

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10350

24 February 1982

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 763



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10350

24 February 1982

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 763

CONTENTS

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Some SADCC Members Fail To Honor Finance Pledges  
(Roger Murray; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) ..... 1

Toward Indian Ocean Common Market  
(Jonathan M'Haruia; AFRIQUE-ASIE; 18-31 Jan 82) ..... 2

ANGOLA

Coffee Shortfall Noted in Both Private, State Sectors  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Dec 81) ..... 6

BURUNDI

Briefs  
Finance Agreements With France ..... 7

CAPE VERDE

Pereira Expresses Hope on Relations With Bissau  
(Aristides Pereira Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18-31 Jan 82) .... 8

Church, Private Interests Seen Affected by Land Reform  
(Colm Foy; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) ..... 11

CHAD

Libyans Said To Be Unfavorable to Chadian Reconciliation  
(POURQUOI PAS?, 21 Jan 82) ..... 13

OAU Force Said To Be Playing Game of Imperialist Interests  
(Antonia Blis; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18-31 Jan 82) ..... 15

Briefs  
Habre Advance Disturbs Mitterrand ..... 18

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO	
Effects of Petroleum Output on Political, Economic Situation (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Dec 81) .....	19
GUINEA-BISSAU	
Cape Verde Dialogue Needed To Improve Country's Image (Editorial; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Jan 82) .....	23
Briefs	
Responsibility for Racist Remarks	26
Opposition to Naguicave Settlement	26
IVORY COAST	
Echoes of Impatience With Economy, Politics Heard (Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Dec 81) .....	27
Steady Improvement of Economy Reported (William A. Stoever, Dennis J. Conlon; Jan 82) .....	31
Various Aspects of Petroleum Problem Examined (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Dec 81) .....	33
LESOTHO	
Details on Assassination Squad Given (Jasper Mortimer; THE STAR, 22 Jan 82) .....	40
MALAWI	
Briefs	
Foreign Exchange Reserves	44
MALI	
Food Production, Other Economic Problems Discussed (Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Dec 81) .....	45
Briefs	
Algerian Aid for Oil	54
Soviet Cooperation on Gold	54
MOZAMBIQUE	
South Africa Seen Supporting NRM Destabilization Campaign (David Ward, Martin Plaut; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) .....	55
Foreign Trade Regulations, Organization Reviewed (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Dec 81) .....	57

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGERIA

Briefs

Increase in Inflation	59
Ships Under Nigerian Flag	59
Japanese Loan for Irrigation	59

RWANDA

Briefs

1982 Budget	60
Tea Factories From Belgium	60

SENEGAL

Briefs

Humored National Union	61
------------------------	----

SOUTH AFRICA

Death of Prominent Black Civil Rights Leader Examined (NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) .....	62
--	----

ANC's Seventieth Anniversary Marked (Abdou Berrada; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) .....	64
---	----

UPPER VOLTA

Economic Emphasis Said Misdirected (Guy Arnold; NEW AFRICAN, Jan 82) .....	67
---	----

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SOME SADCC MEMBERS FAIL TO HONOR FINANCE PLEDGES

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 pp 29-30

[Article by Roger Murray: "SADCC Plans are Hit: Cash Short is Blamed"]

[Text] THE NINE countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) met in Blantyre late last year to review progress in funding vital transport and communications projects. These play a crucial role in the SADCC's overall objective of reducing economic dependence on South Africa.

Despite pledges of about \$650-million made at the Maputo conference in 1980, only \$180-million has so far been actually raised to meet the estimated cost of \$1,920-million required to implement 99 regionally-integrated and country projects.

Since the historic summit meeting which took place in Lusaka in April 1980 at which the SADCC was established, the nine participating countries - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe - have made steady progress in implementing concerted action to secure regional co-operation within their strategy of economic liberation.

The transport and communications sector has been given the highest priority since a fundamental re-orientation of the historic traffic patterns which tie most of the SADCC states to routes through South Africa, is seen as the most crucial area to the overall aim of reducing existing economic dependency.

### SA blamed

This concern was reflected in the strong condemnation of South Africa for allegedly pursuing "a policy of destabilisation directed against SADCC member

states" made in a statement issued by the SADCC Council of Ministers at Blantyre.

The statement blamed South Africa for the destruction of bridges near Beira and of navigational aids in Beira port. The statement said the timing of the latter attack appeared to be "deliberately related" to the meeting. These attacks, the statement asserted, could only be seen as a "direct response to the growing success of regional transport rehabilitation".

The SADCC statement set a precedent. This was the first time that Malawi has been associated with such a strong condemnation of South Africa's policies towards the region. Previously, Malawi had maintained close trade and general economic ties with South Africa, and had adopted a rather lukewarm approach to the SADCC.

Indeed, President Banda was not present in person to open the meeting. At every other SADCC meeting the proceedings have been formally opened by the President of the host country.

The statement was unusual in that the SADCC has not previously made public statements on overtly political issues. As the ministers themselves said in the statement, they were primarily concerned with "development co-ordination". Yet it was felt impossible "to pass over in silence South Africa's aggressive actions."

### Transport

The main item on the agenda was to review progress in financing the projects

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

drawn up by the Maputo-based Southern African Transport and Communications Commission. Though the cost of the projects presented to international and bilateral financing agencies at the Maputo conference has been scaled down from the original estimate of about \$1950-million to \$1920-million actual aid disbursements so far available are sufficient to meet only the cost of a small number of the projects.

Only about \$180-million has been firmly committed, leaving a total of \$1,740-million still to be financed in order to complete the programme.

Of the total of 97 projects originally presented at the Maputo conference, some have been completed, and finance has been secured for a few of the other projects. A small number of additional projects have been added to the original list, leaving 99 projects still needing total or part financing.

Most of the projects for which sufficient funding has already been raised, were not in a real sense new projects, and formed part of existing bilateral aid commitments.

For example, the Maseru international airport in Lesotho, accorded low overall priority by SADCC, already has \$46-million committed out of total costs of \$60-million. Most of the finance has been raised from Arab donor agencies, and the amount provided represents a quarter of the total funds actually committed to the SADCC programme by mainly Western and Arab donors.

In contrast, the ambitious rehabilitation project of Mozambique's ports, and the four-country railway system connecting them to other SADCC states, has received almost no funding.

According to the document prepared for the Blantyre meeting by the Transport and Communications Commission, the total project cost is now estimated at

\$916-million, an increase over the \$792-million cost originally estimated for the Maputo conference.

### Telecommunications

In addition seven related railway projects, including the "urgent rehabilitation" of the Mozambique-Swaziland railway, estimated at \$84-million, all require financing. Out of seven road projects associated with Maputo port, and costing an estimated \$200-million, the only financing secured is \$17-million for road projects in Lesotho. The situation is similar for the other two port rehabilitation projects, at Beira and Nacala.

Among the other major projects for which financing is still required, is the Lobito port transport system, involving rehabilitation of the port and the Benguela railway at an estimated cost of \$75-million, and the Dar-es Salaam port transport system, involving seven projects at a total cost of \$95-million.

Telecommunications projects have fared better. Two have been completed since the Maputo conference, and most have been surveyed for equipment requirements. To complete the planned network, three new projects have been added, including 12 microwave link projects, and six earth satellite communications projects, at an estimated cost of \$134-million.

If much of the programme cannot be implemented due to a failure to raise funds, the efforts to reduce dependency on South Africa will suffer a major setback.

One concrete development in Blantyre was the formal go-ahead for the establishment of a permanent SADCC secretariat at Gaborone in Botswana, with a staff of eight. A Zimbabwean is to be appointed as director.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4700/705

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN COMMON MARKET

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18-31 Jan 82 pp 58-59

[Article by Jonathan M'Haruia: "A Common Market for the Indian Ocean"]

[Text] While the regime of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam has deliberately tied the island of Mauritius to the racist regime in Pretoria through a loan agreement whose provisions are particularly repugnant (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 254, 7-20 December 1981), the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), although still part of the opposition, is already taking concrete steps to promote commercial cooperation and the regional economy, which the party has always recommended and which the situation in the Indian Ocean cannot fail to help, even if certain political obstacles remain.

Everything began, in fact, when the Mauritian Marketing Office, noting a record production of potatoes -- about 14,000 tons, when Mauritian consumption is about 11,000 tons a year -- planned to export the surplus, mainly to the Seychelles. Aware of the poor relations between Mahe and Port-Louis, owing to Ramgoolam's friendship with James Mancham,<sup>1</sup> and especially their common views -- the Mauritian regime has never digested the coming to power of the socialists in Mahe and regularly insults, both publicly and in private, the government of Albert Rene, which further poisons the few ties that exist -- the officials of the Marketing Office contacted Paul Berenger at the beginning of November so that he might enter into negotiations with him -- his relations with President Rene are very cordial -- concerning the sale of surplus potatoes.

The MMM, which has always supported further economic and commercial ties between Indian Ocean countries and which believes that this is the solution to their development and economic independence from Western metropolises and especially Pretoria, send a delegation to Mahe on 9 November, a delegation made up of Paul Berenger and Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo, party economic adviser, to undertake discussions along these lines.

The Berenger mission, which stayed on the island from 9 to 15 November, had no difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Seychelles authorities for the export

<sup>1</sup> The former Seychelles president, put in office by the English upon independence in 1976 and involved in the recent abortive coup d'etat against the regime of Albert Rene.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

to that country of 1,000 tons of potatoes and 600 tons of onions, beginning in 1982. It also noted the existence of vast prospects for commercial trade between the two countries, hindered by a basic obstacle: the lack of any regular ocean shipping line between the Seychelles and Mauritian ports.

Aware of the need to strengthen bonds between the coastal nations, President Albert Rene spontaneously decided to provide a link between Mahe and Port-Louis by the government-owned "5 Juin" boat, which would supply the distant Seychelles islands. Furthermore, in order to encourage the development of regional trade, he decided to give priority to Mauritian products that could be exported to the Seychelles, especially since these products would replace those still imported from South Africa by private merchants.

With the problem of the shipping line resolved and in keeping with the policy still preached by the MMM regarding regional cooperation, certain party leaders -- in particular, Paul Berenger, Kader Bhayat and Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo -- founded a company as soon as they returned from the Seychelles: INTRACORP (Intra Regional Trading Corporation), in accordance with the provisions of current law on companies and in the absence of a better legal structure. It will act as the local representative of the company owning the "5 Juin," the vessel which, beginning in January, will provide the Mahe-Port Louis connection once every two months in the beginning and once a month later. INTRACORP will also specialize in regional import-export.

The company, whose establishment renders South-South cooperation a concrete fact, is basically for the purpose of promoting commercial trade and setting up certain industrial projects bring the countries in the southwest Indian Ocean together, mainly the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Comoro Islands and Reunion. It will effectively engage in commercial activities that will eventually enable countries in the region to get away from an excessive and dangerous dependency on Western countries for products that they can supply, to tighten their bonds, bring down certain prices on their respective markets, free themselves from the growing influence of South Africa, especially in the case of Mauritius, and improve their economic and commercial situation.

Regarding exports to the Seychelles, in addition to potatoes and onions, products that could be exported immediately include edible oils, margarine, soap, frozen chicken and livestock feed. Regarding Mauritian imports of Seychelles products, salted fish and coconut, to mention but these two, have already been chosen. As for the establishment of industrial enterprises, technical aid may be given to the Seychelles, particularly for the setting up of a color television network on the island at the beginning of 1983.

Trade between Indian Ocean countries is so paltry that it is a field in which everything remains to be done, opposition circles in Mauritius state, and INTRACORP will not be confined to the Seychelles, but will also extend to Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Reunion and the Comoro Islands.

The establishment of this company by MMM leaders met with diversified comments and reception, both within the Mauritian left and government circles. To the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

criticisms of members, party leaders, greatly concerned by the project, answer that the prime objective is basically political, insofar as the MMM has always preached maximum economic and regional cooperation.

It is also stated that the company's purpose is not profit. It is to enable MMM leaders to better master the details of the import-export business, chartering, and so on. This explains the presence at the head of the company of Paul Berenger, future minister of economy, finance and labor if there is an election victory, and of Kader Bhayat, who would then be minister of commerce in an MMM-PSM [Malagasy Socialist Party] government.

Lack of Arguments

Furthermore, in this new context, the company just founded by the MMM leaders would be absorbed by the state Commerce Corporation, which will be set up as provided by the government's joint program, and would become a specialized department in regional cooperation.

It must be noted that the National Commerce Corporation just launched by the Ramgoolam regime is not in keeping with the provisions governing a state corporations and that its powers are limited to the importation of rice and flour, which the MMM deems to be absolutely inadequate.

Lacking arguments and knowing full well that the startup of the cooperation project will bring about a drop in prices for certain basic commodities now imported, the men in the regime accuse the MMM of hatching "sinister schemes," such as the financing of its election campaign by the Seychelles or even the importation of weapons! Whatever the case, it is planned that even before the coming general elections, the concrete results that might be registered in regional trade will themselves contradict these accusations.

With, on the one hand, the talks that began in April 1981 between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Reunion and Mauritius and, on the other hand, the excessively timid gestures to Madagascar and the Comoro Islands -- because of the lack of political determination on the part of the Mauritian regime -- the proposed regional cooperation launched by the main opposition party in Mauritius seems to indicate that the process of building an Indian Ocean Common Market is on the way. However, political and economic observers in Port-Louis do not hesitate to point out that the political obstacle to this process resides in the very existence of the regime of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who prefers to be the yes man of Pretoria rather than to serve the interests of the peoples in the region.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie

11,464  
CSO: 4719/521

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANGOLA

COFFEE SHORTFALL NOTED IN BOTH PRIVATE, STATE SECTORS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1882 11 Dec 81 p 3324

[Text] Angola's coffee production in 1981 amounts to no more than one-tenth of the tonnage produced the year before the country's independence. In 1974, in fact, according to the Statistical Yearbook of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), production was 225,000 tons. In 1980, the best year since independence, production was only 36,576 tons. This year, according to a recent issue of JORNAL DE ANGOLA, it fell to only 21,501 tons.

The "coffee plan" developed by the Luanda authorities for the 1981 season met only 64 percent of its target; it had called for a ceuillette [translation unknown] of marketed coffee. Both the state and the private sector failed to meet their targets.

It had in fact been envisioned that the state sector would produce 20,677 tons of marketable coffee, but it obtained only 12,020 tons, including 3,928 tons from the province of South Cuanza, 3,667 tons from Uige, 3,118 tons from North Cuanza, and 1,307 tons from the combined provinces of Bengo, Cabinda, and Malanje. As for the private sector (including the cooperatives), the plan called for it to produce 12,689 tons, but it produced only 9,481.

A report from the technical department on Encafe's coffee production emphasizes, in this connection, that the partial failure of the plans for the sixth national coffee season--which began 1 June and has been over since September--was the result of lack of motivation on the part of the personnel responsible for the ceuillette [expansion unknown] because of poor material and social conditions. The Luanda daily did not fail to observe in passing that this deplorable situation recurs year after year.

"It is time," adds JORNAL DE ANGOLA, "to do everything possible to avoid a repetition of the same problem next year. We cannot get along forever on improvisation--at least, if we are serious about our production plans. Once again, the coffee harvest suffered from the inadequacy of transport, in addition to unfavorable weather conditions."

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

9516  
CSO: 4719/358

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BURUNDI

BRIEFS

FINANCE AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE--The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burundi, Lt Col Edouard Nzambiamana, signed three conventions for financing involving aid from the French FAC (Fund for Aid and Cooperation) to Burundi on 11 December at Bujumbura. These agreements bear on the following subjects: (1) 2.5 million French francs for detailed prospecting using geophysical and geochemical means in the northern zone of Kirundo and in the southern zone of Gitega-Ruyigi. France has contributed to the financing of a detailed study of mineral deposits in the northeast of Burundi. (2) 3.5 million French francs for commercial reforestation. This sum will make it possible to continue a reforestation program covering 7000 hectares which was begun in 1979. (3) 3 million French francs to protect the Kibira forest. This sum should make it possible to reforest 180 hectares and open up 50 kilometers of additional trails. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 39] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9855

CSO: 4719/464

7  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAPE VERDE

PEREIRA EXPRESSES HOPE ON RELATIONS WITH BISSAU

PM080901 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18-31 Jan 82 pp 6-9

[Interview with Cape Verde President Aristides Pereira by Simon Malley: "We Are Prepared To Establish Interstate Relations With Bissau on New Bases"--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Cape Verde President Aristides Pereira was calm, but bitterness, disappointment and a kind of pain could be detected in his words. The coup in Bissau 14 November 1980 shook and shocked him deeply.

Indeed the reason why Aristides Pereira is still deeply affected by the military coup is that he is extremely worried about its repercussions on the very future of a nation, an ideal and a dream to which he has been so closely bound for several decades....

Is there not a danger that the crisis between the two capitals will grow worse? Is a confrontation possible or inevitable? What interpretation should be given to statements apparently made by the chairman of Guinea-Bissau's revolution council, saying that he would seize Cape Verdian merchant ships by force? The Cape Verdian head of state prefers not to overdramatize those statements, as some sections of the Portuguese press have done:

"You see," he replied with a faint smile, "we have read such statements in the Portuguese press. We find them surprising and hope that they are merely a misinterpretation of various statements. We think it is inconceivable for a head of state to talk in that way...!"

"The main point is that if the Bissau leaders showed sangfroid and realism they would realize that our decision [to dissolve joint Guinea-Bissau-Cape Verde Shipping Company] is not hostile. They should tackle this problem, which affects a vital aspect of our economy and trade, with the necessary lucidity. When the majority of partners no longer wants a company, how can anybody legally oppose it? What about international law?"

However, Aristides Pereira refuses to spurn the future. Neither the bitterness nor the frustration he feels prevents him from hoping. And when we asked him whether the release of Luiz Cabral [former president of Guinea-Bissau's Council of State and deputy secretary of the PAIGC] is not an encouraging sign dawning on the horizon of relations between the two states, his answer revealed that glimmer of hope which he does not want to abandon:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Of course," he said, "Luiz Cabral's release is a good thing. It is a positive factor for Guinea-Bissau. It reveals some commonsense on the part of the Guinean leaders, and even a sense of responsibility, while demonstrating the correctness of the position we had defended from the start. Of course, when President Luiz Cabral was arrested, along with a number of his comrades, we were still members of the same party and my responsibility as PAIGC secretary general made it my duty to express my opinion and condemn the coup d'etat and the arrest of the leaders."

[Question] What about the other political prisoners?

Aristides Pereira: Although we are no longer bound to the same party and hence do not want to interfere in Bissau's internal affairs, we can nonetheless say that, since the country's main leader has been released, we see no reason for leaving the others in prison.... It is up to the Bissau leaders to shoulder their responsibilities.

We asked a final question on the crisis between the two countries. What about the slander campaign or racist feeling being developed in Guinea-Bissau whose main target is so-called "Cape Verdian colonialism"--a quarrel based on prejudices inherited from savage colonialism?

"We regret the fact," the Cape Verdian head of state replied, "that the Bissau leaders have not learned from the colonial past. Remember the history of the national liberation war and how racism and tribalism were used for centuries by the colonial system and particularly by the penultimate governor, Antonio Spinola. That also applies to the occupation and domination of Guinea-Bissau by colonialism. I say that the Bissau leaders should return to the lessons of the past, of our common history. The language used before, during and after their congress in Bissau was the language of racism. It would be a terrible thing to unleash that process. It would be terrible and dangerous because, once started, it is likely to become uncontrollable and get out of the leaders' hands. Unfortunately that is already being seen in Bissau. And that worries us a great deal because there are Cape Verdian citizens living in Guinea and we sometimes feel concern for their safety.

"Moreover, it must be remembered that racism can be whipped up by special socioeconomic conditions. Unless it is stopped, and quickly, we are likely to see a campaign whose results, we are sure, will do great damage to Guinea-Bissau itself."

Aristides Pereira thought for a moment:

"I do not want to close this subject on a pessimistic note. Allow me to tell you that, although the events of 14 November were, I am sure, felt by both our peoples as a very severe blow, it must be admitted that we should be realistic. The coup destroyed the plan for unity to which we aspired so much. We must, therefore, act accordingly. The achievements in the efforts to unite the two

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Cape Verdian and Guinea-Bissau peoples were not in vain and should not be wasted. It is vital that the Bissau officials be realistic and aware of that fact too. They must realize that, although everything was destroyed by the 14 November events, we must start again by other means. However, if we are to start again we must first normalize relations between the two states. The achievements by our two peoples form a capital which is still real and which can be set in motion at any time provided a responsible spirit is adopted. That is what I wanted to say, and it reflects the deep convictions of our people and their leaders..."

The interview continued and dealt with many other subjects: Cape Verde's role in normalizing relations between Dakar and Luanda, the situation in southern Africa and in Chad, relations with France, the domestic situation.... We will continue its publication in our issue.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie

CSO: 4719/544

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CAPE VERDE

CHURCH, PRIVATE INTERESTS SEEN AFFECTED BY LAND REFORM

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 172, Jan 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Colm Foy]

[E~cerpts] 1982 MAY WELL be a make or break year for Cape Verde's agriculture. If the past years of these remarkable people and their equally remarkable political leaders are anything to go by, then, despite the enormous difficulties, Cape Verde may still have a chance of survival.

First and foremost among the social and economic problems is the land question. In a country such as this, there is no room for sentimentality over land use. To survive, the country must grow as much as is humanly possible to cut down on imported food supplies and allow precious foreign currency to be used elsewhere.

The climate is so dry that for several years in succession recently, all the islands' food crops - including the staples, maize and beans - failed. Even the most fertile land was unable to bear crops. At the same time much of the best land was not worked by the local people because the owners were absent from the islands.

The problem is compounded due to the complex land relations which exist in the country. Cape Verde is one of the few places in Africa where absentee landlords own vast stretches of farming land which are either worked by contract labour or, simply kept as an investment. It is also unusual in that one of the biggest landlords is the Catholic Church which reportedly owns 50 per cent of all the available land. Other large holdings belong to Portuguese companies and individual investors.

The government has now introduced a long-awaited land reform paper to deal

with the problem but the document is such a long and complex piece of legislation that it has caused a great deal of confusion. Last October, one man was killed and another injured when jittery soldiers fired into a crowd demonstrating against the proposed reform or against what they took it to mean. Abroad, emigre Cape Verdians have also been protesting in the belief that their land will be taken away from them.

Everyone agrees that the large landowners and the Church must be persuaded to hand the property back to the people. This applies especially to those landlords whose soil has lain fallow ever since independence. The problem arises when the law has to take into account all the Cape Verdians who still own land in the islands but whose permanent place of residence may now be far from the country. These people, still see their sojourn as temporary. They fully intend to return to their homes one day and so do not want to find that they suddenly have no homes to go to and no land to pass on to their sons. Such emigres are also a very important source of revenue for the country in that they still send remittances in foreign exchange to the families they left behind.

On the other hand, the government cannot allow the continuing inequitable system of land tenure to endure simply on the basis of sentimentality and, besides, it's not the small emigre peasants that the reform is aimed at.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### **'Be discreet' call**

Nonetheless, fear of the unknown and worries over the future, plus not a little chicanery on the part of the larger landlords, have led to a distinct tension in the islands over the proposed reform.

In response to the situation, the government and the party have embarked on a huge process of public information including radio broadcasts and individual teach-ins in the rural areas. After the shooting incident, the police and army have been told to be more discreet and understanding and the population has been assured that the reform will only work if it meets with their approval.

In response to this gesture and to the continuing troubles with Guinea-Bissau, the population of Praia - the capital - turned out last November in an impressive demonstration of support for the Agricultural Reform, the party and the country's President - the veteran guerrilla leader Aristides Pereira. The assembly in Praia heard speeches condemning the split in the PAIGC caused by the coup in Guinea-Bissau and asking for support for the agricultural reform as an expression of solidarity with the party and its platform ●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Ltd

CSO: 4700/692

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

LIBYANS SAID TO BE UNFAVORABLE TO CHADIAN RECONCILIATION

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 21 Jan 82 pp 42-43

[Article by F.K.]

[Text] This past autumn, as Goukouni asked him to do, Qadhafi withdrew his troops. He did so with spectacular and suspicious abruptness, creating a vacuum in the south and center that has been more or less filled by blue-helmeted Africans from the OAU. (In the north, it seems that the Libyans were in less of a hurry to leave: uranium and petroleum exist there far beyond the Aouzou strip that they have held for a long time.)

Coming out of its Sudanese "sanctuaries," Hissein Habre's FAN (Northern Armed Forces) took the city of Albeche along with sizable equipment stores that had strangely been left behind by the Libyans. That left the FAN better equipped than the wavering troops of Weddeye Goukouni's GUNT (Transitional National Union Government)--which is itself divided.

Weariness is currently working in favor of Hissein Habre, whose troops are camped around the city of Ati, halfway to the capital city of Ndjamena, where life has resumed as best it can in the patched-up ruins. He does not want to attack Ati, which is held by the OAU Force's Zairians and Senegalese. Either he will go around the city by establishing trails strong enough to support his fine armor, or he will wait for the "Arab telephone" to have its effect.

The 300,000 inhabitants of Ndjamena are already expecting--some with fear and others with hope--to see him return as triumphant conqueror or as partner in a "patriotic" reconciliation whose future, in Chadian style, would be another story.

Meanwhile, although apparently doomed to get along with each other, the two partners refer to each other in violently categorical and vivid terms. As far as Goukouni is concerned, the leader of the FAN is "a traitor--an enemy of the people--with whom one does not negotiate." For his part, Hissein Habre amiably told L'EXPRESS that Goukouni, "cornered like a mad dog, ought to disappear at the end of a rope."

While awaiting that agreeable prospect, the GUNT's president, hampered by dissensions in his own team and the stagnation of an economy that has scarcely recovered from the latest shocks, is censoring the press, which he had so far left quite free, and knocking 50 percent off the salaries of the civil servants, who are already furious

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

at having received only 6 months' pay last year. With the coffers empty, he cannot satisfy his own people--who are thus tempted to hope for better from the challenger.

Meanwhile, France, which had helped Goukouni with military equipment so he could get rid of the Libyans, is discreetly stepping up its diplomatic activity in the region. In Lagos, President Mitterrand's African adviser, Guy Penne, has discussed the chances of a Chadian compromise with Nigerian President Shemu Shagani, who has already acted as "wise man" in that affair.

More mysterious is the apparent about-face by Sudanese President Numayri. After backing Hissein Habre for months in the name of their common hostility toward Qadhdhafi, he has now reestablished diplomatic relations and air links with Ndjamena and returned the Chadian Embassy in Khartoum--which had been occupied for months by Habre's people--to Goukouni's diplomats. He is giving assurances that he will prohibit the movement through Sudan of arms being sent to Habre and that he will provide Chad with food aid. Is this a sign that U.S. diplomacy, which has a special line to Khartoum as well as to Cairo, is playing Goukouni off against Habre? Or are there ruses making the game even more subtle than that? Everything is possible, especially Sudanese mediation.

The big enigma remains, of course, the discretion of the Libyans. It is hard to imagine them favoring a Chadian reconciliation that would inevitably work against them. It is easier to imagine them waiting until the situation disintegrates enough to make them indispensable again. Unless Qadhdhafi really wants to go on an orgy of virtue with a view to becoming a great man in the OAU and winning the chairmanship of that organization for the Libyans.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 POURQUOI PAS?

11798  
CSO: 4719/523

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

OAU FORCE SAID TO BE PLAYING GAME OF IMPERIALIST INTERESTS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18-31 Jan 82 pp 12-13

[Article by Antonia Blis: "Another Upheaval"]

[Text] By suddenly demanding, on 29 October, the total withdrawal of Libyan troops stationed in Chad, whose help was decisive for ending a 9-month war and routing the dissident forces of Hisssein Habre, the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] obviously took a gamble--only too apparent today--which threatens to plunge the country back into a crisis of unprecedented scope and complexity.

And people are still wondering why the GUNT decided to make such a decision. Did it overestimate the new French Government's intentions and capabilities for providing assistance? Did it reasonably believe the word of Hisssein Habre, even though it is known--his whole course of action confirms this--that, guided by a single ambition, to seize power in Ndjamen, he has successively betrayed all his commitments, all his friends and allies? Finally, did it have too many illusions concerning the real intentions of the OAU, in which the supporters of Goukouni Oueddei's government could be counted on the fingers of one hand 6 months ago, an OAU which proclaimed its support for the GUNT at its latest summit meeting in June in Nairobi under new political circumstances marked by the fall of the Giscardian government in France and which pledged to establish an inter-African force capable of replacing Libyan troops and assuring the defense and security of Chad?

#### Strategic Position

We could also wonder on the basis of what information and analysis of the Chadian situation did France issue a formal appeal to the OAU for the latter to implement its plan and to more or less initiate the process that has been developing since 29 October.

For the time being, there is no getting around the fact that all the elements of a new bloody conflict and a new plot against the revolutionary achievements of the Chadian people are falling into place in Chad, and that in the vacuum created by the departure of Libyan troops, the allied forces of imperialism are surging toward goals which are more than questionable.

News reports from Chad now speak only of rumors of war and the almost regular advance of Hisssein Habre's forces. Thus the seizure of Oum-Hadjer by the FAN [Northern Armed

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Forces] was announced on 23 December, a "strategic position" closing off access to the province of Batha, a vast central region of the Ouaddai, all of whose localities had previously been occupied by Hissein Habre's men.

In early January, it was reported that advancing FAN troops were within a dozen kilometers of Ati, the capital of Batha Province, located about 400 km east of Ndjamen--where about 2,000 troops of the inter-African force are concentrated--while others were moving toward Mongo, in Salamat. The goal of Hissein Habre's forces, comprised of men from Kousseri, in Cameroon, via Sudan, powerfully equipped and supported by Cairo and Khartoum, is clear: to strengthen their positions and to advance toward Ndjamen so that if they cannot take the city and hold it totally, at least they can establish themselves as a force to be reckoned with.

Are we going to find ourselves back in the same situation as in March 1980, on the verge of Ndjamen's second war? That is a reasonable fear. For in the face of the enemy's thrust, the GUNT has only an embryo of an established national army, whose members are equipped with dissimilar weapons and which actually still has to be organized. There are also factions whose combat readiness and motivation are far from identical.

As for the inter-African force, the least that can be said is that, at least until now, it apparently does not disturb the FAN. Its deployment is considered complete, according to the Nigerian commander, Wole Ohunayo, who stated on 4 January that about 5,000 men, 2,000 of them Nigerians, were currently in place in their respective zones of operation.

The main question remains: What good is this force? In accordance with the resolution adopted by the OAU summit of 24-27 June at Nairobi, its composition was to be first approved by the GUNT and its mission was to assure the defense and security of the country until government forces were established.

This point was fully included in the agreement "on the Status of the Pan-African Peacekeeping Force in Chad," which was signed on 28 November 1981--on the eve of the announcement of the demand for Libyan withdrawal--between President Goukouni Oueddei, on one hand, and on the other, the acting OAU chairman, Daniel Arap Moi, the Kenyan chief of state, and the OAU general secretary, Edem Kodjo. This text undoubtedly needed more detailed specifications, as demonstrated by its conflicting interpretations today. But how can the defense and security of a country be assured if not by fighting those who, with assistance from abroad, as in the FAN's case, are striving to rekindle the flame of war and to impede the stabilization process?

Two observations are essential. On one hand, the composition of the inter-African peacekeeping force was not submitted for GUNT's prior approval. On the other hand, and above all, today there is a desire in high OAU circles, whose views are of course supported by those who have sent troops, including Zaire in particular, to assign this force only the mission of legitimate defense ... without specifying against whom.

This interpretation of the nature and role of the inter-African force poorly conceals obvious motivations. President Goukouni was also justified in declaring, several weeks ago, that "if the OAU persists in its interpretation, the outright withdrawal of its force will be demanded."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Not only is the inter-African force of no use in the present situation, but it has also managed to cloud the Chadian issue. And above all, the fact cannot be ignored that its presence plays into the hands of imperialist interests and goals. Thus the Zairian contingent, for example, supplied with arms by the United States, looks like a pawn for Washington's plans to penetrate Africa, in which Chad is a pivotal point.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie

11915

CSO: 4719/511

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHAD

BRIEFS

HABRE ADVANCE DISTURBS MITTERRAND--The advance of Hissein Habre's troops toward Ndjamenena seriously disturbs President Francois Mitterrand, who justifiably fears that his assurances and promises to President Goukouni may not be respected: This was the main reason for the visit of his adviser on African and Malagasy affairs, Guy Penne, to Lagos, the site of the conference of countries which have supplied troops for the inter-African force. In view of the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] president's proposal to demand the withdrawal of the inter-African force if it should continue to remain idle before the continuing advance of Hissein Habre's troops, the French chief of state said that he hoped the OAU force would not become the "protectors" of a man sentenced to death by Ndjamenena, especially since it is no secret to anyone that it was Paris which pushed for sending the inter-African force to Chad. An African diplomat in Ndjamenena remarked: "French diplomacy unfortunately seems to totally disregard the movements of U.S. secret services, which have staked everything on Hissein Habre with the aid of Mobutu, Bongo and Numayri." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18-31 Jan 82 p 17] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie] 11915

CSO: 4719/511

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONGO

EFFECTS OF PETROLEUM OUTPUT ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1091, 2 Dec 81 pp 44-46, 47

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Oil's Hour Has Come"]

[Excerpt] In search of contracts, many businessmen are arriving in Brazzaville where, for the first time since independence, much construction is in evidence.

The airline companies Air Afrique and UTA have had to increase their flights to the Congolese capital. Now there is at least one flight a day between Paris and Brazzaville. Foreign companies that previously completely ignored the Congo's sky are now crawling on all fours in order to get in the door. Around the pool at the Hotel Meridien, French still dominates, but a lot of English, Italian, German, etc. is also heard. The Lebanese, formerly almost nonexistent, are rushing en masse.

The authorities, visibly surprised but also concerned, are trying to stem the tide of these new conquistadores, and are increasing emergency measures. Thus, every foreigner now debarking at Brazzaville is summoned by the state security service, which asks him what he is doing in the Congo and how long he intends to stay.

The change is equally visible in the efforts begun in the area of urbanism. Although nothing, or very little, had been done for many years, now there is a real building boom. Following the kickoff given during the festivities marking Brazzaville's centennial (October 1980), a series of projects is under way. "It's the first time I have seen so many cranes in the sky over the capital," a foreign businessman who has been in the Congo for 15 years told me. All the large firms, trade firms as well as insurance companies and banks, are trying to present the most imposing front possible. The French chain of PLM hotels is building a 500-bed complex, and the oil company Elf-Congo is about to construct a 26-story building; the entire commercial center of Brazzaville is undergoing a complete transformation.

The government has not been left behind; it even intends to be the real motor of what is happening. In an outlying area of the capital, situated halfway between the airport and the city center, Chinese and Soviet technicians work

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

side by side, all the while superbly ignoring each other--an example of peaceful coexistence which should inspire all the African countries. As they have already done in other African capitals, the former are building an imposing people's palace. The latter are constructing a no less imposing edifice destined to house the party's high school.

The Cubans are building social housing. Farther away, along the riverbank, a French company is erecting the official residence of President Denis Sassou Nguesso. Most ministries and administrations are following the fashion of the day. You are being received in a minister's office? A scale model of the building designed to house the ministry in question attracts your attention first of all.

There has been a frenzy of construction, and its repercussions are beginning to be felt in the working class section of Poto-Poto; there has been an impressive wave of businessmen looking for contracts; and there has been a brisk upsurge in activity affecting Brazzaville and, of course, Pointe-Noire, port and economic capital of the country. All of this has a single, identical source: the influx of black gold.

Oil's hour has now come to the Congo. Today it is sure of having in its pocket its admission card into the black gold exporters' club. Back in 1975, Brazzaville's rulers had been told that production, which ran about 2.5 million tons, would double the next year, and that in the near future their country would become a veritable Eldorado! The euphoria was so great that civil servants, whose salaries had been frozen for years and who often went 2 or 3 months without being paid, were immediately given raises.

It was, unfortunately, a short-lived promise! Instead of doubling, oil production declined during the next 3 years, falling to 1.8 million tons in 1977. But since 1978 the trend has definitely been reversed. Following production of 4.5 million tons in 1981, it is thought that with only presently known deposits, the Congo will approach an annual production of 10 million tons by the end of the decade. Or perhaps even more, because predictions are constantly being revised upward.

A wind of optimism is once again blowing over the country. From now on, students' stipends and businessmen's travel expense accounts will be substantially increased, and a significant salary increase has been announced for the beginning of 1982. The government, however, is not limiting itself to blow-by-blow actions. It is completing the draft of a 5-year plan, 1982-1986, which should be adopted by the National Assembly in December, at the same time as a new Investment Code. The state alone, not including the private sector, intends to invest at least 800 billion francs CFA (16 billion French francs) during that time span. Pierre Moussa, a young technocrat of few gestures but with a lively spirit, and the head of this ministry, confided to us that the overall outlines of the plan are based on the reconquest and development of the national land and on the development of infrastructures, especially in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, and energy.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Congolese rulers, concerned about avoiding the mistakes generally made by petroleum-producing countries, have not hesitated to send commissions to certain of these countries in order to study their experiences. They learned a lesson from these observations: the need to develop a large production sector aside from oil. The only way to effectively combat a rural exodus and to keep the farmers in their native areas, the minister of planning told us, is to put modern conveniences, ranging from rural roads to telephone booths, and including dispensaries and ambulances, at their disposal.

This is what, in official language, is termed a "village-center," an institution designed to serve as the basis for agricultural development. The authorities seem determined to invest the bulk of the oil-produced money in these institutions. They are determined to slow, if not to halt, population growth around the Brazzaville-Pointe Noire axis, which already accounts for almost half of the Congolese population. This will be a battle of giants, since it is extremely difficult to eliminate this universal phenomenon.

The same is true for corruption, against which the authorities claim they want to wage an all-out war. In order to do this, they have asked the government in Paris to help them uncover fraud, overbillings, and other dishonest procedures engaged in by French businessmen in collusion with Congolese officials. In another attempt to reduce the risk of error and theft, the Brazzaville government has asked COFACE (French Insurance Company for External Trade) to guarantee only those projects that have obtained the endorsement of the Congolese Ministry of Planning.

Regardless, the easy money of oil is beginning to haunt the populace. Everyone wants his share. Fast, as much as possible, and by any means. Evidence of this was given by a young doctor who was loudly protesting in front of us at the Linacongo (National Airline of the Congo) agency in Brazzaville. He had been taken off a flight to Pointe-Noire without explanation, although he had a ticket marked OK. He saw his place given to a Lebanese businessman who had just greased the palms of the company's agents, a much too frequent practice in administrative and service bureaus. A diplomat who knows the country well told us that as long as you offer a substantial "matabiche," all doors are miraculously open for you.

The Congolese Labor Party (PCT, Marxist-Leninist inspired and the only party) keeps watch. Its most militant officials and members are indefatigably active, in hopes of keeping the effects of bourgeois contamination to a minimum. The slogans spread across the large posters at intersections of the capital's major arteries relay official pronouncements as best they can. The struggle to preserve revolutionary purity is omnipresent and sometimes takes unexpected turns, such as this slogan inscribed in front of Brazzaville's law courts: "Down with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie!" Or this one, prominently displayed in front of the central post office: "Down with envelopes!" A sentence which evidently condemns not envelopes that are for mail, but those containing corruption money. But considering where it was placed, [the slogan] couldn't help but make you smile.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The arrival of black gold has not just given rise to new needs and, along with that, the necessity of earning money at any price. It has also provoked a certain disaffection with political agitation and inflammatory speeches. Theoreticians, doctrinarians, and other guardians of the faith seem to be, if not losing ground, at least on the defensive. A diplomat who lives near a factory said, "Before, I would be awakened in the morning by the speeches that a political representative would give from time to time to the workers assembled in the courtyard. But for some time now, I haven't heard speeches, applause, or slogans repeated in unison."

It's true. It's as if the Congolese are suddenly more aware of profits than of politics. "We remain more faithful than ever to our Marxist-Leninist ideology," Comrade Lekoundzou Ithi Ossetoumba, member of the Political Bureau of the PCT and finance minister, affirmed in a convinced tone which did not invite a reply. "However, we think it is time to worry about worker output. That is why meetings will take place from now after working hours." This concern with efficiency is supported by President Denis Sassou Nguesso's slogan asking party members to be content no longer to be "Red," but to be "both Red and expert, in order to obtain positive results."

As such, oil does not have only bad effects. By instilling a taste for work in the Congolese, it is at the same time offering a Marxist-Leninist regime an indispensable basis for combating underdevelopment. On condition, of course, that it knows how to avoid the pitfalls, excesses, and deviations to which every young revolution is exposed.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.

9720

CSO: 4719/329

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA BISSAU

CAPE VERDE DIALOGUE NEEDED TO IMPROVE COUNTRY'S IMAGE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18 Jan 82 pp 8-9

[Editorial by Simon Malley: "For a Summit Meeting"]

[Text] Could the Guinea-Bissau authorities' freeing of President Luiz Cabral lead to gradual normalization of relations between Bissau and Praia? On the basis of information gleaned from the most reliable sources in Bissau, Praia and Dakar, it seems that present conditions should favor a process of laying foundations for a dialogue that all democratic and progressive African and international powers sincerely desire. AFRIQUE-ASIE unhesitatingly joins in the expression of this desire, and our position has been unambiguous ever since the military takeover of 14 November 1980.

Suffice it to mention certain facts:

(1) The overthrow of President Luiz Cabral has willy-nilly isolated Guinea-Bissau to a very great extent from the progressive states of Africa and the Third World generally. Portuguese-language countries--former Portuguese colonies--and progressive or revolutionary regimes have condemned, rebuked, disavowed or ignored in embarrassed silence the military takeover in Guinea-Bissau. Except for President Joao Bernardo Vieira ("Nino"), all the brains and ringleaders had suspicious ties with reactionary and neocolonialist forces in Portugal and other imperialist powers.

Guinea-Bissau's prestige has been seriously tarnished, as has been shown by some state visits made by the president of the Council of the Revolution to France and the Soviet Union. Is it not significant, for example, that President Nino was not received by President Brezhnev in Moscow and that his discussions were limited to meetings with Boris Ponomarev and a vice-president of the Council, Vassiliy Kuznetsov? Or that his trip to Paris went almost unnoticed, while the Cape Verdian president, Aristides Pereira, was welcomed with such interest that he was received twice in 4 days by President Mitterrand?

(2) Guinea-Bissau patriots are very much aware that threats to the country's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty have sharply increased since the events of 14 November. These threats are both political and economic, and the historical prestige of the PAIGC had resisted them for a long time thanks especially to the active solidarity between the Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verdian peoples, who are united by the same desire for progress and by common objectives.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(3) At the last Bissau congress, the hopes and maneuverings of the most reactionary elements, the ones most closely tied to neocolonialist interests, were blocked. These elements did not succeed in dominating the congress nor in moving into the upper echelons of the party. Rather, several of them were subjected to sharp criticism by grassroots party members for their abuses, corruption and social and political behavior. Thus, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Victor Maria Saude, was violently denounced by many party cadres. The situation is especially revealing of the political atmosphere in the country because the party's intellectual elite remains basically hostile to the coup d'etat.

(4) A threat hangs over President Vieira, and it comes from those who were the true architects of the coup. The president of the Council of the Revolution has refused to give in to their pressure; he has resisted the demands of counterrevolutionaries from FLING [Front for the Struggle for Guinea-Bissau Independence] and UPANG [expansion unknown] who have fought the PAIGC for a long time and who have set impossible conditions for their return to the country; he has been hostile to appointing his Foreign Affairs minister to the post of deputy general secretary of the party and to appointing the present governor of the National Bank to the position of prime minister. All this and much else marks him as a man to be brought down for those who dream of turning Guinea-Bissau into a paradise for Western capitalists--especially the Portuguese. Everybody in Guinea-Bissau knows that getting rid of Nino would leave the doors of Bissau wide open to the Spinozist petty bourgeoisie with their rip-off mentality. If that happened, what would become of the truly revolutionary and patriotic elements in the armed forces, for whom Nino remains a prestigious figure?

(5) The danger of racism spreading in Guinea-Bissau as a result of statements by some Bissau leaders is seriously worrying progressive Africans. Aren't those people becoming emulators of the most vicious colonialists of the Portuguese era when they seek to widen the gap between the Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verdian peoples by setting mixed bloods and blacks against each other? Did not President Kountche of Niger recently warn the chief of the Guinea-Bissau diplomatic corps against the danger of such statements, which African peoples should unhesitatingly reject? What has become of the memorable lessons of the martyr Amilcar Cabral, whom the Bissau leaders claim to be following?

(6) The leaders in Praia have said many times that they favor a dialogue with Bissau at the highest level, as have Presidents Samoral Machel, of Mozambique, and Abdou Diouf, of Senegal; these statements make it possible to be very hopeful for the future, especially since deep concern about Bissau has been expressed in the postponement of the annual meetings of the leaders of the Portuguese-language countries (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe).

Is it not playing into the hands of the real enemies of the Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verdian peoples and of all Africa to keep the quarrel going between the two countries, to continue trading accusations and recriminations and to use newspapers and corrupt journalists to stoke the fire of racial and racist prejudice in order to thwart any hope or possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries?

Victory cannot be claimed by maintaining the fiction of the PAIGC label in Bissau. The only victory that is possible or attainable is the one that Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verdian patriots can win over their domestic and foreign enemies. To win it,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

only one way is possible: dialogue. Dialogue based on the sincere good will of both parties to overcome all the problems caused by the events of 14 November 1980. Dialogue at the highest level, between the two heads of state, as an image of that which had begun and was developing between the two peoples. If the initiatives of Presidents Samora Michel and Abdou Diouf are not acceptable to the Bissau leaders for one reason or another, why not suggest others? The main thing is that Presidents Aristides Pereira and Bernardo Vieira be able to meet in private conversation in order to build new and fruitful relations between the two countries. Despite what may have happened in the last 14 months, the bitterness of some, the disillusionment of others, this conversation is being impatiently looked forward to by all Cape Verdian and Guinea-Bissau patriots worthy of the name and, beyond them, all the democratic powers of the continent.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie

8782

CSO: 4719/519

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACIST REMARKS--Some diplomats posted in Bissau report that the Guinea-Bissau minister of the Interior, Manuel Saturnino da Costa, has taken a Senegalese journalist as a partner in opening a cabaret in Bissau. The journalist already owns a cabaret in the Senegalese capital, which, he says, is intended to "finance" his newspaper. He recently played a part in an incident inflaming race prejudice in Guinea-Bissau by pitting mixed bloods and blacks against each other on the explicit instructions of the Guinea-Bissau minister of the Interior. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18 Jan 82 p 17] 8782

OPPOSITION TO NAGUICAVE SETTLEMENT--What is it? A very ordinary matter: a joint shipping company was formed on 3 September 1977 as part of a Guinea-Bissau-Cape Verde unity project managed by the PAIGC. The project was undertaken at the insistence of Cape Verde and with its financial support. However, following the events of 14 September 1980, economic and trade relations between the two countries were frozen, and Guinea-Bissau obviously wished to impede the operations and management of the company. Cape Verdian stockholders (the government and private parties), who held 52 percent of the stock, decided to call a general meeting in a special session that approved the dissolution of NAGUICAVE [Guinea-Bissau-Cape Verde Navigation Company] with the support of all stockholders, including those of both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Differences arose over the way in which the company was to be liquidated. Guinea-Bissau insisted that the boats be put up for sale on the international market, but the Cape Verdian stockholders felt that this was not in the general interest, especially because their country would be left without a national security fleet, which had been purchased almost completely with Cape Verdian effort and capital. Under these conditions, a majority (52 percent) of the stockholders passed a motion to transfer the company's assets and liabilities to the Cape Verdian government, which would then reimburse the other stockholders for their proportionate shares of the liquid assets. Since all guarantees have been provided for, it is of course understood that Guinea-Bissau will not be put at a disadvantage, as it will be paid on the basis of frozen assets as calculated by a commission of three experts appointed, respectively, by Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and a company or international organization agreed upon by the two governments. The majority decision of the general meeting has been attacked by Bissau, which has appealed to the San Vicente court. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18 Jan 82 p 7] 8782

CSO: 4719/519

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IVORY COAST

ECHOES OF IMPATIENCE WITH ECONOMY, POLITICS HEARD

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1092,9 Dec 81 pp 36-38

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "The Restless Ones Speak Out"]

[Text] In addition to the economic and social crisis, there is the fear of a constitutional vacuum.

The ceremonies marking the 21st anniversary of Ivorian independence (7 December) put the accent on austerity this year. No new infrastructure projects were announced and there was no round of partying in the provincial capital, as was the custom in the past. The official viewing stands which workers had begun setting up in early October all along Abidjan's Boulevard Valery Giscard d'Estaing were dismantled. The ministers who had thought they were supposed to have this work done saw themselves hauled over the coals and described as "insensitive" by an angry head of state.

What is happening, as President Houphouet-Boigny acknowledged before the National Council of the PDCI (Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, which he heads) when it met on 16, 19 and 25 November in Abidjan, is that the country is in the midst of a crisis of "exceptional gravity." The crisis is caused first of all by the impact of a global recession on an economy that is broadly open to the outside. But also, and more important, it was caused by the catastrophic fall in the world market price of cacao, which has led to a decline of something close to Fr CFA 400 billion (Fr 8 billion) in export earnings. The combination of these two developments has brought about an unprecedented state of stagnation. Many businesses are slowing down or are in perilous straits, while others have simply shut down. This stagnation has had especially severe effects on the building trade and public works, two sectors which ever since independence had been a driving force in the extraordinary boom the country experienced.

Among "expatriates" (the Ivory Coast has more of them than any other country south of the Sahara) it is not unusual to meet technicians ready to pack up. They may go to Cameroon, or Gabon, or to Congo to wait for better days. Or perhaps they will resign themselves and go back home. "There is nothing more for us to do here," confided on construction engineer who, during the fat years, had decided to settle down "for good" in the Ivory Coast. Today, he is getting ready to "dispose" of all his assets and real estate and set sail for other parts. "Since there can be no question of my returning to live in France," he further confided, "I will go somewhere else in Africa, but I cannot stay in the Ivory Coast, where everything is falling apart."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Some businessmen are not so pessimistic. While acknowledging current problems, most prefer to curtail their lifestyle and rethink their investment plans rather than clear out. "There is no question we are going through some hard times," averred a French industrialist who has been in the Ivory Coast for some 20 years, "but there is no reason to despair." He goes on to explain that with its impressive road network, its energy infrastructure, its excellent communications and hotel facilities, not to mention the spirit of initiative in the rank and file, the Ivory Coast is certainly not in mortal danger. "Prospects are not grim," he said in conclusion. "The country will recover sooner than people think."

That optimism seems to be shared by the big international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The former announced on 25 November that it was providing the Ivory Coast loans totaling \$166 million. Most of that money will be used to improve economic management, stimulate public investment, and support agricultural prices. It will also facilitate the importation of certain raw materials indispensable to industry, some equipment goods, and spare parts. This latest commitment brings to \$906 million the amount of loans the World Bank has provided the Ivory Coast to help it cope with the crisis it is facing.

In addition to those loans, the IMF last February promised to put \$500 million at the disposal of the Abidjan government. That is impressive proof that the donors still have faith in the country. Some donors are even prepared to approve new loans, members of the Ivorian ruling class suggest. But the authorities themselves are turning down those offers, believing that it would not be wise for the country to incur further indebtedness. They believe the country should not go beyond the current debt ceiling if it wants to continue to enjoy the confidence of the international financial community. True, the experts say the Ivory Coast's petroleum prospects are excellent. People say that by 1983 it will produce enough to cover all of its domestic needs, and that by the end of the decade production will approach 8 million tons, or the equivalent of what Gabon is producing today.

But the black gold miracle has not yet become a reality, and meanwhile the economic crisis is having distressing effects on society. Privately owned industries have reduced their production and in the end thrown a number of workers out on the street, where they join the ranks of those who lost their jobs last year when the state-owned companies were eliminated. Then there are the young people fresh out of university who took poor advice in the beginning and now cannot find work that corresponds to their training. That veritable army of industrial reservists conjures up frightening prospects for the authorities. According to one particularly bleak analysis of the situation given to the PDCI National Council, the secretary general of the UCTCI (General Union of Ivory Coast Workers), Mr Joseph Koffi, estimates the number of jobseekers at close to 80,000!

At the same time, the housewife's budget is being eaten away by galloping inflation of retail prices. In 1 year the price of some staples doubled at the Treichville market, while the cost of premium gasoline is now up around Fr CFA 275 (Fr 5.50) per liter! Under these conditions, the government could not ignore the demands articulated before the National Council by various socio-vocational groups, especially since wage levels have remained the same for 4 years. Various measures, therefore, have just been announced: starting 1 January 1982, civil service

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

salaries will be increased 10 percent. A solidarity fund, to be created out of a systemwide 1-percent deduction from employee salaries, is to be set up in 2 years for the benefit of the most disadvantaged categories.

Ignored for a number of years, doctors will see some improvement in their situation. As for the young people who cannot finish school, they will be guided toward agriculture. The state is going to devote substantial resources to them, both for training and for modernization of the reception, production and communication infrastructure. Will these measures be enough to appease the indignation generated by the sudden deterioration in the standard of living? Will they be enough to dispel the grumbling of the white-collar unemployed? Nothing could be less certain, because the rank and file and the intellectuals as well have another reason--a political one--for being impatient, not to say exasperated: the constitutional vacuum presently facing the Ivory Coast.

By the terms of the reform adopted 25 November 1980, president of the National Assembly will no longer succeed to the presidency in the event the position is vacant. Instead the successor will be the vice president. But no vice president has been named yet, and the delay is feeding all sorts of rumors. "Resign, and stand for election with your vice president-designate," shouted opposition deputy Camille Adam during a speech by 76-year-old President Houphouet-Boigny. "I will name my vice president when the time comes," retorted "the Old Man," not without adding that it is a question on which he continues to reflect, day in and day out. But for the moment, priority must be given to the economic battle, he concluded, because "the vice president will not be the one to get the country out of the crisis." Which is true.

For all that, Mr Camille Adam's interpellation should not be taken lightly. Certainly, this deputy, a brilliant pleader and head of the Ivorian section of Amnesty International, is no stranger to controversy. Along with labor organizer Ngo Blaise, deputy from Bouafle, he had already made a mark for himself in the debate during the first budget session to which the National Assembly was invited. The two men had not hesitated to criticize--in what was seen as an impertinent way--certain projects sponsored by the head of state, including one in his home village of Yamoussoukro.

For once, the statements of the Cassandra of Ivorian politics went beyond isolated concerns. He was in fact the spokesman for all the restless persons who are worried about this constitutional vacuum in which the Ivory Coast is caught. At this point, that includes almost the entire political class, the cadres, youths, and the politicized workers. All of them, whether they admit it or not, are waiting for the head of state to do something that will chase away the dark clouds which might otherwise needlessly begin to amass.

In addition, a number of people, including some of the President's close advisers, sometimes feel that a not insignificant piece of the machinery of state is not in place, especially since the dismissal of Mr Philippe Yace, former secretary general of the PDCI. Since then, President Houphouet-Boigny has not had a right hand to assist him directly in the staggering task of administration and decision-making at the party and state level. There is no one who would even be able to take charge of immediate business if the head of state were to become temporarily disabled.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Given the succession question, the economic crisis, and the social problems, one might say that the Ivory Coast is truly at the crossroads. The entire sociopolitical framework of the country is threatened. It is true that Felix Houphouet-Boigny, having been in the political arena for nearly 40 years, has weathered a number of crises before. And once again he may well land on his feet, despite the problems now facing him. All the same, in Africa it is easier to get into politics than to leave it.

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981

9516  
CSO: 4719/357

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IVORY COAST

STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMY REPORTED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 p 51

[Article by Dr William A. Stoever and Dennis J. Conlon: "Ivory Coast: How to Influence People and Win the Economy War"]

[Text] THE IVORY COAST is one of tropical Africa's new economic success stories. Although the country lacks oil or substantial mineral deposits, its GNP has grown at an average annual rate of 7 per cent since independence in 1960. The country now has the highest income per capita in West Africa, estimated to average \$1,250 in 1979.

The benefits of growth have spread to the lower income groups to a greater extent than in most other African countries. In 1970 it was estimated that the poorest 80 per cent of the population received 43 per cent of the nation's income, whereas in other comparable countries the same segment received 32-36 per cent.

### **Viable base**

In the authors' analysis, two of the important factors contributing to this growth have been the government's decision to concentrate its resources on improving the country's natural exports (mainly tropical agricultural products) and its liberal, free-market economic policies.

The former decision has avoided the establishment of inefficient, small-scale import-substituting industries, while the latter policy has promoted industrialisation through the establishment of a few labour-intensive export-orientated factories.

The country's policies are almost a textbook example of the ways foreign investment can help promote the growth

of a viable and competitive industrial base. Following are some of the ways in which the country has made itself attractive to foreign investment and reaped substantial benefits in the process.

The approach of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny's government, since the country's independence in 1960, to foreign investment has not been marked by the erratic shifts in ideology or application that have characterised some other African countries.

The Investment Code of 1959 has been virtually unchanged up to the present, and its longevity has created a stable and reassuring environment for foreign investors.

### **Cheap labour**

The Ivory Coast's continued close ties to its former colonial ruler France have helped to make the country both politically and economically attractive. Post-independence investment has continued to flow in from France, while during the decade from 1970 to 1980 non-French foreign companies have increased their investment at an even faster rate. The Lome Convention of 1975 allows duty-free entry into the entire E.E.C. for all Ivorian exports.

Like many other West African member countries of the French Communaute, the Ivory Coast uses the CFA franc, whose convertibility is guaranteed by the French treasury. This makes the currency relatively stable and gives investors some assurance that they will be able

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

to repatriate reasonable returns on money they put into the country.

Many foreign companies have found that the combination of a stable economy, access to the large EEC market, and cheap labour enable them to make substantial profits on certain kinds of products. Generally the export products have been tropical agricultural commodities and labour-intensive low-technology manufactures.

The country's emphasis on improving its agricultural base has resulted in rising purchasing power at all levels of the population. This in turn has created a viable market for some locally-produced consumer goods.

**Unrestricted**

The Ivory Coast has allowed comparatively free entry of capital, adequate dividend repatriation, a relatively unrestricted regulatory environment, and comparatively few economic distortions for political purposes. Consequently, foreign as well as domestic entrepreneurs have been free to make profit-maximising decisions unfettered by heavy-handed controls and bureaucratic red tape.

Most foreign companies into the mid-1970's were allowed to hold 100 per cent ownership in their Ivorian subsidiaries if they wished. In 1975 the government announced the objective of "Ivorianization" of capital, but it has moved slowly in requiring companies to take in local partners, and it has paid adequate compensation for the few full or partial divestitures it has forced. In practice it has allowed considerable leeway for negotiation of local ownership requirements.

The government has imposed essentially no restrictions on the level of technology employed by incoming investments. Consequently the majority of foreign investment has been in agricultural processing, textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals and simple household items. These manufactures have created jobs, earned foreign exchange, supplied domestic needs, and helped to expand the country's industrial base●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4700/705

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IVORY COAST

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PETROLEUM PROBLEM EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 pp 3366-68


[Text] The coastal areas on the southern rim of the Gulf of Guinea could prove to be one of the world's seven biggest Saudi-type oilfields still remaining to be exploited, according to the recent study published by the AGIP company. The Ivory Coast, the geographic center and economic magnet of this part of West Africa, could take advantage of the opportunity, if this is the case, to take a decisive step toward expansion. And the petroleum manna could resolve the cash-flow crisis the country is presently experiencing, as well as partially offset the shortfall (several hundred billion CFA francs) in foreign exchange earnings due to the poor price of coffee and cacao on international markets. But caution and discretion seem to be the golden rule of the members of the oil committee,\* all Ivorians except for the chairman, who are kept informed by the oil operators.

President Felix Houphouet-Boigny likes to say--as he did at Yamoussoukro on 13 September at the final signing ceremony for an oil agreement--that in this regard the Ivory Coast is like a panther, the most ferocious beast of the jungle--who "does not roar out his victory cry until he has finished off his prey." The victory proclamations he refers to are nothing other than the claims one hears frequently in Abidjan that a new "Ivorian [economic] miracle" is at hand.

Despite the injunctions to be patient, oil is one of the leading preoccupations of financial and industrial circles in Abidjan. Production from the Belier field began in August 1980, and eight other concessions have been given to oil companies whose exploratory work is at various stages of advancement. Whatever the discoveries may be, the production levels hoped for, and the profits the Ivory Coast hopes to reap from the oil exploration--even if less than a "black gold rush"--the arrival of the oil operators and their expense accounts is already starting to revive economic activity, which has been somewhat sluggish of late.

\* The committee is composed of the secretary general in the Office of the President, the minister of mines, the finance minister, the head of Petroci [Ivorian Petroleum Company], and the head of the Autonomous Sinking Fund, among others.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



The map of oil concessions in the Ivory Coast (above) shows that offshore exploration is now going on all along the coast from Grand-Lahou to the Ghanaian border. The companies involved are American (Phillips, Exxon, Sedco, Union Texas), Italian (AGIP), Anglo-Dutch (Shell) and French (CFP-Total). In addition, the state-owned oil company, Petroci, holds an interest in all the consortia that have been created, but does not systematically help pay the exploration costs.

The most recent exploration agreement, signed at Yamoussoukro on 13 September 1981, covers 730 square kilometers in Section D-1 west of Abidjan. The operator is the AGIP company (31.9 percent of the consortium), which in fact is involved in every prospecting license given out in the Ivory Coast except for the Belier, and is also the operator on the Grand-Lahou concession. (Present concessions in the Ivory Coast cover 22,600 square kilometers, 17,400 of which are offshore).

The French company CFP-Total, according to Mr Jacques Dupouy-Camet, operations director for the group, has only recently shown an interest in oil exploration in the Ivory Coast. From now on, however, Total will be involved in all stages of the production line: exploration, refining and distribution.

Total, which holds 10.1 percent of the shares of SIR (Ivorian Refining Company), has distribution rights to 17.5 percent of the oil marketed in the Ivory Coast. Total has four prospecting permits: Grand-Lahou A-1 (17.5 percent of the consortium), Abidjan D-1 (21.25 percent) and Assinie E-1/M-1 (72.5 percent). The French company is the operator on the latter twin concession (E-1 offshore, 780 square kilometers, and M-1 on onshore, 5,240 square kilometers). During the first half of 1981, Total carried out 3,000 km of seismic sections and was considering starting up some new exploratory drilling late in November 1981. Its total investment in exploration should come to around Fr 200 million in the initial stage.

In reality, only two concessions--Belier and Espoir--have really gone beyond the first stages of exploration.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Belier: Prospects for Limited Expansion

The pumping of oil from the Belier field beginning in August 1980 marked the Ivory Coast's entry into the ranks of oil-producing countries. The prospecting permit on that concession, located off Grand-Bassam 40 km east of Abidjan, was issued in November 1970. Esso Exploration is acting as the operator and leader of a consortium composed of Esso, Shell, and Petroci. The consortium took the name Ivorian Oil Operations Company (SIOP); the shareholders are Esso (63.75 percent), Shell (21.25 percent), and Petroci (15 percent).

The exploratory work and drilling begun in 1970 did not bear fruit until April 1979, when the results obtained justified moving into production. Between 1970 and 1979, seven geophysical studies were made and 8,500 km of seismic sections taken. In addition, 20 exploratory wells totaling 54,800 meters were bored under water varying between 40 and 100 meters in depth. These wells were plumbed from 2,200 to 3,400 meters below the sea bottom.

The oil is carried up to a platform 37 m wide by 61 m long with a total weight of 5,000 tons, which sits on eight 60-m piles. The platform, which was built through a joint venture between ETPM and UIE at a total cost of \$15.5 million, is linked to the land-based installations by a 28-km pipeline that cost 3.4 billion CFA francs.

Within a few months after beginning production in August 1980, Belier reached a production level of 9,000 barrels per day, or a rate of 450,000 tons per year. In all, SIR gets about 1,600 cubic meters of oil with a density equal to 0.845. However, total deliveries in fiscal year 1980-1981 were only 330,000 tons, because there were several unexpected production problems.

Prospects for expansion appear limited. In 1981, production should be 380,000 tons, and it is not likely that the maximum annual production capacity of the installations (15,000 barrels per day, or 750,000 tons per year) will be approached in 1982. While the experts may anticipate growth to an annual production level of 400,000 tons by 1982, Exxon officials like John W. Youd, vice president of the company's Ivorian branch office, are hoping that a program of reinjecting natural gas into producing wells (estimated to cost \$35 million) will result in even greater production increases, at least in later years.

Esso continued its exploratory drilling in 1981 (three wells in the first 6 months, totaling 25,749 drilled feet), but the results of flow tests were disappointing, it appears. The deposit seems to be characterized by a large number of small high-density pockets which cannot sustain a high rate of continuous extraction. This explains some of the dry holes.

Overall investment in the Belier field seems to have totaled 55 billion CFA francs as of the end of 1980, including 22 billion for operations. If the price per barrel paid by SIR to SIOP is indeed \$28, then the annual turnover of 25 billion CFA francs will doubtless make that investment profitable. In October 1981, tests carried out by Schlumberger confirmed the presence of natural gas in sufficient quantities to consider exploiting it at some future time.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Espoir: A Two-Stage Development Strategy

The Espoir field, whose reserves appeared from the very first soundings to be much larger than those of Belier, has whetted imaginations in Abidjan and elsewhere for the last 18 months.

The deposit appears to sit astride two concessions. Concession C-1, situated off Jacquville, 50 km west of Abidjan, is worked by a consortium including Phillips Petroleum (57.5 percent), AGIP (22.5 percent), Sedcc (10 percent), and Petroci (10 percent). This area, covering approximately 1,093 square kilometers, was the subject of a renegotiation of production interests in March 1980 to enable Petroci to increase its share to 60 percent.

Concession AB, south of C-1, is much larger (12,141 square kilometers), and a production-sharing contract providing for variable participation has governed operations since 1975.

The American company Phillips Petroleum drilled some 15 exploratory wells between January 1980 and September 1981. The account of petroleum activities in the Ivory Coast published by the trade magazine PETRO CONSULTANT shows that in the first half of 1981, five wells totaling 54,135 feet were drilled. Out of these five wells, three appear to have found some oil. The first (AB1x) is located 56 km southeast of Abidjan in Section AB, where the water is 400 m deep. The second (AB2x) is 4 km east-southeast of the first (water depth, 485 m), and the third (C1x) is about 5 km northwest of well Alx (water depth, 400 m). Since then, another exploratory well completed in late June 1981 has reportedly tested out at a yield of 17,400 barrels per day. While one must not rely excessively on these data, which provide only indications, it should be noted that Phillips Petroleum's operational plans call for the drilling of 30 exploratory wells, each costing \$12 million, between now and the end of 1983. That is not "small potatoes," noted Howard Cormier, Phillips's chief of drilling operations, in an interview with BUSINESS WEEK in July 1981.

The overall strategy for developing the Espoir field can be outlined as follows:

The first exploratory wells proved the existence of sufficiently large pockets of oil below water of medium depth to justify moving more quickly to the production phase. These, in turn, should produce the cash flows to finance continued exploration off the coast. The reserves discovered in the deepwater areas are reportedly of higher quality than the others, but precisely because of the depths involved, more sophisticated techniques are required both to conduct exploratory testing and to go into production. Thus they will not be exploited until sometime around 1984-1985.

In the initial period, therefore, the "Dan Duke" platform, an auto-elevatrice [translation unknown] installation with a maximum production capacity of 80,000 barrels per day (4 million tons per year) will be brought from Japan, where it was built, to the Ivory Coast, where it will go into operation by the end of 1982. Anchored on a baseline at a depth of 100 m, the "Dan Duke" platform will be connected to four previously drilled wellheads by 22 km of pipeline. This pipeline will be put in position in the second quarter of 1982 by the Apache. That ship, loaned to Phillips by the Santa Fe company and expected to arrive in Abidjan in February 1982, has the equipment to "unreel" the line on board. The oil extracted will be temporarily stored by a tanker moored to the platform and periodically transferred to other tankers.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Initial production, by June 1982, should be around 25,000 barrels per day, and by the end of the year it should reach 50,000 barrels per day, if the second phase of the first stage is completed in the meantime. Production during the second half of 1982 should reach between 700,000 and 1.2 million tons. It remains to be seen whether it will reach between 2.5 and 3.5 million tons by 1984. The existing contracts allow the "Dan Duke" to conduct operations for 3 years, up to July 1985.

During that time, exploration on the high seas will continue, and the technology required to exploit deposits below bodies of deep water is under study right now. CG Doris, a French company, is currently designing a new fixed-platform system based on the principle of a floating concrete "gravitating tower" separated into sealed compartments, with a joint allowing both horizontal and vertical movement, coupled with a Cardan joint to prevent torque.

The gravitating tower project is getting 50 percent of its financing from an EEC subvention and 50 percent from Phillips, Chevron, CFP, and EFC. To date, no off-shore oil operations have ever been done in water deeper than 300 meters. This tower could therefore be used not only at Espoir (360 m) but in the Santa Barbara Channel in the United States and in the Casablanca field in Spain (where Chevron is the operator).

Production possibilities could be considerable: current predictions are 300,000 barrels per day by around 1985-1986. But that estimate reflects only the personal intuition of observers on the scene. The heavy investment planned--900 billion CFA francs between now and the end of the decade--does, however, lend support to these optimistic assessments.

However that may be, and even if future political and financial developments are set aside, before the potential at Espoir can be realistically assessed there remains the necessity of surmounting the technical problem (water depth) and determining whether this field may in fact contain much more natural gas than oil.

Production and Consumption: Uncertain Projections

It is tempting to try to draw up an estimate of oil production and consumption in the Ivory Coast in order to come up with a figure for overall export earnings. According to the data that have been gathered, crude oil production could rise to the following levels: 400,000 tons in 1981; 1.1 to 1.6 million tons in 1982; 2.5 to 3.5 million tons in 1983; and 3 to 4 million tons in 1984.

While these projections are only approximate, it is even more difficult to determine how much crude oil the nation itself will consume. In effect, the Ivory Coast, which has a refinery with a theoretical capacity of 2 million tons, traditionally serves the oil needs of the neighboring countries of Mali and Upper Volta, and in addition it provides fuel oil and diesel oil to foreign ships passing through Abidjan as well as jet fuel to airplanes touching down in Ivory Coast.

In 1980-1981, SIR reportedly refined 1.45 million tons of crude, of which 330,000 tons came from the Belier field and the rest from various other sources (Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia: estimated cost 100 billion [CFA francs]). In addition, 354,000 tons of finished products (butane, premium auto gasoline: 138,000 tons;

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

regular gasoline, kerosene: 90,000 tons; diesel oil: 110,000 tons) were imported. Exports (international, Upper Volta, Mali) during the same period approached 600,000 tons of refined products.

Domestic consumption (all finished products together) during the 1980-1981 fiscal year amounted to 1.03 million tons, or 13 percent below the previous year's level. The consumption decline for 2 years in a row is explained not only by mediocre economic conditions but also, and more importantly, by EECI's (Electrical Energy of the Ivory Coast) gradual substitution of hydro for thermal energy. Since early 1981, hydroelectric powerplants have been providing almost all of the country's electricity, and since July 1981 the thermal powerplant at Vridi, which had consumed 118,000 tons of diesel-380 fuel in 1979-1980 and 62,000 tons in 1980-1981, has almost ceased its activity. The Ivory Coast's hydroelectric potential will soon be further increased by the Soubre dam, on which work is expected to start by the end of 1982 (see the bidder prequalification notice in MTM of 11 December 1981, p 3305).

One of the other important parameters, from the point of view of the Ivorian oil ledger, relates to SIR's production capacity. At Vridi, near the port of Abidjan, SIR has a refinery with a theoretical capacity of 2 million tons which in fact at present handles no more than 1.6 million tons. Petroci--the state-owned company which is the biggest shareholder (30 percent) in SIR--has asked for and obtained a commitment to increase its maximum capacity to 4 million tons. This expansion, whose cost (180 billion CFA francs) is now considerably higher than the original estimates (100 billion) has generated violent controversy in Abidjan, and is now more than a year behind schedule. Hydroskimming is now set to begin in April 1982, and hydrocracking--which should facilitate increased production of diesel oil or jet fuel--is scheduled to begin in August or September 1982. This latter, which requires ultrafine tuning that will be time-consuming to complete, will in all probability not be operational before 1983.

If it stays to its schedule, SIR over the 1981-1982 fiscal year should refine 2.4 million tons of crude oil, including 400,000 tons extracted from Belier. It could then, without more than minimal recourse to import of finished products, cover both Ivorian consumption (1.01 million tons of oil products) and also that of Mali, Upper Volta, and its international market (630,000 tons). Then, with the expected [economic] recovery in late 1982, consumption may well increase by 10 to 15 percent per year.

In order to total up the oil balance-sheets, one would need to know the percent of crude oil from Espoir that will be refined by SIR, assuming that it is of sufficiently high quality. In reality, however, by the terms of the existing production-sharing contracts, Petroci has only a 10-percent interests, and there is apparently nothing to prevent the other members of the consortium from exporting the rest of the production, unless Petroci exercises its right to increase its interest to 60 percent. This is the big unknown with regard to short-term prospects for oil operations. Many international banking institutions, especially in France, are ready to finance Petroci's participation, but they are requiring detailed information on the size of the Espoir reserves. Now the American operators appear to be reluctant to turn over the information demanded. The American banks that helped resolve the Ivory Coast's cash-flow problems this year (Chase Manhattan

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and several others put together a \$275 million Euroloan) are supporting the American operators. The magazine BUSINESS WEEK, in the article cited earlier, emphasized in this regard Washington's very keen interest in African oil.

The French companies have not been able to maintain their initial advantage: the exploratory work conducted by Elf several years ago, a few kilometers from the Espoir field discovered by Phillips, has not yielded anything, and Total--which devotes most of its attention in the Gulf of Guinea to Cameroon--cannot compete with the resources the Americans have committed.

The latter are thus in the strongest negotiating position, since it is unlikely that AGIP--like ENI during the 1960's--will play the role of spoilsport. By November 1981, the Ivory Coast had still not exercised its option on the Espoir field, even though the production schedule becomes firmer day by day. Given these uncertainties, there is as yet no basis on which to assess the financial profit that the country will get out of the oil operations.

However, given the trends shown in the projections sketched out above, the Ivory Coast could probably become a net exporter of petroleum by 1983. One must hope that this will remain only a theoretical possibility, and that the oil earnings will in fact be used to upgrade agriculture and make it the driving force behind the country's expansion, as President Houphouet-Boigny would like. If the discovery of large deposits of natural gas is confirmed, the Ivory Coast will also have to move quickly to adopt a specific policy on exploitation, in order to clear up the current uncertainties on the petroleum scene.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

9516  
CSO: 4719/376

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LESOTHO

DETAILS ON ASSASSINATION SQUAD GIVEN

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 21 Jan 82 p 12, 22 Jan 82 p 11

[2 Part Article by Jasper Mortimer: "This Secret Band of Killers Poses a Threat to Lesotho"]

[21 Jan 82 p 12]

[Text] MASERU — An assassination squad that allegedly killed six Basotho last year remains at liberty.

Named after a Sesotho monster, Koeoko, the squad is blamed for the killing of:

● Odilon Seheri, a prominent educationist and former secretary to King Moshosho II, who was taken from his car on June 12 and later found burnt beyond recognition.

● The grandson of Lesotho Christian Council chairman Ben Masilo in a shooting attack on the Masilo home on September 4 in which Mr Masilo narrowly escaped death.

● Edgar Motuba, the anti-government editor of the largest circulation newspaper in Lesotho, who was abducted from his house on September 7 and

found shot to death a day later.

● Osiel Mohale and Lechese Koeshe, two personal friends of Mr Motuba who were killed with him.

● Michael Ramorotolo, an opposition supporter who was abducted in early September and whose body has never been found.

This hit squad is presumed to be responsible for numerous death threats (some of which were signed "Koeoko") and sent to:

● Vice-chancellor Antony Setsabi of the National University of Lesotho and three of his staff, including the registrar.

● Four senior members of the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC), and second largest church in Lesotho, including Motuba and Masilo and two others who did not want to be named.

The killing of Motuba and the attempt on Masilo's life had international repercussions.

Amnesty International commissioned a Johannesburg advocate to investigate Motuba's murder — the report has not been released yet — and he was a member of the British Commonwealth Press Union. He had a reputation for publishing views of both the ruling Basotho National Party and the opposition Basutoland Congress Party.

The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) sent Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan a message about the abductions of Motuba and Masilo. Masilo fled to South Africa, visited the United States and was last reported to be heading to Kenya to take up a post at the AACC headquarters in Nairobi.

By no means are all the persons

Koeoko has killed or threatened supporters of the Basutoland Congress Party. Some, such as Vice-Chancellor Setsabi, had never supported either party.

But from the language used in the threats — "You are an LLA collaborator" (a reference to BCP's Lesotho Liberation Army) — it seems that Koeoko reserves the right to decide who is "against the Government" (Koeoko's words) or not.

Senior LEC sources have no doubt the Government is behind Koeoko. They believe the Government formed it as a counter to the LLA.

(Churches are quite important in Lesotho politics. Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan is Roman Catholic and his BNP is thought to favour that church, whereas the BCP reportedly draws its members largely from the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LEC).

The Government denies these allegations vehemently. Foreign Minister Mooki Molapo said in a recent interview:

"Masilo and Motuba constituted no threat to the Lesotho Government. Motuba was a critic who used the pen.

"If we were the type of government who kills critics, we would kill other persons such as Godfrey Kolisang and other BCP executives in Maseru as they constitute a threat in that they aspire to be the government."

While there is no evidence linking the Government to the murders, several people — including Mrs Motuba and

Masilo — believe the killers are members of the official Police Mobile Unit (PMU).

The evidence alleged is:

● Armed RMU men came to Motuba's offices twice: the first time they threatened his life and said they did not like his paper; the second time they stayed outside because of a nearby crowd.

● As Masilo ran from his house during the shooting, he saw a "military vehicle" shining its headlights on his home. The vehicle was parked outside a policeman's home.

● Sources close to the Motuba family say a policeman at Morija, the local vil-

lage, told Mrs Motuba that one of the men who abducted her husband was a member of the PMU and that his name had been given to police headquarters in Maseru.

One can only speculate as to Koeoko's identity. It may consist of zealous PMU-men that have taken it upon themselves to retaliate for LLA attacks. It may be the Cabinet does not know what certain extremists in the PMU and BNP are doing.

Despite all the murders and threats, Koeoko is still at large. No arrests have been made.

Yet Koeoko has left clues. For instance death threats are typed rather

than "written" in letters cut from newspapers, and they are posted in Maseru.

If the CID took a sample of typing from every typewriter in the capital (probably only a few hundred), they might well trace the machine used. (Typewriters have individual characteristics, such as the wear on the keys).

Many Basotho regard Koeoko as an ally of the Government, owing to the views expressed in its threats and to its choice of victims. Until the Government turns its denials into arrests, it will continue to be suspected of at least acquiescing in Koeoko's murders. —

(c) Argus Co. 1988.

[22 Jan 82 p 11]

[Text]

MASERU — "Our headboy had just said goodbye," recalls Mrs Matabi Motuba of the last moments she spent with her husband, "but then he came back to say two men were outside."

It was September 7 she, her husband, and their three young children were sitting in the kitchen of their house in Morija, a small town 50 km south of Maseru.

Mr Motuba was proof-reading the last article for that fortnight's edition

of Leselinyana la Lesotho (Light of Lesotho). For the past eight years the paper had been his life.

Its circulation stood at 30 000, more than double its rival, the Roman Catholic weekly Moeletsi oa Basotho (12 000) and far above the government weekly Mochochono (3 000). This was in no small way a tribute to his editorship.

Although the Morija-based Lesotho Evangelical Church published Leselinyana, Motuba confined church affairs to only a quarter of the paper and general news to the rest. He was known

for having the courage to quote from the pamphlets of the outlawed Lesotho Liberation Army as well as from the ruling Basotho National Party.

"At that moment two men walked into the kitchen.

"We are your visitors," the one said. They wore blankets, but underneath Mrs Motuba saw they had short firearms.

"Will you please come outside. We want to talk to you," the man said.

"No," said Mr Motuba, pen in hand. "will you please come in."

"He took them into the lounge and Mrs Motuba went to her bedroom. Moments later her husband told her

the men were police and wanted to take him to Maseru.

"He told me he would ask the men to take him to Morija police station to confirm they were police.

"We went to the kitchen where two friends had arrived. Lechese Koeshe and Osiel Mohale — whose daughter was staying with us. The friends volunteered to accompany Edgar and they all went outside.

"I asked them where they were going with my husband.

"They didn't want to tell me. When Edgar said they must tell me, they said they were police from Maseru and were taking

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

him there and would bring him back.

"I was afraid to ask for their ID cards."

The four men left in Mr Koeshe's car, with Mrs Motuba very worried. She telephoned Morija police station but did not get through.

"I think the telephone was out of order purposefully."

The next morning she went to Morija police station but they knew nothing about the r n. She telephoned Mr Koeshe's office in Maseru, but he had not arrived. She knew that of Edgar was safe Mr Koeshe would have telephoned.

The next day news came: 50 km down the road at a place called Slloe, there were three bodies covered in blood.

She heard her husband and his friends were found lying not far from the road and in so much blood it seemed the killing had been done there.

Who was behind it?

"I don't know," she replied, "but I think it was the Police Mobile Unit. These people have been following my husband since 1978 and in November 1980 two PMU men came to his office and said they wanted the names of the persons who wrote articles for

Leselinyana) under pen-names."

Her husband refused. "They wanted him next time they would 'do their work.'"

"Then they telephoned him on November 28 and told him they would come at 11 am on December 4 and were going to 'do their work.'"

An LEC delegation tried to see Prime Minister Leabua about the threats for the church had also received written warnings to Motuba. The Prime Minister passed the delegation on to Transport Minister Peete Peete.

On the morning of December 4 the LEC delegates met Minister Peete who said he would see that Edgar was protected.

After the delegation left they heard from Morija that the PMU men had arrived and parked outside Edgar's office.

The delegates went back to the Minister who sent some PMU officers to Morija and that night a PMU soldier stayed near Edgar's house. Church sources were sceptical of this protection.

According to Mrs Motuba, the only reason why the two PMU men did not interfere with Edgar was because a mobile bank van had set up shop next to

his office and the size of the crowd deterred them.

Today Mrs Motuba faces the future on her income as an accountant at Morija Girls' High School. She expects a little pension from the church, but overall she says: "I don't see how it is going to be better. "I hope the Lord will help me to get my children educated."

\* \* \*

"It was 11 pm when I was woken up by barking dogs and a loud banging on the door." Ben Masilo writes in his church newspaper, Leselinyana la Lesotho.

The date was September 4, 1981. Although Mr Masilo did not know it, it was the last night he would stay at his home in Qoaling outside Maseru.

"I opened the curtain a little and saw two armed soldiers. After asking them what they wanted, I told them I was Masilo.

"They said: 'Get out, man, we have come to kill you, we've been ordered to.'

"I told them I would not do so and told them to kill me right in my house. At this point my wife lit a lamp and immediately there was merciless shooting.

"After I escaped I saw two military vehicles shining their headlights on my house. One of them was outside the house of a Member of Parliament, Mr Sekantsi, who is my neighbour. His

son is a policeman who lives at his father's home.

"I am writing this so the people of the nation should know who attacked me, contrary to the broadcasts of Radio Lesotho which have tried to play down the attack.

"For a long time my name and other people's names have been published in pamphlets threatening our lives.

"After my return from Europe in June when I found that Odilon Seheri (former secretary to King Moshoeshoe II) had been killed, I was told by a member of the (ruling) Basotho National Party that I should leave the country because I would be murdered and Leselinyana la Lesotho editor Edgar Motuba would follow me.

"My work in the Lesotho Christian Council and Lesotho Evangelical Church made certain people in the Government very bitter.

"When the Prime Minister led a Lesotho delegation to Maputo (recently), one delegate, when he saw what the World Council of Churches was doing there, said to other delegates: 'If Masilo were not a member of the Lesotho Christian Council our country would be getting a lot of aid. A way should be found of getting rid of this guy.'

"I heard this from other members of the delegation.

"Motuba has died but the truth that he died for remains

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

alive and will haunt  
those who murdered  
him forever."

★ ★ ★

Three days after  
the attempted assass-  
sination of Masilo,  
the same hit squad  
allegedly abducted  
Edgar Motuba from  
his home and killed  
him.

Leselinyana la Le-  
sotho is now edited  
by a group of senior  
members of the  
LEC. It continues to  
have the largest cir-  
culation in Lesotho.

Mr Masilo filed  
this report from  
somewhere abroad.  
He is expected to  
take up a post with  
the All African  
Conference of Chan-  
ches in Nairobi.  
for Argus Co. 1982.

COPYRIGHT: Argus Co. 1982

CSO: 4700/667



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALAWI

BRIEFS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES--Malawi's foreign exchange reserves reached their highest level at the end of October: 75 million Malawi kwachas. Reserves are expected to decline to between 40 and 50 million kwachas by the end of the fiscal year (March 1982). The temporary improvement is primarily due to the good yield on tobacco (high prices) and sugar (a larger crop) this year, as well as to the credit line extended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under a Standby Arrangement, and a Structural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank. The IMF credit line to Malawi stands at \$67 million. By the end of October, Malawi had received \$33 million. The goal of the Malawi Reserve Bank is to have foreign exchange reserves on hand to cover 3 months of imports (this year, Malawi's monthly imports were between 20 and 30 million kwachas). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883 11 Dec 81 p 3317] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

CSO: 4719/356

44

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALI

FOOD PRODUCTION, OTHER ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 pp 3343-3346

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Food Goals, Economic Reorganization"]

[Text] The vicissitudes Mali has experienced have for 20 years favored excessive media coverage of them. The level of the gross domestic product per capita, one of the lowest in the world, has contributed to this, without however reflecting the real importance of the traditional self-subsistence sector or the real quality of life in Mali. Given such a context, everything becomes a subject to be dramatized. For example, we read recently that foreign aid, including that from France, provided 80 percent of the budget income, while a glance at the subsidies granted to facilitate budget implementation shows the absurdity of this percentage figure.

Food Products--The Heart of the Problem\*

Quite rightly, it has been claimed that natural calamities have befallen Mali, but it has been too readily assumed that they are inevitable, and that as a result of them, international aid in food was required. Worst of all, doubtless out of peasant caution, the people of Mali themselves have grown accustomed to receiving such aid and to suggesting it, hoping thus to conjure away bad luck. What was not reported, for example, was that the first shipments of grain (40,000 tons) sent to the Tuareg grouping camps in the north during the major drought periods of 1973 came from the provinces of Bougouni and Sikasso, and that inadequacy was much less to blame for the shortage than the poor conditions for handling the aid shipments. In 1979 and 1980, based on a few isolated observations, major French newspapers carried reports of a cotton harvest limited to 30,000 tons of cottonseed, while in fact the volume exceeded 150,000 tons. Closer to us, government estimates in 1981 confirmed by bodies participating in contributing aid to the Sahel revealed a probable grain shortage of 300,000 tons because of the limited rainfall in the planting season. Well-oiled mechanisms were put into operation on this basis in Paris and Brussels to correct the situation in time. Now if Mali has not yet achieved self-sufficiency in food, it nonetheless has a corn harvest this year which is sufficiently abundant to reduce the market price in relation to the official price by two thirds, and sufficient in any case to offset the local shortages which have occurred in the Gao region.

---

\*Concerning "food and income crops," see the article in the 11 December 1981 MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

On the other hand, however, we frequently read in supposedly serious reports that Mali, when it was called the Sudan, was the "millet granary for the AOF [French West Africa] federation." This is to presume somewhat hastily that the supply difficulties there today are the responsibility of the authorities alone. This is only true to the extent that the reserve granaries controlled by the administration represented an effective safeguard against shortage, within the general framework of a subsistence economy, and with much less developed urban populations. But it is false if it is meant thereby that Mali supplied the food needs of other territories, in an era when the marketing of grains was impossible except within a very limited radius, in terms of the tonnage, markets, harvesting, storage and transport means available.

The image-oriented media need to incarnate the poverty in a country, just as Colonel Qadhdhafi personifies the Satanic will to destroy stability for it today. Underlying these reputations there are always some facts, but it is necessary to interpret the form in which they are set forth. Lying across sub-Saharan West Africa, between the 10th and the 13th parallels, from Senegal through Mali, Mossi, the Nigerian emirates, the cotton regions of Chad and Baguirmi, to Ouaddai, there is a zone which until the beginning of this century contained one of the major political organizations and which remains the home of the heaviest population concentrations. Their impoverishment to the benefit of the coastal regions is occurring on both the economic and human levels. Following capital in gold and jewels, it is now the men who are departing: from Mali to Senegal and France, from Upper Volta to the Ivory Coast, from Ouaddai to the Sudanese Djezireh, causing the decline in food production to become a little worse with every passing year. The only regions escaping the rule are those where the development of an income crop, such as cotton in South Mali and Logone and Mayo-Kebbi in Chad provide a means of trade against imports which it would be illusory to seek to eliminate, or even simply to reduce. As to the supplying of food to regions with income crops by those who have none, this is a difficult program to carry out, because declining food production in the latter follows the same rising curve in the former as industrial farm production. The need is never felt there to import even a grain of millet.

The Sahel regions are not doomed to a poverty in contradiction with their history. There are indeed weather or agronomic problems leading to the impoverishment of the soil and likely to accelerate the desperate extension of traditional crops in certain cases. The tragedy lies in the failure to find, in their farm arsenals, something on which to gamble which might play the trade role played elsewhere by cotton or rice. Or more exactly, the inability to market successfully, in the modern sense of the term, the crops which were once the source of their prosperity and which are, in the majority of cases, grains. It is not a question of a definitive situation. The demand for grains in the urban centers, where the population has doubled or tripled in Africa since 1950, offer them broad markets. The technical difficulties of harvesting, storing and shipping the products can henceforth be easily resolved, and in this realm, moreover, given a free economy, the solutions develop of their own accord as soon as sufficient production exists. The most serious obstacle is the low unit value of grains, in comparison to the relatively large number of hours of labor they represent, and the limited enthusiasm for this crop on the part of the peasant, as a result, who thus tends to limit his cultivation to the satisfaction of his family's needs. Only an improvement of yields, as a function of more modern tools and the use of fertilizers, can alter the factors in this problem.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mali-Sud 1 and 2

The two operations in progress in Mali-Sud 1 and that to be launched in 1982 in Mali-Sud 2 are important in a way not limited to the frontiers of Mali, because they were structured on the basis of these factors.\*

The solution adopted to develop the initial financial resources was the introduction of cotton, well-suited to this role. Its unit price (130 Mali francs per kilo) is higher than that of millet, corn or sorghum ( $\pm$  80 Mali francs per kilogram). It is also a food product the cultivation of which fits in perfectly, in a continuous cycle, with the rotation of grain crops benefiting from the delayed effect of chemical fertilizers. It lends itself readily to the use of draft animals, producing an improvement in yields and a reduction in labor time per hectare, the use of manure and of fallow pastureland, and the development of nonnomadic livestock raising.

Financed jointly by the World Bank (IDA [International Development Association]), the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), the Central Fund, the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development], the African Development Fund (ADF) and the government of Mali, Mali-South 1 is a project covering the 1975-1982 period. The estimated cost is 21.9 billion Mali francs, or 45 million dollars, including a loan of 15 million from the IDA.

The results achieved during the 1980-1981 season, the sixth since the operation began, were mediocre where cotton was concerned, in terms of production as well as area under cultivation and achievement of the goals, which were almost reached during the preceding season, and also yields and even the number of operations included. Since the rain came very late, some peasants limited or abandoned their cotton crop rotation. Foreseeing a difficult year for food supply, as did the authorities themselves, they "pushed" corn crops, thinking that they could sell the surplus of self-consumption crops at a remunerative price on the urban market. This hope proved partially in error, because of the abundance of supply, but it bears witness to the administrative responsibility of the producers, and the fact that cotton, which served as the propulsive mechanism at the beginning of this project, in no way enjoys any privilege when grain income reaches or exceeds the level of what it can produce.

For the same reasons, ambarry, after a period of difficulty in 1976 and 1977 because of the low purchase price available to the producer, and which reached a peak in 1979-1980 with 2,100 tons produced in expert-assisted cultivation, dropped again to 1,640 tons in 1980-1981.

Compensation was obtained above all, as we have noted, from corn, since millet and sorghum suffered from the short duration of the rainy season in 1980 and the plant materials themselves which were used were relatively unproductive. With a goal of 21,400 tons, the corn harvest totaled 54,000 tons in 1979-1980. The total for 1980-1981 is not yet known, but it is estimated at 70,000 tons. Even this represents only the production staffed by the Mali Textile Company (CMDT), representing only a portion of the crop growers. In fact, corn, once a simple garden crop, has enjoyed an undeniable popularity because of the average open field yields obtained (2,400 kg per hectare in 1980-1981), which could be increased to 4 or 5 tons on the basis of mass

---

\*They have also been utilized in the AVV [Development of the Volta Valleys] in Upper Volta.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

selection of local plants and seed stock, and further increases would be possible thanks to the new varieties now being tested. This popularity, it is true, may reflect the mediocre sale price this year in 1982. On a national level, the increase in the tonnage marketed for corn, millet and sorghum, taken together, can be estimated at 30,000 tons.

To these figures must be added those for rice, cultivated, within the framework of a program previously financed by the EDF [European Development Fund] and now taken over by the CMDT, on partially developed low-lying land. The (expert-assisted) production came to 8,000 tons, with average yields of 1,300 kg per hectare.

In addition to industrial equipment (three cotton-ginning mills were built), the accompanying social measures are of great importance. Village associations, further training of smiths in the manufacture and repair of farm tools, the training of young farmers and the beginnings of mechanization (50 tractors currently in service) are gradually contributing to the development of a new type of family farming using draft animals, improved seed, chemical and organic fertilizers, with a "nest egg" made up of four or five head of cattle, and an area of seven or eight hectares planted to cotton, sorghum and corn.

On this basis, the Mali-Sud 2 project has brought about moderate development for cotton (180,000 tons of cottonseed in the fifth year), a reduction in ambery cultivation, which no longer seems profitable without subsidies, an increase in millet and sorghum production from 103,000 to 165,000 tons, with an increase in yields from 500 to 1,100 kg per hectare, and an increase in corn from 70,000 to 150,000 tons, with an average yield of 3 tons per hectare. Linked with the continued development of the lowland areas (1,600 to 4,000 hectares), the production of paddy rice should reach 22,000 tons, with yields of 1,800 kg per hectare.

Parallel campaigns have also been pursued with regard to other crops, such as sesame and "niebe", and nonnomadic livestock raising. Staffing and research will be strengthened, social measures will be pursued and extended, with a campaign to drill 400 wells financed by Swiss aid in the Bougouni region, the development of a reforestation area around Sikasso, the gradual extension of mechanization to the 250-tractor level, an extension of the ginning capacity to 190,000 tons. Supplementary operations, finally, are planned to combat onchocerciasis, while the possibility of processing the Bourem phosphates for farm use will be studied.

#### Irrigated Areas

The basic goal of these two programs continues to be to make Mali self-sufficient in food. In 1980, grain still accounted for 3.01 percent of the import total. The effort made in Mali-Sud, like the infrastructure projects making it possible to create new irrigated areas, should make it possible to absorb this remainder speedily and to plan the marketing of a constantly increasing surplus in such neighboring countries as Senegal, Guinea and Liberia, which do not have enough. This would thus, a posteriori, justify the flattering but overstated reputation of the former territory of Sudan, also contributing to a better foreign trade balance.

With this goal in mind, is the development of irrigated areas the best solution? In the zones with sufficient average rainfall (Mali-Sud, Centre-Ouest, Seno-Dogon), the improvements in yields which such areas would make it possible to obtain under certain

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

conditions should be compared with the high cost of carrying out and maintaining this development, the training of farmers in a special technique, and the difficulties caused by the population shifts this generally entails. The history of the Niger Office is but the tail of the interplay of these factors, and still today the amortization of its now longstanding water distribution structure is not sufficient to avoid regular recourse to foreign aid. The FAC contributed 9.6 million French francs in 1981 to what is termed its "renovation." The Central Fund has allocated two loans in the course of the past 2 years totaling 13.2 million French francs for the building of the Coste canal (19 km). This will open up 40,000 hectares for rice cultivation, and will make possible a substantial saving in energy by replacing pumping facilities with the gravity principle. If it is true that rice cultivation cannot be contemplated in Africa without cultivation improvements, the cost of this canal (4.8 billion Mali francs) will nonetheless burden the cost price of paddy rice for a long time yet to come.

It would seem to be less urgent in Mali to develop new areas, even if irrigated, than to mobilize farmers to achieve greater compensation per hectare cultivated on the land already available without investments other than those the cost of which is tolerable thanks to the income from cotton (or any other possible crop, if such is to be found, with comparable advantages).

From this point of view, it can be said that the advantages of the Selingue Dam, which was put into use at the beginning of 1981 with 66 billion Mali francs in financing from foreign aid (France, FRG, Canada, Italy and the Arab nations) have to do mainly with energy. The 11-megawatt power of the turbine currently installed has already doubled the electric current which can be supplied to Bamako. One of its secondary effects will improvement of navigation conditions on the Niger between Koulikoro and Markala. But the profitability of the 55,000 hectares of land the development of which it theoretically makes possible is more problematical. The 9,000 individuals who had to be displaced for the reservoir would not be sufficient to exploit that area, either, presuming they were to agree to the experiment, and supplementary manpower would have to be sought elsewhere. Moreover, the fact that the site has not been cleared, because of the danger of upsetting the oxygen balance in the water, also serves as a hindrance to the development of fishing, which might have alleviated the difficulties in this undertaking.

Even assuming a hydraulic infrastructure serving an industrially equipped sugar complex, as would be the case with the Bankoumana project in the Selingue zone, on which the Technip, with FAC and Central Fund financing, is making a feasibility study, the profitability of developing 3,000 hectares is doubtful.

This approach should doubtless be corrected when it comes to regions in which low average rainfall makes irrigation technology necessary. The Labezanga Dam, to the southeast of Gao, would thus be justified, but it would be reasonable to coordinate its development with that of Kandadji, in Niger, 100 km downstream, which would make it possible to irrigate 100,000 hectares and would provide a supply of 800 gigawatts per hour. The same factors obtain for Dire, where the solar plant should make possible the irrigation of 3,000 hectares. In 1981 the FAC provided a subsidy of 3.4 million French francs for this project. To speak the truth, the cost of these installations should result in their orientation toward crops more remunerative than basic foodstuffs (cotton, early vegetables, fruits), since the organization of domestic marketing of grains is such as to offset the disadvantages there of regional crops destined for export.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## Economic Balances

Eliminating grain imports and replacing them gradually with exports is obviously a current focus for the economy of Mali. However, actions designed to improve the traditional balances--farm diversification and mining research and exploitation--should not be neglected as a result. The 19 percent of the import total for which the oil bill accounts can only lead to hopes for favorable results in the ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] activities in the Gao sector, Macina and Araouana, and those of ESSO and ELF in the Taoudeni basin, even if only with a view to oil production limited to local needs. There are no positive indication as yet to justify any prediction. The search for uranium undertaken by the Japanese Power-Nuclear and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) firm in the Gao sector is reported to be more encouraging.

The mineral resources listed are numerous, but their scattering in the volume of known reserves makes exploitation unlikely. In Kalana, gold extraction, pursued with technical assistance from the Soviets, yields 1.8 tons per year, to which are added 470 kg of silver. This effort will be continued for 3 years. However, the equipment loan of 3 million rubles (246 million French francs) granted by the Russians, repayable in 10 years, deferred for 2, and at 4 percent interest, is not the bargain of the century. Because of the volume and geographic location of the bauxite in Kemeba, to the southwest of Bamako, it is not especially attractive to the large international companies. The deposits of iron and magnetite in Bafing and Bafoulabe are still being studied by the Russians and by the Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office (BRGM), with FAC financing.

We have excluded from this study the public and semipublic industrial sector, conceived on the basis of the irrational approach which prevailed in many African countries after independence was won in the 1960's. The failings in technical and commercial administration subsequently caused the initial inadequacy of the profitability coefficients to deteriorate. Last week we reported the total of the state company debts (p 3279), but an analysis of the demographic, psychological and social consequences of this experiment remains to be undertaken.

It is acknowledged that 20 of these 26 bodies should be eliminated. It is unlikely, however, that the government will take the risk. This aberration would create discontent in the higher ranks of government employees, whose political influence the government had hoped to use with regard to the wage earners in industry and trade and lower-ranking government employees, the final arbiters, along with the students and the military, in crises affecting the regime in Bamako, as in many other Third World capitals.

What is most likely is that once the wage debts have been covered thanks to the French loan, and the popular reaction thereby been offset in part, the authorities will try to encourage private capital contributions to these companies. Where the trade offices are concerned, their role remains limited, to the benefit of the private sector. The Malian Agricultural Products Office (OPAM), which marketed only 6 percent of the millet production and 30 percent of the rice in 1981, but accounts for 50 percent of the Mali Development Bank credit state companies, will be limited to the function of supplying public departments. The Cement Company of Mali (SOCIMA), whose annual production has dropped from 50,000 to 15,000 tons, will be reinforced by German and Saudi loans. The SOCAM (canned foods), in which major errors caused the loss of 75 percent of its production of tomato paste, is only surviving thanks to two loans, totaling 5.6 million French francs, granted by the Central Fund. Only

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the contribution of the FRG, in the amount of 1 billion Mali francs, can save the Bourem phosphate exploitation undertaken by the SONAREM [National Company for Prospecting and Exploitation of Malian Mining Resources]. Parallel to this, a trend toward the private sector is strengthening. The Industrial Shea Company of Mali (SIKA-MALI) has just been established, with a capital of 1 billion Mali francs, 52 percent of it contributed by German and Belgian firms and the balance by Mali merchants. An affiliate of the Central Fund, the PROPARCO, has underwritten 10 percent of the capital of Great Mali Mills, along with the SOMDIAA and a Lebanese enterprise, to establish a food complex in Koulikoro, for which moreover the Central Fund has granted a loan of 15 million French francs.

All in all, it could be said that the financial contributions expected by the government of Mali in connection with its entry into the UMOA [Western African Monetary Union]\* cannot be justified by a desire for reform alone. What is required is a reorganization of the economy, first of all in the primary sector and then in the industrial sector, by cautious but determined chipping away, on both the capital and management levels, at the supposedly irreversible structures established by Mr Modibo Keita. Often ridiculed but nonetheless solid and skillful, Gen Moussa Traore, if he can achieve this goal, will finally have replaced the self-pity which has paralyzed Mali for too long with confidence.

## Agricultural Results for the Mali-Sud 1 Operation 1975-1982

	Goal	1979-80 Achievement	1980-81 Achievement
<b>Cotton</b>			
Area (in hectares)	136,000	118,612	102,362
Production (in tons)	143,400	141,964	102,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	1,062	1,197	1,000
Expert-assisted operations	91, 800	75,661	68,745
<b>Ambary</b>			
Area (in hectares)	46,000	3,401	3,484
Production (in tons)	3,000	2,081	1,640
Yield (kg per hectare)	700	658	471
Expert-assisted operations	7,600	12,252	10,943
<b>Millet-Sorghum</b>			
Area (in hectares)	300,000	118,860	114,338
Yield (kg per hectare)	800		±900
<b>Corn</b>			
Area (in hectares)	14,600	24,271	--
Production (in tons)	21,400	53,396	(70,000)
Yield (kg per hectare)	1,500	2,200	(2,400)
Expert-assisted operations	24,300	23,310	23,321
<b>Rice (developed lowlands)</b>			
Area (in hectares)	4,400	1,358	1,551
Production (in tons)	8,800	3,280	--
Yield (kg per hectare)	2,200	2,400	--
Expert-assisted operations	6,800	1,046	1,111

\*Concerning the matter of Mali's joining the UMOA, see the article in the 11 December 1981 MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, p 3<sup>2</sup>79.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Agricultural Results for the Mali-Sud 1 Operation 1975-1982 (continued)

	Goal	1979-80 Achievement	1980-81 Achievement
Rice (undeveloped lowlands)			
Area (in hectares)	7,200	4,198	3,387
Production (in tons)	6,500	--	--
Yield (kg per hectare)	900	--	--
Expert-assisted operations	2,500	2,100	2,461

Estimates for Mali-Sud 2 Operation 1983-1988

	Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Cotton						
Area (in hectares)	118,000	120,400	122,800	125,200	127,600	130,000
Production (in tons)	142,000	148,000	156,000	164,000	172,000	180,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	1,200	1,230	1,270	1,310	1,348	1,385
Expert-assisted operations	75,000	75,000	76,000	76,600	77,300	78,000
Ambarry						
Area (in hectares)	1,500	1,500	1,000	700	500	200
Production (in tons)	1,000	1,000	666	466	333	130
Yield (kg per hectare)	666	666	666	666	666	666
Expert-assisted operations	6,000	6,000	--	--	--	1,000
Millet-Sorghum						
Surface (in hectares)	115,000	122,000	129,000	136,000	143,000	150,000
Production (in tons)	103,500	112,240	122,550	136,000	150,150	165,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	900	920	950	1,000	1,050	1,100
Corn						
Surface (in hectares)	29,000	33,200	37,250	41,700	46,000	50,000
Production (in tons)	70,000	83,000	98,712	116,760	133,400	150,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	2,300	2,500	2,650	2,800	2,900	3,000
Rice (developed lowlands)						
Surface (in hectares)	1,600	--	--	--	--	4,000
Production (in tons)	4,000	--	--	--	--	14,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	2,500	2,700	2,900	3,100	3,300	3,500
Rice (undeveloped lowlands)						
Surface (in hectares)	4,200	4,800	5,600	6,400	7,200	8,000
Production (in tons)	3,780	4,560	5,300	6,400	7,200	8,000
Yield (kg per hectare)	900	950	950	1,000	1,000	1,000

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Financial Commitment of Aid and Cooperation Fund  
to Mali in 1981

(in millions of French francs)

Rural Sector	
Fruitema Project	1.6
Reorganization of peanut production	5
Mopti II rice operation	1.8
Renovation of the Niger Office	6
Kayes-Nara livestock breeding (water) zone department	2
Dire agricultural area (wheat share)	3.4
Peanuts for confectionary purposes (second section)	1.5
Renovation of the Niger Office (No 2)	3.6
Industries and Mines	
Diamond syndicate	2
Gold syndicate	1.8
Infrastructures	
Telecommunications Department	0.6
Diaba bridge on National Route 6	0.9
Dredging of the Timbuktu canal	0.8
Social Sector	
Public health	3.1
Cultural Sector	
Equipping of the national film- making industry	0.3
Grand Total	34.4

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.

5157  
CSO: 4719/382

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALI

BRIEFS

ALGERIAN AID FOR OIL--A group of Algerian experts will travel to Mali in January to study the implementation of a plan to build up oil reserves in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu with Algerian aid, it was announced on 18 December after a visit to Algeria by a Mali delegation headed by Mahamane Alassane Toure, director of the state-owned company Petrostock. Algiers reports that Alassane Toure's talks with the Algerians dealt with Mali's troubles in securing adequate oil supplies on Mali territory. The seriousness of this problem recently led the Mali government to set up a state-owned firm--Petrostock--in order to carry out a policy of building up security reserves and distributing petroleum products. The trip of the Mali delegation to Algeriers enabled it to present Mali's need for technical assistance with a view to consolidating the young Petrostock company. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS NO 1886, in French 1 Jan 82 p 24] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9855

SOVIET COOPERATION ON GOLD--A delegation led by Robert Tieble N'Daw, Mali's minister of industrial development and tourism, went to the Soviet Union from 9-12 December 1981. The Soviet-Mali talks led to the signing of a new inter-governmental agreement on future economic cooperation between the two countries. The signing of this agreement was the beginning of a new stage in the development of Soviet-Mali economic cooperation, said Mr N'Daw. In accordance with this agreement, Soviet and Mali organizations will cooperate in the exploitation of a gold mine in Kalana. The exploitation of the gold ore deposits in this region should provide an important source of funds needed for national development and for the improvement of the country's financial position. In order to provide the Kalana firm with a permanent supply of electricity, an electricity transmission line 120 kilometers long will be built between Selingue and Kalana with the assistance of the USSR. The implementation of these projects has a special place in Mali's new five-year economic development plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 25] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9855

CSO: 4719/464

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

## SOUTH AFRICA SEEN SUPPORTING NRM DESTABILIZATION CAMPAIGN

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 172, Jan 82 p 24

[Article by David Ward and Martin Plaut]

[Text] THE WRATH of the SADCC ministers was caused by a series of bombings in Mozambique. Immediately before the conference, marker buoys leading to the Mozambican port of Beira were blown up, causing the temporary closure of the port's main harbour. Two weeks earlier road and rail bridges near Beira were destroyed, breaking the crucial transport link to Zimbabwe's border at Umtali.

These events, in the view of the SADCC ministers, are "a direct attack on the growing success of regional transport rehabilitation, and appears to be deliberately related to this meeting".

The bombings were not carried out directly by the South African Defence Force but by the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM). The Mozambican authorities insist that the MRM is strongly supported by Pretoria and is operating as a surrogate sabotage force, a tactic that is already familiar in Angola.

### Don't blame us

Just as Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed Unita is attempting to undermine the Angolan Government, so the MRM is seeking to discredit Frelimo in Mozambique. In both cases the South Africans deny involvement.

Following the recent attacks, a military spokesman in Pretoria commented: "Mozambique should learn to deal with its own problems. If they cannot handle the MRM they should not blame us."

Evidence is mounting, however, that the MRM was created and supported

entirely by the South Africans. In the last 18 months, for example, Frelimo has recorded over 40 South African violations of Mozambican air-space. The main aim of these flights is to drop supplies to the MRM. Frelimo troops have also found quantities of ammunition, used by the MRM, marked in both English and Afrikaans.

The MRM's history lends weight to the Mozambique Government's allegations. The MRM appears to have been formed by the combined involvement of ex-colonial Portugese and remnants of the colonial armed forces.

The MRM began its military activities during the Zimbabwe civil war in the late 1970s. It was given a training base, near Umtali, by the Smith/Muzorewa regime. Broadcasting facilities for a radio station which directed fiercely anti-Frelimo propaganda towards Mozambique were also set up. At the time, the MRM was controlled entirely by the Rhodesian security forces who, themselves, were crucially reliant on South African military assistance.

Following Zimbabwe's independence the entire operation, including the radio station, was moved into South Africa and is now based at Gazankula in the Northern Transvaal close to the Mozambique border. The governments of both Mozambique and Zimbabwe claim to have precise details of the base. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has accused South Africa of training upwards of 5,000 former followers of Bishop Muzorewa alongside the MRM.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

To counteract the problem of the MRM, the Zimbabwe and Mozambique governments have agreed a joint military strategy and both Prime Minister Mugabe and President Samora Machel attended a special summit meeting at Umtali earlier this year in order to devise an anti-MRM strategy. The problem, however, seems to be escalating.

### **Playing havoc**

Since January it is estimated that more than 500 people have been killed in the conflict, including 200 MRM guerrillas and 80 Mozambican soldiers. In particular, the tactics of the MRM are playing havoc with the Frelimo administration's village based strategy. The communal villages in remote rural areas of central Mozambique are favourite guerrilla targets and Zimbabwe is facing a minor refugee crisis as peasants flee from the MRM across the border.

The total number of displaced persons in Zimbabwe is now over 3,000 and increasing at a rate of 25 per day. There is a real danger of the fighting spreading inside Zimbabwe's borders. According to local officials some of the people crossing into Zimbabwe as refugees are MRM guerrillas who take advantage of the free movement across the border. One Zanu-PF MP representing the border area has called for urgent aid. "There is still a war going on and we need the help and protection of the government", he says.

The scale of the MRM's guerrilla operations is achieving exactly the kind of political and economic destabilisation that Pretoria desires. The recent bridge damage is a good example. Although the bombing took place in Mozambique, the greatest impact will be felt in Zimbabwe. At present, 80 per cent of Zimbabwe's trade goes through South African ports but the ports of Beira and Maputo offer the cheapest and shortest routes to the sea.

### **50 per cent cheaper**

Beira for example is estimated to be approximately 50 per cent cheaper than

Durban. The bombings will further delay Zimbabwe's attempts to increase traffic through Mozambique. The explosions also damaged the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline, which has been closed since UDI in 1965 but was scheduled to re-open last December. It now seems likely that the re-opening will be further delayed, forcing Zimbabwe into an extended reliance on South African oil supplies.

The tactic employed by South Africa, through the MRM, is not simply to destroy the Mozambique Government. It is sufficient constantly to harass as many of the Frontline States as possible, making economic development impossible and support for the South African liberation movements an even greater sacrifice. Therefore, it is not surprising that the recent SADCC meeting focussed so clearly on the South African acts of aggression.

Since its formation last year, the SADCC has acted as a first priority to rationalise and improve the regions transport routes. Mozambique is central to this aim since its Indian Ocean ports are the best outlets for its landlocked neighbours, such as Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. The Beira bombings indicate clearly that South Africa is prepared to adopt any tactics to disrupt the SADCC initiative. As the final communique of the SADCC conference aptly commented, South Africa's actions are simply "terrorist destabilisation"●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Ltd

CSO: 4700/692

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MOZAMBIQUE

FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS, ORGANIZATION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3324

[Text] In our edition No 1682 of February 1978, p 325, we published "reliable information on the possibilities of sales" to Mozambique, extracted from the bulletin of the Belgian Foreign Trade Office.

The same source is taking a fresh look at the question, in a different form, both more concise and more complete, for it is studying not only the possibility of sales to Mozambique, but also possibilities of buying in that country, where foreign trade is a state monopoly under the control of "trade centrals."

Exports from Mozambique to foreign countries are handled mainly by the following centrals: Carbomoc (coal); Citrinos de Mocambique (citrus fruits); Mademo (tropical wood); Magma (minerals); Mabor de Mocambique (tires and tubes); Riopelle Texteis (fabric); Companhia Vidreira de Mocambique (hollow and sheet glass).

With regard to imports to Mozambique from other countries, the following system is in force: Each ministry receives an allocation of hard currency for the acquisition of imported products, while the industries that make use of the latter are responsible for scheduling deliveries of supplies. Only after the ministry concerned has approved that plan does the purchasing center call for bids. The call for bids, while notifying the traditional suppliers in each industry, is normally addressed to all potential suppliers without distinction. Other things being equal, preference is given to socialist countries.

Two other conditions are especially important in Mozambique: delivery time requirements, because of the urgency of getting certain activities in operation; and delays in payment because of structural foreign exchange deficit.

Despite the essential role played by the centrals, the foreign supplier is at an advantage if he contracts directly with the user. In such a case, it is recommended that he have the purchasing center verify on the scene the quality of the product imported and its proper utilization.

Here is a list of the principal import centers in Mozambique. It should be understood that some of them are also involved in the export of Mozambican products to other countries:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Enacomo: imports of food and textile products, export of tea, copra, cajou [translation unknown], salt, and other agricultural products; Intermecano: imports of vehicles, agricultural equipment, and spare parts; Interquimica: imports of seeds, fertilizer, chemical products, pesticides, insecticides; Interfranca: tax-free imports; Intermetal/Equitec: imports of industrial equipment and current consumption material; Intermetal/Edime: imports of raw materials, connecting materials, iron, steel, and nonferrous and other metals; Pescom Internacional: exports of crustaceans, imports of deep-frozen fish, canned fish, and fishmeal; Equipesca: importing and distribution of water pumps and irrigation equipment; Dimac: importing and distribution of construction equipment; Eneme: importing and distribution of office equipment, typewriters, computers, calculators, etc.; Medimoc: imports and exports of pharmaceutical products.

COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981

9516  
CSO: 4719/358

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN INFLATION--According to Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), the rate of inflation in Nigeria was 22.7 percent in the first quarter of this year, compared with only 8 percent the first quarter of the previous year, while the rate for 1980 as a whole was only 9.9 percent. If it is difficult to get exact figures on Nigeria's rate of inflation, with the rate varying according to the source (MTM of 22 May 1981, p 1421), one thing nevertheless seems clear: the rate has been particularly high this year. The Central Bank and the FOS both recognize this. According to the Central Bank, the consumer price index in Lagos rose 23.9 percent in a 5-month period, while the price of food products alone rose 33.5 percent in the same period. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3309] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

SHIPS UNDER NIGERIAN FLAG--More information has come to light about Nigeria's intention to open a London office for the registration of ships sailing under its flag (MTM of 13 November, p 2883). A British shipowner, Mr Nicholas Churcher, has in fact reached agreement with the African state for the latter to open such an office in the British capital on 1 January. Only about 100 ships were registered under the Nigerian flag at the beginning of 1980, but Mr Nicholas Churcher believes that figure could reach 3,000, or even more than the number under the Panamanian or the Liberian flag. The scheme would bring Nigeria only 1 million pounds in registration fees per year and would create no jobs in the country, for the shipowners would not be required to hire Nigerian crews. Last May an attorney named Richard Dresner was considering opening a center in London where shipowners could register their ships under the flag of convenience of their choice, but this scheme was abandoned because of opposition from the seamen's union and from a number of deputies in the House of Commons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3309] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

JAPANESE LOAN FOR IRRIGATION--Japan recently awarded Nigeria a loan worth 16.9 million yen (49 million nairas) for construction of the latter's Lower Anambra Irrigation Project. The loan agreement was signed in Tokyo by Mr Victor Masi, Nigeria's finance minister, and Mr T. Hosomi, president of the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. The project, which is part of Nigeria's Green Revolution, should be finished in the next 5 years and lead to annual production of 50,000 tons of rice on an area of 5,000 irrigated hectares. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1883, 11 Dec 81 p 3309] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

CSO: 4719/356



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RWANDA

BRIEFS

1982 BUDGET--The operational budget of the Republic of Rwanda for fiscal year 1982 has been set and balanced at 16.2 Rwanda francs (1.62 million dollars); likewise a development budget of 3.5 billion (35 million dollars). Although receipts have increased by 12 percent, the austerity policy adopted because of limited financial resources will continue, due in particular to the price of coffee in the world markets. Many financing projects are contained in the 1982 budget, in particular the establishment of a national development council (legislative assembly), a program for soil conservation and reforestation, school reform, and the construction of administrative buildings. Rwanda must also face the problems of repayment of its foreign debt and subsidies to government-owned firms. The ministry has planned steps to increase income: an increase in highway tolls, a national lottery, and greater vigilance at customs offices. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1886, in French 1 Jan 82 p 39] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie Paris 1982] 9855

TEA FACTORIES FROM BELGIUM--The Belgian firm Soberi has just signed two new contracts in Rwanda. They are for the delivery of two "ready-to-use" tea factories, one in Pfunda and the other in Gisovu, with a production capacity of 900 tons per year and 1800 tons per year respectively. The total investment involved is 350 million Belgian francs and will be financed by BAD (African Development Bank). These two contracts are added to two tea factories which have already been assembled by Soberi in the same country for the same client. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 39] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9855

CSO: 4719/464

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SENEGAL

BRIEFS

RUMORED NATIONAL UNION--There are persistent rumors circulating in Dakar about a measure which President Abdou Diouf could take in regard to the 1983 parliamentary elections: The chief of state would request the formation of a national union, which would group together other Senegalese political organizations around the Socialist Party. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 257, 18-31 Jan 82 p 17] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie] 11915

CSO: 4719/511

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SOUTH AFRICA

DEATH OF PROMINENT BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER EXAMINED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 p 43

[From the Liberation Fronts: "The Day They Did a 'Biko' on Mxenge"]

[Text]

When Steve Biko died violently while in South African police custody in 1977, he was virtually unknown by SA Whites. Now, five years later, another prominent black civil rights fighter has died violently and White South Africa is trying to hush up the matter. *New African* here pays tribute to yet another brave black activist who was murdered while in custody

GRIFFITH MXENGE'S wife Nonyamezel could not believe what she saw when she went to identify her husband's body at a government mortuary in Durban. His head had been bashed in. His ears had been cut off. His stomach ripped open. His whole body was a map of wounds made by a sharp instrument.

When news of his gruesome death first became known early on the Friday morning, black leaders and the black community at large were numbed with shock and disbelief. Mxenge was no ordinary man.

Yet to the white community his death was passed off as just another "black death". The comment of the news editor of a daily newspaper in Durban typified white ignorance. When told of his death by a reporter, the news editor asked: "Who is Griffith Mxenge?"

The truth is that Mxenge's death is of similar significance to that of Steve Biko. Both were men who had considerable influence in black politics.

Mxenge, 46, was the father of three young children and one of the country's most prominent black lawyers. He knew the suffering, the aspirations and the goals of the disenfranchised Blacks.

### **The cruel world**

He carried out his legal work with his wife Nonyamezel, also an attorney, from offices in the black area of Durban. A former member of the banned African National Congress, Mxenge graduated as a lawyer from the University of Natal in 1975 after being released from Robben Island a few years earlier.

He served three years on the notorious prison island after being found guilty of alleged ANC activities. On his release in the early 1970s he was prohibited from continuing with his law studies because of a banning order.

But when he started his practice he became one of the most sought after political civil rights lawyers in South Africa. He travelled widely to represent political activists throughout the country.

He was initiated into the cruel world of political trials when he was the instructing attorney for the widow of Joseph Mdluli, the ANC member who died while in detention on March 19, 1976. Although he was the Mdluli family lawyer, Griffith Mxenge was detained in

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

March of that year and held without trial for 103 days.

Thereafter he was the instructing attorney in many political trials in the various centres of South Africa, especially Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town, East London and Johannesburg.

He was also the attorney for the family of Mapetla Mohapi, the secretary-general of the banned South African Students' Organisation (SASO), who died while in police custody in Port Elizabeth on July 15, 1976.

Early in 1980 Mxenge represented Chief Sabata Dalindeybo, the paramount chief of the Tembus in the Transkei, who was found guilty of making disparaging statements against Transkei's so-called independence and Chief Kaiser Matanzima. Chief Dalindeybo has now skipped the country and has joined the ANC in exile.

More recently, Mxenge was actively involved in the anti-SAIC campaigns of the Natal Indian Congress Anti-Republic Committee which was established to protest against the 25th anniversary of the white republic. He was also a founder-member of the new black newspaper *Ukusa* started by the banned journalist Marimuthu Subramoney, and of the Release Mandela Committee.

Early last year when about 11 black South Africans were killed in a South African Defence Force raid on ANC houses in Matola in Mozambique, Griffith Mxenge attempted to get their bodies to South Africa. When this failed he made all the arrangements for the families of the dead men to travel to Maputo for the funeral that was addressed by ANC president Oliver Tambo and Mozambique's President Samora Machel.

The president of the Release Mandela Committee, Archie Gumede, said there was no doubt that Griffith Mxenge was a victim of "political assassination". "We are deeply perturbed and shocked," Gumede said, "that a man who contributed so much to the cause of the black people should be so brutally assassinated. They can kill thousands of Mxenges but they will still not kill the black people's quest for liberation."

The vice-president of the Natal Indian Congress, M.J. Naidoo, said that Mxenge would not want the black people to mourn his death but rather continue with the struggle.

"His death has not been in vain. The struggle for which Griffith Mxenge contributed so much will be eventually won by the democratic-loving people of this country," Naidoo said ●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4700/705

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC'S SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY MARKED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 pp 28-29

[Special Report by Abdou Berrada: "The Will to Be Free: ANC's Survival Secret"]

[Text] THE QUESTION of how the African National Congress has survived 70 years of ruthless and methodical repression is one that will occupy future students of South African history for many a long year.

Perhaps those future students will never learn the true secret; only those who have lived through some, at least, of the extraordinary events of those 70 years can have any real appreciation of what they have meant and of the abiding spirit of freedom that has driven men past the point of death in pursuit of their innermost beliefs,

### Onlookers

Maybe the white masters of today should be among the most earnest seekers after that elusive truth. If they were to come anywhere close to it in their researches, they might discover that in 70 years they have not been able to destroy the ANC; instead through political repression, direct assault and all the subversive cunning the apartheid state has brought to bear, the movement has grown and flourished to a national resistance that bears comparison with any of the great freedom movements of history. The white masters might even come to realise that it is their policies that are doomed, not those of the ANC.

To understand the present, let us look at the past. Once armed African resistance to the European settlers was crushed in the last half of the 19th century, and after the British defeated the Boers, the ease with which the Whites were able to patch up their rival-

ries and set up a colonial state to their common advantage confounded the "natives" (as they indeed were). The Africans were reduced to the status of mere onlookers of history unfolding in their own land.

Deep soul-searching on their part led to that historic meeting in Bloemfontein when, on January 8, 1912, eighteen months after the setting up of the Union, the South African Natives' National Congress was born.

The generation of Sol Plaatje and John Dube, elected first Secretary General and President respectively of what was soon to become simply the African National Congress, had in fact understood that lack of unity on the part of the Africans had been the prime reason for their defeat.

It is this lesson, so bitterly learned, which successive leaders of the ANC have had to repeat time and time again in response to various challengers from the left or the right.

In their first deliberations, the conveners of the Bloemfontein meeting agreed that the wars between Xhosas and the Sothos, the Zulus and the Tongas had to be buried for ever.

'The Congress Is Unique Because Its Consciousness Transcends Class Barriers'

This anti-ethnic and anti-tribal stance has characterised the oldest organisation ever since - no mean achievement in a land where the rulers have attempted to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

bend the laws of economy and even history and geography to foster what anywhere else in Africa would be called tribalism.

### Vindicated

Proponents of apartheid must see as one of their greatest failures this total lack of ethnic consciousness on the part of the generations brought up on "Bantu education" and who so readily identify themselves with the ANC. Conversely, the ANC leaders can only observe how vindicated the policy has been by looking at the ravages of tribalism in countries like Angola or Zimbabwe.

But this is not the only meaning of unity as understood by the founders and as handed down to their heirs. The Congress was also unique from the start because of its deliberate recognition that national consciousness transcends class barriers.

This was reflected in the structures of the first constitution with the establishment of two colleges, one for the chiefs and one for the commoners, under a joint leadership. Homogeneity provided by similar education—often in the Christian missions—or in the day-to-day struggle—mostly inside the trade unions in the later stages—soon made any distinction obsolete. But the necessity to unite all social strata in the same strategy remained.

### Instinctive

These two themes inherited from the founding fathers were to be enlarged during the fifties and the sixties into the present day policy of accepting into the ranks of the ANC not only all Africans wishing to overthrow apartheid, but also any citizen, regardless of race or colour, provided he or she accepts to make his or her standpoint that of the most oppressed.

This resolutely anti-racist platform, embodied in what became the historic manifesto of the ANC, the Freedom Charter of 1955, caused the most serious internal crisis the movement has known. It resulted in the creation of the rival Pan African Congress in 1959. It also explained, in large part, the much less important expulsion of the small group known as the African Nationalists in 1976.

However the most potentially dangerous challenge did not come from within. This arose in the late sixties, years after the Verwoerd government banned the ANC and the PAC and all meaningful political expression in South Africa.

Helped by the vacuum created by the imprisonment of leaders like Nelson Mandela, the silencing of Albert Luthuli, banned until his death in 1966, and the departure in exile of so many cadres, the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement was also uniquely served by the charisma and intelligence of a young man who had never known the ANC and who, in death, was to become the symbol of South African martyrdom.

But even the generation of Steve Biko, which so angrily rejected the alliance with "white liberals" never questioned the ANC policy of uniting, under one banner, Africans, Indians and Coloureds. It was in fact under the direct influence of this movement that young Indians and young Coloureds resolutely refused the distinctions imposed by the apartheid laws and adopted instead the term of "black".

This use, now universally accepted, was considered during those early BCM years a label as proudly and as provocatively worn as a red flag in other circumstances.

A third theme is present in the seven decades of the ANC and which accounts for its longevity. It may be termed the cautious nature of a movement which is so steeped in the social fabric that it naturally knows when not to go too far ahead of the people.

The early demands of the representatives of the people may look modest today and the manner with which these were presented to the rulers can make us smile.

But almost throughout its history, the ANC has instinctively known what were the most popular and pressing demands and articulated them in ways that most people would approve. This has been the case for all the great campaigns conducted by the movement, from the refusal of the union to the present armed struggle.

### Resilience

Many critics, mostly from various shades of Marxism, tend to account for this prudence by emphasising the intel-

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

lectual, urban and "petty bourgeois" nature of most ANC leaders.

This explanation, which in fact ignores or pretends to ignore the more complex nature of the movement, fails precisely because it cannot account for its resilience and growth.

How, after its banning in 1961, was the ANC able to survive underground? How, today, despite what may appear as unsurmountable logistical problems, groups of Umkhonto We Sizwe guerrillas can launch spectacular operations and regroup inside the country, can perhaps never be explained fully.

But surely some of the international recognition accorded to the ANC (and many of its internal successes) are due to the men and women who direct it.

These cadres who after the 1976 uprisings have had to cope with taxing new problems like the influx of refugees, many of them children, seem precisely to have made their guiding rule the attachment to the basic principles which had allowed their organisation to survive and to become the inspiration of all the other nationalist movements in Africa●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4700/705

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UPPER VOLTA

ECONOMIC EMPHASIS SAID MISDIRECTED

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 172, Jan 82 p 19

[Article by Guy Arnold: "Zerbo Gets the Wrong Balance"]

[Text] Upper Volta, staggering under mass unemployment and inflation and one of the poorest nations in the world, is concentrating on dubious prestige projects while the majority of the people have empty bellies. *Guy Arnold* reports

IN A CLASSIC case of putting the cart before the horse, Colonel Zerbo's regime seems bent on expensive prestige projects while the country is crying out for agricultural reform and greater employment.

Upper Volta, landlocked in the Sahel belt, is one of the poorest nations in the world with the GNP of less than \$200 per head. The drought of the 1970s took heavy toll of the country's meagre resources. The rising cost of imports pushed inflation to staggering proportions and contributed to the downfall of the Lamizana regime in 1980. Today, although the government has announced a policy of concentrating on the rural sector, it is pursuing major development projects which tend to belie the stated aim.

For example, the government is pressing ahead with work on the Sahel railway extension to the north - 350kms - although so far it has only obtained finances for 100kms. The railway has been criticised as economically unviable but is defended by the regime because of its social as well as its economic value.

**Lack of skills**

Great emphasis upon rural development, therefore, makes sense but the

constraints - whatever policies the government adopts - are formidable. Apart from unemployment and inflation there is almost no surplus capital generated at home. Poor infrastructure and lack of skills means that the country is dependent upon continuing foreign aid.

This in part explains the recent overseas visits by members of the government. These visits, however, have also been part of a search for recognition or 'legitimacy' for the regime. In the first venture out of the country since the coup which brought him to power, Colonel Zerbo visited several West African countries last autumn while Foreign Minister Felix Tientaraboum went to London, New York and the UN.

While in Ghana, last September, Col-links between the two countries. A lake is to be made navigable and warehouses and depots are to be built at Tema to handle Voltan goods. On the same trip, Zerbo visited Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin and Mali.

In London, making a determined bid to show that Upper Volta is not tied only to France, Tientaraboum, outlined his country's economic needs: agriculture and mining both require foreign investment and hopefully; some would be forthcoming from Britain. He also sought increased British trade.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

These overseas visits were also designed to enhance the image of the regime. One line being advanced is that for the time being at least, Upper Volta simply cannot afford inefficient democracy. Whether the regime will be able to demonstrate that military rule, however well intentioned, is more efficient remains to be seen. The government is trying hard to show that it is open in its attitudes and that the majority of the people are united behind its development programme.

The trouble with this image is the developing and potentially explosive row with the trade unions. At the beginning of November, Zerbo banned strikes until further notice. Warnings were issued to the trade unions and especially to Zoumana Traore, the secretary-general of the *Confédération Syndicale Voltaïque*, who had become an outspoken critic of the regime. He was told to curb his criticisms.

Tensions had in any case been growing between the regime and the unions. Colonel Zerbo, however, denies that restrictions upon the unions involve their suppression but clearly there is a deep and apparently growing rift between the two sides.

By the end of November, Traore had disappeared and was being sought by the police. He resigned from the commission which was investigating the Lamizana regime as a protest against the government's ban on strikes.

Colonel Zerbo still insists his decree will remain in force until a social contract governing the right to strike is adopted. A troubled economic background makes this government-union confrontation potentially all the more dangerous to the stability of the country●

COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited

CSO: 4700/689

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY