many years would remain impotent vis-à-vis the imperialist powers and would be forced to seek assistance from them. But the capitalists' hopes of weakening the Soviet Union proved fruitless. The Soviet people not only rapidly healed the wounds inflicted on them and overcame the harsh consequences of the war but also moved their economy forward at an unprecedented pace. There has been occurring in this country in the postwar years a rapid upsurge of the economy, a flourishing of culture, education, and science, and a rise in the living standards of the Soviet people. The Soviet Union became more powerful than before. At the same time world imperialist reactionary forces were seriously weakened as a result of the collapse of fascism. This fact was of cardinal significance for the fate of mankind, and in large measure predetermined the evolution of the contemporary world.

Alongside social changes caused by the victory over fascism, an important role in the affairs of mankind is played by those changes which have taken place in the consciousness of peoples, in the minds of millions of persons, and in the revolutionary renewal of the world. Other socialist nations have emerged to take their place alongside the Soviet Union. No longer the Soviet people alone, but an entire community of peoples have begun building a new society, implementing the ideas of scientific communism. The formation of a world socialist system was the second most important event of modern history, after the October Revolution. The international Communist and worker movement grew immeasurably and became greatly strengthened, and the world revolutionary process assumed a new and powerful scope. Communist parties, which during World War II marched in the front ranks of the fighters against fascism and sustained heavy losses in this struggle, gained even greater prestige and authority than before among the masses, expanded their influence, and became the world's greatest political force.

Not only different armies, states and social forces clashed in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The war also signified a contest between different ideologies. The thrust of Hitler's strategy, which threw the bulk of the armed forces eastward, that fury and savageness which were invested in this assault by fascism, that uncompromising character of the struggle to the death which was assumed by the battles on the Soviet-German front -- all this was due to a single thing: the fact that Germany's Hitlerite bosses were possessed by anticommunism, and the social-class essence of all their policies. The bankruptcy of the fascist ideology also signified the bankruptcy of those ideas which this ideology accepted from the arsenal of bourgeois political thought.

Consequently, one of the most important historical results of World War II and the Great Patriotic War lies in the fact that progressive democratic forces, thanks to the victory over fascism, became stronger and laid firm grasp to the forward line of history, while reaction and imperialism had suffered a cruel loss.

The entire subsequent course of world development, the political and intellectual life of peoples and nations have been linked with the results and consequences of World War II. And as regards the final result and outcome of the war, including the postwar status quo of the borders of the European nations, they are formally stated most clearly in the Final Act of the 35-nation Helsinki Conference. "The achieved results are worth the expended efforts," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress. "The conference participants collectively affirmed the inviolability of the established borders. A code of principles of intergovernmental relations has

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been drawn up, which is in full conformity -- both in letter and spirit -- with the demands of peaceful coexistence."¹⁸

The task of preserving and consolidating peace requires great efforts, for influential circles in some Western nations are not showing any particular inclination genuinely to repudiate the psychology of "cold war"; they are not only failing to foster strengthening of mutual trust and international cooperation but are making every effort to encourage hostility toward the socialist countries. In this connection a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the past war, of its course and outcome, and exposure of those who are actually to blame for that war is of not only scientific but also of political, practical significance in the contemporary campaign for international détente and for preventing another, even more bloody and devastating war.

This is why the topic "The international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War and its influence on the fate of mankind" is of current vital importance. It requires independent, thorough, comprehensive elaboration. In developing this topic, it is essential to show the influence of our victories in the course of the entire war on the policy and strategy of our allies, on the disintegration of the Hitlerite coalition, and on the upsurge in the national liberation struggle and the Resistance Movement in those countries which were fighting fascism. Comprehensive elaboration of this topic is also important because our ideological adversaries are endeavoring to implant in the postwar generation a distorted picture of the past war and to ignore the world-historic significance of the victory of the Soviet people over fascism. But in spite of all the tricks and devices of the enemies of the USSR, the great exploit of the Soviet people cannot be relegated to oblivion.

The Soviet people, defending the world's first socialist state, were at the same time helping deliver the peoples of other countries from Hitlerite tyranny and were showing an example of international solidarity. Herein lies the international significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the war against fascist Germany. And it is essential comprehensively to reveal this in the works of Soviet historians.

The Great Patriotic War was a war of all the people. Thorough investigation of the popular character of the Great Patriotic War is of great importance. At the beginning of the 20th century Lenin stated: "Wars are being waged today by peoples."¹⁹ Our entire people was fighting against the fascist hordes which had invaded the Soviet Union. Our people gained victory in the military, economic and ideological struggle against a powerful and crafty foe. It is the duty and obligation of Soviet historians worthily to reflect the popular epic, the great heroic feat of the Soviet people.

The topic "People and War" is quite extensive. It encompasses all the activities of the people during the war years: the battle front, the home front, and the struggle behind enemy lines. Although a comparatively large amount of attention has been devoted to the exploit of the Soviet people at the front and their armed struggle as the main content of the war, with a large number of scholarly studies and memoirs devoted to this subject, this theme is so deep and broad that it will long remain an important object of scholarly investigation performed by Soviet historians. This applies to an even greater degree to treatment of the labor exploit of Soviet

citizens, who provided the battle front with weapons, ammunition, everything needed to defeat the fascist invaders, and to investigation of the selfless struggle by Soviet patriots behind enemy lines. In recent years scholars have devoted more attention to revealing the broad popular character of the war. Fruitful work in this area is being done by the people at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History of the USSR, who have produced interesting scholarly studies.²⁰ Much has been done at republic scientific establishments. Considerable work is being accomplished by Ukrainian and Belorussian historians.²¹ Scholarly research is also now being conducted more vigorously in other republics, krays, and oblasts.²² The broad scientific community is taking part in producing these works. All this unquestionably is expanding the front of scholarly search. A great deal has already been accomplished, especially in recent years. But nevertheless the literature which has been published on this subject does not yet reflect the entire diversity and complexity of the topic. The actuality of the war years is richer, more vivid and complex than it sometimes turns out to be in some scholarly studies.

Some foreign historians, analyzing the events on the Soviet-German front, are unable or unwilling to comprehend how the Soviet people succeeded, in incredibly difficult conditions of war, in the course of four years of struggle, in supplying an army of millions of men with an increasing quantity of the latest combat equipment, ammunition, provisions, and all other requisite supplies, and to surpass the enemy, who had at his disposal the resources of almost the entire continent of Europe, in both quantity and quality of arms. They consider this to be a "Russian enigma," an "economic miracle." Many bourgeois historians find an explanation to all this in U.S. lend-lease, claiming that U.S.-supplied military equipment, strategic raw materials, and foodstuffs saved the USSR from defeat in the war and that the victory "on all fronts" was primarily brought about by "American industry, American resources, and American manpower reserves."²³

The solution lies in all preceding activity of the party and Soviet people, in the creation of a powerful socialist industry during the years of the prewar five-year plans, and in an ability most fully to mobilize in the course of the war all economic resources for meeting the needs of the war front. One of the most important tasks of historians is to show most fully the sources of the social and economic superiority of the USSR in the struggle against the fascist aggressors and the true meaning of the economic miracle accomplished by the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The topic of the exploit accomplished by the Soviet citizens behind enemy lines requires further elaboration and thorough scholarly investigation. Many books have been published on this problem. But they deal chiefly with the partisan movement and the activities of underground groups in individual republics and oblasts. At the same time we lack synthesizing historical-theoretical studies which present the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines on a scale of the entire territory under occupation, and the forms of this struggle have been examined in insufficient detail.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the tried and tested political leader of the Soviet society and organizer of the struggle by the entire people against the imperialist aggressors. The party Central Committee was the main headquarters which exercised supreme political and strategic direction of the armed struggle as

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well as the selfless labor of the working people on the home front. All this ensured a solid, monolithic unity of the entire multinational Soviet people and a victory of world-historic significance.

Many books have been written about the Communist Party and its guiding and directing activities during the Great Patriotic War. This topic has found expression in solid works on the history of the past war.²⁴ The party appears before us in all its organizational and ideological might. Historical works comprehensively reveal its colossal efforts in organizing and mobilizing all manpower and material resources with the aim of achieving victory over the enemy.

New party work forms and methods were required and new, extremely important tasks were advanced under the conditions of the war. It was essential to reorganize the entire national economy on a war footing as quickly as possible, to build a powerful war economy, to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces, and to develop an extensive partisan movement behind enemy lines. It was necessary to strengthen to an even greater extent the moral-political unity of the Soviet society and the friendship of the peoples of the USSR; to raise up all Soviet citizens to take part in the Great Patriotic War against the German-fascist invaders; to ensure the establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition, a united front of freedom-loving peoples against fascist Germany; to unite all progressive forces for its total defeat.

A central place in party activities was occupied by military-organizational work for successful conduct of the armed struggle against the aggressor. Here is just one example. In the first months of the war 5,300,000 men were mobilized into the army and navy, while by December 1941 more than 300 divisions had been formed and incorporated into the army in the field.²⁵ The party raised up the entire Soviet people for the struggle against the enemy, substantially increased the numerical strength of the armed forces, trained and indoctrinated military personnel in a spirit of high moral fiber, organization and discipline. Enlistment of vast masses of people into active armed struggle in a short period of time, under the extremely difficult conditions of the first period of the war, is one of the greatest services performed by our party. This is why party military-organizational activity during the years of the Great Patriotic War requires further comprehensive scholarly investigations.

There is a need for more thorough investigation of party ideological activities during the war years. This important topic has not been sufficiently addressed,²⁶ although the role of party ideological work during the war years was extremely important. The Communist Party attached exceptional importance to ideological activities among the soldier masses and workers on the home front. It concentrated principal attention on instilling in Soviet citizens strong patriotic qualities, total dedication to the socialist homeland, hatred toward fascism, organization, discipline, and vigilance. The party tirelessly waged aggressive, militant counter-propaganda and exposed the fascist lies about the Soviet societal and governmental system. The enemy did not succeed in shaking the ideological conviction of Soviet citizens. As the war progressed it became even stronger, and the Soviet people united even more closely behind the Communist Party, which was staunchly and consistently upholding the sacred principles of communism.

The high degree of ideological conviction and political awareness on the part of the masses, achieved as a result of many years of ideological indoctrination work by

the Communist Party, constituted one of the decisive factors in our victory. In an hour of mortal danger these lofty patriotic qualities were displayed by soldiers marching into battle against the enemy, and by workers, kolkhoz farmers and all working people on the home front, who were devoting all their energies toward achieving victory.

Vigorous party-political work conducted in the line units was a decisive means of influencing the consciousness of our fighting men, instilling in them excellent moral-political and fighting qualities, and ensuring victory over the enemy.²⁷ It comprised an organic and integral part of all ideological and organizational activity by the Communist Party in exercising party leadership of the Armed Forces. This is why the role of party-political work in combat conditions requires even more comprehensive treatment. The role of Communists at the front -- commanders, deputy commanders for political affairs, political section officials, and military councils has been insufficiently investigated and has not been comprehensively shown. It is important to reveal concretely and at the same time deeply the nature of their work, its forms and methods, to investigate how the ideological charge obtained in the process of party-political work exerted influence on the character of military obligations and their results, to what extent and how it helped overcome the difficulties of the armed struggle with the enemy.

The topic "Komsomol and Defense of the Homeland" is one of the important problems of history of the Great Patriotic War. Komsomol -- loyal assistant to the party -- made a significant contribution to victory. In the harsh years of the Hitlerite invasion Soviet young people displayed a high degree of political awareness and showed outstanding examples of courage and heroism. On the very first days of the war tens of thousands of Komsomol members volunteered for service in the regular army. Discussing the exploits of Soviet boys and girls, M. I. Kalinin noted: "There is not one type of weapon nor one form of combat in the Patriotic War which did not involve the participation of Komsomol, where Komsomol was not in the front ranks."²⁸ During the war years Komsomol gave the homeland millions of selfless fighting men. Eighty to eighty-five percent of the total Komsomol membership fought with weapon in hand in the regular army or in partisan detachments; approximately 11 million Komsomol members fought at the front.²⁹ In the flame of battle many patriots sacredly preserved the revolutionary and fighting traditions of the peoples of the USSR, adding to and further developing them. They justified the high degree of confidence bestowed upon them by the homeland and the party -- selflessly defending the achievements of socialism.

Books, collections of documents, memoirs,³⁰ plays, songs, and motion pictures deal with the diversified activities of Komsomol during the war years. An extensive literature on the role of Komsomol in the past war now is making it possible to produce a large, synthesizing study entitled "Komsomol in the Great Patriotic War."

Consequently, future efforts by scholars doing investigative research on the Great Patriotic War should be concentrated on elaboration and synthesis of the entire war period of the history of the USSR (1941-1945), all sociopolitical and military processes which took place during the war, and thorough disclosure of the leadership role of the CPSU in achievement by the Soviet people of the world-historic victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan.

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Completeness of historical investigation on the war can be achieved only when we possess a chronologically sequential examination and analysis of the processes and phenomena which took place during those years. Only under this condition is it possible correctly to define the role and place in the war of a given concrete event. And although general studies on the history of the Great Patriotic War have been published in this country, its individual aspects have not all been studied and analyzed equally deeply and thoroughly. The problem of the genesis of World War II and the Great Patriotic War is one of these important problems. Questions of origin and causality are central aspects of the study of any war. "It seems to me," stated Lenin, "that the main thing, which is usually forgotten in the question of war, which is given inadequate attention, the main thing, which generates so many arguments and, I would say, empty, hopeless, aimless arguments -- is forgetting the main question of what class character a war bears, what caused this war to break out, what classes are waging it, and what historical and historical-economic conditions engendered it."³¹ Lenin further emphasized: "If you failed to study the policies of both groups of belligerent powers over the course of decades... if you failed to show the link between this war and preceding policies, then you understood nothing in this war!"³²

A sharp ideological struggle is in progress and all kinds of lying fabrications are being concocted in regard to questions pertaining to the causes of World War II and determination of those to blame for it. As was shown at an international conference in Weimar (May 1975) and particularly at the 14th International Congress of Historical Sciences in San Francisco (August 1975), some bourgeois historians are continuing to falsify the prehistory of the war and are attempting to whitewash imperialism -- the sole culprit and in that world tragedy. Many historians in the FRG, for example, are distorting the policy of the Communist parties on the eve of the war. They are attempting to argue that in the prewar years Comintern was fighting not so much against fascism as against the Social Democrats and that the USSR and the Red Army allegedly had close, special links with the Reichswehr. They make every effort to distort the meaning of the treaty of nonaggression entered into on 23 August 1939 by the Soviet Union and Germany, claiming that this treaty was allegedly the precondition behind Germany's initiation of the war.

Many of our historians are studying the policies of the imperialist nations long before the beginning of World War II and are analyzing new documents, which reveal on the one hand the acuteness of conflicts within the capitalist world and, on the other, their class unity for the purpose of struggle against the world's first socialist state. The topic of causality behind the war is examined in detail in multivolume studies.³³ These and other studies persuasively demonstrate, backed up by extensive documentary materials, that it was imperialism which prepared for and unleashed World War II, and they expose numerous falsifications of bourgeois propaganda, which endeavors to muddle and confuse the complex and contradictory prewar processes, to distort events, and to remove responsibility from those who are genuinely guilty of monstrous crimes.

The origin of a war is first and foremost a political question. Why did World War II take place? What are the reasons and causes? What must be done to ensure that a like or even more terrible tragedy is not repeated? These questions are of concern today as well to millions of people in all countries. Marxist historians have

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elaborated well constructed, profoundly scientific concepts of the origin of World War II and the criminal, misanthropic substance of fascism as the result of extreme imperialist reaction. The works of Soviet historians are helping progressive forces throughout the world in their struggle against attempts by ultrarightists to revive fascism; they remind people that fascism and racism have been and remain the worst enemies of peoples, enemies of peace, socialism and democracy. This is why we need books and articles which trace the history of fascism and its social roots, particularly since numerous items are being published in a number of capitalist countries (FRG, United States), the authors of which are essentially attempting to whitewash and retouch the repulsive countenance of German fascism and its Fuehrer.³⁴ Time cannot lessen the hatred of peoples toward fascism and its crimes.

One very important task is further revelation of the decisive role of the Soviet Union in achieving victory in World War II. It is a well-known fact that the actual contribution by the different countries toward victory varied. Reactionary bourgeois historians and ideologues deliberately tangle and confuse this problem, since its correct treatment would mean acknowledging the decisive role of the Soviet Union. They claim that there are no scales on which one could weigh the contribution of a given country toward achieving victory and that there are no criteria by which that contribution could be measured.

Soviet historians have worked out such criteria. They are based on factors which characterize the political essence of war, the aims of the belligerent nations, the ideology prevailing in a country, achieved results, and particularly the political, economic, and military damage inflicted on the adversary in the course of the war. the magnitude and degree of contribution toward victory by individual countries, alongside objective circumstances, were in large measure also determined by such subjective conditions as the activeness of the masses in the war and the policy of the governments of the anti-Hitler coalition in mobilizing manpower and resources for the struggle. Applying these criteria, one can elucidate the scope, intensity and effectiveness of the combat operations of each country and their influence on the course and outcome of the war as a whole. Analysis of these main criteria and war results shows that the peoples of the Soviet Union bore on their shoulders the brunt of the struggle against the bloc of fascist states.

The decisive role of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the victory over fascism is particularly clearly evident if one examines their activities from the standpoint of attainment of three main war aims.

The first aim was to halt the German-fascist invaders and to block the road to further spread of aggression. As we know, on the Soviet-German front, as a result of stubborn combat and at the cost of heavy casualties and stress, the enemy was halted and the aggressor's road was blocked. There is no other example in history where a nation, finding itself in such a complex and difficult position at the outbreak of a war, achieved such a convincing victory over a powerful adversary. The most difficult period of the war was 1941-1942, containing dramatic events involving the retreat of our forces due to a disadvantageous strategic situation. But the main thing was the fact that in these most difficult conditions of combat, Soviet fighting men stood up under the attacks of a most powerful adversary, blocked the aggressor's path, thwarted his "blitzkrieg" plan and inflicted serious defeats on the enemy at Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, on the Kursk Salient and the Dnieper,

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and thus built a solid foundation for the future Great Victory. It was achieved primarily because the Communist Party and Soviet Government rapidly and effectively reorganized the economy and the nation's entire life on a war footing. Success was achieved by the heroism, the stubborn, selfless struggle and great moral staunchness of the Soviet people.

The second important task consisted in depriving the enemy of means of waging war, that is, destroying the bulk of his manpower and military hardware. This task was also successfully accomplished. Hitler's army lost a substantial percentage of its cadre troops on the Soviet-German front: 10 million officers and men, 77,000 combat aircraft, 48,000 tanks and assault guns, 167,000 artillery pieces, 2,500 warships, cargo and troop-carrying vessels.³⁵ This made things easier for our allies in the other theaters, which in the final analysis hastened the end of the war and led to the total military defeat of fascist Germany.

Finally, the Soviet Union also accomplished the third task -- rendering of direct assistance to the peoples of the Western European countries in delivering them from Hitlerite occupation. This required great effort, resources and sacrifices. The genuine internationalism of the Soviet Union, internationalism in practical deeds, was displayed here. Also important in this connection is further elaboration of questions connected with the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and the role of the antifascist liberation movement. These are large, fundamental questions around which a sharp, unceasing ideological struggle continues to be waged today.

Scholarly investigators should also focus on questions pertaining to the character and content of the resistance movement in the occupied countries and the correlation between external and internal forces in liberating the European countries from the fascist invaders. These are important problems. Their elucidation requires a correct methodological approach.

In analyzing the events of World War II, Soviet historians proceed from the position that objective internal socioeconomic and political factors which caused the development of a revolutionary situation were the principal preconditions for the resistance movement and armed uprisings in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. The Red Army did not bring revolution "on its bayonets," as reactionary bourgeois historians attempt to claim. The defeat of the German-fascist armies on the Soviet-German front and entry by the Red Army into a given country accelerated the maturation of the preconditions for insurgency and held in check moves by domestic reaction. Workers, peasants, and democratic strata of the intelligentsia were the motive force of insurgencies, with the hegemony of the proletariat and leadership role of Communist and worker parties. In certain instances the opposition segment of the national bourgeoisie also took part in revolutionary events, but only as long as this was in its class interests. It naturally did not go beyond expulsion of the foreign invaders and the endeavor to preserve its domination.

In connection with this, historians are faced with at least two tasks. First, to elucidate more deeply and correctly the correlation between external (Soviet Armed Forces) and internal (the Resistance Movement) forces for liberation of the European countries from the fascist invaders. Revealing activation of the Resistance Movement as a logical general democratic, patriotic movement of the broad masses and showing its forms and the leadership role of the Communist and worker parties in

the struggle against fascism, at the same time one should examine the conditions which ensured the successes of the Resistance Movement and antifascist uprisings in connection with the situation on the Soviet-German front. The successes of the Soviet Armed Forces were the decisive external factor which led to the victory of the working people in these countries. It was precisely interaction between the external factor and the internal forces of Resistance which accelerated processes connected with liberation of the Western European nations from fascist occupation. Secondly, one should correctly define the character of the uprisings and revolutions which took place in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe during and after their liberation.

Various points of view have been expressed in the Soviet literature on this question. According to one of these views the popular democratic revolution is a special type of social revolution, which is neither a bourgeois-democratic nor a socialist revolution in pure form. The authors who hold these views are of the opinion that the revolutionary process in these countries went through stages of two revolutions: popular democratic, and socialist. Other investigators claim that the popular democratic revolution in these countries represents one of the forms of socialist revolution. Since the question of the character of a popular democratic revolution is by no means a terminological question but rather a fundamental one, it should be thoroughly studied, elaborating a unified interpretation of this very important historical-theoretical problem.

Comprehensive study of the history of wars depends on how fully is provided a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the societal affairs of the warring classes, nations, and coalitions. This applies first and foremost to study of the Great Patriotic War, since it claims a special place in history. This was a contest between two systems, and its outcome determined the fate of all mankind. Therefore elaboration of the root problems of the Great Patriotic War and their comprehensive and thorough examination is an extremely important task.

Wars in defense of the socialist homeland, and particularly the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 convincingly attest to the high level of Soviet art of warfare. It won out over the art of warfare of the fascist Wehrmacht and rightfully became one of the factors in our victory.

Considerable attention was devoted to investigation of the experience in conduct of the war and armed struggle in the USSR. But the task consists in more thoroughly studying questions which are of particular interest to the present day, in comprehensively revealing the modes and forms of military operations, which have retained their significance up to the present day. The experience of World War II and the Great Patriotic War contained excellent models of strategic leadership, organization and execution of offensive and defensive operations which were unprecedented in world history. Such operations as the Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Iasi-Kishinev, Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and others became classic models of world art of warfare. They were conducted over a vast area, in various conditions, ended with outstanding results, and had far-reaching military and political consequences. Their successful execution became possible thanks to the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the State Defense Council and Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and thanks to the vast knowledge, talent and military expertise of the commanders and political workers. These operations were a vivid demonstration of the advantages of socialist military

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organization and military theory over fascist military organization and military theory.

The task now consists in producing synthesizing studies on the history of Soviet military strategy, strategic leadership of the war effort, studies revealing the scope and scale of front and interfront operations, organization and conduct of strategic defense, the strategic offensive and counteroffensive, preparations for and execution of encirclement operations, operations on coastal axes, in the Far North, etc.

The experience of war constitutes a foundation for improving military theory. But successfully utilizing the experience of the past means taking into consideration the reasons not only for victory but for setbacks as well. The historian who presents in his writings the experience of past battles is obligated to show not only the high points of victories but also that which created the conditions for achieving them, to show not only that which shines brilliantly but also that which still stands in the shadows and awaits investigation.

Of course military history is not a collection of ready answers to questions posed by contemporary practical military affairs. V. I. Lenin stated that theoretical points, historical and practical experience should serve as a guide to living, innovative action. "To preserve a legacy," stated Lenin, "by no means signifies being limited to that legacy."³⁶ Applied to military affairs, this means that contemporary military theory and practice can be developed on the basis of the lessons and conclusions proceeding from the experience of military history, but with absolutely mandatory consideration of all new things which have occurred in the area of military organizational development, art of warfare, improvement of military hardware, etc. Study of military experience is a matter not only for military historians and theorists but for practical experts as well. It is the task of military historians to synthesize the experience and to communicate it to military cadres in such a manner as to arouse their interest, a desire solidly to assimilate this experience and to apply it in their daily practical activities.

Of course today the Soviet Armed Forces have in large measure become different from what they were during the Great Patriotic War. A genuine revolution in military affairs has taken place under the influence of the rapid advance of science and technology. Enormous successes have been achieved in army and navy weapons and equipment, in their organizational structure, and in theory of art of warfare. The experience of the past war cannot serve as a ready formula, but the basic principles of military leadership and Soviet art of warfare have retained their viability up to the present day. Therefore we need studies which not only describe facts but -- and this is most important -- draw substantiated conclusions and contain an analysis of principles of action. The experience of the Great Patriotic War is indispensable in this regard.

Popular scientific books on the Great Patriotic War are in increasing demand. Historical biography, for example, has always been the most popular, most easy to understand form of military historical investigation. D. A. Furmanov once presented to the public V. I. Chapayev, legendary hero of the civil war. Too few works are published, however, on the military leaders and heroes of the Great Patriotic War,³⁷ and many of those which have been published cannot be compared with Furmanov's

excellent book as regards power of indoctrinational and emotional effect on the reader, especially young people. One of the most important tasks of historians is to produce popular books on the Great Patriotic War -- small in size and length but deep in content and vivid in form.

An unrelenting, high-principled campaign against bourgeois falsifiers remains a highly important task, which requires considerable attention. We know that an increasingly more acute ideological struggle is being waged between Marxist historians and historians of the bourgeois camp on the principal questions pertaining to the history of World War II. Marxist historians endeavor to present a genuinely scientific, truthful picture of the origin, course and outcome of the war. Reactionary bourgeois historians, carrying out the social imperative, are proceeding along the path of falsification and distortion of the events and lessons of the past war and are attempting to present them in a false light.

Bourgeois historians and propagandists, exerting massive influence on the Western reader, falsify the history of the war: they grossly distort its causes and political character and make phony claims to the effect that the Soviet Union achieved victory in the war not by virtue of the advantages of the socialist system and its military and economic might but as a result of economic assistance by the United States and other allies; in moving the armed struggle to foreign soil, the Soviet Union allegedly was pursuing not liberation but expansionist aims, etc. All these claims have nothing in common with historical truth and demand a well-reasoned and detailed critique. The increased aggressiveness of imperialist propaganda in recent years, including in the area of historiography of World War II, and intensification of its anti-Soviet, anticommunist character are making it necessary to expand the campaign against bourgeois falsifiers. There is no place for neutralism and compromises in this struggle. "Needed here is a high degree of political vigilance," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "vigorous, efficient and persuasive propaganda effort, a prompt and expeditious rebuff to acts of hostile ideological sabotage."³⁸

The falsifiers of the history of World War II are hard at work not only in the West but in the East as well. Beijing propagandists recently announced a sensational "discovery," publishing an article in the newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO an article entitled "On the Initial Moment of World War II." This article contains an appeal to revise "existing views" and "to reestablish the true countenance" of World War II, conducting toward this end a "thorough study" of the war from the position of the ideas of Mao Zedong.³⁹

This Maoist propaganda sheet argues that World War II began in China and that not the Soviet-German but rather the Chinese front was the principal front in the struggle against the aggressor, and that it was not the Soviet Union but China which "defended world democracy and civilization" against the fascist barbarians, fighting "on the forwardmost line on the main front" of the antifascist struggle.

Why is Maoist propaganda now, almost four decades after the beginning of World War II, distorting the truth and presenting the history of the war in a Beijing version? It is being done for the purpose of fabricating a lie about the special mission of Mao and the Maoist leaders, to portray China in the role of "liberator" of peoples, and thus to depreciate the decisive role of the USSR in achieving the world-historic victory in World War II.

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But the Soviet Union's great service to humanity is well known. It was also acknowledged in the past in China as well. And our country has never belittled the role of the many years of struggle by the Chinese people for their liberation and has highly praised the contribution made by China to the antifascist struggle of peoples, to the struggle against militarist Japan. Nevertheless the Chinese front was not the main front, including when World War II broke out. All forces opposing fascism joined ranks precisely around our country; and the USSR, heading the just war of liberation against imperialist aggression, not only played a decisive role in liberation of a number of European countries, but also helped the Chinese and other peoples of Asia in their struggle against militarist Japan. To disparage the significance of the liberation movement of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces both in Europe and Asia constitutes the grossest falsification, which no sober-minded person can accept.

* * *

We have presented some of the principal problems pertaining to further study and investigation of the Great Patriotic War. Evaluating the degree of completeness to which it has been studied and giving due credit to the work which has been accomplished, one should bear in mind that the history of this war still contains much which is not yet known, and many names of unknown heroes. Thorough study of the war requires further elucidation of documentary material. Archives still contain untouched piles of documents, utilization of which will make it possible more fully to reveal the history of the war in all its diversity. It is necessary to step up work on establishing the documentary history of the Great Patriotic War and on gathering together all those valuable items which comprise the primary source base for investigative research. Gathering together documents, materials, combat soldiers' letters and photographs; preserving for posterity specimens of military equipment and weapons of that time, and displaying them in this country's museums -- all of this is very important both for the history of the Soviet State and as a remembrance of those who defended our homeland.

Year by year, the terrible war time is receding further into the past. Today it is all history, which is studied only in books. But it is history which everybody should know and remember. One of the principal tasks of Soviet historical science is to recreate a complete picture of the unparalleled struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against fascism, to portray in an inspired manner the deathless military and labor feat accomplished by the Soviet people for the sake of the freedom and progress of the homeland and of all mankind, and to show the sources of our world-historic victory.

FOOTNOTES

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39. PRAVDA, 8 August 1978.

O. A. Rzheshhevskiy. BOURGEOIS HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE ON THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT (Analysis of Contemporary Trends)

The years of the Great Patriotic War are receding ever further into the past. But its events, results and lessons are continuing to exert enormous influence on world sociopolitical development. "Time, separating the war years from us," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "enables us more deeply and fully to appreciate the deathless deed of those fighting men who accepted death in the name of life, in the name of the freedom, independence and honor of our beloved homeland, in the name of socialism."¹

The ideologues of imperialism are undertaking enormous efforts to conceal from the postwar generations the truth of the world-historic victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, and the deathless combat deed accomplished by the Soviet people and their heroic Armed Forces, who defended the achievements of socialism and saved the world from the threat of fascist enslavement. Bourgeois historians, writers and journalists, carrying out the social imperative dictated by reactionary imperialist forces, deliberately and viciously falsify the history of the Great Patriotic War. They pursue far-reaching aims with this: to undermine the steadily growing international prestige and authority of the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces and the efforts of peoples in the struggle for peace; to halt the revolutionary movement, to drive a wedge between its individual detachments, and to weaken the unity of the socialist countries and the fighting alliance of their armies; to rehabilitate imperialism as the main source of wars and its contemporary aggressive policy, and ideologically to justify aggressive NATO plans directed against the Soviet Union and the peoples of the socialist and developing countries.

A leading role in this subversive activity is played by a unique military-historical "cartel" of major capitalist countries, the principal components of which are military-historical services and other specially established government organizations. The concepts elaborated by this "cartel," while containing certain differences due to the distribution of class forces, historical and national peculiarities, and the nature of participation in World War II by each of the countries involved in the "cartel," are unified by a common bourgeois ideology, hostile to socialism, and the reactionary policy of imperialism. The capitalist world's largest set of basic works on World War II (more than 100 volumes) was prepared at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, operating with the personnel and facilities of the military historical service. The principal component part of this group of works is the series "The United States Army in World War II" (approximately 80 volumes). It also includes the 15-volume "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II," the 7-volume "The Army Air Forces in World War II," and the 5-volume "History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II."²

Official ideas on the events of World War II and the Soviet-German front elaborated by the U.S. military historical service are also contained in "Encyclopedia Americana,"³ in "American Military History,"⁴ which is intended for military educational institutions, and a number of other publications.

In Great Britain the principal publication of this type is the 80-volume "Official History of the Second World War," prepared by the historical section attached to the British cabinet.⁵ In the FRG the Bundeswehr military historical service is working actively in this area, putting out a multivolume "History of World War II."^{5a} A 96-volume "Official History of the War in Greater East Asia" ⁶ was published in Japan, produced by Japan's national defense directorate, etc. These works are essentially of a reactionary, anti-Soviet character. Their authors sidestep the question of the guilt of imperialism in starting the war and even attempt to push off on the USSR responsibility for it; they ascribe to the United States and Great Britain the inappropriate role of "dominant force," thus attempting to depreciate the decisive contribution of the USSR to defeat of the fascist-militarist bloc; they employ a phony interpretation of the results and lessons of the war in order to revive the myth of "Soviet military threat" in one form or another.

These themes are amended and renewed, but in the final analysis are repeated in different variations in the publications of the majority of "second echelon" bourgeois historians and are aggressively utilized by bourgeois propaganda.

Propaganda agencies of the imperialist countries have undertaken many efforts to put out literature on World War II and the Great Patriotic War calculated for the mass reader. The first such item was produced in 1966-1968 in England by B. Liddell Hart and B. Pitt. Their "Illustrated History of the Second World War" is a magazine-type edition (96 magazines combined into eight volumes). Garishly made up and bearing the names of well-known bourgeois scholars, they attracted the attention of a fairly broad readership, and in subsequent years were published in French and Spanish, and thus reached many capitalist countries. In the United States, in response to the popularity of these volumes, Ballantine Books undertook the publication of a series of 100 inexpensive paperback books on World War II.

A characteristic feature of recent years is an increase in the number of bourgeois publications specially dealing with the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front. We shall list several of these. They include the three-volume "The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945" by A. Constantini (France) and books by C. Ryan entitled "The Last Battle," by E. Ziemke entitled "Stalingrad to Berlin," by H. Salisbury entitled "Nine Hundred Days. The Siege of Leningrad," by W. Craig entitled "Enemy at the Gate. The Battle for Stalingrad," by M. Caidin entitled "Tigers Are Burning," by W. Kerr entitled "The Secret of Stalingrad" (United States), by A. Seaton entitled "The Russo-German War, 1941-1945," by J. Strawson entitled "The Battle for Berlin," by J. Erickson entitled "The Road to Stalingrad" (Great Britain); by E. Klink entitled "Operation Citadel," by F. Forstmeier entitled "Odessa, 1941," by K. Reinhardt entitled "The Turning Point at Moscow," by M. Kerig entitled "Stalingrad," by J. Foester entitled "Stalingrad, Tear in the Alliance, 1942/43" (FRG).⁷ Of these, only in A. Constantini's book, and to some degree the books by M. Caidin and K. Reinhardt is there noted an effort by the authors to engage in scholarly investigation. The remainder of this literature, as regards its basic content, falsifies history.

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The writings of bourgeois historians show the following basic trends: first of all, the significance of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front is minimized; second, the achievements of Soviet art of warfare are denied or distorted; third, attempts are made to deheroize the Red Army and to cast slurs on the great combat exploit of Soviet fighting men, who saved the world from the threat of fascist enslavement. Let us examine these trends in greater detail.

In order to minimize the significance of the armed struggle of the Soviet-German front and to make it look like the decisive role in defeating the fascist-militarist bloc was played not by the Soviet Union but by Great Britain and the United States, bourgeois historians created the so-called "theory of decisive battles" of World War II. One of the authors of this theory, for example, U.S. military historian and political commentator H. Baldwin, is of the opinion that the outcome of World War II was determined by 11 battles ("great campaigns"). He considers these to include the Polish campaign in 1939, the Battle of Britain, the invasion of Crete, the fall of Corregidor, the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Tarawa, the invasions of Sicily and Normandy, the naval battle in the Leyte Gulf, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Battle of Okinawa.⁸

Most frequently bourgeois historiography includes among the decisive battles (their number varies from one historian to the next -- ranging from 5 to 20) the battles at El Alamein, in Tunisia, in the North African Theater; the Battle of Midway and the battles for the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific Theater, and only one battle on the Soviet-German front -- the Battle of Stalingrad. A number of bourgeois authors who are adherents of this theory make no mention whatsoever of the battles of Moscow, Kursk and others on the Soviet-German front, which determined the radical turning point in and the final outcome of World War II. In all variations, and herein lies the heart of the theory, the absolute majority of key battles happen to occur on fronts where combat operations were being conducted by Anglo-American troops. Unwarranted preference is given to the Asian-Pacific and North African theaters, while the main theater -- the European, and the Soviet-German front in particular, is relegated to secondary importance.⁹

We shall note first of all the incomparability of scale and, most important, the results and the military-political consequences of the battles between which bourgeois historians practically place an equal sign.

At El Alamein the British (October-November 1942) were opposed by four German and eight Italian divisions, totaling approximately 80,000 men. In the course of the operation the backbone of this force succeeding in withdrawing, avoiding defeat in detail. The German-fascist forces in the Stalingrad offensive, on the other hand, exceeded 1 million men. Just in the period of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, from 19 November 1942 through 2 February 1943, 32 divisions and 3 brigades of fascist Germany and its allies were totally routed. In addition, 16 enemy divisions sustained a serious defeat. Total enemy casualties exceeded 800,000.

The Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the entire war, which was further developed and completed in subsequent Soviet combat operations. The operation at El Alamein was not and could not be of "turning-point" significance in this war, either by scale or results.

Anglo-American sources claim that the Allies took 250,000 Italian and German officers and men prisoner in Tunisia (May 1943). These figures were announced by Churchill and Eisenhower soon after the fighting in North Africa ended. Some bourgeois U.S. historians, such as R. Beitzell, claim that 275,000 men surrendered in Tunisia. Serious doubt must be cast on these figures: they are clearly exaggerated and are being utilized to minimize the significance of the battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet-German front as a whole. "Psychologically and militarily," states Beitzell, "Stalingrad was a more significant victory for the Allies. Tunisia was more productive strategically and as regards exhaustion of the resources of the Axis."¹⁰ In recent years, however, the tacit agreement by bourgeois historians with the figures given by Churchill and Eisenhower has begun to weaken. British bourgeois historian B. Liddell Hart reached the conclusion that in actual fact the number of prisoners taken by the Allies was considerably smaller. In confirmation he makes reference to information on the number of fascist troops on rations, pay and allowances in Tunisia. According to these figures, 170-180 thousand men were receiving rations, pay and allowances in April 1943.¹¹ Another well-known British historian, A. Taylor, has brought certain clarity to this question. He writes: "The Allies took 130,000 prisoners, but subsequently this number was puffed up to a quarter of a million."¹²

The landing of a U.S. reinforced Marine division on the island of Guadalcanal in August 1942 is called by almost all U.S. historians the "beginning of the counter-offensive in the Pacific." But there are insufficient grounds for such a conclusion. This operation was offensive only at the tactical level, while at the strategic level it was of defensive significance -- to prevent further increase in the Japanese military threat to Australia.

We should separately discuss the naval battle at Midway Island on 4-6 June 1942, in which powerful Japanese naval forces, which were attacking the U.S. operations base on that island, were defeated. Losing 4 carriers, 1 heavy cruiser and 322 aircraft (the majority of these went down with the carriers), the Japanese were forced to withdraw.

Although the Battle of Midway did constitute a large-scale success for U.S. naval forces and deprived militarist Japan of a large percentage of its aircraft carriers, nevertheless it did not end Japanese naval supremacy in the Pacific and did not exert direct influence on the general course of World War II.

The decisive battles, including the turnabout of events in the Pacific, began much later. F. Roosevelt, addressing Congress on 7 January 1943 with an assessment of the Battle of Midway and the fighting for the island of Guadalcanal, commented that they were essentially defensive and constituted "part of the strategy of containment which characterized this phase of the war."¹³

Marxist military-historical science is waging a purposeful struggle against bourgeois falsifiers, consistently and persuasively exposing their contrived theories, including the "theory of decisive battles."

At the contemporary stage the main trend in this struggle is determined by change in the correlation of forces in favor of Marxist military-historical science, loss by bourgeois historiography of its former position in the capitalist world, and the steadily evolving process of scientific discrediting of reactionary concepts of the history of World War II. Of considerable importance in this regard is publication

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of the Soviet multivolume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], which has drawn the attention of historians of many countries and various views.

The British Communist newspaper MORNING STAR, criticizing another fruitless attempt to play down the contribution of the USSR to the defeat of the fascist-militarist bloc, undertaken by N. Longmate in a recently published book entitled "When We Won the War,"¹⁴ stated: "In spite of great efforts by British, British Commonwealth, and U.S. troops on the Western Front, nobody has grounds to deny that an incomparably more savage struggle was being waged on the Eastern Front, where the Russians had been battling the main forces of the Wehrmacht since 1941."¹⁵

Bourgeois historians, endeavoring to consolidate their position, are forced to maneuver. They "refurbish" discredited ideas and theories, resort to great flexibility in their argumentation, and employ objectivism as the principal means of concealing the genuine sociopolitical essence of their writings. This can be observed in particular in the example of evolution of the "theory of decisive battles," which has undergone appreciable changes in recent years.

First of all, bourgeois historians were compelled essentially to give up their claims that on the Soviet-German front only the Battle of Stalingrad was decisive for the course and outcome of World War II as a whole. As a rule they now acknowledge that the battles of Moscow and Kursk were also of decisive significance. U.S. historian H. Baldwin, who formerly claimed that only the Battle of Stalingrad was of decisive significance on the Soviet-German front, in his new book (failing to mention his past statements) he writes that the Battle of Moscow "was without doubt a turning point in World War II, to an even greater extent than Stalingrad.... The German invasion of Russia and the subsequent largest land battles in history," he states in summarizing 1941, "had political, psychological and military results of global significance."¹⁶ We should note, however, that while acknowledging the decisive significance of the battles of Moscow and Kursk, H. Baldwin, J. Erickson and other bourgeois historians continue to falsify history and the events connected with these battles.

Second, attempts are being made to "strengthen" the "theory of decisive battles" by various means, to make up for its "losses," in order to continue utilizing it for hegemonistic and anti-Soviet purposes.

In recent years, for example, a number of new items have been published in the West, dealing with the decisive battles of World War II. The most substantial of these include H. Maule's book "The Great Battles of World War II"¹⁷ and a book entitled "Decisive Battles of the 20th Century," N. Frankland and C. Dowling, editors.¹⁸ H. Maule lists 13 such battles (Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Cheren, Cyrenaica, Moscow, Midway, Guadalcanal, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Anzio, Imphal, Normandy, and Rangoon), while Frankland and Dowling list 14 (the Battle of the Atlantic, the Battle of Britain, the Battle of France, Moscow, Pearl Harbor, Singapore, Midway, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Kursk, Schweinfurt, Imphal-Kohima, Normandy, and Leyte). Thus, alongside the truly decisive battles of the war, such as the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, they "additionally" place engagements and operations of local significance (at Cheren in Eritrea, in Cyrenaica, Burma, etc).

We should note that many Western historians do not subscribe to the "theory of decisive battles." Some of them, examining events more objectively, point without hesitation to the primary significance of the battles on the Soviet-German front for the course and outcome of World War II. H. Michel (France) writes that Soviet historians "correctly see in the brilliant successes of the Red Army the most decisive victory, which signified a turning point in World War II as a whole."¹⁹ A. Taylor agrees: "The main forces of the German Army were always on the Eastern Front."²⁰

Objective appraisals, although rarely, can also be encountered in the writings of U.S. historians. L. Morton, in one of his traditional reviews of new literature on World War II, published in the journal AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, wrote: "The war (in Russia) was conducted quite independently of the war in the West and was by any criteria the largest, bloodiest and most decisive theater of World War II. In comparison with this war, all the efforts of the Allies in the West were of dwarf dimensions."²¹ Such assessments unquestionably promote the development of a more correct view on the contribution of the Western Allies to victory over the aggressors.

* * *

The dominant idea in bourgeois literature examining the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front is an idea which disparages Soviet art of warfare.

In the writings of certain bourgeois historians one encounters objective assessments of the role of the Soviet Supreme High Command in directing the Armed Forces and the achievements of Soviet strategy, operational art and tactics. Highly consistent in this regard is a study written by French historian A. Constantini entitled "The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945)." Objective appraisals of Soviet art of warfare can also be found from time to time in the writings of other bourgeois authors.

"The offensive at Stalingrad," acknowledges I. Ziemke, "marked a new stage in the conduct of operations by the Soviet Army.... The most important elements were massive infantry actions in a narrow sector of the front for the purpose of producing a breach, which would subsequently be utilized by large tank forces operating independently, to achieve penetration deep into the enemy's defenses.... Increased flexibility was observed in all phases of an operation. For example, concentration of troops for an offensive was conducted swiftly, calmly, unobtrusively, without attempts to discover a weak point, and without extended artillery duels...."²²

But standing in contrast to such appraisals -- which are extremely rare in the West -- are others, which openly slander Soviet art of warfare. H. Baldwin claims that "there was not much brilliance in the strategy of the Russians."²³ That same E. Ziemke, appraising Soviet strategy, states that it was "defensive from a psychological standpoint (?)."²⁴ A. Clark writes that planning of Soviet combat operations "lacked imagination" and that their execution "failed to display that art and skill which throughout the entire war characterized the British, Americans, and particularly the Germans."²⁵

What facts do these historians employ? They chiefly utilize the difficulties experienced by the Soviet Armed Forces in the first months of the war. The facts are

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against the falsifiers, however. An analysis of the achievements of Soviet art of warfare convincingly demonstrates its superiority over the art of warfare of the fascist Wehrmacht -- the most powerful and experienced war machine of the capitalist world at that time. The brilliant success of Soviet strategy is graphically evident in the example of the failure of fascist Germany's plan of blitzkrieg war against the USSR and the rout of the German-fascist troops at Moscow. "If the Soviet Union had been unable to hold the Eastern Front," U.S. Secretary of State E. Stettinius subsequently wrote, "the Germans would have had the possibility of capturing Great Britain. They also could have seized Africa and then could have established a beachhead in Latin America. President Roosevelt constantly bore this threat in mind."²⁶

Innovative resolution of an extremely complex group of problems of art of warfare was vividly manifested in the Battle of Stalingrad, Kursk, the Battle of the Caucasus, in the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and many other Soviet combat operations. We should emphasize that the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad were won under conditions of approximately equal relative strengths. The victories were won thanks to well thought-out command and control of troops, as well as the skill and heroism of Soviet fighting men.

We should specifically mention, however, a quite common version put out by bourgeois military historians, according to which the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the war against the Soviet Union was a consequence chiefly of the fact that Germany "could not compete with the Russians in expending human lives."²⁷ In H. Salisbury's book entitled "The Greatest Battles of Marshal Zhukov," which is a fabrication of the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov, the author claims without any proof whatsoever that the Red Army won victories purely through the copious shedding of blood, while the Soviet command authorities, and I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov personally, are accused of "ruthless" expenditure of manpower resources. The purpose of these "accusations" is not only to disparage Soviet art of warfare but also to conceal the scale of atrocities perpetrated by German fascism on occupied Soviet soil.

Rebuking Salisbury and other falsifiers, G. K. Zhukov wrote: "Today it is of course very easy and simple to engage in paper calculations of relative strengths and to preach wisely how many divisions it should have taken to win a given battle a quarter of a century ago, to argue where more troops were introduced and where fewer than that number which today seems advisable to a given historian. All this was incalculably more complex on the battlefield." G. K. Zhukov decisively rejected Salisbury's attempts to distort the historical truth. The Soviet command authorities, the marshal writes, "put into battle as many troops as was necessary on the basis of the prevailing circumstances. They did not expend more forces than were required by the conditions of a given operation."²⁸

The Communist Party, Soviet Government and Supreme High Command, in the most difficult conditions of a devastating war forced upon our country by Germany and by all international imperialism, made a maximum effort to remove from the path of attack and to save as many civilians as possible who were threatened with fascist annihilation, while in planning military operations they were constantly concerned with conserving manpower resources and reducing casualties to a minimum.

We shall cite just one fact which attests to the flimsiness of the conjectures by reactionary U.S. historians.

In January 1944 the Maritime Army was unable for an extended period of time to accomplish its assigned missions in the fighting for the city of Kerch'. The Supreme High Command studied the situation in the army's zone, and on 27 January 1944 Headquarters, Supreme High Command issued a directive which stated: "It is evident from the operations of the Maritime Army that the army's main efforts are now directed toward capturing the city of Kerch' with intensive street fighting. Combat in the city is leading to heavy casualties (my emphasis -- Auth.) and is making it difficult to utilize the support weapons available in the army -- artillery, rocket launcher systems, tanks, and air.... Headquarters, Supreme High Command orders:

1. The principal combat actions of the army's forces shall be shifted to open ground.
2. Actions in the city shall be limited to operations playing a secondary role to the actions of the army's main forces on open ground.
3. Proceeding from these instructions, forces shall be redeployed and comments on the subsequent plan of action shall be submitted to the General Staff not later than 28 January 1944.

No 220014

I. Stalin, Antonov
27 January 1944, 1720 hours"29

* * *

In recent years reactionary historians have stepped up their attempts to "deheroize" the Red Army and to misrepresent the sources of the great combat exploit of the Soviet people, accomplished for the sake of defense of the socialist homeland.

When the war was still in progress, many prominent bourgeois political and military leaders, historians and writers noted time and again the mass heroism of Soviet fighting men. "Only a blind man can now deny," stated the U.S. bourgeois magazine SATURDAY EVENING POST in 1944, "that the triumph of the Red Army was the triumph of Soviet socialism, Soviet planning, the Soviet system."³⁰ Today the majority of bourgeois historians have become such "blind men." Some of them attempt to explain the heroism of Soviet citizens as "Russian nationalism" and to ignore the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR as one of the most important factors in the victory. Others declare that the reasons for the unity and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people in the struggle against the invaders lie in the "excessive acts of brutality" by the Hitlerites. This is particularly manifested when bourgeois authors treat the history of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War. Still others, which is encountered most frequently, resort to unabashed anti-Soviet slander.

W. Craig states that discipline in the Red Army was maintained "by the method of executing every tenth man." In the 64th Rifle Division, which was defending the approaches to Stalingrad, "one colonel," according to Craig, proceeded as follows: "He walked up to the large formation of assembled soldiers. With a pistol in his hand, he turned toward the first rank and began counting loudly: 'One,

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two, three, four....' He put a bullet into the forehead of the tenth. While his victim was still writhing on the ground, he again began to count: 'One, two, three....' He again shot the tenth man, and continued counting in a monotonous drone: 'One, two....'³¹ This fabricated "incident" is no accident, not a mistake, and not a result of a pathological imagination. It is one of the typical devices employed by reactionary bourgeois historians for purposes of anti-Soviet propaganda and to exploit the trusting gullibility of the unenlightened foreign reader.

For Mr Craig's information, the 64th Rifle Division fought bravely and courageously on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. In September 1941, in the most difficult year of the war, the division distinguished itself in an offensive operation north-east of Smolensk. As an element of the 16th Army, it fought stubborn engagements and accomplished its assigned mission -- to divert to itself enemy reserves from the Yel'nya area. The commanding general of the Western Front noted in an order that "the glorious 64th and 50th Rifle divisions and the valiant 47th Air Division inflicted heavy tank losses on the enemy and forced him to retreat in disarray in the vicinity of Dukhovshchina."³² The 64th Rifle Division added to these fighting traditions in the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, and in other sectors of the front.

U.S. general Stilwell wrote in 1945: "The Americans will be expressing the feelings of their own soldiers in paying due tribute to the Russian soldier. We observed him in this war during a stubborn, selfless defense against the mighty German war machine, during his epic resistance at Stalingrad, and in his first great victory there, when he destroyed the German 6th Army and turned the course of the war toward final victory. We saw him drive the German Army back and sweep the invaders from his homeland in the largest and most stubborn offensive in military history. In the course of three years of constant struggle we saw him bear the entire brunt of the onslaught of the Germans, and we saw him rout them. He surpassed all the achievements of Russian soldiers in past wars, and all soldiers of every nationality are proud of the fact that they fought in partnership with him in this war. The entire civilized world should particularly praise the merits of the central figure in this struggle -- the Russian soldier."³³

Today historians such as Craig and Baldwin attempt to attribute to the Soviet Army certain "internal weaknesses" and "antagonisms" to represent it as a caste army, isolated from the Communist Party and from the people. Writings of this kind serve as food for the notorious "Sovietologists" and "Kremlinologists" and are aggressively utilized in anticommunist propaganda.

Perhaps the "culmination" of adaptation of the writings of U.S. bourgeois historians to the requirements of today's political programs of imperialism is their adventurist "recommendations" of new military campaigns against the USSR, only slightly (and not always even that) veiled by the mask of "academicism."

This trend is very clearly manifested in research studies conducted on contract with the U.S. military. They include a book by MIT faculty member B. Whaley entitled "Codeword Barbarossa."³⁴ The author analyzes the "element of strategic surprise" in fascist Germany's attack on the USSR which, to quote the author, it "almost totally achieved."³⁵ At first glance the book appears to contain objective information. The author does not share the view of the neofascist historians on the "preventive" nature of the attack by fascist Germany on the USSR, calling it "most absurd."³⁶ The author states that the Soviet Government had no illusions about Germany's plans

and that its aim was to keep the country out of the war until 1942, when the "Red Army would become invincible."³⁷ Devoting principal attention to evaluation of information on preparations by fascist Germany to attack the USSR, which in his opinion could have been known to the Soviet Government, the author points to the extremely contradictory nature of the information received from capitalist countries. The wave of false information, he writes, was so great that even the government of Japan, Germany's most powerful and dependable ally, knew virtually nothing about the imminent German attack on the USSR, since it believed that German military preparations in the east "were only a maneuver aimed at camouflaging preparations for an invasion of the British Isles."³⁸ The main content of B. Whaley's book, however, is subordinated to the task of praising the actions of fascist Germany. The treachery and cunning of the Hitlerites in their attack on the USSR which, as the author puts it, "the Soviet system was unable to foresee," serve him as a recommendation for the future.

The tricks and devices of reactionary propaganda, however, cannot conceal the historical fact that the German-fascist invaders were halted only on Soviet soil; the Red Army alone was able to block the path of further spread of German-fascist aggression and to make a decisive contribution to the defeat of the fascist-militarist bloc.

The truth of history is incontrovertible. Precisely herein lies the reason for the profound crisis of bourgeois military-historical science and the inevitable unmasking of its falsifications. Some of them (the myth of the "preventive" attack by fascist Germany on the USSR) have remained the exclusive domain of neofascist historians; others (attempts to deny the decisive contribution of the USSR to the defeat of the fascist bloc) have virtually collapsed; still others (the claim of "irreproachable" performance by the United States and Britain of their duty as allies) are increasingly revealing their flimsiness.

Comparatively recently, for example, the minutes of a meeting of the U.S.-British Joint Staff on 20 August 1943 became known; future U.S. and British policy toward the USSR was discussed at this meeting. They discussed the question of whether "the Germans would not help" Anglo-U.S. troops enter German territory "in order to push back the Russians." At a time when the Soviet Union, engaged in mortal combat with the fascist Reich, was forging the links of victory of the anti-Hitler coalition, U.S. and British military leaders were discussing a question which essentially aimed at undermining joint efforts by the USSR, the United States and Britain in the struggle against the fascist bloc.

It is typical that at approximately the same time a document entitled "Political Considerations for the Contingency that Germany Will Be Unable to Hold out in This War" was recorded in Hitler's imperial chancellery. The recommendations were formulated as follows: "If Germany loses the war... it and the rest of Europe will be threatened by total American and Russian domination.... Therefore there would be only one policy objective in case of military defeat: the European nations should stand united under United States protectorate." Thus the Nazi leaders were planning, when threatened by imminent defeat, uniting on an anti-Soviet basis with the most reactionary U.S. circles and preserving fascism.

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These two documents, with accompanying evaluations, were first made available to the scholarly community in the seventh volume of "History of World War II."³⁹ They point with new emphasis to the enormous importance and effectiveness of those consistent measures which were undertaken throughout the entire war by the Soviet Government with the aim of strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition and neutralizing anti-Soviet trends in U.S. and British policy. This policy led to victory over the aggressors and confirmed the possibility of cooperation between countries with differing social systems.

Publication in the USSR of the multivolume "History of World War II" was greeted by bourgeois critics with obvious alarm. The profound scientific potential and extensive primary-source foundation of this study, which includes documents from virtually all the world's major archives, and the convincingness of the Marxist line of reasoning, which affirms the historical truth, evoked heightened interest abroad in each new volume as it came out.

This is why Western propaganda centers seek to weaken the impression produced by this work of Soviet historians. The U.S. United Press agency, for example, disseminated an article which expressed dissatisfaction with the study's critical analysis of the policy of the Western powers in the prewar years. The journal AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, in a review of the first three volumes of "History of World War II" by one (U. Shparr), virtually repeats the fantasies of Hitlerite propaganda, attempting to hang the responsibility for beginning World War II on the USSR and to whitewash the main culprit -- international imperialism.⁴⁰

Unmasking falsifiers of the history of the Great Patriotic War is an important component part of our struggle against bourgeois ideology. Soviet historians, together with historians from the brother socialist countries, are waging a resolute assault on the position of reactionary historiography, which is falsifying the events of the past war for the benefit of the aggressive intrigues of the monopolies. An irreversible process of affirmation of the historical truth, the international prestige and influence of Marxist-Leninist historical science is developing increasingly more vigorously.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course: Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1976, Vol 5, page 287.
2. "The United States Army in World War II," Government Printing Office, Washington, 1950 -- "Publications of the U.S. Army Center of Military History," Washington, 1978, pp 1-17; S. Morison, "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II," Boston, 1947-1962, Vols I-XV; W. Craven and J. Cate (Ed.), "The Army Air Forces in World War II," Chicago, 1948-1958, Vols I-VII; "History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II," Washington, 1963-1968, vols 1-5. The following have been published in the Soviet Union in Russian-language translations: F. Pog'yu, "Verkhovnoye komandovaniye" [Supreme High Command], Moscow, 1959; S. Morison, "Bitva za Atlantiku (sentyabr' 1939-May 1943) [Battle of the Atlantic (September 1939-May 1943)], Moscow, 1956; "Vazhneyshiye resheniya" [Critical Decisions], Moscow, 1958, as well as certain other books of the mentioned official series.

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3. "Encyclopedia Americana," New York, 1970, vols 1-30.
4. M. Matloff (Ed.) "American Military History," Washington, 1973.
5. "Official History of the Second World War," London: HMSO, 1948. A component part of this work -- four volumes of the series "The Grand Strategy" -- were published in the USSR. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1973, page 110.
- 5a. "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg" [The German Reich and World War II], Stuttgart, 1979, Vol 1.
6. "Daitoa senso kokan sen si," Tokyo, 1966-1976, vols 1-96.
7. A. Constantini, "L'Union Soviétique en guerre (1941-1945)," Paris, 1968-1969, vols I-III; C. Ryan, "The Last Battle," New York, 1966; E. Ziemke, "Stalingrad to Berlin: the German Defeat in the East," Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, 1968; H. Salisbury, "900 Days. Siege of Leningrad," New York, 1969; W. Craig, "Enemy at the Gates. Battle for Stalingrad," New York, 1973; M. Caidin, "Tigers Are Burning," New York, 1974; W. Kerr, "The Secret of Stalingrad," Garden City, 1978; A. Seaton, "The Russo-German War, 1941-1945," London, 1971; J. Strawson, "The Battle for Berlin," London, 1974; J. Erickson, "The Road to Stalingrad," London, 1975; E. Klink, "Das Gesetz des Handelns. Die Operation 'Zitadell', 1943" [The Law of Negotiation, Operation Citadel, 1943], Stuttgart, 1966; F. Forstmeier, "Odessa, 1941," Freiburg, 1967; K. Reinhardt, "Die Wende von Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/1942" [The Turning Point at Moscow. The Collapse of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941-1942], Stuttgart, 1972; M. Kerig, "Stalingrad," Stuttgart, 1974; J. Foester, "Stalingrad. Risse im Bündnis 1942/43," Freiburg, 1975. The U.S. Army Military Historical Service intends to publish an additional two volumes in the near future, dealing with the armed struggle of the Soviet-German front: "Road to Moscow: The Russian Campaign, 1941," and "From Moscow to Stalingrad, 1941-1942" (Geschichte und Militärgeschichte. Wege der Forschung" [History and Military History. Directions in Research], Frankfurt/Main, 1974, pp 134-135.
8. H. Baldwin, "Battles Lost and Won. Great Campaigns of World War II," New York, 1966. See also "Decisive Battles of the 20th Century. Land-Sea-Air," edited by N. Frankland and C. Dowling, London, 1976.
9. Some reactionary authors unabashedly declare that their "works" pursue such aims. U.S. historian R. Dupuy, for example, writes that he set for himself the task of depicting the war in his book "in such a manner that the reader not only gained a picture of its great scope but at the same time appreciated the decisive role of the United States in the victory of the free world over the forces of totalitarianism" (R. Dupuy, "World War II, A Compact History," New York, 1969, page VII). In China Maoist historians Wang Zhende and Hou Chende, in an article entitled "On the Initial Moment of World War II," published in 1978, attempt to prove that not the Soviet-German but the Chinese front was the principal front in the struggle against the aggressors and that not the Soviet Union but China "defended world civilization" (for more detail, see PRAVDA, 8 August 1978).
10. R. Beitzell, "The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943," New York, 1972, pp 65, 66.

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11. B. Liddel Gart, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna" [History of the Second World War], Moscow, 1976, page 412, translated from English.
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16. H. Baldwin, "The Crucial Years," New York, 1976, page 320.
17. H. Maule, "The Great Battles of World War II," London, 1975.
18. "Decisive Battles of the 20th Century. Land-Sea-Air," edited by N. Frankland and C. Dowling, London, 1976.
19. H. Michel, "La Seconde guerre mondiale" [World War II], Paris, 1968, Vol I, page 467.
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21. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Vol 75, No 7, 1970, page 190.
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23. Baldwin, "Battles Lost and Won...", op. cit., page 185.
24. Ziemke, op. cit., pp 80, 504.
25. A. Clark, "Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945," London, 1965, pp 63, 387.
26. E. Stettinius, "Roosevelt and the Russians," Garden City, 1948, page 7.
27. "The Encyclopedia Americana," New York, 1970, Vol 29, page 441.
28. KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1970, page 93.
29. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1971, pp 73-74; for detail on this subject, see N. Shekhovtsov, "Soviet Strategic Leadership and Fabrications of Falsifiers," VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1974, pp 45-52.
30. Cited in L. Yeremeyev, "Glazami druzey i vragov" [Through the Eyes of Friends and Enemies], Moscow, 1966, page 265.
31. Craig, op. cit., page 72.
32. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1961, Vol 2, page 75.

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33. IZVESTIYA, 3 June 1945.
34. B. Whaley, "Codeword Barbarossa," Cambridge, Mass, 1973.
35. Ibid., page 226.
36. Ibid., page 225.
37. Ibid., page 226.
38. Ibid., page 237.
39. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945," Moscow, 1976, Vol 7, pp 514-515.
40. THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, December 1976, page 1183.

CONCLUSION

The great feat accomplished by the Soviet people, who made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the most reactionary forces of world imperialism -- German fascism and Japanese militarism -- is inscribed forever in the history of mankind in gold letters. The heroic accomplishments of the Soviet people in 1941-1945 will always serve for the working people of the entire world as a model of courage, profound patriotism and proletarian internationalism, a strongly attractive example in the struggle for freedom, national independence, and social progress.

The world-historic victory over fascism exerted the most profound effect on the fate of all countries and peoples and opened up extensive opportunities for development of the world revolutionary process.

The emergence of socialism beyond the framework of a single country, the victory of popular democratic and socialist revolutions in a number of nations in Europe and Asia, the emergence of a world socialist system, collapse of the colonial system and gaining of national independence by the peoples of former colonies, broadening of the sociopolitical rights of working people in capitalist countries, growth of the international Communist and worker movement, and its transformation into the most influential force of the present day -- all this would have been impossible without the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan.

The results and consequences of the Great Patriotic War are continuing to exert influence on the contemporary international situation and societal processes.

In the more than three decades which have passed since the defeat of fascism, Soviet scholarly researchers have accomplished a great deal toward comprehensive analysis and genuinely scientific appraisal of the most important political, economic, military and diplomatic phenomena and events of the war years. Many valuable works have been written, extensive and diversified documentary materials have been made available to scholars, and important scientific-theoretical conclusions and syntheses have been made.

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In examining the various problems of the struggle against the German-fascist invaders, primary attention in Soviet historiography has been focused on demonstrating the role of the masses -- the genuine makers of history -- and the multifaceted organizing activities of the Leninist Communist Party. Recreating an objective, historically truthful picture of the origin, course and outcome of the past war, Soviet historians consistently rely on the military-theory legacy of V. I. Lenin and extensively utilize his teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.

In fundamental studies published in recent years, and particularly such major works as the six-volume "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945], a concise history of the Great Patriotic War, the first book of the fifth volume of "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], the 10th volume of "Istoriya SSSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney" [History of the USSR From Ancient Times to the Present Day], "Sovetskiy Soyuz v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. 1941-1945" [The Soviet Union in the Years of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945] and, finally, 10 volumes of the 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny. 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], the authors profoundly reveal the prehistory of the war and the titanic efforts of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in conditions of unleashed fascist aggression to mobilize all the nation's resources to defeat the enemy.

Many studies dealing with this period contain a detailed analysis of the armed struggle on the battle fronts and the most important military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces and combat actions of partisan and underground groups.

Much has also been accomplished by Soviet historians in analyzing the state and development of the Soviet home front. Considerable attention has been devoted to problems of party supervision and direction of reorganization of the economy of the USSR onto a war footing and establishment in this country of a smoothly running war economy, which ensured the economic victory of the Soviet Union over the fascist bloc.

At the same time, as is shown in the materials in this volume, many topics connected with the events of the Great Patriotic War have not yet been adequately treated. The present state of historiography and investigation of primary sources makes it possible to proceed with producing major synthesizing studies on all important problems of history of the past war. The resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress direct social scientists toward preparing solid studies which would be the result of further broadening and deepening of study and investigation of the laws, patterns and mechanisms of societal development, scientific synthesis of the world-historic experience of the CPSU, and other cardinal problems. Publication of "Malaya Zemlya," written by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, constituted an important event in contemporary Soviet sociopolitical affairs. It revealed the principles of leadership and direction by the Communist Party during the period of the battle against fascism, the nature and sources of the heroism of Soviet citizens, modes and methods of party-political work at the front. The book is not only of great political and scientific-historical but also of indoctrinational significance, since it vividly reflects the moral and ideological foundations of the new men. "Turning to the history of the Great Patriotic War," emphasized L. I. Brezhnev, "will teach the younger generation of Soviet citizens to be worthy of their fathers, to stride persistently along the road of building communism, which our people defended at a truly incalculable cost."1

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Essential conditions for successful accomplishment of the important tasks assigned by the party to historians is their close bond with the life and affairs of all Soviet society, creation of a productive and innovative atmosphere on every scientific work force, high-principledness and party-mindedness, and a consistent campaign for excellent quality in every publication and for increasing the effectiveness of scholarly research.

FOOTNOTE

1. KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1977, page 83.

APPENDIX: Topics Recommended by the All-Union Scientific Conference "Historiography of the Great Patriotic War" for Scholarly Research

- I. On the Problem "The CPSU -- Inspirational Force Behind and Organizer of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War"
 1. Communist Party ideological work in the period of the Great Patriotic War.
 2. Communist Party activities to strengthen the friendship and international unity of the peoples of the USSR in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
 3. Party guidance and direction of government and public organizations in 1941-1945.
 4. The party's role in securing the decisive victories of the Soviet Armed Forces.
 5. The Communist Party -- organizer and leader of the popular struggle behind enemy lines.
 6. The party underground in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
 7. The Communist Party -- organizer and director of the war economy of the USSR.
 8. The leadership role of the Communist Party in relocating the productive resources of the USSR in 1941-1942.
 9. Communist Party activities pertaining to directing Soviet industry in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
 10. Party economic-management policy in the village during the war.
 11. CPSU activities in the area of ensuring uninterrupted functioning of transportation in 1941-1945.
 12. The Communist Party -- organizer of rebuilding the economy and culture in those areas of the USSR liberated from fascist occupation.
 13. The CPSU -- directing socialist competition of workers on the Soviet home front.
 14. Soviet culture -- powerful party weapon in the struggle against fascism.
 15. CPSU foreign policy activity in 1941-1945.
 16. Party organizational development in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
 17. CPSU historiography in the period of the Great Patriotic War.
- II. On the Problem "Armed Struggle of the Soviet People Against the German-Fascist Invaders During the Years of the Great Patriotic War"
 1. The decisive role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the victory over fascism in World War II.
 2. Development of Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
 3. Organization of strategic direction of the Soviet Armed Forces in the war years.

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4. Activities of Headquarters, Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
5. Soviet border guards in the Great Patriotic War.
6. The Battle of Smolensk.
7. Radical turning point on the Soviet-German front.
8. The Belorussian Operation.
9. The East Prussian Operation.
10. Liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Donbass by the Soviet Armed Forces.
11. The liberation of Poland in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
12. The liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945.
13. The liberation of Hungary in 1945.
14. The liberation of Austria in 1945.
15. The struggle of Soviet partisans and members of the underground in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
16. The struggle of the Soviet people against the German-fascist invaders on temporarily occupied Soviet territory.
17. Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of World War II.
18. Critique of bourgeois falsification of history of the Great Patriotic War.
19. Soviet citizens in the antifascist Resistance Movement during the years of the Great Patriotic War.
20. Historiography of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against the German-fascist invaders in 1941-1945.

III. On the Problem "The Soviet Home Front in the Great Patriotic War"

1. Party and government direction of the USSR economy in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
2. Activities of the State Defense Committee and other emergency bodies in 1941-1945 in the area of directing the Soviet war economy.
3. The USSR Council of People's Commissars in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
4. Reorganization of the USSR economy onto a war footing and transformation of the Soviet nation into a unified military camp.
5. The Soviet home front in the year of the radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War.
6. The Soviet home front in the concluding period of the Great Patriotic War (1944-1945).
7. The alliance of the worker class and kolkhoz peasantry during the war years.
8. Strengthening of the friendship and international unity of workers on the home front in 1941-1945.
9. Relocating the productive resources of the USSR in 1941-1942.
10. Construction in the USSR during the years of the Great Patriotic War.
11. Rebuilding the economy and culture of the liberated areas in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
12. Rebuilding Soviet cities which had suffered from German-fascist occupation.
13. The eastern regions of the USSR -- powerful arsenal for the war front.
14. Activities of local soviets on the home front.
15. Activities of Soviet trade unions on the home front.
16. National-governmental organizational development in the USSR in wartime conditions (1941-1945).
17. Mobilization of the country's labor resources in 1941-1945.
18. Financing the USSR economy and sociocultural measures in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

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19. USSR trade in 1941-1945.
20. Work of health care agencies on the Soviet home front.
21. Labor exploit of Soviet women in the Great Patriotic War.
22. Labor exploit of youth in the Great Patriotic War.
23. Socialist competition in 1941-1945.
24. USSR industry in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
25. USSR transportation in the war years (1941-1945).
26. Motor and air transport in the Great Patriotic War.
27. USSR agriculture in 1941-1945.
28. Exploit of communications workers on the home front.
29. Soviet culture in the Great Patriotic War.
30. Activities of cultural-educational establishments on the home front.
31. USSR science and technology in 1941-1945.
32. Activities of scientific and technical societies in conditions of wartime.
33. The home guard in the Great Patriotic War.
34. Daily life of the workers on the Soviet home front in conditions of wartime (1941-1945).
35. Universal military training of the civilian population (Vsevobuch) in the period of the Great Patriotic War.
36. Activities of Osoaviakhim and the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1941-1945.
37. Activities of antifascist committees of Soviet women, Soviet youth, Soviet scientists, and the All-Slavic Committee in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
38. Historiography of the Soviet home front in the period of the Great Patriotic War.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

BOOK DESCRIBES MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION SCIENCE

Moscow OSNOVY VOYENNOY PSIKHOLOGII I PEDAGOGIKI in Russian 1981 (signed to press 10 Mar 81) pp 362-367, 3-6

[Table of contents, Annotation and Introduction of book edited by Doctor of Pedagogic Sciences Prof Maj Gen A. V. Barabanshchikov and Doctor of Psychological Sciences Prof Col N. F. Fedenko]

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Brief Description:

This textbook presents the main points of Soviet military psychology and education science in conformity with the curriculum at higher command and engineering schools. Advice and recommendations on teaching and training enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers are presented on the basis of practical experience in combat and political training of Soviet Armed Forces personnel. This textbook is intended for personnel enrolled at higher command and engineering schools. It can be recommended to officers of military units and naval ships, as well as to persons enrolled at party schools.

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Armed Forces are called upon reliably to defend the socialist homeland and to maintain a continuous state of combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

An important feature of the contemporary development of the USSR Armed Forces is a continuous improvement in their technical equipment. V. I. Lenin considered this to be one of the main indicators of the defense capability of the state. "The very finest army and persons most dedicated to the cause of the revolution," he stated, "will be immediately annihilated by the enemy if they are inadequately armed, provisioned, and trained."¹ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union rigorously follows these Lenin precepts.

Attaching great importance to technical equipment of the USSR Armed Forces, the CPSU at the same time has always believed and continues to believe that weapons can be a powerful means of national defense only if army and navy personnel are deeply aware of their great responsibility to the homeland and possess a consummate mastery of their weapons. "A solid fusion of a high degree of technical equipment, military expertise and indomitable morale -- this is the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces,"² stressed L. I. Brezhnev in the CPSU Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress. For this reason the party devotes unrelenting attention to training and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel and increasing the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces.

Demands on the content, quality and effectiveness of work in the area of Communist indoctrination of Soviet servicemen have increased in present-day conditions. CPSU

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decisions have stressed time and again that the heart of ideological and political indoctrination work has been and remains formation in Soviet citizens of a scientific philosophical outlook, total dedication to the cause of the party and Communist ideals, a love of the socialist homeland, and proletarian internationalism. Also of great importance in indoctrination of personnel is development of a vigorous political attitude, total dedication to the military duty, a high degree of discipline, political vigilance, hatred toward imperialism, readiness and willingness to come to the defense of the homeland at all times.

In order to accomplish these important tasks of Communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens, army and navy personnel, the CPSU Central Committee considers it essential continuously to raise the scientific level of ideological and political indoctrination work, further to strengthen its bond with practical realities, and to develop the aggressive character of the indoctrination process.

Officer cadres play the principal role in development of the Soviet serviceman and in ensuring the continuous combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces. Officer cadres train and indoctrinate army and navy personnel and direct the daily activities of their subordinates.

Troop training and indoctrination are organized and conducted on a scientific basis. V. I. Lenin emphasized that a modern army cannot be built without science.³ These words ring particularly true today. "Soviet military science," notes USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "reliably serves, as it always has, the cause of practical accomplishment of the tasks facing the Armed Forces."⁴

Military psychology and military education science play an important role in training and indoctrination of personnel.

Military psychology studies the laws and patterns of development and manifestation of the psychological features of the individual serviceman and military collectives in conditions of peacetime and wartime. Military education science investigates the essence, content, laws and patterns of training and indoctrination of servicemen and military collectives. It substantiates the principles, forms, methods and means of training and indoctrination of servicemen and military collectives. Working in close coordination, military psychology and military education science elaborate the conditions and ways of effectively influencing the consciousness and behavior of military personnel for the purpose of forming excellent moral-political and fighting qualities in these personnel.

Military psychology and education science incorporate advances made in many sciences dealing with man, the collective, their labor and combat activities.

Military psychology and pedagogy as sciences are closely linked with the theory and practice of party-political work. At the same time party-political work in the military produces fine, positive results if it is performed taking into account the laws and patterns revealed by military psychology and education science. Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, notes that "successes in combat, moral-political and psychological training of personnel are due to a significant degree to the fact that their activities are

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grounded on scientific theory and practice of party-political work and take into account the points and conclusions of Soviet military psychology and education science."⁵

Profound mastery of military psychology and education science is a serious matter. In order successfully to train and indoctrinate his subordinates, it is not enough for an officer to possess a certain sum total of knowledge which he acquires at military educational institutions and in independent study of the literature. As is indicated by practical experience, he must develop in himself a psychological-pedagogic mode of thinking -- the ability to think in terms of psychology and education science in accomplishing training and indoctrination tasks and in daily supervision of his men, just as he thinks, for example, in the terms and concepts of tactics in solving tactical problems.

This textbook will assist future officers in this. It contains a systematized presentation of military psychology and military education science in conformity with the curriculum for higher military schools and reveals the fundamental psychological-pedagogic laws and patterns forming the foundation of successful service and combat activity of military personnel, the essence, forms and methods of training, indoctrination and moral-psychological preparation of personnel, cohesion of military collectives, strengthening of discipline and combat readiness of units and subunits.

Knowledge of military psychology and education science is transformed into firm concepts and ideas, into a psychological-pedagogic mode of thinking only when the student systematically assimilates the curricular material and thoroughly understands theoretical content and practical significance. This is promoted by the student thoroughly thinking through each and every lecture, independent study of the recommended literature, as well as regular, well-prepared presentations at seminar classes.

The habit of reading on a regular basis newly-appearing works on military psychology and education science, active participation in a military psychology and education science study group, and systematic reading of war memoir literature, which contains a wealth of experience in training, indoctrination and guidance of the activities of personnel during the years of the Great Patriotic War -- all this helps gain a better understanding of the service performance, combat activities and daily life of personnel, as well as training and indoctrination tasks assigned to Soviet Army and Navy officers, and helps understand the essence of a psychological-pedagogic approach to accomplishing them. Very helpful in mastering military psychology and education science is viewing and discussion, from the standpoint of psychological-pedagogic science, of training and feature films dealing with the life and activities of Soviet servicemen.

A decisive role in mastering curricular material on military psychology and education science is played by practical application of knowledge obtained on these subjects and work with personnel during a tour of duty in line units, in daily training and service activities.

Vigorous and systematic independent work by cadets and young officers in order to master military psychology and education science will produce the desired results --

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military-psychological and pedagogic knowledge will be transformed into their personal views, into a system of psychological-pedagogic thinking. And this is the foundation of effective, genuinely innovative work in the area of training and indoctrinating subordinates and guiding their activities.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 35, page 408.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchetnyy doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVI s'yezdu Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza i ocherednyye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki" [Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1981, page 89.
3. See Lenin, op. cit., Vol 40, page 183.
4. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1979, page 321.
5. A. A. Yepishev, "Ideologicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Ideological Work in the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, 1979, page 139.

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